The British Empire on the Western Front: a Transnational Study of the 62Nd West Riding Division and the Canadian 4Th Division
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University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Graduate Studies The Vault: Electronic Theses and Dissertations 2013-09-24 The British Empire on the Western Front: A Transnational Study of the 62nd West Riding Division and the Canadian 4th Division Jackson, Geoffrey Jackson, G. (2013). The British Empire on the Western Front: A Transnational Study of the 62nd West Riding Division and the Canadian 4th Division (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/28020 http://hdl.handle.net/11023/1036 doctoral thesis University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY The British Empire on the Western Front: A Transnational Study of the 62nd West Riding Division and the Canadian 4th Division By Geoffrey Jackson A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY CENTRE FOR MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES CALGARY, ALBERTA SEPTEMBER 2013 © Geoffrey Jackson 2013 Abstract This dissertation is a detailed transnational comparative analysis focusing on two military units representing notably different societies, though ones steeped in similar military and cultural traditions. This project compared and contrasted training, leadership and battlefield performance of a division from each of the British and Canadian Expeditionary Forces during the First World War. The Canadian division selected was the 4th, formed in April of 1916 from a mix of units already training in England as reserve battalions as well as others sent from Canada. The Canadian 4th Division’s first encounter with the Germans came in the late fall of 1916 on the Somme, and from 1917 until the end of the war it fought continuously with the Canadian Corps in every major operation in which the latter was involved, playing a central role in all of these. The second unit examined was the British 62nd Division, authorized by the War Office in late 1915 to draw upon recruits from northern England. It was part of what was known as the Second Line Territorials. The 62nd Division sailed for France in January 1917, and from the spring onward also fought continuously until the end of the war. The questions underlying this research are twofold: based on the experience of these two infantry divisions, how did the two armies attempt to form effective fighting forces during the war from little more than enthusiastic amateur warriors, and were they successful in doing so. Secondarily, were there significant differences ii in the processes employed and did these differences manifest themselves in battlefield superiority of one Expeditionary Force over the other. In fact the research clearly indicates that both the Canadians and British ultimately were successful in overcoming the daunting challenge that they faced, and that the keys to doing so were installing capable leadership at the most senior levels of command in combination with thorough training based on an appropriate tactical doctrine. Furthermore, while differences certainly existed in approaches and performance, it was the similarities in how the two Expeditionary Forces prepared for and waged war which predominated. In the end these two divisions embraced similar training and battlefield tactics, benefited from like (and capable) styles of command, and underwent a broadly comparable evolution. Most importantly, after an inevitable – but remarkably brief - period of ‘learning’ at the Front, they became consistently effective combat divisions. iii Acknowledgement This dissertation would not have been possible without the assistance of a great many people. It has been my incredible good fortune to have as a supervisor, Dr. Patrick Brennan, whose assistance both on this project and in my academic life as a whole has been exceptional. I would also like to thank my committee members, Dr. Holger Herwig, Dr. Robert Huebert, Dr. Jonathan Vance and Dr. Jörg Denzinger for their insight and suggestions, all of which have markedly improved the quality of this dissertation. Any errors or weaknesses that remain are solely my own. The Centre for Military and Strategic Studies provided a stimulating scholarly environment and generous financial support for my doctoral studies and associated research, for which I am grateful. Finally, the helpfulness of numerous archivists in Canada and abroad, so freely given, must be noted. Above all others, however, I would like to thank my parents for their support and Renée, Madeline and Emilia who have made my life absolutely amazing. iv Dedication To Renée, Thank you for everything v Table of Contents Abstract ....................................................................................................................................... ii Acknowledgement .................................................................................................................. iv Dedication .................................................................................................................................. v Table of Contents .................................................................................................................... vi Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 1 Chapter 1: Raising and Training the Divisions ........................................................... 16 Chapter 2: The 4th Division and 62nd Division enter the line ................................. 42 Chapter 3: The 62nd Division at Bullecourt .................................................................. 82 Chapter 4: The 4th Division’s road to Vimy ................................................................. 118 Chapter 5: The 4th Division in the Fall of 1917 ......................................................... 163 Chapter 6: The 62nd Division and Cambrai ................................................................ 208 Chapter 7: 62nd Division in the spring of 1918 ......................................................... 240 Chapter 8: The 62nd Division and the “Victory Campaign’ .................................... 280 Chapter 9: The 4th Division and the ‘Last Hundred Days’ ...................................... 317 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 368 Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 397 vi Introduction This dissertation examines how the British Empire’s armies managed to create competent fighting divisions relatively quickly during the war. It should be borne in mind that all Dominion, and a great majority of British, divisions were so formed, not from properly trained reservists as in the major continental armies like France and Germany, but from raw, enthusiastic recruits, most having limited or no peacetime military training, and with only a thin cadre of reasonably experienced officers, generally confined to the senior ranks, to provide professional leadership.1 This study comprises a comparative examination of how two of these many divisions, one British (the 62nd West Riding Division) and one Canadian (the 4th Canadian Division), were raised, trained, and fought. Assessing the effectiveness of this division-building process, the dissertation will argue, ultimately needs to be measured by a single criterion – certainly the only one that mattered during the war years – namely how effectively the units performed operationally. As logically compelling as this test may be, how does one go about actually assessing ‘operational effectiveness’ with any measure of reliability, given their inherent subjectivity in the concept? After all, surely an otherwise competent division could fail to achieve the goals given to it if the attack plan was unrealistic. But to assess battlefield ‘effectiveness’ under these terms would be doubly subjective – one would have to first assess the feasibility of the attack plan and then 1 This constitutes a remarkable achievement and certainly was instrumental in the British Empire’s forces’ capacity to play a leading role in the decisive fighting on the Western Front in 1917 and 1918. 1 the ‘success’ with which it was carried out. Instead, the analysis which follows will accept the attack plans as givens. In support of such a claim, one must remember that there was a mounting effort as the war progressed and commanders matured to make battlefield goals more modest, more realistic, and hence more achievable. Unquestionably, this does not mean all plans were achievable, or that adverse conditions of weather or unit exhaustion or operational crisis, to name three, did not intervene to cloud the determination. But taking the battle plan as a given analytically eliminates one level of subjectivity, leaving only the task of assessing how competent the division was in execution – in other words, measuring its performance against the plan. There is subjectivity here, to be sure, but it is considerably reduced. Given the large numbers of engagements examined, and