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George C. Marshall Foundation VOL. 3, NO. 2 THE MAGAZINE OF THE GEORGE C. MARSHALL FOUNDATION P.O.. Booxx 11660000, , L Leexxininggtotonn, V, VAA 2 42454050 “e day I receive the magazine, I sit down with it and read every word.” —Don DeArmon, Frederick, MD INSIDE THI S ISSUE is magazine, in tandem with our Marshall Legacy Series and other initiatives, brings Marshall to life substantially and in a fashion that does justice to the complexities of his Marshall, the Global Commander life, character and career. Marshall, the Global Commander Marshall and his Generals Marshall and WWII Combat Commanders Marshall and the Marshall and the President, 1943 President Marshall Legacy Series Marshall’s Men World War II Myths The Last Word FALL 2017 FALL 2017 Features George C. Marshall: Global Commander 4 By Forrest C. Pogue, Ph.D. General George C. Marshall was the first American general to be truly a global commander. As U.S. Army Chief of Staff, he commanded ground and air forces which at the end of the war in Europe numbered some 8 and 1/3 million men in nine theaters scattered around the world. This article has been excerpted from the Harmon Memorial Lecture delivered by the late Dr. Forrest Pogue, Marshall’s biographer, at the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1968 when he was di - rector of the Marshall Library. George C. Marshall and World War Two 12 Combat Commanders By Stephen R. Taaffe, Ph.D. One of General George C. Marshall’s biggest and most important responsibil - ities as army chief of staff during World War Two was the selection of the army’s high-level combat leaders. These army group, field army, and corps command - ers played a major role in every campaign and battle in which the American army participated, from Guadalcanal in the Pacific to the invasion of Germany in Europe. It is impossible to fully understand these engagements without ex - amining the roles of the men who operated the army’s combat machinery. After all, an army is no better than the officers who command it. Fortunately, Marshall’s ability to identify these men and forge them into such an effective team is additional testimony to his claim as one of the greatest generals in American history. Marshall and the President, 1943 20 y r a r b By Nigel Hamilton, Ph.D. i L h c r a D-Day–Operation Overlord as it was codenamed–was planned to be the e s e R largest amphibious invasion in human history. The selection of its supreme l l a h commander, late in 1943, was therefore of huge and historic importance, as s r a M everyone in military circles was aware. Who should it be? Even Stalin, whose . C e forces would mount an equivalent offensive from the East, became fretful at g r o e the “Big Three” Tehran conference in November, predicting Overlord would fail G : t i d unless the right commander was immediately appointed, in sufficient time to e r c o ensure victory. t o h p FALL 2015 welcome Departments 3 Welcome 28 Marshall Legacy Series • Marshall Myths • World War II Myths • Calendar for the Legacy Series VOL. 3, NO. 2 30 Marshall Shorts MARSHALL is the membership magazine of the • Marshall’s Men George C. Marshall Foundation. We encourage re - • Best New Books production and use of articles contained herein, with permission. Direct correspondence and re - 32 The Last Word quests to the George C. Marshall Foundation, P.O. Box 1600, Lexington, VA 24450. Telephone: 540-463-7103 Website: www.marshallfoundation.org Membership information is available on our web - site. Your membership supports programs and activities during your membership year. By re - newing your membership, you help us perpetu - ate the legacy of the man President Harry Truman called “the great one of the age.” As the keeper of the flame, the Marshall Foundation preserves and communicates the remarkable story of the life and times of George C. Marshall and his contem - poraries. It has become a unique, national treas - ure worth protecting at all costs. That’s why your membership is so important. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from FedEx for underwriting the costs associated with production of this issue. Editor: Rick Drake at Front cover image: Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall was reluc - [email protected] tant to receive medals and honors during World War II. Following the war, however, he received many accolades and decorations, some of which are shown on the front cover. The French Legion of Honour in Contributors: Rob Havers, Rick Drake, the center is surrounded by decorations from Greece, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Stephen R. Taaffe, Nigel Hamilton, Morocco, and the Soviet Union. Kevin Remington, Elaine Ubina, Kelly Nye MARSHALLFOUNDATION.ORG FALL 2017 3 George C. Marshall: Global Commander BY FORREST C. POGUE, PH.D. Clearly, General George C. Marshall was the first American general to be truly a global commander. As [U.S. Army] Chief of Staff, he commanded ground and air forces which at the end of the war in Europe numbered some 8 1/3 million men in nine theaters scattered around the world. At the time of Pearl Harbor, Marshall's only important garrisons outside the General Marshall at the Potsdam continental United States were in the Philippines and Hawaii. A few months Conference in July later, he had troops moving to the Hawaiian Command, now commanded 1945 by airman Lt. Gen. Delos Emmons, for support of operations in the Pacific. Marshall had appointed Gen. Douglas MacArthur as commander of the Southwest Pacific eater and arranged for him to be named as commander of the Australian forces as well. To head Army and Army Air Forces in the South Pacific, he named Gen. “Hap” Arnold's Chief of the Air Staff, Maj. y r Gen. Millard F. Harmon, brother of the distinguished general for whom this series of lectures a r b i L is named. Air units and service troops were also on their way to India, Burma, and China, where h c r a e s Gen. Joseph Stilwell was to command. An air force was also set up in the Middle East. e R l l a h s r a One morning in 1944, General Marshall invited the M . C e No other Chief of Staff in Great Britain g representative of a commander who believed that his r o e G : t theater was being neglected to attend a morning briefing i or the United States carried a heavier d e r c in his office. In accordance with the usual custom, the o t o burden in dealing with legislative bodies, h p officers charged with this duty had placed on the map the pins showing the progress on the different active the Press, state executives, and makers of fronts of the world. At a glance one could see that fight - public opinion ing was raging in Italy, in northwest and southern France, on the Ledo Road, in the air against Germany and the possessions of Japan, or in the widely scattered islands of the Pacific. e Chief of Staff was amused as he saw his visitor's Marshall was the leading figure in developing a growing realization of the many fronts the War Department had to arm and supply. In addition to his normal duties as Army Chief, Marshall had important special responsibilities. global force, in cooperating with the Allied powers, In 1941, he became the only military member of the high policy committee dealing with the is article has been excerpted from the Harmon Memorial Lecture delivered by Dr. Pogue at the U.S. Air in leading the fight for unity of command… Force Academy in 1968 when he was director of the Marshall Library. e full text of the lecture is available on our website. 4 MARSHALLFOUNDATION.ORG FALL 2017 5 atomic bomb project. Later, when implementation of the project was Participants in the Allied Planning placed under Maj. Gen. Leslie Groves, that officer was made directly Conference that responsible to Secretary of War Stimson and to General Marshall. took place at the y r Allied Force Head - a r b i L quarters (AFHQ) in h c r General Marshall served as the executive of the Combined Chiefs a e Algiers in June s e R l l 1943 include ( from a of Staff in giving directives to Gen. Eisenhower while he was Allied h s r left to right ): British a M y . Commander in the Mediterranean and, later, when he became Supreme r C a Foreign Secretary r e b g i r L o Anthony Eden, h e Allied Commander in northwest Europe. He also represented the Joint c G r : a t i e General Alan s d e e r R c Chiefs of Staff in dealing with General MacArthur in the Southwest l l Brooke, Air Chief o a t h o s r h a Marshal Arthur p Pacific and General Joseph Stilwell in the China Burma-India eater. M . C Tedder, Admiral e g r o Andrew Cunning - e G General Marshall : No other Chief of Staff in Great Britain or the United States carried a heavier burden in dealing t i ham, General d e with Chiefs of the r c Harold Alexander, o with legislative bodies, the Press, state executives, and makers of public opinion. In frequent t War Dept. in March o h p General Marshall, 1942: LTG Henry H. appearances on Capitol Hill, he gained votes for appropriations and for huge increases in man - General Dwight Arnold ( seated left ) At the war’s close, the British Chiefs of Staff, Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Admiral of the Eisenhower and and LTG Lesley J.
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