DOCSLIB.ORG

The Dilemma of NATO Strategy, 1949-1968 a Dissertation Presented

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

The Dilemma of NATO Strategy, 1949-1968 A dissertation presented to the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy Robert Thomas Davis II August 2008 © 2008 Robert Thomas Davis II All Rights Reserved ii This dissertation titled The Dilemma of NATO Strategy, 1949-1968 by ROBERT THOMAS DAVIS II has been approved for the Department of History and the College of Arts and Sciences by ______________________________ Peter John Brobst Associate Professor of History ______________________________ Benjamin M. Ogles Dean, College of Arts and Sciences iii Abstract DAVIS, ROBERT THOMAS II, Ph.D., August 2008, History The Dilemma of NATO Strategy, 1949-1968 (422 pp.) Director of Dissertation: Peter John Brobst This study is a reappraisal of the strategic dilemma of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the Cold War. This dilemma revolves around the problem of articulating a strategic concept for a military alliance in the nuclear era. NATO was born of a perceived need to defend Western Europe from a Soviet onslaught. It was an imperative of the early alliance to develop a military strategy and force posture to defend Western Europe should such a war break out. It was not long after the first iteration of strategy took shape than the imperative for a military defense of Europe receded under the looming threat of thermonuclear war. The advent of thermonuclear arsenals in both the United States and Soviet Union brought with it the potential destruction of civilization should war break out. This realization made statesmen on both sides of the Iron Curtain undergo what has been referred to as an ongoing process of nuclear learning. This led to deterrence, rather than defense, being the priority for both the NATO allies and the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact. But fundamental tensions remained, and a need for military strategies seemed to remain. The problem was to then gauge how important conventional forces, tactical nuclear weapons, and strategic nuclear forces were to determine force postures that provided the most effective combination of deterrence and defense. iv The first chapter is an overview of the development of Western defense policy and strategy in the early years of the Cold War. The second chapter looks at the development of NATO down to the important Lisbon conference of 1952, where it briefly seemed NATO might embrace the defense of Europe based on conventional forces. Chapter three addresses the attempts by the British and Americans to assert “new looks” towards NATO strategy in the wake of the blossoming thermonuclear age which resulted in the strategy popularly referred to as massive retaliation. Chapter four discusses the critique of the strategy of massive retaliation which developed in the late 1950s. Chapter five, in turn, studies the problems faced by the Kennedy administration when it tried to advance a strategy known as flexible response as an alternative to massive retaliation. The sixth chapter chronicles the strange resilience of flexible response in the period after Kennedy’s death. Flexible response eventually became NATO’s official strategy late in 1967 and remained so until the end of the Cold War. But its ambiguity, a feature which had marked alliance strategy since the late 1950s, meant that the change in strategy did little to resolve the fundamental dilemma of articulating strategy in the context of the Cold War in Europe. The epilogue discusses how the dilemmas and ambiguities of flexible response played out in the final two decades of the Cold War and how the problem of its interpretation lay at the heart of the ongoing debates over NATO strategy. Approved: Peter John Brobst Associate Professor of History v Acknowledgements As is the nature of any large scale undertaking, I have accumulated a great many debts in the course of completing my dissertation. First, I would like to thank the staffs of the Eisenhower (Abilene, KS), Johnson (Austin, TX), Kennedy (Boston, MA), and Truman (Independence, MO) Presidential Libraries, the US National Archives and Nixon Presidential Materials (College Park, MD), the US Naval Operational Archives (Washington Naval Yard), the British National Archives (Kew, England), the Imperial War Museum (London, England), NATO Archives (Brussels, Belgium), and the Nobel Institute (Oslo, Norway) whose assistance was essential for the completion of my dissertation research. Frances Carter provided a wonderful bit of respite on all my trips to Kew, England. The librarians at the British Museum, Ohio University, the University of Kansas, and the University of Oslo also offered assistance. Dr. Ed Marolda and the rest of the staff at the Naval Historical Center provided a good deal of encouragement when my research (on a somewhat different topic) was getting under way. They were also kind enough to provide a good deal of constructive criticism late in the process when they invited me back to the Washington Naval Yard to present some of my findings. Adam Nordstrom, Brent and Renee Geary, and Ben and Kim Jordan were all kind enough to provide me with lodgings and good company on several of my research visits to Washington, DC. My history career owes much to a number of wonderful teachers and professors over the years. My parents, Norman and Tina Davis, have always encouraged my pursuit of learning. Steve Denny, Dana Engleman, and Gayle Garrelts all did a lot to set me vi down the scholar’s path. At the University of Kansas, I had stimulating courses in history with Professors Anna Cienciala, J.C.D. Clark, Lloyd Sponholtz, Carl Strikwerda, Bill Tsutsui, and Ted Wilson. Professor Rose Greaves, a stimulating mentor to myself and many others through the years, deserves special mention. During my many pleasant years as a graduate student at Ohio University, I enjoyed my association with many people in the Department of History and Contemporary History Institute. I had the good fortune to be associated with a number of fine scholars whose examples have encouraged me over the years. These included Professors Charles Alexander, David Curp, Marvin Fletcher, Bill Frederick, Patrick Griffin, Alonzo Hamby, Jeffery Herf, Joan Hoff, Harold Molineu, Chester Pach, Sholeh Quinn, and Bruce Steiner. My academic career was guided by Professors John Brobst, Norman Goda, Donald Jordan, and Steven Miner. Thanks to the Hamby, Jordan, Miner, and Goda families for helping me feel more at home in Athens, Ohio. Professor Chester Pach has also given considerably of his time to me over the last few years, and has provided an admirable example of rigorous scholarship and service to the department. I would also like to thank Kara Dunfee, who always made my visits to Brown House very pleasant. Kara, Misty Milstead and Sherry Gillogly all deserve thanks for assistance navigating the university bureaucracy over the years. My advisor, John Brobst, has patiently directed this project as it has evolved over the last few years. I deeply appreciate the advice and guidance he has provided. I was fortunate in graduate school to make a number of great friends, many of whom had to listen to all too many hours of my weekly Courtside Pizza/Tony’s stammtisch. The old guard included such worthies as Rachel Ayerst, Jeff and Andrea vii Bloodworth, Tom and Terrie Bruscino, Anna Dzirkalis and JD Wyneken, Ricky Garlitz, Brent and Renee Geary, Steve George, Kassi and Kevin Klinefelter, Ren Lessard, Steve Manfredi, Tina and Nexh Morina, Matt Moss, Amaryah Orenstein, Mark Rice, Seung- Won Song, Steve Tootle, James Uhler, and James and Ophelia Waite. Owing to the considerable duration of my stay in Athens, there was plenty of time for their to be a new guard as well, including John and Deborah Blom, Renee Lafleur, Christian Peterson, John and Anna Peterson, Briana Sauer, Matt Shipton and Elizabeth Lanier-Shipton, and a host of others. JD, Ricky, and John Blom all weathered stints of various time as apartment mates. Tom and I had the good fortune to traipse all over the state of Ohio together in search of book sales. All four were fine companions in academic and other pursuits. Thanks too to all my OU students over the years, who made me realize how rewarding teaching can be, and all the STUF gang for helping me remember that there is more to graduate school than trips to the library. A good deal of my research got under way during a year I spent in Oslo, Norway on a Fulbright scholarship. I owe a large debt of gratitude to Beth Clodfelter at Ohio University who encouraged me and skillfully guided me through the application process. Helge Pharo at the University of Oslo and Rolf Tamnes at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies generously supported my application. Professor Pharo and Professor Geir Lundestad, director of the Norwegian Nobel Institute, and the staff of the Norwegian Atlantic Committee all helped facilitate my research needs during my stay. Hallvard Notaker and Tove Knudsen, both in their own ways, greatly enriched both my year viii abroad and became good friends. And thanks to all my fellow Fulbrighters who helped me make the most of the year. A number of friends and family members helped me edit my often convoluted prose into what follows. Of course, I retain full responsibility for any and all mistakes. My father Norman Davis and bother Stephen Davis read through numerous chapters for me. Ricky Garlitz, Kassi Klinefelter, Becky Miller, and Mark Rice all helped with various drafts of chapters, often on short notice. I also greatly appreciate the perceptive and probing comments of my committee members: Professors Brobst, Goda, Miner, Molineu, and Pach. Terrie Bruscino, who already has her hands full with a wonderful family, kindly agreed to assist in the final formatting of my dissertation.
Recommended publications
  • The Northward Course of the Anthropocene

    The Northward Course of the Anthropocene

    Eric Paglia in a Time of Environmental Crisis and Telecoupling Transformation, Temporality COURSE OF THE ANTHROPOCENE THE NORTHWARD (Continued from front fl ap) the fi elds of environmental history, crisis THE NORTHWARD COURSE management and security studies, political geography, and science and technology studies (STS). The primary areas of empirical OF THE ANTHROPOCENE analysis and theoretical investigation encompass constructivist perspectives and temporal conceptions of environmental and climate crisis; the role of science and expertise in performing politics and shaping Transformation, Temporality social discourse; the geopolitical signifi cance of telecoupling—a concept that refl ects the and Telecoupling in a Time interconnectedness of the Anthropocene and supports stakeholder claims across wide of Environmental Crisis spatial scales; and implications of the recent transformation in humankind’s long duration relationship with the natural world. Several dissertation themes were observed in practice at the international science community of Ny- Ålesund on Svalbard, where global change is made visible through a concentration of scientifi c activity. Ny-Ålesund is furthermore a place of geopolitics, where extra-regional he Arctic—warming at twice the states attempt to enhance their legitimacy as rate of the rest of the planet—is a Arctic stakeholders through the performance of source of striking imagery of amplifi ed scientifi c research undertakings, participation Tenvironmental change in our time, and has in governance institutions, and by establishing come to serve as a spatial setting for climate a physical presence in the Far North. This crisis discourse. The recent alterations in the dissertation concludes that this small and Arctic environment have also been perceived remote community represents an Anthropocene by some observers as an opportunity to expand node of global environmental change, Earth economic exploitation.
  • A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture WILLIAM J

    A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture WILLIAM J

    This chapter will appear in: Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest . Influence and How to Limit it. Edited by Daniel Carpenter and David Moss. Copyright © 2013 The Tobin Project. Reproduced with the permission of Cambridge University Press. Please note that the final chapter from the Cambridge University Press volume may differ slightly from this text. A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture WILLIAM J. NOVAK A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture WILLIAM J. NOVAK PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN SCHOOL OF LAW The idea of regulatory capture has controlled discussions of economic regulation and regulatory reform for more than two generations. Originating soon after World War II, the so-called “capture thesis” was an early harbinger of the more general critique of the American regulatory state that dominated the closing decades of the 20th century. The political ramifications of that broad critique of government continue to be felt today both in the resilient influence of neoliberal policies like deregulation and privatization as well as in the rise of more virulent and populist forms of anti-statism. Indeed, the capture thesis has so pervaded recent assessments of regulation that it has assumed something of the status of a ground norm – a taken-for-granted term of art and an all-purpose social-scientific explanation – that itself frequently escapes critical scrutiny or serious scholarly interrogation. This essay attempts to challenge this state of affairs by taking a critical look at the emergence of regulatory capture theory from the perspective of history. After introducing a brief account of the diverse intellectual roots of the capture idea, this essay makes three interpretive moves.
  • Curriculum Vitae Nancy J

    Curriculum Vitae Nancy J

    +Curriculum Vitae Nancy J. Jacobs Fall 2019 Department of History [email protected] Box N T: 401-863-9342 Brown University F: 401-863-1040 Providence, RI 02912 202 Sharpe House PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS Professor, Department of History, Brown University 2016–present Elected Faculty Fellow, Institute for Environment and Society, Brown University 2014–present Associate Professor, Department of History, Brown University 2003–2016 Associate Professor, Department of Africana Studies, Brown University 2003-2012 Benedict Distinguished Visiting Professor, Department of History, Carleton College Spring 2014 Director of Undergraduate Studies, Department of History, Brown University 2007–2011 Director, International Scholars of the Environment Program, Watson Institute 2008–2009 Assistant Professor, Departments of History and Africana Studies, Brown University 1996–2003 Visiting Assistant Professor, Departments of History, Carleton and St. Olaf Colleges 1995–1996 Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of History, Fort Lewis College 1994–1995 Associate Instructor, Department of History, Indiana University 1992–1993 Intern, Political Section, United States Embassy, Pretoria, South Africa 1986 EDUCATION Ph.D. in History 1995 Indiana University, Bloomington M.A. in African Studies 1987 University of California, Los Angeles B.A. in History and German 1984 Calvin College, Grand Rapids, Michigan PUBLICATIONS Books Birders of Africa: History of a Network. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016. xvi +350 pp. (South African paperback issued by University of Cape Town Press, 2018.) 1 African History through Sources, volume 1: Colonial Contexts and Everyday Experiences, c. 1850–1946. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. xv + 328 pp. Environment, Power and Injustice: A South African History. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. xii +300 pp.

  • Was the Cold War Necessary? the Revisionist Challenge to Consensus History Norman M

    was the cold war necessary? the revisionist challenge to consensus history norman m. wilensky Nearly ten years ago, seventy-five distinguished students of American history participated in a poll measuring the performance of thirty-one presidents from George Washington to Dwight Eisenhower. Each par­ ticipant in the poll helped to place the presidents into five general categories: "Great/' "Near Great," "Average," "Below Average," and "Failure." One of the surprise rankings was the "Near Great" mark accorded to Harry Truman, ninth on the list. Only the five "Great" presidents—Lincoln, Washington, Franklin Roosevelt, Wilson and Jeffer­ son—and three "Near Great" executives—Jackson, Theodore Roosevelt and Polk—preceded Truman. John Adams and Grover Cleveland, who immediately followed Truman, completed the "Near Great" group. What qualities and achievements elevated Truman above many other presidents? He was, according to these historians, a strong executive who acted masterfully and farsightedly in foreign affairs. Summarizing the poll for his fellow historians, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr. noted that Tru­ man "discharged impressively the awesome obligations devolving on the United States as the leader of the free world in the cold war with Soviet Imperialism." The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Berlin airlift, the Point Four program and the intervention in Korea "all con­ stituted landmarks in an assumption of global responsibilities undreamed of only a few years before." Yet, less than a decade after the poll, this estimate is being dramatically challenged by historians of the cold war.1 A recent book sharply critical of cold war policies as well as Truman's role is Rexford G.
  • US Army Was Already Upset About Its Losses from Deep Personnel and White House Photo Via National Archives Budget Cuts When Gen

    US Army Was Already Upset About Its Losses from Deep Personnel and White House Photo Via National Archives Budget Cuts When Gen

    National Park Service photo by Abbie Rowe By John T. Correll US Army was already upset about its losses from deep personnel and White House photo via National Archives budget cuts when Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor arrived as the new Chief of Defense Technical Information Center photo Staff in June 1955. Army strength was down by almost a third since the Korean War and the Army share of the budget was dropping steadily. These reductions were the result of the “New Look” defense program, introduced in 1953 by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, and the “Massive Retaliation” strategy that went with it. New Look was focused on the threat of Soviet military power, putting greater reliance on strategic airpower and nuclear weapons and less emphasis on the kind of wars the Army fought. US planning was based on the standard of general war; the limited conflict in Korea was regarded as an aberration. If for some reason another small or limited war had to be fought, the US armed forces, organized and equipped for general war, would handle it as a “lesser included contingency.” New Look—so called because Eisenhower had ordered a “new fresh survey of our military capabilities”—was driven by the belief that adequate security was possible at lower cost, especially if general purpose forces overseas were thinned out. Another factor was the recognition that NATO could not match the con- ventional forces of the Soviet Union, which had 175 divisions—30 of them in Europe—and 6,000 aircraft based forward. So in 1952, the US and its allies had adopted a strategy centered on a nuclear response to attack.
  • "•"Society Don to Sir Archibald Auldjo Beginning by BETTY BEALE Jamieson

    "•"Society Don to Sir Archibald Auldjo Beginning by BETTY BEALE Jamieson

    THE EVENING STAR, Washington, D. C. B-7 Mrs. Austin Wed MONDAY. ArFIL IS. IBM In London • ••AAA . EXCLUSIVELY Mrs. Margretta Stroup Aus- tin, formerly of Georgetown, IgP YOURS was married Thursday in Lon- "•"Society don to Sir Archibald Auldjo beginning By BETTY BEALE Jamieson. M.C., K.B.E. Sunday, April 22 Lady Jamieson is. Informa- tion and Cultural Affairs Of- Visiting Canadian Navy Gen. Gruenther Tempted ; ficer in the American Embassy in London She is the daugh- on the occasion of our We will Open Olir doors ter of Mrs. Ner Wallace Starts Wave of Parties Press /or Truman Wedding Stroup of Bethesda and the 11,h Anniversary The story of Gen. Alfred women in journalism will stage sister of Dr. Russell Cartwright Canada's newest antisub- ship are sipping cocktails and for Sunday Dinners Gruenther’s resignation from a big to-do that evening at Stroup, pastor of ,the George- marine destroyer nestled into sampling hors d'oeuvres as guests of and Mrs. supreme command of NATO the Muehlebach Hotel which town Presbyterian Church. a Maine avenue pier this Ambassador • forces and also from the will draw Blevins Davis, Perle Heeney, the crew will be oc- . ,/ from 2 until 10 p.m. | , Sir Archibald Is a director morning, leading quite . nat- cupied with shaking the kinks Army begins with the Presi- Mesta, et al. Blevins will j of Robert Fleming. Invest- / urally in this Nation’s Capital their a /// dent’s heart attack last fall. give a reception Sunday after- ment Bankers, and was, until out of legs at USO Since so many of you hove asked heavy in the YWCA.
  • Framing of Islam in the Early Cold War Era of Racialized Empire-Building

    Framing of Islam in the Early Cold War Era of Racialized Empire-Building

    THE LESSER-EVILS PARADIGM FOR IMAGINING ISLAM: U.S. EXECUTIVE BRANCH (RE)FRAMING OF ISLAM IN THE EARLY COLD WAR ERA OF RACIALIZED EMPIRE-BUILDING by Sydney Porter Pasquinelli BA, Wayne State University, 2009 MA, Wake Forest University, 2011 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Kenneth P. Dietrich School of Arts & Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Rhetoric & Communication University of Pittsburgh 2018 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH KENNETH P. DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS & SCIENCES This dissertation was presented by Sydney Porter Pasquinelli It was defended on October 27, 2017 and approved by Paul Elliot Johnson Deepa Kumar John Lyne Shanara Rose Reid-Brinkley Dissertation Director: Gordon Roger Mitchell ii Copyright © by Sydney Porter Pasquinelli 2018 iii THE LESSER-EVILS PARADIGM FOR IMAGINING ISLAM: U.S. EXECUTIVE BRANCH (RE)FRAMING OF ISLAM IN THE EARLY COLD WAR ERA OF RACIALIZED EMPIRE-BUILDING Sydney Porter Pasquinelli, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2018 Rhetorical criticism of declassified United States executive branch intelligence documents produced by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations (1945-1961) illuminates how US agents (re)imagined Islam in this crucial yet understudied era of racialized empire-building. Two case studies help unravel characteristics of this dominant discourse: The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s attempt to delegitimize the Nation of Islam by characterizing its leadership and doctrine as violent, racist, and unorthodox; and the Central Intelligence Agency and State Department’s simultaneous effort to validate Islam and Islamism in the Middle East by positing them as ideological forces against communism and Arab Nationalism. Interactional and interdisciplinary consideration of archived rhetorical artifacts uncovers how motives to expand US empire, quell anti-imperial and anti-racist resistance, and advance early Cold War objectives encouraged executive agents to reframe Islam.
  • Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations

    Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations

    Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Updated November 9, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R41368 SUMMARY R41368 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations November 9, 2020 U.S.-Turkey tensions have raised questions about the future of bilateral relations and have led to congressional action against Turkey, including informal holds on major new Jim Zanotti arms sales (such as upgrades to F-16 aircraft) and efforts to impose sanctions. Specialist in Middle Nevertheless, both countries’ officials emphasize the importance of continued U.S.- Eastern Affairs Turkey cooperation and Turkey’s membership in NATO. Observers voice concerns about the largely authoritarian rule of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Clayton Thomas Turkey’s polarized electorate could affect Erdogan’s future leadership. His biggest Analyst in Middle Eastern challenge may be structural weaknesses in Turkey’s economy—including a sharp Affairs decline in Turkey’s currency—that have worsened since the Coronavirus Disease 2019 pandemic began. The following are key factors in the U.S.-Turkey relationship. Turkey’s strategic orientation and U.S./NATO basing. Traditionally, Turkey has relied closely on the United States and NATO for defense cooperation, European countries for trade and investment, and Russia and Iran for energy imports. A number of complicated situations in Turkey’s surrounding region—including those involving Syria, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh (a region disputed by Armenia and Azerbaijan), and Eastern Mediterranean energy exploration—affect its relationships with the United States and other key actors, as Turkey seeks a more independent role. President Erdogan’s concerns about maintaining his parliamentary coalition with Turkish nationalists may partly explain his actions in some of the situations mentioned above.
  • (June 1941) and the Development of the British Tactical Air Doctrine

    (June 1941) and the Development of the British Tactical Air Doctrine

    Journal of Military and Strategic VOLUME 14, ISSUE 1, FALL 2011 Studies A Stepping Stone to Success: Operation Battleaxe (June 1941) and the Development of the British Tactical Air Doctrine Mike Bechthold On 16 February 1943 a meeting was held in Tripoli attended by senior American and British officers to discuss the various lessons learned during the Libyan campaign. The focus of the meeting was a presentation by General Bernard Montgomery. This "gospel according to Montgomery," as it was referred to by Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder, set out very clearly Monty's beliefs on how air power should be used to support the army.1 Among the tenets Montgomery articulated was his conviction of the importance of air power: "Any officer who aspires to hold high command in war must understand clearly certain principles regarding the use of air power." Montgomery also believed that flexibility was the greatest asset of air power. This allowed it to be applied as a "battle-winning factor of the first importance." As well, he fully endorsed the air force view of centralized control: "Nothing could be more fatal to successful results than to dissipate the air resource into small packets placed under the control of army formation commanders, with each packet working on its own plan. The soldier must not expect, or wish, to exercise direct command over air striking forces." Montgomery concluded his discussion by stating that it was of prime importance for the army and air 1 Arthur Tedder, With Prejudice: The war memoirs of Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder (London: Cassell, 1966), p.
  • John F. Kennedy and Berlin Nicholas Labinski Marquette University

    John F. Kennedy and Berlin Nicholas Labinski Marquette University

    Marquette University e-Publications@Marquette Master's Theses (2009 -) Dissertations, Theses, and Professional Projects Evolution of a President: John F. Kennedy and Berlin Nicholas Labinski Marquette University Recommended Citation Labinski, Nicholas, "Evolution of a President: John F. Kennedy and Berlin" (2011). Master's Theses (2009 -). Paper 104. http://epublications.marquette.edu/theses_open/104 EVOLUTION OF A PRESIDENT: JOHN F. KENNEDYAND BERLIN by Nicholas Labinski A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School, Marquette University, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts Milwaukee, Wisconsin August 2011 ABSTRACT EVOLUTION OF A PRESIDENT: JOHN F. KENNEDYAND BERLIN Nicholas Labinski Marquette University, 2011 This paper examines John F. Kennedy’s rhetoric concerning the Berlin Crisis (1961-1963). Three major speeches are analyzed: Kennedy’s Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis , the Address at Rudolph Wilde Platz and the Address at the Free University. The study interrogates the rhetorical strategies implemented by Kennedy in confronting Khrushchev over the explosive situation in Berlin. The paper attempts to answer the following research questions: What is the historical context that helped frame the rhetorical situation Kennedy faced? What rhetorical strategies and tactics did Kennedy employ in these speeches? How might Kennedy's speeches extend our understanding of presidential public address? What is the impact of Kennedy's speeches on U.S. German relations and the development of U.S. and German Policy? What implications might these speeches have for the study and execution of presidential power and international diplomacy? Using a historical-rhetorical methodology that incorporates the historical circumstances surrounding the crisis into the analysis, this examination of Kennedy’s rhetoric reveals his evolution concerning Berlin and his Cold War strategy.
  • Kazakhstan Missile Chronology

    Kazakhstan Missile Chronology

    Kazakhstan Missile Chronology Last update: May 2010 As of May 2010, this chronology is no longer being updated. For current developments, please see the Kazakhstan Missile Overview. This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here. Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation. 2009-1947 March 2009 On 4 March 2009, Kazakhstan signed a contract to purchase S-300 air defense missile systems from Russia. According to Ministry of Defense officials, Kazakhstan plans to purchase 10 batteries of S-300PS by 2011. Kazakhstan's Air Defense Commander Aleksandr Sorokin mentioned, however, that the 10 batteries would still not be enough to shield all the most vital" facilities designated earlier by a presidential decree. The export version of S- 300PS (NATO designation SA-10C Grumble) has a maximum range of 75 km and can hit targets moving at up to 1200 m/s at a minimum altitude of 25 meters.
  • Kspreaj Vellow-Red Blend

    Kspreaj Vellow-Red Blend

    ** EVENING B-18 THE STAR. Washington, D. C. A District vote WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER IS. ISAS iclared. for Pres- Committee agreed last Monday ident and Vice President ¦ Veterans Urged to Unite would I to work, for the right to vote for Concerted not Change the balance in Con- presidential Drive and vice presidential gress and, consequently, would 1 electors. meet congressional Against Future Wars approval, he Mr. Lee said representatives of For Vote Urged added. both parties and other local United action against future The Israeli veterans’ leader j “I can't imagine opposition organizations wars by veterans of all lands A Board of will meet with the saw service in World War II in Trade committee developing in the District of [Boardj of Trade yesterday asked for committee at was advocated here by an Israeli a special Palestine unit of the a community , Columbia to voting like every- jthe next meeting, tentatively set visitor, himself a veteran of two British Army, first in the Suez effort to get the right to vote body else, for President and for November 19. wars. area and the North African for President and Vice Presi- Vice President,” said Mr. War- ner. an attorney. This Meir Bar Rav Hay, a 36-year- campaign, then in Italy as a dent for the people of Washing-; goal ton. lacks financial and technical jGruenther Reports old lawyer from Haifa, and a special unit in the American sth ! This aim was termed problems inherent m seeking member of the Army “practi- executive board under Gen. Mark Clark. cal politics” by Vinton E.