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Notes 1 At War with Zion 1. David R. Devereaux, The Formulation of British Defence Policy towards the Middle East, 1948–56, London 1990, p. 22. 2. Michael J. Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers, 1945–48, Princeton 1982, pp. 15–16. 3. Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel, Oxford 1976, p. 156. 4. J.C. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, New York 1968, p. 109. For Wingate in Palestine, see Moshe Dayan, Story of My Life, London 1976, pp. 28–30, and Leonard Mosley, Gideon Goes to War, London 1955, pp. 34–78. See also A.J. Sherman, Mandate Days, London 1997, pp. 108–16. The Emergency regulations used by the British to defeat the Arab revolt were to be later used by the Israelis, Naomi Shepherd, Ploughing the Sand: British Rule in Palestine, London 1999, p. 246. 5. Sachar, op. cit., pp. 222–6. 6. Yigal Allon, Shield of David, New York 1970, p. 140. 7. Yehuda Bauer, From Diplomacy to Resistance, Philadelphia 1970, pp. 114–18; Sachar, op. cit., pp. 232–42. 8. For the Revisionist movement, see Lenni Brenner, The Iron Wall, London 1984. 9. For the LEHI, see Y.S. Brenner, ‘The Stern Gang 1940–48’, Middle Eastern Studies, 2 (1) October 1965 and more recently by Joseph Heller, The Stern Gang: Ideology, Politics and Terror 1940–1949, London 1995. 10. Geoffrey J. Morton, Just the Job, London 1957, pp. 137–49; Edward Horne, A Job Well Done, Tiptree 1982, pp. 274–8. 11. Menachem Begin, The Revolt, London 1979, pp. 42–3. 12. J. Bowyer Bell, Terror Out of Zion, Dublin 1977, p. 91. 13. For an account of the assassination of Lord Moyne, see Gerald Frank, The Deed, New York 1963. According to his nephew, Sir Henry Channon, Lord Moyne was ‘the only modern Guinness to play a social or political role . He collected yachts, fish, monkeys and women’, Robert Rhodes James (ed.), Chips: The Diaries of Sir Henry Channon, London 1967, p. 241. 14. Nicholas Bethell, The Palestine Triangle, London 1979, p. 181. 15. Michael J. Cohen, Churchill and the Jews, London 1985, p. 258. 16. Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 201. 17. Tom Segev, One Palestine Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate, London 2000, pp. 471–2. 18. Bowyer Bell, op. cit., pp. 128–34; Eitan Haber, Menahem Begin, New York 1978, pp. 142–3. 19. Begin, op. cit., pp. 133–53. 20. For the Labour Party and Palestine, see Joseph Gorny, The British Labour Movement and Zionism, 1917–1948, London 1983, pp. 164–88. 21. David Horowitz, State in the Making, Westport 1953, pp. 3–4. 195 196 Notes 22. Sacher, op. cit., pp. 245–6. 23. Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, London 1983, pp. 173–81. For Bevin’s anti-Semitism see Peter Weiler, Ernest Bevin, Manchester 1993, p. 170. According to one account, Bevin’s hostility to the Zionists derived from his belief that Ben Gurion and Co. were dangerously left-wing; see W. Roger Louis, ‘British Imperialism and the End of the Palestine Mandate’, from W. Roger Louis and Robert Stookey, The End of the Palestine Mandate, London 1986, p. 24. 24. Gregory Blaxland, The Regiments Depart, London 1971, pp. 32–3. 25. Bowyer Bell, op. cit., pp. 152–3. 26. For discussions of the development of British counterinsurgency and for its weaknesses in Palestine see, Thomas Mockaitis, British Counter-Insurgency, 1919–60, London 1990, Bruce Hoffman, The Failure of British Military Strategy within Palestine, 1939–1947, Tel Aviv 1983 and David Charters, The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945–47, London 1989. 27. See David Charters, ‘British Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign, 1945–47’, Intelligence and National Security, 6 (1) January 1991; Nigel West, The Friends, London 1988, p. 35. 28. R.D. Wilson, Cordon and Search, Aldershot 1949, pp. 75–6. The author was a paratroop officer who served with 6th Airborne in Palestine. 29. Ibid., p. 47. 30. Nigel Riley, One Jump Ahead, London 1984, p. 185. 31. Bethell, op. cit., pp. 233–4. 32. Bullock, op. cit., p. 257. 33. Sacher, op. cit., pp. 263–4; Bethell, op. cit., pp. 237–8. 34. Hugh Thomas, John Strachey, London 1973, p. 229. 35. Bernard Montgomery, Memoirs, London 1958, pp. 387–8. 36. For accounts of the King David Hotel incident, see Thurston Clarke, By Blood and Fire, London 1981, and Bethell, op. cit., pp. 253–67. 37. Bowyer Bell, op. cit., p. 174; Blaxland, op. cit., p. 44. Barker later claimed that his remarks were an ill-considered outburst that did not reflect his considered views, but his correspondence with his Arab lover, Katy Antonius, reveals a vicious anti-Semite: ‘Yes I loathe the lot of them – whether they be Zionists or not. Why should we be afraid of saying we hate them – it’s time this damned race knew what we think of them – loathsome people’, in Segev, op. cit., p. 480. 38. See Joseph Heller, ‘“Neither Masada–Nor Vichy”: Diplomacy and Resistance in Zionist Politics, 1945–1947’, International History Review, 3, 1981. 39. Samuel Katz, Days of Fire, London 1968, p. 110. 40. Hoffman, op. cit., p. 26. For a sympathetic account of Cunningham, see W. Roger Louis, ‘Sir Alan Cunningham and the End of British Rule in Palestine’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth Studies, XVI (2) May 1988. 41. Wilson, op. cit., p. 112. 42. Colin Mitchell, Having Been a Soldier, London 1969, pp. 58–9. 43. Montgomery, op. cit., pp. 428, 429. 44. Roy Farran, Winged Dagger, London 1948, p. 348. 45. Bernard Fergusson, The Trumpet in the Hall, London 1970, pp. 210–40. For discussion of the Farran affair, see Horne, op. cit., pp. 564–6 and David Charters, ‘Special Operations in Counter-Insurgency: The Farran Case, Notes 197 Palestine 1947’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, 124 (2) June 1979. 46. Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers, pp. 242–3. 47. Bowyer Bell, op. cit., pp. 236–8 and Smith, op. cit., p. 76. 48. Ze’ev Venia Hadari, Second Exodus, London 1991, Ruth Gruber, Destination Palestine, New York 1948 and Jon and David Kimche, The Secret Roads, London 1955. And most recently Aviva Halamish, The Exodus Affair: Holocaust Survivors and the Struggle for Palestine, London 1998. 49. Ritchie Ovendale, Britain, the United States and the End of the Palestine Mandate, 1942–1948, Woodbridge 1989, pp. 210, 217. 50. For the fate of the Arabs at Zionist hands, see Simha Flapan, The Birth of Israel, New York 1987, Michael Palumbo, The Palestinian Catastrophe, London 1987 and Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, Cambridge 1988. See also Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist–Arab Conflict 1881–1999, London 2000. 2 The Running Dog War: Malaya 1. Robert Thompson, ‘Foreword’ to Richard Clutterbuck, The Long Long War, London 1966, p. VIII. Major General Clutterbuck, himself a veteran of the Malayan Emergency, was another prominent advocate of the British ‘model’ for counterinsurgency operations and this book was written with the explicit intention of offering lessons for the Americans in Vietnam. For an interesting comparative discussion of Malaya and Vietnam see Robert Tilman, ‘The Non-Lessons of the Malayan Emergency’, Asian Survey 6 (8), 1966. 2. For Thompson and Vietnam see ‘Robert Thompson and the British Advisory Mission to South Vietnam 1961–1965’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 8 (3), Winter 1997. 3. J.J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare, London 1966, p. 320. McCuen thanks the then Colonel Clutterbuck, attached at the time to the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth for his assistance with this book. 4. Martin Gilbert, Never Despair: Winston Churchill 1945–1965, London 1988, p. 934. 5. J.H. Brimmell, Communism in South East Asia, London 1959, p. 96. 6. Rene Onraet, Singapore – A Police Background, London 1947 pp. 116–7. 7. F. Spencer Chapman, The Jungle is Neutral, London 1949, p. 18. 8. Charles Cruikshank, SOE in the Far East, London 1983, pp. 63–4. 9. Lee Tong Foong, ‘The MPAJA and the Revolutionary Struggle 1939–1945’, in Mohamed Amin and Malcolm Caldwell, Malaya: The Making of a Neo- Colony, Nottingham 1977, pp. 99–100. See also Brian Montgomery, Shenton of Singapore, London 1984, p. 161. 10. Spencer Chapman, op. cit., pp. 147, 160, 162. For other accounts by British soldiers and civilians living with the Communist guerrillas see, Robert Cross and Dorothy Thatcher, Pai Naa, London 1959; John Cross, Red Jungle, London 1958; and Robert Hamond, A Fearful Freedom, London 1984. See also Joseph Kennedy, British Civilians and the Japanese War in Malaya and Singapore, London 1987, pp. 104–121. 198 Notes 11. For the effectiveness of the MPAJA see Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya, Singapore 1983, pp. 63–4. See also Paul H. Kratoska, Malaya and Singapore During the Japanese Occupation, Singapore 1995. 12. Spencer Chapman, op. cit., p. 381. 13. Michael R. Stenson, Repression and Revolt, Athens, Ohio 1969, p. 1. 14. Cheah Boon Kheng, op. cit. pp. 122–3. 15. Edgar O’Ballance, Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, London 1966, pp. 62–3. 16. Cheah Boon Kheng, op. cit., pp. 96–100. 17. Ibid., pp. 82–100. 18. Ibid., pp. 195–241. 19. For industrial conflict see Michael R. Stenson, Industrial Conflict in Malaya, London 1970. See also T.N. Harper, The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya, Cambridge 1999, p. 80. 20. Hua Wu Yin, Class and Communalism in Malaya, London 1983, pp. 76–85. A recently elected Labour MP, Woodrow Wyatt, described how, on a visit to the country, ‘young Chinese and young Malays, intelligent, willing to be democratic, anxious for self-government, asked me repeatedly when I was there .
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