Preserving the character of the nation: British military attitudes to nuclear weapons Tim Street June 2015 Introduction study by considering these issues within the current domestic and international political context, particularly the impact of deep public What are the views of the British military on spending cuts and the crisis in Ukraine. This is nuclear weapons today? How can we answer this done in order to better understand the pressures question given both the different actors and the British armed forces are currently under and institutions and the level of secrecy surrounding the effect this has on the nuclear weapons this issue? Moreover, why should those debate, particularly given the concerns raised by supportive of non-proliferation and disarmament, former and serving military personnel regarding or anyone else- especially given the political the government’s approach to defence and the nature of these weapons- care what the military strategy underpinning it in recent years. For thinks? As a study published by the Nuclear example, the determination of the government to Education Trust (NET) and Nuclear Information build four new nuclear-armed submarines in order Service (NIS) this week entitled British Military to maintain continuous-at-sea-deterrence (CASD), Attitudes to Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament whereby a submarine is perpetually on deterrent states ‘The armed forces have a unique patrol, ‘threatens to be at the expense of further relationship with and experience of the country’s reduction in conventional forces’ according to nuclear arsenal. They are responsible for 2 Professor Malcolm Chalmers . This situation has deploying the UK’s nuclear weapons, ensuring produced an apparent contradiction in the UK’s their security, and for delivering many aspects of security strategy given that, as we shall see, the country’s security strategy.’1 The study prominent political and military figures have highlighted that whilst many believe the UK should argued that the UK needs strong conventional remain a nuclear power, significant concerns exist military capabilities in order for the threat to use about the costs and risks of the UK’s Trident nuclear weapons- as in deterrence- to remain nuclear weapons system amongst the military credible. community, raising doubts about its future. For example, the funding crisis facing the Ministry of Overall, this article therefore seeks to address this Defence has meant that nuclear weapons contradiction by proposing that, in addition to the spending is increasingly questioned when compelling moral and legal arguments for nuclear conventional equipment is needed and many have disarmament, given prevailing economic and lost their jobs. political dynamics, the UK is finding it increasingly difficult to meet the ambition of being a leading This article aims to complement the NET / NIS 2 Chalmers, Malcolm (2010), Like for like renewal of Trident 1 Wilson, Henrietta (2015), UK Military Attitudes to Nuclear will come at expense of conventional forces, www.rusi.org, Weapons and Disarmament (London: NET / NIS), p.9 28th July BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL ∙ Preserving the character of the nation | 2 power with a strong military capable of global Firstly, nuclear weapons have always brought power projection. Yet rather than planning for a money, bureaucratic power and prestige to the transition to a security strategy and identity institutions wielding them. In the early 1980s, compatible with its available resources and the when the Soviet threat was supposedly at its real threats to security facing the nation’s citizens- peak, historian and peace activist E.P. Thompson such as climate change, hunger and poverty- described the ‘savage in-fighting over the war planners prefer to maintain familiar policies which budget’ that took place between service chiefs of minimise institutional risk3. This is principally the army, navy and air force concerning which because, as Nick Ritchie points out, ‘military platform the UK should adopt for its nuclear organisations and large bureaucracies are arsenal6. Back then the navy wanted the Trident characteristically cautious, pragmatic and system as it meant submarines whilst the army resistant to what may be perceived as radical and air force wanted nuclear-tipped cruise change’4. For Chalmers, in the case of decisions missiles. British governments have studied this on Trident this has meant that decisions are question several times (most recently with the ‘driven as much by institutional and political 2013 Trident Alternatives Review) and always momentum as by strategic necessity’5. decided, according to their criteria, that a submarine-based system is more credible and Trident and ‘in fighting over the war reliable, mainly because ballistic missiles are seen budget’ as being more effective than cruise, whilst the question of which platform is cheaper is disputed7. Yet the navy leadership’s position on Trident Perhaps the best way to begin considering military today may not be as clear-cut as one might views on the UK’s nuclear arsenal is to focus on assume. This is because, as former Armed the publicly available opinions of the top brass, Services Minister Nick Harvey has pointed out, serving and retired, from the different services. As the ‘competing costs facing defence in 2020’ well as having the biggest say in these matters means that the ‘surface part of the navy’, will, they are also responsible for the strategic alongside the army and air force, want to engage direction of the armed forces and have been quite in an ‘open debate as to whether replacing Trident vocal on nuclear issues in recent years given the with another full scale programme of nuclear ongoing acrimony over the size of the defence 8 weapons is an absolute must’ . budget and what equipment the military needs. Moreover, given the hierarchical nature of the One of the main points of contention here is that military, whilst those of lower rank may have whilst the navy’s surface fleet is being ‘entirely expertise regarding the safety, security and other rejuvenated’ to include new, technologically technical considerations, it is reasonable to say advanced, destroyers, frigates and aircraft that their influence and insights on the political carriers, the size of the fleet has been cut back. debate will not greatly differ from that of the Former First Sea Lord Alan West has therefore general public. argued that the surface fleet is too small for the 9 navy to fulfill all the tasks assigned to it . As for Of the three services, it is often assumed that the the other services, the fact that different nuclear navy’s leadership value Trident highly and it may weapon systems continue to be discussed means appear quite obvious why this should be so. 6 Thompson, E.P. (1981), Britain and the Bomb (London: 3 Such a transition, from a ‘conflict management or New Statesman), p.10 containment approach to one of proactive conflict prevention’ has been recently explored by Richard Reeve (2015) in 7 Wyatt, Caroline (2010), Is there a cheap alternative? Cutting the Cloth: Ambition, Austerity and the Case for www.bbc.co.uk, 23rd April Rethinking UK Military Spending (London: Oxford Research Group) 8 Wright, Oliver and Sengupta, Kim (2012), Top military chiefs go cold on nuclear deterrent, www.independent.co.uk, 26th 4 Ritchie, Nick (2006), Replacing Trident: Who Will Make the September Decisions and How? (London: Oxford Research Group), p.4 9 Powell, Michael (2012), Royal Navy needs two more 5 Chalmers, Malcolm (2010), Like for like renewal of Trident destroyers now says Admiral, http://www.portsmouth.co.uk; will come at expense of conventional forces, www.rusi.org, Brooke-Holland, Louisa (2013), The Royal Navy’s surface 28th July fleet: in brief, http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL ∙ British military attitudes to nuclear weapons | 3 that an option remains for the air force (platforms and material costs of the Afghan and Iraq wars, that could be operated by the army are not and, since 2010, the government has imposed considered sufficiently credible) to once more be huge cuts on public spending.13 given a nuclear mission, meaning its chiefs retain some interest in the UK remaining a nuclear Whilst the Ministry of Defence (MoD) got off lightly power.10 compared to other departments in the 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review, further cuts Trident as a political weapon came in 2013/14 and 2014/1514. The MoD is now facing cuts of as much as 35% by 2018-19 in real 15 As former Prime Minister Tony Blair stated in his terms compared to its 2010-11 level . Moreover, 2007 memoir, whilst Trident is hugely expensive, the Treasury has stated that if the MoD wants a its utility in the post-Cold War world is ‘less in successor nuclear-powered ballistic missile terms of deterrence, and non-existent in terms of submarine (SSBN) fleet, the money for it will have to come from the defence budget, as it did for the military use’. Blair admitted that what matters 16 more to the military are ‘helicopters, airlift and original Vanguard-class project. If four new anti-terror equipment’ yet giving up Trident would SSBNS are built, current spending projections be ‘too big a downgrading of our status as a show that nuclear weapons will then eat up about 11 a third of the MoD’s overall annual equipment nation’. What was being acknowledged here is 17 that the UK’s nuclear weapons are, and always budget for about fifteen years. Whilst the navy have been, political weapons, a fact would get their subs and two new aircraft carriers the army is set to be the significant loser with acknowledged in the 1980s by Field Marshal Lord 18 Michael Carver, who saw ‘no military logic’ in the further cuts to manpower on the horizon. decision to acquire Trident12.