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Select Committee on International Relations and Defence Corrected oral evidence: The UK and Afghanistan Wednesday 21 October 2020 11 am Watch the meeting Members present: Baroness Anelay of St Johns (The Chair); Lord Alton of Liverpool; Baroness Blackstone; Baroness Fall; Lord Grocott; Lord Hannay of Chiswick; Baroness Helic; Lord Mendelsohn; Lord Purvis of Tweed; Baroness Rawlings; Lord Reid of Cardowan; Baroness Smith of Newnham. Evidence Session No. 10 Virtual Proceedings Questions 85 - 91 Witnesses I: Lord Houghton of Richmond GCB CBE DL; Lord Mark Sedwill KCMG FRGS, former Cabinet Secretary and former National Security Adviser. USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT 1. This is a corrected transcript of evidence taken in public and webcast on www.parliamentlive.tv. 1 Examination of witnesses Lord Houghton of Richmond and Lord Sedwill. Q85 The Chair: This is our second session today on the UK and Afghanistan. I welcome Lord Houghton of Richmond, the former Chief of the Defence Staff, and Lord Sedwill, former Cabinet Secretary, former National Security Adviser, former ambassador to Afghanistan and former NATO senior civilian representative in Afghanistan. Lord Sedwill has the advantage of chairing the Atlantic Future Forum right now. I believe it started its sessions yesterday, and it is being held aboard the carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth. I had the opportunity to see it from land a year ago when I was in Portsmouth, and all I can say is that when they say it is big, it is big. I thank him for taking time out from that to join us. At this stage, I always make the point that the session we are having is broadcast, transcribed and on the record. I advise both witnesses and my colleagues that in either asking or answering questions, if there are relevant interests to be declared—in the case of the witnesses, I have not already mentioned this—they should do so. Thank you very much to both our witnesses for sharing your expertise today in our inquiry. As usual, I will start by asking a very general question, and then I shall turn to my colleagues to ask more detailed questions. Starting with the general question, how would you define the UK’s national security and foreign policy interests in Afghanistan? I would like to start with Lord Houghton on this occasion, but I will try to alternate between the two of you so that you are not always the second person answering. Lord Houghton of Richmond: Thank you. It is nice to be able to speak ahead of Mark; that is great. I thank the Committee for the invitation to give evidence to the inquiry. I do so in part out of a strong sense of residual duty to support such inquiries into our most recent involvement in Afghanistan. I am mindful, having seen some of the questions, that I am not absolutely up to date with the detail of some of them, but I will do my best to give you is the best that I can on policy context and background, which goes straight to this first question. Perhaps I might start with an unconventional approach to answering. The most significant factors that influenced our physical and resource commitment to Afghanistan in the period since the start of 2015 and the Resolute Support mission, but also in the year prior to that, have probably been more to do with things external to Afghanistan than inside it. I would say that those external factors are the political recognition at that time, 2014, of both the domestic unpopularity and practical unsustainability in human resource terms of an enduring combat mission, balanced by the need, almost a moral imperative, that was felt to 2 continue to justify the engagement and the sacrifice already made. There was definitely a need to continue to play, and to be seen to play, a leadership role within the international community, particularly within NATO. Then, I think, there was also a strong need to sustain a narrative, both domestically and internationally, of progress and success. So there was an overall need to justify the overall endeavour. Those issues frame the external context. The internal context consisted of a recognition that the security situation remained very fragile. The Afghan security institutions, although formally in security leadership, continued to need significant support. There was an absolute recognition that there had been no internal resolution of the political fractures in Afghanistan. Principally, that is between the government and the Taliban but also within the government themselves, who were an aggregation of many fractured parts. There was therefore a continuing fear that an ungoverned and unsecured country could once again become a safe haven for international terrorism, and particularly, about that time, the potential for ISIS, maybe in the format of ISKP,1 to undermine the original and enduring purpose of the whole enterprise—in fact, to me, the only thing that supports a truly satisfactory narrative—of ensuring that Afghanistan would never again be a safe haven for terrorism. To the internal conflicts, I would add the wholly proper recognition of the need to help to sustain the important humanitarian development progress that had been achieved. I shall pause there, but often we think of the factors that affect our interests as being internal to Afghanistan, but there were a whole raft of external considerations that set the parameters within which we then defined the way in which we met our internal interests. Lord Sedwill: Like Nick Houghton, I thank you for giving me the opportunity to join you. This is my first appearance before a select committee since becoming a Peer—although I have not yet been introduced to the House—and on a topic that, like Nick Houghton, I have not been involved in directly in recent years but about which, for obvious reasons, I feel very strongly. I am very happy and flattered to have the opportunity to contribute to your inquiry and I will do my best to answer your questions. On the first question, for brevity’s sake, there is very little for me to add to what Nick Houghton just set out. Fundamentally, the reason we went into Afghanistan in the first place is the reason we remain engaged: the national security threats that spill out of failed or even fragile states affect us at home and affect our allies—notably, as he said, terrorism. Of course, we also need to keep in mind serious and organised crime; Afghanistan certainly was, although I do not know whether it still is, the 1 Islamic State Khorosan Province 3 source of most of the heroin on British streets, and that kills more people every year than terrorism does. Lord Reid will recall from his time as Home Secretary the pernicious effects of that, so we cannot ignore the chronic as well as the acute problems such as terrorism. Instability in Afghanistan affects a volatile region. Over centuries, certainly over many years, Afghanistan has been a theatre in which regional rivalries have played out, neighbours have meddled and instability in Afghanistan risks spilling out into a volatile region. The border areas of Pakistan, for example, are also Talibanised, and if the Pakistani Taliban have safe havens in Afghanistan, that poses significant security problems, just as we have always been worried about the Afghan Taliban having safe havens in those parts of Pakistan. None of us can afford to see Pakistan destabilised, for all the obvious reasons. The stability of Afghanistan is the only basis on which we can be confident of having the institutions in place—including our own, but preferably Afghan—to deal with those threats of terrorism, serious and organised crime and regional instability. As Lord Houghton also pointed out, we in this country have always had a humanitarian imperative, and Afghanistan is among the poorest places in the world. We must not neglect, let alone lose, the progress that has been made in education— getting girls into education—in healthcare outcomes and in life expectancy, just as we would aim not to do so elsewhere. At the second layer, though, I think it is in our national security interest partly because of the stamina, if you like, of the Western alliance—or the fact that that stamina started to erode five to 10 years ago—but also because an external military presence in any country inevitably becomes part of the problem the longer it endures. In my view, there came a tipping point, probably around the time when I was there or just beforehand, when, at least in parts of Afghanistan, the external military presence was a contributor to tensions and internal conflict while also being the key capability to try to deal with it. That is why we had to develop and then implement the transition programme: essentially, to hand over responsibility to Afghan forces— they were the ones on the ground, in their own communities—to try to take out some of the tension that was generated by the highly intrusive presence, as it would be in any country, of foreign forces. A big part of our national security interest is not just stabilising Afghanistan, but enabling the Afghans to stabilise Afghanistan for themselves, because that is the only enduring model in which we can be confident. However, that requires, at least for the foreseeable future—as it has for the past few years—underwriting by external financial, military and developmental support, and support for other kinds of capabilities. I should probably leave it there, because I imagine we will explore one or two of those points in further questions.