DISCUSSION PAPER 5/2016 External Defence Engagement in Africa Summary of the 2016 Tswalu Dialogue Terence McNamee Strengthening Africa’s economic performance External Defence Engagement in Africa Summary of the 2016 Tswalu Dialogue Contents Security Drivers in Africa 3 Interests ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5 Partnership 6 Long-Term (Institution Building) versus Short-Term (Operational/Combat Support) Cooperation 7 Libya, Terrorism and other challenges ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7 Conclusion 8 External Defence Engagement in Africa – Chairs and Participants 10 About the Author Dr Terence McNamee is the Deputy Director of the Brenthurst Foundation. Published in March 2016 by The Brenthurst Foundation E Oppenheimer & Son (Pty) Ltd PO Box 61631, Johannesburg 2000, South Africa Tel +27–(0)11 274–2096 · Fax +27–(0)11 274–2097 www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org All rights reserved. The material in this publication may not be reproduced, stored, or transmitted without the prior permission of the publisher. Short extracts may be quoted, provided the source is fully acknowledged. Layout and design by Sheaf Publishing, Benoni. EXTERNAL DEFENCE ENGAGEMENT IN AFRICA External Defence Engagement in Africa Hosted by the Brenthurst Foundation in conjunction with the British Peace Support Team, the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the 2016 Tswalu Dialogue examined external defence engagement in Africa. Various forms of ‘engagement’ – from training and logistical support to diplomacy, joint operations and external intervention – were discussed. Delegates included leading African security experts, officials, and former heads of state, along with high-level ‘external’ participants drawn primarily from the United States, France and the United Kingdom. The wellsprings for the discussions were four major Papers circulated in advance of the meeting and briefly summarised by the authors during the Dialogue. The Papers – one each examining French, British and American defence engagement, and one on African security challenges – will not be reviewed here. Instead, this brief summary will focus on the main themes that emerged from the ensuing debates and identify key areas for further dialogue. All the various contributions reflected in this Paper are, as per the nature of the Tswalu Dialogue, unattributed. Security Drivers in Africa No discussion of external engagement on African inflection point. The sobering experiences of inter- security can ignore the profound changes which have vention in Afghanistan, Iraq and, increasingly, Libya taken place on the continent since the end of the afford huge opportunities for reflection and learning Cold War and the consequent adaptations in policy- on how to improve bilateral, multilateral and intra- making Africa’s partners have undertaken. Inter-state African responses to security challenges. armed conflict has all but disappeared in Africa. Within Africa, the key drivers that will determine Neither African civilians nor soldiers are dying in the severity and pliability of those challenges were violent conflict in anywhere near the numbers seen discussed from a number of angles. in the 1970s through to the early 2000s. At the same time, much of the continent confronts varying lev- The sobering experiences of els of acute political volatility and threats to internal stability, which increasingly have a transnational intervention in Afghanistan, Iraq dimension. Few areas of the continent do not con- front either one or an interplay of: extremist terrorist and, increasingly, Libya afford huge groups, organised crime, forced migration and renas- opportunities for reflection and cent communal conflict. External (for this Dialogue, synonymous with ‘Western’) defence engagement in learning on how to improve bilateral, Africa is continuing to adjust to these new circum- multilateral and intra-African stances and realities. There is broad consensus on the need for ‘African Solutions to African Problems’ even responses to security challenges while that consensus has at times dissolved in the face of both inadequate African capacity and political will on the one hand, and the assertion of Western People: Africa’s population is predicted to double interests on the other. Cooperation between Africa to 2.4 billion by 2050. This astonishing demographic and its external partners has achieved significant suc- change will be especially pronounced in countries like cesses in areas such as training and counter-piracy, Nigeria and Tanzania, already grappling with acute but in a broad sense the relationship has reached an population-related pressures. The ability to provide BRENTHURST DISCUSSION PAPER 5/2016 3 EXTERNAL DEFENCE ENGAGEMENT IN AFRICA jobs, education and services for rapidly expanding movements. Technology is, as ever, a double-edged populations will place enormous demands on all sword, as several participants noted. On the one hand, African governments and institutions. Even in com- it has evened the playing field between the state and paratively advanced economies like South Africa, the non-state actors in terms of the monopoly on the use scourge of unemployment is having myriad adverse of armed force. Rebels have better access to sophisti- impacts: only seven per cent of the 15–24 age group cated weaponry and resources than governments in has a decent job. Overwhelmingly, the participants parts of the continent. It is also generating less need regarded Africa’s population explosion as cause for for labour in some sectors, such as mining, through grave concern. It was not convincingly framed as various forms of mechanisation. On the other hand, an opportunity, in the way, for example, East Asia it has created new opportunities for progress such benefited from its so-called ‘demographic dividend’ as holding governments more accountable, greater a generation ago. The discussion returned frequently job-creating entrepreneurship, or improvements in to the ability of African countries to sustain com- farming techniques. paratively fragile state institutions through massive Governance: Despite huge advances in politi- demographic shifts. cal participation and elections in Africa during the past two decades, significant challenges remain. Competitive politics has opened the democratic By 2030 the majority of Africans space to a greater chunk of the citizenry but also will live in cities heightened tensions in some societies divided sharply along ethnic lines. More detrimental over the long- term have been recent failings in the governance of Urbanisation: By 2030 the majority of Africans Africa’s economies, resulting in runaway corruption will live in cities, and by 2050 some 56%. Africa is and rent-seeking, rather than development-oriented expected to add 800 million urban dwellers by then, practices and policies. The narrative of ‘Africa Rising’ including more than 200 million in Nigeria alone. was rooted partly in significant macro-economic Urbanisation presents huge development oppor- reforms that occurred after 2000, resulting in sus- tunities – depending on the quality of governance, tained annual economic growth rates of around infrastructure, and investment. In an environment 5 per cent. Impressive though that was, it will not be of rapid urbanisation and the growth of mega-cities enough to maintain the advances if current popula- throughout the continent, failures in any or all of tion projections eventuate. those areas will significantly amplify existing chal- lenges to the state. This places particular emphasis Competitive politics has arguably on the role, skills and capacity of police forces, whose make-up and performance have been given heightened tensions in some societies scant attention compared to countries’ armed forces, which have generally received greater support due divided sharply along ethnic lines to legacy agreements and a desire by international forces to train in Africa. An emphasis on rule of law, rather than militarisation of the security environment The period of democratic consolidation in Africa within Africa’s urbanised space, should therefore be has been marked by a recent uptick in coups and a key driver for the furtherance of democratic prin- democratic backsliding, such as in Burundi and ciples across Africa. Uganda, and changes to specific countries’ consti- Technology: The blistering pace of technological tutions affording incumbents the chance to stay in advances and change in Africa – especially cellphone power or fiddle elections with only minor censure penetration – has arguably outstripped our under- by the African Union or regional bodies. Grave standing of its implications in areas such as trade, questions are being asked of the capacity of such capital formation and remittances, the cost of doing bodies to thwart future similar attempts which may business, and the promotion of ideas and political be planned in other countries due to hold elections. BRENTHURST DISCUSSION PAPER 5/2016 4 EXTERNAL DEFENCE ENGAGEMENT IN AFRICA Yet while some argue that hard-won democratic gains by colonial and post-colonial legacies, where armed are being taken away from citizens,