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Home , Brenthurst Foundation, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Mali, President of Nigeria, Somalia

On the State of Peace and Security in

BY

ecent developments and security threats in , Central African and are alarming. And we cannot forget South and the endless conflicts in R and the Great Lakes. The (AU), at its 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration, pledged not to bequeath to future generations of Africans a legacy of and conflicts, by silenc- ing the guns by 2020. But 2020 is around the corner. What is the way out of this situation?

Background to Today’s Security Concerns

The African continent has no doubt witnessed many transformations in the last several decades, ranging from advances in the use of communication technology, to rapid trig- gered by an expanding market for Africa’s commodities, and a burgeoning youth population able to innovate in this environment. At the same time, our potential to translate these transformations into stable peace and development for African people is hampered by the continuing threat of armed conflict, along with its transmutations. Armed conflicts have become a recurrent reality in Africa since . From 1960 until the present day, fifty percent of Africa’s states have been ravaged by one form of conflict or another. The post-Cold conflict resurgence is particularly disturbing. Peace and security scholars have attempted to classify armed conflicts on the continent into various catego- ries – some of which understandably only feature in our discourses in a historical sense. Categorization at this point is necessary, if only as an indication of how far we have come as a continent.

HE Olusegun Obasanjo is the former President of Nigeria ( 1976–79; 1999–2007), a leading international statesman with a passion for conflict resolution and mediation, and the current Chairman of the ’s Advisory Board. This Paper is an edited version of HE President Olusegun Obasanjo’s opening address to the Third Tana High-level Forum on 26 April 2014 in , .

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■■ Post-colonial conflicts arising from agita- ■■ , denial and perceived or real injus- tions for liberation from the control of colo- tice induced conflicts like the militancy in the nial settlers in such as Delta of Nigeria or the current Boko (1980); (1990); and in Haram . (1994). ■■ Boundary and territorial conflicts such as Even though a substantial decline in the the Angolan Bush War in South Africa occurrence of inter-state conflicts, including (1966-1989); the – conflict many of those mentioned above, was experi- over the Atlas Mountain (1963); the ter- enced in the , an alarming rise in the ritorial tensions between Ethiopia and number of intra-state conflicts, and what some (1998–2000); the –Somali war scholars refer to as “new wars” in their various (1963–67); the Somali–Ethiopian conflict forms and shades, is taking place. By , (1964–78); the – conflict (1977); these conflicts tend to be more intense and and the –Nigeria conflict over the intractable. They range from large-scale warfare disputed Bakassi Peninsula (1994) – the to low intensity conflicts; and of late we have settlement of which I was part of. seen how public protests and people’s move- ■■ Conflicts linked to secessionist ambitions ments can set off a chain of violent, even if such as the case of Sudan and transformative events. Over the past years, (1983–2011); the age-long Cassamance countries such as Algeria, , Libya, Egypt, rebellion in ; the Cabinda agitations , of Congo, in Angola; and the Biafra in Nigeria Republic of Congo, Ethiopia- Eritrea, (1967–70). , , , , Somalia, ■■ Resource-based conflicts such as the Sudan South Sudan, Sudan, , Mali, Central and South Sudan conflict over the African Republic, and Nigeria have witnessed region; the Congo- conflict one form of escalating conflict or another with (2007); the Senegal/ conflict their attendant consequences. Some of these (1989); and the conflict raging in eastern countries are still undergoing heart-wrenching Congo over the last decade. episodes of violence at the moment. The gory ■■ Identity-based conflicts such as inter-eth- events of the last month of 2013 in South nic or inter-tribal conflicts. Examples of Sudan and the horror witnessed on the streets these are the 1994 Rwandan ; the of in attest to massacres; the Tuareg uprising in this and, in my view, should challenge our Mali; clan fighting in Somalia and Liberia; resolve as Africans to silence the guns in these Algerian fighting against the ruling places forever. Arab class in Algeria; and the ongoing South Further additions to these are growing and Sudan conflict. menacing terrorist activities and ■■ Annexationist conflicts such as the occupa- taking place in Somalia, Mali, Kenya, and tion of the Western by Morocco in North Eastern Nigeria to date. In some 1975; and British Southern in respects, these conflicts and forms of insecurity 1961. are not as new as some peace and security scholars might claim. For one, their root causes

10 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 2 ON THE STATE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA and triggers are not necessarily new. We have Africa’s streets” both in its violent and non- long spoken about the structural violence that violent manifestations. The phenomenon in underlines armed conflict. The Constitutive Act which largely young populations take to the of the AU pays particular attention to this. We streets to voice their feelings of exclusion have also noted that the triggers of these con- through mass non-violent protests; and flicts are numerous and interwoven. Several are another phenomenon in which a form of worth highlighting. socialization causes young people to throw bombs on themselves and are ready to kill Triggers deserves closer attention. As a result we see the Politically, poor governance, state building threat landscape changing. We therefore must processes such as the struggle for control of ask ourselves whether this threat landscape is power, and unconstitutional changes of gov- changing fundamentally and whether we are ernment remain key conflict drivers. still looking at the right framework for address- Economically, , struggle for owner- ing the breadth of security challenges con- ship, management and control of natural fronting the continent. resources, as well as unequal distribution of these resources constitute factors that Politically, poor governance, state building trigger conflicts across the continent. Socially, processes such as the struggle for control inadequate capacity for diversity management, of power, and unconstitutional changes the real or perceived inequality and discrimi- of government remain key conflict drivers. nation against minorities, marginalization Economically, corruption, struggle for along ethnic and religious lines as well as the ownership, management and control of natural alienation and consequent disillusionment of resources, as well as unequal distribution the youth are further additions. Internationally, of these resources constitute major factors colonial legacies, and foreign interference in that trigger conflicts across the continent. political transition and governance have Socially, inadequate capacity for diversity equally triggered conflicts. management, the real or perceived inequality But what is indeed new is the pattern of and discrimination against minorities, mutation of old conflicts. As a result we some- marginalization along ethnic and religious times see their manifestation in more extreme lines as well as the alienation and consequent forms of militancy. To be certain, this extreme disillusionment of the youth are further expression of violence is not the unique pre- additions. serve of Africa. However, while it is tempting to conclude that what we are experiencing is copycat stealing of “narratives” from all over The consequences of conflicts, in their the , we must reflect on how deeply mil- various manifestations, on state, , and itant groups believe in those narratives. Initial , are enormous. It is therefore evidence suggests that despite a copycat imperative for African leaders to muster the method of expression, these are reactions to necessary resolve and determination to ensure local rather than global conditions. We now that these deadly conflicts and their negative know that we cannot ignore the “power of

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consequences on our citizens become a thing National governments have adopted sev- of the past. eral measures, policies, and initiatives to Politically, Africa’s ability to establish enhance peace and security in affected coun- secure, democratic, and economically prosper- tries. At the regional level, the Economic ous states is being hampered. State institutions Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and infrastructures are eroded, thereby under- has, in accordance with the Constitutive Act of mining the integrity of the state. Formal econ- the AU, consistently condemned unconstitu- omies have collapsed, giving room for the rise tional changes of governments in the region, of shadow states where warlordism, impunity, imposed sanctions against defaulting member and criminality thrive. states, and facilitated mediation processes in these conflicts. It has deployed peacekeepers At the global level, the has and human rights observers to conflict affected supported the restoration of peace and security countries. The Inter-Governmental Authority in Africa through the adoption of various on Development (IGAD) has also intervened resolutions, which established in resolving conflicts in Sudan, South Sudan missions across the continent and Somalia. At the continental level, the African Union, since its transformation from the OAU to the AU in 2001, embarked on a paradigm Socially, the humanitarian dilemma across shift from its principle of non-interference to the African continent is huge. The incalculable a principle of non-indifference and the right to loss of human lives, the damage to material intervene. Guided by the principle of “African infrastructure and environmental resources solutions to African problems” the AU has and the massive flows of and inter- taken significant actions to enhance peace and nally displaced persons is a scar on our con- security in the continent. The adoption of the . Protocol Relating to the establishment of the Economically, the loss of income and Peace and Security Council, in December assets, damage to infrastructure, diversion of 2003, and its framework for conflict-preven- resources from socio-economic development tion, management, and resolution in Africa – to peacekeeping, collapse of trading systems, the African Peace and Security Architecture cuts in social spending and capital flight, are (APSA) – are commendable. some of the negative consequences of these The AU has undertaken several peacekeep- armed conflicts. ing missions in Burundi, , Somalia, Our actions as decision makers, private Darfur, and Central African Republic with sig- stake-holders and civil society should comple- nificant results. Also worth mentioning are the ment the relentless efforts of national govern- evolving AU Agenda 2063, which places bal- ments, the AU, regional economic communi- ancing state and as one of its ties, and the international community on the core priorities, the African Common Position prevention, management and resolution of on the Post-2015 Development Agenda which these conflicts. explores the interconnectedness between peace, security and sustainable development,

12 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 2 ON THE STATE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA and the African Governance Architecture two sides of one coin. While AGA focuses on (AGA) which aims at promoting good gover- broader questions of governance, APSA nance for sustainable peace and security. places emphasis on the mechanisms for con- At the global level, the United Nations has flict management, resolution, and peace- supported the restoration of peace and security building. These two must work together to in Africa through the adoption of various reso- bring about peace and security in the conti- lutions, which established peacekeeping mis- nent. sions across the continent. These efforts have ■■ All components of APSA should be been furthered by financial and sup- equally implemented for a more coherent from various development partners and and comprehensive approach to managing non-state actors across the globe. peace and security in Africa. Will these efforts be enough to eradicate ■■ African stakeholders – government, pri- conflict by 2020? Certainly not! We need to do vate sector, and civil society – must make more. Much also depends on our ability to concerted efforts to support existing - engage in hard collective thinking and “hori- nisms and initiatives, building strong infra- zon scanning” in ways that enable us to inject structure of government and viable institu- flexibility when required, into our existing tions. response frameworks. The Tana High Level Forum on Security in Africa offers an impor- A pivotal moment is now upon us. The tant contribution to a process of collective long-running debate on achieving sustainable thinking. If we must achieve sustainable peace peace and security in Africa is like running a in Africa, the following non-negotiable priori- marathon. Implementing existing frameworks ties to fast-track the implementation of already and initiatives will require resilience, dedica- existing mechanisms are of utmost impor- tion, resources, and patience; perhaps more tance: patience than we would like. We must all set our minds and put our hands together to Priorities for Peace achieve this imperative order for Africa. ■■ Democracy and good governance must In the words of the late South African form the basis for management of affairs in President , “It always seems every in Africa. Peace, security and impossible until it’s done.” Let us press on in good governance are fellow passengers. this conviction therefore – strongly and con- ■■ African leaders and decision-makers sistently, towards our goal of achieving sus- must reaffirm their commitment in terms of tainable peace and human security in our dear resources, and demonstrate the political will continent, Africa. PRISM required to ensure the operationalization of an African-owned APSA. “African solutions” will ring hollow if we fail to fund our initia- tives and programs. ■■ The implementation of the African Governance Architecture must be accorded the needed priority as APSA and AGA are

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