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In (Hc Abscncc of Any Other Rcqucst to Speak. the Prc\Idcnt ;\Djourncd The

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Part II 25s _-. .-_--.--.-_---. __. -. In (hc abscncc of any other rcqucst to speak. the At ths came meeting. the rcprcsentativc of F-rancc Prc\idcnt ;\djourncd the deb;ltc. sn)ing th<it the Security rcvicucd the background of the matter and stntrd that ( (1unc11 would rcm;rin scilcd of the quc\~~on 50 that II In IIcccmbcr 1974, the l,rcnch Government had organ- mlpht rc\umc con~ldcrntion of it :it any appropriate ~/cd a conhuttation of thz Comorian population which llrne.“‘-“‘ rcsultcd in a large majority in Favour of indcpendencc. Howcvcr. two thirds of the votes in the island of klayotte were negative. The French parliament adopted Decision of 6 I:ebruary 1976 ( IHHXth meeting): rcJcc- on 30 June I975 a law providing for the drafting of a lion of c-Power draft resolution constitution prcscrving the political and administrative In a telegram’Oz’ dated 28 January 1976, the Head of rdentit) of the islands. Although only the French State of the Comoros informed the President of the parliament could decide to transfer sovereignty, the Security Council that the French Govcrnmcnt intended Chamber of Deputies of the Comoros proclaimed the TV, organilr a referendum in the island of Mayotte on 8 independence of the island> on 5 July 1975. I’sbruary 1976. tie pointed out that Muyottc was an On 31 Dcccmbcr. the French Government recognired lntcgral part of Comorian territory under French laws the indcpcndcnce of the islands of Grandc-Comore, and that on I2 November 1975, the linitcd Nations had Anjouan. and Mohfli but provided for the pcoplc of admitted the C‘omorian State consisting of the four Mayottc to make a choice between the island remaining lhland:, of Anjouan, Mayottc. MohCli and Grande- in the French Republic and being integrated in the new (‘omorc. In view of the flagrant aggression by France. Comorian State. hc rcqucstcd an urgent meeting of the Security Council The question of the referendum thus resulted from to maintain pcacc in the archipc!Jgo and to safeguard the scrupulous application of the principle of self-deter- the intcgrlty of the country. nilnation and l.‘rancc h;id the duty to furnish the ljy IcttcriO!h dated 3 February 1976. the rcprcsentative inhabitants of \l%ayottc the means of making an impar- of Guinea-Bissau. on behalf of the African Group, asked ti;rl choice I”” the President of the Security Council to make the The rcprcscntative of Guinea-Bissau, speaking also in necessary arrangements for convening a meeting of the the name of the OAU, said it was France’s moral duty Council not later than Wednesday, 4 February 1976. to help the Comorians forge a nation and to preserve the By letter loz9 dated 4 February 1976, the representative groups of the four islands as a united republic. The of Uganda transmitted a message from the President of Government of Guinea-Bissau and the OAU always did the Republic of Uganda, then Chairman of the Organi- stand for the principle of self-determination and regard- zation of African Unity (OAU), in which the Comorian ed the case of Mayottc as one of political manipulation position was fully endorsed. of local parties by the French Government in order to At the 1886th meeting on 4 February 1976, the preserve some degree of influence in the arca.‘“)’ Council included the question in its agenda and consid- ered the issue at its 1886th to 1888th meetings between At the 1887th meeting. the representative of the 4 and 6 February 1976. During its deliberations, the rep- Comoros stated that his Government would never accept resentatives of Algeria, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, a division of whatever nature of its new state. The unity Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Nigeria, of the islands was an undeniable fact accepted by the Saudi Arabia and Somalia were invited, at their request, to French thcmselvcs. tic affirmed that several French participate in the discussion without the right to vot~.‘~‘” texts and laws showed the political and administrative At the 1886th meeting. the rcprcscntativc of the unity of the archipelago since the time of colonization C’omoru\ \;lid that his Govcrnmcnt’\ position was clearly and the l;~w on the basis of which the referendum on cxprc\\cd 111the tclepram of :!X .I;~nuary’“” ;IIN~ the hc;ld Indcpcndcncc held in Ijcccmbcr 1974 stipulated that the 01 111s I\C~C~,I~IIU~ wcultl prtbvik ttiu ;~tltlil~on;il Infornr;i- I;\ttcr wwld hc held on ;I global basis and not for each 11011 ncl.c\\;ir-) OII the ishuc upon hi\ :lrriv;ll I”‘.’ ~sl~~nd in isolation. France. perplexed by the result of the -_-.__ - rcfcrcndum, took Mayotte as an excuse for extending colonialism and interfering in the internal affairs of the C‘omoros by taking administrative, military and other measurcs.‘ol’ The rcprescntative of Panama stated that the Security C’ouncil and the General Assembly had accepted for membership the State of the Comoros as comprising the four islands. To question the territorial integrity of the new State would be contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter and the Declaration of the Grnnting of Indcpcndcnce to Colonial Countries and Pcople$ “‘lr. (‘hrptcr k’lll. Slrintenrncc of inlcrnrfionrl pcncc and wcurily 256 At the 1888th meeting, the representative of the to safeguard the unity and territorial integrity of the United Republic of Tanzania introduced a draft resolu- State of the Comoros composed of the islands of tionlo” co-sponsored by Benin, Guyana, the Libyan Anjouan, Grandc-Comoro. Mayottc and MohCli. Arab Republic and Panama. He declared that the draft The draft resolution received II votes in f;lvour. I resolution avoided any condemnation and asked for the against ;\nd 3 abstentions and was not ;\doptcd owillp to respect of the principles of the Charter, which were the the negative volt of ;I pcrmrncnt Illcllthrr of IIIC best safeguard for small countries like the Comoros. ltc Council.‘N’ also stated that since in Article 25 of the Charter Following the vote, the rcprcscnt;ltivc of l:r;lncc Member States agreed to bc bound by the decisions of stated that his ncgativc VOIC showed that I:r:~ncc W;IS the Council, it would bc only fair that the Security confronted with a real problem and did not cxcludc the Council, acting on behalf of the international communi- undertaking of negotiations with the Comoros.““’ ty, would take into account the views of the Member The representative of Benin regretted that the dr;tft StateS.‘o’” resolution was not adopted. and wondcrcd whcthsr At the same meeting the Chinese representative France, as a party to the dispute. W;IS cntitlcd 10 recognized the independence of the Comoros as a great participate in the vote.““* victdry in the struggle against imperialism and colonial- ism and reaffirmed the inalienable right of the new The representative of the Libyan Arab Republic expressed its sincere doubts and reservations in conncc- State to maintain its unity and territorial integrity.‘*‘p tion with the result of the voting. In his view, in The representative of the USSR declared that the accordance with Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Char- decision of the United Nations had come to constitute ter, France was not entitled to cast a positive or negative the international legal basis for recognition of the vote since France was a party to the dispute.lW’ Comorian State and its territorial integrity and reaf- firmed his country’s solidarity with the struggle of the The representative of France, in response to the comments made by the Libyan representative. recalled colonial people for their freedom and indcpcndence.‘W that in Panama in March 1973. in a matter which The representative of the United Kingdom stated his brought Panama into direct conflict with the United understanding of both the position of the Comoros. States, no one found it exceptional that Panama, which according to which its former colonial boundaries should held the presidency. should have voted and that the have been retained after independence, and of the United States also voted and exercised its right of veto. constitutional imperatives with which the French Gov- He stressed that for 25 years the Council had always ernment was confronted. The United Kingdom Govern- felt that in a situation like the present, one should not ment hoped that the issue could bc settled by continuing prevent States members of the Council or States negotiations.‘~’ directly or indirectly concerned in the matter from The Japanese representative suggested the resumption casting their vote, as they would undoubtedly exercise of talks between the two Governments and proposed the their vote if this matter was considered in the context of suspension of the referendum by France, pending the Chapter VII of the Charter, under which the right to outcome of the talks.l”2 . vote was not challenged. He could have provided a list At the same meeting the Council proceeded to the of precedents in which, analogous to the case under vote on the draft rcsolution’MJ sponsored by Benin, consideration, delegations did not hesitate to use their Guyana, Libyan Arab Republic, Panama and the right of veto and where this right was not challenged by United Republic of Tanzania. By its preambular para- anyonc.lM8 graphs the resolution would have recalled General The representative of Benin said he was not challcng- Assembly resolutions 3291 (XXIX) and 3385 (XXX) ing the veto which had been cast, but he was raising a reaffirming the unity and territorial integrity of the question so that members of the Council could give Comoro archipelago.
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