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Somalia 2019 Crime & Safety Report

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Somalia 2019 Crime & Safety Report This is an annual report produced in conjunction with the Regional Security Office at the U.S. Mission to Somalia. The current U.S. Department of State Travel Advisory at the date of this report’s publication assesses Somalia at Level 4, indicating travelers should not travel to the country due to crime, terrorism, and piracy. Overall Crime and Safety Situation The U.S. Mission to Somalia does not assume responsibility for the professional ability or integrity of the persons or firms appearing in this report. The American Citizen Services unit (ACS) cannot recommend a particular individual or location, and assumes no responsibility for the quality of service provided. Review OSAC’s Somalia-specific page for original OSAC reporting, consular messages, and contact information, some of which may be available only to private-sector representatives with an OSAC password. The U.S. government recommends U.S. citizens avoid travel to Somalia. Terrorist and criminal elements continue to target foreigners and locals in Somalia. Crime Threats There is serious risk from crime in Mogadishu. Violent crime, including assassinations, murder, kidnapping, and armed robbery, is common throughout Somalia, including in Mogadishu. Other Areas of Concern A strong familiarity with Somalia and/or extensive prior travel to the region does not reduce travel risk. Those considering travel to Somalia, including Somaliland and Puntland, should obtain kidnap and recovery insurance, as well as medical evacuation insurance, prior to travel. Inter- clan, inter-factional, and criminal feuding can flare up with little/no warning. After several years of quiet, pirates attacked several ships in 2017 and 2018. Avoid sailing near the Somalia coastline, as previous attacks have occurred as far as 1,000 nautical miles off the coast. Merchant vessels, fishing boats, and recreational craft all risk seizure by pirates and having their crews held for ransom in the waters off the Horn of Africa, especially in the international waters near Somalia. If transit around the Horn of Africa is necessary, vessels should travel in convoys, maintain good communications contact, and follow the guidance provided by the Maritime Security Center – Horn of Africa (MSC-HOA). Consult the Maritime Administration’s Horn of Africa Piracy page for information on maritime advisories, self-protection measures, and naval forces in the region. 1 While Somaliland has experienced a level of stability not present in other parts of Somalia, the Department of State continues to warn U.S. citizens against all travel to Somalia, including the self-proclaimed “Independent Republic of Somaliland.” Travelers who visit Somaliland despite this warning should check conditions in Somaliland before embarking on their journey. Terrorist attacks have occurred against international relief workers, including Westerners, throughout Somalia, including in Puntland and Somaliland. No area in Somalia is immune from violence; the potential exists throughout the country for hostile acts, either targeted or random, against foreign nationals at any time. Transportation-Safety Situation Road Safety and Road Conditions Road conditions in Somalia differ significantly from those in the United States. Road conditions and road safety standards do not meet U.S. or EU standards. Traffic lights/signs are a rarity, and roads are not well maintained, causing poor conditions and making driving hazardous. Additionally, little street lighting exists; therefore, night driving can be dangerous. Vehicle accidents are common, as are accidents involving pedestrians. Traffic enforcement is minimal. Illegal roadblocks, banditry, and other violent incidents, including the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and threats to U.S. citizens and other foreign nationals are common throughout Somalia. For more information on self-driving, review OSAC’s reports, Driving Overseas: Best Practices and Road Safety in Africa. Public Transportation Conditions There are few, if any, formal travel services or organizations that provide services in Somalia. Aviation/Airport Conditions The United States continues to be concerned about the risks to U.S. civil aviation operating in the territory and airspace of Somalia due to the hazards associated with terrorist and militant activity. As there is no direct commercial air service to the United States by carriers registered in Somalia, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has not assessed the government of Somalia’s Civil Aviation Authority for compliance with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) aviation safety standards. Additionally, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has prohibited U.S. civil aviation from flying below flight level (FL) 260 in the territory and airspace of Somalia. For additional background information regarding FAA flight prohibitions and advisories for U.S. civil aviation, consult the Federal Aviation Administration’s Prohibitions, Restrictions and Notices. In February 2016, an al-Shabaab operative using an IED targeted an airplane departing from Mogadishu’s Aden Adde International Airport (MGQ). The mid-air detonation damaged the airplane and resulted in one fatality (the bomber) and two injuries. The airplane returned and landed safely at MGQ. For more information, review OSAC’s report, Security in Transit: Airplanes, Public Transport, and Overnights. 2 Terrorism Threat Local, Regional, and International Terrorism Threats/Concerns There is serious risk from terrorism in Mogadishu. The security situation in Somalia remains unstable and dangerous. Terrorist operatives and armed groups in Somalia continue to attack Somali authorities, forces associated with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and non-military targets. Kidnapping, bombings, murder, illegal roadblocks, banditry, use of indirect fire, and other violent incidents to foreign nationals can occur in any region of Somalia. In addition, foreigners should avoid places where large crowds gather and government officials frequent, including hotels, restaurants, shopping areas, and public buildings. Portions of Somalia are under Federal Government of Somalia control with the military support of AMISOM. However, al-Shabaab, an al-Qa’ida affiliate, has demonstrated the capability to carry out attacks in government-controlled territory with particular emphasis on targeting hotels frequented by government officials; government facilities; foreign delegation facilities and movements; and restaurants, coffee shops, and other commercial establishments frequented by government officials, foreign nationals, merchants, and the Somali diaspora. Insurgents conducted a number of high profile attacks in 2017 and 2018, many of which targeted government officials and candidates. These attacks consisted of complex assaults, IED detonations, and suicide bombings. Insurgents targeted hotels where candidates stay and various Federal Government of Somalia facilities in Mogadishu and Mogadishu’s MGQ airport, which houses a majority of international aid workers and diplomatic facilities. Al-Shabaab-planned assassinations, suicide bombings, and indiscriminate armed attacks in civilian populated areas occur regularly in Somalia. Significant attacks in the past year include: January 18, 2019: A complex attack consisting of an ambush on an AMISOM convoy, followed by several IEDs targeting the responding AMISOM force, killed dozens and injured many more. January 1, 2019: Seven mortar rounds struck the UN compound at Mogadishu International Airport, injuring three. December 22, 2018: A suicide bomber rammed a checkpoint at Hoyoyinka junction in the Wardhighley district of Mogadishu, killing 20 and injuring 30. November 9, 2018: A complex attack, consisting of three VBIEDs and follow-on attackers targeting the Sahafi Hotel in Mogadishu, killed 25 and injured 106. July 7, 2018: A complex attack, consisting of two VBIEDs and four follow-on attackers at the Ministry of Internal Security killed 16 and injured 25. May 9, 2018: A suicide bomber detonated an IED in the Aargada Market in Wanlaweyne, Lower Shabelle, killing 14 and injuring 18. March 22, 2018: A VBIED detonated outside of Hotel Wehliye in Mogadishu, killing 17 and injuring 15. February 23, 2018: Two vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) exploded near Villa Somalia and the Dorbin Hotel in Mogadishu, killing 32 and injuring dozens more. 3 Anti-U.S./Anti-Western Sentiment There is a particular threat to foreigners in Somalia in locations where large crowds gather or where foreigners routinely spend time, including airports, government buildings, hotels, restaurants, and shopping areas. Political, Economic, Religious, and Ethnic Violence Civil Unrest There is serious risk from political violence in Mogadishu. Demonstrations and acts of civil disobedience are not uncommon, and often become violent. In December 2018, there were three days of large-scale protests in Baidoa following the arrest of a former al-Shabaab leader and presidential candidate of South West State, which resulted in an unknown number of civilian casualties. Post-specific Concerns Kidnapping Threat Kidnapping remains a constant threat in Somalia – to include Somaliland and Puntland – in addition to assaults, assassinations, and grenade attacks. Beyond these high-profile attacks, al- Shabaab continues to target foreigners; it has also claimed responsibility for other regional terrorist attacks, including a January 2019 attack on an office and hotel complex in Nairobi,
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