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South and Central Somalia Security Situation, Al-Shabaab Presence, and Target Groups

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South and Central Somalia Security Situation, Al-Shabaab Presence, and Target Groups 1/2017 South and Central Somalia Security Situation, al-Shabaab Presence, and Target Groups Report based on interviews in Nairobi, Kenya, 3 to 10 December 2016 Copenhagen, March 2017 Danish Immigration Service Ryesgade 53 2100 Copenhagen Ø Phone: 00 45 35 36 66 00 Web: www.newtodenmark.dk E-mail: [email protected] South and Central Somalia: Security Situation, al-Shabaab Presence, and Target Groups Table of Contents Disclaimer .......................................................................................................................................................... 3 Introduction and methodology ......................................................................................................................... 4 Abbreviations..................................................................................................................................................... 6 1. Security situation ....................................................................................................................................... 7 1.1. The overall security situation ........................................................................................................ 7 1.2. The extent of al-Shabaab control and presence.......................................................................... 10 1.3. Information on the security situation in selected cities/regions ................................................ 11 2. Possible al-Shabaab targets in areas with AMISOM/SNA presence ........................................................ 17 2.1. Targets within FGS, AMISOM/SNA, and international organisations .......................................... 17 2.2. Al-Shabaab defectors ................................................................................................................... 17 2.3. Journalists, human rights activists and NGO’s............................................................................. 18 2.4. Business people ........................................................................................................................... 19 2.5. Women ........................................................................................................................................ 19 2.6. Civilians ........................................................................................................................................ 19 3. Recruitment to al-Shabaab ...................................................................................................................... 20 3.1. The recruitment process.............................................................................................................. 20 3.2. Child soldiers................................................................................................................................ 21 3.3. Women in al-Shabaab ................................................................................................................. 22 4. Possible al-Shabaab targets in areas under the control of al-Shabaab ................................................... 23 4.1. Target profiles in areas under the control of al-Shabaab ............................................................ 23 4.2. Airstrikes ...................................................................................................................................... 24 4.3. Returnees..................................................................................................................................... 24 4.4. Women ........................................................................................................................................ 24 4.5. Public executions ......................................................................................................................... 25 Annex A – Meeting notes ................................................................................................................................ 26 UN source (A)............................................................................................................................................... 26 UN source (B) ............................................................................................................................................... 30 UN source (C) ............................................................................................................................................... 34 Somalia Country Director of a humanitarian agency .................................................................................. 35 NGO working in Somalia .............................................................................................................................. 41 Somali NGO.................................................................................................................................................. 43 1 South and Central Somalia: Security Situation, al-Shabaab Presence, and Target Groups International organisation (A) ..................................................................................................................... 46 International organisation (B) ..................................................................................................................... 49 Independent organisation ........................................................................................................................... 50 Anonymous source ...................................................................................................................................... 53 Western source ........................................................................................................................................... 58 Annex B – Terms of reference ......................................................................................................................... 61 Annex C – Map of Somalia ............................................................................................................................... 62 2 South and Central Somalia: Security Situation, al-Shabaab Presence, and Target Groups Disclaimer This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology.1 The report is based on approved notes from meetings with carefully selected sources. Statements from all sources are used in the report and all statements are referenced.2 This report is not, and does not purport to be; a detailed or comprehensive survey of all aspects of the issues addressed in the report and should be weighed against other available country of origin information on the security situation in South Central Somalia, including the extent of al-Shabaab control and presence, al-Shabaab target groups in areas with AMISOM presence, recruitment to al-Shabaab, and possible al- Shabaab target groups in areas under al-Shabaab control. The report at hand does not include any policy recommendations or analysis. The information in the report does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Danish Immigration Service or the Danish Refugee Council. Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal position. 1 European Union: European Asylum Support Office (EASO), EASO Country of Origin Information report methodology, 10 July 2012. http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ffc33d32.html 2 One source found that the information provided was for background only and not for quotation. For this reason the source is not referenced. 3 South and Central Somalia: Security Situation, al-Shabaab Presence, and Target Groups Introduction and methodology The report at hand focuses on the security situation in South Central Somalia, including the extent of al- Shabaab control and presence, al-Shabaab target groups in areas with AMISOM presence, recruitment to al-Shabaab, and possible al-Shabaab target groups in areas under al-Shabaab control. Previously, in September 2015, DIS published the report “South Central Somalia Country of Origin Information for Use in the Asylum Determination Process3”. The report is the product of a joint mission conducted by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and the Country of Origin Information Division, Danish Immigration Service (DIS) to Nairobi, Kenya from 3 December to 10 December 2016. The purpose of the mission was to collect updated information on issues recurring in cases regarding Somali asylum seekers in Denmark. The terms of reference for the mission were drawn up jointly by DIS and DRC, in consultation with the Danish Refugee Appeals Board as well as an advisory group on COI (“Referencegruppen”).4 The terms of reference are included at the end of the report. (Annex B) Many of the organisations working in Somalia have their administrative headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya. In the planning phase of the mission, contacts were established with relevant sources who confirmed their availability in Nairobi during the tentative time period for the mission. On this background and due to security considerations it was agreed to limit the mission to Nairobi. In the scope of compiling this report, the delegation consulted 12 interlocutors in Nairobi, Kenya, during the mission, comprising representatives from UN and other international organisations, international and local NGO’s, and western embassies. All the sources represent organisations or diplomatic representations actively engaged in S/C Somalia.
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