“A Correct and Progressive Road”: Us-Turkish Relations, 1945-1964
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“A CORRECT AND PROGRESSIVE ROAD”: U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS, 1945-1964 Michael M. Carver A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY May 2011 Committee: Dr. Douglas J. Forsyth, Advisor Dr. Gary R. Hess Dr. Marc V. Simon, Graduate Faculty Representative Dr. Tiffany Trimmer 1 2011 Michael M. Carver All Rights Reserved ABSTRACT 2 Dr. Douglas Forsyth, Advisor This historical investigation of U.S.-Turkish relations from the end of World War II to 1964 provides a greater understanding of the challenges inherent in the formation and implementation of U.S. policy in Turkey at a time when the Turks embarked on multiparty politics and a determined campaign to become a modern and distinctly European nation through ambitious economic development programs. Washington proved instrumental in this endeavor, providing financial support through the Marshall Plan and subsequent aid programs, and political sponsorship of Turkey’s membership in international organizations such as NATO and the EEC. U.S. policymakers encountered various quandaries as they forged bilateral relations with the Turks, specifically reconciling democratization with Turkey’s development and participation in the containment of communism. The Turkish government under Adnan Menderes demonstrated its reliability as a U.S. ally, providing troops to fight in the Korean War and cooperating in the construction of NATO bases and the modernization of its military, but it came under increasing pressure from the political opposition when its economic policies failed to secure long-term economic growth and stability. Starting in the mid-1950s the Menderes government adopted increasingly authoritarian measures to control dissent, a problematic situation for Washington, as it desired greater Turkish democracy while at them same time did not wish to compromise the growing American military presence in Turkey. The U.S. solution to dealing with Turkey’s political tensions was one of nonintervention and detachment, an approach that produced greater Turkish resentment and compromised Washington’s ability to manage the frequent crises of the 1960s including 1960’s coup and the 1964 Cyprus crisis. 3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS It is impossible to overstate the contributions made by my advisor, Dr. Douglas J. Forsyth, in the completion of this dissertation. At every juncture in the process, be it research, writing, or revisions, he has been equally generous with his time and his insight. I must offer thanks and praise to Dr. Gary Hess and Dr. Tiffany Trimmer for their assistance throughout the last few years, as well as to Dr. Mark Simon of the Political Science Department for his counsel and recommendations. Dr. James Miller came aboard late in the journey, but offered encouragement and sound guidance that I only wish I might have heard earlier. No less important are the contributions made by Dr. Scott Martin, Dr. Don Rowney, Dr. Rebecca Mancuso, Dr. Andrew Schocket, and Dr. Amilcar Challu. A special mention needs to be made of Tina Thomas and DeeDee Wentland. Thanks also to my friends, Rob MacDonald, Joe Faykosh, Ian Mladjov, Peter Kuebeck, David Kuebeck, Norma Flores, William Smith, Dustin McLochlin, Andy VanCamp, Jay Perry, Jeff Zalewski, Beth Dutridge-Corp, and Stephanie Gaskill. Finally, I must recognize the unfailing support and love from my parents; my sisters, Laura and Jane; my brother-in-law, James; and my nieces, Maria and Veronica. 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION: IMAGINED NOSTALGIA………………………………………….1-21 CHAPTER I. “NYLONIZING”: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO 1949…………..22-80 CHAPTER II. “A MOST WONDERFUL THING FOR TURKEY”: 1949-1952………81-137 CHAPTER III. “IF ALLAH DOES NOT PROVIDE…”: 1952-1953…………………138-182 CHAPTER IV. “PROFESSIONAL INCOMPETENCY”: 1954-1956………………...183-237 CHAPTER V. “SURROUNDED BY DANGERS”: 1957-1959………………………238-292 CHAPTER VI. “THE SPOTS OF THE LEOPARD”: 1960-1961…………………….293-347 CHAPTER VII. HOSTAGES TO THE PAST: 1961-1964…………………………...348-415 CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………..416-423 REFERENCES….……………………………………………………………………..424-443 5 Abbreviations in the Text AKEL – Progressive Party of the Working People (Cyprus) CEE – Committee of European Economic Cooperation CIA – Central Intelligence Agency (United States) CNU – Committee of National Unity (Turkey) ECA – Economic Cooperation Administration (Marshall Plan) EEC/EC – European Economic Community/European Community EOKA – National Organization of Cypriot Freedom Fighters ERP – European Recovery Plan (Marshall Plan) DP – Democratic Party (Turkey) EIB – European Investment Bank EPU – European Payments Union EU – European Union GATT – General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade GNA – Grand National Assembly (Turkey) IMF – International Monetary Fund IBRD – International Bank of Reconstruction and Development IRBM – Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile ISI – Import Substitution Industrialization JAMMAT – Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey JCS – Joint Chiefs of Staff (United States) JP – Justice Party (Turkey) JUSMMAT – Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey MAP – Mutual Aid Program (Marshall Plan) MDAP - Military Defense Assistance Program (United States) MEC – Middle East Command MLF – Multilateral Force (NATO) MRM – Medium Range Missile MSA – Mutual Security Agency NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization NEA – Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (U.S. State Department) NKEK – Mechanical and Chemical Industries (Turkey) OCB – Operation Coordinating Board (United States) OEEC – Organization of European Economic Cooperation OECD – Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development RPP – Republican Peoples Party (Turkey) SANACC – State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (United States) SEE – State Economic Enterprise (Turkey) SOFA – Sate of Forces Agreement SPO – State Planning Organization (Turkey) TJP – Turkish Justice Party TL – Turkish Lira 6 INTRODUCTION: IMAGINED NOSTALGIA “If the party in power takes a correct and progressive road, all of us will help it, because this country is not one party or another; it is the entire nation.”1 -Kasim Gülek, Secretary General of the RPP November 20, 1955 At one time Turkey’s robust support of American security policy in the Middle East was one of the few unchanging variables in an otherwise unpredictable region. But events preceding and subsequent to the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan highlighted and broadened an existing rift between the allies. Turkey’s loyalty to the U.S. is no longer a constant, a reality made all too clear on March 1, 2003 when the Turkish Parliament, after several months of pressure from Washington, voted against American requests to utilize Turkey as a staging area for the offensive against Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power.2 Of the rejection, former president George W. Bush noted dolefully, “On one of the most important requests we had ever made, Turkey, our NATO ally, had let America down.”3 Such a refusal of an American request by Turkey would have been unthinkable in earlier decades, particularly if it risked a scaling back in U.S. support and funding. Bush briefly recounts the assurances offered in exchange for the permission sought by Washington: “We promised to provide economic and military aid, help Turkey access key programs from the International Monetary Fund, and maintain our strong support for Turkey’s administration to the European Union.”4 As this study shows, a similar such pledge might easily have been made in previous decades by the Eisenhower, Kennedy, or Johnson administrations: the twin assurances of 1 Richard D. Robinson Developments Respecting Turkey (Volume Three): September 1955-Augst 1956 12. 2 Ayşe Gül Altimay and Amy Holmes “Opposition to the U.S. Military Presence in Turkey in the Context of the Iraq War” in Catherine Lutz, ed. The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts (Washington Square, New York: New York University Press, 2009): 270. 3 George W. Bush Decision Points (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010): 250. 4 Ibid. 7 American dollars to boost Turkey’s economy and military, and American support in strengthening ties with international organizations such as the IMF and the EU. Bush’s specific mention of Turkey as a NATO ally borders on the ironic; by the mid-1960s Turkey found itself being routinely let down by a fellow NATO partner, the United States, particularly in 1964 when President Johnson threatened to do nothing if a crisis in Cyprus enticed the Soviet Union to become involved in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey learned that NATO members, specifically the U.S., could ignore their defensive duties to other members on an apparent whim.5 With the rupture between Turkey and the U.S. conceivably widening, some circles in Washington bemoan that the U.S. has “lost” Turkey. Such assertions lead to the question, at what point was Turkey securely America’s possession to lose? While there’s no denying that the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s (GNA) 2003 vote shows all too well how much U.S.- Turkish relations had deteriorated since the cold war, it should not have been wholly unanticipated by the Bush administration. The GNA’s action was part of a steady decline rather than an unforeseen turning point, one that began in the mid-1960s. Most historical accounts of Turkish-American relations cite the period of 1945 to 1964 as the years of greatest closeness and synchronicity of goals between the two countries, when American and Turkish fears of Soviet expansionism in the Near and Middle East reached their height. At the close of World War II dealings between U.S. and Turkish officials reflected shared security concerns regarding the Soviets until the prospect of détente in the mid-1960s promoted a reexamination of policy goals by the leaders of both countries. The loss of this common enemy in the early 1990s made it all the more difficult for each side to justify the continued closeness of the previous four decades. Additionally, Turkey increasingly pursued 5 For an examination of the current state of the Turkish public’s jaundiced view of U.S. policy see Giray Sadik American Image in Turkey: U.S.