1 CANADIAN ARMOURED BRIGADE AND THE BATTLE OF LAKE
TRASIMENE, 20-28 JUNE 1944
by
William John Pratt
Bachelor of Arts, University of Victoria, 2008
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Masters of Arts
in the Graduate Academic Unit of History
Supervisor: Marc Milner, PhD, History
Examining Board: David Charters, PhD, History Marc Milner, PhD, History Larry Wisniewski, PhD, Sociology
This thesis is accepted by the Dean of Graduate Studies
THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK
May, 2010
© William Pratt, 2010 Library and Archives Bibliotheque et Canada Archives Canada
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While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans in the document page count, their la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu removal does not represent any loss manquant. of content from the thesis. Canada ABSTRACT
On 20-28 June 1944, the 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade, supporting the XIII British
Corps, participated in the Battle of Lake Trasimene, north of Rome. This understudied event in the Italian Campaign defies established notions about the nature of the Second
World War. Undertaken against entrenched enemy in rolling countryside, the battle reveals that Anglo-Canadian tank-infantry cooperation was the decisive factor on the battlefield. The troopers of the Ontario, Three Rivers, and Calgary Armoured Regiments were aggressive to a fault, providing direct firepower support and overcoming obstacles which would otherwise put the infantry to ground. Sherman tanks proved effective in the street-fighting role and destroyed several of the famous German Panther tanks.
Ultimately the XIII Corps paid a high price to prosecute the Italian campaign's containment strategy. This study offers an examination of combined arms in success and failure, and situates armour as a vital component of the all-arms team.
ii DEDICATION
To the soldiers of the Ontario, Three Rivers and Calgary Armoured Regiments, who made the ultimate sacrifice, this work is humbly dedicated. May their efforts be understood and remembered.
iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I would like to thank Lee Windsor for his guidance on this work. His encyclopaedic
knowledge of the Italian campaign is the foundation of this thesis. Walking the ground
on his 2009 battlefield tour was an experience I will never forget.
Marc Milner was an excellent adviser and editor, and was always willing and able to turn a draft over with remarkable efficiency. Both Marc and Lee's friendly
manner and lack of pretension are a part of the Gregg Centre way, and made for an enjoyable tenure at the University of New Brunswick. Brent Wilson and Valerie Gallant were the consistent denizens of the Centre. A chat with them all was always uplifting.
My fellow graduate students at the University of New Brunswick provided a
useful sounding board for ideas. Their comradeship was appreciated and will be missed.
While these are too numerous to name, some may be singled out for the contribution to this thesis. Charley Eddy, a fellow Italian campaign enthusiast, commented on the prospectus and an early thesis proposal and was always keen to talk shop. Eric
Greisinger critiqued the prospectus. It is my hope that his empathy for the common soldier affected this thesis. Joseph Zeller edited and reduced a leviathan draft. Jamie
Horncastle, Scott Leslie, Iain O'Shea, and Joseph Zeller engaged in numerous discussion on warfare and history, and could commiserate when the writing got tough.
Geoff Keelan and Christine Leppard kindly shared their own research. Christine directed me to Calgary Regiment archivist A1 Judson, who was a wealth of information.
The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, the Security and Defence
Forum, the Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society, and the University of New
Brunswick provided appreciated financial support.
iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ii
DEDICATION iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS v
LIST OF FIGURES vii
1.0 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION: Missing from the Narrative: Towards a Complete Account of the Battle of Lake Trasimene 1 1.1 The Battle of Lake Trasimene and Official History 1 1.2 Armoured Development, 1916-1940 9 1.3 The Blitzkrieg Standard and Explanations for British Armoured Failings 14
2.0 CHAPTER TWO: Precursor to Trasimene: 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade's Training and Operations 18 2.1 Formation and Training of the 1 Canadian Army Tank Brigade.. 18 2.2 Operations from HUSKY to DIADEM 27
3.0 CHAPTER THREE: Grand Strategy and Pursuit, May-June 1944 41 3.1 Grand Strategy: Resource Management in a World War 41 3.2 Army Group Strategy: Pursuit from the Gustav to the Dora Line 43 3.3 German Consolidation: From the Dora to the Albert Line 53
4.0 CHAPTER FOUR: The Vicious Encounter Battle: Vaiano and Sanfatucchio 62 4.1 XIII Corps Approaches the Trasimene Line 62 4.2 Sanfatucchio Village 19-21 June: Close Support Shermans in Urban Operations 77 4.3 The Inniskillings Bite and Hold Pucciarelli, 21-22 June 91 4.4 Vaiano 23-24: The Nadir of Tank-Infantry Cooperation 99
5.0 CHAPTER FIVE: Through the Battle Outposts and Into the Main Defensive Line 24-27 June 1944 108 5.1 Panthers at Pescia 108 5.2 Across the River Pescia 24-25 June 115 5.3 4th Division Advances Through the Hilltop Villages 120
6.0 CHAPTER SIX: Breaking the Main Defensive Line 28 June 126 6.1 Sacrifice Beyond Casamaggiore 126
v 6.2Clearing the Hill Country and Pursuit, 29 June-3 July 136
7.0 CHAPTER SEVEN: Conclusion 149
8.0 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY. 153
9.0 APPENDIX ONE: Selected XIII Corps Order of Battle and Command 163
10.0 APPENDIX TWO: Selected XIII Corps Casualties 165
11.0 CURRICULUM VITAE
vi LIST OF FIGURES
I.0 FIGURE ONE: Canadians in Southern Italy 30
2.0 FIGURE TWO: Approach and Breakthrough, The Hitler Line 15-23 May 1944 45
3.0 FIGURE THREE: Advance From Rome 5-11 June 49
4.0 FIGURE FOUR: Pursuit From Dora to Albert Line 10-20 June 1944 55
5.0 FIGURE FIVE: XIII Corps' Front at the Trasimene Line 68
6.0 FIGURE SIX: No.l Operational Research Section Appreciation of Trasimene Defences 70
7.0 FIGURE SEVEN: The Battle of Lake Trasimeno 72
8.0 FIGURE EIGHT: 36 Brigade and Wiltshire's Centre Line 75
9.0 FIGURE NINE: Contemporary View From Villa Strada North-west to Vaiano 77
10.0 FIGURE TEN: Battle of Sanfatucchio 78
II.0 FIGURE ELEVEN: Contemporary View from Castiglione del Lago South to Sanfatucchio 81
12.0 FIGURE TWELVE: 'H' Company London Irish Rifles, 'B' Squadron Ontario Regiment 87
13.0 FIGURE THIRTEEN: German Prisoners in Sanfatucchio 21 June 89
14.0 FIGURE FOURTEEN: 6th Inniskillings advance through Pucciarelli with Ontario Regiment Sherman in Foreground 94
15.0 FIGURE FIFTEEN: Air Photo, Pescia Crossing Ill
16.0 FIGURE SIXTEEN: Vaiano to Casamaggiore 121
17.0 FIGURE SEVENTEEN-.The Trasimene Line 127
18.0 FIGURE EIGHTEEN: Casamaggiore 28 June 128
vii 19.0 FIGURE NINETEEN: Laviano to Petrignano
viii CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION: Missing from the Narrative: Towards a
Complete Account of the Battle of Lake Trasimene
The Battle of Lake Trasimene and Official History
The modern Battle of Lake Trasimene, where 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade (1CAB)
fought in support of the 4th and 78th British Divisions, is a forgotten battle of the Italian campaign. This is unfortunate, because the battle demonstrated the importance of tank support and success in the all-arms team. An in-depth operational study of the Battle of
Lake Trasimene is therefore long overdue. Moreover, a case-study of the XIII British
Corps' use of this Canadian independent infantry-tank brigade provides an investigation of historically derided Allied tank-infantry cooperation. It offers a corrective to the dominant historical narrative which claims that Anglo-Canadian infantry-tank brigades were a flawed concept. The study shows that despite the rhetoric which claims that the mountainous Italian peninsula was not tank country, armour remained a vital component of the all-arms team, offering direct fire support to the infantry and allowing them to advance.
A study of the operations of 1CAB during the Battle of the Trasimene Line addresses several overlapping historical narratives surrounding the battle: the Italian campaign proper; Canadian, British, and German Army history; and armoured operations in the Second World War. The campaign's histories have primarily selected faulty command decisions, harsh conditions, strategic futility, and friction within the
Anglo-American alliance as their focus. Both Canadian and British Army histories have
largely scrutinized the Normandy campaign, where the debate on military effectiveness continues. Armoured histories often work in a vacuum, in absence of the other combat 1 arms.
The writing of history is always an approximation of the past by the use of selection and representation, and the history of battle is no exception to this rule. As Tim
Cook writes in Clio's Warriors, "the friction and fog of war and the many complexities surrounding hundreds of thousands of men involved in life-and-death struggles [can] not be summed up in a short, after-battle report."1 The unit war diaries, narratives compiled by an intelligence officer as an daily on-the-spot history of the unit, serve as the primary source for the military historian investigating the operations of the Second World War.2
Yet even war diaries written by participants are only a summarized estimation of the complex and dynamic actions of the battlefield.
The official histories of the Italian campaign, penned by military professionals and seeking to establish a bare narrative skeleton of events, are constrained by space and scope. While these works offer the most thorough chronicles of the Italian campaign from July 1943 to the spring of 1945, the need to describe the actions of thousands of soldiers over years of conflict means that combat is rarely represented below the brigade or battalion level. The American and British official histories have a particularly herculean task, as these nations had large contributions to the campaign. With dozens of battalions engaged in any particular battle, it is understandable that these works do not explore in depth below this level of organization. The result is that the complex actions
' Tim Cook, Clio's Warriors: Canadian Historians and the Writing of the World Wars (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2006), 49. 1 Official Historian Gerald Nicholson noted that the "quality of war diary varied with the ability of the officer entrusted with its compilation". Gerald Nicholson, "The Writing of an Official War History" G.W.L Nicholson Fonds, 26 October 1956, Library and Archives Canada, MG31 G19 Vol. 6., 6. C.P. Stacey, the chief of Canada's Second World War official historians made the claim that only the message log, the record of signals and orders at formation headquarters, could give a realistic recreation of military operations. C.P. Stacey, A Date With History (Ottawa: Deneau, 1982), 230. 2 of thousands of soldiers become summarized in bland statements, such as W. G. F.
Jackson's: "the 6th Inniskillings, also supported by Canadian tanks, secured the hamlet of
Pucciarelli during the 21st [of June]."3
Sir William Godfrey Fothergill Jackson was responsible for completing the
British official history of the war in the Mediterranean. It was not until 1987 that the
final part of the last volume, Victory in the Mediterranean, detailing the events after the
battle for Rome, was released.4 Jackson's task was to provide a narrative of the long
fight on the ground in Italy while still according space for aerial, naval and administrative aspects. As the Italian campaign has not received a large amount of in- depth historical attention, especially so for the period after the invasion of Normandy in
June 1944, many of its actions are described only by Jackson's necessarily terse prose.
In 1953, Eric Linklater wrote an early history of the campaign, designed to give the general public a readable account while the official histories were being completed. His comments regarding the utility of the basic narrative summary of single-volume accounts could also be applied to the official histories. Linklater states, "the crowded concourse of events leaves no room for individual features - but in the record of events there is a multitude of human implications like the anonymous voices in the roar of a great crowd; and the narrative may provide a framework, a kind of map, for those who,
by knowledge or by sympathy, can identify some of the voices."5 It will be seen that
3 W. G. F. Jackson, Victory in the Mediterranean, Vol. 6, Part 2, 43. 4 This long delay was a result of the low priority of the Mediterranean theatre in the list of official publications and the deaths of three members of the team working on the Mediterranean series. The team which was writing the British official history of the Mediterranean theatre lost Major General HL Davies, the army historian, Captain FC Flynn, the Naval Historian, as well as the editor of the series, Brigadier CJC Molony. As Molony had finished writing the narrative until the fall of Rome, those chapters were assigned to Part 1 of Victory in the Mediterranean. 5 Eric Linklater, The Campaign In Italv, (London: HMSO, 1951), 6. 3 many of these voices still remain silent in the historiography of the Italian campaign.
The Canadian official history, authored by Colonel Gerald Nicholson, is an excellent single volume narrative on a much smaller contingent. Yet it suffers from similar constraints of the British official histories. Nicholson was aided by No. 1
Canadian Field Historical Section, who were charged with the recording of battle-action and typing early historical summaries. These officers were assigned to main headquarters from the army level down to the division and interviewed senior officers regarding recent operations.6 The Canadian officer with the most influence on the collection of sources for Canadian participation in the Battle of Lake Trasimene was R.T.
Currelly. Described by his officer commanding as "an explorer, researcher and detective," Currelly's initial interviews with officers after the battle provided excellent material for the Canadian Historical Section's early narrative.7 However, the historical summary which deals with 1 CAB's action at the Battle of Lake Trasimene was focused on Canadian operations, and compiled from an exclusive reading of Canadian war diaries, Currelly's interviews and Corps level British sources. While such an account was all that the officers had time to complete, its lack of the British infantry, artillery and engineering perspectives at the tactical level, as well as enemy accounts, leaves it incomplete and one-sided.
A lack of a multinational all-arms perspective is also found in regimental histories.8 While often the best source for tracking a specific battalion's actions,
6 Gerald Nicholson, "The Writing of an Official War History" G.W.L Nicholson Fonds, 26 October 1956, Library and Archives Canada, MG31 G19 Vol. 6,6. 7 Tim Cook, "Clio's Soldiers: Charles Stacey and the Army Historical Section in the Second World War" Canadian Historical Review 83:1 (March 2002), 42. 8 David Wilson also notes a lack of the infantry perspective in Liddell Hart's history of the Royal Tank Regiment, The Tanks (London: Praeger, 1959) and perhaps the only book to deal generally with 4 regimental histories vary enormously in quality, from simply drum and trumpet propaganda serving to perpetuate the mythos of the regiment, to valuable scholarly works, and irreplaceable sources of personal testimony.9 The histories of the three regiments of 1 CAB show the variety in the field, with works ranging from single volume histories covering the entire history of the regiment to collections of anecdotes best likened to a regimental scrapbook.10
Nicholson perpetuated the all-armoured approach in his official history in engagements where 1CAB was working under command of British formations, and further narrowed his selection of what to tell with emphasis on higher commanders. Tim
Cook notes in Clio's Warriors that the historical officers had a bias towards higher rank:
In the process of shaping the war record in form and content, the historical officers chose to favour the larger narrative and the grand movement of units over that of the private soldier. Such neglect must surely be one of the key flaws in the historical process during the war. Very rarely did they mention any soldier below the rank of lieutenant in their dispatches and narratives."
infantry-tanks in the Second World War, Bryan Perrett's Through Mud and Blood: Infantry / Tank Operations in World War //(London: Hale, 1975). David Allan Wilson, "The Development of Tank- Infantry Co-Operation Doctrine In The Canadian Army for the Normandy Campaign of 1944", Masters Thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1992, 10. * Regimental histories have been described as "nursery history", regimental propaganda, and "quixotic monographs more akin to publicity pieces or organizational hagiography than to legitimate historical works." Michael Howard, "The Use and Abuse of Military History." Royal United Service Institution Journal, 107:625 (1962), 4. Cook, Clio's Warriors, 63.Some regimental histories are the products of doctoral dissertations such as Reg Roy's history of the British Columbia Dragoons. R.H. Roy Sinews of Steel (Kelowna: Charters, 1965). Others were the products of Masters theses. Robert Tooley, Invicita: The Carleton and York Regiment in The Second World War (Fredericton: New Ireland Press, 1989). Several Ontario Regiment histories exist, the most informative being, Captain Alexander Schragg, History of the Ontario Regiment: 1866-195], (1951). The Calgary Regiment's two volume series contains a portion of Hugh Henry's University of Victoria Masters Thesis on the regiment's role in the Dieppe raid, along with an eclectic collection of personal anecdotes. Richard Maltby, Onward II (Vancouver: 50/14 Veteran's Association, 1991). The Three Rivers Regiment has both a single volume account of the regiment's history and at least two collections of personal testimony. Jean-Yves Gravel and Michel Grondin. Les Soldats-Citoyens : Histoire du Regiment de Trois-Rivieres, 1871-1978 (Quebec : Editions du Bien public, 1981). J. M. O'Dell, Bogie Wheels (1988). Charles Prieur, War Chronicles 1939-1945, Three Rivers Regiment (Tank) (2000)
Campaign. As a result, its story will always be an appendage to the main Canadian narrative in Italy. An integration of primary source material found in the Canadian and
British unit war diaries offers a long-overdue balanced perspective of this understudied battle.
Beyond filling a gap in the narrative of Canadian participation in the Second
World War, an in depth study of Canadian operations at the Trasimene Line offers a corrective to a historiography which dismisses Anglo-American forces as ineffective and
Canadians in Italy benefited from his own ten-week tour of the country in 1948, which gave the author a new perspective of the difficulties of the rugged Italian terrain. His sympathy for the plight of the soldier in Italy was increased by his hospitalization due to jaundice during the period, as the disease was a common affliction during the campaign. Cook, Clio's Warriors, 110, 180. Nicholson noted a specific goal of his battlefield tour was to examine the terrain from the German perspective. Gerald Nicholson, "The Writing of an Official War History", 8. u Nicholson's account benefits from his access to captured German records. A source for the examination of how The Canadians in Italy was crafted is found in the Nicholson Fonds at the Directorate of History and Heritage. This includes a manuscript which collates all the comments received on drafts of Nicholson's history. Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH), 82/985 F1-F4 Box 1. 6 their infantry-tank concept as flawed.13 Canadian official historian Charles P. Stacey accepted an interpretive framework forged by the post-war writings of Liddell Hart and
Chester Wilmot which criticized Anglo-Canadian military effectiveness. These historians claim that material superiority and Bernard Montgomery's leadership allowed the Allies to best the Germans in Normandy despite the presumed inferiority of Allied soldiers to their German opponents.14 Similar views have been expressed about the
Italian campaign, where an apparently small number of Germans used skill and determination to frustrate the advance of Allied forces. In 1991, John English built on this critical narrative, blaming Canadian high command, in particular, for failing to develop appropriate leadership, training or doctrine in the Canadian Army.15 For
English, Canada's interwar Army was distracted by, "strategic and regimental twin attractions [which] ensured the general neglect of the operational and tactical sphere of war." In this sphere, English argues, the artillery barrage dictated the timing of the attack, robbing junior leaders of initiative on the battlefield. Regimental fealty blinded officers to the need for all-arms training and tank-infantry cooperation was ignored.
" John Ellis' Brute Force (1990), is perhaps the most explicit work that claims quantitative superiority alone resulted in the Allies finally overcoming the qualitatively superior Wehrmacht. Ellis argues that despite industrial and logistic superiority, Allied Commanders "seemed unable to impose their will upon the enemy except by slowly and persistently battering him to death with a blunt instrument." John Ellis, Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War (New York: Viking, 1990). Ellis relies on a large amount of statistics regarding the quantity and abilities of weapons to show that the Allies had a many-fold material superiority over the Axis powers. Francis P. Sempa "Review: Brute Force" Presidential Studies Quarterly, 22: 2 (Spring, 1992), pp. 432-433. Carlo D'Este notes that Ellis' criticism of the Allied "great captains" relies too much on hindsight and not enough on the "fog of war" and the "untangible virtues of leadership." Carlo D'Este, "Review: Brute Force" The Journal of Military History 55:2 (April 1991), 266-267. 14 The narrative which denigrates Canadian military effectiveness is traced to the earlier works of Liddell Hart and Chester Wilmot who wrote that the superior generalship of Montgomery explained allied success against superior soldiers. Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 5-6. 15 John A. English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command (New York: Praeger, 1991), 56, 117, 312. 7 English goes as far to assert that in the Normandy campaign, "without question, the tank
arm remained the weakest link in the Anglo-Canadian order of battle."
In the past decade scholars have begun to revise this critical approach to Anglo-
Canadian military effectiveness. A "third wave" of Canadian military history seeks to
challenge the conventional historical narrative by a close re-examination of individual
battles and their primary sources.16 Drawing on this scholarship, John Buckley's British
Armour in the Normandy Campaign (2004) seeks to revise the orthodox historiography's
criticism of the Anglo-Canadian tank arm.17 Buckley finds three major themes in the
predominant narrative of failure in the campaign: inferior equipment, poor morale and
inadequate tactical and doctrinal techniques. Buckley argues that the so-called 'tank gap'
between German and Allied models was not as pronounced as it has been portrayed, and draws into question the methodology which assesses poor Allied morale. He notes that critics have failed to acknowledge the context of the campaign, and ignored the
innovation and flexibility that was displayed in the armoured divisions and independent
brigades.
16 Lee Windsor notes Canadian military history's first wave was the official historians who often had a top down, uncritical view of operations. The second wave consists of those who accepted their predecessor's narrative and added social and cultural considerations. The third wave has begun to revise the original narrative, often using quantitative methodology associated with social history. Lee Windsor. "Updating the Official Gospel: Canadian Military History's Third Wave", A cadiens is. XXXIII, 2 (Spring 2004), pp. 144-57. The works of Terry Copp and Lee Windsor are those which predominantly influence the current work. Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003). Terry Copp, Cinderella Army: The Canadians in Northwest Europe, 1944-45 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2006). Lee Windsor, "Anatomy of Victory: 1st Canadian Corps, Allied Containment Strategy and The Battle for the Gothic Line", Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of New Brunswick, 2006. Such a revisionist approach at the University of New Brunswick drew on the scholarship of Dominick Graham, and is also evident in the work of Marc Milner. See Marc Milner, "Reflections on Caen, Bocage and the Gap: A Naval Historian's Critique of the Normandy Campaign," Canadian Military History 7:2 (Spring 1998), 7-17 and "Stopping the Panzers: Reassessing the Role of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division in Normandy, 7-10 June 1944," Journal of Military History 74:2 (April 2010) 491-522. " John Buckley, British Armour in the Normandy Campaign (Routledge: New York, 2004), 5-9. 8 An examination of the 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade's operations in the understudied Battle of Lake Trasimene directly addresses the debate over Allied military effectiveness, and fully supports Buckley's views. A close analysis of the battle situates armour as a vital aspect of the combined-arms team, and speaks to the difficulties inherent in tank-infantry communications and co-operation. Study of the battle amends overarching generalizations which deride the performance of the Anglo-Canadian tank arm. At Trasimene, strong bonds between the infantry and the tanks enabled several highly effective assaults, yet when these bonds broke each arm was defeated in detail by their German opponents. The case-study proves the importance of infantry-tank support to the prosecution of the war, and examines the dynamics of the combined-arms team in success and failure.
Armoured Development, 1916-1940
The concept of blitzkrieg had as shocking an effect on armoured historiography, as it did on the French army in 1940.18 Histories condemn the Allied failure to develop and properly use a tank that would fight "from the mud through the blood to the green fields beyond."19 However, the 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade's operations at Trasimene demonstrates the merits of an alternative approach to armoured warfare developed during the interwar period and one that would prevail by the later stages of the Second
World War.
The first armoured fighting vehicles, originally called "tanks" as a method of
'* Interestingly C.P. Stacey notes that the Canadian Chief of General Staff General Harry Crerar mentioned in correspondence of late 1940 that "in some influential quarters in the British Army" the feelings were that infantry tank units were not needed. This could be seen as the direct influence of the Fall of France, which reinforced the idea of armoured divisions and operational manoeuvre. C. P. Stacey, Six Years of War, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966), 89. The Royal Tank Regiment's motto was "from mud, through blood, to the green fields beyond". 9 concealing their identity, lumbered onto the battlefields of the Great War at no more than walking pace.20 In this nascent stage of armoured development, the tank's ability to crush barbed wire and advance into machine-gun fire was recognized as granting the infantry valuable mobility and fire-support, yet just how the tanks were to be used was the source of far-ranging theory and debate. A small number of progressive thinkers, dubbed the
"apostles of mobility" by later armoured enthusiasts, preached a gospel which featured the tank as a decisive war-winner.21 In 1916 an early paper by sapper Giffard LeQuesne
Martel, "A Tank Army", conceived of all-armoured armies sweeping across the battlefield as ships at sea.22 The paper envisioned three types of tanks for the roles of close-quarter action, firepower support, and the destruction of other tanks. The report's suggestion of numerous tank types and all-armoured organization predicted facets of tank development and use that would be much debated in subsequent years.
In December of 1916, Lieutenant J.F.C. Fuller was posted to the staff of the
Heavy Branch of the Machine-Gun Corps which commanded the British Expeditionary
20 More often than not, these mechanical behemoths broke down before reaching their objectives, nearly asphyxiating and cooking their unfortunate crews. Infantry were quick to note that tanks drew a considerable volume of enemy fire. .Making their debut in the Somme offensive of 1916, only nine of forty-nine tanks deployed reached their objectives Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Fire- Power- British Army Weapons and Theories of War (Winchester, Mass: Allen & Unwin Inc., 1982), 137, 135. 21 Armoured advocates formed an important part of the mechanical school in Great War, commonly associated with Winston Churchill, who lobbied against the traditional school, associated with Douglas Haig. It has recently been suggested that a false dialectic between radical prophets and reactionary authorities exists in the literature. J.P. Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks: British Military Thought and Armoured Forces, 1903-1939 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), 72. The ecclesiastic theme is first found in Liddell Hart's regimental history of the Royal Tank Regiment and is later adopted as Lord Carver's title for his survey of armoured theorists. Liddell Hart, The Tanks: The History of the Royal Tank Regiment and its predecessors Heavy Branch Machine-Gun Corps, Tank Corps and Royal Tank Corps 1914-1945, Volume One 1914-1939 (London: Cassell, 1959). Michael Carver, The Apostles of Mobility: The Theory and Practice of Armoured Warfare (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicholson, 1979). 22 Michael Carver, The Apostles of Mobility: The Theory and Practice ofArmoured Warfare (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicholson, 1979), 22-23. 10 Force's tanks in France. Together with Brigadier Hugh Jamieson Elles, Fuller was responsible for planning the Third British Army's 20-28 November 1917 Cambrai offensive, which has been described as "the first truly modern battle," and featured over
300 tanks causing surprise dubbed "tank panic".23 Fuller's most famous treatise on the deployment of armour was "Plan 1919", devised in 1918 after the observation of
German tactical methods in their spring offensive.24 Fuller assigned tanks a role of penetration and disruption, urging troops to attack headquarters (as Fuller put it, the enemy was to be "shot through the brain"). Fuller advocated the mechanical means of attack, claiming that infantry would henceforth play a minor role in warfare. Later, in
1932s Lectures on Field Service Regulations, he went as far to state that, "to combine tanks and infantry is tantamount to yoking a tractor to a draught-horse."25 Historian and
Royal Tank Corps veteran Michael Carver notes that while Fuller was a regular contributor to the fledgling tank arm's intellectual discourse, by 1926 and the publication of The Foundations of the Science of War, his obtuse, academic approach had alienated him, sounding the "death-knell" for this "unrealistic visionary['s]" career.26 Yet the idea of all tank formations survived and forms the basis of the British Armoured Division of
1939.
Sir Basil Liddell Hart's writing career began after he was gassed at the Somme
23 Sir Ivor Maxse, after Cambrai, was to state that, "the tank, if used in the battle with discretion, is capable of economizing man power and minimizing casualties." Imperial War Museum, Maxse Papers, XVIII Corps, No. G..S. 70 Dated 21 August 1917. As in Bidwell and Graham, 91, 128. J.P. Harris doubts that Fuller was responsible for the planning of Cambrai as is conventionally stated, instead suggesting Brigadier H.H. Tudor, the Commander Royal Artillery of 9th Division. J.P. Harris, 104. 24 Robert H. Larson, The British Army and the Theory of Armored Warfare, 1918-1940 (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1984), 90. 25 In Michael Carver, 37. 26 JP Harris, in a work that seeks to diminish the influence of Fuller and Liddell Hart on Second World War armoured doctrine and practice, claims that Fuller "often ignore[ed] the inconvenient complexities of the real world." J.P. Harris, 83. 11 and then posted back to England for troop training, where his training manuals on infantry tactics brought him notoriety. By 1924, Hart had left the army for a full-time career in journalism. His position at Daily Telegraph and later at the Times gave him considerable influence on both public and military opinion during the early years of military mechanization.27 His concept of the expanding torrent and the indirect approach are his legacy to armoured theory. Liddell Hart claimed the expanding torrent, "was designed to turn opportunism into a system, so that a progressive infusion of resources should go on as quickly and continuously as possible along the line of least resistance."28
Hart's notion of defeating the enemy's will instead of his physical forces, the so-called
"indirect approach," was a theory that he shared with Fuller. As Michael Carver stated,
"in essence, the indirect approach was a strategy of dislocation through paralysis rather than annihilation through attrition." Significantly for both his popularity in the military establishment and the feasibility of his ideas, Hart had not abandoned the infantry in his enthusiasm for armour.
During the Great War the British Army developed two types of tanks: the more ponderous and heavy rhomboidal Mark series, and the more lightly armed yet quicker
Mediums. In November of 1919, the British Army Council solidified its continued desire for two types of tanks: the one for close support and the other for exploitation.29
The Field Service Manuals of 1920 and 1924, however, indicate that the infantry-support
27 John J. Mearshimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 3. 21 Carver, 40, 87. 29 David French, Raising Churchill's Army: The British Army and the War Against Germany, 1919-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University, 2000), 28. David Wilson claims that economic weakness and a poor industrial capacity led to the "dual doctrine" of infantry and cruiser tanks, which reacted to the only types of tanks being produced. Wilson, "The Development of Tank-Infantry Co-Operation Doctrine in the Canadian Army for the Normandy Campaign of 1944", 38. 12 role was paramount.30 The manuals argued for mutual support stressing, "tanks must
protect infantry from machine gun fire and the delay imposed by uncut wire; infantry
must protect tanks from the close range fire of enemy field artillery and antitank guns."
Historians Bidwell and Graham address a divergence, however, between doctrinal discourse and reality. The authors state that, "Field Service Regulations, supported by the several arms manuals - Infantry Training, Cavalry Training, Tank and Armoured
Car Training, Artillery Training — proved impeccable guidelines for the conduct of operations, but they were abstractions, treating the arms as pieces on the chessboard of war with characteristics as unvarying as chessmen."31 It would take employment of combined-arms groups in operations to learn that the varying conditions of the battlefield would necessitate a flexible doctrine.
The Kirke Committee was formed in 1931 to distil the lessons of the last war and ensure they were enshrined in manuals and training.32 Tanks were valued in the subsequent report, and a recommendation was made to permanently affiliate tank and infantry units. Yet as the Army's role was still thought to be mainly defence of the empire and not a war on the continent, the subject was largely dismissed. In 1937, the
Mobile Division was formed, with mechanized cavalry in light tanks, soon to be overtaken by the armoured division proper. The organization of this division on the outbreak of the Second World War included two tank brigades and a mixed brigade of artillery and infantry. The armoured division, equipped with cruiser tanks, was to apply
30 Robert H. Larson, The British Army and the Theory ofArmored Warfare, 1918-1940 (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1984), 113. 31 The criticism is extended to Fuller, Liddell, and Hobart's "literary approach to any problem." Bidwell and Graham, 171,178. 32 Bidwell and Graham, 187. 13 the doctrine of the "apostles of mobility" in the break-through battle, while the infantry- support tanks were organized in "army-tank brigades" which were to thicken up the
infantry's firepower and support infantry divisions during the break-in battle. As will be seen, histories have emphasized the failure of Allied armoured divisions to achieve true operational manoeuvre, and dismissed infantry tanks using the same standards as the cruisers.
The Blitzkrieg Standard and Explanations for British Armoured Failings
Between 1916 and 1940, the British armoured forces developed into an autonomous arm, with tanks and doctrine for the roles of infantry support, reconnaissance and exploitation. Yet in May 1940, the fall of France and subsequent withdrawal of the
British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk served to emphasize all that the British Army was not. It apparently did not possess tanks of the quantity or quality of the Germans.33
Nor was it equipped with the mobile doctrine and organization which could penetrate the enemy's line and fight a battle of manoeuvre in the vulnerable rear areas. The subsequent historiography, heavily influenced by Liddell Hart himself, has largely posited that German success justified those British apostles of mobility in the interwar years who had argued for highly mobile and independent armoured forces.34 The failure of French armour, the majority of which were infantry-tanks spread throughout their
33 This opinion lingers despite the success of the May 1940 Arras counterattack, which witnessed the success of the Matilda I Infantry Tanks in Douglas Pratt's 1 Army Tank Brigade against Rommel's 7th Armoured Division tanks which had outpaced their infantry support. The attack allowed the British to fortify Dunkirk. Perrett, 26-37. 34 John Mearshimer has reassessed Liddell Hart's role in the interwar years, claiming that his policies for avoiding a continental commitment were detrimental to the development of British arms in the late 1930s. Mearshimer rejects Hart's influence on blitzkrieg, claims that the indirect approach was in fact an alternative to the blitzkrieg strategy, and shows that Hart believed in Douhetian notions of heavy aerial bombing as the answer to the dominance of defence. John Mearshimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 5-6. 14 defensive positions, seemed to further justify these claims. The result of the German
Blitzkrieg was to diminish the importance of infantry-support tanks and shift the emphasis to armoured divisions in the breakthrough role.
Explanation of the British failure to develop their armoured forces to the
proficiency of their German rivals comes in material, social and cultural forms. The
financial restrictions of the interwar years meant that the budget for the British armed
forces was small. The portion spent on tank procurement was largely put into the development of light tanks, which were valuable for training, force protection,
reconnaissance and imperial policing. The general weakness of the British interwar mechanical industry is also suggested as a reason why British tanks did not stand up to the German models. Cultural explanations include the memory of the attrition of the
Great War in the British psyche. This reduced public sympathy for military spending and deterred British politicians and soldiers from planning for another continental commitment. The Ten Year Rule, instated in 1919, determined that Britain would not be engaged in another major war for a decade and thus would not need to concern itself
with rearmament. In 1928, the rule was made into an automatically renewing part of
British policy on a daily basis. Under these conditions it was impossible for British
Army planners to lobby for the budget and materials to prepare for a continental war.
The conventional social explanation puts the blame for inadequate development of the tank arm on conservatives in the cavalry who were reticent to give up their horses.
As Graham and Bidwell put it, the regimental system meant that infantry, artillery and cavalry "were inclined to resist all arms doctrines and to cling to their autonomy."35 The
33 Bidwell and Graham, 37, 152. 15 cult of the horse was also a force against mechanization. Regimental officers dug-in their heels against progress which would deny them hunting or polo. The cavalry lobby was notably powerful in the interwar years.36
Despite problems of doctrine, organization and equipment during the interwar years, British armoured theorists remained adamant after 1945 that they pioneered the concept of Blitzkrieg.37 The suggestion by Liddell Hart, reinforced by Heinz Guderian's post-1945 memoirs, that German generals learned from his interwar writings has since been vehemently opposed. Graham and Bidwell question, "how Liddell Hart had the effrontery to claim after the war was over that the German generals were among his disciples, when in fact in the desert they adopted an exactly opposite policy and disproved his fanciful theories by repeatedly and bloodily crushing the widely dispersed units of the Eighth Army one by one is difficult to understand."38 The British reaction
36 Cavalry Colonels were respected member of the regiment, usually a retired member, and together were a powerful pressure group. Bidwell and Graham claim that the Royal Armoured Corps, created in April 1939 by combining the mechanized cavalry units and the Royal Tank Corps, was the weakest of the three British arms because it was built on the hide-bound cavalry regiments. As a result "the new, decisive arm of the future" was given to "the most mentally inert, unprofessional and reactionary group in the British army." British armoured forces, which claimed to want fire support only from the Royal Horse Artillery are described as "prisoners of their class and their regimental upbringing." Bidwell and Graham, 190. 227-28. Robert Larson has recently challenged this explanation, suggesting that the rise of the middle classes and the dominance of infantry and artillery in the officer corps' senior ranks meant that the landed cavalry class's resistance of mechanization was marginalized. Larson's work instead suggests a failure to dispense with a Napoleonic model of warfare which favoured attrition. Larson, 17-18. 37 In the post-war world, the role of the newly formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces was to prevent the Russian forces from invading Western Europe, a role at which the German Army had ample experience. In the early cold war, NATO operational planners looked to the German model, and to captured German generals to develop their doctrine. Terry Copp in the premier revisionist work of Canadian Second World War military history, notes that Kurt Meyer, commander of the 12th S.S. Hitler Youth Panzer Division was released from his cell to help NATO members study German tactics. Terry Copp, Fields of Fire, 7. Buckley, 5-9. Heinz Guderian. Panzer Leader, (Michael Joseph: 1970). 3* Bidwell and Graham criticize the British Army in North Africa for a lack of combined-arms doctrine. Bidwell and Graham describe the British Jock Columns as little more than mobile batteries for long- range harassing fire. The propensity to send out "Jock Columns" is derided for separating the different arms, especially leaving the artillery behind. Armoured divisions are particularly chastised for "dispersion and fragmentation of units" in their deployment and failure to meet the German standard of manoeuvre in mass at close enough intervals for mutual support between the tanks, guns 16 to the German Blitzkrieg called for more armoured divisions. The speed with which the
French forces were overwhelmed suggested that the tank was the decisive weapon of a
new form of modern warfare.39
It has been shown that the idea of infantry-tanks in the support role has been
diminished by a strong conceptual lobby in favour of cruiser-tank operations commonly
associated with the German blitzkrieg of 1940. That true operational manoeuvre was
exceedingly rare and difficult to perform is evident from a cursory examination of the
history of the Second World War. The failure of Anglo-American units to meet the
blitzkrieg standard is an unfair appraisal of Allied armour. Ubiquitous Anglo-American
infantry-tank formations operating the Sherman and Churchill tanks were a vital
component of the Allied order of battle. Their role in grinding down the Germans in
battle was a significant contribution to winning the war which is evident in the
Trasimene case-study. To the development of 1CAB to prosecute this role we now turn.
and motorized infantry. Bidwell and Graham, 222-25, 233. " Historians have gone as far as to suggest that the role of infantry in the offensive was questioned. Timothy Harrison Place, "Lionel Wigram, Battle Drill and the British Army in the Second World War," War in History 7:4 (2000), 445. 17 CHAPTER TWO: Precursor to Trasimene: 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade's
Training and Operations
Formation and Training of 1 Canadian Army Tank Brigade
Prior to the Trasimene battle, 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade had the better part of two years training in Britain and a year of operational experience. During this period standard operating procedures for tank-infantry cooperation and communication were developed which helped the brigade marry-up swiftly with the infantry that it was tasked to support, and then to fight effectively alongside these foot-soldiers. Infantry-tank doctrine was constantly changing during the period as doctrinal concepts were forced to conform to the reality of warfare. From its modest beginnings in Borden, Ontario 1
Canadian Armoured Brigade kept abreast of these changes. Moreover, it learned hard
lessons in combat from July 1943 onwards. By 1944 it had developed into the most desired infantry-tank formation in the Eighth British Army.
The Canadian Armoured Corps got off to a slow start. In 1936, six units were designated tank units, including those of the future 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade which
re-badged from infantry to armour.40 The addition of the word "Tank" on the end of the
regimental names was the closest these regiments would come to an armoured fighting
vehicle for some time.41 At the beginning of 1938 the Canadian Tank School appeared at
40 The six units re-badged were: the Argyll Light Infantry, the Ontario Regiment, the Three Rivers Regiment, the Calgary Regiment, the New Brunswick Regiment, and the Essex Regiment. The Ontario regiment was chosen to switch to armour as there was not much experience in vehicle driving and maintenance during the era. It was hoped the regiment's recruiting base of Oshawa, home of the General Motors plant, would help to liaise between the army and the automobile industry. J.K. Marteinson and Michael McNorgan, The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps: An Illustrated History (Kitchener: Robin Brass, 2000), 70. 41 Tank production began in Canada in May-June 1941. Prior to this the only tanks available for training were sixteen British light tanks, some obsolete American light tanks (arriving in the summer of 1940) and a single Infantry Tank Mk III Valentine sent as a Canadian production template. C. P. Stacey, "Canadian Military Headquarters Report No. 42: Visit to Canadian Army Tank Brigade", 13 August 18 Borden, Ontario, equipped with only a handful of light tanks. The new regiments began
training in trades, driving and maintenance, machine-gunnery, communications and
tactics.42 Crew training followed, with a day-long tactical exercise using Carden-Lloyd
light tanks. Tactics of the day were strictly infantry-support. During the first months of
the war National Defence Headquarters debated the usefulness of Canada's tank arm, considering closing the school in January 1940 and reconverting the Three Rivers and
Ontario regiments to infantry. The Blitzkrieg of 1940 quelled these doubts and staff at
National Defence Headquarters began to consider the formation of an armoured
brigade.43 Public opinion had a similar reaction to Blitzkrieg, with editorials demanding
more armour in the Canadian Army and the organization of a "buy-a-tank" campaign in
Kitchener. Malcolm Sullivan, author of the most detailed personal account of Canadian
Second World War armoured operations, recalls the exciting newspaper accounts of
"fast-moving tank warfare near cities and places with strange sounding names."44 On 4
February 1941, the 1 Canadian Army Tank Brigade, Canadian Armoured Corps (CAC),
was officially formed, with the 11th Army Tank Battalion (Ontario Regiment (Tank) and the 12th Army Tank Battalion (Three Rivers Regiment (Tank)) from the already existent
1 Canadian Armoured Brigade and adding the 14th Army Tank Battalion (Calgary
1941,2. 42 The school was later known as the Canadian Armoured Fighting Vehicle School and the Canadian Armoured Fighting Vehicles Training Centre. Marteinson and McNorgan, 74, 83-4. 43 Historians note that the Fall of France caused the British to believe that the tank would be the queen of the battlefield. Keith Donaldson, "Thunder in the Mountains: 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade in Italy, 1943-1944," Masters Thesis, University of Calgary, 2008, 22. 44 Sullivan, C. Malcolm. 3 Troop: A Fighting Unit of a Canadian Tank Squadron in Wartime Italy and Holland, Where Fear of Failure Was Overcome (Saint John: Centennial Print, 1998), 5. Lawrence Zaporzan's masters thesis takes the wartime experiences of Sydney Valpy Radley-Walters as its topic, and offers an extremely detailed account of Canadian Second World War armoured operations. Lawrence James Zaporzan, "Rad's War: A Biographical Study of Sydney Valpy Radley-Walters From Mobilization to the End of the Normandy Campaign 1944," Masters Thesis, University of New Brunswick, 2001. 19 Regiment (Tank) personally selected by Brigadier Frank F. Worthington.45 In April
1941, a large contingent of the 1 Army Tank Brigade sailed for England. Many men were attached to British units for training while waiting for the rest of the brigade to arrive on 30 June.
Troopers of the 1 Canadian Army Tank Brigade in Britain gradually progressed from individual basic training to large-scale exercises. The early period was typified by a lack of equipment and personnel, and it was not until the spring of 1942 that the war establishment in both was attained.46 Meanwhile, Brigade headquarters staff progressed from skeleton exercises, practising operations and administrative orders, to sand-table exercises and tactical exercises without troops on a weekly basis.47 Larger exercises were more helpful for training the staff of formations rather than units or sub-units, but the long movements over roads exposed mechanical problems with their Churchill tanks and put the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers to the test in their repair.48 In
1941, the Brigade was stationed under canvas at Lavington, carrying out exercises with
43 In an early report, the official historian names the 11 February 1941 as the effective date of the Brigade's placement on active duty. C. P. Stacey, "Canadian Military Headquarters Report No. 42: Visit to Canadian Army Tank Brigade", 13 August 1941, 2. C. P. Stacey, Six Years of War, 92. The Three Rivers and Ontario regiments were officially turned into Army Tank Battalions. Marteinson and McNorgan, 89. Worthington is considered the father of the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps and is still revered by its members. 46 In August 1941 gunnery training was delayed due to a lack of ammunition. C. P. Stacey, "Canadian Military Headquarters Report No. 42: Visit to Canadian Army Tank Brigade", 13 August 1941,4. 47 In September 1942, some kinks were still left to be ironed out as the results of Exercise ROLLO, on identifications and passing information indicated that the intelligence personnel needed more training. 1 Canadian Army Tank Brigade Headquarters War Diary (W.D.), September 1942, Microfilm TI0629, Library and Archives Canada. 4* The umpire after exercise "BEAVER III" 22-24 April 1942, an division-scale exercise in anti-invasion training, noted that "the way tanks were driven, kept going, repaired and brought on was worthy of the highest praise." 119 of the 139 Churchill's were at one time off the road with breakdowns. Gearboxes were the primary cause of failure at 17.6%, as selector rails fractured and third and fourth speed forks bent; next came steering brakes at 15.9% and bogies at 12.16%. 1 Army Tank Brigade Headquarters War Diary, May 1942, Microfilm T10629, Library and Archives Canada. Marteinson and McNorgan, 108. C.P. Stacey noted that large scale-exercises were lessons in tactics to officers, but only tests of endurance for the average soldier. C.P. Stacey, "Canadian Military Headquarters Report No. 133: Battle Drill Training," 31 August 1944, 19. 20 the Home Guard and placed in a limited operational role for local defence.49 The
Brigade was under the Canadian Corps for administration and training and under
Southern Command for this operational role. The personnel of the brigade became
gradually accustomed to English life. Social acclimatizing ranged from the formal
inspection of King George VI to a more common liaison indicated by high rates of
venereal disease and the occasional court martial for bigamy.
As fresh recruits were added to the Brigade they were inserted into the training
schedule and given a role. In March 1942, the standard of basic training was still
deemed to be low, and the training period was extended another month and a half.50 In
August the Calgary Regiment suffered heavy losses in the Dieppe raid, which would
necessitate a return to basic training for its fresh reinforcements." New personnel would
have had some form of their basic training completed which would include physical
hardening, knowledge of military protocol, and small arms range practice. For tank
crews the next step in the process was to be assigned a technical trade in the armoured
vehicle.52 Training pamphlets emphasized that, "the object of crew training is to produce
a team."53 Working within the tight confines of their vehicle and dependent upon each
" C. P. Stacey, "Canadian Military Headquarters Report No. 42: Visit to Canadian Army Tank Brigade", 13 August 1941, 4. 50 1 Canadian Army Tank Brigade Headquarters War Diary, February 1942, Microfilm T10629, Library and Archives Canada. 51 The regiment lost eighteen officers, including the commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Andrews, 159 other ranks, and twenty-nine Churchill tanks. 1 Canadian Army Tank Brigade W.D., August 1942. 52 Intensive trades training was the main reason why tank crews were considered more expensive to train than infantrymen. Place notes the reluctance to use these more expensive troops for general labour in the Home Forces. Place, "Lionel Wigram, Battle Drill and the British Army in the Second World War," 445. Crew positions consisted of drivers, co-drivers, loader-operators, gunners and commanders. All members of a tank crew were expected to be acquainted with each other's role in case of casualties. Replenishment and maintenance tasks were divided amongst the crew, with the driver being primarily responsible for mechanical aspects. "Military Training Pamphlet No. 22: Part III - Employment, Tactical handling of Army Tank Battalions:," (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1939). 53 "Military Training Pamphlet No. 51: Troop Training for Cruiser Tank Troops" (Ottawa: King's Printer, 21 other for survival, armoured crews would become strongly attached to each other. They knew every nuance of their vehicle from daily maintenance and operation, and often gave it a name, making it the sixth member of the crew.
The 1 Canadian Army Tank Brigade began their tenure in Britain with the
Infantry Tank Mark IIA "Matilda." and progressed through several tank models during training.54 In 1943 the Brigade received the M4A4 Sherman tank, which it would fight with during its operations in Sicily, Italy and North-West Europe. If technological determinism is an important theme in the history of Second World War armoured operations, then the Sherman tank is a primary focus of historical debate. Its apparently impotent gun, thin armour and propensity to "brew up" and incinerate its crew is oft portrayed as a pathetic match for the awe-inspiring German Tiger and Panther tanks.55
This perspective has produced a vast array of glossy picture books that portray armoured warfare as a series of tank designs. The majority of them imply that the ability to field a superior piece of equipment is the most important factor in armoured warfare, and that the Allies were a step behind the Germans throughout the war.56
October 1941), 4. 54 The Matilda showed its worth in a counterattack near Arras in 1940, but was soon to be proven out of date by the desert war. The Ontario Regiment received the first Infantry Tank Mark IV "Churchill" off the assembly line in the late summer of 1941 .A representative of the Vauxhall manufacturer was appointed to the brigade to report on results in training during this experimental stage. C. P. Stacey, "Canadian Military Headquarters Report No. 42: Visit to Canadian Army Tank Brigade", 13 August 1941, 5. Throughout 1941-42 the brigade gradually upgraded from the Churchill I to the Churchill IV, upgrading the main armament from the 2 pounder gun to the 6 pounder. The 12th Canadian Army Tank Battalion received its first Churchill II with 6pdr gun in the second week of April. By late June all "A" vehicles were received by the brigade, and 48 Churchill Ills were on-hand. In early 1943, the brigade was briefly issued the Canadian Ram tank. 1CAB Headquarters War Diary. Microfilm T10629. Library and Archives Canada. 55 Popular accounts note that burning gasoline was to blame for the Sherman's propensity to burn, but it was acknowledged at the time that ammunition was the culprit. The tanks were stocked with shells in every conceivable compartment, and their proclivity for ignition was later reduced by wet stowage for the rounds. 56 John Stone, The Tank Debate: Armour and the Anglo-American Military Tradition (London: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000), vii. Exemplary of the genre is author Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, whose 22 Recent revisionists question this dominant theme of German qualitative tank superiority. By 1990, Paddy Griffith made the claim that the "myth of German supremacy in tank design was, indeed, a myth."57 He claims that parity between Anglo-
American and German tanks existed throughout the war and suggests that the British held a slight advantage for most of the desert war. Historian Lee Windsor has noted that the Sherman tank's climbing and river fording ability, engine and suspension reliability and speed made the tank well-suited to the Italian campaign.58 Windsor states that the
Sherman's wide track and powerful engine afforded "some degree of tank superiority" over the German tanks. As Ontario Regiment troop commander Malcolm Sullivan stated, the Sherman "was a marvellous infantry support weapon" with an accurate high- explosive capability.59 Canadian armoured veterans have also noted that the Sherman's
technical works take an engineering approach to the challenges of tank warfare. Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, Design and Development of Fighting Vehicles, (London: Macdonald, 1968). Ogorkiewicz, Armoured Forces (New York: Arco Publishing Company, Inc, 1960). A more nuanced and well-balanced version of this genre is exemplified by Stephen Hart's Sherman Firefly vs. Tiger. While Hart includes the usual diagrams and data on armour thickness, top speed, and muzzle velocity, he also includes information on the tanks in combat and the difficulties that crews faced in their operation. Stephen A. Hart, Sherman Firefly vs. Tiger (Oxford: Osprey, 2007), 4. 57 P.G. Griffith, "British Armoured Warfare in the Western Desert 1940-43," in Armoured Warfare, ed. J.P. Harris and F. H. Toase (New York: St. Martins, 1990), 74. 58 Lee Windsor, "Quansem Ilep: I Canadian Corps breaks the Gothic Line Summer, 1944," M.A. Thesis, Laurier University, 1996, 10,31, 102, 185. Lee Windsor, "Anatomy of Victory: 1st Canadian Corps, Allied Containment Strategy and The Battle for the Gothic Line", Ph.D. diss., University of New Brunswick, 2006, 107, 131, 148,173,277,384. An opposite perspective on climbing ability is given in a postwar survey of the commanding officers of the Three Rivers and Calgary Tank Regiments. When prompted to outline the Sherman's greatest weaknesses, Lieutenant Colonels Caron and Richardson singled out climbing ability and lack of armour. Major Mclndoe of the Ontario Regiment claimed high silhouette and high track pressure as the Sherman's flaws. "Armour and Equipment Questionnaire", M.B.K. Gordon Fonds, Library and Archives Canada, MG30 E367, Vol. 2. Interestingly, Field Marshall Albert Kesselring when prompted to compare the Sherman and Tiger tanks after the war claimed that the Sherman had the advantage in mobility, manoeuvrability, a more powerful motor and a better "caterpillar drive." He notes, however, that "when it comes to a question of fire power and armor plating, however, 1 must admit that I preferred the "Tiger." Donald S. Detwiller, ed., World War II German Military Studies, Volume J. Part II. The ETHINTSeries Continued, ETHINT 72, Question 16, 6 May 1946 (New York: Garland, 1979). 5* Good mobility and machine-guns also come under praise for the infantry-support role. These comments are tempered in noting that the Sherman's armoured-piercing shell could "rarely penetrate more than three inches of armour plate." Sullivan, 39, 66. 23 mechanized turret traverse system gave its gunner the critical opportunity to fire the first shot.60 In the broken Italian terrain, the Sherman's speed could be used by a skilled crew to compensate for the German tank's advantages in armour and gun.
Avoiding the presentation of armoured warfare as a series of tank designs helps to achieve a more balanced perspective. While tank enthusiasts often compare the specifications of opposing army's tank models to show that German tanks would win in a duel over open ground, such idealized jousting matches was not how the war was fought. Instead, it was the integration of the tank in an all-arms team, fighting in the uncontrollable factors of terrain and weather which was decisive on the battlefield.
There can be no doubting that technology plays a major role in military effectiveness, but the manner in which it is used is equally important.
Tank-infantry co-operation training may be considered the basic building block of the combined-arms team. British doctrinal pamphlets, which formed the basis of
Canadian tactics as well, stressed that knowledge of the other arms, and particularly how the infantry platoon fights, was essential.61 British doctrine of 1942 prescribed a two
60 Sydney Valpy Radley-Walters gives a favourable view of the M4A4 in Lawrence Zaporzan's biographical study. Lawrence James Zaporzan, "Rad's War: A Biographical Study of Sydney Valpy Radley-Walters From Mobilization to the End of the Normandy Campaign 1944," Masters Thesis, University of New Brunswick, 2001, 128. Charles Baily also revises the German tank superiority thesis by noting in close country, and in poor visibility situations such as thick fog, the Sherman's swift power-traverse often trumped the long-range guns of the German tanks. General Creighton Abrams, for whom the current main battle tank of the American Army is named, is enlisted to support the Sherman's dominance in turret traverse and manoeuvrability in flanking attacks. Charles M. Baily, Faint Praise: American Tanks and Tank Destroyers during World War II (Connecticut: Archon, 1983), 106, 111. Roman Jarymowycz notes the electric traverse was extremely helpful in the fog for the same reasons, Roman Jarymowycz, Tank Tactics (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner: 2001), 247. The Italian terrain was hard on the Sherman tank mechanically, however, and the Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers attached to 1CAB must be praised for keeping engines, transmissions, final drives and suspensions operating after so much climbing. Don Dingwall, Canadian Armour in the Italian Campaign Italy 1943-1945 (Kanata: Canadian Tracks Publishing, 1999), 7. 61 "Training Instruction No. 28: The Troop Leader of an Army Tank Battalion", 1 Canadian Army Tank Brigade Headquarters War Diary, 6 January 1942, Microfilm T10629, Library and Archives Canada. 24 echelon advance against a prepared defence. The first was to be an all-tank force which would neutralize enemy machine-guns so that the second could advance. The second echelon was to be a mixed force of armour and infantry which would advance to and hold the objective. In Britain, the 1 Canadian Army Tank Brigade trained with a large number of the infantry battalions of the I Canadian Corps. Typical arrangements were a three-day course, which would be very similar to that used in the spring of 1944 when training in theatre with the infantry of the XIII British Corps. The training sessions began with lectures, and progressed to familiarizing infantry with the tanks and finally small-scale exercises. As the I Canadian Army Tank Brigade would be operating with a number of different infantry units in operations, this training process was good preparation for swift liaison and planning at all levels.
This cursory examination of the 1 Canadian Army Tank Brigade's two years in
Britain offers a corrective to histories which blame poor training for presumed poor
Anglo-Canadian military effectiveness. J.K. Marteinson and Michael McNorgan emphasize the lack of training procedure during this era for army tank battalions.62 The authors claim that due to a lack of emphasis on the combined arms team in the doctrinal pamphlets of the period, little work was done on all-arms operations beyond basic familiarity with the workings of the other arm. Buckley notes that the British were good at the technical side of training (radio, gunnery, etc) but not as good at the tactical side.63
A lack of space to manoeuvre and equipment is said by Buckley to have reduced the efficiency of British tactical training. Keith Donaldson revises this criticism of armoured training in his 2008 Masters thesis on 1 Canadian Army-Tank Brigade's
62 Marteinson and McNorgan, 132. 6j Buckley, British Armour in the Normandy Campaign, 81. 25 operations. Donaldson emphasizes the intensive training for tank, troop and squadron leaders in movement and the proper use of ground.64 The fundamentals of these were stated in one training instruction as using manoeuvre and terrain to reduce the target one presents to the enemy, force the enemy into disadvantageous ground, and avoiding difficult ground.65
1 CAB's training was highly influenced by the Canadian Corps' enthusiasm for battle drill. Battle drill was a method of teaching minor tactics to infantry which used fire and movement and realism. Donaldson notes that after the adoption of battle drill, the tankers increasingly applied infantry concepts of fire and movement, involving leaps and bounds with a one group giving covering fire and another moving up to the next firing position.66 In the case of the 1 Canadian Army Tank Brigade, the numerous exercises involving tank infantry co-operation seem to suggest that ample time was afforded to familiarize the armour with the infantry arm. Yet for infantry battalions, three days spent training with armour could only go so far to develop all-arms combat teams.
Timothy Harrison Place has noted that failure to link the minor tactics of battle drill with the preferred higher tactics of the artillery barrage was a hindrance to the development of a common British doctrine.67 The training syllabi of 1 Canadian Army Tank Brigade seems to support this thesis. Since the artillery, arguably the most sophisticated arm in the Anglo-Canadian order of battle, often dictated the timings of offensive actions during the war, such a failing may be a major training disadvantage during the era. The notion
64 Donaldson, 23. 65 "Training Instruction No. 28 - The T[roo]P L[ea]D[e]R of an A[rm]Y T[an]K B[attalio]N" Microfilm T-10629, Vol. 14027, WD HQ 1 CATB, January 1942, Appendix 2. As found in Donaldson, 24. 66 Donaldson, 26. 67 Harrison Place, "Lionel Wigram..450. 26 that training is essentially manoeuvre and war-fighting essentially fire-power would
seem to hold true.
The 1 Canadian Army Tank Brigade had conducted ample training at all levels of
command before sailing for the Mediterranean in June 1943. Stacey's ultimate verdict is
that while the Canadians had trained hard for years, there was no substitute for battle:
"there is no doubt that training can do just so much and no more; there is no umpire and
no instructor like the bullet."68 Stacey notes that equipment shortages in the early days
lost precious time, and training methods were evolving through-out the period. The
official historian places the brunt of his criticisms on regimental officers, "whose attitude
towards training was casual and haphazard rather than urgent and scientific." Others
note that boredom was setting in by the spring of 1943 after two years of training in
Britain.69 Some senior officers were concerned that these troops were losing their edge.
In the case of the 1 Canadian Army Tank Brigade, there is no evidence of lack
lustre attitudes or poor morale. The large number of tank-infantry training sessions with the I Canadian Corps suggest that the brigade was largely familiar with a host of infantry
battalions. This process would pay dividends for a brigade which would constantly be operating with different infantry battalions in operations. Quick and efficient liaison and
planning with cooperating infantry would be essential for the Brigade's operations with
the Eighth Army, and training was excellent in this respect. Further development of the combined-arms team would progress in the unforgiving classroom of war.
Operations from HUSKY to DIADEM
As official historians C.P. Stacey and William McAndrew have noted, actual operations
" C. P. Stacey, Six Years of War, 253. Marteinson and McNorgan, 143. 27 are the best form of training for any formation.70 From July 1943 when the brigade participated in Operation HUSKY to June 1944 when the brigade participated in the breaking of the Trasimene Line, extensive operational experience was gained. Working with a number of British and Commonwealth divisions through terrain that varied from volcanic mountains to undulating hill-country, the brigade became adept at quickly formulating plans with unfamiliar infantry. In the event, it was seldom deployed as a formation, its units usually parcelled out in troop and squadron sized packages where- ever the infantry of the Eighth Army would need them the most.
The Eighth Army was famous for its victories in the desert, and the campaign in
North Africa represented a sharp learning curve for the Anglo-Americans. David Wilson argued that a major failure existed in the lack of tactical integration of tanks and infantry early in the African campaign.71 Wilson noted that as the war continued the doctrinal pamphlets began to change to reflect the nature of experience. In February 1942, the
New Zealanders in the desert had "jettisoned British doctrine when the press of battle proved it to be flawed."72 A report from North Africa claimed that infantry must remain close to the tanks in the first wave, as they were responsible for neutralizing enemy anti tank guns. In "Notes from Theatres of War No.10 (Cyrenica/Western Desert, Jan./June,
1942)" the infantry were told to precede the tanks to destroy these anti-tank guns in defiance of the current doctrine. The Canadians had benefited during training from such
70 William McAndrew, "5th Canadian Armoured Division: The Background - 1943-1944", Directorate of History and Heritage, 84/68 folder 3, 18. As C.P. Stacey put it, "nothing can take the place of battle in the final moulding of the efficient soldier." C. P. Stacey, Six Years of War, 248. 71 Wilson follows this lack of integration through the contradictory ebb and flow of doctrinal pamphlets up to the Normandy campaign. David Allan Wilson, "The Development of Tank-Infantry Co-Operation Doctrine In The Canadian Army for the Normandy Campaign of 1944", Masters Thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1992, ii. 72 Wilson, 88. 28 pamphlets and from soldiers who had served on exchange with British units in North
Africa.73 Throughout 1942, numerous lectures from veterans of the North African campaign were attended by the officers of the 1 Canadian Army Tank Brigade.74 1
Canadian Armoured Brigade (designated this title in August 1943) would operate under command of the Eighth Army for the better part of two years, beginning in July 1943 with Operation HUSKY, the invasion of Sicily.75
In Sicily, the Three Rivers Regiment played a major role in support of the 1st
Canadian Division, while the remainder of the brigade remained comparatively idle.
The regiment was introduced to a number of features in Sicily that would be common throughout the Italian campaign. The most shocking of these in terms of the trooper's experience was death. On the 15 July 1943, the regiment received its "baptism of fire"in an encounter battle at Grammichele; one trooper was killed and eight men were wounded.76 The advance from the town of Valguarnera introduced the tankers to the
71 The first draft of which reached Algiers on 3 January 1943. The total exchange numbered 201 officers and 147 other ranks. C. P. Stacey, Six Years of War, 248. Around two dozen of these were armoured personnel. Marteinson and McNorgan, 143. One officer and one of the other ranks were sent from both the 1 l'b and 12th Canadian Army Tank Battalions. 1 Canadian Army Tank Brigade War Diary, December 1942. Brigadier W.C. Murphy recalled, how "eagerly [tank-men] perused reports from the western desert during the years they sat in England awaiting their turn." W.C. Murphy, "What is Tank Country?" Canadian Military History 7:4 (August 1998), 69. 74 On 31 January, General Martel lectured, on 17 July Lt.Col. Bogert lectured on Libya, on 24 July Colonel Thompson of the R.C.O.C. lectured on "Recovery and Repair of Tanks in Libya". On 1 September, General Willoughby Borri, the O/C Administration Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, gave lectures to staff officers. On 13 October, Lt.Col. Mclntyre lectured on the Burma campaign. It should be noted that most lectures were given to the staff officers only. 1 Canadian Army Tank Brigade War Diary, 1942 Microfilm T10629. Library and Archives Canada. The Commanding Officer of the Three Rivers Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Leslie Booth, had been one of the officers attached to a British armoured regiment in North Africa. Marteinson and McNorgan, 144. 75 During August, squadron organization changed from five troops per each of the three squadrons to four, with only three tanks per troop. Sullivan, 3 Troop, 26. Eight Army, XIII Corps, "Org of 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde 19/20 Aug 43", DHIST 273C1.046(D1). The three tank troop organization has been criticized for not allowing a troop commander to divide his forces in to two evenly distributed groups for fire and movement. lh Marteinson and McNorgan, 144-154. Nicholson, Canadians in Italy, 89, 103, 108-09. 29 *'0 VkOftOM
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30 craft of German demolitions typical throughout the campaign. Attempting to bypass a demolished bridge over the Dittaino, the tanks forded a shallow point only to have nine
Shermans put out of action by anti-tank mines and be subjected to furious small-arms and artillery fire. Tank versus tank battles were also conducted, notably in Leonforte where three enemy tanks were taken out to the loss of a single Sherman, as a troop was rushed into the town to aid the beleaguered Edmonton regiment. The Sicilian campaign gave the Three Rivers regiment extensive experience in combined-arms action ranging from hasty-attacks to prepared offensives dictated by the timing of the artillery barrage.
Drivers and their tanks were put to the test, navigating the twisting roads of the Sicilian mountains.77 At times the sheer steepness of these hills had given gunners trouble, their
75mm guns unable to elevate to a high enough position.78
Bill McAndrew's 1987 article entitled "Fire or Movement" offers a critical investigation of Canadian tactical doctrine which takes the 24-28 July fight for Agira,
Sicily as its case-study.79 McAndrew makes the claim that the Canadian tactical doctrine, and hence its British mold, emphasized rigidly planned artillery barrages to the detriment of flexibility and manoeuvre.80 The author states that, "instead of flowing along paths of least resistance, manoeuvre was often limited to an extended line of infantry following a moving belt of fire towards the enemy's prepared defences."
McAndrew also examines the attack on Nissoria, in which the infantry were pinned
77 Nicholson especially stresses the skill of the drivers in the relief of the Hastings and Prince Edward regiment at Assoro on 22 July. Nicholson, Canadians in Italy, 106. 78 The problem left the infantry to their own devices on the 16 July attack on Piazza Armerina and resurfaced in the Northern Apennines in the fall of 1944. Nicholson, Canadians in Italy, 93. 79 William J. McAndrew, "Fire or Movement?: Canadian Tactical Doctrine, Sicily 1943," Military Affairs 51:3 (July 1987) 140-145. s" This them is also found in his survey of Canadian participation in the campaign. Bill McAndrew, Canadians and the Italian Campaign, 1943-1945 (Montreal: Editions Art Global, 1996). 31 down in the town while the barrage continued on without them. When infantry of the
Royal Canadian Regiment exploited an undefended flank and bypassed the main
German resistance, they halted at a report line when wireless contact broke down, obeying their previous orders not to advance. Later, an order recalled the Royals from their potentially advantageous position. For McAndrew, the battle shows that a firepower-based doctrine imposed rigid control in hopes to dissipate the fog of war, which effectively deprived junior leaders of the initiative. McAndrew's conclusions are typical of a specific school of Second World War historian which contrasts the
"operational art" of the Wehrmacht with the ponderous artillery-based British doctrine.81
On 3 September 1943, the Calgary and Ontario regiments crossed the straits of
Messina as a part of the vanguard of the British Eighth Army, invading Europe against negligible resistance.82 Demolitions and the limited road network slowed progress north.
On 1 October, the Calgary Regiment entered its first stiff battle in the town of Motta
Montecorvino. Several Shermans, using the folds in the ground to their advantage, fought their way forward through heavy artillery fire. Two tanks gained the town, but infantry support had been left behind and the tanks were disabled. The next day ten
" In 1986, John Sloan Brown identified a "Mythos of Wehrmacht Superiority" which had been produced by various postwar cultural and historical trends. S.L.A. Marshall's controversial postwar study Men Against Fire claimed that "most infantrymen spent World War II cowering in the bottom of their foxholes"; and the histories of Liddell Hart who vented his frustration on Allied leaders who did not "share his elevated impression of himself." Brown's article aimed at confronting Trevor Dupuy's cliometric attempts at proving German battlefield superiority in Numbers, Predictions and War (1978). John Sloan Brown, "Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy and the Mythos of Wehrmacht Superiority: A Reconsideration" Military Affairs, 50:1 (Jan 1986), 16. John English's work On Infantry is a classic example of this school. John English,/} Perspective On Infantry (Praeger: 1981). Martin van Creveld's Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982) is described by Terry Copp as the "basic text for...the 'combat effectiveness' approach to military history". Creveld claims the German army was superior due to organization and training which led the German solider to believe he was "a member of a well led team whose structure, administration and functioning were perceived to be...equitable and just." Terry Copp, Fields of Fire, 8. n Marteinson and McNorgan, 155-164. Nicholson, Canadians in Italy, 180, 236. 32 Shermans were lost in the fight for Motta. The crucial need for mutual support of combined arms had been demonstrated.
While the Italian campaign is not associated with tank on tank engagements on the scale of the eastern front or Normandy campaign, the Three Rivers Regiment's fight at Termoli on 5-6 October 1943, shows that such incidents did occur and that the
Shermans could hold their own against the German Mark IV PanzerkampfwagenP The action here on the Adriatic coast also emphasizes the crucial need for tanks and infantry to properly liaise or "marry-up" before fighting together as a team, and exemplifies the gradual conceptual shift away from the earlier doctrine of an tank-led assault wave. In support of the 78th British Division, the tanks arrived as the battle was already underway and blunted the armoured forces of the 16th German Panzer Division. The turning- point of the battle was a thrust south-west from the town of Termoli by 'B' Squadron, clearing the ground for the 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers and the 6th Royal Inniskilling
Fusiliers of Brigadier Pat Scott's Irish Brigade onto the objective.84 'B' Squadron accounted for a number of enemy casualties and eight enemy tanks. At the battles end, all three squadrons had seen battle, losing ten casualties and five tanks destroyed or disabled, but inflicting heavier losses on the enemy.
Keith Donaldson's 2008 Masters thesis highlights the flexibility of the army-tank brigade, through a long-overdue critical analysis of the battles of Termoli, San Leonardo, and the Gustav Line. Donaldson notes that upon entry into the Termoli battle the Three
*3 Don Dingwall, Canadian Armour in the Italian Campaign (Kanata: Canadian Tracks, 1999), 8. 84 Nicholson, Canadians in Italy, 254. XIII Corps commander Sidney Kirkman noted "Brigadier Scott has proved a most efficient Brigade commander...he is an inspiring leader, but rather wild." Sidney Kirkman to Richard McCreery, Kirkman Fonds, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, 9 January 1945. 33 Rivers Regiment tankers likely recalled the lessons learned in the Sicilian campaign. A post-Sicily discussion between the Three Rivers and Calgary Regiments had noted that when tanks led the advance, often the infantry would go to ground upon receiving mortar or artillery fire.85 It was deemed better for the infantry to lead, leaning against the supporting artillery barrage with the tankers suppressing enemy fire from behind.
Donaldson notes that 'C' Squadron's initial advance was made with two troops up, and the headquarters and remaining two troops following.86 Despite these lessons, for several of the advances in the Termoli action the tanks led the infantry.87 Donaldson concludes that the Three Rivers tankers used the terrain masterfully to unhinge the
German defences, and exhibited strong decision-making and leadership under fire, yet tank-infantry co-operation was not conducted with the efficiency it could have been. On numerous occasions the tanks led, resulting in infantry casualties from hidden enemy positions which emerged when the tanks passed by. The author suggests that time to marry-up before the attack may have reduced these losses.
In December 1943 all three regiments were concentrated on the Adriatic in support of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division. The Brigade played a distinguished role in what has come to be the most memorable Canadian battle of the Italian campaign:
Ortona. The 8-9 December 1943 engagement at the town of San Leonardo by the
1,5 Volume 18205, WD, TRR, August 1943, Appendix 14: "Points Raised at Study Group by Off[ice]rs of 14C.T.R. [Canadian Tank Regiment - the Calgary Regiment] and Answers by Off[ice]rs of 12 C.T.R. [the Three Rivers Regiment], 17 Aug. 43." As found in Keith Donaldson, "Thunder in the Mountains: 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade in Italy, 1943-1944" (MA Thesis, University of Calgary, 2008), 46. "6 This box formation (with squadron headquarters in the centre) had been the squadron-level battle drill for open-country, allowing the formation to advance with two troops up in any direction and was noted in training in early March 1943. Vol. 18205, WD, TRR, March 1943, Appendix 7: Squadron Battle Drill (31 March 1943), 1. Donaldson, 47. " Donaldson notes this may have been a preferable mode of operations to the County of London Yeomanry, whose experience with tanks in the desert may have reinforced a more all-tanks approach. Donaldson, 50, 59. 34 Calgary tanks and the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada is described by Donaldson as a
"textbook example of an assault on a built-up area by a combined armour and infantry
force."88 The Calgary Regiment fought effectively in the infantry support role,
neutralizing machine-guns and shooting the infantry into the town. They also proved to
be a valuable anti-armour tool, knocking out several German tanks when bracing for the
inevitable counterattack. In one famous incident at Casa Berardi, the Ontario Regiment's
'C' Squadron under command of Major Snuffy Smith supported a company of the 22e
Regiment (VanDoos) onto a position beyond the gully which had held up the 1st
Canadian Division's advance for several days. The tanks then took up a position behind a nearby ridge and scored numerous hits on Panzer Ills and IVs. In Ortona town itself,
the Three Rivers Regiment would conduct a gruelling street-fighting battle which would
become the source of considerable doctrinal reportage regarding the proper use of armour in built up areas.
In January 1944, operations consisted of smaller scale diversionary attacks near the Arielli River. Two operations for units of 1 Brigade would show that in actual operations, the guidelines offered in military training pamphlets were difficult to achieve. On 17 January 1944, an attack was mounted across the Riccio River, north of
Ortona, by 11 Canadian Infantry Brigade. This was the first operations of units of the recently arrived 5th Canadian Armoured Division, which intended to seize the high ground to the east of the Arielli River. The attack failed to make head-way, and after heavy casualties was called off. The Three Rivers tanks in support were restricted to
firing from a distance, as engineers under well-sited mortar and machine-gun fire could
** Donaldson, 65. 35 not clear fords over the Riccio of mines.89 The incident exposes problems in the tasking of an armoured regiment "in support" instead of "under command".90 When "in support" the tank commander would still make the critical decisions regarding his tanks' movement yet such control could separate his armour from the supporting infantry. The all-arms team proved to be better unified when "under command" of the infantry commander.
In the last days of January, the Calgary Regiment supported the Hastings and
Prince Edward Regiment in an attack on the Villa Grande-Tollo road. Attacks on 30
January were repulsed by heavy artillery and machine-gun fire. The next day the tanks were to lead. Six Shermans advanced and while two were disabled by mines, the remainder remained close to the artillery barrage and "caught the enemy with his head still down." Only two tanks now remained and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy on the objective, but the supporting infantry had been halted by heavy mortar and machine-gun fire, and when ammunition ran low the armour was forced to withdraw. In an after-action report by General Chris Vokes, commanding officer of 1st Canadian
Infantry Division, flexibility was stressed in the need to alter the speed of the barrage to the pace of the infantry advance and in infantry-cum-tank tactics, which "must endeavour to observe and conform to the actions of the other, thereby helping where help is obvious."91 The strict timetable of the barrage was beginning to fall out of favour, to be replaced with concentrations on call directed upon known enemy positions.
In late March 1944, 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade was removed from operations
Nicholson, Canadians in Italy, 370, 378. Bill McAndrew, Canadians and the Italian Campaign, 1943-1945, 92. 91 Major General Chris Vokes, "Report by H.Q. 1 Cdn Div on the attack by the hast and P.E.R. as made on the Tollo road 30 and 31 Jan 44, 3 Feb 44, as found in Nicholson, Canadians in Italy, 379. 36 on the Adriatic and came under command of Lieutenant General Sidney Kirkman's XIII
Corps in the Volturno Valley south-east of Venafro.92 A personality conflict between
Major-General Chris Vokes and Brigadier William Wyman played a role in the
deployment of 1 CAB away from their countrymen, but this was largely due to British
Army organization.93 Army-tank brigades were truly army assets and thus could be
allotted to the various infantry formations as the army commander saw fit. When 1CAB
arrived, a period of tank-infantry co-operation training was directed with great intensity due to the anticipated assault on the Gustav and Hitler lines. Planning dictated that the
Brigade would support the 8th Indian Division for the assault, but as the latter was not
scheduled to arrive in the training area until 20 April training began with the 4th and
78th British Divisions, rotating battalions out of the line on the Cassino front for the training.94
The purpose of the training was to, "familiarize" infantry with tank characteristics and tactics; teach intercommunication methods and target indication; and to introduce personnel from each arm to their counterparts before the upcoming battle.
Typical training consisted of a three day intensive program. The first day the infantry moved into the bivouac area and the battalion commander and forward observers95
"2 Canadian Historical Section, Canadian Military Headquarters, Report No. 158, "Operations of the 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade in Italy, May 1944 to February 1945: Part I, The Gustav and Hitler Lines", 1-2. n McAndrew suggests the personality conflict thesis. McAndrew, Canadians in the Italian Campaign, 90. "4 The 1 Brigade was scheduled to support Major-General Dudley Ward's 4th Division for the assault but circumstance and personalities intervened. Major General D. "Pasha" Russell, general officer commanding the 8th Indian Division, who reportedly "appreciated the value of the friendship and mutual admiration which had been built up between the staffs and other personnel of the two formations" during Adriatic operations, successfully requested that the brigade be in support of his division. 1,5 Report No. 158 notes that one of the three artillery regiments of infantry divisions was often assigned to the same infantry brigade, and that this was paralleled at the lower organizational branch, in that a battery was often assigned to the same battalion. This explains the artillery's forward observer here 37 visited the armoured regimental headquarters to establish the details of training. The second day the infantry attended a lecture on tank armament, characteristics, capabilities and limitations, and tactical employment of troops within the squadron. The "Aide
Memoire", 1 CAB's guide to preparation and employment of a tank-infantry attack, was discussed. Orders were issued at all levels of command. Finally, the infantry were shown around and inside the tanks. On the third day, an attack with two companies up was conducted. In the evening, the men further socialized at a "sing-song and get- together", aided by a "special rum issue". Operation DIADEM, the Allied Armies in
Italy advance to Rome, would soon make casualties of many of these merry-makers.
The most recent and relevant of 1CAB's battle experience as applied to the Battle of Lake Trasimene was the May 1944 assault on the Gustav and Hitler lines. In this battle the Ontario and Calgary Regiments supported the 8th Indian Infantry Division across the Gari river under a massive artillery barrage. The Three Rivers Regiment was tasked with exploiting the hard-won bridgehead and pushed through the defences in depth with the 1st Canadian Infantry Division towards Petrignano. In the first day of
Operation HONKER, as the assault on the Gustav Line was called, communications failed and tanks became bogged, but the Indians and Canadians managed to carve out a bridgehead.96 On 13 May, tank-infantry cooperation improved greatly due to the time now allowed for marrying up and planning an attack. The Calgary Regiment and the 19
Indian Brigade attacked toward Pannaccioni, with the infantry directing tank fire on hidden self-propelled gun positions and the tanks destroying machine-gun positions
seeming organic to the infantry battalion. 96 Keith Donaldson, 102, 112. 38 holding up the infantry.97 On 15 May, the 17 Indian Brigade and the Ontario Regiment to the west of the Sant' Angelo horseshoe, a patch of the roughest ground in the Liri valley, methodically knocked out a tank, self-propelled gun and eight anti-tank guns.98
The Three Rivers Regiment experienced trouble at the "horseshoe", getting separated from the infantry who were subsequently held up by snipers and machine-guns.
Donaldson concludes that the efforts of 1CAB during HONKER were extremely effective, and although tank-infantry co-operation at times lapsed, the overall effect made the brigade an essential part in the offensive.99 The regiments of 1 CAB had witnessed fierce fighting in their battles in the Liri Valley and it was now the task of the I
Canadian Corps to break the Hitler Line and exploit this breach up the Liri Valley towards Rome. The brigade was withdrawn for desperately needed rest and refitting.
By June 1944, the better part of a year had been spent by the brigade in theatre on active operations, in which the regiments were gradually introduced to larger and more complex operations. The brigade was fortunate that it was allowed to crawl and walk before it was required to run. The numerous instances of the brigade's utility in shoring up direct-fire support for the various infantry formations it supported show that the infantry-tank was a welcome and efficient member of the all-arms team. Terrain in Italy, with its herring-bone structure of successive mountain ridges, made deployment of large concentrations of armour near-impossible, and by flexible deployments of troops and squadrons where needed, the independent army-tank organization was well-justified.100
1,7 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, 406. ** Several days later near Aquino an Ontario Regiment assault in support of the 78th Division would lose twelve tanks to anti-tank gun fire. McAndrew, Canadians in the Italian Campaign, 96. " Donaldson, 112. 10(1 The herring bone metaphor is Horsfall's. John Horsfall, Fling our Banner to the Wind (Kineton: The Roundwood Press, 1978), 109. 39 There were times when tank-infantry co-operation had broken down and the mutual support afforded by the tank-infantry team was negated. Yet more often than not, the operations of the brigade show that the historiographic dismissal of penny-packets of armour in non-blitzkrieg settings neglects the valuable role that tanks could provide suppressing enemy machine-gun fire and destroying enemy self-propelled guns, anti tank crews, and tanks.101 Difficulties in the Allied pursuit of the crumbling German armies in May-June 1944 show that the rhetoric regarding sweeping movements of the armoured divisions is more easily said than done across unfavourable lines of communications against an enemy adept at delaying tactics and demolitions.
"" Roman Jarymowycz claims infantry-tanks were "penny-packeted out to support infantry combat, shunted around, [...] from division to division and forced to reinitiate complex get acquainted rituals with the infantry unit they supported." Roman Jarymowycz, Cavalry from Hoof to Track (Westport: Praeger, 2008), 179. An earlier work stated emphatically, "one definite truism, however, is that armour must be concentrated to enforce its true dominance and not frittered away in penny packets helping infantry." T. A. Gibson, "Infantry and Armour and the Influence of Mobility" The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal 103:1972-73, 199. 40 CHAPTER THREE: Grand Strategy and Pursuit. Mav-June 1944
Grand Strategy: Resource Management in a World War
On 12 May 1944 the Allies conducted Operation DIADEM, a major assault to breach the
German defences around Cassino. After eleven days of heavy fighting the last defensive line in the Liri Valley was broken. According to Allied doctrine, their armoured formations ought to have exploited the breach and poured north, harrying the German retreat and consolidating the victory. Ultimately, Allied armour failed to perform the pursuit role that doctrine had prescribed for it. The armoured division's massive train of transport was largely road-bound, and German rearguards demolished Italian roads cut into the mountains and destroyed numerous river crossings; such dependence on the road network meant inevitable delay. As one regimental historian noted, "fighting with an armoured division in Italy was like using a dagger to open a tin.'"02
An analysis of the pursuit phase of the Allied victory in May-June 1944 gives the historical context for the Trasimene battle, where the first serious delay was inflicted upon Alexander's pursuing armies. It also serves to show the similarities of tactical problems met by both infantry-tank brigades and those in the armoured divisions, cutting through the rhetoric of operational manoeuvre and calling into question the dual doctrine of infantry-support and cruiser tanks. While organizationally, such a bifurcation of
Anglo-Canadian armour allowed a flexibility that gave corps commanders a diverse toolbox, these tools were often used for the same task of advancing to contact and assault.
IM Armoured divisions consisted of 3414 vehicles and while an infantry division contained 3375, this number could be reduced by two thirds without affecting its fighting power. C.J.C Molony et al., Victory in the Mediterranean, Volume VI, Part / (London: HMSO, 1984), 241. 41 The Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Anglo-American committee responsible for planning the war effort at the highest level did not stray in 1944 from the grand strategic objective originally set at their first meeting in Washington at the 1941 ARCADIA conference.101 This strategy stated that Germany was to be defeated before Japan by amphibious invasion across the English Channel. The cross-channel invasion, however, would need a massive accumulation of men, materiel and shipping to insure success, and despite American Chief of Staff George Marshall's pressure for an early invasion in
1942, the forces would not set sail for Normandy until the spring of 1944.104 In the meantime, the Mediterranean theatre offered the Allies an opportunity to engage the Axis forces and secure the vital Mediterranean sea-lanes. Axis defeat in North Africa in May
1943 turned the French colonial empire to the Allied cause, and secured the vital Suez canal. In July-August 1943, the conquest of Sicily further secured Mediterranean shipping and gave the Allies the opportunity to strike at the mainland of Europe, and knock one Axis power out of the war. It would also draw German military resources away from the OVERLORD invasion, now planned for spring 1944.
On 9 September 1943, the Italian government surrendered as the troops of the
Fifth American army set sail for Operation AVALANCHE, the amphibious invasion at the bay of Salerno.105 The subsequent occupation of the peninsula by German forces,
103 Lee Windsor, "Anatomy of Victory: 1st Canadian Corps, Allied Containment Strategy and The Battle for the Gothic Line", (Ph.D. diss., University of New Brunswick, 2006), 32-33. IW American official historian Ernest Fisher goes beyond the traditional accounts of the British predilection for operations in Italy regarding traditional strategic interests and notes that emotional factors such as Churchill's ancestry (the Earl of Marlborough's fight at Blenheim) and the desire, after being repulsed at Dunkirk, to return to the continent. Ernest F. Fisher, Cctssino to the Alps (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 5. Windsor plays down the traditional historical viewpoint of American abhorrence versus British enthusiasm for the campaign. Windsor, "Anatomy of Victory", 43. 105 Molony, 295. 42 and the replacement of Italian divisions in the Balkans, meant that the Allied goal of containing German men and materiel in the Italian peninsula was realized.106 As
Nicholson observed, however, the very presence of Allied formations in Italy was not enough to keep the German forces confined there.107 The mountainous terrain, with its narrow mountain defiles, numerous rivers, and few east-west lines of communication was ideal ground to defend. The Allies would have to maintain heavy pressure if the
Germans were to be prevented from thinning out their line. As Nicholson put it, "the
Allied Armies in Italy had to remain the perpetual aggressor."
Army Group Strategy: Pursuit from the Gustav to the Dora Line
By the end of 1943 the Allied advance had stalled south of Rome, and there it remained through the winter. The spring not only brought an improvement in operational conditions, but also pressure to attack to contain even more German troops in advance of
Operation Overlord. With the success of the massive May 1944 DIADEM offensive, breaking the Gustav and Hitler Lines and linking the American II Corps with the beleaguered VI Corps in the Anzio beachhead, the opportunity emerged for Allied pursue up the Italian peninsula. As the Germans withdrew the pursuit began.
Traditional military wisdom stated that this phase of battle could net more results than the assault. Armoured forces, inheriting the role from their forefathers in the highly mobile cavalry and equipped with great protection and firepower, were assumed to be the perfect troops for pursuit. In the Liri Valley, however, the 5th Canadian Armoured
106 Sixteen divisions were originally sent south into Italy, some of which were drawn from the counter- invasion reserve. A few months after September 1943,20% of the German Army was guarding the Mediterranean coast. Windsor, "Anatomy of Victory", 47. 107 Between July and October 1943 the number of German division rose from six to twenty-five, and on the eve of the DIADEM attack the numbers were twenty-five German to twenty-seven Allied. Nicholson, "Speech to United Services Institute", 5. 43 Division was to find that breaking through the line and exploiting in depth was more difficult to perform in theatre than the rhetoric regarding armoured divisions in doctrinal pamphlets suggested. German armour and anti-tank guns, skilfully prepared mines and demolitions, and the traffic congestion of several allied armoured divisions pressing forward on a limited road network, delayed the pursuit.108
In the first days of June, as the II American Corps finally cut Route 6 with artillery fire and began to exploit towards Rome, the situation for the Germans grew increasingly dire. Kesselring recalled, "the first of June marked the beginning of an appalling deterioration of the Fourteenth Army's plight. The fighting strength of the divisional combat groups retiring behind the Tiber and Aniene rivers had ebbed to a bare minimum.'"09 Great numbers of men and materiel were needed to replace those struck from the order of battle, and these requests to OKW were granted, fulfilling the Allies strategic purpose of drawing German resources away from the upcoming Normandy invasion.
Ernest Fisher commented that "in the Liri Valley, the Canadian and British armored divisions, with their vast columns of supporting vehicles, did more to slow down the Eighth Army's pursuit than the enemy." Fisher, 222. The frustration of this stage of the campaign brought into question the abilities of Canadian Corps commander Lieutenant-General E.L.M. Burns, and was the subject of immediate "lessons learned" analysis. General Oliver Leese, commander of the Eighth Army, had determined that the Canadian Corps Headquarters incapable of "handling a corps of several divisions in mobile warfare." Nicholson, Canadians in Italy, 450. "w Albert Kesselring, A Soldier s Record, (London: Morrow, 1954), 246. By 29 May, Kesselring reported to Chief of the Operations Staff of the Armed Forces High Command (OKW) Albert Jodl that the situation had drastically changed from his previous positive report. Kesselring reported that approximately 25,000 men were casualties. Further indication of the stress on German manpower in the Mediterranean theatre can be seen in the commander-in-chief of Fourteenth German Army's order to send forward a battalion of military policeman in Rome on 1 June. Molony, 250-51, 273. By 1 June he talked of 35,000 casualties when requesting further replacement battalions. "Report No. 24: The Italian Campaign (From the Fall of Rome to the Evacuation of Florence (4 Jun - 10 Aug 44)" Historical Section (G.S) Army Headquarters, 31 March 1949, 12-13. The XIV German Panzer Corps had only fourteen tanks ready for combat. Fisher, 198. 44 Pfc Villa Pitdmonfe I POL Santo XXX— Lucia ISM AoutnoI ACoss/no Monte Cost mo
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FIGURE TWO: Approach and Breakthrough, The Hitler Line 15-23 May 1944. Fisher,
Cassino to the Alps.
Kesselring desperately needed to replenish his exhausted forces after the heavy attrition of Operation DIADEM.110 The nineteen German divisions that had faced the
110 German equipment loses to 28 May were reported as 500 heavy and 1600 light machine-guns, 300 45 Allies in the offensive had been shattered. Kesselring reported on 4 June that his forces
had lost 38,024 casualties and the number was still climbing."1 The first task of German
Army Group C was to establish a line where some semblance of organization could be achieved. Kesselring's greater operational problem was to rebuild the decimated
Fourteenth Army whilst checking the Allied advance long enough to properly prepare the Gothic Line further north."2 As the Germans had blown the bridges on the Tiber, there would be no opportunity until the latitude of Orvieto for them to transfer units west from the Tenth Army to reinforce the Fourteenth Army. On 4 June 1944, Kesselring's order stated that through a phased withdrawal through four intermediate lines the
artillery pieces, sixty rocket launchers, and 200-250 tanks all types (half the armour on hand of both armies). Fisher, 223. It seems difficult to rectify Kesselring's post-war claim that after 1941 Hitler and the Wehrmacht operations staff's "fundamental mistake was to completely misjudge the importance of the Mediterranean theatre" as OKW did dispatch troops to southern Europe in desperate attempts to hold in North Africa, Sicily and the Italian peninsula when the major cross-channel invasion was imminent and the Russians continued to advance on the Eastern Front. Kesselring stated that "Africa had become a theatre in which decisions vital to Europe were maturing." Kesselring, A Soldier s Record, 164. One method of assessing how well the Allied Armies Italy performed their strategic role of containment is to count the numbers of divisions that Kesselring had to send to the south to shore up his defences after taking such large casualties. Simply counting divisions, however, does not account for the men sent south as reinforcement pools for those formations that were already destroyed. One prisoner of war stated that the 1st Parachute Division in May 1944 sent 1300 men south from Germany to replace the casualties incurred over the hard-pressed months defending Cassino. XIII Corps alone captured over 2000 prisoners from 11th May to 5th June. XIII Corps Intelligence Summary No. 411,5 June 1944. Appendix 364 to Tenth Army W.D., 5 June 1944 (C.R.S. - 64832/6) in Nicholson, Canadians in Italy, 459. Fisher's states the same figure for 10 May-10 June 1944. Allied casualties had been even greater at 40,205. The Eighth Army is recorded as losing 11,639 casualties and the Fifth Army 28,566. By 10 June the Hermann Goring Panzer Division numbered 811 men, the 1st Parachute Division 902. Fisher, 223. Kesselring's priority was to reinforce the Fourteenth German Army on the Tyrrhenian side of the peninsula which now consisted of only Schlemm's I Parachute Corps. These four divisions needed reinforcements if they were to slow the Allies north of Rome. He sent the XVI Panzer Corps (29th and 90th Panzer Grenadier and 26th Panzer Divisions) to bolster Fourteenth Army as well as three fresh (if green) divisions (356th Infantry Division, 162nd (Turcoman) Divisions and the 20th Luftwaffe Field Division from Denmark).The shift of these units from their positions further east presented a "harvest of opportunity" for the U.S. XII T.A.C and Desert Air Force fighter-bombers. Jackson, Victory in the Mediterranean, Volume VI, Part 2, p. 10. 112 Fisher, 231-32. Improvements in the Gothic Line defences were not urgently ordered until as late as 2 June 1944 with the release of the German High Command's "Gothic Order", "Report No. 24: The Italian Campaign (From the Fall of Rome to the Evacuation of Florence (4 Jun - 10 Aug 44)" Historical Section (G.S) Army Headquarters, 31 March 1949, 40. 46 Fourteenth and Tenth Armies would establish themselves in a continuous position on the
Dora Line.115
While Kesselring aimed at consolidation, Alexander stressed haste in hopes of disruption and annihilation. On 7 June, Alexander's Operation Order stated that,
"Commander-in-chief authorizes Army Commanders to take extreme risks to secure the vital strategic areas...before the enemy can reorganize or be reinforced.'"14 As the
Germans fell back beyond Rome, the Fifth American Army made considerable progress on the Tyrrhenian coast. Reconnaissance forces patrolled widely to the north and Clark ordered highly mobile task forces to be formed composed of the combat commands of the 1st U.S. Armored Division.115 The Fifth Army was ordered to press on to area Pisa -
Lucca - Pistoia, and the Eighth Army to area Florence - Bibbiena - Arezzo."6 Army commanders were to ignore any gaps created on their inner flanks.
Allied planners in Italy had appreciated the difficulties faced by a pursuit force in the terrain north of Rome.117 In their report is a clear elucidation of the techniques used to overcome German rearguards.
113 The Dora Line ran from south of Orbetello on the Tyrrhenian coast to the southern edge of Lake Bolsena to Narni, Reiti, and Terni proceeding then to Aquiia where it met the Caesar Line and continued to the Adriatic coast. Jackson, Victory in the Mediterranean, Volume VI, Part 2,8, 19. 114 The intended haste in Alexander's order is seen to trickle down to all formations under command. A XIII Corps operational order of 8 June states to push on to Florence and Arezzo, "as fast as possible, by-passing any considerable enemy opposition and taking risks in order to achieve the object quickly." XIII Corps Operation Order No. 24, 8 June 1944. The 78th Division was to "adv with light mobile forces up valley of TIBER directed on ORVIETO securing any brs which are intact. This adv will be made irrespective of action of 6 S A ARMD DIV." 78th Division Operation Order No. 21,9 June 1944, 78th Division Headquarters War Diary, British National Archives, WO 170/499. 115 Task forces were composed of a medium tank battalion, a motorized infantry battalion, engineers, reconnaissance units and a battalion of self-propelled artillery. Infantry were to lead during the night and the armour during the day. Fisher, 237. 116 B.H.S.C.M.. Operations of British[. . .]Part II Section A. Paragraph 47. 117 British Historical Section Central Mediterranean. (B.H.S.C.M.) Operations of British, Indian and Dominion Forces in Italy, 3 September 1943 to 2 May 1945. Part II The Campaign in Central Italy 26 march to 10 August 1944. Section A Allied Strategy. Appendix D "Appreciation of the situation when the main front joins hands with the ANZIO bridgehead." 47 The Italian terrain is particularly favourable to delaying action and demolitions. Where roads run through defile, outflanking can only be effected by penetration of the line of rearguards at one or more points followed by a rapid advance on the focal road points. Except for the two coastal roads, the only way of achieving this is by the simultaneous advance of highly mobile, hard hitting, self-contained columns on all available roads, with similarly composed reserve columns moving by routes from which they can rapidly support any penetration effected. It will only be by speed in the general advance, and by the boldest action by individual columns, that the enemy can be prevented from putting into full effect his demolition programme.
Far from plodding forward at the pace of the infantry, the infantry-tanks of the army- tank brigades would be used in these columns of all-arms with great effect, yet it would not be an easy fight. Beyond the Dora Line, the first hastily prepared defensive position north of Rome, the terrain in central Italy was typified by low mountains and rolling hills that are ideal ground for the defender.118 Allied bombing of the Italian road network added to logistic problems."9 As commander of the XIII British Corps, Lieutenant
General Sidney Kirkman wrote in his diary upon approaching Lake Trasimene:
The main road...has been obliterated for a distance of about 400 yards by our own bombing. In this weather it forms a frightful bottleneck. The enemy withdrawing naturally destroys as many communications as he can, but the damage done by the RAF is generally worse whether to roads or bridges.120
Traffic congestion was multiplied by the fact that Fifth U.S. Army commander
Lieutenant General Mark Clark had to relieve the exhausted II American Corps, and remove the VI Corps for the invasion of southern France121
118 Jackson, Victory in the Mediterranean, Volume VI, Part 2, p. 3. "" The Tactical Air Force was also having a heyday claiming 1698 vehicles destroyed between 2 and 8 June. Nicholson, Canadians in Italy, 458. Of the advance through this wreckage a 78th Division officer noted "at no stage did we get clearer evidence of the support were getting from the air." Cyril Ray, Algiers to Austria, (London: 1952), 141. 120 Sidney Kirkman Diary, 19 June 1944. 121 Jackson, Victory in the Mediterranean, Volume VI, Part 2, p. 13. 48 L**t U[fj.5A%(
10 Br
\ 10 C0»»»S AREA OF OPERATIONS \ H
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FIGURE THREE: Advance From Rome 5-11 June. Fisher, Cassino to the Alps.
49 German demolitions finished off many bridges and culverts that were still intact after the Allied interdiction efforts. As one member of the Irish Brigade noted "we stopped on one little rise and watched for half an hour the constant glow in the sky as bridge after bridge was blown ahead of us and listened above the whir of the cicadas for the low distant thud."122 Demolitions were being stressed from the highest level. An order bearing Kesselring's signature stated that:
Demolitions of every kind must more than ever be executed with sadistic imagination. Under the guidance of the last engineers to leave the area, working with troops of other branches of the service who have been trained in this work, every street, every bridge or other construction will be totally destroyed. Houses, the demolition of which will block narrow village streets, will be blown up.123
Ideas regarding the swift movements of armoured forces, fostered in the interwar years and accepted as gospel with the German blitzkrieg, never had the conditions of the
Italian campaign of 1944 in mind.124
The tactical problem of the day was largely how to overcome these demolitions and rearguards tailored specifically against road-bound armoured divisions. As Jackson states:
8th Army's pursuit became a never-ending story of leading troops held up by relatively minor demolitions covered by one or two tanks or S.P. Guns, which took time to locate and destroy before the British Sappers could clear a way through. The most precious weapons in the 8th Army's armoury at this time were the humble bulldozer and the Sappers' simple mine probe, which was often used instead of the electronic mine detector because the later frequently broke down and did not locate the deeper buried mines.125
In 10 Brigade, the Commanding Officer Brigadier Shoosmith issued his "Notes from in Colin Gunner, Adventures with the Irish Brigade, (Antrim: Greystone Books, 1991), 114.
123 7gth £)jvisjon intelligence Summary No. 193, 25 June 1944. 124 Jackson notes this frustration. Jackson, Victory in the Mediterranean, Volume VI, Part 2, 13, 25. 125 A 4th Division conference on 12 June 1944 states that an enquiry of 1 CAB was made as to the feasibility of attaching a blade to their Sherman tanks. "Notes on the Division Commander's Operations Group Conference", 4th Division War Diary, 12 June 1944. 50 recent [Operations]", which laid out policy in the pursuit.126 As much as possible the advance was to continue off the roads, as the brigadier noted that cross-country advance often surpassed road-bound flanking formations that had to clear the routes of mines.
Carriers and M3 "Stuart" light tanks were effective off-road to reconnoitre the forward areas, but where the ground was forested dismounted infantry had to lead. Interestingly the brigadier notes that, "the principles learnt with regard to infantry and tank cooperation appeared to have been assimilated by the majority of commands. In view of the constant changing of affiliated tank formations, it is essential that these principles are disseminated down to all ranks and that every soldier in the brigade knows how to work with the tanks." The desire to take risks in pressing forward artillery observers was noted, and infantry were suggested as a useful pool of labour for the numerous engineering tasks.
The British XIII Corps attempted to use its armour-heavy order of battle to its advantage, pushing armoured formations ahead of the pursuit. Yet by 1944 the anti-tank capabilities of the German army were quite effective in the form of the hand-held infantry weapons and anti-tank guns such as the light 5cm Pak 38 or the heavier 88mm
(designed for anti-aircraft role but found to be extremely effective for direct-fire).127 A
15 June entry in a captured German officer's diary gives insight into the manner that hand-held infantry weapons were used to shore up weak positions against the tank-heavy
126 10 Brigade War Diary, June 1944 Appendix. Shoosmith was described by Sidney Kirkman as "command[ing] 10 Inf Bde with great distinction. It was in every way the best Bde in 4 Div when Dudley Ward took over the Division." Yet these comments were qualified by the appraisal that "he is inclined to be difficult with his equals, lacks a sense of humour and will undoubtedly be a great trial to his staff." Sidney Kirkman to Richard McCreery, Sidney Kirkman Fonds, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, 9 January 1945. 127 On 10 June, XIII Corps intelligence reports stated that armoured thrusts near Viterbo broke through an anti-tank gun screen in some heavy fighting but ran into problems from infantry with "bazookas" near Celleno. XIII Corps Intelligence Summary No. 414,10 June 1944. 51 Allied advance. Near Citta Delia Pieve, he states "the country is not tank proof; therefore more training for the young fellows in the handling of the Faustpatronethe new hand-held anti-tank weapon that fired a lethal shaped charge. 128
While the Sherman and Churchill tanks are often derided in comparison to
German armour, their mechanical reliability and climbing power could often trump the
German's supposed technical superiority. Evidence to support this suggestion is found in the XIII Corps intelligence summaries of late May, one of which states that "our successful and unexpected use of tanks along the mountain tracks found the enemy with no anti-tank guns in the area".129 Confirmation is also found in a 19 May 1944, report by the German Battle Group von Sangen which states, "the performance of enemy tanks and motor vehicles was astoundingly good, particularly in mountainous country. For this reason, close anti-tank weapons should be kept ready even in sectors where the employment of German tanks seems impossible."130 The famed German Panther tanks, on the other hand, suffered from mechanical failure. As the staff of the XIII Corps recorded, 40% of Panther tanks found scuttled on the side of the road that summer appeared to be abandoned due to mechanical breakdowns.131
Clausewitz once stated that "the energy thrown into the first stage of the pursuit chiefly determines the value of victory."132 While great opportunity arose in the first week of June for the pursuit and envelopment of the Fourteenth German Army, logistic choke points, the constraint of motorized divisions to the road networks, and divisional
128 XIII Corps Intelligence Summary No. 422, 23 June 1944 12,1 XIII Corps Intelligence Summary No. 405, 28 May 1944. 130 Translated and reproduced in Appendix "A" of 10 Brigade Intelligence Summary, 7 July 1944. 131 From XIII Corps "Report on Enemy AFVs", reprinted in 1CAB War Diary, 3 July 1944. 132 Fisher, 227-29. 52 positioning and boundary lines reduced the Allied pursuit to a crawl. The capture of
Rome was also a benchmark in the campaign in terms of resources. General Wilson had told Alexander on 22 May 1944 that his "overriding priority in the allocation of resources" would shift to preparations for ANVIL once Rome fell, as it did on 5 June. A time-line was given for the removal of three American divisions, all of the French
Expeditionary Corps, and the experienced VI U.S. Corps headquarters. Such a withdrawal would mean those forces still in Italy would bear a greater burden in containing German forces in the peninsula.
German Consolidation: From the Dora to the Albert Line
The great difficulties in the pursuit battle precluded unleashing Allied armoured divisions as mechanized cavalry hordes swarming the retreating Germans. By 10 June
Kesselring's Armies began to shore up their defences and offer stronger opposition to the
Allied advance.1" At this point sufficient forces were shifted west to secure against a
Fifth Army flanking manoeuvre along the coast north of Rome, as the Germans could now put twenty-one of twenty-six divisions in the line. Orders from the German High
Command would soon commit them to a vicious fight at the Albert (or Trasimene Line).
On 10 June Kesselring had sent a teletype message to the High Command which stated "his intention of defending Italy as far south of the Apennines as possible" and
"his second imperative duty [...]to prevent the destruction of his Armies before they reach the Gothic Line and to let them reach the new line in battle-worthy condition."134
133 B.H.S.C.M.. Operations of British [...] Part II Section A. Paragraph 49. The Tenth Army's war diary indicates that a lack of fuel, disallowing the shift of forces to their right flank, kept headquarters worrying about a gap between the armies until at least 14 June. "Report No. 24: The Italian Campaign (From the Fall of Rome to the Evacuation of Florence (4 Jun - 10 Aug 44)" Historical Section (G.S) Army Headquarters, 31 March 1949, 35. I3J O.B.S.W. W.D., 10 June 1944 (C.R.S. 64832/1) in Nicholson, Canadians in Italy, 461. 53 Hitler, however, was nonplussed with the terminology in this message and sent a reply which stated that delaying resistance was to be discontinued and that a hard defence of the ground as far south of the Apennines as possible was in order.135 Kesselring's protests to Chief of the Operations Staff of the Armed Forces High Command (OKW)
Albert JodI regarding the foolhardy defence of unprepared positions fell on deaf ears.
On 14 June Kesselring issued the notice "Army Group Order for the Transition to the
Defence" which stated that, "every officer and man must know that upon reaching [the
Albert-Frieda Line] the delaying tactics will come to an end and the enemy advance and break-through must be stopped."136
Faced with Hitler's demand that there be no delayed retreat to the Gothic Line and having already lost the Dora Line, Kesselring would have no other option than to mount a determined defence of the line Piombino-Lake Trasimene-Portocivitanova known as the Albert-Freida Line and referred to in Allied parlance as the Trasimene
Line.137 The task of surveying the line was put to divisional reconnaissance officers, with particular focus on positions that would be as "tank-proof as possible". Engineers were to build obstacles with the help of construction units, and conscript Italian labourers. Men and women from fifteen to fifty years of age were to assist in the line's
135 Hitler reportedly received Kesselring's plan for a delayed retreat with, "misgivings and distrust." High Command would begin to order "the definitive defence of the Italian area as far south as possible" on a daily basis. "Report No. 24: The Italian Campaign (From the Fall of Rome to the Evacuation of Florence (4 Jun - 10 Aug 44)" Historical Section (G.S) Army Headquarters, 31 March 1949, 22. Strategically, the Germans were at Hitler's whim, who appears to have more reason than just a psychological fixation on the holding of every inch of geography in support of his policy forbidding tactical withdrawal in Italy. Jackson states potential rationality in Hitler's concern over Allied aims in the Balkans, the desire to keep Allied ground and air forces far from Germany, and distrust of the strength of the Gothic line. Jackson, Victory in the Mediterranean, Vol. VI, Part 2,9-10. 136 Appendix 9 to O.B.S.W. W.D., 14 June 1944 (C.R.S. - 64832/5) in Nicholson, Canadians in Italy, 461. 137 Jackson, Victory in the Mediterranean, Volume VI, Part 2,21-22. 54 LXXVl I PZ tCHT &
"V
PURSUIT FROM ROME TO THE TRASIMENO LINE
FIGURE FOUR: Pursuit From Dora to Albert Line 10-20 June 1944. Fisher, Cassino to
the Alps.
hasty construction.138 Unlike the extensive poured concrete fortifications in the Hitler line, the majority of the Albert Line positions were pits dug with the help of coerced labour. Janet Kinrade Dethick, in her collection of anecdotes and folk tales regarding the
Trasimene battle, retells an account of one Umbrian man:
I made a machine gun post down in the wood below Cimbano. It was full of them -1 made one and my friend made another one just above it. About twenty
138 Janet Kinrade Dethick, The Trasimene Line June-July 1944 (Perugia: Uguccione Ranieri di Sorbello Foundation, 2002), 41,49,51. 55 or thirty people cut down the trees to cover up these posts. We dug holes with these big hoes and the guns went inside to the depth of a metre or a metre and a half. When I had made the gun post I went home and there I found these two Germans. They put me with my back against the wall and pointed their revolver at my heart. I had a cigarette case and they robbed me of two cigarettes. But they didn't shoot me...
The line's original position ran from Castiglione della Pescaia on the Tyrrhenian Sea from Grosseto to Magione, however, due to the weakness of the Tyrrhenian coastal sector an additional line was added, called the Anton Line, which would run from
Follonica to merge with the Albert line at Fiume Orcia. Kesselring wished to discuss with the Fuhrer the difficulty of defending such positions, but his audience with Hitler did not take place until 3 July, at which point the Albert Line had been lost. Growing partisan sabotage did not help Kesselring's situation.
Partisan activity was increasing as the Germans fell back and as one German officer reported on 14 June, "no German soldier can go anywhere alone because the instances of guerrillas surrounding them are multiplying.'"39 Partisan bands on the road network near Orvieto had kept travel at night to a bare minimum due to fears of attack on transport.140 Security was increased on all transport, with instructions for soldiers travelling certain routes to have their weapons at the ready. Escaped Allied prisoners of war were also reported to be causing problems for the German retreat and rewards were offered for turning them over.141 German reports indicate that the "guerillas" were becoming better organized and had access to Allied intelligence resources. When
139 XIII Corps Intelligence Summary No. 422, 22 June 1944. 140 H.Q. Military District 1043, "District Order No. 14", 7 April 1944, reprinted in ICAB Intelligence Summary No. 107, 16 June 1944. i4! ^th Qivision intelligence Summary No.33, 7 June 1944; "Recapture of Escaped Enemy Prisoners in Italy", Hermann Goering Panzer Regiment notice 15 May 1944, in Appendix 10 Brigade Intelligence Summary No. 48, 9 June 1944. 56 Lemelsen learned that he could not bring supplies from Siena to Grosseto due to sabotage of the lines of communication, he was granted authority from Army Group C to kill ten Italians for every German killed as well as for acts of sabotage.142
The Americans advanced with armoured columns on all roads and tracks during the day and lorry born infantry during the night with a constant leapfrogging of units.
The efforts of XIV Panzer Corps to defend the Dora line were brief. The 20th Luftwaffe
Field and 162nd Turkoman Divisions were pushed back by the 36th American Division and a Regimental Combat Team of the fresh 91s< American Division. On 15 June
American forces entered Grosseto (see the far left on Figure Four), and the next day a number of casualties were taken crossing the Ombrone River.143 It would take until 20
June for the Americans to advance beyond this formidable river barrier guarded by Von
Senger's XIV Panzer Corps. After two days of heavy fighting, Von Senger was authorized to pull his corps back to the Anton switch line.
On 20 June, the French too were up against a river obstacle, the Orcia River, a tributary of the Ombrone.144 To the east of the Tiber strong resistance was met by the
6th British Armoured Division at Todi which was outflanked by bridging the Tiber. The outposts of the Trasimene Line were met before Perugia, and on the 20 June the division
142 Jackson, Victory in the Mediterranean, Volume VI, Part 2, 23. 143 On the right, 1 Armored Division's Task Force Ramey had been held up for two days by the defenders south of Trinia, but the clearing of the nearby villages threatened the German lines of communications and on 16 June the Americans entered the city. Since 13 June the 26th Panzer, and 29th and 90th Panzer Grenadier Divisions had travelled to the west of the Tiber and were resisting the American advance. Fisher, 246, 249. As von Senger's XIV Corps assumed command, the 90th Panzer Grenadier division moved into the line and the 19th Luftwaffe Field Division replaced the "unreliable" 162'"' (Turkoman) Division, the Germans fell back onto the onto the hills north of Grosseto which were the outposts of the Albert Line. Jackson, Victory in the Mediterranean, Volume VI, Part 2, p24, 144 The French had executed a rapid advance in the centre which took Montefiascone on 11 June, taking two days to get beyond Lake Bolsena and on 18 June reaching Radicofani in deteriorating weather conditions. Fisher, 248. 57 was halted by heavy resistance.145 On the far right of both armies, the Poles made a rapid advance on the Adriatic coast. On 21 June they crossed the Chienti River, but this bridgehead was destroyed by fierce counterattacks and the Poles remained thirty-five kilometres from the vital port city of Ancona.
Kesselring notes in his memoirs a fear of a tactical flanking attack from Elba, the invasion of which he could see no other purpose for.146 Vietinghoff of the Tenth
Army, however, is said to have had more confidence in his ability to hold his section of the line and poured resources forward. The result was that as Fourteenth German Army retired on the Tyrrhenian coast, Tenth Army's right flank became more vulnerable.
Jackson criticizes the Allies for not realizing this and taking advantage of the gap, yet qualifies this by stating that Alexander was being pestered by Allied Forces
Headquarters regarding Operation ANVIL troop requirements and that the staff was looking too far ahead to the Gothic Line assault to see the opportunities that were open to them in late June.147
On the Fifth Army's immediate right, the XIII British Corps advanced with the
143 Fisher, 252. Jackson criticizes Leese for not leading with the Indian Divisions who were adept at mountain warfare. Jackson, Victory in the Mediterranean, Volume VI, Part 2, 14. 146 Kesselring, A Soldier's Record, 251. It is the British official historian's assertion that the invasion of Elba had a decisive effect on the Battle for the Trasimene Line. On 17 June, the 9th French Colonial Division invaded the island, resulting in 400 killed and 600 wounded. As WGF Jackson states, the battle was "short but severe [.] Costly but unnecessary...the garrison could have been left to rot." It is Jackson's claim that the invasion had a psychological effect on the German command, playing on the paranoia of an amphibious assault on the Tyrrhenian coast in the vicinity of Leghorn. Kesselring reportedly used this leverage to convince Hitler to allow him to soften orders of holding onto geography for geography's sake and resulted in Fourteenth German Army's early occupation of the Anton switch line and retirement to the Gothic line. Jackson, Victory in the Mediterranean, Vol VI, Part 2,31. 147 The original narrative of the Central Mediterranean Historical Section for its part notes that the postponement of the Elba attack, originally scheduled for a month earlier, removed much of its military worth. Political concerns at Allied Forces Headquarters resisted Harding's suggestion that the 9th Division be used for a amphibious hook on the mainland. The French wished to keep the force earmarked for operations in France. B.H.S.C.M.. Operations of British [...] Part II, Section A. Paragraph 51. 58 6th South African Armoured Division and the 78th Infantry Division in the lead. At
Bagnoregio a hard fought delaying action against 6th South African Armoured Division postponed the fall of the major communications hub of Orvieto until 14 June.148
Although the advance to the Trasimene Line was frustrating and slow, tank- infantry co-operation was often excellent. On 14 June, 9 British Armoured Brigade crossed the Torrente Paglia in the advance to Orvieto. During the advance a battle-group based on the Royal Irish Fusiliers and the Warwickshire Yeomanry reported fifteen enemy guns knocked out, eighty-five prisoners of war taken and further tanks and vehicles destroyed.149 The next day the Irish gained the town of Ficulie destroying a large armament of enemy equipment and taking numerous prisoners of war.150 The 3rd
Kings' Own Hussars took up the advance and destroyed fifty German vehicles and several anti-tank guns.151 The success of the units of 9 Armoured Brigade against these rearguards suggest that the Germans had not had time to properly set their anti-tank gun positions and were surprised by the use of aggressive armour. This action shows that combined arms teams featuring infantry-tank regiments could have great effect, and further emphasizes the blurring of the roles of armoured divisions and this infantry-tank brigade. When used with daring and skill, the Sherman tank could get the better of rearguards specifically designed to stop its advance.
M* B.H.S.C.M.. Operations of British [...] Part II, Section A. Paragraph 49. The Hermann Goring Division was shifted into the line here north of Orvieto. Fisher, 250. Doherty, 227. 149 Total prisoners of war bagged for the day was 120. 78th Division War Diary, 14 June 1944. One tally for the 56th Reconnaissance Regiment for the same period from Orvieto to Lake Trasimene was 145 Germans killed, 121 prisoners, captured or destroyed twenty-six guns of over 26 mm. calibre, fifty-five machine guns and thirty-seven vehicles. The battle-group was under command of Lt.Col. Chavasse of the 56th Reconnaissance Regiment and included MIOs, 25 pounders and a field company of engineers. Ray, 142. 150 XIII Corps War Diary, 15 June 1944. 151 78,h Division War Diary, 14 June 1944. 59 By the time that the Allied Armies had reached the Trasimene line, the German armies had completely regrouped.152 Seven of the mobile divisions had been moved across the Tiber to the west and were now in the line between Lake Trasimene and the west coast. Four fresh divisions had arrived. In all sectors but the American's in the west, the ground now favoured the German defenders, and on 17 June the rains broke and the ground deteriorated in a muddy morass. As XIII Corps commander Sidney
Kirkman wrote on 18 June, "advance has only gone a short distance partly due to mud and inability to use tanks but also to stubborn resistance."153
The Allied pursuit had netted a large amount of vehicles and prisoners but had also exposed the limitations of road-bound armour-heavy formations. Kesselring managed to shift his mobile reserve forces to bolster the weakened Fourteenth Army on the Tyrrhenian coast. After this shift Kesselring had mustered nine divisions against the
Allied Armies nine.154 As Ernest Fisher noted, "even allowing for the fact that three of the nine were under strength, the ratio of nine and a half to nine scarcely afforded a promise of a continued rapid Allied advance." Success had been found by armoured elements of the XIII Corps, and the operations of 9 Armoured Brigade, an infantry-tank formation, shows that the dual roles prescribed by British armoured doctrine were not strictly adhered to by cruiser or infantry tank formations respectively. British infantry- tanks could manoeuvre in combined arms groups which do not resemble popular historical rhetoric regarding plodding penny-packets.155 An examination of 1CAB in the
152 B.H.S.C.M.. Operations of British, Indian and Dominion Forces In Italy, 3 September 1943 to 2 May 1945. Part II The Campaign in Central Italy 26 March to 10 August 1944. Section D Eighth Army Advance to Florence. Chapter II - The Battle of Lake Trasimene. Kirkman Diary, 18 June 1944. 154 On X British Corps side of the Tiber the Germans had eight divisions to the Allied five. Fisher, 250. 155 The deployment of single or few tanks has been criticized as a failing observed in the Great War. Tim 60 assault of the Trasimene Line will demonstrate that infantry-tanks could be an effective
means of providing firepower to the infantry, but that success in this role relied first and
foremost on integrated all-arms cooperation.
Travers, "Could the Tanks of 1918 Have Been War-Winners for the British Expeditionary Force?" Journal of Contemporary History, 27:3 (July 1992), 395. 61 CHAPTER FOUR: The Vicious Encounter Battle: Vaiano and Sanfatucehio
XIII Corps Approaches the Trasimene Line
The Battle of Lake Trasimene was a largely British assault on a series of defences in depth, sited on several successive ridge-lines between Lakes Chiusi and Trasimene in
Umbria province north of Rome. It was part of the larger Battle of the Trasimene Line, a position which stretched across the Italian peninsula from Grosseto on the west coast to south of Ancona on the Adriatic. The line was built hastily and intended only to delay the Allies advance to the Pisa-Rimini Line (later known as the Gothic Line).156 Despite this delaying role, Adolph Hitler ordered no early withdrawal from the position, and
Commander-in-Chief Southwest Albert Kesselring reluctantly passed on this message to his subordinates. In the engagement of 20-28 June 1944, the Germans successfully held the assault back although their defences gradually crumbled under the determined Allied advance. Heavy casualties were suffered on both sides, which speaks to the enormous concentration of Allied firepower and the "foresight and grim determination" of the
German troops who obeyed orders to stand and fight.157
The 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade played an essential role in the Battle of Lake
Trasimene. It augmented the direct-fire assets of the British 78th and 4th Infantry
Divisions. Their efforts indicate that histories criticizing "penny-packets" of infantry- tanks as squandered resources are in need of revision.158 While the tank certainly was not queen of the battlefield, as posited by armoured enthusiasts since the interwar years
156 The Germans would later change the name from the Gothic line to the Green line to avoid the implications of the Allies taking such an ominously named line. 157 The quotation is from Horsfall. Horsfall, 147. 1511 In Normandy, one explanation for Major General Guy Simonds failure to plan for a counterattack in Operation ATLANTIC was an organization which "penny-packed the armour by squadrons." Jarymowycz, Tank Tactics, 121. 62 and alarmists in 1940, it was an essential component of the all-arms team, which could overcome entrenched machine-gun positions which would otherwise force the infantry to ground. For Canadian tankers, however, the Lake Trasimene Battle is not a story of unqualified success. Co-operation with the infantry at times broke down with deadly consequences. Communications between armoured regiments was at times confused and led to missed opportunities. Casualties for the Three Rivers Regiment were high.
The battle offers an important example of the intricacies of the combined arms team in both success and failure, and emphasizes the crucial supporting role of armour on the
Second World War battlefield.
The Trasimene Line changed the nature of the fighting for the Allied Armies in
Italy in the summer of 1944. Here the pursuit ground to a halt. On 21 June British intelligence stated, "for the first time since the breakthrough [ofj the Valmontone line the enemy is fighting fiercely to hold ground."159 The Trasimene Line was known not to contain "prepared defences" such as the Tobruks, Panzerturms, or other poured concrete fortifications, but instead featured a series of hastily prepared weapons pits and slit- trenches. In the west, the Albert Line (as the Germans called it) was based on the River
Astrone on the Tyrrhenian coast, running to the Orcia and upper Ombrone.160 Facing the
Americans on the Ombrone was the Fourteenth German Army's XIV Panzer Corps, with three "poor" divisions and two of good quality. To the American's right the French advanced against 1 German Parachute Corps, between Montalcino and Montepulciano,
159 1CAB Intelligence Summary No. 110, 21 June 1944. As a 4th Division Intelligence Summary stated, "it is clear that we are dealing with a different set of circumstances from those obtaining in the last few weeks, and that nothing must be taken for granted." 4th Division Intelligence Summary No. 39, 24 June 1944. I6n B.H.S.C.M.. Operations of British [...] Part II, Section A. Paragraph 52. 63 the later being the German army boundary.161 From here the line ran to Chiusi, between the Lakes Trasimene and Chiusi, and then to the high ground north of Perugia. This section of the line was held by the seven divisions of the Tenth Army's LXXVI German
Corps, who faced the British Eighth Army advancing with the XIII Corps (of which
1 CAB was a part) to the west of the Tiber and the X Corps to the east. East of the
Apennines on the Adriatic sector the line followed the Chieti River where the Poles were told to merely maintain pressure, as the main Eighth Army effort would be made by the
XIII British Corps.
The XIII British Corps, after pushing through the logistic knot of two conquering armies in Rome, advanced to the west of the Tiber with mobile combined-arms teams centred around the regiments of 9 British Armoured Brigade and the divisional reconnaissance battalion.162 Following up the success of these mobile armoured columns, which had assaulted a number of anti-tank gun positions and reaped a large harvest of German prisoners and casualties, 11 Brigade was tasked with clearing the mountainous region to the south-west of Lake Trasimene.163 To the west the 6th South
161 The XIV Panzer Corps had to be reinforced by battle groups of the 16th SS and 42nd Jaeger Divisions. 162 The leading troops were composed of the 78th Infantry Division under Major-General Charles Keightley and the 6th South African Division under Major-General W.H. Evered Poole. Keightley was described by Corps Commander Sidney Kirkman as "by far the best [divisional commander] I have so far had under me. He gets on with a job himself, without worrying me, is full of resources and enterprise." Sidney Kirkman Diary, 4 July 1944. Poole had served as a brigadier in the western desert and Brigadiers J.P.A Furstenburg of 11 Armoured Brigade and R.J. Palmer, D.S.O. of the 12 Motorized Brigade were also veterans of the desert war. Among the ranks were fresh recruits, veterans of the desert fighting and 800 Rhodesians who were said to fit in well with the units they were scattered into. "History of 6 S.A. Armd Div in Italy, Oct 1942 - May 1945," National Archives of Britain, CAB 106/644,6. 163 Between the 13th and the 15th of June, the 11 Brigade had been moving in troop transport from just north of Viterbo to the town of Ficulle. On 16 June at 1300hrs resistance from snipers and self- propelled guns was met 600 yards south of Monte Gabbione. It was not until 17 June at 0600hrs that the Northamptons could report occupation of the town. The Northamptons had suffered two killed and twenty-nine wounded during these operations. At 0630hrs 17th June the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers passed through the Northamptons positions with a squadron of the Wiltshire Yeomanry. During the day a cross-country advance on Piegaro would reach within 200 yards of the village where resistance 64 African Division advanced from the 17-21 June in pouring rain with tracks dissolving and fields becoming thick with mud. By 19 June the weather conditions were described by the XIII Corps War diary as "appalling."154 On this day the South Africans were to meet resistance at the ancient hill-top walled town of Chiusi. Chiusi had been selected by Kesselring as a fortress position, which would be held to the last man despite being outflanked. A fierce fight between the Hermann Goring Division and the South Africans would stop the advance here for several days.
As the XIII Corps approached the outpost zone the Germans showed an increasing determination to stand their ground. Taking Route 71, rising from the valley floor to the hilltop town of Citta Delia Pieve, the 1st Surrey Regiment followed the
Shermans of the 3rd King's Own Hussars.165 From 16-19 June, the 78th Division's advance was held up here by fierce resistance.166 When the forward troops entered the
kept them pinned for the rest of the day. The next morning, at 0600hrs on 18 June, Piegaro was occupied by the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders without opposition and the group's next objective was the high ground which commanded the Piegaro-Panicale road. "Spasmodic opposition" was met, but the Northamptons entered the village of Panicale early on the 19th of June. 11 Brigade War Diary, 16 June 1944. IM XIII Corps War Diary, 19 June 1944. Locals remembered "it seemed like winter". Dethick. 81. 165 These forces were augmented by a patrol group composed of 1 Royal Irish Fusiliers and two mortar carrier under command of Lt. L.M. Manson. The rest of the battalion cleared outposts on the far right flank with the 56th Reconnaissance Regiment. 11 Brigade War Diary, 16 June 1944. On 17 June, the regiments were relieved by the Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry and the 5th Royal East Kent Regiment (Buffs) according to a regrouping of the 78th Division which assigned the 36 Brigade to the left sector with the armoured regiment under command. Post-war comments by John Horsfall regarding the needless fight for the town of Citta della Pieve are curiously not supported by the Royal Irish Fusiliers diary. Horsfall contends that the town was entered by the Royal Irish Fusiliers on 16 June and needlessly abandoned by the 1st Surrey Regiment necessitating the stiff fighting for the town over the next two days. The 2nd London Irish Rifles War Diary, of which Horsfall was the commanding officer does mention the incident claiming that the Royal Irish Fusilierss entered the town on the 16 June and killed twenty-five enemy and took fifty prisoners of war. 2nd London Irish Rifles War Diary, 18 June 1944.
166 7gth j)ivjsion War Diary, 16-19 June 1944. Intelligence reports claimed that the defence of the town was tasked to the 1 Parachute Division, which judging from reports from prisoners of war had a combat strength of around 600 men. This estimate places the division at approximately 10% fighting capacity. The town itself, like so many Italian towns of ancient origin was perched on a hilltop and offered "an ideal place for a parachutist defence". 78th Division Intelligence Summary No. 189, 18 June 1944. 65 town they were attacked by anti-tank and mortar fire, necessitating withdrawal to the southern approaches.167 It would take until 19 June for the 36 Brigade to overcome resistance in Citta della Pieve and advance back down to the valley floor near Moiano.168
With resistance overcome here in the mountains to the south of Lake Trasimene, the formations of the XIII Corps were prepared to advance to contact the covering positions of the Trasimene Line.
The section of the line that the XIII Corps encountered on 20 June consisted of mountainous terrain in the west, near Montepulciano, which dropped to the Chiani valley across which a series of irrigation canals divided the valley floor to the west of
Lake Chiusi.169 The terrain between Lakes Chiusi and Trasimene consisted of a series of hills rising around Sanfatucchio and Villa Strada, connected by ridges running east-west across the line of advance (see Figure Five). These hills stretched for fifteen miles to the north where the Chiana Valley widens. Route 71 ran on the low ground south of Chiusi, through Moiano and up to the east of Sanfatucchio and Pucciarelli near Lake Trasimene.
167 Three officers were killed and three wounded. XIII Corps War Diary, 17 June 1944. The 5th Buffs War Diary states that the positions in houses in the town were "untenable". 5th Buffs War Diary, 16 June 1944. Stiff opposition by snipers continued in the town and self-propelled guns shelled the 5th Buffs area. The 13Sth Field Artillery and 4.2" mortars fired on the town and suspected nebelwerfer positions. 78th Division War Diary, 17 June 1944. 5th Buffs War Diary, 17 June 1944. An intercepted German order for the abandonment of the town provided for a successful shoot confirmed by the 36 Brigade upon discovering the casualties on the far side of the town as they passed through. Horsfaii, 137. On 18 June the 5th Buffs with a squadron of the Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry fought beyond Citta Delia Pieve during the day, resistance being described as "exceptionally fierce." 78th Division War Diary, 18 June 1944. 168 The 1st Surreys would give their medical officer and padre Military Crosses for the tending the wounded in Citta della Pieve. 'A' Company commander Captain Giles was awarded a bar to his Military Cross. G.L.A. Squire, and Hill, P.G.E. The Surreys in Italy, (Clandon, Surrey: The Queen's Royal Surrey Regiment Museum, 1992), 31. 169 The Chiana Valley would prove easy ground for delay due to the wet nature of the ground practically year round, with irrigation channels running west to the Chiana Canal which intersected all routes. B.H.S.C.M.. Operations of British, Indian and Dominion Forces In Italy, 3 September 1943 to 2 May 1945. Part II The Campaign in Central Italy 26 March to 10 August 1944. Section D Eighth Army Advance to Florence. Chapter II The Battle of Lake Trasimene. Paragraph 38. 66 This highway crossed the Pescia River north of these two towns which would prove a significant tank obstacle. This main supply route was paralleled by the railroad line to
Arezzo and was the obvious route for the advance of armoured forces. The other north- south access road passed through the hilltop towns closer to Lake Chiusi: Vaiano,
Gioiella, Casamaggiore and Petrignano. These would be the scenes of ferocious fighting in the Battle of the Trasimene Line. The cultivated fields in the area were sown with wheat and grape vines, providing cover to the defender and delaying the attacker.170
While the highest of these hills were little more than 350 meters, excellent observation and cover was offered by the hilltop villages of the region, many of which came ready- made for observation with a church tower possessing commanding views of the approaches to the south.
The best source for the precise nature of the defences is offered by the report of the No.l Operational Research Section, which conducted a detailed survey of the line immediately after the battle.171 Allied intelligence on the line was poor, and this was probably due to the excellent aerial cover provided by the vegetation.172 It was thought
WGF Jackson, Victory in the Mediterranean, Vol. VI, Part 2, p.41. 171 The Section's goal was to contrast the defensive system with that of the Hitler Line for "lessons learned" purposes. While the findings of the No. 1 Operational Research Section are informative the caveat must be provided that their test section of the line consisted of the area roughly bound by Pucciarelli-Badia-Frattavecchia and Castiglione. This portion may not provide the best example of the entire main defensive line as this eastern section based on the Pescia is sited on flat ground with the water obstacle in the foreground, while the main defensive line to the west has the benefits of the Casamaggiore-Frattavecchia ridge. Caution should be used in universalizing their claims for the rest of the line. No. 1 Operational Research Section, Report No. 1/23, "The Trasimene Line South West of Castiglione del Lago." King's Own Calgary Regiment Archives, K04SA 2143. 172 Only a few anti-aircraft sites were known before the battle. No. 1 Operational Research Section, Report No. 1/23, "The Trasimene Line South West of Castiglione del Lago.", Kings' Own Calgary Regiment Archives, K04SA 2143, 2. As the battle progressed, however, intelligence from the civilian population was increasingly helpful. Intelligence was provided through civilian sources which reported enemy positions, "proposed lines of resistance", and intentions "which later proved very accurate." II Brigade Message Log, 11 Brigade War Diary, 21 June 1944. 67 FIGURE FIVE: XIII Corps' Front at the Trasimene Line. From Kompass #662
"Lago Trasimeno - Val di Chiana - Chiano Terme"
that the digging of many positions, stretching for a depth of two miles and usually cited under foliage, was conducted immediately before the battle began.173 The report divides the line into three sections: a main defensive line built on the villages of Frattavecchia,
Casamaggiore, and along the Pescia River; battle outposts in the hamlets of Pescia,
Ranciano, Badia and Lopi; and covering positions on the ridge between Sanfatucchio and Vaiano which stretched to Lake Chiusi in the west.174 These covering positions
173 An escaped British prisoner of war reported that he heard of "considerable defences" being prepared near Perugia at the end of May. 4th Division Intelligence Summary No. 34, 9 June 1944. 174 Jackson also conceptualizes this way. Jackson, Victory in the Mediterranean, Volume VI, Part 2, p,41. 68 consisted of machine-gun and anti-tank posts with strong-points in the two main villages.175 Observation posts were based on the Sanfatucchio-Lopi-Gioiella road.
Trenches were dug following the lines of ditches and frequently were placed under dense foliage and vines thus concealing them from aerial and ground observation.'76 The main battle zone consisted mostly of dug-in strong points based on small woods or farms which were linked by a complex network of tracks. This zone was 2000 yards deep near the lake and narrowed to the west. In the east its forward edge was denoted by the tank obstacle of the Pescia River. Defences here were aided by large trees and belts of tellermines on both banks.177 The battle outposts were strong in anti-tank weapons sited on reverse slopes.178 On 17 June, captured documents indicated that the
Trasimene Line would be held "for a longer period" than the lines of resistance that had been hastily formed in the pursuit phase.179
175 The posts were dug by Italian labourers, who claimed posts were made every 500 meters. Dethick, 49, 51. 176 The operational researchers report described smaller trenches which were typically six feet by two feet and five feet deep. Various weapons pits were inspected by the Research Section, including light anti aircraft positions in the anti-tank role, machine-gun pits (some in a semi-lunar shape near the advanced positions, but most similar to the rifle pits), and square mortar pits. It appears that field guns and anti tank guns were not dug in. Dug-out shelters existed in the area surveyed. Generally thirty by fourteen feet and situated in existing ditches with timber and straw overhead coverage filled in by three feet of soil. These positions were the only ones with overhead cover. Nearly all houses in the area were utilized as defensive positions, but due to their twelve inch thick walls little additional fortification was thought to exist. The straight ditches and "geometrical patterns" of the fields forced platoon and company positions to take on the shape of three sides of a rectangle. Rows of vines were approximately twenty-five yards apart on average, which often limited fields of fire to this distance. Many of the tracks in the area had steep banks which would trap vehicles in them once committed. 177 Partisans had disabled tellermines blocking the road at Centoia. Dethick, 74. 178 The Operational Research Section found evidence of 75mm Pak 40s, 20mm anti-aircraft/anti-tank Flak 30s, 88mm rocket projectors, and Panzerfausts in these hamlets. The Section explained the large concentration of anti-tank weapons and dearth of infantry guns by noting the former were probably left behind to support rearguards during the withdrawal to the line. Writing of the 20mm anti-aircraft guns, Horsfall described "a tornado of fire and explosion as a nearby flak battery set about [the infantry] with air bursts". Horsfall, 174. Spending the night in his tank on 23-24 June a corporal from the Ontario Regiment noted "a lot of strange popping against the turret that turned out next morning to be 20 mm Oerlikon AA fire". Sullivan, 100. I7" XIII Corps Intelligence Summary No. 418, 17 June 1944. 69 MAP 2
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FIGURE SIX: No.l Operational Research Section Appreciation ofTrasimene Defences.
British National Archives, War Office File 291/1316
Four German divisions were positioned to face the XIII Corps, but these formations were only at approximately 50% fighting strength.1 The 334th German
180 XIII Corps Intelligence Summarv No. 421,21 June 44. The state of the Army Group C on 12 June was twelve divisions "almost fit for action" and a remaining sixteen which had the combat value of one reinforced regiment. "Report No. 24: The Italian Campaign (From the Fall of Rome to the Evacuation of Florence (4 Jun - 10 Aug 44)" Historical Section (G.S) Army Headquarters, 31 March 70 Infantry Division was closest to the lake, which, with the 1027 Regiment under command, was composed of four infantry regiments (roughly equivalent to Anglo-
Canadian brigades). 1st Parachute Division, whose numbers were the weakest after a month and a half of heavy fighting, held the strong-point in Vaiano.181 Defending Chiusi against the South Africans was the Hermann Goring Panzer Division and finally, on the far German right, the 356th Division defended the Sarteano-Chianciano road. While many of these formations were under strength, it appears that the ammunition situation on the German side was remarkably good, this perhaps due to falling back across a main ammunition dump at Perugia.182
An order from Kesselring on 13 June urged machine-guns and long range infantry arms to open up at maximum range, and expend as much ammunition as required to force the opposing forces to disperse.183 Fuel proved not nearly so plentiful and German soldiers were reminded that the "fuel situation will continue to remain critical as the available fuel is required primarily for the tasks of the Panzer and Panzer
Grenadier Divisions."184 Morale seems to have varied throughout the Corps with the bleak outlook of decimated units like the 334th Division contrasted with more recent replacements to the Hermann Goring Division, who were still quite optimistic.185
1949, 45. 181 The existence of the two elite divisions, 1st Parachute and the Hermann Goring Panzer Division, indicate that Kesselring had committed his mobile operational reserve. 182 Locals conscripted as labour report that there was a large German ammunition dump in Cascina, just east of Panicarola. Dethick, 24. 183 XIII Corps Intelligence Summary No. 423, 24 June 44. An operation order of the 26th Panzer Division dated 2/3 June 1944 states "should enemy follow up he should be fought off regardless of expenditure of ammunition", 4th Division Intelligence Summary No. 33, 7 June 1944. 184 An order dated 13 June lists methods of conservation ordered including towing petrol vehicles by diesels, the mixing of diesel fuel with petrol, and the evacuation of all petrol vehicles to rear areas. 78lh Division Intelligence Summary No. 194,28 June 1944. 185 From 3rd Division Periodic Report No. 152, found in 1CAB Intelligence Summary, No. 107, 16 June 1944. 71 Ife5
The Battle of Lake Trasimeno 13 Corps 20th -28th June 1944
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FIGURE SEVEN: The Battle of Lake Trasimeno. Jackson, Victory in the
Mediterranean, Volume VI, Part II, 40. 72 Morale in the Allied Armies Italy in the summer of 1944 is described by most historians and participants as at an all-time high.186 The capture of Rome, the balmy summer weather in Italy, and the constant advance did much to leaven the soldier's spirit.187 As John Horsfall noted of his troops in early June, "the impulse of victory is a very strong one and brings with it a reckless self confidence...both as individuals and in their corporate esprit with the Irish Brigade there was an intense pride which would dwarf peril and fatigue alike." The ammunition situation for the Allies during the period was the inverse of the Germans. Heavy artillery shell expenditure was a part of the
British way of war, and after the massive expenditures in the DIADEM offensive, and a month and a half of constant advance, artillery regiments were beginning to fire at slower rates than normal. Massive losses of manpower from casualties in DIADEM had largely been replaced, but many of these soldiers, especially those of the 4th Division, were still combat novices. As John Horsfall noted of his 2nd London Irish Rifles, "I felt that we had done the best we could with our brittle order of battle...none of the companies had more than a handful of experienced N.C.O.s left to them.'"88
In this condition on 19 June 1944, elements of the 78th Division first encountered the forward covering positions of the Trasimene line. 36 Brigade had occupied Citta della Pieve and pushed forward to German positions in the hills to the north-west of Moiano.189 1st German Parachute Division resistance was stubborn, but
"lr' Doherty, A Noble Crusade, 255. As one commanding officer later wrote in a letter home to his father "it is a grand feeling to be going forward the whole time." Horsfall, 104. 188 The comment was made on 17 June on approach to the Trasimene Line. Horsfall, 139. On 19 June, a 4th Division battalion, the 6th Black Watch, received a draft of six sergeants and ninety-four other ranks, enabling them to form a fourth rifle company consisting of these new members. The battalion was, however, still short of officers. 80. 36 Brigade War Diary, 19 June 1944. 6,h Royal West Kents had taken casualties during the day from small arms, shell and mortar fire as they advanced. "A" Company was heavily shelled in Palazzola. 73 with the help of a well coordinated fire plan, and the tanks of the Royal Wiltshire
Yeomanry the infantry advanced.190 Attacking across a stream and into heavily wooded hills, the tanks sprayed the area liberally with machine-gun fire and high-explosive, but were delayed by a large demolition where the road passed under a railway bridge.191
The infantry managed to push on and consolidated on their objectives in the hills to the north of the railway and stream.192
The next day the 36 Brigade and the Wiltshire Yeomanry advanced through
German machine gun positions, snipers, small arms fire and shelling to take their objectives from a kilometre west of Villa Strada to the town itself.193 In the evening
Zero hour for the attack on Moiano was 1930hrs. The 6Ih Royal West Kents diary reports that the "barrage [was] highly successful" in the attack through "steady rain and mist." 6lh Royal West Kent Regiment War Diary, 19 June 2010. 190 The fire-plan was laid on by the 138th Field Regiment. The 6th Royal West Kent Regiment, the 5,h Royal East Kent Regiment and the tanks of the Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry pushed the parachutists back taking twenty-five prisoners and caused "a good number" of German casualties. 138th Field Regiment Royal Artillery War Diary, 19 June 1944. 1,1 5lh Royal East Kent Regiment War Diary, 18 June 1944. In the evening of 19-20 June the 5th Royal East Kents (The Buffs) were counterattacked by a group of fifty paratroopers, twenty of which were killed and fifteen taken prisoner. 78th Division War Diary, 20 June 1944. 193 On the left of the 36 Brigade front the 6th Royal West Kent Regiment leapfrogged companies forward through enemy small-arms fire to a position one and a half kilometres west of Villa Strada. 6,h Royal West Kents W.D., 20 June 1944. At 1 lOOhrs, 20 June, the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 500 meters South of Villa Strada, overcame machine-gun positions at close range. 8"' Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders W.D., 20 June 1944. 'X' Company and a troop of the Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry advanced to positions south-east of Villa Strada. At 1245hrs, the 5th Buffs 'B' Company advanced to the right of the town. 5th Royal East Kent Regiment W.D., 20 June 1944. Tank support followed behind, but was delayed until 1500hrs when called forward to engage snipers and machine- guns firing from a large house on the objective. Once the German small-arms fire was dealt with, 'B' Company of the 5th Royal East Kent Regiment consolidated on their objective and the remainder of the battalion moved up and through this position onto their nearby objectives, advancing into intermittent shelling. At 1530hrs the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders' 'X' Company had secured Villa Strada with the help of a troop of the Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry. At 1830hrs positions were gained on the ridge directly north of Villa Strada in the hamlet of Poggio del Solea. The Argylls overlooked the village of Vaiano, but were subject to heavy shelling and mortaring. Half an hour later, 'R' and 'B' Companies advanced to either side of the village in an attempt to envelop the German positions there. At 2130hrs the attack advanced into "fierce opposition". A foothold on the outskirts of town was gained which "undoubtedly inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy." The Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry's war diary states that "many enemy infantry were killed and several guns probably knocked out by 'B' Squadron who lost 4 tanks." Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry W.D., 20 June 1944. 74 FIGURE EIGHT: 36 Brigade and Wiltshire's Centre Line. G. S.G. S., No. 4229,
"Castiglione del Lago", Sheet 121 II, Grid squares are 1000 yards by 1000 yards. 75 the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders advanced into "fierce opposition" gaining a
"foothold" on the outskirts of Vaiano.194 At 0200hrs on 21 June a strong enemy
counterattack by the 4th Parachute Regiment pushed the Argylls back after "fierce close
quarter fighting."195 The Wiltshire's diary states that "resistance was very stiff and only
[a] slight advance was made."196 In the early afternoon of 21 June the 36 Brigade was
relieved by the 4th Division's 28 Brigade. 197 The attack had been called off by Major-
General Keightley, as the 4th Division was moving into the line and the 78th Division's
front would be narrowed by a concentration to the east, shortening the latter's frontage
and placing two divisions between Lake Trasimene and Lake Chiusi, a distance of less than nine kilometres.198 Enemy resistance had stiffened considerably.199 Vaiano would stop the allied advance for three full days.
1,4 'A' Squadron, who had been supporting the Royal West Kent's advance on the Argyll's left flank, later took over from 'B' in supported of the Argylls. Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry W.D., 20 June 1944. 195 The regiment lost one killed, sixteen wounded, and twenty-six missing, and would remain in position for the next 48 hours, being shelled and mortared by the enemy. 8lh Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders W.D., 20 June 1944. 36 Brigade W.D., 20 June 1944. A.D. Malcolm, History of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 8th Battalion, 1939-47. Ray, 146. Support was given in the form of'B' Group of the 1st Kensington Regiment, whose mortars and machine-guns would be tasked with harassing fire when night fell and defensive fire against the counterattacks. 1st Kensington Regiment W.D., 21 June 1944. B.V.C. Harpur et al. "The Kensingtons" : Princess Louise's Kensington Regiment: Second World War. (London: Regimental Old Comrades Association), 148-49 The Argylls were also supported by the guns of the 138th Field Regiment, who had taken up firing positions behind an olive oil factory in Villa Strada. 138th Field Regiment W.D., 21 June 1944. 1'"1 'B' Squadron had lost four tanks in the action. J.R.I. Piatt, The Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry (Prince of Wale's Own) 1907-1967, 169. 197 The Buffs war diary states that relief was expected soon, and at 1500hrs the commanding officer of the Somerset Light Infantry and his company commanders arrived to survey the ground for their upcoming positions. At 2000hrs the relief was conducted without a hitch. Relief was finally given for the Argylls by the 2nd/4th Hamps at 2130hrs on 22 June, and all elements were released from Vaiano save for the anti-tank platoon which stayed in support of the Hamps. 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders W.D., 22 June 1944.From the 18-20 June, the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had suffered eighteen wounded, two killed and fourteen missing. "Situation at Hrs Daily", 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders W.D., June 1944. "" 36 Brigade W.D., 21 June 1944.XIII Corps Intelligence Summary No. 421,21 June 44. 199 As the 38 Brigade war diary stated "the enemy resistance has been stiffening considerably during the past few days. The parachutists...put up a hard fight in Citta del[la] Pieve...and along the whole of the Divisional front, there has been a much greater concentration of enemy forces." 38 Brigade W.D., 21 June 1944. 76 FIGURE NINE: Contemporary View From Villa Strada North-west to Vaiano.
Sanfatucchio Village 19-21 June: Close Support Shermans in Urban Operations
The struggle for Sanfatucchio displays both the inherent capabilities and difficulties of tank-infantry cooperation when fighting in the urban environment. On the right on 19
June 1944, the 78th Division's 11 Brigade had cleared the mountain range to the south west of Lake Trasimene and would now leave this high-ground and attack the other main covering position of the Trasimene Line, at the village of Sanfatucchio. The No.l
Operational Research Section had found a few slit trenches dug next to buildings in the village, but the houses themselves were to be the site of fierce fighting.200 On 19 June
1944, the Warwickshire Yeomanry with the 5th Northampton Regiment and the 1st East
Surreys advanced in the face of cratered roads, enemy anti-tank rifles, and mortar fire, consolidating in and around Macchie overnight.201
200 No. 1 Operational Research Section, Report No. 1/23, "The Trasimene Line South West of Castiglione del Lago." King's Own Calgary Regiment Archives, K04SA 2143, 5. 201 At 0900hrs, the Warwickshire Yeomanry moved up to Panicale with 'C' Squadron and the reconnaissance troop in the lead, and 'B' Squadron carrying the 5th Northampton Regiment on their 77 BATTLE OF
MflCCHII
SCALE :• KILCS
FIGURE TEN: Battle of Sanfatucchio. Horsfall, Fling Banners to the Wind. tanks. Craters held up the column here until early afternoon. In the afternoon the No. 4 Troop of'C' Squadron crossed the canal and entered the village of Macchie, two kilometres to the southeast of Sanfatucchio, which the war diary reports as "full of enemy". Warwickshire Yeomanry Regiment W.D., 19 June 1944. 1000 yards beyond the town, the lead and rear tanks were hit by "enemy bazookas" and after causing casualties to the Germans, their crews were captured. It is noted that the Lake Trasimene battle is where the 1 [Canadian] Armoured Brigade first met the "deadly German anti tank bazooka". "Highlights Commemorating 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade during World War 2", Directorate of History and Heritage, 141.013 (D6).' 'C' Squadron withdrew to the canal, and the infantry and 'B' Squadron took the town during the night. At 1800hrs, the 11 Brigade pushed 5th Northamptons into Macchie encountering heavy mortaring. Before last light a farm to the west of Macchie which held enemy was assaulted with tank support and captured. In the evening the 1 East Surreys moved up and consolidated positions parallel to those of the Northamptons, 11 Brigade W.D., 19 June 1944. 78 On 20 June, the 11 Brigade advanced toward Sanfatucchio with the 5th
Northampton Regiment on the right, the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers directly onto the town, and the 1st East Surreys to the left.202 The Fusiliers were quickly "wedged against the town" and their supporting battalions could make no progress on the flanks. The subsequent attack of 'B' Squadron of the Warwickshire Yeomanry and the 2nd
Lancashire Fusiliers' on Sanfatucchio is an example of the disintegration of tank- infantry co-operation.203 Both units' diaries put the blame on the other arm. At 1230hrs
No. 2 Troop of the Warwickshires and 'A' Company began the operation by moving northwest on the Macchie-Sanfatucchio road. Initially little resistance was met, and the tanks played a supporting role, firing rounds at houses indicated by the infantry.204
However, mortars and machine-guns pinned down the infantry before long and an artillery concentration was called in from 'B' Battery, Royal Horse Artillery. The Allied infantry were having a hard time performing proper reconnaissance while keeping contact between platoons in the tall corn. When tanks advanced to the crossroads, the lead tank was knocked out by a hand-held anti-tank weapon and had to be evacuated.
No. 1 Troop was moved from the left of the village to support 'C' Company of the
Lancashire Fusiliers, who had made an advance to the west but were going to ground due to small arms fire. Nos. 2 and 4 Troops engaged the enemy in Sanfatucchio as 'A'
Company worked its way forward. 'A' Company advanced through the cross-roads and
No. 3 troop was passed up the hill to the village. When 'A' Company reached the corner that No. 3 Troop was firing from they could no longer move forward. At 1930hrs the
21.2 Richard Doherty, A Noble Crusade, 232. "B" Group of the Lancashire Fusiliers lent mortar support to the attack. Harpur, "The Kensingtons", 148. 21.3 Warwickshire Yeomanry Regiment W.D., 20 June 1944, Appendix F. ^ 11 Brigade W.D, 20 June 1944. 79 battle-group was withdrawn from the village to allow the divisional artillery to engage.
The Lancashire Fusiliers diary states that the tank-infantry cooperation was poor and points out that the Warwickshire Regiment had engaged a house occupied by
Fusiliers during the action. The infantry diary also implies that the tanks provoked withdrawal. Both infantry and armoured diaries indicate the frustration at failing to gain the objective of Sanfatucchio, perhaps a function of meeting stronger resistance there than expected.205 The incident shows the difficulties of tank-infantry communication, especially in ground with poor visibility such as the high standing corn fields. It appears that the tank telephone, installed in most Shermans of 1CAB by mid-1944, had not alleviated the problems of tank-infantry communication which came naturally with the noise and restricted vision inherent in tank warfare.206 Speaking of an earlier encounter John Horsfall noted one of his company commanders had:
found it necessary to hammer on one of the tank turrets with a rifle butt before he could interest its preoccupied commander in E Company's problems. The real trouble just then was the corn itself. At its full height, nobody could see anything either from a tank or anywhere else.207
In an environment where companies could barely keep track of their own platoons, maintaining a situational awareness of enemy locations was impossible. The defences in
Sanfatucchio, while technically a covering position, were going to be difficult to
21,5 A member of the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers intelligence section noted the attack should have not proceeded due to the exhaustion of the infantry due to little sleep or food in four to five days. Dethick, 93. The telephones were often damaged as they were fastened outside the tank, often in ammunition boxes. Tank-infantry radio communications were seen as the most difficult at the troop-company or lower level and various studies were conducted by operational researchers regarding the best way to link armour and infantry with man-pack No. 18, tank-installed No. 19, and satchel No. 38 wireless sets. No. 1 Operational Research Section, "Tank Communications: Infantry to Tank, and Use of a Second W/Set No. 19 in Sherman Command Tanks", September 1944, WO 204/7656. 2,17 Horsfall's memoirs were aided by a daily diary and letters written during his service in Italy as well as correspondence with his fellow veterans after the war. Horsfall, xiii, 61, 143, 146. 80 overcome.
John Horsfall observed the scene on 20 June from an observation post at
Castello di Montalera, where the 38 (Irish) Brigade had set up its headquarters. As
Lieutenant Colin Gunner, the officer commanding of a Vickers' gun platoon, wrote in his memoir, "from this eyrie of a castle[,] red banned hats surveyed the shimmer of Lake
Trasimene before them and thumbing their Staff College Manual at the page marked
Hannibal, launched the Rifles and Skins along its shores."208 Horsfall notes the surreal nature of the landscape with "the entire Trasimene sector spread out below us like a model landscape, with the lake itself as the centre piece. As a battlefield it hardly seemed real....the cotton wool puffs of shell explosions were rising continually in those hillocks where we knew the Lancashire Fusiliers were hanging on by their eyebrows."
Sanfatucchio, on the 20 June, was reported "spitting fire in all directions."
Sanfatucchio San Felice Cemetary
8K?iw^' --m
FIGURE ELEVEN : Contemporary View From Castiglione del Lago South to
Sanfatucchio.
208 Colin Gunner, 116. 81 An attempt to push a Lancashire Fusilier's patrol into the town before midnight was met with artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire and it subsequently withdrew.209
Overnight, the infantry were unable to infiltrate and spent the evening in forward positions under a heavy rain.210 Meanwhile, the squadron commanders of the Ontario
Regiment, which had been hastily moved sixty miles north the previous day, liaised with their respective infantry battalion commanders of the Irish Brigade.2" "Wireless communication was established and troops allotted to Co[mpanies]" in preparation for continuing the fight for Sanfatucchio.
In the early morning of 21 June the Germans were still holding fast to the village of Sanfatucchio while the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers had secured some of the houses on the south-eastern outskirts.212 At 0420hrs, Lieutenant Colonel John Horsfall of the 2nd
London Irish Rifles arrived at the 2nd Lancashire Fusilier Regiment's headquarters and a plan was developed to envelop the village with the 2nd London Irish Rifles on the left
2119 The 2 Lancashire Fusiliers (2LF) companies were told to lay up and infiltrate at night, with 'B' Company in the lead. At last light the regiment reported their forward companies 200 yards south of the town. A "strong fighting patrol" sent out reported "extremely stiff opposition in the village." Only a small percentage of the patrol returned. 11 Brigade W.D., 20 June 1944. At 2000hrs on 20 June, the 11 Brigade reported three companies of 2 Lancashire Fusiliers surrounding the town, with two pinned down by mortar and machine-gun fire and another making progress.78th Division Information Log, 20 June 1944.At 2150hrs, the 66th Medium Field Regiment supported the Lancashire Fusiliers with a fire-plan. The regiment was busy during the day shooting on nebelwerfer and enemy harassing batteries with the assistance of the 75th Heavy Regiment. 66th Medium Field Regiment, 20 June 1944. One veteran noted Sanfatucchio was the greatest concentration of nebelwerfer fire the regiment had seen to date and that the sound was "like the scream of a dying donkey with the noise of some heavy furniture on very rusty castors superimposed on each other." Dethick, 90. Known enemy locations were engaged by the 57th Army Field Regiment of the Royal Artillery. Two hundred rounds of harassing fire was brought down on enemy communications and two known enemy localities were bombarded with very slow fire. Zero hour was 2300hrs. 57th Army Field Regiment W.D., 20 June 1944. 210 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers W.D., 20 June 1944. 211 11th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 20 June 1944. The Ontario Regiment had first met the 2nd London Irish Rifles on the 23rd of May when they were assigned in support of the pursuit. The men of the regiments reportedly messed together and sang Irish songs. Horsfall, 82. 212 B.H.S.C.M.. Operations of British [...] Part II, Section D, Chapter II. Paragraph 16. 82 and the Fusiliers on the right.213 'B' and 'D' Groups of the 1st Kensington Regiment, the divisional support battalion, were set up in Macchie and the brick-works nearby, tasked with supporting the attack with their heavy and medium machine-guns and 4.2" mortars.214 Tank support would be provided respectively by the Ontario Armoured
Regiment and the Warwickshire Yeomanry.215
The commander of the 2nd London Irish Rifles, John Horsfall, later noted that a group of buildings on the north-west corner of Sanfatucchio could possibly fall to a combined attack and that "once that had happened [he] did not think the garrison would fight for long when fired in to from behind -especially by tanks."2'6 The plan was to get tanks up through the folds in the ground to the west and attack with 'E' and 'F'
Companies with the twelve tanks of the Ontario Regiment's 'B' Squadron. Recalling the battlefield as the Irish Brigade teed up its attack, Horsfall noted:
The [la Chiusa] brickworks was not an imposing place, but at least it provided fairly solid masonry in front of us and some kind of covered approach from the rear. It lay in the centre of the low ground, scarcely a mile in front of the as yet undamaged silhouette of our objective. Prominent against the star-studded sky was the stark outline of Sanfatucchio church, and in the long daylight hours to come we would live with this monument towering over the smoke swirling round it.217
213 78th Division Information Log, 21 June 1944. 2n Douglas Mclndoe and the infantry of the 2nd London Irish Rifles married up.218 Zero Hour for the attack was 0800hrs, at which time the Rifle's six-pounder anti-tank guns began engaging targets.219 At 0805hrs smoke was laid to cover the advance of the tanks and infantry.220 Heavy opposition came from the west of the town and defensive fire tasks were called for on the town of Sanfatucchio itself.221 At 0917hrs a troop of'B' Squadron had advanced to the western edge of the town.222 The 2nd London Irish Rifles 'F' and 'E' Companies were receiving fire from the west towards San Felice cemetery and a troop of tanks was shifted here and artillery smoke laid down in assistance.223 At 1030hrs, the forward companies of the 2nd London Irish Rifles were in the village, but so too were the Germans.224 Ronnie Boyd's 'E' Company took a number of casualties in their attack advancing up the street supported "at point blank range by one or two tanks. 2I* 2nd London Irish Rifles W.D., 21 June 1944. The Ontario Regiment had a troop of M10 tank destroyers from the 105th Anti-tank Regiment under command for the attack, which reportedly did "much shooting" during the day. 105th Anti-tank Regiment W.D., 21 June 1944. 2I<) 38 Brigade W.D., 21 June 1944. The six pounders of the platoon under Captain G. Fitzgerald had been proven adept in street-fighting situations previously. In Civitella, earlier in the month, the jeep- towed guns proved able to get into places tanks could not. Their ability to be manhandled and good high-explosive capabilities were great assets in street-fighting. The anti-tank platoon and Teddy Cullen's Vickers teams of the Kensington Regiment were tasked with adding fire that directed on the front of the town by the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers Regiment. 'F' Company of the 2nd London Irish Rifles objective was the high ground behind the town. Horsfall, 124, 150. Cullen features largely in the memory of the Irish Brigade's fight for dismounting a Vickers gun and firing it through the floor "in road drill fashion" at Germans occupying the floor below. Colin Gunner, 117. 22U 2nd London Irish Rifles W.D., 21 June 1944. 221 When the map reference was rechecked, this fire switched to 200 meters north-west of the small hamlet of San Felice. 222 1 1th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 21 June 1944. 2nd London Irish Rifles W.D., 21 June 1944. R.T. Currelly, 1 Canadian Field Historical Section, "Report on Operations 11CAR (Ont R) from 12 June to 30 June 44", 141.4A11DI3(1) 11 Cdn Armd Regt (Ont R.), 2. At the same time No. 1 Troop of the 11th Canadian Armoured Regiment under Lieutenant Jourard advanced alone to the cemetery to the right of the town into a firestorm of mortar and shell fire. The tanks advanced after the infantry, but drew much of the defensive fire. Horsfall, 150. 223 2nd London Irish Rifles W.D., 21 June 1944. 22-1 38 Brigade W.D., 21 June 1944. 84 blast[ing] their way into the first building block."225 Horsfall stated that the Sherman's 75mm "was a marvellous gun, and a single shell from it was sufficient to bring down a large part of the front wall of a house." Most of the defenders were killed from the fire of the tanks.226 The 17th Field Regiment had some difficulties providing support, as the Lancashire Fusiliers were pinned down so close to the village, but smoke was laid down, and one battery engaged in some "delicate shooting."227 From the position in his command tank on a ridge-line Horsfall stated, "the little town seemed on fire with dense rolling smoke pouring from it in the slight breeze...we could see nothing as the dust clouds thickened - only the flash and spume of the shell explosions, and black streaks of oil smoke spiralling slowly upwards above the holocaust beneath."228 The 17th Field Regiment soon ran out of smoke ammunition, and when this cover cleared several tanks were lost to German guns which covered the town from the north. Horsfall noted company commander "Ronnie Boyd with ['E' Company] gradually worked their way down the main street, diving form one house to the next as soon as the nearest tank had put a shell through it....Grenades were also flying about in both directions, but I don't think anyone bolted...at that stage they had nowhere to bolt to as the garrison was now surrounded."229 The Rifles reported the objective fully occupied at 1115hrs and the town 225 Street clearing was systematized with the tanks shooting the buildings and infantry throwing grenades through the breaches and then storming the buildings. Horsfall, 56, 101, 151. 22(i Doherty, 233. 227 Doherty, 233. The 17th Field Regiment's three batteries were assigned to each of the battalions of the Irish Brigade, and "regarded itself as a part of it". Paul Rockliffe was assigned to the 2nd London Irish Rifles and the commanding officer considered him his "right arm." Horsfall, 52, 151. At 1 lOOhrs the Lancashire Fusiliers moved up to the outskirts of town and winkled out harassing snipers while the Rifles cleared the town.2nd Lancashire Fusiliers W.D., 21 June 1944. m German shelling and mortaring were reportedly on a heavy scale, and intelligence estimated that all of the 334th Division's artillery and some army assets were deployed to defend the town. 78th Division Intelligence Summary No. 191, 22 June 1944. 22* Horsfall, 150. 85 itself was reported clear by 1130hrs.230 Horsfall recalls "sprawled riflemen and their German opponents lay scattered down the main street."2'1 The Kensingtons were moved up to consolidate the town, establishing their Vickers machine-gun positions on the outskirts and 4.2" mortar positions in the town square.212 As Horsfall noted the mortars were usually brought up quickly by carrier onto a recently gained objective as "they were the first necessity, providing mobile close range fire power."233 When the advance was pursued to the north-west, towards the cemetery in San Felice, resistance increased and sniping became heavy.234 Two of the Ontario's tanks and one M10 tank destroyer235 were knocked out in this area, but Lieutenant Hopkins, whose tank was shot up, later directed artillery fire onto the offending anti-tank gun. 'B' Squadron reported they only had seven functioning tanks. 'H' Company of the 2nd London Irish Rifles Regiment fought its way toward the San Felice cemetery with 'G' Company behind.236 Company commander, Major Desmond Woods, was wounded by a stick grenade, as was his successor. Camouflaged 88mm guns knocked out all but one of the supporting tanks which "pulverized [the church] at point blank."237 In a 2.0 11th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 21 June 1944. 2nd London Irish Rifles W.D., 21 June 1944. 2.1 Horsfall, 152. 2.2 These positions were subject to heavy shelling over the following night. 1 Kensington Regiment W.D., 21 June 1944. 2" The gunners of Fitzgerald's anti-tank platoon had driven up the road towards Pucciarelli, unlimbered a quarter a mile off under machine-gun fire and went into action over open sights, neutralizing the town. They later shifted their fire to Sanfatucchio itself as 'E' Company was coming from the north. Horsfall, 152. 234 1 1 Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 21 June 1944 255 The M10 "Wolverine" Tank Destroyer had a 3" (76.2mm) gun, and as such offered the largest mobile direct-fire weapon in the Trasimene fight. Three Rivers intelligence officer Horace Beach derided the M10 operators for not being forward with the tanks in his scathing report of the battle. MIOs were active in the battle, usually attached to various groups in small numbers. Their inherent weaknesses were a slow hand-cranked traverse and an open-topped turret. Horace Beach, "Notes on the Battle of the Lake Trasimeno Line," Ace Beach Fonds, 4 July 1944. 256 Richard Doherty, 233. 237 Horsfall, 153. 86 FIGURE TWELVE: 'H' Company London Irish Rifles, 'B' Squadron Ontario Regiment. Horsfall, Fling Banners to the Wind. harrowing attack on the walled cemetery, Germans threw grenades over the wall which 'H' Company men were taking cover behind, fortunately throwing their deadly projectiles too far. When a German feldwebel (sergeant) peered over the wall 87 Lieutenant Webb Bowen shot him with his pistol. 'H' Company consolidated in the cemetery area. At 1355hrs, 21 June 1944, 'G' and 'H' Companies of the London Irish Rifles advanced to the next objective, the lateral road some 500 meters north, overcoming heavy opposition with the aid of "plenty of artillery support."238 The situation on the left flank was reported as confused. One company commander stated that the enemy was "possessed and fighting like maniacs."239 Five hundred yards to the north, at a farm called Casa Montemara, Colin Gibbs' 'F' Company was also subject to a strong counterattack.240 This was broken up by the riflemen aided by effective artillery fire, called in by forward artillery observer Captain Alan Parsons, who was tasked with destroying all buildings suspected to house the Germans. Such a shoot was impressive granted the proximity of the Rifles and the enemy, and was aided by the 5.5" medium artillery. Speculative tank fire into the corn was effective with numerous Germans surrendering or firing over their shoulders in retreat. The last light situation report indicated the London Irish Rifle's anti-tank guns and the Kensingtons' Vickers machine-guns in position with the Rifle's 'G' company ready in a counterattack role.241 A counterattack on 'E' Company at 2230hrs was held at At I450hrs, these companies reported themselves 300 yards above this second objective. 2nd London Irish Rifles Regiment W.D., 21 June 1944. At 1625hrs, a counter attack of company strength on the left of the London Irish Rifles in the cemetery area was beaten off. 38 Brigade W.D., 21 June 1944. 23<> Richard Doherty, 233. An indication of the ferocity of the fighting in the village is given by a captured situation report which stated that the 754th regiment and the 334"' Fusilier Battalion had both suffered 50-60% casualties. The scale of the fighting is given in the XIII Corps Information Log from 78th Division in which captured enemy diaries indicate that on 21-22 June 754th Regiment lost half of its fighting strength and the 334 Fusiliers diminished by two thirds. It appears that the 754th Regiment was in charge of the defences of the town. 78 Division Intelligence Summary No 193, 78th Division W.D., 25 June 1944. 240 Richard Doherty, 234. 241 2nd London Irish Rifles, 21 June 1944. One M10 of the 105th Anti-tank Regiment had been knocked out by an anti-tank gun during the day killing two and wounding the rest of the crew. All troops of the 315th Battery were put under command of the 11th Canadian Armoured Regiment in the evening. At 88 FIGURE THIRTEEN: German Prisoners in Sanfatucchio 21 June. Horsfall, Fling Banners to the Wind. a mere twenty yards distance and the 17th Field Regiment, and 4.2" and 3" mortars brought down defensive fire tasks on the enemy. The Kensingtons medium machine- guns were sent forward in support.242 Counterattacks on the 21 June were beaten back 2300hrs the guns of the 254th Anti-Tank battery were established in their positions and awaiting the inevitable counterattack. 105th Anti-tank Regiment W.D., 21 June 1944. 242 3 8 Brigade W.D., 21 June 1944. In the evening, the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers were relieved by the 2nd 89 with enemy losses numbering seventy prisoners from the 334th German Infantry Division.243 Horsfall recalled that during the fight for Sanfatucchio, "the scenes in the town were unforgettable, and the cessation of shelling accentuated other noises - the panting of injured men, the crack of rifle bullets on masonry, and dislodged bricks falling into the street with glass showering down, splintering and tinkling."244 The actions of the London Irish Rifles, the Ontario Armoured Regiment, and their supporting artillery, machine-guns, and mortars, in performing this highly coordinated left-flanking attack against the 334th German Division's defensive positions in Sanfatucchio displays the deadly capabilities of the all-arms team. The fight emphasizes the utility of the Sherman tank in street-fighting. The same 75mm gun criticized by most popular accounts of tank-warfare was able to destroy thick Italian masonry and expose the German's positions for the infiltrating riflemen.245 Artillery concentrations were precise and flexible. There was no lack of aggression in this flanking attack, nor in the 6th Inniskilling Regiment's concurrent attack on the village of Pucciarelli. Fighting here would show an effective bite and hold doctrine, which was tailor-made for an enemy whose defensive doctrine was built around the immediate counter-attack of lost defensive positions. Lancashire Fusiliers, pulled out of the line for rest in the village of Panicale. The battalion had had all company's forward on 21 June, sniping from positions on the south-west outskirts of Sanfatucchio in support of the Irish Rifles sweep through the village. 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers W.D., 21 June 1944. M Losses were specifically denoted from the 1st Battalion of the 754 Regiment and the Is' Battalion of the 755 Regiment. 4lh Division Intelligence Summary No. 38, 23 June 1944. These two regiments had only five battalions between them at the time, and Horsfall estimates their fighting strength was roughly equivalent to the Irish Brigade's. Horsfall, 147. At this time replacements were called in for 'H' Company's 18-set and 38-set operators. 2nd London Irish Rifles W.D., 21 June 1944. After the battle five of the six forward companies of the 754th and 755th German Infantry Regiments were written off, and the two regiments had to be amalgamated. Anon, The London Irish at War, (London: London Irish Rifles Old Comrade's Association), 167. 244 Horsfall, 155. 245 M10 Tank Destroyers also noted the effectiveness of their 3" (76.2mm) Armoured Piercing Capped rounds on the Italian Masonry. 105th Anti-Tank Regiment R.A. War Diary, July 1944. 90 The Inniskillings Bite and Hold Pucciarelli, 21-22 June The fight for Pucciarelli again demonstrates the various weapons systems of the all- arms team in the assault role. In the approach to the town, we are given an idea of the empathy of tankers for their infantrymen advancing unprotected alongside the armour. The cult of the counterattack in German defensive doctrine would meet the consolidation phase of Allied assault doctrine head on in Pucciarelli, where the Kensingtons' Vicker's machine-gun crews would have to fight off German infantry and self-propelled guns at close range. While the Ontario's 'B' squadron and the 2nd London Irish Rifles attacked Sanfatucchio from the left on 21 June, on the right 'A' squadron, under Acting Major Earle K. Kennedy, supported by the 6th Inniskilling Regiment moved up through the 5th Northamptons positions to the east of route 71, advancing through small arms opposition.246 Malcolm Sullivan, officer commanding 'A' Squadron's No. 3 Troop recalls, "even though our four machine guns were constantly firing, I could see infantrymen being hit and dropping. I marvelled at the resoluteness of these men as they moved forward in a well disciplined manner, maintaining their spacing and doing their job, mostly with a look of resignation on their faces." Sullivan advanced on the right flank hoping to fire in enfilade on the Germans in the ditches.247 246 'A' Squadron of the Ontario Regiment advanced to Carraira at 1040hrs. An enemy anti-tank gun in the area was destroyed by an attached self-propelled gun. R.T. Currelly, 1 Canadian Field Historical Section, "Report on Operations 11 CAR (Ont R) from 12 June to 30 June 44", 141.4A11D13( 1) 11 Cdn Armd Regt (Ont R.), 2. During the move up to Carraira, artillery shells had mortally wounded 'A' Squadron's second-in-command Captain A.W. "Bud" Hawkins. Sullivan's No. 3 Troop, making a flanking movement from the right, was down to two tanks as the third had thrown a track. No. 1 Troop, attacking up the main road, was also down one tank due to mechanical problems. Sullivan, 89. M7 An interesting technique of skipping high-explosive shells off the ground to air-burst over the Germans was used to good effect, yielding more than thirty prisoners and a number of dead. Another tank of'A' Squadron's No. 1 Troop was hit, and the final tank under command of the troop leader "Bill" joined No. 3 Troop. Sullivan took the lead in the open country until finding a good defensive field of fire to the east of the main road. Attempts to liaise with the 6th Inniskilling Regiment's company commander necessitated a dangerous dismounted search. Sullivan, 89. A German Pak 41 anti-tank gun that was sited on the outskirts of Pucciarelli, where the road turns south and crosses the 91 The 17th Field Regiment reports putting a smoke screen down in the morning "to blind Pucciarelli".248 Both Uncle (artillery code for a concentration fired by all guns of a division) and Mike (regimental concentration) targets were fired in rapid succession throughout the afternoon, and forward observer Major M.H. Scott laid on Fire-plan KETTLE to help the Skins reach their objective.249 The plan was to move with two companies up, and two companies following with the support of'A' Squadron of the Ontario Regiment.250 Zero hour was set at 1500hrs, but the counterattack on the Rifles in the San Felice cemetery diverted all artillery support to the west, and zero hour was postponed until 1645hrs.251 At 1645hrs 'A' and 'B' Companies of the 6th Inniskillings crossed the start-line advancing into heavy enemy shelling, while the Royal Artillery put a two regiment concentration down on the first objective in the town.252 Clouds of smoke billowed through the village as the 'A' Squadron tanks blasted the sturdy houses. At 1718hrs, 'B' Company was held up by machine-guns. When the tanks advanced, contact was lost with their supporting infantry, perhaps due to poor visibility due to the smoke. 'D' Company was ordered to send forward their tank support and 'B' Company was to push forward when this arrived. 'A' Company advanced alone on their left and when almost railway tracks was taken out by the attached self-propelled battery. Another demolished Pak 41 was found after the battle behind the town cited to cover Pescia. Tellermines, 81mm rocket launcher ammunition, panzerfausls, and flak 30 ammunition were also found on the site after the battle. No. I Operational Research Section, Report No. 1/23, "The Trasimene Line South West of Castiglione del Lago." King's Own Calgary Regiment Archives, K04SA 2143, 5. At I343hrs the 57th Field Regiment fired as a part of another Uncle target, concentration of Scale 5 on the eastern portion of Pucciarelli. 57th Field Regiment W.D., 21 June 1944. 248 1 7th Field Regiment W.D., 21 June 1944. 24 253 Artillery fire was called in on a heavy machine-gun position holding up 'A' Company, with the lead troops only 300 yards away from this position. The shoot successfully broke the resistance. 'D' Company used 'B' Company's allotted tanks to advance to the eastern crossroads objective. When this was gained the tanks returned to 'B' Company, who used green flares to show the tanks where to go. Colin Gunner remembered, "the Canadian tanks saved the day by pumping H.E. into the lost houses and killing most of the attack group."254 Again the Sherman was utilized to great effect in neutralizing defensive positions in the urban environment as a vital direct-fire asset in the combined-arms team. When tanks and infantry were separated, due to poor visual communication, the desire to keep moving to look for targets, or the need to reduce ones own tank as a target, artillery could be used to destroy machine-gun posts with great precision. At 1915hrs the message reached the Skins that the Rifles were "unlikely to get up tonight" and the decision was made to consolidate in Pucciarelli. Two troops of anti tank guns from the 254th Anti-tank Battery were brought up to bolster the 2x1 The alternate armoured perspective is given by the ll"1 Canadian Armoured Regiment war diary which reports that the infantry was hesitant about entering the town, but that Lieutenant Mclvor "seized the initiative" and advanced upon the town while the infantry followed. The battalion had a machine gun platoon from the D support Group attached for the attack and two troops of 6-pounders from the 254"' Anti-Tank Battery. The 6-pounders could keep enemy positions behind Sanfatucchio on Pucciarelli ridge busy, and blast buildings in the town itself. 11th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 21 June 1944. Richard Doherty, 233. Sullivan denies any hesitancy on the part of the Inniskilling Regiment. Sullivan, 91. 254 Colin Gunner, 117. 93 FIGURE FOURTEEN: 6th Inniskillings Advance through Pucciarelli with Ontario Regiment Sherman in Foreground. Dethick, The Trasimene Line June-July 1944, frontispiece. regiment's three remaining guns. At 2315hrs the Skins reported being unable to contact the 2nd London Irish Rifles to the west due to a group of enemy between the two battalions.255 The 78th Division's radio log claims that, "opposition [was] very considerable."256 German shelling continued through the night and Colin Gunner remembered the night as "a fiery dark [...] for buildings blazed in both village[s] and along the front."257 255 2nd London Irish Rifles W.D., 21 June 1944. 256 78 Division Information Log, 21 June 1944. 257 Gunner, 118. 94 An idea of the heavy casualties sustained by the 78th Division on the 21st of June is offered by the war diary of the 11th Field Ambulance.258 The medical dressing station established at Mura, just west of Panicale reported treating 152 casualties. Later intelligence reports stated that "about 100 bodies" were found in Sanfatucchio.259 The savage nature of the fighting is given by an Italian civilian account: One Allied soldier came in with a bandaged shoulder and on his arm there was the Red Cross. He told us that he'd gone to the aid of a wounded German and that the wounded man had shot him in the shoulder. The Allied soldier then killed the German with his rifle butt.260 22 June was largely spent consolidating the Pucciarelli-Sanfatucchio ridge by bringing up anti-tank and medium machine-gun assets while the divisional and corps artillery continued to fire concentrations and harassing fire in the two kilometre stretch between the current infantry positions and the Pescia river.26' The process was hampered by several vicious company-level counterattacks directed on the Inniskiillings *'* The following day would yield 102 casualties, with fifty-four and 119 on the 23rd and 24th respectively. 11th Field Ambulance W.D., 22 June 1944. The 2nd London Irish Rifles had lost over a hundred casualties for the second time in six weeks. Their companies were no more than one third of their strength. Ray, 147. 23'' 4th Division Intelligence Summary No. 39, 24 June 1944. The Skins reported 60 enemy killed, 12 prisoners of war captured and many wounded. Their own losses were 9 killed, 18 wounded and 4 missing. 6th Inniskillings Regiment W.D., 21 June 1944. Dethick, 98. 2<'' The destruction of a German salient between the two towns was one task of consolidation. At dawn on June 22nd the 6th Inniskillings with a squadron of the 1 Ith Canadian Armoured Regiment attacked along the ridge between Pucciarelli to Sanfatucchio and with sterling support from mortars, artillery and the Canadian tanks cleared the ridge with little cost to themselves. B.H.S.C.M.. Operations of British [...] Part II, Section D, Chapter II. Paragraph 17. One strong-point was on top of Pucciarelli ridge halfway between 'E' Company and the Inniskillings posts, and the other in the centre of the slopes running east from the crossroads northwest of Sanfatucchio. 'G' Company of the 2nd London Rifles with tank support from 'B' Squadron of the Ontario Regiment successfully assaulted the ridge position at 0845hrs 22 June. Horsfall, 165-66. On the 22nd June, "J" Troop of the 105th Anti-tank Regiment took up positions in the Sanfatucchio church yard. 'G' Troop set up on the left flank. 105th Anti-tank Regiment W.D., 22 June 1944. On the 22nd June, at 1620hrs the 57th Army Field Regiment participated in at Uncle shoot, scale 3 in the area near La Villa. A harassing fire programme was engaged overnight with four targets in the area of the town of Pescia running north-west to the river of the same name. 57th Army Field Regiment W.D., 22 June 1944. 95 in Pucciarelli and the London Rifles in Sanfatucchio.252 An attack at 0600hrs on the Inniskillings will serve as an example. Approximately forty infantry and one heavy self-propelled gun supported by artillery and mortars counterattacked.263 The self- propelled gun did considerable damage by shooting into the houses, taking out a medium-machine-gun post and burying the guns. The Kensington's No. 5 Platoon, with their Vickers medium-machine-guns "stood to" and received fire from mortars, small arms and self-propelled guns. German infantry advanced up the street and the Vickers guns continued to fire throughout the action. A sharp grenade exchange followed. At this time the Germans had also infiltrated No. 4 Platoon's heavy mortar positions, and this platoon took cover and engaged the enemy with small arms fire. One private was killed. At lOOOhrs this attack lost momentum and the Germans withdrew to their original positions. The Kensingtons positions were subject to heavy mortar fire throughout the day.264 The assault on Sanfatucchio and Pucciarelli had gained the 78th Division a toe-hold in the forward line, providing a jumping off point and observation 262 In the morning of 22 June, the 38 Brigade consolidated its position astride Pucciarelli and Sanfatucchio. Self-propelled guns seen slinking into the woods were reportedly "heavily engaged". Enemy in houses on the high ground between the two villages were pushed out by two platoons of the 2nd London Irish Rifles supported by tanks. The Germans responded with heavy machine gun fire, but were pushed off the position by 1030hrs. The war diary claims that once this position was taken, the nearest observation post still open to the enemy would be in Castiglione del Lago. 38 Brigade W.D., 22 June 1944. At 1050hrs a counterattack was observed forming up in front of the Rifles 'G' Company position and was dealt with by heavy artillery fire and sending tanks to this position. At 1125hrs 'G' Company's position was consolidated and tanks and mortars engaged houses 800 yards to the north. The 'G' Company area was being heavily shelled. When at 1710, F company of the 2 London Irish Rifles went forward, they advanced 200 yards before being pinned down by the enemy and were counterattacked but managed to hold their positions 150 yards away from the enemy lines. The enemy was engaged by 3" and 4.2" mortars. 2nd London Irish Rifles W.D., 22 June 1944. 263 1 Kensington Regiment W.D., 22 June 1944. 38 Brigade W.D., 22 June 1944. 6th Inniskillings Regiment W.D., 22 June 1944. 264 On 22 June, on the Rifles front in Sanfatucchio, two counterattacks of about 30 Germans were repulsed as well. One at 0400hrs was reported to be "beaten back with heavy losses to the enemy." 11th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 22 June 1944. Sergeant Ganley of the Kensingtons' "B" Group received a Military Medal for gallantry in this action. Harpur, "The Kensingtons", 149.. 96 over the main defensive line further back on the Pescia. On the night of the 22-23rd of June near Pucciarelli and Sanfatucchio the enemy was heard "digging in hard" and "spasmodic" mortaring and shelling were received by the 38th Brigade's battalions.265 The 3" and 4.2" mortars of the Kensingtons replied in turn and prisoner reports later confirmed that these bombs had caused considerable damage.266 At 1 lOOhrs, 'E' Company of the 2nd London Irish Rifles on the western edge of Pucciarelli received small arms and anti-tank fire, but Allied tanks neutralized the sources of this trouble.267 Mortars in 'F' Company area engaged houses held by the enemy and the Germans were seen to evacuate their casualties here under cover of the Red Cross flag. The 78th Division's 21 June attack on the villages of Sanfatucchio and Pucciarelli defies easy categorization as a success or failure.268 At the end of the day the 2nd London Irish Rifles and 6th Inniskilling Regiment had stormed this interconnected warren of German machine-gun and anti-tank positions and consolidated their positions in wait for the inevitable counterattacks. When these attacks came, they were only repulsed at extremely close range. Infantry-tank co-operation was at times criticized, 263 38 Brigade W.D., 23 June 1944. m On 23 of June at 1230hrs, three tanks moved up near the forward medium-machine-gun positions of the Kensingtons. When the armour moved into the open for a shoot they drew considerable mortar and shell fire, with No. 5 Platoon enduring heavy fire for three hours, including several direct hits on their building wounding five other ranks. 1st Kensington Regiment W.D., 23 June 1944. 21,7 Over the next several days, the battalion would push platoons forward on the left as flank protection for the Royal Irish Fusiliers, and would finally be relieved on 26 June. Casualties to the 2nd London Irish Rifles over the past six days would amount to seventeen killed and ninety wounded. Prisoners taken amounted to seventy-seven and one can only speculate as to how many casualties they inflicted. 2nd London Irish Rifles W.D., 23 June 1944. Horsfall notes that the price of six officers and over seventy N.C.O.s and rifleman was high and that the three forward companies of the 2nd London Irish Rifles were hardly stronger than a platoon, but notes also that Germans left at least sixty of their dead behind in Sanfatucchio. Ultimately, Horsfall claims the attack was a failure as the attack had "broken in and not through", but certainly in hindsight this would have been an impossible task for a single battalion. Horsfall, 160, 161. 97 and as such points to the lingering problems of communication and target indication which had been long known by analysts of the Directorate of Tactical Investigation.269 In high-standing wheat fields, or labyrinthine Italian villas, such problems were compounded. Tactical doctrine stated that in such country infantry were to lead and locate threats for the armour, yet to do so in the face of machine-gun and well sited mortar fire was easier said than done. Artillery co-operation was excellent during the fight, with numerous concentrations called in from the forward observers of the field regiments and ranging fire behind the front lines reportedly doing much damage. Direct fire from the anti-tank regiments was also praised. While the infantry and armour were assaulting the outpost line, artillery regiments shot up the areas directly behind the lines.270 These assets, combined with the firepower of the mortars and machine guns of the division's support battalion overwhelmed the 334th German Infantry Division and left many of its members dead on the field of battle. Horsfall wrote these words which speak to the lasting memory of the fight for those who endured it: There was something left in our minds too - about that pretty village. Emotive and deep, whatever it was would remain. Always."1 The Directorate of Tactical Investigations study on tank-infantry target indication concluded that coloured tracer fire from the light Bren machine-gun was the best method. "Army Operational Research Group Memorandum No. 134: The Indication of Targets by Infantry to Tanks," 18 November 1944, WO 232/38. The use of the Verey flare gun was derided by the report due to lack of range and inaccuracy especially in windy conditions. As a member of the 6th Black Watch Regiment noted, "the ranges of Very pistols and German 'tatty-masher' grenades, thrown by a strong arm, were about equal, [the infantryman would] be a very lucky man if he got to fire a second flare, should the first one miss or the tanks be slow to react to his signal." C. T. Framp Papers, 100. At lOlOhrs on 21 June, the 57th Field Regiment fired a regimental shoot of scale 5 on a predicted enemy self-propelled gun area behind Pucciarelii. At 1120hrs, the 57th Field claimed twenty direct hits on enemy vehicles leaving the wood near the main bridge over the Pescia. What with the hastily constructed positions enemy and good observation, the Commander Royal Artillery advised more use be made of the air burst fuze. An entry in the 57th Field's war diary states that a minimum of 20% air burst would be fired in all shoots. At 2300hrs the 57th Field Regiment fired a short harassing fire programme on enemy communications in the area of La Villa. 57th Field Artillery W.D., 21 June 1944. Horsfall, 163. 98 The pause on 22-23 June in the advance of the 78th Division was due to lack of progress by the 4th Division on the left flank and it is to the fierce fighting at Vaiano that we must now turn.272 Vaiano 23-24: The Nadir of Tank-Infantry Cooperation While problems of visibility and communications were seen to cause minor difficulties and delays in the 78th Division's attack on Sanfatucchio and Pucciarelli, it is the action against Vaiano on 24 June which shows the consequences of the disintegration of the all-arms team. Doctrine for close country prescribed that infantry lead the advance and tanks follow in support. At Vaiano, when the Three Rivers pushed on to their objectives and the infantry were pinned down by machine-gun fire, we find that both arms were unable to succeed alone. While the Three Rivers Regiment claimed a large number of enemy during the day, ranging alone ahead of the infantry, their inability to hold ground, especially at night, meant retiring and giving up the ground gained. As 38 Brigade pushed up against the the 334th Infantry Division's strong covering position in Sanfatucchio-Pucciarelli on 21-22 June, the 4th British Infantry Division moved up in preparation to attack Vaiano.273 In the early hours of 23 June, the 28 Brigade relieved the 36 Brigade, whose 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had been so violently ejected from the town.214 The day was spent pushing patrols towards 272 R.T. Currelly, 1 Canadian Field Historical Section, "Report on Operations 11CAR (Ont R) from 12 June to 30 June 44", 141.4A11D13( 1 > 11 Cdn Armd Regt (Ont R.), 2. 273 On the left of the 78th Division, on the morning of 21 June, the I East Surrey regiment had to deal with machine-gun fire from houses a kilometre south of Sanfatucchio near the village of MufFa. The regiment advanced from here in a north-west direction, observing company sized groups of enemy infantry to the north near San Felice and proceeding from their positions at Podi Paterno to the high ground at Colle Mungo. The 5th Northampton Regiment consolidated a thousand yards south of Panicorola. 57th Field Artillery W.D., 21 June 1944. 274 The 2nd/4th Hampshire Regiment relieved the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders at 2130hrs on 22 June. 2nd/4th Hampshire Regiment W.D., 22 June 1944. The 2nd Kings Regiment relieved the 6th Royal West Kents at 2300hrs on the same day. 2nd Kings Regiment W.D., 22 June 1944. The 2nd 99 Vaiano in hopes that the paratroopers would retreat, but the soldiers of the 1st German Parachute Division would not give up their position so easily. The defensive positions in Vaiano were reported on 23 June by civilian sources to include a line of machine-gun emplacements spaced 100-200 yards apart.275 Positions were reported to be occupied during the day and were subsequently harassed by Allied artillery fire.276 The weather over the night of 23-24 June steadily worsened, and the 4th Division war diary claims that "the general state of the ground still precluded large scale operations with tanks."277 In the morning of 24 June, a one hour pause was permitted between the barrage on 78th Division front, where the Pescia River positions were being assaulted, before at 0945hrs the guns bombarded Vaiano.278 One account states that "at times the whole village was hidden by a smoke-pall as buildings collapsed under the terrific bombardment."279 Minutes later, the attack on Vaiano went forward with the 2nd Somerset Light Infantry supported by the Three Rivers Regiment and a troop of Ml 0s of the 105th Anti-tank Regiment.280 At 1 lOOhrs the tanks crossed the stream at the base Somerset Light Infantry relieved the 5th Royal East Kent Regiment (Buffs) at 0030hrs 23 June. 2nd Somerset Light Infantry W.D., 22-23 June 1944. 275 28 Brigade Intelligence Summary No. 12,23 June 1944. 27f> On the 23rd June at 1700hrs 'C' troop of the 209th Battery of the 105th Anti-tank Regiment moved two MIOs onto the ridge at Poggio del Sole. After a reconnaissance the MIOs engaged houses and suspected machine-gun pits. The shoot was reported successful, firing 80 rounds of APC and high- explosive. The shoot brought retaliation from the enemy in the form of mortar fire, but there were no casualties. 105th Anti-tank Regiment W.D., 23rd June 1944. 111 When night fell their occupants moved back to their reverse slope positions or as another report claimed, to the gully before the line. 28 Brigade Intelligence Summary No. 13 describes the weather as "nostalgic cricket-season weather". 4,h Division W.D., 25 June 1944. m In the morning of 24th June, the 78th Medium Regiment was in position to support the 78th Division with counter-battery tasks and concentrations at 0530hrs. At 0920hrs, the 105th Battery switched to tasks prepared for the 28 Brigade's attack in the area of Vaiano. Captain Hesketh was assigned the Forward Observer with the Somerset Light Infantry. 78th Medium Regiment W.D., 24 June 1944. Also with the leading companies was forward observer of the 30th Field Regiment Capt. JSFJ Hubbard who was later wounded. The 30th Field reports participating in the short barrage in the morning intended to support the 2nd Somersets onto Vaiano. 30th Field Regiment W.D., 24th June 1944. m 2nd/4th Hampshire Regiment W.D., 25 June 1944. 2*o 4th Divjsjon w.D., 24 June 1944. 105th Anti-tank Regiment W.D., 24 June 1944. Under command 100 of the first objective.281 As they made the crossing, machine-gun posts from the opposite ridge opened up and the infantry took cover. As the Somerset's diary claims, the commanding officer attempted to coax his companies forward to join the tanks, but 'B' Company were so "spandaued" that they were "not able to organize any plan." German nebelwerfers (multi-barrelled rocket launcher artillery) and guns were now shelling the area, and the Somersets suffered a number of casualties.282 By 1200hrs, the attack had bogged down completely as opposition increased. As the 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment's war diary ominously states, "things began to happen."281 When the infantrymen stood up in the long corn, they were fired upon by well concealed machine-gun positions. In some instances, the German machine-gunners held their fire until the tanks had passed and then opened up on the infantry. The first armoured casualty reported was one of the artillery's forward observers, Captain Hoare, killed when his tank was hit by a hand-held anti-tank weapon. The tank caught fire, the driver bailing out, but the loader-operator extinguished the fire, were: 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment, 30th Field Regiment, 106 Battery of 78th Medium Regiment, 61/14 Anti-tank Battery, 391 Battery 98th Anti-tank Field (Self-Propelled ) Regiment, 7th Field Company Royal Engineers, a Machine-Gun company of the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers, a half company of 4.2" Mortars from the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers, and support troops. "28 Infantry Brigade Operations Instruction No. 19", 28 Brigade W.D., 21 June 1944. By 1030hrs all seemed to be going well with reports of an enemy withdrawal. At 1045hrs the observation post of the 98th Self Propelled Regiment of Royal Artillery, approximately 1200 yards East-North East of Vaiano reported taking machine-gun fire from the flanks. Shortly afterwards the observer was reported as a casualty and had to be replaced. 4th Division Royal Artillery W.D., 24th June 1944. At 1130hrs the tanks bypassed Vaiano and reported on Poggio del Papa. 12 Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 24 June 1944. 4th Division W.D., 24 June 1944. Local Italians later noted they had been conscripted to haul ammunition to gun positions here in Poggio del Papa, but these presumably had been pulled out before the Three Rivers arrived. Dethick, 52. 281 2nd Somerset Light Infantry W.D., 24 June 1944. m Horsfall recalls that on the 22 June the enemy first used nebelwerfers in the Trasimene battle. He recalls "only satanic angels could have devised the rising shriek of those winged monstrosities falling in sixes - but they only added to the general din and achieved little." Horsfall, 169. Nicknamed "moaning minnies" by the troops colourful metaphors abound in attempting to describe their roar. One regimental history said they sounded like "hundreds of corks being screwed round in the necks of giant bottles. P.W. Pilt, Royal Wilts, 196. 2*3 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 24 June 1944. 101 picked up the driver and drove back through the lines.284 The frustration in the battle for Vaiano, where Three Rivers Regiment suffered numerous casualties, is betrayed in the unit war diary's statement, "approximately one man and a Spandau with a couple of others, hold Vaiano", implying the infantry were shirking their duty of storming the town. At 1600hrs the Somerset's "A" Company observed the enemy leaving positions, but were suppressed by machine-gun fire.285 At 1900hrs a small group managed to cross the stream and chase the Germans out of a machine-gun position in a house. 'B' Squadron managed to get two troops and squadron headquarters onto the forward slope beyond Vaiano, and the rest of the squadron made progress up the next slope towards their final objective of Poderi Poggio del Papa. At 2000hrs they retired from the position still without infantry support from "their flat-footed friends".286 The tankers deemed the objective "untenable" as the sun set due to the chance of infiltration by German anti-tank teams and were forced to return to the start lines and surrender the ground that they had gained that day.287 The squadron lost eight casualties, five 2M Another forward observer, a Major McCallum was wounded and Captain D.K. Dawson killed, all by shelling and mortaring. The 98th Antitank Field Regiment was in support of the attack, and at 0955hrs engaged three tanks behind the front lines 500 yards north of La Villa. At 1315hrs the an enemy mortar observation post behind Poggio del Papa was engaged and suffered a direct hit. At 1450hrs the personnel situation was reported critical. The battery captain had been hit at 131 Ohrs, and Captain Hoare was hit, his driver and signaller were missing. The tank serving as observation post was brought back to where the tanks had withdrawn on the northern outskirts of Vaiano. While the tanks requested two teams, they claimed they could manage with one. At 1800hrs, the 98th's war diary curiously states "infantry sitting down" at Poggia del Sole. 98th Anti-tank Field Regiment W.D., 24 June 1944. 285 2nd Somerset Light Infantry W.D., 24 June 1944. 2!"' Estimates of enemy dead numbering around fifty for the squadron's effort. No. 1 Canadian Field Historical Section, "Report on Operations of 12 CAR (TRR) 2 June to 30 June 44...", 1 August 1944, Directorate of History and Heritage, 2-3. 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 24 June 1944. The 4th Division Intelligence Report of the day states that an Italian civilian identified a German observation post in the damaged Vaiano church tower for a gun position in Poderi Poggio del Papa. Both targets were engaged by the Royal Artillery. 4,h Division Intelligence Summary, 24 June 1944. 1CABW.D., 24 June 1944. 102 prisoners, and a disabled tank in this action. The tank had been bogged down and continuing the damnation of the poor bloody infantry, the war diarist states, "a patrol of infantry were very slow to leave to protect the tank during the night." As a result, the tank crew was captured and their tank burned. These were the only prisoners of the Three Rivers Regiment taken throughout the war. By 2200hrs the tanks were back to their harbour to the east of Vaiano, but not before suffering one killed and several wounded in the process.288 Some solace was offered in the late news that 'B' squadron was credited with over 100 Germans killed to their two killed and six to eight wounded. The Somersets consolidated for the night having sustained casualties of four officers and twenty-six other ranks.289 At sunset they held the track leading northeast to Sanfatucchio, with the 1st Surreys 1500 yards down the same road.290 The pressure on the paratroopers would finally press them out of Vaiano, and over the night 24-25 June, they would move out of the town falling back on La Villa. The events of 24 June provoked a vitriolic response from 1 CAB's Intelligence Officer. The entry in the war diary condemns the infantry of the 28 Brigade for failure to keep up to the tanks.291 The main concern was "small enemy suicide squads...fanatically" fighting with the German hand-held anti-tank weapon. Despite the praise for the troop tactics, which provided covering fire from two tanks as the third moved up, he claims that "the [12th Canadian Armoured Regiment] was the victim of inexperienced support." The claim is made that the 28 Brigade troops had no 2,8 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 24 June 1944. u" 2nd Somerset Light Infantry W.D., 24 June 1944. 290 B.H.S.C.M.. Operations of British [...] Part II, Section D, Chapter II. Paragraph 29. 291 1CAB W.D., 24 June 1944. The condemnation is also seen in an after-action report determined too caustic to pass up the chain of command. Ace Beach, "Notes on the Battle of the Trasimeno Line". 103 experience of working or training with tanks and blame is laid on the infantry for the 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment's losses of eight tanks on the first day. Long after the events of the summer of 1944, Brigadier William C. Murphy wrote in correspondence to the Canadian official historian Gerald Nicholson, regarding what he saw as unfair comments written in a draft copy of the official history about the Three Rivers Regiment in the fight for Vaiano.292 Murphy claims that the infantry of the 28 Brigade were "not well led" and notes that in his diary entry of the day he had described the infantry as "very sticky". Murphy had been summoned by Major General Dudley Ward to 4th Division headquarters and asked to visit the commander of 28 Brigade to see if there was a possible solution to the halted advance. When he arrived there the commander admitted that the troops "had no marrow in their bones." A lack of aggression was recorded in not obtaining objectives that "should have been easily taken and held." A few days later on 26 June Sidney Kirkman would write of the 4th Division that "certain [battalions] still rather poorly trained and full of reinforcements [so] the advance must be rather deliberate."293 The attack on Vaiano and the initial effort against Sanfatucchio prove that communications in the all-arms team was inherently difficult in country with poor visibility. Blaming the weakness of newly badged infantry replacements does not, however, provide a complete explanation of these costly set-backs. Brigadier Murphy noted after the war that terrain played a role in dividing the all-arms team.294 Infantry m Gerald Nicholson, "Collation of Comments — Fourth Draft Official History of the Canadian Armv in the Second World War. Volume 2". Directorate of History and Heritage, 82/985 F5-82/987 Fl, Murphy - Vol. 3 folio 255, p.756. 2'" Kirkman Diary, 26 June 1944. Murphy noted that Shermans in Italy were used to surprise German defenders who assumed that tanks could not cover the ground over which they assaulted. W.C. Murphy, "What is Tank Country", 69-70. 104 preferred a covered approach to an objective, while tanks preferred ranging over hills adopting hull-down positions and covering for the movement of other tanks or troops. The hills to the west of the Chiana valley that the Three Rivers would have to assault through were in this sense good tank country, yet due to the long standing crops visibility was restricted. Murphy notes that such rolling hills are not only good tank country but also perfect anti-tank country, as the Three Rivers losses of fourteen tanks to armoured-piercing rounds in the battle would attest.295 With the high-standing crops concealing not only enemy machine-gun positions but friendly infantry as well, the mutual support offered by all-arms deteriorated to deadly effect. At Vaiano, the infantry proved unable to assault German machine-gun positions with their own fire-power. The Three Rivers tanks had meanwhile progressed to the next objective by abandoning their supporting infantry. While some accounts note that the infantry found it comforting to know that tanks were behind them, one can assume that some infantrymen felt that tanks, with their armoured protection, should lead the advance, as indeed early doctrine stated they should.296 By mid-1944, however, Interestingly the 105th Anti-Tank Regiment Royal Artillery noted in its lessons learned of the Trasimene Battle that the M10 tank destroyer could operate in country that the Sherman could not, presumably due to being lighter than the tanks. 105th Anti-Tank Regiment Royal Artillery War Diary, July 1944. M Three Rivers lost two tanks to mines, two to bazookas, four to shellfire. 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D. 30 June 1944. The 60th Light Aid Detachment who repaired the tanks reported two "K" casualties from A.P. on 26 June and thirteen on 28 June. 60th Light Aid Detachment W.D. June 1944. 2,6 John Horsfall notes the infantry's comfort in tanks supporting from ridge-lines behind the infantry during the pursuit phase. Horsfall, 90. Brigadier W.C. Murphy of 1 CAB recalled, "Italy, with its mountains, valleys, olive groves, vineyards, crops, walled cemeteries, and other detestable features (that is, from a tank point of view) further complicated relations between the two arms. After all, the infantry wore cloth jackets, and the tankmen had several inches of steel to protect, them, so why should not the tanks fight where the infantry had to go?" Murphy, "What is Tank Country", 69. As a soldier of the 6th Black Watch wrote of this tactical discrepancy during operations in the Liri Valley, "We believed, certainly I did, that the tank should be in the front, so to frighten the life out of the German infantry and cause them to either surrender, or bolt, before we reached them. On the other hand, the tank commander appeared to believe we, the infantry, should go first, so to cause the 105 doctrine acknowledged that in close country, infantry would have to lead.297 Pushing the 1st German Parachute Division's soldiers out of their covering position in Vaiano, took the better part of three days. While the delay may seem like an eternity at the battalion level, a reading of XIII Corps commander Sidney Kirkman's diary exposes the operational factors constraining the advance.298 Problems with the wet ground hampered progress. Artillery regiments and the 10 and 12 Brigades were having increasing problems moving up behind the 28 Brigade. On the 22 June, 78th Division commander Charles Keightley could report the occupation of the "good jumping off places" in Sanfatucchio and Pucciarelli, yet the need to relieve their left brigade would be helped by a pause. More importantly, a delay until 24 June would allow aerial photos of the enemy positions to arrive, and the delivery of more artillery ammunition. The next day Kirkman wrote, "ammunition available only allows of an attack on a one [battalion] front if it is to go to any depth, but we have enough to do this properly to a depth of at least 3000 yards."299 Such planning is criticized by those who rail against a ponderous artillery-based British way of warfare, but it allowed a concentration of firepower which saved the lives of infantrymen who had to advance against German defensive positions. Kirkman's operational concepts were a direct product of the Italian campaign's containment strategy. He stated he was, "very hopeful about tomorrow, weather has held and there are no signs of the Bosh withdrawing." The fact that during German anti-tank gunners to surrender, or bolt before he reached them." C.T. Framp Papers, 105. m "Military Training Pamphlet No. 63: The Co-operation of Tanks With Infantry Divisions," May 1944. 21,8 On the same day a French liaison officer came to XIII Corps headquarters claiming they were hung up on in the mountains. General Poole of the South Africans was told to push hard on his left on their common boundary to come to their aid. Kirkman Diary, 22 June. il,1) It is clear that Kirkman conceived the main effort to be from the 78th Division, as a last push before they were withdrawn. Kirkman Diary, 23 June. 106 this period the Normandy beachhead was in its build-up phase, with Allied troops dug in and holding across the front, shows the importance of the Battle of Lake Trasimene to the greater war effort. Many more Germans would be killed and captured in Italy over the last two weeks of June than in Normandy. 107 CHAPTER FIVE: Through the Battle Outposts and Into the Main Defensive Line 24-27 June 1944 Panthers at Pescia While the action at Vaiano proved that armour alone could not hold ground, and infantry without its support could not move forward, the 78th Division's attack on the outpost positions to the east shows how the combined forces of all-arms could dismantle the German offences. In assaulting the outpost positions of Ranciano and Pescia, the Ontario Regiment dispel the myth of German armoured superiority, proving that when used with skill and determination the Sherman could destroy the hallowed Panther tank. Flexible artillery concentrations were used to great affect, giving the infantry the firepower they needed to overcome defensive positions and repel counter attacks. Excellent all-arms coordination and cooperation would carry the day. To the east by the night of 24 June, the 38 Brigade overcame fierce resistance in Sanfatucchio and Pucciarelli, survived the German counterattacks, and began to press through the outposts at Pescia and Ranciano encroaching on the main defensive position on the Pescia River. With the German defences in depth sited throughout the high- ground to the west, as the 78th Division pushed their flanking hook through the east end of the line, an increasing amount of German artillery could be brought to bear on the advancing British. This concentration of defensive firepower in combination with strongly held German infantry defences north of the Pescia stalled the 78th Division's advance here on the east of the XIII Corps' front. This necessitated the 4th Division fighting through the series of reverse slope positions in the hill country to the west. As XIII Corps Commander Sidney Kirkman wrote on 25 June, he had been restraining the 108 4th Division and the 6th South African Division "during last two days, but today, since the action of [the 78th Division] has forced the enemy out of his chosen position, I have told them both to be more active in pressing on tomorrow."300 The tenacious yet under strength German 1st Parachute Division were holding ground, but with each day the Allies were able to concentrate more artillery assets, and were leapfrogging brigades into the line on 4th Division's front. The German's defiant stand became increasingly costly, showing that the Battle of Lake Trasimene effectively contained and destroyed German forces in accordance with the over-riding strategy of the Italian campaign. On the 78th Division's front, the plan for 24 June was to push through the series of battle outposts that lay before the main defensive position along the Pescia.301 These followed the line Pescia-Ranciano-C.S.Biagio-Pod Gaggiolo-Selvella-Cse.S. Lucia and were based on hamlets of farms and featured anti-tank guns, machine-gun and mortar positions. The ground was what John Horsfall calls "a sniper's paradise with concealed approaches everywhere. The trees and the orchards - and above all that corn - gave perfect cover."302 The Royal Irish Fusiliers were to advance on the left towards the "townlets" of Pescia and Ranciano, with a company of the 6th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers to their right providing flank support and the 5th Northampton Regiment advancing astride the railway. In the evening on 23 June at 2000hrs, the Royal Irish Fusiliers married up with the Ontario Regiment's 'C' squadron in hard rain.303 At 3M Kirkman Diary, 25 June 1944. 301 A large variety of anti-tank weapons were found in the area including flak 40s, 88mm rocket projectors, 20mm anti-aircraft/anti-tank guns, panzeifausts, rifle-grenades, hand-grenades, and hollow charges. Farmhouses again were not prepared, but showed signs of loop-holing. Their walls reportedly stood up well to allied shelling. Slit trenches were consistently dug on the perimeter ditches of the farms. No. 1 Operational Research Section, Report No. 1/23, "The Trasimene Line South West of Castiglione del Lago.", Kings' Own Calgary Regiment Archives, K04SA 2143, 5-6. 302 Horsfall, 167, 170. 3113 1 l,b Canadian Armoured Regiment, 23 June 1944. 109 0530hrs 24 June, their attack began into the misty wheat fields, preceded by an artillery barrage of three field and one medium regiments.304 As the barrage ended a great number of single artillery regiment targets were fired on tank, mortar and gun positions.305 The Canadian tanks also searched the houses with their 75mm guns and machine-gunned potential forward defensive localities. When Major G.L. "Dickie" Roberts' 'B' Company of the Royal Irish Fusiliers was held up from considerable resistance on their left, a call for artillery support was made and a ten minute concentration allowed the company to advance.306 Light machine gun fire proved difficult to pin-point for the tank support, but as they moved up the fire stopped and 'B' and 'C' company moved forward toward their final objectives of Ranciano and Pescia respectively.307 At 0900hrs a counterattack supported by German armour was made in the Pescia area on a company of the 5th Northampton Regiment and the Ontario Regiment's No. 3 Troop of'A' Squadron. The 11 Canadian Armoured Regiment's war diary notes "as is the enemies [sic] custom he used his tanks singly or two at a 304 38 Brigade W.D., 24 June 1944. The attack was preceded by an artillery barrage by the 17th, 132nd, 138th and 57th Field Regiments starting at 0530hrs which bombarded the opening line for 24 minutes that lifted at 10 minute intervals. 1 llh Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 23rd June 1944. 17th Field Regiment W.D., 24 June 1944. A company of 4.2" mortars were also added to the fire-plan, which searched the area of the Pescia river. A squadron of M10 tank destroyers was also attached to the force. 1 Royal Irish Fusiliers W.D., 24 June 1944. The "C" and "D" Groups of Kensington Mortars fired "a tremendous amount of ammunition, mingled with harassing fire from the machine-guns" during the day. Harpur, "The Kensingtons", 151 The barrage proceeded directly through 2nd London Rifles "F* Company positions in Casa Montemara, its commander Colin Gibbs elected to seek cover in the basements of the buildings instead of withdrawing from the position. Little mention is made of close air support during the battle, presumably due to poor weather conditions, but here Horsfall mentions "Hurribombers and Thunderbolts" overhead destroying buildings in relays. Horsfall, 171. Rover David's headquarters had been set up in Panicale during the battle. Dethick, 78. 505 17th Field Regiment W.D., 24 June 1944. 3'"' 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers W.D., 24 June 1944. 3(17 The troops overcame a 20mm anti-aircraft gun which could not depress its barrel sufficiently to hold the Royal Fusilier's advance. "Robbie" Robinson correspondence, Dethick, 110. 110 FIGURE FIFTEEN: Air Photo, Pescia Crossing. One Grid Square Approximately 1000 yards by 1000 yards. WO 170/1368. time...this type of opposition is not strong enough to break through a squadron." The first Ontario Regiment tanks to make contact were those of the leading troop of 'A' squadron, which knocked out a Panther tank and damaged another which withdrew.308 This action belies the popular version of tank warfare in the Second World War which triumphs German armour as vastly superior to the Sherman. Upon inspection, the Shermans of Malcolm Sullivan's No. 3 Troop had performed some some amazing gunnery.309 The gun of one Panther was found "burst open. Shards of the barrel were curled back like the skin of a banana; the Ontario's (#3 Troop) had placed one well- directed and fortunate shot right in the muzzle of the gun." 308 This damaged tank later knocked out a Sherman before it was destroyed by gun fire. 309 Schragg, History of the Ontario Regiment. As found in Sullivan, 99. Ill The three tanks of No. 3 Troop had taken up positions near Pescia town on a ridge overlooking the small valley of the Pescia River. As Malcolm Sullivan states: I put binoculars to my eyes and focused on the top of the ridge directly opposite us. There, in clear view, were three Panther tanks, side by side, all with their guns trained up the valley to the west, where I figured C Sqn's location to be... Dutch, my gunner, couldn't find the targets in his scope, so I had him stand in front of me while I pointed over his shoulder, at the Panthers. There was a man standing on the top of the right-hand tank, looking up the valley in the same direction as their guns were trained....I then told Dutch to 'blow the man off the right hand tank', giving him a range of 1800 yards. Dutch did exactly that with his first shot! I told Jack to load AP shells for rapid fire. My eyes followed the tracer lines of seven AP shots to the target and watched them all bounce off the thick armour plating. Then smoke started coming from the turret hatch and the Panther backed over the ridge, out of sight, and brewed-up (burned). I told Dutch to traverse left onto the next tank, and resume firing.. .1 watched six of seven AP's bounce off the second tank.310 This action, in which Sherman tanks destroyed the feared German Panther, shows that the myth of invincibility surrounding German armour needs to be revised. The commander of Eight Army, Lieutenant General Sir Oliver Leese, later wrote to Ontario Regiment commander Lieutenant Colonel Purves, "I send to you and the squadron(s) concerned my warmest congratulations on the fine engagements at Pescia and Ranciano, in which you knocked out a number of Panthers and Mark IV tanks. Please congratulate squadrons concerned." While armoured-piercing rounds bouncing off Panther turrets belay swinging the revisionist pendulum too far in the Sherman's favour, when operated with skill it could best the German cats. Later in the day, however, No. 3 Troop's good fortune ended. Spotting a Panther crew outside their tank, Sullivan failed to adjust the sights quickly enough for a 500 yard machine-gun shoot. Shortly thereafter, another No. 3 troop tank's turret exploded, detaching itself from the hull and killing two crew members. Sullivan's tank was shot 310 Sullivan, 101-03. 112 clean through and his crew bailed out just in time to save their lives. The enemy were later dispersed by artillery fire. At 0920hrs Pescia was reported clear.1" In the attack on Pescia town the Fusiliers took eighty prisoners of war and their supporting squadron knocked out two tanks. At 1205hrs Captain Neville F. Chances' 'C' Company of the Royal Irish Fusiliers reported a counter-attack with tank support which included three Panther tanks.312 At 121 lhrs, tanks of the 11th Canadian Armoured Regiment were sent forward and knocked out a Panther tank, after which the counter-attack dematerialized.313 Sergeant Robinson, now commanding No. 17 Platoon, of'D' Company of the Royal Irish Fusiliers had the following to say of the Ontario Regiments gunnery: [the Shermans] hit one of the German Tigers [sic] with their 75s. The first shell hit the flash jacket on its gun muzzle, the next went through it like butter just under the base of the turret, a third was lower still in to the body and fuel tanks and this set it on fire immediately - and the fourth blew off one of its tracks. Three of the crew baled out and were shot down immediately by the tank's Besas as they did so. The tank was later observed with its dead commander hanging out of the turret and the remains of its crew scattered around it. With Pescia town now held, at 1400hrs the Royal Irish Fusiliers and the Ontario's 'C' Squadron shifted their attack to the stronger defences at Ranciano, approximately 500 yards to the west.314 They met considerable opposition and inflicted 3,1 38 Brigade W.D., 24 June 1944. 512 B.H.S.C.M.. Operations of British [...] Part II, Section D, Chapter II. Paragraph 24-25. Schragg claims these were Mark IVs, but this is probably in error. Schragg, History of the Ontario Regiment, from Sullivan, 99. 313 Horsfall, 174. One of these three tanks that remained undamaged accounted for a Sherman of 'C' Squadron later, but was eventually destroyed by Allied artillery fire. Schragg, History of the Ontario Regiment, from Sullivan, 99. ,|J Trenches and gun pits were prepared around the perimeter of the village and were all concealed under foliage. The Research Section curiously notes that the positions had fields of fire of under twenty yards. Weapons stores in the village and surrounding area included three Flak 20s, 20mm mags and 113 heavy casualties on the enemy. The Ontario Regiment was said to "as usual put up a magnificent performance." A Panther tank was found in the woods to the west of the town and this tank, presumed to be the third tank that had been spotted on the ridge towards Pescia town, was knocked out.315 By 161 Ohrs the town was reported cleared.316 German reports from the CXXVI Panzer Corps' formations reported "violent fighting, heavy casualities, and deep penetrations" in the area between lakes Chiusi and Trasimeno.317 In an classic use of military euphemism, reports from the Corps' Chief of Staffs visit to the 334th Infantry Division were said to indicate the division had "fought well but they [...] also shed a good deal of hair." The combat infantry element had been reduced to 350 soldiers, and a battalion from the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division was shifted from east of Lake Trasimene to bolster the division with fighting personnel.318 Some parachutists and Hermann Goring troops were also shifted eastwards to help the 334th hold ground.319 Six Panther tanks were reported destroyed, most of which fell to the Ontario tanks. Such attrition speaks to the success of the Italian containment ammo, six MG42s, three Italian 81mm mortars, six German 81mm mortars, panzerfausts, 88mm rocket projectors, tellermines, five mortar trucks and an ammunition store. The main defences of the village were to the south-west where they extended very close to the Pescia town position. The position offered good coverage of the main road and was thought to be explicitly sited to guard the crossing of the Pescia directly to the north which was mined. A tank ambush position was set up 300 yards to the north of the village which incorporated a light-machine-gun, panzerfausts and anti-tank grenades. No. 1 Operational Research Section, Report No. 1/23, "The Trasimene Line South West of Castiglione del Lago.", Kings' Own Calgary Regiment Archives, K04SA 2143, 6. 11th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 24 June 1944. 38 Brigade W.D., 24 June 1944. B.H.S.C.M.. Operations of British [...] Part II, Section D, Chapter II. Paragraph 25. 3" 11th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 24 June 1944. ;|6 The Royal Irish Fusiliers lost forty casualties to the attack and took eighty-five prisoners of war. 11th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 24 June 1944. 38 Brigade W.D., 24 June 1944. B.H.S.C.M.. Operations of British [...] Part II, Section D, Chapter II Paragraph 25. 317 "Report No. 24: The Italian Campaign (From the Fall of Rome to the Evacuation of Florence (4 Jun - 10 Aug 44)" Historical Section (G.S) Army Headquarters, 31 March 1949, 49. 318 On the night of 23-24 June, 104 Panzer Grenadier prisoners were captured by the Irish Brigade. Horsfall, 178. The 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Parachute Regiment and the Reconnaissance Battalion of the Hermann Goring Division were sent to Pozzuolo. 114 strategy as the high number of German casualties were being replaced by a constant stream of reinforcements, forcing the Germans to commit resources to the theatre even after the Normandy invasion had secured a beachhead. Across the River Pescia 24-25 June As the Royal Irish Fusiliers on 24 June had overcome the two main outposts in front of the main line sited on the Pescia River, it now fell on elements of the 36 Brigade to make the breach of this significant tank obstacle. The crossing of the Pescia displays the problems armour could encounter in the Italian terrain. While the Pescia was not considered an obstacle to the infantry, tanks could not cross the river. Yet with the aid of supporting of tank fire from the near bank, infantry seized a foothold allowing engineers to erect a Bailey bridge overnight. As such the incident once again emphasizes that an obstacle to one arm is surmountable to another, and that by careful all-arms coordination progress may be made. Intelligence obtained from civilian sources identified a line formed on the River Pescia with firing bays on the south bank of the stream and machine gun positions every forty yards to the lake.320 The banks were four yards above the river, and the firing bays on the southern banks allowed a man to stand on a platform and rest his weapon on the top of the bank.321 The Germans were reported to be "very touchy" about any encroachment onto this line.322 The Rio Pescia itself was mined at the four 3211 XIII Corps Information Log, 22 June 1944. Later, these reports were altered to state that there were machine-gun positions every 400 yards, and that the position was manned by about 300 men. 78th Division Royal Artillery Operations Order No. 29,23 June 1944. 321 38 Brigade Intelligence Summary No. 15, 22 June 1944. 322 Other reports confirm this as prisoners of war claimed that they were ordered to hold fast before the river. XIII Corps Information Log, 24 June 1944. The line was reported manned by Germans from Route 71 eastwards to the lake and Italian fascists westwards. This is the only reference to Italian fascists found for the battle and may be in error. 38 Brigade Intelligence Summary No. 15, 22 June 1944. Later intelligence reported that the Pescia Line was to be held until 29 June as the Florence 115 crossings on its east-west running section.'21 The 78th Division used the full spectrum of fire-power to support the infantry across the river. The attempt at a bridgehead across the Pescia River was made by the 5th Royal East Kent Regiment (The Buffs) with support from the Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry. While there were numerous anti-tank positions on the forward edge of the zone, once the battle-posts were overcome infantry and engineer infiltration onto the river was relatively easy as plenty of cover was available. While the 9 Armoured Brigade's war diary states that the Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry had three scissors bridges at their disposal, they were not thought to be useful for the crossing of the river due to the soft state of the muddy banks.324 The Germans had successfully destroyed the road bridge for Route 71, but the railway bridge was intact and swept by the fire of British infantrymen, so it was expected to remain useable. The bridge on the main road was reported only partially demolished, and as one intelligence summary stated "may well prove the enemy's undoing to-morrow."325 The Wiltshire Yeomanry later attempted to cross the rail bridge, but demolitions to the bridge surface and enemy fire prevented the crossing.326 At 1803hrs 24 June, the attack for a bridgehead across the Pescia began with the Shermans of the Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry approaching the river 300 yards upstream Line further north was not ready. XIII Corps Information Log, 25 June 1944. 323 No. 1 Operational Research Section, Report No. 1/23, "The Trasimene Line South West of Castigiione del Lago.", Kings' Own Calgary Regiment Archives, K04SA 2143. 324 9 Armoured Brigade W.D., 24 June 1944. Scissors bridges were added to the war establishment of Army Tank Brigades in June of 1942. 1 Army Tank Brigade Headquarters W.D., May 1942 Microfilm T10629. Library and Archives Canada. Piatt, 172. 325 Curiously this bridge was reported intact and held by the 17th Field Regiment by the 38 Brigade W.D., 21 June 1944. 7801 Division Intelligence Summary No. 192, 24 June 1944. Prior to the battle, partisans had attempted to destroy the bridge to delay the German retreat to no avail. Dethick, 37. 326 9 Armoured Brigade W.D., 24 June 1944. 116 from the railway bridge under cover of a large smoke screen."7 When at 1820hrs the 5th Royal East Kent Regiment (Buffs) followed the tankers into the battle zone the smoke caused a good deal of confusion.328 At 1840hrs, the 5th Buffs attacked the river positions with 'Y' Company leading.329 Artillery fire blasted the infantry onto their objective. Trouble from machine-gun fire to the left was smoked out by the tanks. The river itself was reported by the Buffs war diarist as "not a serious obstacle being only a few inches deep".130 Two inch and three inch mortar ammunition found in the area of the river after the battle indicate that the British infantry used it as an intermediate position before attacking into the main battle zone.331 At 1900hrs, 'Y' Company reported itself across the Pescia.332 The weather broke again and rain began to flood the battlefield.333 The Wiltshire's tanks were having difficulties crossing the river. Heavy mortaring of the railway bridge and the area around the river prevented sappers from opening a crossing to tanks.334 A large amount of armoured-piercing rounds and sniping in the low visibility made the position extremely dangerous.335 While the majority of the regiment was withdrawn, half of'C' Squadron was stationed on the near bank to The 1st Royal Horse Artillery fire smoke and several concentrations to aid in the assault. 78th Division Information Log, 24 June 1944. The company unfortunately moved faster than predicted and some casualties resulted due to allied artillery shells. 5th Royal East Kent Regiment W.D., 23 June 1944. 350 This may have been so for infantrymen, but the sharp, deep banks of the river provided a perfect tank obstacle. Horsfall, perhaps showing that his expertise was infantry based, described the river as "a sluggish and shallow water course, and barely an obstacle even to tanks." Horsfall, 170. Dethick notes the Pescia "hardly deserves the name of river, having the appearance of a ditch. Dethick, 120. 331 No. 1 Operational Research Section, Report No. 1/23, "The Trasimene Line South West of Castiglione del Lago.", Kings' Own Calgary Regiment Archives, K04SA 2143. 332 7 8th Division Information Log, 24 June 1944. 333 The Wiltshire's diary states that the "torrential thunderstorm" at 1915hrs "ruined any chances of crossing the river before nightfall. 9 Armoured Brigade W.D., 24 June 1944. Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry W.D., 24 June 1944. 334 9 Armoured Brigade W.D., 24 June 1944. 335 Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry W.D., 24 June 1944. 117 support the infantry who had already crossed. These tanks were withdrawn at last light.316 The 5th Buffs 'D' Company had advanced and overcome scattered small arms fire and by 2100hrs had gained a toehold across the river with the remaining two companies following a half-hour later."7 At 2200hrs the Royal Engineers of the 256th Field Company set to work on building the thirty foot single span Bailey bridge over the river Pescia.338 "Intermittent but accurate shellfire" made the task particularly risky, and the sappers laboured all evening to put the span across. At 0510hrs, 25 June, the bridge was reported completed.339 As Canadian official historian Gerald Nicholson notes, much credit has been given to German engineers for the quality of their demolitions throughout the Italian campaign, but few accolades have been given to the Allied engineers.340 Nicholson queries, "which is the greater accomplishment? To blow a bridge, or to build one?" The Wiltshire Yeomanry were to cross at 0530hrs and the 6th Royal West Kent Regiment were to pass through the 5th Buffs at 0600hrs.341 On the morning of the 25 June the bridgehead had been reinforced and positions were being shelled heavily and '•6 The 5th Buffs reported taking fifty prisoners from the 334th Infantry Division who were naturally suffering form low morale. 5th Royal East Kent Regiment W.D., 24 June 1944. 337 A damaged Panther tank was found in this position as well as ammunition, four horses and a cart carrying signals equipment. Fifty prisoners were taken, which increased the divisional total to 200. 36 Brigade W.D., 24 June 1944. 5th Royal East Kent Regiment W.D., 23 June 1944. B.H.S.C.M.. Operations of British [...] Part II, Section D, Chapter II. Paragraph 25. 33* 256th Field Company Royal Engineers W.D., 24 June 1944. 3" 78th Division Information Log, 25 June 1944. 256th Field Company Royal Engineers W.D., 24 June 1944. 340 "Speech to United Services Institute," G.W.L. Nicholson Fonds, Library and Archives Canada, MG 31 G19, Vol. 6, 22 October 1956, 15. 341 The British historical officers claim that wet ground prevented the Wiltshire Yeomanry to advance across the bridge until 0930hrs and that at dawn the infantry advanced without them. B.H.S.C.M.. Operations of British [...J Part II, Section D, Chapter II. Paragraph 27. The Wiltshires' regimental history stated that the Trasimene battle was "one of the toughest actions fought with 78th division." Piatt, 172. 118 resisted fiercely by infantry positions directly to the north.342 Valorous attempts by the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highland Regiment to leapfrog platoons toward Castiglione del Lago were met by heavy shell and mortar fire.343 The 78th Division Intelligence Summary of 25 June remarks that the 334th Division's casualties must have been severe for them not to challenge this bridgehead over the Pescia.344 Historian Richard Doherty noted later that this was a sign that the "German cohesion had been broken."345 The presence of German headquarters staff taken prisoner and men from the 'B' echelon in the fighting line gives an indication of the state of 334th Division.346 Prisoners captured north of the Pescia by 11 Brigade reported that they had instructions to hold their positions to the last man.347 The constant stream of German reinforcements arriving during this period were apparently not enough to bolster the withering 334th Infantry Division. The war diary of the Tenth German Army notes on 25 June that, "west of Lake Trasimene the defensive fighting continues with unabated violence."348 The 334th German Infantry Divisions was praised for preventing a breakthrough, but it was noted that "its fighting strength had further dwindled down." The situation was no better to the west. The following day Fourteenth Army commander Lemelsen demanded permission to withdraw. As he 342 During the night the 5th Northamptonshire Regiment had been repulsed in an attempted crossing to the east of the main road, but patrols at 0540hrs 25 June found the position unoccupied and the battalion moved forward into their positions.5th Northamptonshire Regiment W.D., 25 June 1944. 343 The bombardment was described as "one of the heaviest experienced." Since 18 June, the battalion had lost seven killed, fifty-four wounded and thirty-eight missing. A.D. Malcolm, History of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 8th Battalion, 1939-47, 205-06. The day's losses tallied two killed and fourteen wounded. Ray, 149. 344 7 8th Division Intelligence Summary No. 193, 25 June 1944. 345 Richard Doherty, 235. 346 38 Brigade Intelligence Summary No. 16, 24 June 1944. 347 1 1 Brigade W.D., 25 June 1944. 348 "Report No. 24: The Italian Campaign (From the Fall of Rome to the Evacuation of Florence (4 Jun - 10 Aug 44)" Historical Section (G.S) Army Headquarters, 31 March 1949, 52-54. 119 noted to Tenth Army commander von Vietinghoff in telephone conversation, the enemy "is breaking through on the coast and is extending his gains in the centre. Everything goes wrong. There are no reserves to save the situation."349 4th Division Advances Through the Hilltop Villages The inherent communications difficulties in the tank-infantry team have been shown in the difficulties of the 4th Division in breaching the covering position at Vaiano. By 25 June, however, the pressure from the east forced the paratroopers to abandon the position and draw northwards along the Umbrian hilltop towns.350 Over the next three days the Three Rivers tanks assisted the infantry of the 28 Brigade assault through the towns of La Villa and Gioella, as they approached the main defensive line. The ground was not gained without cost. On the night of the 25 June near La Villa, Three Rivers tanks were ambushed by paratroopers with hand-held anti-tank weapons, losing a tank. Infantry of the 2nd/4lh Hampshires engaged in a vicious house to house fighting. On 26 June, 'A' squadron of the Three Rivers Regiment was committed to the bloody battle for the Trasimene Line, moving up through Lopi with Lieutenant Colonel W.V.H. Robins' 2nd King's Own Regiment.351 Upon reaching Gioella resistance from machineguns and ofenrohrs (German bazookas) held up the advance and the infantry From 1-26 June Tenth Army had received 7765 replacements, and sent a further 2121 soldiers to Fourteenth Army or the reserve pool. There were also 3,385 soldiers travelling to the Army. The British historical section's interpretation of this retreat to the main line of resistance on the Casamaggiore-Frattavecchia ridge was that pressure from the 78th Division in their bridgehead across the Pescia forced the Germans right flank to conform. B.H.S.C.M.. Operations of British [...] Part II, Section D, Chapter II. Paragraph 30. 351 When they moved up through Lopi to the high ground south of Gioiella, further damnation of the infantry support was given in the war diary's statement that "co-operation with the Infantry was NIL." The justification given for this lack of support was that the 28 Brigade had been roughly handled in the breaking of the Gustav Line, five weeks prior, and that it had absorbed a considerably amount of "green reinforcements."One company of the 2nd Kings regiment was reported to have had 90 reinforcements. 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 26 June 1944. 120 FIGURE SIXTEEN: Vaiano to Casamaggiore, G.S.G.S, "Castiglione del Lago" Map Detail, 1:50,000, Map Squares are approximately 1000 yards by 1000 yards. 121 took extreme casualties from small arms fire.352 'D' Company had a single officer remaining.353 At 2200hrs the tanks were reported to be in the town "having had some of the stiffest fighting they had yet experienced." Three Rivers Regiment casualties for this day of battle amounted to five killed, nineteen wounded, with two tanks brewed, and caused the war diarist to exclaim that the regiment "is suffering more casualties than in the Gustav and Hitler Shows."354 On 27 June, the 4th Division was to approach the main defensive position of the section of the Trasimene Line. The day opened with the rumble of the divisional artillery firing at suspected enemy positions 400 yards north of Gioiella.355 At 1 lOOhrs 'B' Squadron of the Three Rivers Regiment and the 2nd Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry Regiment, advanced across country to the south-east of Casamaggiore into slight opposition which increased as the team approached town.356 Fire from the high ground on the Casamaggiore-Frattavecchia ridge held the squadron to 500 yards from Gioiella by mid-day.357 At 1555hrs the 2nd Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry's 3=2 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment, 26 June 1944. Casualties reported in the W.D. total four killed, eighty wounded, and nine missing. 2nd King's Own Regiment W.D., 26 June 1944. 334 Captain N.H. Bier was reported to resume his post as "B" Squadron battle captain, "in absence of officers of any sort, let alone experienced ones." Difficulties in tank and personnel reinforcement were acute, with a bridgehead 200 miles behind in the Roccasecca area, limited transporters and congested road space. I CAB W.D., 26 June 1944. 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 26 June 1944. B.H.S.C.M.. Operations of British [...]Part II Section A. Paragraph 53. 355 At 0815 the General Officer Commanding 4th Division ordered the Royal Artillery to bring all available fire on the enemy movement north of Gioiella. At 1045hrs the 30th Field Regiment reported firing three regimental shoots, the first 400 yards to the northwest of Gioiella, and the following two at 400 yard increments north west respectively. 4th Division Royal Artillery W.D., 27 June 1944. 336 By 1050hrs 'C' Company had secured Point 315 at Selvella, and 'D' Company had secured Point 332. 2Di Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry W.D., 27 June 1944. 4th Division Royal Artillery W.D., 27 June 1944. 357 A platoon of heavy machine-guns were allotted to the 2ni Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry for the attack. 10 Infantry Brigade W.D., 27 June 1944. No. 1 Canadian Field Historical Section, "Report on Operations of 12 CAR (TRR) 2 June to 30 June 44...", 1 August 1944, Directorate of History and Heritage, 3. The 22nd Field Regiment reports that attack on Casamaggiore ridge was held up for most of the day from fire on the high ground on the right and "considerable" anti-tank fire from self- propelled guns. 22nd Field Regiment Royal Artillery W.D., 27th June 1944. 500 yards south-west of 122 reported that 'D' Company had suffered over forty casualites, including all its officers and was unable to advance.358 Two troops of Three Rivers tanks advanced and brought fire on the enemy position from a "hollow a few hundred yards short of it," which decreased the volume of fire from the position. Terrain restricted the advance as two tanks were bogged in a small stream. The infantry had had a hard time keeping up to the artillery fire-plans due to machine-gun fire from positions concealed by the high corn.159 Despite these difficulties, at 1955hrs the Three Rivers tanks made their objective on the Casamaggiore-Castiglione road, and their supporting infantry were in the neighbourhood.360 The 2nd Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry were ordered to secure the road from the cemetery to Casamaggiore overnight to "give [the 2nd Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment a] fair chance" in their attack the next morning. In the evening on the right, the 2nd Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment's patrols encountered enemy in Frattavecchia and concentrated in the area of Conte.361 The Trasimene Line began to collapse on 27 June.362 To the left of the XIII Corps the French had crossed the River Orcia and moved north on Route 2. Simultaneously, 11 South African Armoured Brigade had flanked the Germans at the Frattavecchia artillery fire scattered resistance on the forward slope at Selvella. 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 26 June 1944. "* 'D' Company would be led by Company Sergeant Major Manley, who would awarded the Military Cross for the action. E.G. Godfrey, The History of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, 1939-45, 280. 22nd Field Regiment W.D., 27 June 1944. The 2nd Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry pushed 'B' Company attacked a position forward of Points 332 and 315 (Selvella) at 1845hrs. 3WI A platoon of the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers machine-guns reported under command at 2000hrs and 10 Brigade commander Brigadier Shoosmith ordered the 2nd Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry to sweep the road east and west of BULFORD. 10 Brigade Diary of Events, 27 June 1944. 3"' 10 Brigade W.D., 27 June 1944. The 2nd Kings Regiment was attempting to get back onto Point373 on the main road which looped west from Gioiella. 10 Brigade Diary of Events, 27 June 1944. }('2 B.H.S.C.M.. Operations of British [...] Part II, Section D, Chapter II. Paragraph 36. 123 Astrone, and on the night 27-28 the 24th Guards Brigade entered Chianciano without making contact. The remainder of the 11 South African Armoured Brigade had pursued to the area of Lake Montepulciano. The XIII Corps front now formed a straight line from just south of Castiglione del Lago, past the north end of Lake Montepulciano to Chianciano. The time that the Germans had gained must be measured against their high casualties.363 Lieutenant-General Sidney Kirkman was nonetheless disappointed during these past few days with the progress made by his corps, stating on the 27 June, "not a very satisfactory day, some advance by [6th South African Division], without very heavy fighting. Intentionally no great advance by [the 78th Division], and only a small advance by [4th Division] with a good deal of ammunition expenditure, and in spite of the fact they were meant to make the day's effort."364 The following day Kirkman visited 4th Division commander Dudley Ward and spoke to him about "fighting and tactics", noting "they have been much cramped by having to keep a [brigade] out to relieve [78th Division]." On the 28 June, the final battles of Lake Trasimene pushed the Germans from their chosen defensive ground. The actions of the XIII Corps on 24-27 June allow an investigation of the capabilities of the Allied all-arms team on the Second World War battlefield. The Ontario Regiment's performance at Pescia shows that skilled Sherman tank operators could knock out Panther tanks and help the infantry overcome defensive positions 563 A total of 718 prisoners had been taken from 18-28 June, the majority of which came from the 334th Division. One of its regiments had been reduced to 150 men. The 1st Parachute division, already weak on arrival at the line now included regiments with as few as 120 soldiers. The Hermann Goring Division had to amalgamate two of their battalions. The shifting of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division onto the XIII Corps front from that of the X Corps was hoped to ameliorate the situation. 3W Kirkman Diary, 27-28 June. 124 which otherwise would halt the advance. The Wiltshire Regiment's ability to support the 5th Buffs bridgehead across the Pescia shows that while this tank obstacle could halt the armour, smoke and firepower from the near bank could allow an infantry foothold to be gained and the engineers to bridge the river. The advance over the hills to the west displays the grim reality of attrition as the 4th Division ground through this ideal defensive terrain. The Germans were now running out of defensible terrain in the west as they were pushed back through the successive ridge-lines and were soon ousted completely from the position. 125 CHAPTER SIX: Breaking the Main Defensive Line 28 June Sacrifice Beyond Casamaggiore The Second World War historiography which stresses poor Allied combat motivation and inflexible doctrine wedded to inferior equipment is an inadequate explanation for the final breaching of the Trasimene Line. From 24 to 27 June the Three Rivers Regiment proved the worth of its mobile firepower by supporting the infantry of the 4th Division assault through 1st German Parachute Division positions in a series of hilltop villages. By 28 June the 4th Division in the hill country to the west had conformed to the 78th Division's salient across the River Pescia. On this day, the XIII British Corps assaulted through the German's main defensive line. All arms played their role in dominating and suppressing the main defensive line with fire-power, and only after considerable determination were the Germans be pushed back. Again heroism and professionalism were shown by the Canadian troopers in pushing on to their objectives into defences sited specifically to nullify tanks. Shermans continued to knock out Panthers. Flexible artillery disrupted German counterattacks with concentrations on call. Yet heavy losses were taken by both Allied infantry and armour. The XIII Corps payed a high price in blood to prosecute the containment strategy of the Italian Campaign. Late on 27 June the 2nd Duke of Cornwall's Regiment had fought to positions on the Casamaggiore-Castiglione road. On 28 June, the 4,h Division plan was to pass the 2nd Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment through the 2nd Duke of Cornwall's Regiment positions on the Casamaggiore-Castiglione road exploiting north with the Pozzuolo- Nardelli road as a final objective. The 2nd Duke of Cornwall's Regiment were to attack 126 ^;%jyastiglione /del Lago 29 JUN "C" SQN 12™ CDN LAKE LARMD REGT TRASIMENE 26 JU Gioiella Case Ranciano Pescia^kP 26 JUN -..sr•^Pucci* v Bad i a Carraia SanfatucchicJ^^. ^ \ I ,e?'* LAKE Vaiano Ao CHIUSI THE TRASIMENE LINE 2 Strada MILES 1 MILES CONTOURS INDICATED BY LAYER TINTS 300. 350 METRES FIGURE SEVENTEEN: The Trasimene Line. Nicholson, Canadians in Italy, 478 inset. west into Casamaggiore. Both infantry battalions had a squadron of the Three Rivers Regiment under command.365 The 78th Division was informed in hopes that they could coordinate the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers Regiment movement with this attack from their 365 'C' Squadron had its own fourteen Shermans, two MlOs, a medium artillery forward observer and a self-propelled 105mm forward observers. 127 position near Frattavecchia. The close nature of the country made for slow going for both infantry and tanks, as tracks were sodden with the previous day's rains and the enemy's increased shelling and the excellent defensive position on the ridge running through Casamaggiore "made the advance extremely precarious."366 Due to cloud and early morning mist, close air support was impossible.367 ifBjjK i- r/t'CHi te START LINE 2 Beds Herts, 'C' Sqn TRR FIGURE EIGHTEEN: Casamaggiore 28 June. Geographical Section General Staff, "Castiglione del Lago", Detail, Map Squares approximately lOOOyards by 1000 yards. 366 4th Division W.D., 27 June 1944. 367 1 0 Brigade Diary of Events, 28 June 1944. The mist, interestingly, was a factor in Hannibal's 214 BC Battle of Lake Trasimene (or Thrasymene as Polybius recorded it), allowing Hannibal to attack Flaminius' forces in surprise from the flank. Polybius. Histories. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh. translator. London: Macmillan, 1889. Reprint Bloomington 1962. Hertfordshire Regiment were 400 yards south of the Casamaggiore road when they encountered heavy shelling and nebelwerfer concentrations.368 When at 0530hrs, Major F.W. Johnson of the Three Rivers Regiment's 'C' Squadron moved up to the start-line, he found no infantry about.369 It was then that he was informed that Zero Hour had been pushed back an hour.370 Unfortunately, the tanks were now exposed, surprise lost and the Germans had an hour to prepare for the attack. The combined arms team would have to fight for the start line. Lieutenant A.F. Farrow of'C' Squadron had joined the regiment two days earlier.371 His actions on 28 June earned him the Military Cross. The squadron was in support of the Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment with an objective 1500 yards north of Casamaggiore near Carlira farm.372 At 0630hrs, with Farrow's No. 2 Troop on the right and No. 5 Troop on the left, 'C' Squadron and the 2nd Bedfordshire Regiment advanced behind a barrage.373 A quarter of a mile from the objective the troops received "murderous" fire from the high-ground to the left, and the Three Rivers squadron were reduced to three tanks. Armour piercing rounds from Panther tanks and enemy self- 36* 2nd Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment W.D., 28 June 1944. 'A' Company commander Major Lord Wynford was severely wounded, leaving the company to Lieutenant Cox. Hugh Williamson, The Fourth Division 1939 to 1945 (London : Newman Neame, 1951), 169. 36D 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 28 June 1944. 370 The 2nd Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment were informed that the attack had been postponed at 0400hrs. 10 Brigade Diary of Events, 28 June 1944. 371 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 25 September 1944. m ^th [)ivjsion w.D., 28 June 1944. 373 No. 1 Canadian Field Historical Section, "Report on Operations of 12 CAR (TRR) 2 June to 30 June 44...", 1 August 1944, Directorate of History and Heritage, 3. 12"1 Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 28 June 1944. The 22nd Field Regiment participated in the barrage in support of the 2nd Hertfordshire and Bedfordshire Regiment. While the leading companies remained close to the barrage until their second objective, here they were pinned to the ground. 22nd Field Regiment Royal Artillery W.D., 28 June 1944. 129 propelled guns damaged eight tanks, five of which brewed up.374 One of the tanks disabled was that of Major Johnson. He and his crew escaped and left the squadron in command of Captain Ian M. Grant. At 0700hrs the leading companies of the 2nd Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment reached the first crest at Point 322.375 At 0735hrs the regiment reported 50% casualties in the two leading companies upon reaching objective codenamed BENTLEY, the lateral track near the farm Carlira, 1500yards north of the Casamaggiore-Castiglione road.376 These companies then amalgamated. Independent actions by infantry and armour had already inflicted great casualties, but the risk of the 2nd Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment being completely over-run was imminent. Only by the consolidation of the objective by all- arms would this penetration of the main defensive line be shored up. The Three Rivers Regiment had been moving up into heavy machine-gun and shell-fire during the morning.377 At lOOOhrs, the commanding officer of the 2nd Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment was concerned about consolidating BENTLEY, suggesting that another battalion was needed in the position as all his companies were deployed.378 He urgently requested tank support and a consolidation party for the area, and at 1032hrs the Shermans of the Three Rivers Regiment arrived. With Captain Ian Grant in ™ 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 28 June 1944. 10 Brigade Diary of Events, 28 June 1944. 576 2nd Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment W.D., 28 June 1944. Major Jenkins' 'B' Company had shrunk to less than thirty men. Officer commanding 'A' Company, Lieutenant Cox was killed by tank fire, and the company reduced to two officers, forty other ranks. Williamson, 169. 577 1CAB W.D., 28 June 1944. lst/6th East Surrey Regiment Message Log, 28 June 1944. At 0800hrs the Three Rivers tanks had reached the first ridge 500 yards north of the Casamaggiore-Castiglione road, advancing through strong resistance. 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 28 June 1944. "s The 2nd Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment had urgently requested tank support at 0900hrs. 10 Brigade Diary of Events, 28 June 1944. 130 command the tank force fought onto the objective, helping infantry up to positions in a house just south of the Carlira-Mercanizia track.379 Lieutenant Farrow's tank broke down so he took over his corporal's Sherman and advanced with Captain Grant to engage a German infantry counter-attack supported by four Panthers. Farrow fought for four hours unaided on the right against infantry and tanks until the enemy attack abated. The record of events in the Three River Diary notes that his action allowed 'A' Squadron to successfully attack Casamaggiore. Meanwhile, 'C' Squadron's three tanks had made it to the Carlira road accompanied by fifty infantrymen, but two tanks had damaged traverse and firing mechanism. The enemy had let the Shermans pass and then attacked them with concealed anti-tank guns and Panther tanks from the flanks.380 Under Captain Grant they fought off an armoured counterattack. Grant would be recommended for the Victoria Cross on the day by Brigadier W.C. Murphy, the only such recommendation the commander of 1CAB made in the war.381 Murphy justified his recommendation by citing Grant's "absolute disregard for danger, his outstanding leadership, and the contribution his little group made to breaking up attack after attack by German infantry supported by tanks." Captain Grant would receive the Distinguished Service Order, an award not usually bestowed on a junior officer. Four enemy tanks were sited moving westbound on the lateral road one :,T> |2"' Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 28 June 1944. No. 1 Canadian Field Historical Section, "Report on Operations of 12 CAR (TRR) 2 June to 30 June 44...", 1 August 1944, Directorate of History and Heritage, 3. The Three Rivers war diary notes that at 1 lOOhrs there were fifty infantry men and three tanks on BENTLEY, but two of the Shermans were in "B" condition with traversing and firing mechanism difficulties. 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 28 June 1944. 31,1 Gerald Nicholson, "Collation of Comments — Fourth Draft Official History of the Canadian Armv in the Second World War. Volume 2". Directorate of History and Heritage, 82/985 F5-82/987 Fl, Murphy - vol. 3 folio 254, page 758. 131 kilometre to the north of the Casamaggiore-Frattavecchia road.382 Enemy tanks, including the "deadly Panther M[ark] V" were reported "massing for a counter thrust". At I lOOhrs, 'C' squadron met this force. There were two tank casualties on both sides.383 Another counterattack developed from this direction, and with medium machine-guns, 3" mortars and flanking fire from the 2nd Kings Regiment these attacks were beaten off by the 2nd Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment. At 1320hrs the forward company of the Bedfordshire Regiment radioed that the situation had stabilized, as enough supporting arms were available.384 On the right, the Three Rivers 'B' Squadron was tasked with securing 'C' Squadron's flank. Officer commanding Captain Crooks moved down the road and surprised a platoon of paratroopers marching forward.385 Crooks' tank could not depress its gun sufficiently to fire at the Germans so he jockeyed back and forth while firing high explosive rounds. At this point a German armoured piercing round passed through one side of the Sherman's turret and out the other, reportedly passing between Crooks' legs. Another 'B' squadron tank was brewed, the ammo exploding and lifting the turret. This explosion killed Captain N.H. Bier, "one of the regiments best liked officers and an excellent Battle Captain." The war diary states that he "died at his post - in a tank." The rest of the squadron took hull down positions and engaged targets on the right 3,2 10 Brigade W.D., 28 June 1944. 31,3 MIOs of the 98th Field Regiment (Self-Propelled) Royal Artillery attempting to move up were "shot up" and allied tanks were reported "badly depleted and lying low."SeIf-propelled guns from the 391st Battery were said to score a kill on a Panther during the day, firing "immediately over the co-driver's cover - the Panther's most vulnerable point." 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 28 June 1944. 3M lst/6th East Surrey Regiment Message Log, 28 June 1944. 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 28 June 1944. Around 1200hrs the squadron advanced on the right, observing enemy infantry moving up a valley from the north-west. High-explosive rounds drew a white flag and the infantry brought back seventeen prisoners. No. 1 Canadian Field Historical Section, "Report on Operations of 12 CAR (TRR) 2 June to 30 June 44...", 1 August 1944, Directorate of History and Heritage, 3. 132 flank. By the end of the skirmish, the Three Rivers Regiment had lost six tanks while beating back four counter attacks.386 In the extremely fluid and chaotic battle for the Casamaggiore ridge the dangerous yet vital role of the artillery's forward observer is evident. As the 4th Division's war diary states, "the rest of the afternoon was a tale of more counter attacks and at one time the situation was none too favourable. The good reporting of enemy forming up however enabled the art[illery] to disperse many such concentrations, and little by little the enemy's efforts were worn down."387 Around noon the forward observer attached to the Three River's 'C' squadron was killed in his tank.388 The 22nd Field Regiment reports that Captain A.C. Sharp the forward observer with a company of the Bedfordshire Regiment was in the squadron commander's tank when on "reaching the crest [it] immediately burst into flames."389 The war diary states that "although the bodies in the tank were unrecognizable, Captain Sharp is believed to be among those killed and he was reported 'missing believed killed'." Nonetheless, effective artillery support arrived. Three times the enemy formed up for counterattack in the afternoon and were beaten off by artillery fire. Sharp's death is indicative of the essential yet dangerous role that artillery observers played in the Second World War. m 1CABW.D.,28 June 1944. 4th Division W.D., 28 June 1944. Numerous shoots during the day dealt with enemy forming up two miles north at Pozzuoio. At 0836hrs on the 28th June, the 75th and 78th Medium Regiments engaged an enemy counterattack forming up in the Pozzuoio area. 78th Medium Regiment W.D., 28 June 1944. 4th Division Royal Artillery W.D., 28 June 1944. At 1013hrs the 22nd, 30th and 77th Field Regiments fired Uncle targets (concentrations of all guns of the division) to the north of Pozzuoio on a scale of five targeting tanks and infantry. 4th Division W.D., 28 June 1944. At lOOOhrs on 28 June 1944, the 57th Field Regiment targeted four nebelwerfers southeast of Nardelli, in a bombardment that started at Scale 4 and increased to Scale 10 during half on hour. At 1205hrs, an enemy mortar area was requested as an Uncle target, and the shoot on it is claimed by the unit war diary as being effective. 57th Field Regiment W.D., 28 June 1944 3X8 12,h Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 28 June 1944. 22nd Field Regiment Royal Artillery W.D., 28 June 1944. 133 The hardened metal shield of the Sherman tank could provide cover from small arms and high-explosive, but they could also live up to their reputation as "steel coffins". In the morning of the 28 June, the 2nd Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment and its supporting squadron of Three Rivers tanks had sacrificed greatly to break the main Trasimene Line.390 Meanwhile, attacks on the towns of Casamaggiore and Frattavecchia were underway, both towns being captured by the evening.391 The advance of the 78th Division's 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers Regiment and 'B' Squadron of the Warwickshire Yeomanry on Frattavecchia shows the dynamics of support available to the infantry. At 0700hrs 28 June the artillery barrage opened up on Frattavecchia and 'A' and 'B' Companies of the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers advanced, mopping up machine gun and sniper posts.392 The troops of the Warwickshires 'B' Squadron lent effective 390 The Bedfordshires had ninety-two casualties reported 28-29 June. Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment W.D., June 1944. 11,1 The 2nd Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry Regiment had been tasked with attacking west towards Casamaggiore from their position 1000 yards down the Castiglione road. At 0725hrs the regiment was held upon the outskirts of the town and engaging machine-gun positions with their attached 4.2" mortars. At 1830 hours, Major Banfield's 'B' Company of the 2nd Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry attacked again with the support of tanks and gained their objective on the road 1000 yards west of the cemetery. At 1845hrs a company of the lst/6th Surreys supported by 'A' Squadron of the Three Rivers Regiment entered Casamaggiore and at last light there was confused fighting in the town. 10 Brigade W.D., 28 June 1944. 2nd Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry W.D., 28 June 1944. At 1700hrs a small fire plan was shot by three field regiments 500 yard north west of Casamaggiore to support the attack by the 1 Surreys. 4th Division Royal Artillery W.D., 28 June 1944. By 1800hrs the infantry had occupied Casamaggiore and the high ground to the west, thus relieving the pressure on the Bedfordshires' left flank. 4th Division W.D., 28 June 1944. 22nd Field Regiment W.D., 28 June 1944. The Three Rivers' war diary states that this attack, accompanied by "A" Squadron was extremely well laid on, the tanks shooting the infantry "from objective to objective and then covered them into town." 12 Canadian Armoured Brigade W.D., 28 June 1944. Due to confusion over the location of the 2nd Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment, reports of the Germans pulling out on the far side of Casamaggiore were not engaged by the Royal Artillery. The Three Rivers' war diarist acidly states that "presuming of course that our infantry would be sitting on the road over which Jerry was retreating." The unit war diarist reported that "it was the 12th's roughest day on record and everyone felt deeply the loss of fine men and offlcers."12A Canadian Armoured Regiment, 28 June 1944. 392 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers W.D., 28 June 1944. The barrage was fired by 132nd and 138th Field Regiments, the former firing on three battery frontage. 132nd Field Regiment W.D., 28 June 1944. 138th Field Regiment W.D., 28 June 1944. 134 support during the advance, taking out machine-gun positions that were firing on the Lancashire's 'C' Company, advancing on the right. By lOOOhrs 'D' and 'C' Companies had passed through to 800 yards north of Frattavecchia, just beyond the Casamaggiore- Castiglione road. Warwickshire tanks leapfrogged through objectives, some being disabled by mines and rough going. At llOOhrs the 132nd and 138th Field Regiments fired another barrage, which was deemed successful and the Lancashire Fusiliers reached their objectives with slight losses.393 The continued advance highlights the vulnerability of tank commanders on the Second World War battlefield. The Lancashire Fusilier's advanced to their objectives beyond Frattavecchia, towards Stoppa and Point 317 beyond the Casamaggiore- Castiglione road. An amalgamated troop of the Warwickshire Yeomanry was in support, but at 1230hrs when a concentration of German mortars and shellfire hit the tanks, all three tank commanders became casualties, and their tanks withdrew.394 The incident shows the drawbacks of Sherman tank commanders advancing "unbuttoned", with their torso or head exposed above their cupola. The need to have situational awareness often trumped protection for tank commanders, but the effect of high- explosive on these three commanders of the Warwickshire's shows the consequences that could incur with such standard operating procedures. Despite the losses of these tanks, 'D' Company of the 2nd Lancashire Fusilier's managed to gain their objectives of Colle Stoppa and Point 317, taking several casualties, and reportedly having a "hectic 31,3 The 132nd Regiment fired over 4000 rounds during the day and resorted to "borrowing" ammunition from the 57th Field Regiment. Its 322nd Battery was said to fire "large quantity of airbursts" during the day "at the enemy digging in." The 138th Field Regiment's diary states that German artillery activity was on a larger scale than experienced for some time. 132nd Field Regiment W.D., 28 June 1944. 138th Field Regiment W.D., 28 June 1944. 3(M Warwickshire Yeomanry W.D., 28 June 1944. 135 time", but taking twenty-two prisoners in the advance.395 To the west, overnight on 28-29 June, the 2nd Bedfordshire Regiment made BENTLEY a firm base.396 In the early hours of 29 June the 2nd Bedfordshires and the Surreys moved up to the Nardelli-Pozzuolo road to no opposition.397 As 29 June dawned, the enemy had withdrawn on both 4th and 78th Division's fronts. The 11th Canadian Armoured Regiment's intelligence officer wrote, "the Trasimene Line may now be considered completely broken."398 The fighting in this region was far from over, however, as the Germans would fight hard in their retreat to the Arno line, delaying on every defensible point. Clearing the Hill Country and Pursuit, 29 June-3 July 1944 On 78th Division's front the enemy withdrew on 29 June due to the steady pressure of the 4th Division to the west.399 The brigade war diary states that, "it was not the intention to commit the [brigade] to severe fighting in view of its impending move". The 78th Division was finished in Italy for the time being, with many of their forces already en route to Egypt. At 1040hrs 29 June the Air Observation Post reported white flags flying from the Castle in Castiglione del Lago.400 These were flown by civilians, and the town was confirmed as in allied hands at 1120hrs by a squadron of the 56th 31,5 Hugh Williamson interprets the action of the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers at 1330hrs as the critical moment in the battle, preventing a counterattack on the Bedfordshires from Nardelli. Williamson, 170. 2nd Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment, 29 June 1944. 3,7 As the 4th Division W.D. states however, the 2nd King's Regiment were "not so lucky" as a patrol was ambushed to the west of Casamaggiore "sustaining heavy casualties."4th Division W.D., 29 June 1944. m 11th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 29 June 1944. The Three Rivers intelligence officer also reports 29 June as when the line was broken. 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 29 June 1944. 3,w On the 30th June, 8 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders advanced to the area forward of Piana. 36 Brigade W.D., 29 June 1944. 4 On 28 June the German's had lost their main defence line on the Casamaggiore- Frattavecchia ridge and planned to use the last ten miles of defensible hill country to impose delay upon the advancing Allies.402 On the night of 28-29 June the Hermann Goring Division, stretching from Valiano to Gracciano on the South African's front, had broken contact. As Kirkman would write of the day's efforts, "the bosh went back last night and everywhere we made and advance of 6000-7000 yards."403 On 29 June on the American front, the 34th Division (which had relieved 36th Division) began a fight for Cecina which would last until 1 July and cost the division a great number of casualties.404 The 16th SS Division had arrived and fought with "skill and fanaticism". On the east coast of the peninsula, the Poles found that the Germans had withdrawn from the Chieti river, and despite the fact that their concentration was not complete, proceeded to pursue the enemy. On 29 June two major axis' developed for the advance of the 4th Division, the first by the 1st Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment and the 14th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Calgary Tank Regiment) through Laviano and Valiano, and the second by the 10 Brigade and the Three Rivers Regiment through Pozzuolo and Petrignano.405 At 0630hrs 'C' Squadron of the Calgary Tank Regiment and the 1st 4(11 The 5th Buffs Regiment, who had received considerable shelling in the past five days since their crossing of the Pescia, moved up shortly to consolidate in the town. 11th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 29 June 1944. Later in the day the 56th Reconnaissance Regiment advanced to Spina where it was held up by German resistance. 5th Royal East Kent Regiment W.D., 29 June 1944. 41,2 B.H.S.C.M.. Operations of British [...] Part If, Section D, Chapter II. Paragraph 43. 403 Kirkman Diary, 29 June. 4(14 B.H.S.C.M.. Operations of British [...] Part II Section A. Paragraphs 54-5. 405 The Royal West Kents axis was cross country and also included Points 328 and312. 4th Division Royal Artillery W.D., 29 June 1944. 10 Brigade W.D., 29 June 1944. The objective of 'C' Squadron of the Calgary Regiment and the 1st Royal West Kent Regiment was to "close on the enemy and destroy him." At 1330hrs on 28 June an orders group was held at 12 Brigade headquarters 137 FIGURE NINETEEN: Laviano to Petrignano. G.S.G.S Composite Map, "Castiglione del Lago" and "Montepulciano." Map squares approximately 1000 yards by 100 yards. Royal West Kent Regiment advanced cross country towards Laviano into a heavy fog.406 The mist, "so treacherous to [armoured fighting vehicles]", inhibited the 14th Canadian Armoured Regiment's reconnaissance troop of eleven Honey tanks in establishing the brigade group's centre axis as Vaiano, La Villa, Gioiella, Pod. Ballaria, Laviano, and Valiano. As soon as 1500hrs the 1st Royal West Kent Regiment and the Calgary Regiment set off to an area just north of Vaiano. The situation at the front in the evening was "rather confused" but the next morning the situation was said to be "a little clearer." No. 1 Canadian Field Historical Section, "Report on Operations 14 CAR (Calgary Regt) for period 12 June - 17 July 44...", Directorate of History and Heritage, 28 August 1944, 1-2. 406 The advance began at 0530hrs 29 June and had a troop of MIOs from the 105th Anti-tank regiment in support as did the lst/6th Surrey Regiment and the 2nd Bedfordshires and Hertfordshires. 105th Anti-tank Regiment W.D., 29th June 1944. Starting in a harbour just outside La Villa, the armoured column, preceded by the reconnaissance troop advanced through Gioiella, and Bellaria. 12 Brigade Information Summary No. 44, 30 June 1944. 14th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 29 June 1944. 138 navigation and detection of the enemy.407 At 1215hrs, heavy machine-gun fire from Laviano pinned the group, and an infantry and tank attack was immediately "teed up." When the town was reached no opposition was to be found with civilians informing the soldiers that the Germans had pulled out an hour prior. At 1450hrs on 29 June the Royal West Kent Regiment reported themselves beyond the town and pushing forwards.408 Some small resistance was met to the north of the town, and sniping and demolitions held up the advance. With the day still "in its prime" the decision was made to push on towards Valiano.409 Major resistance was found 1000 yards to the north. Snipers, gullies and the canal held up the Sherman's advance. The infantrymen in the Royal West Kent Regiment pushed forward.410 At 1850hrs the advance was made to 1500 yards short of Valiano, the Calgaries' 'C' squadron had now managed to overcome the tank obstacles and caught up with the infantry.4" Here mortars and small arms continued to hold up the advance and the infantry consolidated for the night after an advance of over sixteen 407 Harassing machine-gun fire was met during the advance but by 1045hrs Ballaria farm had been reached. 1st Queen's Own Royal West Kents W.D., 29 June 1944. At 1120hrs the 98th Field Regiment reported enemy at Laviano (on Point 332) and engaged them. For the Royal West Kent Regiment advance the 14th Anti Tank Regiment had detached a troop of 209th Battery. 4th Division Royal Artillery W.D., 29 June 1944. At 1215hrs a single machine gun nest from a house south of Crewe was overcome. 14th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 29 June 1944. 40* Lieutenant V.J. Saint-Martin was killed by sniper fire in the advance. 4th Division W.D., 29 June 1944. At 1505hrs, the Calgary Tanks reported Laviano clear. 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 29 June 1944. 40" 14th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 29 June 1944. 41(1 By I807hrs the regiment approached Valiano, but the terrain was very difficult and mortar fire increased. Point 255, southwest of the town held machine-gun and sniper positions that had to be dealt with. 1st Queen's Own Royal West Kent's W.D., 30 June 1944. 411 14lh Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 29 June 1944. 77th Heavy Field Regiment W.D., 29th June 1944. Major A. Leslie's "B" Squadron was with the 2nd Royal Fusiliers on the flank. The regiments had cooperated and trained together since 12 June, and the regimental history records "the mutual trust and liking which had sprung up between the two units. The regiment took several casualties in its flanking attack. The Royal Fusiliers (City of London Regiment) History of the 2nd Battalion in North Africa, Italy and Greece. 139 kilometres. On the night of 29-30 June, 4 Regiment of 1st Parachute Division loosened its hold on the village of Valiano. A prisoner stated that Lieutenant Bohlein, commander of '2' Company was wounded. This commander elicited praise from a XIII Corps intelligence summary, which stated that in "the Italian campaign that where our threat has been greatest, there Heidrich's division has been committed; and where the fighting has been most bloody there Bohlein has been found...the peculiar qualities of men like these explain why the parachutists, with companies of only [twenty-five] or [thirty] men, succeed in delaying our advance where infantry and panzer grenadiers, three times as strong, can not."412 Meanwhile to the east on 29 June the Surreys mopped up Casamaggiore, and pushed on towards Pozzuolo. At 1050hrs the infantry were in Pozzuolo, supported by 'A' squadron of the Three Rivers Regiment.413 The town was reported heavily mined and booby-trapped, but the tanks followed the infantry in. 414 At 1900hrs, 1000 yards south of Petrignano, strong opposition was met by both the 2nd Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment and the 6th Surrey Regiment, where they dug in to a night of heavy shelling.415 4,2 XIII Corps Intelligence Summary No. 427, 30 June 1944. 413 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 29 June 1944. Pozzuolo had been the target of an Allied fighter-bomber attack the previous day. Williamson, 170. 414 To the east 1200 yards, the 2nd Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment with the 'C' squadron of the Three Rivers Regiment were reported in Nardelli by 1050hrs and this town was clear by 1300hrs.4lh Division W.D., 29 June 1944. Contact was made again when the Bedfordshire Regiment encountered enemy light machine gun and sniper fire from the area of Rossetti (1600 yards to the north), but with the help of smoke fired on the right flank this opposition was overcome. 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 29 June 1944. 2 Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment, 29 June 1944. Later the 2nd Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment moved north-west to capture Pt 319. 10 Brigade W.D., 29 June 1944. 415 The Surreys were singled out by the Three Rivers' war diarist as "very good" and infantry- tank cooperation apparently worked "quite smoothly" on their advance with 'A' squadron during the day. 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 29 June 1944. 140 When at first light on 30 June 4th Reconnaissance Regiment passed through the lines, they were fired on by anti-tank guns and heavy machine-guns.416 A set-piece attack was deemed necessary and the 2nd Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry and 'B' Squadron of the Three Rivers Regiment passed through lst/6th Surreys to attack Petrignano.417 The fight for Petrignano lasted all day. To the west on 30 June, at 0500hrs, patrols reported the enemy holding the ridge Petrignano-Valiano.418 At 0930hrs on the morning of 30 June an attempt by the 2nd Royal Fusiliers and 'B' Squadron of the Calgary Regiment to outflank Valiano made little progress owing to resistance by machine guns on the next ridge and heavy shelling and mortaring from the town.419 At 131 Ohrs, the 2nd Royal Fusiliers were pinned down by machine gun fire, while three anti-tank guns and close country prevented observation by the armour of targets indicated by the infantry.420 Here confusion as to the location of the Three Rivers Regiment on the right prevented fire being brought down on Petrignano, as the 4,6 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 29 June 1944. At 1530hrs on the 30"' of June, the 4th Reconnaissance Regiment met with disaster. A delayed mine blew up the house containing the regimental headquarters and men of the regiment along with Royal Air Force personnel and eleven civilians were buried in the rubble. Rescue efforts saved a few but eleven regimental headquarters casualties were reported due to the blast along with eleven civilians killed and one airmen killed.. All the regiments maps and papers, including the original war diary for June were destroyed, and thus all of the information on the regiments activities in the breaking of the Trasimene Line were the product of recollection some weeks after the fact. 4th Division W.D., 30 June 1944. 4th Reconnaissance Regiment W.D., 30 June 1944. 4th Reconnaissance Regiment Information Summary 1 July 1944. 417 The battalion advanced with 'B' Company on the right towards an objective of Point 311 and 'C' Company on the left towards Point 344 in Petrignano. The plan was to pass 'A' Company through 'C' when they made their objective. 2nd Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry W.D., 30 June 1944. XIII Corps Information Log, 1 July 1944. The lst/6th Surrey Regiment had suffered seventeen killed and forty-three wounded in breaking the Trasimene Line. Squire, 45. 4I" No. 1 Canadian Field Historical Section, "Report on Operations 14 CAR (Calgary Regt) for period 12 June -17 July 44...", Directorate of History and Heritage, 28 August 1944, 2-3. 4th Division W.D., 29 June 1944. The ridge south of Petrignano is stated as a strong-point with anti tank guns and potentially Tiger tanks. 12 Brigade Information Summary No. 44, 30 June 1944. No. 1 Canadian Field Historical Section, "Report on Operations 14 CAR (Calgary Regt) for period 12 June - 17 July 44...", Directorate of History and Heritage, 28 August 1944, 2-3. 77th heavy field Regiment W.D., 30 June 1944. 42° j^th canac|jan Armoured Regiment W.D., 30 June 1944. 141 regiment claimed they were in the town. Four hours were spent determining locations.421 Petrignano had been erroneously reported taken at 0636hrs. A Panther was reported in the area of the Three Rivers Regiment, but the Calgary Regiment assumed that this was a mistaken report of a friendly tank so artillery left the confusion to be sorted out. The Panther was all too real, and took out two Calgary tanks before withdrawing. The Three Rivers intelligence officer insists the confusion was a result of the Calgary Regiment mistaking their own position on the map, and thus reporting the wrong coordinates of the enemy tank. The Calgary tanks claimed that the Three Rivers had reported that they were in Petrignano at 13 lOhrs and thus let the enemy armoured fighting vehicles escape.422 At 1755hrs locations were again established and the Germans were known to hold Petrignano with Panthers, Mark IV Panzerkampfwagens and potentially self- propelled guns.423 No sooner was this information established than the Calgary Regiment and self-propelled guns opened up on the enemy vehicles, knocking out a Panther and one Mark IV, while losing a brewed Sherman and two damaged. At 1930hrs two more Mark IVs were shot when the enemy withdrew. At 2015hrs, a signal to the Calgary tanks goaded the unit to "follow through and exploit against the retreating enemy".424 The danger of counterattack was said to be too great and three tanks were seen approaching from the north-east, so instead the decision to consolidate 421 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment W.D., 30 June 1944. 422 J4U1 cana(jjan Armoured Regiment W.D., 30 June 1944. 423 No. 1 Canadian Field Historical Section, "Report on Operations 14 CAR (Calgary Regt) for period 12 June - 17 July 44...", Directorate of History and Heritage, 28 August 1944, 2-3. 30 June Behind the front about 2000 yards at Frattavecchia, the 132nd Field Regiment had just moved into position when "overs" from the tank battle on the front began to land in the regiments gun areas and it was subsequently decided to withdraw from the position. 132nd Field Regiment W.D., 30 June 1944. 424 14th cana(jian Armoured Regiment W.D., 30 June 1944. 142 for the night was made. By first light on 1 July the enemy had pulled out of both Valiano and Petrignano. At 0730hrs 1 July, the Three Rivers Regiment was relieved by the Ontario Regiment.425 Losses for the phase of the campaign were ninety-four casualties and twenty-six tanks. The regiment had seen its heaviest fighting since landing in Sicily. On the 4th Division's front the enemy had been so depleted that sergeants were reportedly commanding companies.426 On 30 June, the 1CAB war diary states that "an enemy withdrawal had been carried out along the whole line in Western Italy. During the day advances of three to five miles were reported on all sectors."427 The Tenth German Army's war diary for the 30 June indicates that the situation on the Fourteenth Army's front demanded the withdrawal of Tenth Army, and at 1715hrs the order for withdrawal during the night was sent from O.B.S.W.428 Too often the story of the Second World War is told in absence of the citizens living in the villages and towns of which the front-lines washed across.429 Hardships were the norm in the Tuscan and Umbrian hills. Many citizens huddled together in their cellars as the battle raged. The seizure of all cattle and draft animals, systematically enforced by orders from German generals, took away the civilians food and means of survival.430 There is considerable evidence in the Trasimene Line area that 425 No. 1 Canadian Field Historical Section, "Report on Operations of 12 CAR (TRR) 2 June to 30 June 44...", 1 August 1944, Directorate of History and Heritage. 426 Xlll Corps Information Log, 29 June 1944. 427 1 CABW.D., 30 June 1944. 4211 "Report No. 24: The Italian Campaign (From the Fall of Rome to the Evacuation of Florence (4 Jun - 10 Aug 44)" Historical Section (G.S) Army Headquarters, 31 March 1949, 56. w An excellent source for this civilian perspective is Dethick's The Trasimene Line which gives insight into a politically fractured Italy, partisan activities, and the plight of citizens whose home became a battleground. Janet Kinrade Dethick, The Trasimene Line June-July 1944 (Perugia: Uguccione Ranieri di Sorbello Foundation, 2002). 4?o ygth 0jvisjon intelligence Summary No. 194, 28 June 1944. 143 civilians were killed in cold blood in what 1st Parachute Division commander General Heidrich had earlier called a "scorched earth" policy designed to leave nothing to the allies in evacuated areas.431 The operations of the Calgaries' reconnaissance troop in the advance north of Valiano shows that in the summer of 1944 tactical techniques were constantly improving.432 In the morning of 1 July, attempts to "crowd" the enemies retreat and prevent demolitions were hampered by a large number of mines causing a three hour delay on the ridge that the enemy had withdrawn from the night prior.433 The Calgary Regiment's reconnaissance troop departed in hopes of screening elements on the left and to look for crossing over the canal. The 1CAB war diary notes that this day marked the first use of a regimental reconnaissance troop was used for the purpose it was intended.434 The Stuart light tank had been introduced to the brigade in April 1944, and was found to be an extremely useful supply vehicle. During the Gari river battles, the Stuarts effectively supplied the front-line troops in the shallow bridgehead with ammunition, and the light tanks had been used for this purpose by the Three Rivers Regiment throughout the battle in the hills west of Lake Trasimene. On 1 July, as the rearward defences of the Trasimene Line were being abandoned, the reconnaissance troop searched for a clear route, and succeeded in capturing three bridges, which were 431 Heidrich refers to the policy as such in his letter to his division of 29 May 1944 reprinted in XIII Corps Intelligence Summary No. 410, 3 June 1944. Not all the civilians in the area were the impoverished peasants who had to survive off the shell-pocked Umbrian soil. Refugees in the area reportedly wished to return to such diverse areas as Rome, Naples, Orsogna, Calabria and Sicily. "Weekly Report Ending 25 June 1944", Allied Military Government Liaison Officer XIII Corps to Headquarters Main Allied Military Government Eighth Army, Army: Liaison Reports from 2, 5, 10 and 13 Corps. 1944 Feb.-Aug.,WO 204/10085, 27 June 1944. 432 1 2 Brigade Information Summary No. 45, July 1944. 433 No. 1 Canadian Field Historical Section, "Report on Operations 14 CAR (Calgary Regt) for period 12 June - 17 July 44...", Directorate of History and Heritage, 28 August 1944, 2-3. 434 1CAB W.D., 1 July 1944. 144 prepared for demolition, "by dispersing and mopping up the enemy demolition parties/' The Honeys, as the Stuart tank was called in British service, were useful in neutralizing machine gun outposts as well. By seizing potential logistic choke points before the enemy could perform demolitions, the reconnaissance troop would allow the armour and infantry to remain integrated. On 2 July, the reconnaissance troop of the Calgary Tanks in their Honeys pushed forward towards Foiano.435 The troop seized a crossing over the Chiana Canal while 'C squadron moved on with the 1 Royal West Kent Regiment in preparation for a set piece attack on Foiana Delia Chiana.436 At 0830hrs the Reconnaissance Troop surprised a group of Germans attempting to destroy the bridge over the canal. The Honey's .50 Browning beat off the enemy's security party and prevented the bridge from destruction. The party found a burning Mark IV and self-propelled gun, presumably "scuttled" by the enemy. An attack on Foiano was immediately prepared and the Germans, flanked by the South Africans from the west and threatened by the 4th Division from the south, abandoned the town which was in allied hands by 1300hrs.437 On 3 July, 56th Reconnaissance Regiment advanced into the city of Cortona without opposition 438 It would be their last act before the 78th Division was completely withdrawn from the front and began the journey to Termoli to disembark for Egypt. The battle had taken its toll on the rifle companies of the XIII Corps. In the last two weeks of June 11 Brigade took 257 casualties, and 38 Brigade 621.439 The 6th 435 12 Brigade Information Summary No. 45, July 1944. 436 1CAB W.D.,2 July 1944. 437 The South African's had been held up at Montepulciano until 30 June. Ray, 150. 438 7 8,h Division W.D., 3 July 1944. 43g Jackson, Victory in the Mediterranean, Vol. VI, part 2, p.45. 145 Inniskilling Regiment were disbanded and absorbed into the 2nd lnniskilling Regiment and the 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers ended the battle under command of its adjutant, as all of its field officers had been killed. Horsfall's 2nd London Irish Regiment had company strengths on 26 June which averaged thirty-two men.440 In a letter of 28 June Horsfall mentions a farewell party held with the 11th Canadian Armoured Regiment. Tonight we are having a farewell party with Douglas Mclndoe, my squadron commander - and all his merry men. Like all their type, any show with them is a pleasure. They are... fearless. Our chaps couldn't fail to go when set the example these chaps set. One of them, when things were at their worst, got out of his tank with a bottle of vino to resuscitate one of our platoons who were taking it heavily. Their padre and [medical officer] were also to be seen walking among our chaps, always in the most unhealthy places. The regiment has got in to all the papers as a result of our last.. .our boys' tails are higher than they have ever been for this has been more of a man to man nature than anything previous...the results were...conclusive. Such conclusive results had not, however, been achieved without a paying a high price in Allied blood. The Battle of Lake Trasimene closed off a period of two months of heavy combat for the XIII Corps.441 Casualty figures for the 20-30 June period are more difficult to determine. One Canadian Military Headquarters report states armoured casualties in Italy for June as having been eight officers, forty-five other ranks killed, thirteen officers and 144 other ranks wounded.442 For the 78th and 4th British Divisions an incomplete tally reaches 1073 total casualties.443 4411 Of German losses the author claims to have "captured over three hundred and buried nearly as many." Horsfall, 181. 441 The DDMS medical report for the period states casualties from the 11 May to the 30th June as totalling 635 officers and 8525 other ranks. For 1CAB the rates were thirty-two officers and 182 other ranks. The 4th Division suffered the heaviest losing 192 officers and 2943 other ranks. The 78th Division lost 134 officers and 1978 other ranks. The devastation that such figures mean to the fighting efficiency of the rifle companies is self-explanatory. Quarterly Report by DDMS 13 Corps, I April 1944 to 30 June 1944. 442 As the 5th Canadian Armoured Division was pulled into reserve at the end of May, these figures are representative of 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade's operations in the month of June. Canadian Military Headquarters, "Casualties Canadian Army Overseas", 22/Casualty/l, 12 July 1944. 443 This count is from casualty returns in the war diaries and is shown in Appendix 2. 146 The Germans had fought tenaciously for their hold on the Trasimene line, taking heavy losses due to Hitler's insistence on clinging to this terrain. Exact for specific units remain unknown, but an idea of the heavy losses may be drawn from the data available. The XIII Corps took 590 men and twelve officers prisoner between 20-30 June.444 Casualties for the entire Tenth German Army between 20-30 June were listed as 2854 men.445 As the X British Corps and the Poles on the Adriatic were largely holding during this period a vast majority of these casualties were inflicted by the XIII British Corps. Between 1-26 June the Tenth German Army had received 7765 men and an additional 3365 soldiers were said to be en route to the army. Despite these numbers, there was said to be no reserves available, and a great number of divisions were no stronger than a reinforced regiment. On 1 July the fighting strength of 1 Parachute Division was 1530 men while the 334th Infantry Division was evaluated at 1750 soldiers. While German broadcasts that proclaimed victory in a "complete defensive battle" approach the farcical, there is some truth in the statement that the Heidrich's 1st Parachute Division and Boelke's 334th Division "distinguished themselves by their bravery and steadfastness."446 An intelligence report of the 78th Division seems to reinforce the suggestion of the British official historian that the threat of envelopment from the French to the XIII Corps' left caused the Germans to withdraw from Castiglione del Lago without a fight.447 The summary states that, "events further west, where threats to both Leghorn 444 XIII Corps Intelligence Summaries, XIII Corps W.D.20-30 June. 445 Historical Section (G.S.) Army Headquarters, "THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN (From the Fall of Rome to the Evacuation of Florence (4 Jun-lOAug 44)", Report No. 24,31 March 1949,55,61, 110. 446 "Eighth Army P.W.B. Monitoring Report No. 131", 1CAB W.D., June Appendix, June 28-June 29 1944. 447 78lh Division Intelligence Summary No. 195, 30 June 1944. 147 and Siena have been developing, no doubt caused the enemy to pull out of Castiglione Del Lago the night before last. Although our left neighbours had continued their advance and were threatening the Castiglione - Casamaggiore lateral there appeared to be no immediate threat to the enemy's positions on the lake." As the official historian put it, XIII Corps' "success in forcing its way through the Albert Line west of Lake Trasimeno cannot be ascribed entirely to its own efforts. As we have seen AOK 14 was in dire straits in the last few days of June and had been forced back to the Cenina River by 4th US Corps and to the gates of Siena by the French."448 While this interpretation of the events of late June seems to still hold, the casualties inflicted on the Germans while hammering through the Umbrian hills should not be underplayed. This was the real goal of the Mediterranean strategy, and the steady flow of reinforcements into the Tenth Germany Army prove its value. 448 Jackson, Victory in the Mediterranean, Vol. VI, part 2, p.45. 148 CHAPTER SEVEN: Conclusion The 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade's participation in the Battle of Lake Trasimene defies easy categorization as victory or tragedy. On a grand strategic level, the operation fulfilled the Allied stratagem of holding the Germans in the Italian peninsula and forcing them to deploy reinforcements that otherwise could have been committed to counter the Normandy invasion or Russian advances on the Eastern Front. Heavy casualties in both the Anglo-Canadian and German divisions show that the price paid for this strategy was high. As such, the battle is a microcosm of the Italian campaign. The commitment of the troops of the XIII Corps to fighting the Germans in their chosen defensive positions resulted in long rows of commonwealth gravestones in the Assisi and Orvieto cemeteries. While casualty figures are not exact, the Germans are suspected to have lost more than double the roughly 1100 casualties in the 4th and 78th Divisions. At the operational level of command, the Battle of Lake Trasimene shows the problems inherent in the Italian environment which hampered true operational manoeuvre. Mechanization was at once the problem and solution to mobility on the Second World War battlefield. Divisions relied on thousands of wheeled vehicles to grant them the logistic push necessary in a form of modern warfare which involved such a variety of materiel. As had been proven in the pursuit phase, German demolitions and rearguards seriously delayed the advancing Allied Armies Italy. The rains which began on 17 June had turned the roads into quagmires, and Sidney Kirkman's XIII Corps experienced delays in bringing reserve brigades into the line, and artillery regiments and their ammunition to bear. 149 The current study has the most to offer on the tactical level. Historian's derision of the Allied infantry-tank concept should be tempered with the evidence here, which shows the efficiency of the Sherman tank in providing close-support to the infantry. The problems of tank-infantry communication continued to linger, however, and on several occasions the tanks and infantry were separated, halting the advance and incurring casualties in both arms. The large numbers of reinforcements recently absorbed in Dudley Ward's 4th Division are in part responsible for this separation, yet the inherent difficulties of communication between foot soldiers and tank commanders is also to blame. The Sherman tank proved its worth in the Battle of Lake Trasimene, blasting the infantry onto their objectives over ridges and through the Umbrian villages. On several occasions Panther tanks were destroyed by Sherman gunfire, showing the hyperbole regarding the invincibility of German armour often found in popular accounts of the Second World War to be a myth. While accounts of armoured piercing shells bouncing off Panther turrets remind us that it is important not to swing the revisionist pendulum too far in the Sherman's favour, the technological determinism found in many histories should be tempered with successful engagements such as Sullivan's No. 3 Troop at Pescia. While the quantity of tanks taken out by 1CAB pales in comparison to figures of destruction on the Eastern Front, it should be kept in mind that at one point during June Kesselring could only report 159 serviceable tanks of a total 319.449 Moreover, the Sherman's value in street fighting was duly proven in Sanfatucchio by the Ontarios. With an increasing number of German hand-held anti-tank weapons and an impressive 44l) F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, Vol. 3, Part II (London: HMSO 1988), 309. 150 array of anti-tank assets, the troopers of 1 CAB were pitted against a defensive system which was largely designed to nullify the effect of their arm. In terms of combat motivation, the battle shows that despite a Second World War historiography which cites a lack of aggression in the Anglo-Canadian tank arm, troopers of 1CAB showed the exact opposite behaviour on the battlefield. On numerous occasions the tankers were aggressive to a fault, courageously risking their own lives in driving on to their objectives. Captain Grant and Lieutenant Farrow's action at Casamaggiore ridge prove that Allied tank-men would drive to their objectives through a hail of armoured-piercing rounds with little regard for their own lives. While Allied artillery has been cited by numerous critics as ponderous and inflexible, the battle also shows that by June 1944 the barrage system had been effectively combined with concentrations on call by forward observers. Numerous concentrations were used to fend off German counter-attacks, and the artillery was proven an effective member of the all-arms team. Artillery in the Lake Trasimene battle was used both to suppress entrenched enemy while the infantry closed on their defences and to outright destroy enemy armoured vehicles and infantry caught in the open. Despite a shortage of artillery rounds due to the strained logistic system, the artillery provided a flexible and deadly source of firepower. The divisional support battalions with their Vickers machine-guns and 4.2" mortars are shown to be another source of firepower which were deployed aggressively. The hand to hand fighting in Pucciarelli is a testament to their forward deployment, and the weight of firepower that they harnessed was used to consolidate numerous objectives successfully and break up enemy forming up for counterattacks. 151 Beyond filling an important historiographical gap in Canadian military history, the Battle of Lake Trasimene therefore offers a corrective to the notion that the Anglo- Canadian war machine was inflexible and ill-conceived. Certainly the battle was not an overwhelming success; the numerous dead on both sides of the conflict belay this interpretation. Yet, in the destruction of men and material of the CXXV1 Panzer Corps, the Italian containment strategy was effectively prosecuted. The role of the I Canadian Armoured Brigade in this strategic victory was one which cost a great number of trooper's lives, yet these were not sacrificed needlessly due to poor equipment, ineffective strategy or misguided doctrine. The Battle of Lake Trasimene shows the necessity of armour in the infantry support role and its vital addition of direct firepower to the all-arms team in a campaign which is renowned for being poor country for tanks. The battle for the Canadian tankers, however, is not a story of unmitigated success. Co-operation with the infantry at times broke down with deadly consequences. The battle offers an important example of the difficulties of communication and cooperation inherent in the combined arms team. Ultimately it was the integration of all-arms which prosecuted the containment strategy of the Italian Campaign and the majority of actions in the Battle of Lake Trasimene show that the 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade was a vital part of the combined arms team. The strategic victory in Italy, which demanded a constant flow of German resources into the peninsula, was paid for in blood in engagements such as the Battle of Lake Trasimene in the summer of 1944. While fought many miles from Berlin, in a campaign belittled by historians as a mere sideshow, it is hoped that this thesis has proven that the Allied soldiers sacrifices were not in vain. 152 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ARCHIVAL SOURCES British National Archives, Kew, London "Army: Liaison Reports from 2, 5, 10 and 13 Corps. 1944 Feb.-Aug." Allied Military Government Liaison Officer XIII Corps to Headquarters Main Allied Military Government Eighth Army. 27 June 1944. WO 204/10085. Directorate of Tactical Investigation. 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"Rad's War: A Biographical Study of Sydney Valpy Radley-Walters From Mobilization to the End of the Normandy Campaign 1944," Masters Thesis, University of New Brunswick, 2001. 162 APPENDIX ONE: Selected XIII Corps Order of Battle and Command XIII Corps Lieutenant-General Sidney Kirkman XIII Corps Royal Artillery Brigadier H. Greene 4th British Division Major-General Dudley Ward 10 Infantry Brigade Brig. S.N. Shoosmith 1 st/6th Surrey Regiment Lieutenant-Colonel C.G.S. McAlester 2nd Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry Lt.Col. G.P.D. Musson 2nd Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Lt.Col. B.A. Burke 12 Infantry Brigade Brig. A.G.W. Heber-Percy 1st Queens Own Royal West Kent Lt.Col. H.P. Braithwaite 2nd Royal Fusiliers Lt.Col. C.A.L. Shipley 6th Royal Black Watch Lt.Col. B.J.F. Madden 28 Infantry Brigade Brig. C.A.M.D. Scott 2nd Kings Regiment Lt.Col W.V.H. Robins 2nd Somerset Light Infantry Lt.Col. McKechnie 2nd/4th Hampshire Regiment Lt.Col. Frank Mitchell Support Battalion 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers Lt. Col. F.H. Butterfield Reconnaissance Regiment 4th Reconnaissance Regiment Lt.Col P.G.C. Preston 78th British Division Maj.Gen. Charles Keightley 11 Infantry Brigade Brig. R.K. Arbuthnott 1 st East Surrey Regiment Lt.Col. Hunter 163 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers Regiment Lt.Col. J.A. Mackenzie 5th Northampton Regiment Lt.Col. R.F. Connelly 36 Infantry Brigade Brig. J.G. James 5th Royal East Kents (The Buffs) Lt.Col. Tuff 6th Royal West Kent Regiment Lt.Col R.A. Fyffe 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders Lt.Col. J. Taylor 38 (Irish) Infantry Brigade Brig. T.P.D. Scott 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers Regiment Lt.Col. J.W. Dunmill 2nd London Irish Rifles Regiment Lt.Col. J.H. Coldwell-Horsfall 6th Inniskilling Fusiliers Regiment Lt.Col. J. Kerr Support Battalion 1 st Kensington Regiment Lt.Col. B.L. Bryar Reconnaissance Regiment 56th Reconnaissance Regiment Lt.Col. K.G.F. Chavasse 6th South African Armoured Division Maj.Gen. W.H. Evered Poole. 9 British Armoured Brigade Brig. M.G. Roddick Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry Lt.Col S.L. Lloyd Royal Warwickshire Yeomanry Lt.Col G. Jackson 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade Brig. W.C. Murphy Ontario Regiment Lt.Col. R.L. Purves Three Rivers Regiment Lt.Col. F.L. Caron Calgary Regiment Lt.Col. C.A. Richardson 164 APPENDIX TWO: Selected XIII Corps Casualties, 20-30 June 1944. Division j Brigade Regiment Killed Wounded iMissing TotaljSum th i 4 Division 1 110 Brigade S ! 265 i 1st /6th East Surrey Regiment 7 25 | 32 ; 2nd Duke ofComwalTs Light Infa 23 130! 2nd Bedfordshire and Hertfordshi 13 103 12 Brigade >13 1SI Queens Own Royal West Kei 5 ? >5 | 6th Royal Black Watch 0 0 0 0 ' 2nd Royal Fusiliers j 8 ? >8: 28 Brigade >233 2nd Kings Regiment 12 112 2nd Somerset Light Infantry 13 >13 2nd/4,h Hampshire Regiment 20 74 14 108 Support 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers ? Recce 4th Recce 21 20 2 43 78th Divij ion 11 Brigade >1 10 151 East Surrey Regiment 6 >6 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers 13 49 62 5th N orthhamptons 11 42 36 Brigade >165 5,h Royal East Kents (Buffi) 7 >32 6lh Royal West Kents 12 87 8th Argylls 18 2 26 46 38 Brigade 223 Royal Irish Fusiliers 9 49 2nd London Irish Rifles 17 90 107 6th Inniskillings 10 47 10 67 Support Is' Kensingtons 10 23 33 Recce 56th Recce 1 19 20 1 Canadian^ rmoured Brigade >102 Ontario Regiment >7 >7 Three Rivers Regiment 17 76 94 Calgary Regiment 1 >1 9 British Arm)ured Brigade 36 Royal Wiltshires 28 28 Royal Warwickshires 6 2 8 Grand To tal Minimum 1243 165 CURRICULUM VITAE Candidate's Full Name: William John Pratt Institutions Attended: University of Victoria 2004-2008, Bachelor of Arts, Double Major, History, Philosophy. Conference Presentations: 2009 University of Maine/University of New Brunswick Graduate History Conference, University of New Brunswick, "The Experience of Armoured Warfare: 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade." 2010 21st Military History Colloquium, Laurier University, "1 Canadian Armoured Brigade and the Battle of Lake Trasimene, 20-29 June 1944."