1 Canadian Armoured Brigade and the Battle of Lake

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1 Canadian Armoured Brigade and the Battle of Lake 1 CANADIAN ARMOURED BRIGADE AND THE BATTLE OF LAKE TRASIMENE, 20-28 JUNE 1944 by William John Pratt Bachelor of Arts, University of Victoria, 2008 A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Masters of Arts in the Graduate Academic Unit of History Supervisor: Marc Milner, PhD, History Examining Board: David Charters, PhD, History Marc Milner, PhD, History Larry Wisniewski, PhD, Sociology This thesis is accepted by the Dean of Graduate Studies THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK May, 2010 © William Pratt, 2010 Library and Archives Bibliotheque et Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du 1+1 Branch Patrimoine de I'edition 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A0N4 Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Canada Canada Your file Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-87614-5 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-87614-5 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non­ L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library and permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par I'lnternet, preter, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans le loan, distrbute and sell theses monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, sur worldwide, for commercial or non­ support microforme, papier, electronique et/ou commercial purposes, in microform, autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats. The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in this et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. Ni thesis. Neither the thesis nor la these ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci substantial extracts from it may be ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement printed or otherwise reproduced reproduits sans son autorisation. without the author's permission. In compliance with the Canadian Conformement a la loi canadienne sur la Privacy Act some supporting forms protection de la vie privee, quelques may have been removed from this formulaires secondaires ont ete enleves de thesis. cette these. While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans in the document page count, their la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu removal does not represent any loss manquant. of content from the thesis. Canada ABSTRACT On 20-28 June 1944, the 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade, supporting the XIII British Corps, participated in the Battle of Lake Trasimene, north of Rome. This understudied event in the Italian Campaign defies established notions about the nature of the Second World War. Undertaken against entrenched enemy in rolling countryside, the battle reveals that Anglo-Canadian tank-infantry cooperation was the decisive factor on the battlefield. The troopers of the Ontario, Three Rivers, and Calgary Armoured Regiments were aggressive to a fault, providing direct firepower support and overcoming obstacles which would otherwise put the infantry to ground. Sherman tanks proved effective in the street-fighting role and destroyed several of the famous German Panther tanks. Ultimately the XIII Corps paid a high price to prosecute the Italian campaign's containment strategy. This study offers an examination of combined arms in success and failure, and situates armour as a vital component of the all-arms team. ii DEDICATION To the soldiers of the Ontario, Three Rivers and Calgary Armoured Regiments, who made the ultimate sacrifice, this work is humbly dedicated. May their efforts be understood and remembered. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would like to thank Lee Windsor for his guidance on this work. His encyclopaedic knowledge of the Italian campaign is the foundation of this thesis. Walking the ground on his 2009 battlefield tour was an experience I will never forget. Marc Milner was an excellent adviser and editor, and was always willing and able to turn a draft over with remarkable efficiency. Both Marc and Lee's friendly manner and lack of pretension are a part of the Gregg Centre way, and made for an enjoyable tenure at the University of New Brunswick. Brent Wilson and Valerie Gallant were the consistent denizens of the Centre. A chat with them all was always uplifting. My fellow graduate students at the University of New Brunswick provided a useful sounding board for ideas. Their comradeship was appreciated and will be missed. While these are too numerous to name, some may be singled out for the contribution to this thesis. Charley Eddy, a fellow Italian campaign enthusiast, commented on the prospectus and an early thesis proposal and was always keen to talk shop. Eric Greisinger critiqued the prospectus. It is my hope that his empathy for the common soldier affected this thesis. Joseph Zeller edited and reduced a leviathan draft. Jamie Horncastle, Scott Leslie, Iain O'Shea, and Joseph Zeller engaged in numerous discussion on warfare and history, and could commiserate when the writing got tough. Geoff Keelan and Christine Leppard kindly shared their own research. Christine directed me to Calgary Regiment archivist A1 Judson, who was a wealth of information. The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, the Security and Defence Forum, the Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society, and the University of New Brunswick provided appreciated financial support. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ii DEDICATION iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS v LIST OF FIGURES vii 1.0 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION: Missing from the Narrative: Towards a Complete Account of the Battle of Lake Trasimene 1 1.1 The Battle of Lake Trasimene and Official History 1 1.2 Armoured Development, 1916-1940 9 1.3 The Blitzkrieg Standard and Explanations for British Armoured Failings 14 2.0 CHAPTER TWO: Precursor to Trasimene: 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade's Training and Operations 18 2.1 Formation and Training of the 1 Canadian Army Tank Brigade.. 18 2.2 Operations from HUSKY to DIADEM 27 3.0 CHAPTER THREE: Grand Strategy and Pursuit, May-June 1944 41 3.1 Grand Strategy: Resource Management in a World War 41 3.2 Army Group Strategy: Pursuit from the Gustav to the Dora Line 43 3.3 German Consolidation: From the Dora to the Albert Line 53 4.0 CHAPTER FOUR: The Vicious Encounter Battle: Vaiano and Sanfatucchio 62 4.1 XIII Corps Approaches the Trasimene Line 62 4.2 Sanfatucchio Village 19-21 June: Close Support Shermans in Urban Operations 77 4.3 The Inniskillings Bite and Hold Pucciarelli, 21-22 June 91 4.4 Vaiano 23-24: The Nadir of Tank-Infantry Cooperation 99 5.0 CHAPTER FIVE: Through the Battle Outposts and Into the Main Defensive Line 24-27 June 1944 108 5.1 Panthers at Pescia 108 5.2 Across the River Pescia 24-25 June 115 5.3 4th Division Advances Through the Hilltop Villages 120 6.0 CHAPTER SIX: Breaking the Main Defensive Line 28 June 126 6.1 Sacrifice Beyond Casamaggiore 126 v 6.2Clearing the Hill Country and Pursuit, 29 June-3 July 136 7.0 CHAPTER SEVEN: Conclusion 149 8.0 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY. 153 9.0 APPENDIX ONE: Selected XIII Corps Order of Battle and Command 163 10.0 APPENDIX TWO: Selected XIII Corps Casualties 165 11.0 CURRICULUM VITAE vi LIST OF FIGURES I.0 FIGURE ONE: Canadians in Southern Italy 30 2.0 FIGURE TWO: Approach and Breakthrough, The Hitler Line 15-23 May 1944 45 3.0 FIGURE THREE: Advance From Rome 5-11 June 49 4.0 FIGURE FOUR: Pursuit From Dora to Albert Line 10-20 June 1944 55 5.0 FIGURE FIVE: XIII Corps' Front at the Trasimene Line 68 6.0 FIGURE SIX: No.l Operational Research Section Appreciation of Trasimene Defences 70 7.0 FIGURE SEVEN: The Battle of Lake Trasimeno 72 8.0 FIGURE EIGHT: 36 Brigade and Wiltshire's Centre Line 75 9.0 FIGURE NINE: Contemporary View From Villa Strada North-west to Vaiano 77 10.0 FIGURE TEN: Battle of Sanfatucchio 78 II.0 FIGURE ELEVEN: Contemporary View from Castiglione del Lago South to Sanfatucchio 81 12.0 FIGURE TWELVE: 'H' Company London Irish Rifles, 'B' Squadron Ontario Regiment 87 13.0 FIGURE THIRTEEN: German Prisoners in Sanfatucchio 21 June 89 14.0 FIGURE FOURTEEN: 6th Inniskillings advance through Pucciarelli with Ontario Regiment Sherman in Foreground 94 15.0 FIGURE FIFTEEN: Air Photo, Pescia Crossing Ill 16.0 FIGURE SIXTEEN: Vaiano to Casamaggiore 121 17.0 FIGURE SEVENTEEN-.The Trasimene Line 127 18.0 FIGURE EIGHTEEN: Casamaggiore 28 June 128 vii 19.0 FIGURE NINETEEN: Laviano to Petrignano viii CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION: Missing from the Narrative: Towards a Complete Account of the Battle of Lake Trasimene The Battle of Lake Trasimene and Official History The modern Battle of Lake Trasimene, where 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade (1CAB) fought in support of the 4th and 78th British Divisions, is a forgotten battle of the Italian campaign. This is unfortunate, because the battle demonstrated the importance of tank support and success in the all-arms team. An in-depth operational study of the Battle of Lake Trasimene is therefore long overdue. Moreover, a case-study of the XIII British Corps' use of this Canadian independent infantry-tank brigade provides an investigation of historically derided Allied tank-infantry cooperation. It offers a corrective to the dominant historical narrative which claims that Anglo-Canadian infantry-tank brigades were a flawed concept. The study shows that despite the rhetoric which claims that the mountainous Italian peninsula was not tank country, armour remained a vital component of the all-arms team, offering direct fire support to the infantry and allowing them to advance. A study of the operations of 1CAB during the Battle of the Trasimene Line addresses several overlapping historical narratives surrounding the battle: the Italian campaign proper; Canadian, British, and German Army history; and armoured operations in the Second World War.
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