Quarter 2021 rd Hegemony Issue 102, 3 102, Issue Reimagined Hydrocarbons and Force Integration in in Integration Force Military Power Resistance Operations
JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE ONE HUNDRED TWO, 3RD QUARTER 2021 Joint Force Quarterly Founded in 1993 • Vol. 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 https://ndupress.ndu.edu
GEN Mark A. Milley, USA, Publisher Lt Gen Michael T. Plehn, USAF, President, NDU
Editor in Chief Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D.
Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D.
Senior Editor and Director of Art John J. Church, D.M.A.
Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich
Copyeditor Andrea L. Connell
Book Review Editor Brett Swaney
Assistant Internet Publications Editor Jen Russell
Creative Director Marco Marchegiani, U.S. Government Publishing Office
Advisory Committee BrigGen Jay M. Bargeron, USMC/Marine Corps War College; RDML Shoshana S. Chatfield, USN/U.S. Naval War College; BG Joy L. Curriera, USA/Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy; Col Lee G. Gentile, Jr., USAF/Air Command and Staff College; Col Thomas J. Gordon, USMC/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Ambassador John Hoover/College of International Security Affairs; Cassandra C. Lewis, Ph.D./College of Information and Cyberspace; LTG Michael D. Lundy, USA/U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; MG Stephen J. Maranian, USA/U.S. Army War College; VADM Stuart B. Munsch, USN/The Joint Staff; LTG Andrew P. Poppas, USA/The Joint Staff; RDML Cedric E. Pringle, USN/National War College; Brig Gen Michael T. Rawls, USAF/Air War College; MajGen W.H. Seely III/Joint Forces Staff College
Editorial Board Richard K. Betts/Columbia University; Eliot A. Cohen/The Johns Hopkins University; Richard L. DiNardo/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Aaron L. Friedberg/Princeton University; Bryon Greenwald/Joint Forces Staff College; COL James E. Hayes, USA/National War College; Douglas N. Hime/Naval War College; Kathleen Mahoney-Norris/Air Command and Staff College; Bert B. Tussing/U.S. Army War College
Cover 2 images (top to bottom): Airman receives instruction while refueling E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System aircraft during mission supporting Combined Joint Task Force– Operation Inherent Resolve over U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, February 22, 2021 (U.S. Air Force/Trevor T. McBride); Recruits with Delta Company, 1st Recruit Training Battalion, complete obstacle course during Crucible, aboard Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, South Carolina, April 30, 2021 (U.S. Marine Corps/Samuel C. Fletcher); Soldier from Delta Company, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, conducts Turkish get-ups as part of Bronco Fitness Challenge, at F-Quad, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, March 24, 2021 (U.S. Army/Angelo Mejia) About the Cover In This Issue Soldiers from 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, receive training on vaccine Forum process from Federal Emergency 2 Executive Summary Management Agency officials at Wolstein Center in Cleveland, 4 Fighting as Intended: The Case March 14, 2021, providing for Austere Communications continued, flexible Department By Scott Pence of Defense support to whole-of- government response to COVID-19 14 Improving the Battle pandemic (U.S. Army/Robert Rhythm to Operate at the O’Steen) Speed of Relevance By Matthew Prescott 20 Military Power Reimagined: The Rise and Future of Shaping Recall Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National By Kyle J. Wolfley Defense University Press for the Chairman of the 90 Force Integration in Resistance Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the Chairman’s flagship joint military and security studies journal designed to Operations: Dutch Jedburghs inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and JPME Today and U.S. Alamo Scouts other partners on joint and integrated operations; 29 Hydrocarbons and Hegemony national security policy and strategy; efforts to combat By Kevin D. Stringer terrorism; homeland security; and developments in By Anand Toprani training and joint professional military education to transform America’s military and security apparatus 37 Linking Foreign Language Book Reviews to meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting freedom today. All published articles have been vetted Capabilities with Expeditionary 96 Cult of the Irrelevant through a peer-review process and cleared by the Requirements Reviewed by Paula G. Thornhill Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review. By Douglas J. Robb, Brian H. NDU Press is the National Defense University’s Neese, and Cara Aghajanian 97 Gods of War cross-component, professional military and academic Reviewed by Jon Mikolashek publishing house. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations Commentary expressed or implied within are those of the 98 An Open World contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views 45 A Lesson from an Ancient: Reviewed by Christopher P. Mulder of the Department of Defense or any other agency of Facilitating Retreat and the Federal Government. Desertion Among Insurgencies 99 Net Assessment and Copyright Notice Military Strategy This is the official U.S. Department of Defense edition By Joseph N. Rudolphi of Joint Force Quarterly. Any copyrighted portions Reviewed by Frank Hoffman of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted without permission of the copyright proprietors. JFQ Features should be acknowledged whenever material is quoted from or based on its content. 51 Deconflicting Exercises and Submissions and Communications Experimentation Under JFQ welcomes submission of scholarly, independent Global Integration research from members of the Armed Forces, security policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, By Francis J.H. Park academic specialists, and civilians from the United States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration 58 Thrust and Agility from Trust to ScholarOne, available at https://mc04. and Antifragility: A Combatant’s manuscriptcentral.com/ndupress, or write to: Editor, Joint Force Quarterly Guide to Expeditionary NDU Press Medical Leadership 300 Fifth Avenue (Building 62, Suite 212) By James A. Chambers Fort Lesley J. McNair Washington, DC 20319 67 Avoiding Great Power Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 Email: [email protected] Phony Wars JFQ online: ndupress.ndu.edu/jfq By Brent D. Sadler 3rd Quarter, July 2021 ISSN 1070-0692 79 Cyber Threats and Vulnerabilities to Conventional and Strategic Deterrence By Mark Montgomery and Erica Borghard Logistics Specialist (Submarine) 1st Class Anna Donelan, assigned to Gold crew of Ohio-class guided- missile submarine USS Ohio, scans for contacts while standing lookout watch on bridge, Pacific Ocean, January 22, 2021 (U.S. Navy/Kelsey J. Hockenberger)
Executive Summary
n many parts of joint warfighting, scan to find an objective view? I often those experiences. As the car commercial getting the right situational aware- turn to the sources that seem the most caveats used to say, your mileage may I ness (SA) is essential to success, credible, and that judgment is based on vary. I will say the events of the past few especially to those of us in a position my belief that I have a fairly well-devel- years have sharpened my critical thinking of military or civilian leadership. I oped set of critical thinking skills. But in ways that I find essential to my mental must admit to a lack of SA in recent still, I wonder, what am I missing? It health, especially with the way social years as I, like many, have been drawn seems that this questioning of my own media tends to “push our collective into an information cycle centered view of the world is healthy, based on buttons” emotionally. And that issue of around less-traditional media sources. my conversations with experts in this trying to keep my objective mind as sep- Because I live and work in the Nation’s field. Plus, the old-school habit of good arate as possible from my emotions I find capital area, I fully accept that I live in leadership—of “leading by walking increasingly challenging in today’s world, a “bubble,” where I may not have an around”—has been nearly impossible where seemingly the collective “truths we accurate picture of events. But in recent for many during the pandemic. hold self-evident” are under assault. years, with the rise of social media plat- As a retired officer who served in the What Department of Defense leaders forms—including active disinformation Cold War period, before and after Desert in recent months have made clear is campaigns, both foreign and domes- Storm, in the Kosovo air campaign, and their focus on getting the joint force’s tic—getting and keeping good SA is in Afghanistan mid-war circa 2008, my attention on a range of issues that causes increasingly difficult. Where does one view of things is certainly shaped by concern about whether those in service
2 Forum / Executive Summary JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 to our nation are fully committed to sup- to communications vulnerabilities, Borghard’s article relating cyber issues to porting and defending the Constitution. Matthew Prescott has a number of solid strategic deterrence very timely. As events on January 6, 2021, seem suggestions on improvements to the joint Rounding out this issue in Recall, to show, some Americans have a very force’s battle rhythm that drives deci- another JFQ alumnus, Kevin Stringer, different interpretation of how our sionmaking and force operations. Seeing takes us back to World War II to relate government should work than what was opportunities to update how the joint Dutch and U.S. military support to local considered the “norm” in the past. And force influences potential conflict devel- resistance movements to see what we those serving in the military need to have opment, Kyle Wolfley believes shaping might find useful today and beyond. Plus, a clear understanding of their relationship operations as critical to success. you will find four engaging book reviews to the Constitution, the chain of com- JPME Today first offers you an and the Joint Doctrine Update to further mand, and the people they serve both in article by Anand Toprani, a longtime engage your thinking about the chal- and outside of the military. The moment CJCS and SECDEF Essay Competition lenges today and ahead. As always, we that becomes unclear in the mind of an judge and Naval War College professor, look forward to hearing from you about oath-sworn person (military, civilian, any who examines the relationship between what you think we need to do in the years rank), then bad things happen. If you state power and the resources that fuel ahead. JFQ have served long enough, you have seen our machines. For years, the Defense what unacceptable behavior looks like. Department has tried to stress the need William T. Eliason The question, often asked repeatedly, is for expanded language capabilities across Editor in Chief “what might you do to stop it?” And yes, the joint force. Our medical forces team any problem with good order and disci- of Douglas Robb, Brian Neese, and Cara pline is everyone’s problem. Aghajanian shows us how their partners The joint force not only reflects have worked hard to solve the perennial the society it comes from and serves, deficient between language requirements but it must also demonstrate a certain and capabilities. discipline that honors the rule of law Our Commentary section focuses on and the norms of behavior necessary to another place not necessarily in the mid- control the awesome power our military dle of the Great Power competition ring. is charged with. To allow any kind of Forcing us to look back to the ancients, behavior outside the norm results in Joseph Rudolphi suggests we can find events that we all can identify as immoral much to consider in how we might ap- and detrimental to the mission of the proach the concept of enemy retreat and joint force, from assaults and violent desertion in the future. crimes in the barracks and on our bases We have a wide range of topics in our throughout the world to criminal acts Features section this issue that I think on the battlefield. How those of us in you will find interesting. Looking to the positions of leadership—from the tactical recent shift in global joint integration, to the Secretary—respond, starting with Francis Park offers suggestions on how increasing our situational awareness of to maximize the positive results from ex- these problems and our collective respon- ercises and experimentation. Continuing sibilities to appropriately deal with them, our discussions on the medical side of is what will show whether we deserve to the joint force, James Chambers lays out be called to serve as leaders. That is my some important concepts for successful take. Please let us know what you think. leadership in the increasingly expedition- This issue’s Forum offers three arti- ary world of military medicine. Brent cles to help you explore and rediscover Sadler, a returning alumnus of JFQ, the dimensions of conflict today. When draws on history to write us a cautionary was the last time you worried about your piece to help identify avoidable con- communication links being jammed by frontations, and with the Taiwan Straits the enemy—or experienced it? Scott increasingly in our collective focus, Brent Pence suggests that the joint force needs is on to something important. Recent to organize, train, and equip for oper- remarks by Secretary of Defense Lloyd ating in a more contested environment, J. Austin III and others on updating our where taking modern communications views on integrating older strategies and for granted makes warfighters vulnerable theories into the current environment both physically and mentally. Related make Mark Montgomery and Erica
JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Eliason 3 U.S. Marine with Marine Air Control Squadron 1, Marine Air Control Group 38, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, assembles communication device during Exercise Summer Fury 20, at Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, California, July 31, 2020 (U.S. Marine Corps/Juan Anaya)
Fighting as Intended The Case for Austere Communications
By Scott Pence
It is a law of war: The greater the dependency on a capability, the higher the payoff to an enemy who can lessen its utility, in effect turning our strength into a weakness.
—Colin Gray
odern command and control In a conflict, adversaries can distort U.S. joint vulnerability and offers rec- (C2) systems depend on con- the reliability of data and degrade ommendations to reduce risk. M nectivity to collect information, U.S. technological dominance. If they The current suite of digital com- issue orders, detect changes in the envi- succeed in causing degraded operations, munications is more advanced and ronment, and exploit successes. While adversaries gain a temporary window connected than ever before. Investments the United States focused on counter- of superiority that they can develop in network-centric warfare ballooned to insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, into a permanent relative advantage.1 the point that all echelons of war, from competitors invested in technologies This article offers an overview of threat squad to corps, now possess C2 systems that can neutralize that connectivity. capabilities juxtaposed with current inextricably tied to the space satellite infrastructure and its associated electro- magnetic spectrum (EMS) linkages. U.S. C2 systems expedite lethal fire missions Colonel Scott Pence, USA, is a Military Faculty Member in the School of Advanced Military Studies at from ground, maritime, and air assets; the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
4 Forum / The Case for Austere Communications JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 enable communications with subor- “non-contact” warfare. They were Our adversaries’ progress in space dinates to adjust plans and reallocate concerned with the effectiveness of U.S. technology not only threatens the space resources; and integrate intelligence from operations in the Gulf War and later in environment and our space assets but could unlimited sources. Serbia: “These wars confirmed [our] [also] potentially deny us an advantage The use of these systems in permissive hypotheses regarding where we were if we lose space superiority. . . . Ground communications environments obscured heading. . . . [The United States] and segment assets such as C2 facilities are vul- their inherent fragility. The 1991 Gulf several NATO [North Atlantic Treaty nerable to physical attack and cyberspace War highlighted a position of information Organization] countries are moving to a attack. The space segment may be vulnera- dominance. When Baghdad fell in 2003 new generation of warfare, the remote, ble to attacks from [antisatellite] weapons, after merely 3 weeks, the commander non-contact generation. . . . Those are exoatmospheric nuclear detonations, of Coalition Forces, General Tommy the types of wars for which Russia must directed energy weapons, and interference Franks, noted, “The experience was prepare.”7 Gareev and Slipchenko’s from laser blinding.11 nothing short of religious. I’ve died and book, Future War, foreshadowed a gone to heaven and seen the first bit of series of reforms to counter advanced These statements and documents are network-centric warfare at work!”2 For Western technological capabilities. representative of the consensus among a generation, no conventional enemy or Since then, Russia has invested in security professionals that current global violent extremist organization contested cyber warfare, electronic warfare (EW), competitors possess potent antispace U.S. dominance in EMS or threatened disinformation campaigns, and the syn- capabilities. the tenuous links to space. Decades of chronization of each with the others to A direct ascent antisatellite missile, experience in permissive communications create lethal strikes. like the one China tested against its own environments lulled leaders into thinking Chinese doctrine, meanwhile, satellite in 2007, is a possible measure; perfect situational awareness is a reason- describes information warfare (a however, the impact and concomitant able expectation. It is not. Fog, friction, combination of electronic warfare and debris would have adverse impacts on all and uncertainty are intractable features cyberspace operations) as the preeminent countries with space assets.12 More than a of armed conflict.3 At the March 2021 form of warfare and explicitly focuses decade after China’s antisatellite weapon Future of Defense Summit, Air Force on neutralizing U.S. C2 systems. The test, approximately 3,000 pieces of debris Chief of Staff General Charles Brown 2013 strategy document of the Chinese remain in space. Satellite operators, there- noted, “You can either have information People’s Liberation Army (PLA) stated: fore, have to conduct collision-avoidance overload or information that is not nec- maneuvers any time the orbits transit essarily clear, or it could be deceptive.”4 The side holding network warfare superi- that debris field. Besides creating space An overflow of information is indeed a ority can adopt network warfare to cause debris, any action that physically destroys challenge for today’s commanders. dysfunction in the adversary’s command a satellite alerts U.S. Strategic Command Current C2 systems depend on mul- system, loss of control over his operational because satellites perform an important tiple linkages, and each one is susceptible forces and activities, and incapacitation or missile detection function, so physical to enemy disruption. Linkages include failure of weapons and equipment—and destruction poses serious escalation risks the physical network layer (satellites, ca- thus seize the initiative within military to adversaries. Therefore, kinetic satellite bles, radio frequencies, routers, switches, confrontation, and create the conditions destruction carries high costs for states and computers), the logical network layer for . . . gaining ultimate victory in war.8 that depend on the global economy. For (Web sites and logical programming in rogue states or certain nonstate actors, cyberspace), and the cyber-persona layer A 2015 RAND study reported that however, catastrophic global disruption (the digital representation of an individ- the aim of PLA cyber war “is to create could be the objective. ual or entity, email addresses, Internet information superiority on the traditional A much more likely method to deny protocol addresses, and mobile device battlefield by controlling the flow of in- U.S. network advantages is an electro- numbers).5 Even among the highly digital formation available to the enemy.”9 magnetic attack to jam, monitor, or joint force, the Army depends on space deceive satellite signals. Both Russia and capabilities more than any other Service.6 Antispace China optimized their EW enterprise for Therefore, if an enemy force could deny In 2016, Lieutenant General David monitoring, jamming, and deceiving U.S. the reliability and effectiveness of the Buck, the commander of 14th Air Force, space-reliant devices.13 Space capabilities systems, the disruption would dispropor- stated, “There isn’t a single aspect depend on the space segment, link seg- tionally affect Army forces. of our space architecture that isn’t at ment, and ground segment. Of the three, risk.”10 At the time, 14th Air Force was the link and ground segments are most Known Competitor Capabilities the Service component of U.S. Strategic vulnerable to EW assets. In 2005, Russian military theorists Command for space operations. Pub- Meanwhile, natural events could Makhmut Gareev and Vladimir Slip- lished in 2018, Joint Publication 3-14, nullify modern C2 systems without chenko wrote about the dangers of Space Operations, notes: human involvement. Space infrastructure
JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Pence 5 depends on inherently fragile links in speak on a radio or any device that’s not inherent security design flaws. A single an unforgiving environment, and peri- secure because it’s going to be jammed experienced hacker can neutralize an odic geomagnetic storms can disrupt a or intercepted or worse. It’s going to be entire network. Effects generated in the wide range of electronic devices. The found, and then it’s going to be hit.”18 cyberspace domain can have significant Carrington Event of 1859 was a geo- The 2016 book The Russian Way of War impacts on the physical domains. These magnetic storm that caused telegraph catalogs the proliferation of Russian EW vulnerabilities require continuous and communications around the world to organizations, increasing in sophistication active risk reduction measures.22 fail. Telegraph operators reported sparks from platoon to brigade levels.19 These Russia’s 2007 cyber attack on discharging from telegraph machines, EW capabilities have the potential to have Estonia demonstrated a single-domain shocking the operators, and setting fire to cross-domain effects, influencing ground, attack on a sovereign state’s cyberspace. nearby paper. A 2008 National Research air, maritime, space, and cyberspace The attack incorporated a distributed Council report noted that a similar event operations. denial-of-service attack and debilitated would disable power grids, satellites, and On the highest end of threats to the government offices, schools, banks, and the Global Positioning System (GPS)— EMS is a nuclear high-altitude electro- hospitals. Since this attack, cyberspace and cost over $1 trillion.14 Whether by magnetic pulse (HEMP). Each nuclear attacks in Georgia, Ukraine, and even human intent or by celestial accident, power has the capability to utilize a the 2016 U.S. Presidential election have current mission command capabilities HEMP to disrupt all advanced elec- been attributed to Russian hackers.23 could be denied.15 tronic devices within a variable radius. These hackers launched a cyber attack For obvious reasons, HEMPs have not on Ukrainian naval headquarters just Electronic Warfare been extensively tested and much of the prior to the 2018 Kerch Strait incident Russia’s 2008 incursion into Georgia literature is classified. What is known (the seizure of Ukrainian ships on the combined cyber warfare with air and from Cold War experiments in the 1960s Sea of Azov). This synchronization of ground maneuver. In the aftermath is that any electronic devices exposed state-sponsored entities and military of the Russo-Georgian conflict, the become vulnerable to a burst of gamma planning shows the cyber capabilities that Russian Federation invested in new EW and X-rays that cause instant damage.20 the Russian Federation can employ in any systems and adapted doctrine, organiza- When detonated over a city, the collat- military conflict.24 tions, materiel, and training. The result eral damage to the food supply, power China possesses an array of tactical is a highly capable force integrated into generation, and water access would be cyberspace capabilities. Recent military Russian ground forces and equipped devastating. If detonated over a remote reforms integrated China’s space, EW, with the latest electronic intelligence region, however, a HEMP could deny and cyber forces, uniting them under a and jamming systems.16 electronics from facilitating C2 without single command and streamlining their Six years later, the 2014 Russian loss of life. This creates an incredible risk operations for maximum effectiveness. support to separatists in the Donbas re- to mission but limited risk to force, as the Chinese cyber operations are known for gion of Ukraine demonstrated the lethal HEMP destroys electronics but is of little industrial espionage, theft of intellectual synchronization of Russian disinforma- danger to humans. For this reason, the property, and breaches into classified U.S. tion, cyber warfare, space disruption, probability of a nuclear-armed power em- military networks. A 2013 report con- EMS dominance, and artillery. The ploying a HEMP in a remote operational firmed that Chinese military hackers were Russians pinpointed Ukrainian positions area is moderate because it could be seen involved in corporate cyber espionage.25 via the Borisoglebsk-2, a multipurpose as a reasonable, minimal casualty-produc- Thus, Chinese military cyber operations EW platform that geolocates, jams, ing action that could deescalate a conflict are actively practicing advanced skills in monitors, and even deceives radio and (or neutralize the C2 of Western forces cyberspace through illicit operations that GPS receivers. During the one-sided attempting a counteroffensive). The can be militarized in a period of armed Battle of Zelenopillya, Russian armed U.S. joint force, dependent on higher conflict.26 forces electronically geolocated the 79th end technology for C2, would find itself This cyber warfare capability, prac- Ukrainian Airmobile Brigade, confirmed blinded and deafened in the HEMP area ticed by Great Power competitors, can it optically with unmanned aerial systems, of operations. In response, the U.S. mil- be used in conjunction with antispace and destroyed two Ukrainian mechanized itary must consider C2 methods that are and EW capabilities to blind and deafen battalions within 30 minutes with a high either hardened to withstand the effects opponents during armed conflict. To volume of unguided rockets.17 of a HEMP or are inherently not reliant achieve communications denial, the The former commander of U.S. Army on the EMS.21 adversary can use all its tools at once Europe, Lieutenant General Benjamin or apply them sequentially until they Hodges, noted, “The [Russian] Cyber Warfare achieve the desired effect. An adversary electronic warfare capability—that’s The cyberspace domain is vulnerable can apply modest cyber warfare tools like something we never had to worry about due to ease of access, network and militarized ransomware, distributed de- in Afghanistan and Iraq. . . . You cannot software complexity, rogue users, and nial-of-service attacks, and other tools to
6 Forum / The Case for Austere Communications JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Falcon 9 rocket carrying SpaceX’s Starlink L23 payload launches from Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, Florida, April 7, 2021, propelling 60 Internet satellites into space (U.S. Air Force/James Hodgman)
JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Pence 7 High Road Maximum Resources
Troll Farm Fools Enemy Virus Infects Commander into U.S. Computers Committing Reserve
Satellite GPS Spoofed – Communications Leads Unit into Ambush U.S. Denies Monitored Rare Weather Deepfake Video Fools Communication to Disables Division Commander – Prevent Further Communications Thousands Lost Confusion
Low Road Minimum Resources Enemy Denies Rogue Actor Enemy Cuts Disables Undersea Cables Communication to Prevent Satellite U.S. Information Dominance Communications Communications Mass Jamming Disable Local Jammed (FM/GPS/Radio/Internet) Power Grid
Subsequent EMPs Destroy D.D.O.S. Attack Antisatellite Missiles EMP Launched – Destroys U.S. Redundant Systems on Network Destroy Overhead U.S. Technical Equipment Surveillance gain access to C2 systems via cyberspace, unreliable, inoperative, or immediately the advanced capabilities of near-peer then progress to unit radios through targetable by enemy destructive effects. competitors.29 online routing software. Then an adver- When operating in that environment, The figure visualizes the high like- sary could send viruses via cyberspace to the U.S. joint force would be vulnerable lihood of a CDOE and threats to the neutralize the connectivity to space assets. to tactical disinformation. Adversaries joint all-domain command and control Or an adversary could start with a HEMP can create a CDOE as an offensive (JADC2).30 An adversary can take the burst, judge the effects of electronic dam- measure in support of their conventional high road, which is expensive and re- age, and use cyberspace and antisatellite forces or as a defensive tool to stymie an source-heavy, and confuse U.S. forces tools to complete the communications advancing force. Adversary operations effectively enough that the United denial. A sequential method is the most will attack C2 systems in the cyberspace States decides to disable advanced com- logical because each additional action domain and the EMS concurrently munications to prevent being baited exposes ostensibly secret adversary capa- with attacks on links to space assets. into fratricide and civilian casualties. bilities. Alternatively, the adversary could Meanwhile, adversaries could employ Alternatively, the adversary can use less use all capabilities at once to maximize their well-honed social and news media expensive existing resources to destroy the odds of degrading an opponent’s disinformation campaigns against joint satellites and advanced equipment by ability to use C2 forces in any coherent force headquarters to embarrass and resorting to blunt force (antisatellite manner. The next section postulates how insert doubt into the international missiles, high-altitude electromagnetic this phenomenon might appear in a fu- narrative. This possibility is particularly pulses, and submarines cutting undersea ture conflict. salient in adversaries’ near-abroad, where cables). Meanwhile, the less likely possi- their antispace, electronic warfare, and bility of a rare weather effect or a rogue Blackout: The Communications- information warfare can synchronize actor could destroy space infrastructure at Denied Operational Environment their operations with nearby ground, any time, leaving relative advantage to the Competitor states with sophisticated maritime, and air units.28 side that is most prepared to operate with capabilities can create specific zones of None of this comes as a surprise to austere communication methods. communications denial. This militarized national security professionals; Russian blackout condition is a communica- and Chinese investments in niche capabil- The Challenges of tions-denied operational environment ities are well known and well published in Fighting Degraded (CDOE).27 It is an operational blackout professional journals and national media. For commanders and staffs accustomed that prevents C2 of military forces via Throughout the Department of Defense to accurate situational awareness, space, the EMS, or cyberspace. Within (DOD), there is widespread appreciation the sudden absence of space-enabled these zones, enemy forces could disrupt, of the current threat to modern C2 imagery, EMS-enabled unmanned deny, and deceive all communications systems. U.S. strategic documents high- aerial systems, and cyber-enabled pro- to the degree that the equipment is light the urgency of defending against cesses and communication can have a
8 Forum / The Case for Austere Communications JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Sailors conduct preflight checks on E-2C Hawkeye assigned to “Liberty Bells” of Airborne Command and Control Squadron 115 aboard aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt, January 30, 2021, Pacific Ocean (U.S. Navy/Zachary Wheeler) debilitative effect. Even if the staff had collection processes, analysis, processing, • continue investments in hardening anticipated communications denial and exploitation, and dissemination all require and countermeasures maintained accurate maps and tracking training, standard operating procedures, • adapt organizations to thrive in systems, the change from digital fire and organizations that can make sense of CDOEs missions, friendly force tracking, orders the reporting from multiple manned re- • diversify acquisitions with “low-tech” dissemination, and intelligence updates connaissance elements. This is a paradigm equipment. to an alternate system would fundamen- change from current operations. Manned Each of these options can be scaled, tally uproot the standard operating pro- reconnaissance, on the other hand, none is mutually exclusive from another, cedures of the headquarters. Given the depends on human reporting (verbal or and prioritization of one or more of best of circumstances and a well-trained written) and relies on the expertise (and them enhances readiness. organization, the changes require time cognitive biases) of the reconnaissance Continue Investments in Hardening to adjust, creating a window of oppor- scouts. Interpreting information from and Countermeasures. The fiscal year tunity for an adversary to exploit. human sources requires completely dif- 2020 DOD budget request contained Most concerning, information col- ferent information collection procedures, the most substantial investments in lection and target development are the reporting standards, and intelligence research and development request in 70 capabilities most at risk in a CDOE. collection matrices that, until trained and years, mainly focused on technology.32 While some fourth- and fifth-generation rehearsed, will not enable an accurate A few of these investments specifically aircraft retain capabilities in space-denied situational awareness of the operational address the vulnerable space, EMS, and conditions, U.S. ground headquarters environment. Fighting with degraded cyberspace capabilities of U.S. compet- depend mostly on assets that rely on systems, with current organizations that itors.33 DOD requested $1.1 billion to GPS and satellite communications lack manned reconnaissance and security reduce risk to satellite communications capabilities. Within a CDOE, manned forces at the division or corps level, invites jamming, $2.6 billion for cyber opera- ground and air reconnaissance forces operational surprise. tions training, and $5.4 billion to support are critical to observe named areas of cybersecurity capabilities.34 U.S. Army interest in support of information col- Recommendations Chief of Staff James McConville noted, lection plans. These forces currently do This article identifies three lines of “I think what we are trying to do with not exist as formations at the corps and effort to hedge the joint force against the Joint All-Domain Command and division levels.31 Meanwhile, information operational surprise:
JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Pence 9 Airman uses software to identify interference to specific satellite at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado, December 16, 2019 (U.S. Air Force/Jonathan Whitely)
Control approach is recognizing that matter of months.”36 During World War Therefore, any robust solution must be everything we do in the future, we are II, the British fitted rearward-looking able to withstand simple destruction by going to fight jointly.” JADC2 will allow radars to their bombers to warn that known adversary capabilities. the Army to “use all the sensors on the fighters were nearby. These saved lives Adapt Organizations to Thrive battlefield and get them using technol- initially, but then the Germans developed in CDOEs. In addition to continued ogy to get the information to the right a system that honed onto them and pin- investments in advanced technology, the shooter,” he further explained.35 These pointed the bombers at night. This made U.S. military could adapt specific units critical investments represent the U.S. the rearward-looking radars worse than to accomplish missions with systems that Government’s commitment to techno- useless; they were a direct danger if used. do not depend on space, the EMS, and logical dominance. Luttwak went on to explain, “As soon as cyberspace. Given known capabilities, In the absence of war, advanced C2 a significant innovation appears on the operations within the near-abroad of any systems might appear robust, but warfare scene, efforts will be made to circumvent current competitor present a significant exploits every vulnerability. In large-scale it—hence the virtue of . . . subopti- challenge with existing forces—their combat operations against near-peer mal but more resilient solutions.”37 antispace, EW, and cyberspace capabilities adversaries, every technological advance Investments in new and better technol- can neutralize U.S. C2 systems indefi- will be met with a countermeasure. ogy are necessary but cannot guarantee a nitely. Strategist Everett Dolman wrote, Military theorist Edward Luttwak noted relative advantage. “It is the height of folly for a commander that, paradoxically, the best counter to an Furthermore, technological in- to rely on a capacity that may or may not adversary’s strength is not to strengthen vestments are costly to create and to be available when needed.”38 Therefore, the same aspect of one’s own forces. He maintain. As anyone who has worked in remove the systems from specialized units noted, “In the ebb and flow of reciprocal the “blocks” section of a child daycare and man, train, and equip them for mis- development, the same device could be knows, it is much easier to destroy than sion accomplishment in CDOEs. highly effective when originally intro- to create or maintain. Systems depend- By adapting a portion of the joint duced, then totally useless, and finally ing on redundancy for risk mitigation force to operate without dependence positively dangerous, and all within a can be parried by repeated destruction. on known C2 vulnerabilities, DOD
10 Forum / The Case for Austere Communications JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 could hedge against a likely operational capabilities.41 In this way, less connected networks with military devices, can pro- environment—one in which modern forces facilitate the entry of the most con- vide encrypted communications without communications are denied in whole or nected forces to positions of advantage. betraying locational data.42 A CDOE- in part. And these forces, optimized for Diversify Acquisitions with “Low- optimized force could use a mixture of operations within an enemy’s antiaccess/ Tech” Equipment. Eliminating the austere and modern advanced systems to area-denial (A2/AD) area, could accom- reliance on space, the EMS, and cyber accomplish missions and provide hetero- plish missions that set conditions for joint does not mean the United States needs geneous capabilities to the joint force. all domain operations.39 to revert to telegraphs and smoke signals When it comes to partner-nation To resolve current shortfalls, orga- for communication. Diverse equipment interoperability, low-tech can result in nizational adaptations should reduce increases the dilemmas a potential adver- big gains. The U.S. joint force, with features with known vulnerabilities sary must address. While it is convenient its highly specialized communications (space, EMS, and cyber-reliant C2 for acquisitions and budget professionals platforms, struggles to communicate systems) and add features that would to populate units with like equipment, a with international partners. Both the enhance operations in a CDOE. Changes homogenous force also enables the threat European and Indo-Pacific combatant should retain (or improve) lethality and to focus on a predictable set of targets. commands list interoperability as a critical maneuverability while reducing the Considerations for material de- challenge to overcome with partnered electromagnetic signature of the orga- cisions include legacy equipment, units. In Europe, NATO standards allow nization. An increase in headquarters complementary equipment, alternative communications across cyber channels personnel for battle tracking and courier technology, and dual-use acquisition and along the EMS. However, few na- operations, for example, could be paired mandates. Legacy equipment includes tions have advanced compatible systems with the reduction in computer network materiel solutions that no longer reside that can communicate with those of the personnel. With a focus on enhancing in U.S. military inventories. Units need United States. The scale of challenges capability and reducing exposure, leaders communication wire, fiber optic cable, increases every time the United States could optimize a unit capable of sustained and tactical phones to communicate issues more advanced technology to its mission accomplishment within a CDOE. in assembly areas without transmitting forces. By diversifying C2 technology This is not as simple as just taking the over the EMS. Manual signal operating with less advanced systems, the capacity vulnerable C2 systems out of formations; instruction systems enable operational, for interoperability increases. the manning, training, and equipment secure message exchanges. Light mobility Positive developments exist in every all require integration. The Army’s mul- vehicles, rugged 4x4s, and militarized Service, as leaders reconsider the tactics, tidomain concept requires “formations motorcycles can allow effective courier techniques, and procedures that worked that have systems, leaders, and Soldiers operations for mission orders and infor- in a period of information dominance that are durable, can operate in a highly mation management. but are uncertain in large-scale combat contested operational environment, can- Complementary equipment includes against a near-peer. The U.S. Air Force not easily be isolated from the rest of the advanced camouflage and decoy sys- Pacific’s plan for agile combat employ- joint force or from partners, and can con- tems. These capabilities are expensive ment innovations can provide multiple duct independent maneuver and employ to field to the entire force but would dilemmas to adversaries.43 The U.S. cross-domain fires.”40 A specialized force, add protection in a CDOE. Modern Naval Academy in 2016 reinstituted without vulnerable dependencies on sat- camouflage has varied thermal panels and celestial navigation into its navigation ellite, cyber, and the EMS, would begin location-specific color patterns that offer curriculum.44 And the U.S. Space Force preparations for the mission using austere advanced protection from observation deployed ground-based counter-satellite tools optimized for mission accomplish- by thermal and optical sights. Electronic communications stations in 2020.45 ment within CDOEs. Maneuvering with decoys and EMS-emitting devices that minimal EMS emissions, they would give false targets for adversaries to target Conclusion frustrate the enemy’s preferred methods enhance a unit’s protection plan. Modern Because operations in CDOEs are so of detection and approach the threat EMS-emitting decoys could broadcast likely, the joint force requires alternative systems that created the CDOE. The headquarters radio and satellite commu- means to gain access, accomplish mis- specialized force would use volumes of nications signals from a location separate sions, and enable all-domain operations firepower and maneuver to dis-integrate from actual forces, make one headquar- within them. As long as competitors the enemy’s A2/AD assets and deny ters look like many headquarters, or possess capabilities that can significantly the ability to sustain the CDOE. Once purposely broadcast deception narratives. affect joint operations, the joint force the operational blackout lifts, follow-on Alternative technologies could exploit has a responsibility to develop solutions forces with the latest and most efficient modern advancements while avoiding an to ensure the accomplishment of mis- suites of C2 systems would arrive to overreliance on space-, EMS-, and cyber- sions. And those innovative solutions consolidate gains and exploit success space-based systems. Integrated tactical need not always be new and better with the full convergence of joint force networks, which create pseudo-cellular technology.
JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Pence 11 Airman with 379th Expeditionary Operations Support Squadron Silent Sentry adjusts antenna to maximize signal strength from orbiting satellite, May 27, 2015, at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar (U.S. Air Force/Alexandre Montes)
news/2021/03/30/these-4-stars-want-help- This article contributes to the body professionals should recognize their commanders-avoid-information-overload-next- of work on avoiding defeat in the first hubristic biases toward technological war.html>. battle of the next war. The first battle of solutions. With forces capable of ac- 5 FM 3-12, Cyberspace and Electronic Savo Island, August 1942, was a tragic complishing missions as intended, not Warfare Operations (Washington, DC: failure. The U.S. Navy lost multiple ships degraded, in communications-denied Headquarters Department of the Army, 2017), 1-13–1-14. and over 1,000 Sailors. Historian Robert environments, the U.S. military gains a 6 FM 3-14, Army Space Operations Frank noted: strength, not a liability. JFQ (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2019), 1-1. The Navy was still obsessed with a strong 7 Makhmut Gareev and Vladimir feeling of technical and mental superiority Notes Slipchenko, Future War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, February over the enemy. In spite of ample evidence 1 Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations 2007), 13. of enemy capabilities, most of our officers 8 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department Shou Xiaosong, ed., The Science of rd and men despised the Japanese and felt of the Army, October 2017), 1–4. Military Strategy, 3 ed. (Beijing: Military themselves sure victors in all encounters 2 Office of Force Transformation,The Science Press, 2013), 189. 9 under any circumstances. The net result of Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare Eric Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the all this was a fatal lethargy of mind which Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017 (Santa induced a confidence without readiness.46 2005), 18. 3 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Monica, CA: RAND, 2015), 274. 10 and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret Jonathan Broder, “Why the Next Pearl Decades of technological superior- (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). Harbor Could Happen in Space,” Newsweek, 4 Matthew Cox and Oriana Pawlyk, “These May 4, 2016. ity biased our senior leaders with false 11 4-Stars Want to Help Commanders Avoid Joint Publication 3-14, Space Operations confidence in modern C2 systems. To (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, April 10, avoid accusations of a “fatal lethargy of Information Overload in the Next War,” Military.com, March 30, 2021, available 2018), I-7. 12 mind” on the next generation, military at 12 Forum / The Case for Austere Communications JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Weapon Test, RS22652 (Washington, DC: 25 APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber 44 Devin Arneson, “Charting a New Congressional Research Service, April 23, Espionage Units (Alexandria, VA: Mandiant Course: Celestial Navigation Returns to 2007); FM 3-14, 1-12. Corporation, February 13, 2013), 20, available USNA,” CHIPS, October 16, 2015, available 13 Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, at JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Pence 13 Antitank missile gunners with 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, fire Javelin missile while conducting live-fire combat rehearsal during Fuji Viper 21.3, at Combined Arms Training Center, Camp Fuji, Japan, April 12, 2021 (U.S. Marine Corps/Jonathan Willcox) Improving the Battle Rhythm to Operate at the Speed of Relevance By Matthew Prescott he art and science of decision- commands and their components in provide the commander with timely making begin with the establish- the U.S. Armed Forces and the North analysis and recommendations given T ment of an effective, efficient, Atlantic Treaty Organization increas- the speed and frequency of high-inten- and agile battle rhythm. Combat and ingly observe battle rhythms that do sity operations. This article is intended stability operations throughout the past not effectively provide the commander for the commander or staff officer who 20 years have enabled commanders and and subordinates with timely informa- has ever felt the pressure of a com- staffs to execute real-world operations tion to make decisions.1 Furthermore, pacted battle rhythm and is interested based on established battle rhythms. our current joint force battle rhythm in understanding why and how the Unfortunately, current operation- design involving numerous briefings, battle rhythm is designed to drive the al-level exercises to evaluate joint force working groups, and boards does not commander’s decisionmaking process. Personal observations from oper- ational-level exercises, best practice Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Prescott, USA, is a member of the Training Advisory Team at the North reports from the Joint Staff J7, and Atlantic Treaty Organization Joint Warfare Centre in Stavanger, Norway. lessons learned from the Joint Lessons 14 Forum / Operating at the Speed of Relevance JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Learned Information System reveal that commander’s ability to make timely, headquarters and one with subordinate many units enter exercises with fixed well-informed decisions and to execute and component commands providing battle rhythms that fail to adapt to the effective mission command. short-term horizon analysis and recom- complexities of modern warfare.2 These Daily battle rhythm events tradition- mendations. The briefing is intended scheduled battle rhythm events then feed ally consist of a morning and evening to be short, informative, and selective. into command-level boards—principally, command-level update brief, joint effects A commander does not traditionally a coordination and assessment board. and targeting meetings, and synchroniza- make decisions during these briefings However, high-intensity operations are tion meetings among the joint functions but rather gains a current understand- not routine, and many observed head- to enable executable planned operations.6 ing of the OE. This does not preclude, quarters do not account for the speed In low-intensity operations, where actions however, the commander from issuing and frequency of enemy actions and and effects take place at a slower rate, direction and guidance (D&G) for changes in the operational environment the battle rhythm may be more delib- required adjustments within this plan- (OE). During high-intensity operations, erate, with daily, weekly, and monthly ning horizon. a flexible and agile battle rhythm is re- working groups and boards. While the Commanders or headquarters es- quired to provide the commander with battle rhythm establishes a routine for a tablish boards, working groups, and the best situational understanding of the headquarters, the unit’s battle rhythm planning teams to coordinate actions OE and recommendations from the staff is not fixed; commanders modify it as and solve problems. The primary dif- and subordinate commanders to support the situation evolves. In other words, ference between boards and working robust decisionmaking. If a headquarters’ the battle rhythm is the heartbeat of the groups is the level of authority granted battle rhythm does not account for this headquarters and can speed up or slow by the commander during these events. type of conflict, multiple dilemmas can down depending on the activity within Commanders chair boards or grant arise, such as an adversary maintaining the environment. decisionmaking authority to senior staff the initiative, the commander’s deci- Left unchecked, a headquarters staff leaders within a specific functional area. sionmaking cycle remaining ahead of can determine multiple additional meet- Working groups coordinate action and the staff’s, or planning from subordinate ings that might be productive but not develop recommendations for approval and component commands outpacing necessarily required to feed directly into by the commander during a board. their higher headquarters due to a lack of the commander’s decisionmaking pro- The number, type, composition, and responsiveness. This article addresses this cess. These additional meetings should be frequency of boards, working groups, problem and recommends several ways avoided. If they persist, they inherently and planning efforts depend on the to adjust the battle rhythm when a joint lead to time wasted and jam-packed type of unit, echelon, and operation. headquarters operates in high-intensity days with the command group, staff This coordination is traditionally man- operations. principals, and action officers running to aged by the chief of staff. While some meetings throughout the day rather than boards and working groups, such as the The Battle Rhythm conducting productive staff work. The Information Operations Working Group, A battle rhythm is a deliberate cycle desired coordination and staff interaction the Resource Coordination Board, and of command, staff, and unit activities provided by these additional meetings is the Joint Targeting Coordination Board, intended to synchronize current and better solved by staff interface and collab- are required regardless of the situation, future operations.3 A command’s battle oration during high-intensity operations. others should be run only as the situation rhythm consists of a cyclic series of Furthermore, the negative impacts of a dictates. The challenge is to identify, meetings (including working groups compacted battle rhythm go beyond a based on the tempo of the conflict, which and boards), briefings, and other activi- single unit echelon and affect subordinate meetings are needed. ties synchronized by time and purpose.4 units’ ability to operate efficiently within A board is a grouping of predeter- Ideally, the battle rhythms of all head- a timely orders process. Failing to adhere mined staff representatives with delegated quarters in the chain of command to a disciplined battle rhythm results in decision authority for a particular purpose are nested within one another so that everyone working harder, longer, and less or function. There are two types of outputs of one meeting are available effectively.7 boards: command and functional. The as inputs to higher or lower echelons. command board’s purpose is to gain Inputs and outputs should logically Command-Level Update Briefs, guidance or a decision from the com- support each other and decision Boards, and Working Groups mander. The two principal command requirements. A unit’s battle rhythm Daily update briefs provide analysis boards at the joint level are the Joint manages the most important resource to the commander on information Coordination Board (JCB) and the within the headquarters: the time of requirements within the short-term Assessment Board (AB) and tradition- the commander and staff.5 Regardless planning horizon. Typically, two com- ally happen at different ends of a battle of the battle rhythm design, it must mand-level update briefs are held each rhythm cycle. Decisions made from these be developed to directly support the day, with one briefing internal to the command boards focus future effects, JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Prescott 15 actions, and assessment analysis across the operational assessment should focus orders process and, subsequently, a battle joint force command. only on the priority of analysis provided rhythm. These levels are responsible for The JCB, sometimes called the by the commander’s D&G during the shaping the environment for future tacti- Commander’s Decision Board, is the previous JCB. The desired output is to cal actions, which, if not properly timed commander’s principal decisionmaking seek the commander’s endorsement of and resourced, will prevent the joint meeting and traditionally occurs at the the staff’s operational assessment and force from executing orders successfully. end of a battle rhythm cycle. Its aim is recommended adjustments to the plan. Military and political considerations, to direct future joint action, synchronize A commander has the option to either particularly with sustainment, force pro- resources, issue command-level guidance make decisions during this board or wait tection, and civil-military cooperation, all across the echelons, and resolve disputes to issue additional D&G at the next JCB. require strategic- and operational-level across the joint force. The JCB is an The desired composition of the AB mir- involvement to shape the environment exhaustive review, covering the overall rors the JCB. for tactical units. Shaping desired effects, execution of the campaign. Analysis sometimes known as notice-to-effect, takes and recommendations from the staff Three Considerations for time and even in high-intensity opera- and components are presented during a Unit Battle Rhythm tions realistically cannot take place within the JCB, and the commander makes Developing a battle rhythm is a top- 72 hours. Therefore, a 96- to 120-hour decisions about follow-on actions or down process, and a strategic-level cyclic battle rhythm is appropriate to adjustments to the plan issued to sub- headquarters must develop and imple- coordinate and assess the joint effects re- ordinate commands via a fragmentary ment its battle rhythm first and quickly quired to properly shape a high-intensity order. Outputs from the JCB refine to subordinate units. The aim of the environment. products such as the commander’s crit- higher headquarters battle rhythm is ical information requirements (CCIR), driven by the information necessary for The Essence of Decisionmaking decision support matrices, requests to military and political leaders to make and Staying in Front of higher headquarters, targeting and the decisions. Without these information the Commander defended asset lists, and risk management requirements, driven by the higher In early 2018, former Chairman of the worksheets. The conclusion of the JCB headquarters, a subordinate unit or Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph allows the transition into the next battle component command is unable to Dunford stressed that leaders in the rhythm cycle, beginning with the AB and design its battle rhythm to answer these U.S. military “must be prepared to follow-on working groups and functional requirements and focus activities within make decisions at the speed of rele- boards to support the next JCB. The the battle rhythm cycle to coordinate vance. . . . We must further develop minimum composition of the JCB is the and assess its military actions. leaders capable of thriving at the speed joint force commander; the chief of staff; An additional consideration within a of war.”8 As the speed and complexity subordinate commanders (in person, by command’s battle rhythm is the targeting of war increase, the requirement for video teleconference, or represented by cycle that synchronizes effects and actions faster decisionmaking resides at every their senior liaison officers); the political, in all domains and component com- level of war and “is as applicable, and strategic communications, and legal advi- mands. Complementing the targeting dangerous, to battlefield commanders as sors; the joint operations center director; cycle are the intelligence, surveillance, it is to strategic leaders.”9 In high-inten- and other individuals as required. and reconnaissance (ISR) requirements sity operations, speed of action requires The AB is the second principal meet- to plan and execute joint effects. At the timely decisions and adjustments to the ing for the commander and traditionally joint level, there are risks associated with joint force plan. As mission command occurs at the beginning of a battle accelerating the targeting cycle due to systems improve and information-gath- rhythm cycle. The AB primarily informs the required planning, ISR requirements, ering sources increase, a consistent the commander if the operation is being resource allocation, and target approval challenge for a staff is determining the conducted according to the plan and if process that must be coordinated and relevant information to analyze for the joint force is achieving desired results. synchronized prior to an operation taking decisionmaking. In contemporary mil- Routinely the AB will recommend what place. The air tasking order is a good itary operations, Chairman of the Joint effects or decisive conditions should example of a cyclic process that sequences Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley be the focus for the upcoming battle required resources to execute effects notes that “the sheer volume and speed rhythm cycle. This provides focus to the within a joint operation that has negative of conflicting information can easily Joint Staff and subordinate commands. consequences if not synchronized prop- bring decisionmaking to a screeching A typical agenda divides the operational erly or sped up. halt.”10 Normally, proactive command- assessment across three distinct planning The third consideration is a joint force ers do not like to wait for the staff to horizons: short, mid, and long term. commander’s planning horizon focus. methodically develop and issue orders However, to make this command board At the strategic and operational levels, to lower echelons. In this environment, as effective and concise as possible, the the desired timing of an action drives the the commander often can get ahead of 16 Forum / Operating at the Speed of Relevance JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Coast Guardsmen assigned to Tactical Law Enforcement Team 109, Cape Cod Maritime Safety Security Team, and Sailors assigned to Freedom-variant littoral combat ship USS Sioux City participate in noncompliant vessel pursuit tactics exercise in rigid-hull inflatable boat, April 1, 2021, Atlantic Ocean (U.S. Navy/Marianne Guemo) the staff’s decisionmaking cycle. This must be a balance between the effect the the capability to “act faster,” based on is not a poor reflection on the staff, commander wants to achieve versus the resources, geography limitations, and but rather falls within the nature of the relevance of that decision within a given competing tasks, then acceleration could commander’s desire to make timely time. Within complexity there is an art increase the risk to one’s force. When dis- decisions and execute effective mission and science to decisionmaking. Simply cussing opportunities and time-sensitive command for subordinates. acting faster than an adversary may not decisions, General Douglas MacArthur In most cases, the commander will achieve the desired effect if there are gaps famously stated, “The history of failure always have a better situational under- in the commander’s situational under- in war can almost be summed up in two standing than does the staff due to his standing. Although warfare is arguably words: too late.”13 or her experience, the numerous interac- more complex today, historically the need Instilling the commander’s true tions he or she has had with the higher to make high-quality decisions faster than understanding should be the goal when headquarters, and battlefield circulation an adversary was a fundamental tenet for developing the battle rhythm. Consistent with subordinate units. Over the course success.11 John Boyd, a U.S. fighter pilot gaps in a headquarters’ understanding of these multiple higher and lower ech- during the Korean War, developed his are indicators that its battle rhythm is not elon engagements, a commander may OODA (observe-orient-decide-act) loop effective. Continuously updating staff receive new guidance or issue numerous decisionmaking theory precisely to out- estimates and enemy threat templates can new tasks to subordinate commands think an adversary. He believed that by assist the commander with understanding that the staff may not be aware of until observing, orienting, deciding, and acting friendly and enemy capabilities, oppor- the commander’s return. Using modern faster, one can exploit opportunities to tunities, and vulnerabilities. In addition, command and control technology and defeat an adversary, and this theory argu- assessments that determine what the available information systems should min- ably applies to all levels of war.12 headquarters has learned from previous imize the lag time between a commander Boyd’s theory has theoretical link- actions enable better judgment by the directing subordinates and updating the ages with the purpose of designing a commander. Covering this relevant staff. Once the staff is informed on the battle rhythm. But within a complex analysis during the daily update brief will outputs of these engagements, it should environment, Boyd’s theory is effec- increase the commander’s understanding, immediately analyze the new informa- tive only when the commander has a enable better decisionmaking, and mini- tion, update staff estimates, and ensure true understanding and perspective of mize risk. the entire headquarters is aware of new what the enemy is doing and the cause One method by which the plans requirements. and effect of those actions within the section can remain ahead of the com- Although the commander may desire OE. Furthermore, if subordinate and mander’s decisionmaking cycle is to use to make an immediate decision, there component commands do not have the commander’s critical information JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Prescott 17 U.S. Army paratroopers assigned to 2nd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade, alongside French paratroopers from 8 Regiment Parachutiste D’Infanterie de Marine, 11 Brigade Parachutiste, conduct airborne assault onto Hohenburg Drop Zone as part of Exercise Rock Topside II, at Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany, March 6, 2021 (U.S. Army/John Yountz) requirements to anticipate future any subordinate component commands assessments into the daily update brief- planning requirements and decisions. and minimize the friction of a com- ings, while ensuring it is focused to Ongoing CCIR and assumptions, ana- mander being ahead of his or her staff. answer command-level questions and lyzed and approved by the commander, Using unit liaison officers will assist in al- understanding, will negate the need for should already have branch plans de- lowing parallel planning with subordinate short-term assessments during the AB. veloped based on the likelihood they commands to minimize the notice-to-ef- Combine the JCB and AB. Although could happen. As the situation evolves fect lag time. the JCB and AB have different purposes in favor of or against the joint force and take place at different times during a command, a disciplined staff should Three Recommendations for unit’s battle rhythm, they fundamentally anticipate future actions and decisions Improving the Battle Rhythm strive to provide the commander with the command should make. CCIR and in High-Intensity Operations analysis to understand the environment the decision support matrix both assist Focus Command-Level Daily Update and make decisions. Since both boards with this anticipation. To remain ahead Briefs to Describe Only the Information require staff-wide collaboration to be of the commander’s decisionmaking cycle a Commander Needs to Know Within effective, the Joint Coordination and and ensure that decisions flow seamlessly the Short-Term Planning Horizon. A Assessment boards should be combined down through the echelons to remain concise update brief will keep the com- to synthesize this analysis. If the AB at the speed of relevance, branch plans mander’s attention on providing D&G to explains what needs to be done and should include “draft” changes in task assist the staff with making adjustments the JCB provides the commander with organization and in synchronization to the current plan. Every staff principal options detailing how it can be accom- and troop-to-task matrices.14 Once should not be required to brief if their plished, then combining these two the situation dictates a decision by the analysis does not directly assist with the command boards saves time in producing commander, these prearranged planning commander’s understanding or assist orders and can reduce the battle rhythm products allow the staff to immediately in synchronizing the conduct of the cycle. To further streamline the analysis finalize and issue the necessary orders to operation. Blending current operational presented in the board, the operational 18 Forum / Operating at the Speed of Relevance JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 assessment portion should focus only on and quickly identify the military- and Training Division, Joint Staff J7, Joint Headquarters Organization, Staff Integration, the commander’s priority of analysis in political-level information requirements and Battle Rhythm: Insights and Best Practices the mid- to long-term planning horizon. while directly supporting the strategic Focus Paper, 3rd ed. (Suffolk, VA: The Joint Under this construct, the deputy chief commander’s ability to make decisions Staff, September 2019), available at JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Prescott 19 Battle Group Poland—multinational coalition of U.S., UK, Croatian, and Romanian soldiers who serve with Polish armed forces 15th Mechanized Brigade—performs winter live-fire training during Operation Raider Lighting, at Bemowo Piskie training area, Poland, January 16, 2019 (U.S. Army/Arturo Guzman) Military Power Reimagined The Rise and Future of Shaping By Kyle J. Wolfley he belief that the U.S. military yet scholars and practitioners struggle shaping, is a category of activity that finds itself in a “complex envi- to articulate how these states’ militaries entered the U.S. military lexicon in the T ronment”—one in which con- attempt to achieve their goals through mid-2000s amid a growing realization ventional war is rare, but Great Power ways other than warfighting or coer- that nontraditional uses of force were competition has returned, coupled cion. This article better conceptualizes necessary to manage new challenges. with the persistent threat of violent a type of military operation that is often I define shaping as the use of military nonstate actors—is so commonplace misunderstood and understudied and organizations to construct a more that it can now be considered a truism.1 that has the potential to become one favorable environment through chang- The United States, China, and Russia of the most frequent tools of interstate ing military relationships, the charac- are engaged in a security competition competition in the coming decades. teristics of partners, or the behavior of below the threshold of open violence, This military power logic, known as allies. There are four primary shaping logics: attraction to change interna- tional alignment; socialization to trans- Major Kyle J. Wolfley, USA, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at form a partner’s roles and practices; the United States Military Academy at West Point. delegation to pass the burden of secu- 20 Forum / The Rise and Future of Shaping JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 rity; and assurance to reduce an ally’s Peace program.6 Recently, changes in Shaping and Other Tools insecurity and manage its behavior. power and technology have made shaping of Military Statecraft Militaries use shaping in an attempt to more attractive for emerging powers such Statecraft involves the use of foreign exert control over an ambiguous envi- as Russia and China. This is apparent in policy tools to protect a state’s interests, ronment in which threats and allies are the expansion of multinational military in particular national security. Scholars unclear. Through different activities, exercises in two non-Western security use various frameworks to differentiate such as senior officer visits, exchanges, organizations: the Collective Security among these instruments, but DIME security assistance, forward presence, Treaty Organization and the Shanghai (diplomacy, information, military, and and certain types of military exercises, Cooperation Organization.7 The use of economics) is the most prevalent today.9 militaries employ shaping almost daily. shaping by nondemocratic powers also David Baldwin’s seminal work on eco- However, shaping receives far less atten- suggests that this activity should not be nomic statecraft defines military state- tion than warfighting, coercion, and synonymous with military-led democ- craft as “influence attempts relying pri- other military activities that capture racy promotion, though the limited marily on violence, weapons, or force,” the conventional wisdom of what func- literature on shaping seems to imply this effectively capturing the conventional tions militaries perform. Although the relationship. wisdom on the typical “ways” (concepts term is used regularly to describe U.S. Shaping is more subtle than overt, or logics) and “means” (resources) of operations, our understanding of how more building than breaking, more military strategy.10 Yet military statecraft other militaries use shaping is limited. Sun Tzu than Carl von Clausewitz, and involves far more than using tanks and This article explains the logic, traces more soft than hard power, qualities that aircraft carriers to deter and fight adver- the origins, and anticipates the future render shaping seductive to state leaders, saries; shaping is key to understanding of this important type of military especially given its underhanded nature how militaries achieve their goals in operation.2 and cost aversion. It is often difficult, other, cooperative ways. Although warfighting and coercion however, to determine whether shaping For simplicity, the tools of military theories are well established, the use is “working” or “successful”; its mea- statecraft can be categorized into three of military organizations to construct sures of effectiveness are often elusive.8 overlapping categories: warfighting, a more favorable environment suffers Moreover, the logic of shaping risks coercing, and shaping.11 Warfighting is from conceptual confusion as scholars being misperceived by adversaries and the use of violence within military orga- and practitioners struggle to define these appearing threatening to their interests. nizations to overcome an adversary and nonconventional activities. Over the Thus, the stakes of conceptual clarity are achieve a political objective. Clausewitz past three decades, the U.S. military has high: major powers are exercising shaping provides the hallmark definition, noting applied various phrases and terms other with increased regularity, but without a that the goal of war is to “compel an than shaping, such as military operations clearer understanding, practitioners (es- enemy to do our will” through physical other than war, preventive defense, coop- pecially policymakers and commanders) force: In order to do so, an army must erative security, security cooperation, and risk misperception and misapplication of a “render the enemy powerless.”12 The military engagement, to describe these prominent source of military power. political goals of wars vary: Total wars missions, exposing its discomfort in try- This article proceeds in four stages. demand unconditional surrender from ing to define these nontraditional tasks. The article first defines shaping by com- the adversary, while others are more Non-U.S. terminology also varies: British paring the concept with other forms of limited by territory, objectives, or types scholars and officers often use the terms military statecraft—namely, warfighting of weapons employed.13 In U.S. military defense diplomacy or defense engagement and coercion—and then offers examples doctrine, warfare is divided into two to describe these tasks;3 Chinese doctrine of each shaping logic. Second, the article major categories: traditional and irreg- and scholarship refer to them as military traces the evolution of shaping operations ular. When waging traditional interstate diplomacy;4 and the Indian government in U.S. strategy documents and military warfare, states use their lethal forces for defines them as defense cooperation.5 doctrine. Third, the article argues that, conquest or protection—offensively or Given the volume of inconsistent labels, due to systemic forces—the high costs of defensively.14 this article makes the case that shaping interstate war, changes in the balance of Coercing aims to convince an actor— best represents the overall purpose and power, and the consequences of modern be it state or nonstate—to do something logics of these operations, thereby at- globalization—shaping operations will it does not want to do by manipulating tempting to systematize how we describe become a more attractive tool to major costs, benefits, and risks.15 As opposed to these nontraditional military activities. powers for the foreseeable future. The what Thomas Schelling labeled “brute The use of shaping operations in- article concludes by discussing the need force” (that is, warfighting), military creased substantially following the end for scholars and practitioners to study coercion is largely a state’s threat of of the Cold War, primarily through shaping in the future and for command- future pain, which can take the form of the U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty ers to take the role of shaping in military deterrence or compellence.16 Deterrence Organization (NATO) Partnership for statecraft more seriously. is an attempt to convince an opponent, JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Wolfley 21 Sailors assigned to Arleigh Burke–class guided-missile destroyer USS Carney pose for command photo during ship’s port visit to Naval Station Souda Bay, Greece, November 8, 2018 (U.S. Navy/Ryan U. Kledzik) through overt or implicit threats, that the This article defines shaping as a threat of force. As Derek Reveron notes, costs of invasion—or another undesirable state’s use of military organizations to shaping is “different in fundamental action—outweigh the benefits.17 While carry influence within environments ways from warfighting. Shaping is about the goal of deterrence is to maintain the by changing military relationships, the managing relationships, not command status quo, coercers can also compel oth- characteristics of partners, or the behav- and control; it is about cooperation, not ers to alter their behavior by threatening, ior of allies. The goals of shaping are to fighting; and it is about partnership, not demonstrating, or using limited force. prevent threats from emerging and also dominance.”21 While warfighting and co- Short of violence, states can mobilize to set the conditions for maintaining an ercing are the most familiar tasks assigned troops to persuade an adversary to back advantage in case dangers do arise. Major to the military—what could be thought down or employ a naval blockade to powers use shaping to proactively manage of as “breaking” and “bending”—shap- impose unacceptable costs and thus force allies, friends, and adversaries in the hope ing is a rather surprising military task a concession from the target. States may of avoiding the need for warfighting given its emphasis on “building” advan- also apply selective violence through or costly coercion. By using shaping tage in the environment. strategic bombing to deny an adver- effectively, these powers may obviate Given shaping’s focus on prevention, sary its military means or to punish its the need to react under disadvantageous there is considerable overlap between its population to generate demands for sur- conditions in the future. Broadly, shaping logics and the coercive logic of deterrence render.18 Robert Art and Kelly Greenhill avoids crises, threats, and violence and, as (especially extended deterrence over distinguish between this “wartime com- a recent U.S. military operational manual allies); however, there are also several dif- pellence” and “coercive diplomacy”: the explained, keeps “adversary activities ferences worth noting. Shaping primarily former typically combines violent force within a desired state of cooperation and targets partners and allies, while deter- and economic sanctions, while the latter competition.”20 Shaping relies primarily rence targets adversaries. Shaping is about occurs short of open warfare between on attraction, legitimacy, persuasion, and relationships and is thus necessarily multi- two or more actors.19 positive incentives rather than the use or lateral and cooperative, unlike deterrence. 22 Forum / The Rise and Future of Shaping JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Moreover, shaping’s primary focus is on Table. Logics of Shaping precluding threats from emerging in the Reliance on Soft Power first place; if shaping is effective, there is High reliance on soft power Low reliance on soft power little need to convince an adversary that “military engagement” “security cooperation” the costs of unwanted behavior outweigh Assurance to reduce ally Attraction to change the benefits. At the same time, deterrence Relationship insecurity and manage its international alignment can be improved by shaping through the Target of behavior Shaping attraction or delegation of partners. As a Partner Socialization to transform Delegation to pass the burden 2008 U.S. joint manual notes, shaping Characteristics values and practices of security and deterrence are “distinct but mutually supporting.”22 To achieve the goals of shaping, major attempt to create new allies or coalition Organization training events to socialize powers focus on two targets: the partner’s partners, to detract from an adversarial regime protection against future “color characteristics or the partner’s relationship alliance or coalition, or to reassure a rival. revolutions” in the mid-2000s illustrate with the major power. Relationships refer Using attraction, major powers persuade this logic.30 to the status of relations between the neutral states into a defense-pact alliance The other side of shaping—security partners: friendly, neutral, or adversarial. or multinational coalition and drive a cooperation—relies more on material Characteristics refer to both the partner’s wedge between an adversary and any po- power and threats of force than on the combat power and the role the partner’s tential partners. The targets of attraction mechanisms of engagement described military serves for its society, such as an are certain domestic actors, such as pol- herein. Delegation is when major powers institution that inculcates national values, iticians, military officers, or the general attempt to transition the responsibility of an armed force that protects the state public, who are skeptical of becoming security, against both state and nonstate from external or internal threats, or an the major power’s allies. Attraction often threats, to another military. Partner states organization that defends a certain regime relies on convincing a weary public that that are unable to provide their own or set of political interests.23 States achieve security cooperation is beneficial via protection suffer from what Reveron shaping’s goals through four main logics: public diplomacy—essentially dangling describes as “security deficits,” something attraction, socialization, delegation, and greater security and military effectiveness major powers attempt to overcome with assurance. To change characteristics, such as the “carrot.”27 The hallmark example weapons, training, and other forms of as the partner military’s coercive power or of attraction is the U.S.-led NATO assistance.31 Since 9/11, Western powers practices, major powers use socialization Partnership for Peace of the 1990s. This have attempted to build the coercive and delegation. To manage relationships, partnership intended to recruit new part- and administrative capacity of weaker they employ attraction and assurance. Yet ners and former rivals for peacekeeping, states with the goal of creating more these logics vary in whether they rely on promote democracy in post-Communist stability while preventing the emergence soft power characteristics, such as legiti- Europe, and prepare select militaries for of terrorism and civil war. Additionally, macy, persuasion, and values. Attraction potential NATO membership.28 major powers may send advisors, funding, and socialization rely heavily on these Socialization is the use of military and equipment to another major power attributes; assurance and delegation do organizations to instill values, norms, or to avoid the responsibility of deterring not.24 Although the terms are sometimes practices into other militaries through or fighting a powerful opponent.32 used interchangeably, the U.S. military’s persuasion, teaching, and the building of Delegation, similar to assurance, attempts categorization of operations as military habits.29 The goal is to shift the partner to relieve security deficits; however, del- engagement or security cooperation can military’s identity and role to one that egation attempts to pass this burden to be loosely applied to this distinction.25 is more favorably viewed by the major the partner, while assurance assumes the The table depicts the four shaping power. For instance, militaries may responsibility for it. logics arranged by characteristics and encourage the values of democracy or Assurance is a major power’s attempt relationships. respect for human rights in other armies; to reduce an ally’s sense of vulnerability The first two logics—attraction and conversely, militaries may value state by promising protection through defense socialization—similarly rely on persuasion security and promote the protection commitments and the forward presence and values more than on building or of autocratic regimes against violent of soldiers. Without such signals of sup- transferring material capabilities. These protests. Although socialization overlaps port, the ally may act in ways counter to logics can be considered engagement with attraction—in spreading the demo- the major power’s interest, such as acting activities, defined by Evan Resnick as cratic belief that democracies refrain from aggressively, developing a more indepen- attempts to influence other states by es- fighting one another—the former focuses dent foreign policy, or considering closer tablishing and enhancing contacts across on transforming the values and character alignment with a rival power. One way diplomatic, military, economic, and cul- of the partner, while the latter does not. to limit this adverse behavior is to send tural domains.26 Attraction is a military’s Russian-led Collective Security Treaty signals of commitment through treaties, JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Wolfley 23 troop deployments, arms transfers, and tactical or operational level—such as to observe the military developments of multinational exercises, thereby reducing when one unit supports the main effort these states, while providing advice to the ally’s insecurity.33 By promising pro- of a mission through preparatory fires ambassadors and cooperating with host tection, major powers aim to influence to ensure the enemy is degraded before militaries. Though the term and diplo- domestic opinion in favor of the patron ground soldiers attack, or obscuring the matic status of attaché was codified in the or pacify the region by limiting the sever- enemy’s observation of friendly forces.38 1850s, the stationing of military officers ity of the security dilemma—that is, when In earlier doctrine, this activity was often for political or diplomatic purposes dates one’s states accumulation of security described as “supporting” efforts to back to the Roman empire.45 Another (via increases in weapons or territory) increase the odds of success for the “main common shaping activity is the use of threatens another’s.34 Of course, there is efforts” in war.39 military assistance and advisers to create substantial overlap between the concepts stronger foreign militaries. Historical of deterrence and assurance, given that The Evolution of Shaping examples include French covert assistance the latter involves the extension of secu- in U.S. Strategy and to undermine the British in the early rity commitment to an ally. Yet assurance Operational Doctrine years of the American Revolution,46 as differs from the types of deterrence Origins. While warfighting is the well as U.S. and Soviet funding proxies to covered under coercion: Not only is the type of military behavior most com- develop spheres of influence and prevent logic of assurance aimed primarily at the monly associated with Clausewitz, the the ideological expansion of China, espe- ally rather than the adversary, but also origins of shaping are drawn from the cially in the developing world.47 security commitments often dampen writings of Sun Tzu. Though his focus The End of the Cold War and the fears of the rival that the ally will was on explaining methods of warf- Indoctrination of Shaping. Despite the not act aggressively. The 2015 U.S.-led ighting, Sun Tzu mentions numerous common historical use of shaping, the Operation Dragoon Ride, which intended times throughout The Art of War how term was not codified into U.S. foreign to prevent Russia’s sphere of influence statesmen and generals can subdue policy documents until after the fall of from extending over a weary and uncer- their enemy “without having to fight a the Soviet Union and end of the Cold tain European public, is an example of battle.”40 He acknowledges the immense War. The 1997 National Military Strategy assurance in action.35 costs of war—the “great affair of the painted a picture of the novel security This article’s definition of shaping, state. The field of life and death”—and environment, which comprised numerous which draws on U.S. security and defense how engaging in prolonged violent nonstate threats: ethnic conflict, transna- documents from the 1990s and joint battle is detrimental in terms of both tional crime, proliferation of weapons of doctrine from the mid-2000s, differs lives and treasure.41 In light of these mass destruction, and environmental dam- from other military applications of the potential losses, the preferred approach age.48 In the preface, the Chairman of the term. For instance, a recent Joint Force to defeating one’s adversary is to first Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged that Quarterly article offers strategic shaping “stymie the enemy’s plans” and “his the military instrument of power would as a “coercive strategy . . . to complicate alliances,” even before attacking “his need to contribute to the grand strategy an adversary’s calculus and target his troops” or, reluctantly, “his walled of engagement, “helping to shape the strategic intentions, not just his forces. cities” when there is no other option.42 international environment in appropriate The objective is to create a sharp deter- As one scholar of Chinese strategy ways to bring about a more peaceful and rent effect by removing the adversary explains, “Thus in the Art of War, Sun stable world.”49 In order to implement this leadership’s sense of control of the crisis Tzu treats warfare, from its preparation strategy and protect the first core interest or conflict.”36 The authors firmly situate to execution and termination as first and of enhancing American security, the docu- this concept within theories of coercion, foremost a contest of wisdom. Use of ment identified three mechanisms: shaping which they argue can be improved by force is secondary.”43 When warfighting the international environment, responding imposing multiple dilemmas, posturing is necessary, Sun Tzu emphasizes the to the full spectrum of crises, and preparing assets to threaten what the adversary concept of shi—that is, developing a now for an uncertain future.50 values, and displaying asymmetric capa- favorable configuration of power or stra- The 1997 Quadrennial Defense bilities.37 This adversary-focused use of tegic advantage prior to battle—a term Review Report developed a more detailed shaping differs from this article’s concep- so important that it occurs 15 times defense strategy that emphasized the tion of shaping as constructing a more throughout the short book.44 “shape, respond, prepare” framework favorable environment through changing Though the term does not emerge laid out by the National Security Strategy. relationships, transforming partners, and in official foreign policy discussions until The report notes that the goals of shap- managing allies—which aligns closer to at least the end of the Cold War, shaping ing include the following: “promote the term’s use in U.S. strategy docu- in practice holds a long pedigree. One regional stability, prevent or reduce ments, as described in the next section. of the oldest forms of shaping is the conflicts and threats, and deter aggres- This definition also draws attention to use of military attachés—liaison officers sion and coercion on a day-to-day basis” how shaping is sometimes used at the deployed to the capitals of other nations through the use of military activities such 24 Forum / The Rise and Future of Shaping JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 U.S. Navy Divers assigned to Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit 1 and Royal Thai navy sailors assigned to navy diver and explosive ordnance disposal center prepare to conduct joint dive exercise off coast of Pattaya, Thailand, during Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training Thailand 2019, June 6, 2019 (U.S. Navy/Joshua Mortensen) as forward-stationed troops, military ex- the concept of shaping. In the foreword, operations, and transition.55 Yet military ercises, and officer exchanges.51 the authors explain, “America’s Armed planners wanted to create an environ- Despite the inclusion of shaping in Forces must be able to shape the strategic ment that would preclude threats from high-level strategy, the U.S. military environment to prevent war, respond emerging: Commanders and staffs at struggled with defining these types of when deterrence fails, and begin now to geographic combatant commands began operations as it found itself responsible prepare for an uncertain and challenging imagining how to better shape their for activities other than warfighting or environment.”53 The doctrine notes that environment. General Charles Wald, the coercion. The military’s discomfort an overseas presence has a “stabilizing deputy commander for U.S. European with nonwarfighting activities is evident effect” that allows peacetime engagement Command (USEUCOM) in the mid- in how it began labeling them. The to positively shape the environment.54 2000s, described the need for a “Phase 1993 edition of Joint Publication (JP) The 9/11 Attacks and Renewed Focus Zero” that would come prior to combat 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, dis- on Shaping. The al Qaeda terrorist attacks operations in order to prevent the need tinguished between two main military of September 11, 2001, provided the for costly military intervention following activities: war and military operations next major impetus for shaping in U.S. a future terrorist attack. For Wald, the other than war (MOOTW). The publica- military doctrine. Although warfighting four-phase campaign model depicted in tion noted that MOOTW fell outside of would remain the priority focus for the the pre-9/11 edition of JP 3-0 was insuf- the realm of combat operations, focused invasion of Afghanistan, there was a sense ficient to properly shape the environment on “deterring war and promoting peace,” that military units needed to get ahead and “prevent conflicts from developing in and were intended to “keep the day- of these problems in the future. The the first place.”56 In order to obviate the to-day tensions between nations below military began expressing its ideas for need for costly warfighting, he described the threshold of armed conflict” and operations along a timeline in its 2001 how USEUCOM imagined Phase Zero “maintain influence in foreign lands.”52 revision of JP 3-0 by laying out four as an opportunity for “building capacity The Joint Staff’s May 1997 Concept sequential phases in which peace, war, in partner nations that enable them to for Future Joint Operations was the first and then peace again would take place: be cooperative, trained, and prepared to major joint document that articulated deter/engage, seize initiative, decisive help prevent or limit conflict.” Instead JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Wolfley 25 of measuring victory in terms of enemy missiles, and sensors over the past mine what “success” is and imagine combatants killed during war, success decade has made conquest more chal- the counterfactual (what would have would be determined by how many lenging and provided at least a marginal happened if shaping did not occur) in conflicts were avoided, which would save advantage to the defense.63 Because order to determine effectiveness.68 The both American lives and treasure.57 This shaping (as well as deterrence) does not ability to assess whether straightforward understanding of shaping was then im- require the actual use of violent force, shaping activities, such as building plemented in the 2006 edition of JP 3-0, states will be attracted to this less costly partner capacity, are effective in improv- which expanded the phasing model by option to achieve their goals. ing security or governance is notori- including Phase Zero to “enhance inter- Second are the consequences of ously challenging.69 Even determining national legitimacy,” “gain multinational globalization—the increase in transac- the most important causes of traditional cooperation,” and “assure success by tions across national borders, caused by military power—the ability to win con- shaping perceptions and influencing the advances in transportation and com- ventional wars—is not uncontroversial.70 behavior of both adversaries and allies.”58 munication, that provides quicker and Despite these research problems, the This edition discontinued the binary war cheaper connections for both state and stakes are high for commanders to under- versus MOOTW framework by creating nonstate actors.64 Advances in overland stand and plan for shaping: Not only can three new clusters of operations: major and sea shipping, as well as in information shaping be misapplied, but it may also re- operations and campaigns; crisis response technology, have given violent nonstate sult in unintended, negative consequences. and limited contingency operations; and actors (such as insurgents, separatists, Combatant commands generally direct military engagement, security cooper- and terrorists) increased ability to achieve their shaping activities through theater ation, and deterrence.59 The concept their goals against states; such actors can security cooperation plans, creating an of shaping was generally dedicated to now organize, communicate, finance, and opportunity for commanders and staffs the first cluster to describe how joint transport at much higher rates than in the to grapple with and articulate the goals force commanders could influence their past.65 All major powers today use shap- of shaping. For instance, are port visits environment before combat operations ing as a way to protect themselves against intended to attract new partners, and become necessary. This categorization the possibility of terrorism or separatism why do we think these activities would largely remained intact for the most re- in their countries or on their peripheries. be successful? Should the United States cent (2017) version of JP 3-0, but with Third, changes in the structure of attempt to socialize democratic practices in more articulation of shaping’s goals: the international system—that is, the other militaries, or could this result in re- “help set conditions for successful theater distribution of capabilities between major sentment or blowback? Are multinational operations”; “provide a deeper, and com- powers—also encourage the use of shap- exercises an attempt to assure an ally of a mon, understanding of the OE [operating ing activities. The structure of the system security commitment or to delegate re- environment]”; and “advance national during the Cold War was bipolar, which sponsibility to it? These two logics are not security objectives, promote stability, pre- made deterrent activities such as massive necessarily mutually supporting. Promising vent conflicts (or limit their severity), and conventional exercises more attractive. security often removes the incentives for a reduce the risk of employing U.S. military However, the collapse of the Soviet Union partner to develop its own security capac- forces in a conflict.”60 in 1991 and the resultant loss of support ity.71 Moreover, like deterrence, shaping’s for weaker clients by both superpowers “prevent but prepare” logic unfortunately Shaping as a More Prominent created a decrease in state capacity but an provides an opportunity for misperception Foreign Policy Instrument increase in weapons available to separatist by competitors and has the potential to Although post–Cold War threats of groups.66 However, the system appears elicit negative reactions.72 For instance, instability and terrorism precipitated an to be approaching multipolarity in which U.S. efforts to encourage democracy increase in shaping, changes in technol- Russia, China, and to a lesser extent India in Eastern Europe and Central Asia are ogy and the international distribution are acquiring more power; thus, shaping viewed by Russia as undermining its own of power will likely continue to make provides a means for states to attract allies security, while U.S. troop presence in the shaping attractive in the future. Specifi- and balance against one another. Middle East may create resentment and cally, three systemic forces will increase invite attack.73 Commanders should direct the incentives for shaping.61 First is the Conclusion their staffs to understand how to not only influence of major weapons systems that Changes in power and technology will employ the logics of shaping to create a make conventional war extremely costly. likely increase the incentives for states more favorable environment but also to The massive destructiveness of nuclear to engage in shaping; however, there anticipate how forward presence, engage- weapons encourages immense caution have been few attempts by scholars or ment, and military exercises are perceived among national leaders against inter- practitioners to examine shaping.67 This by adversaries. Thus, commanders, policy- state war as the primary tool of foreign is partly because studying shaping is makers, and scholars would benefit from policy crises.62 Moreover, the techno- essentially studying power. Therefore, as a clearer focus on this increasingly promi- logical progress of air defense weapons, in all analyses of power, one must deter- nent way of military statecraft. JFQ 26 Forum / The Rise and Future of Shaping JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 1 (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, July 12, Notes 19, 2008), 8n11, available at JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Wolfley 27 would place a high emphasis on both forms of York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 86. Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict shaping. 41 Ibid., 76, 80–83. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 27 Nye, The Future of Power, 47–48, 42 Ibid, 85. 240–254. 99–109. 43 David Lai, Learning from the Stones: A 63 Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, 28 James M. Goldgeier, Not Whether but Go Approach to Mastering China’s Strategic “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO Concept, Shi (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, Institute, 2004), 3–4. and Command of the Commons in East Asia,” 1999), 19–30. 44 “Introduction” and “Key Terms,” in The International Security 41, no. 1 (2016), 19–22, 29 This article’s use of the term socialization Art of War, xlv, 11, 78. 47. mirrors that of Alexandra Gheciu, who builds 45 Alfred Vagts, The Military Attaché 64 Though the authors doubt the degree of on other constructivists in international (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), the impact of globalization on national security, relations. See Alexandra Gheciu, NATO in the 3–14. they provide a useful discussion. See Norrin “New Europe”: The Politics of International 46 Jonathan R. Dull, The French Navy and M. Ripsman and T.V. Paul, Globalization and Socialization After the Cold War (Stanford: American Independence: A Study of Arms and the National Security State (Oxford: Oxford Stanford University Press, 2005), 10–14. Diplomacy, 1774–1787 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 5–10. Regarding how communities instill practices, University Press, 1975), 33–49. 65 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Behind the see Emmanuel Adler, “The Spread of Security 47 Michael E. Latham, “The Cold War Curve: Globalization and International Communities: Communities of Practice, in the Third World, 1963–1975,” in The Terrorism,” International Security 27, no. 3 Self-Restraint, and NATO’s Post–Cold Cambridge History of the Cold War, vol. 2, (2002/2003), 30–58. War Transformation,” European Journal of ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad 66 Stathis N. Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, International Relations 14, no. 2 (2008), (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, “International System and Technologies of 195–230; and Vincent Pouliot, “The Logic of 2010), 258–280. Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security 48 The National Military Strategy of the Shaped Internal Conflict,”American Political Communities,” International Organization 62, United States of America, preface. Science Review 104, no. 3 (2010), 415–429. no. 2 (2008), 257–288. 49 Ibid. 67 Important exceptions include Reveron, 30 Wolfley,Military Statecraft, chapter 5. 50 Ibid., 2–3. “Shaping the Security Environment” and 31 Reveron, Exporting Security, 27. 51 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Exporting Security; Carol Atkinson, Military 32 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Soft Power: Public Diplomacy Through Military Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, May 1997), 9. See also Reveron, “Shaping the Educational Exchanges (Lanham, MD: 2014), 157–162. Security Environment,” 4–5. Rowman & Littlefield, 2014); and Alexandra 33 Roseanne W. McManus and Mark David 52 JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations Gheciu, “Security Institutions as Agents of Nieman, “Identifying the Level of Major (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 1993), Socialization? NATO and the ‘New Europe,’” Power Support Signaled for Protégés: A Latent I-3–I-5; Hal Brands, Making the Unipolar International Organization 59, no. 4 (2005), Measure Approach,” Journal of Peace Research Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of 973–1012. 56, no. 3 (2019), 365–366. the Post–Cold War Order (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 68 Baldwin, Power and International 34 See Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under University, 2016), 274–275. Relations, 57–59. the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 53 Concept for Future Joint Operations: 69 See, for example, Mara E. Karlin, (1978), 167–170. Expanding Joint Vision 2010 (Washington, DC: Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges 35 Robbie Gramer, “Operation Dragoon The Joint Staff, May 1997), foreword. for the United States (Philadelphia: University of Ride,” Foreign Affairs, May 13, 2015, available 54 Ibid., 11. Pennsylvania Press, 2018). at 28 Forum / The Rise and Future of Shaping JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Tank driver, at Fort Knox, Kentucky, June 1942 (Library of Congress/Alfred T. Palmer) Hydrocarbons and Hegemony By Anand Toprani here is a widespread notion today of this system and its possible future ent of both British and U.S. power. that the United States inherited by integrating hydrocarbons—specifi- That said, subtle differences exist T from Great Britain and defended cally coal and oil—into our analysis. between the two nations’ experiences. a liberal world premised on the free The control of hydrocarbons—both Coal sustained and augmented British exchange of goods and capital (par- for satisfying domestic demand and for primacy, but British control over coal ticularly by sea).1 This article suggests controlling external flows to allies and was also less extensive than that of the we can better understand the origins adversaries—was an essential ingredi- United States over oil and afforded it far less influence over the internal affairs of other nations (either through coercion or by consent), which is one Dr. Anand Toprani is an Associate Professor of Strategy and Policy at the U.S. Naval War College, a prerequisite for a hegemonic power.2 To Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and the author of Oil and Great Powers: Britain and Germany, 1914–1945 (Oxford University Press, 2019), which received the 2020 Richard W. Leopold simplify, coal contributed to Britain’s Prize from the Organization of American Historians. global power but did not create it, JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Toprani 29 “Breaker Boys,” from Hughestown Borough Coal Company, Pittston, Pennsylvania, pose for photo, January 1911 (U.S. National Archives and Records Administration/Lewis Hine) unlike oil, which was a key element in how it came about (which necessitates a process was, with some arguing that the U.S. rise to genuine hegemony. critique of the relevant scholarly literature) Britain aided, even welcomed, the rise of At a time when there is a great hue and how it perseveres, and what systemic American power, whereas others argue and cry within Western capitals about changes are undermining it. that the United States had been pursuing saving the post-1945 liberal international Transitions between rising and declin- a competitive grand strategy to topple system, those who are planning U.S. ing Great Powers tend to be violent.3 British hegemony since the Civil War.4 operations and strategy—to include the Great Britain and the United States, how- Originally, the concept of Great readership of Joint Force Quarterly— ever, stood for complementary (though Britain passing the mantle of liberal ought to know exactly what it is they not identical) visions of the world order, hegemon to its American cousin was an are defending. But military professionals privileging the interests of trading as outgrowth of the work of the economic should also have a broader awareness of opposed to territorial states. Therefore, historian Charles Kindleberger concern- the other instruments of military power. unlike past transitions among so-called ing the origins of the Great Depression. When we in the national security com- hegemonic powers and their challengers He argued that Britain, specifically the munity study the economic instrument (Spain, Holland, France, and Germany), Bank of England, enjoyed a position of of U.S. power, it is tempting to limit our the proverbial passing of the torch from financial supremacy during the heyday perspective to economic warfare, most Britain to the United States did not re- of the 19th-century gold standard and notably sanctions. The U.S. economy quire them to come to blows, even if this operated as a de facto lender of last resort and financial system are not only instru- transition was accelerated by devastating that stabilized international financial ments of American hegemony but also Great Power conflicts in 1914–1918 markets, usually by coordinating interest constitutive elements of it. Preserving this and 1941–1945. There remain scholarly rate adjustments among central banks. hegemony requires understanding both differences over how consensual the The ebbing of British financial power 30 JPME Today / Hydrocarbons and Hegemony JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 during World War I, and the failure of the Barry Eichengreen put the final nail ex post facto construction that obscured United States (in this case, the Federal in the coffin of supposed British financial the extent of the massive power differen- Reserve) to undertake similar burdens, hegemony. He posited that the Bank of tial between the two nations. Compared despite its then considerable gold reserves England never served as the conductor with American hegemony, Britain’s and status as the world’s largest global of an “orchestra” of central banks. Great position was really one of primacy—first creditor, doomed the international econ- Britain’s economic power had already among equals—whose perpetuation omy—particularly after the 1931 financial begun to wane in the late 19th century. rested largely on a favorable balance crisis, when the Federal Government Its share of global manufacturing output of power within Europe following the raised interest rates to protect U.S. gold shrank as rivals such as the United States Napoleonic Wars. Echoing the work of reserves and thereafter failed to coor- and Germany rose from behind tariff Halford Mackinder, O’Brien argued that dinate a global response to an incipient walls, while the peculiar nature of British British power flourished in the twilight financial crisis.5 political economy (specifically, the nexus of the Columbian era, when control Political scientists picked up between the City of London and financial over maritime trade allowed Britain to Kindleberger’s evaluation of how a col- policymaking at the Treasury and the Bank augment its meager natural resource en- lapse of transatlantic equity and financial of England, which P.J. Cain and Anthony dowments. Even at the zenith of British markets grew into a global economic Hopkins called “gentlemanly capitalism”) influence, however, the foundations of crisis that threatened the very viability of starved British industry of investment by this world were crumbling thanks to the liberal capitalism. Robert Gilpin, based diverting savings abroad to chase higher diffusion of railroads, automobiles, and on his reading of Thucydides’s claims returns within the formal or informal em- eventually aircraft; such proliferation regarding the underlying causes of the pire, as well as in the United States.9 allowed better resourced continental Peloponnesian War, articulated a theoret- Great Britain’s imposing financial powers to chip away at the position of the ical construct of the international system position before 1914 actually masked outlying maritime powers.12 in which hegemonic powers exercised a the true state of the nation’s diminished Although Great Britain relinquished stabilizing role, thus mitigating the innate economic, industrial, and geopolitical its role as “workshop of the world” to tendency of the system toward anarchy. standing. The stability of the global the United States and Germany in the The waning of a power’s hegemonic financial system rested, therefore, less late 19th century, it certainly remained status, and the waxing of a rival’s, created on objective criteria concerning Britain’s the world’s dominant financial power the possibility of a hegemonic war either relative power than on a series of implicit until World War I. Nevertheless, O’Brien to defend the existing system or to create assumptions concerning political econ- echoed Eichengreen by noting that a new one.6 omy—namely, that national governments British officials had neither the intention Kindleberger’s thesis was an attrac- would not run persistent budget or trade nor the means to play the role of a global tive explanation of the Great Depression deficits (the two are closely linked) and financial backstop or to use access to since it complemented the Wilsonian would, if necessary, induce involuntary British markets as an instrument to co- perspective of U.S. officials during the unemployment through higher interest erce potential adversaries, like the United 1930s and 1940s that the economic rates to forestall a balance of payments States does with financial sanctions today. crisis and the war that followed it were crisis that undermined the peg to gold. It is hard to imagine the United States the result of Americans’ failure to accept These commitments were credible to allowing one of its major banks to finance global leadership after World War I.7 This international financiers and bankers a key foreign policy objective of one might be good strategy, but it is poor because of the limited extent of the of its rivals, as Britain did when Baring history. Many elements of Kindleberger’s franchise, which privileged the interest Brothers assisted the fledging United narrative collapse under close scrutiny, of the merchant creditor class in national States with the Louisiana Purchase. especially his argument that Britain’s legislatures rather than those of debtors British fiscal policy, meanwhile, was a position in the world before 1914 was such as farmers in the United States (fol- far cry from that of the vaunted “fiscal- analogous to that of the United States lowing William McKinley’s triumph over military” state of Georgian England, with after 1918. Paul Kennedy, for instance, the forces of free silver led by William its high taxes, intrusive regulation, and demonstrated that the Bank of England Jennings Bryan in 1896) or organized military Keynesianism avant la lettre.13 was hardly a ruthless instrument of labor in Europe, which lacked a broad Victorian and Edwardian governments British statecraft. Because of prevailing national political foundation (in Britain) were all in thrall of the liberal credo of re- liberal orthodoxies, the bank maintained or was actively repressed (in Germany).10 trenchment and sought to curb taxes and relatively small gold reserves. This policy These critiques of British financial su- expenditures—unlike Americans today, facilitated global trade but came at the premacy underpinned Patrick O’Brien’s liberal Britons blanched at the thought expense of Britain’s financial health in comprehensive rebuttal of any hegemonic of running deficits to sustain an empire, wartime, when the country could not transition between Great Britain and the believing that peacetime probity was vital count on a large trade surplus to finance United States.11 O’Brien argued that the to Great Britain’s credibility if the nation its war effort.8 narrative of hegemonic transition was an needed to borrow in wartime. For British JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Toprani 31 elites, the prospect of resurrecting a fiscal- “exorbitant privilege” of relying on of the Qing dynasty in China and the military state was doubly horrifying at foreign savers to finance its persistent weakness of Meiji Japan.26 a time of demands for extension of the budget and current account deficits.18 For Leaving aside that the coal-fired franchise. They would countenance the example, the cumulative U.S. current ac- industrial revolution laid the seeds for latter only by locking in a set of policy count deficit from 1992 to 2019 (which the continental powers to undermine preferences that constrained the scope is matched by corresponding capital sur- the Columbian era through the use of of government spending: adherence to pluses—that is, capital imports) is equal to railroads to move industrialized armies, the gold standard, balanced budgets, 83 percent of total U.S. defense spending the peculiarities of the coal industry deflation (to protect creditors), and during those years.19 and the gradual eclipse of coal as the laissez-faire. If anything, O’Brien understated his world’s dominant source of propul- This approach may have preserved case by neglecting to pay sustained atten- sion fuel during the first half of the 20th some measure of social harmony, but it tion to hydrocarbons, specifically coal and century seriously constrained British came at the expense of British strategic oil, which were also essential ingredients power. Although Great Britain did pos- interests once rival powers and ideolo- of the industrialization, motorization, sess large domestic coal supplies, its coal gies emerged. As Michael Howard once and mechanization of warfare.20 Ample industry (until nationalization) was, due observed, resource constraints and an supplies of hydrocarbons do not necessar- to privatization, fractured into a number incipient distaste for Europe encouraged ily make a Great Power so much as they of rival companies that never achieved British officials to focus on imperial and enable or constrain powers from utilizing the vertical or horizontal integration home defense at the expense of a “con- fully the tools at their disposal.21 But we of the major oil companies.27 Coal tinental commitment” to Europe.14 The should not assume that energy is a uni- was also more labor intensive than the failure to invest in a proper army capable form commodity—just as the chemical capital-intensive oil industry, which left of intervening on the Continent may, properties of coal and oil differ, so too do it more vulnerable to coordinated strike as O’Brien observed, have backfired by their geopolitical effects.22 or sabotage action.28 And although coal depriving Great Britain of a credible deter- Coal was an essential ingredient was a valuable British export, much of it rent against German aggression in 1914.15 behind Great Britain’s sustained, ex- went to nearby markets in Europe, so it The contrast with American eco- ponential growth in the 19th century never became a globally traded commod- nomic, financial, and military power since as a feedstock for factories, railroads, ity like oil.29 Finally, while coal enabled World War II could not be starker. The and steamship lines.23 Coal also allowed fortunate nations to make the transition United States not only took up the role Britain to retain its naval superiority as from organic to mineral economies, it of the dominant naval power from Great steam-powered ironclads replaced wind- was a source of energy appropriate only Britain, but it also quickly established its powered sailing ships. Not only could to the “Paleotechnic” era of iron, textiles, control of the aerial domain of warfare, British factories and shipyards produce and steam power—what some historians which was bolstered by a vast atomic large numbers of the new ships, but called the First Industrial Revolution.30 arsenal after the Korean War and an Britain’s domestic supplies of coal and By contrast, oil was the quintessential extensive set of overseas bases to project stranglehold over maritime coal supplies energy source for the “Neotechnic” age power deep into the Eurasian heartland.16 (through a large fleet of colliers and of steel, internal combustion, chemicals, Its vast military spending has, contrary to extensive network of bases) also meant and electricity—the Second Industrial the fears of conservatives such as Dwight that other navies and merchant marines— Revolution. Without access to patents Eisenhower, not created any “guns including those of the United States in jealously guarded by German chemical or butter” dilemma. Nominal defense the Pacific before the completion of the companies through their alliances with oil spending has risen steadily since the Panama Canal—depended on British companies, coal producers had no ability Korean War, even as the defense share of sufferance.24 to produce synthetic fuels or enter the gross domestic product and even govern- But while coal solidified British petrochemical industry.31 The latter, in ment spending has decreased.17 primacy in the 19th century, it did not particular, was a major consumer for pe- One of the factors that made this pos- create Great Britain’s geopolitical pri- troleum besides transportation and power sible was the remarkable predominance macy. Britain was preeminent by 1815 generation. The petrochemical industry of the dollar in global finance. Across the following its victories over France, and that emerged after World War II became world an insatiable demand for dollars as economic growth had already begun the world’s primary source of synthetic a reserve currency or dollar-denominated to take off as a result of the earlier agri- rubber and helped spearhead the “green securities, the liquidity of the market for cultural revolution and the institutional revolution” through the diffusion of U.S. treasuries, and the attractiveness of legacies of the fiscal-military state.25 But fertilizers developed from petrochemicals the U.S. market for external investment— British primacy also persisted due to the (not to mention the oil-fueled mechani- no doubt aided by the incomparable reach fragmentation of Europe and the relative zation of agriculture). of American cultural preferences—have quiescence of Asia following the decline The close relationship between the provided the United States with the oil industry and the health of the global 32 JPME Today / Hydrocarbons and Hegemony JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 economy and petroleum’s indispens- of even foreign oil in dollars. Obviously, power (Nasserist Egypt, Ba’athist Iraq, able role in modern warfare means it is the fact that oil often required payment or revolutionary Iran) could dominate no surprise that the superpowers that in dollars or hard currencies convertible the Middle East, long before President emerged from World War II possessed into dollars was a profound handicap Jimmy Carter articulated his Carter large domestic supplies of oil. But U.S. for countries suffering from balance of Doctrine in 1980.39 Most oil is trans- hegemony depended on more than mere payments deficits. Likewise, reliance on ported by tanker (thanks in part to self-sufficiency, which mostly evaporated dollars and U.S. banks as financial inter- pipelines’ vulnerability to sabotage or after 1948.32 A large U.S. domestic mediaries became yet another source of economic blackmail), which gives the industry created the wherewithal to vulnerability for countries such as Japan: dominant naval power extraordinary expand overseas both for markets and Its access to oil in 1941 was effectively coercive ability in the event of war or for new supplies. This process incentiv- blocked without a formal embargo when crisis since it is difficult for either produc- ized American diplomats to solidify U.S. the United States froze Japanese accounts ing or consuming nations to stockpile predominance in Latin America and in the American banks.37 more than a few months’ worth of oil. influence over budding oil producers The growing demand for oil priced in Even then, doing so entails a tremendous in areas once of marginal interest to the dollars throughout the 20th century en- financial and material cost due to the vast United States (such as the Persian Gulf). abled a form of seigniorage whereby the quantity and diversity of petroleum that Oil also shifted the naval balance in favor United States could pay for imported oil modern nations require, and because it is of the United States even before World using dollars that lost some of their value impossible to recycle oil or petroleum in War I, particularly in the Pacific, where before foreigners could recycle them the same way as other critical commodi- Great Britain and Japan were relatively into U.S. goods and services. The fact ties, such as copper, nickel, tungsten, starved of oil while the U.S. Navy en- that oil is traded in dollars encouraged chromium, and others.40 joyed prolific oilfields in California.33 foreign central and private banks to hold Ultimately, oil—its ubiquity in mod- Oil also gave the United States an dollars as a reserve currency even after ern societies and centrality to military immense advantage during the Second the collapse of the Bretton Woods system affairs, the operations of the industry, and Industrial Revolution. Germany was a in 1971–1973; it also incentivized the geopolitical competition over access—has leader in the development of the internal use of dollars for cross-border trade even served to create an American hegemony combustion engine and was unchallenged when a U.S. actor is not the counterparty, that has no historical parallel in either within the realm of chemicals, but it because dollars can always be exchanged its military or financial dimensions. could not keep pace with U.S. motor- for goods and services around the world. Moreover, hydrocarbons have preserved ization or follow Great Britain and the Nations always had an incentive to earn this power even as the United States, like United States into converting its battle or accumulate dollars even if they traded Great Britain before it, relinquished its fleet to oil before World War I.34 Even little with the United States—yet another status as the world’s dominant industrial Britain for its oil depended on sources form of “exorbitant privilege” that so power and oil producer. While nations controlled directly or indirectly by the enraged critics of American power, albeit such as Saudi Arabia and the Soviet United States and relied after World War one with major costs for certain sectors of Union overtook the United States as an I on U.S. security and financial assistance the U.S. economy. Specifically, if the dol- oil producer in the 1970s, U.S. firms to maintain access. Oil combined with in- lar was to retain its predominance after continued to dominate the international dustrial power—both aircraft production Washington severed the link with gold, trade in oil. Even more important, oil- and petrochemicals—similarly allowed the United States had to embrace full related transactions continued to be the United States to exert dominion capital mobility and commit to provid- denominated in dollars. over the newest domain of warfare—the ing ample liquidity to satisfy economic A century before, coal sustained air—even if the results never matched growth. These developments depressed British primacy but ultimately proved the claims of enthusiasts such as Giulio domestic manufacturing by artificially to be a hindrance as technological, Douhet35 (although recent studies sug- raising U.S. exchange rates and encour- social, and political change affected the gest that the firebombing of Japan during aged U.S. firms to look for cheaper labor structures of nations, economies, and World War II was far more effective at abroad.38 One of the major beneficiaries conventional warfare. Even supplies in producing social disorder than it was in of this process was, of course, China. coal-rich Great Britain were vulnerable Germany36). In effect, American pre- Furthermore, unlike coal, oil is to labor unrest, and the coal unions’ dominance on the high seas and in the air produced in relatively few geographic close links to the Labour Party forced the restricted potential rivals’ access to oil in locales, two of which (North America government to nationalize the industry the 20th century far more extensively than and the Gulf of Mexico/Caribbean) were even as its profitability declined. To make British control of coaling stations ever did in the U.S. orbit. The United States has matters worse, British earnings from coal a century prior. (with the assistance of Great Britain at exports after World War I shrank as new U.S. commercial ascendancy in the least until 1971) worked consistently to sources came online and demand slack- oil industry contributed to the pricing ensure that no rival foreign or domestic ened from the ongoing conversion to oil. JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Toprani 33 Kuwaiti oil well control specialists direct fire control rig over oil well fire in order to complete water blasting method to extinguish fire at Rumaila Oil Field, in southern Iraq, as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom, March 27, 2003 (U.S. Army/James P. Johnson) Before 1914, this last factor was most after British firms began developing the encouraged the United States to devote pronounced in the naval dimension, but Middle East, where security in wartime vast resources to the strategic sinkhole thereafter it spread to other domains of was always questionable. that is the Middle East.41 This status quo warfare thanks to the internal combustion Oil, therefore, in many ways created no longer seems tenable. Even before the engine. Coal was not suitable for internal as well as sustained American hegemony. recent pandemic, climate change threat- combustion, and the transition away One might assume that the resurgence of ened to turn the oil and gas industries’ from steam left Great Britain saddled U.S. domestic oil production during the reserves into stranded assets and therefore with obsolete infrastructure around the “shale revolution” would presage a new erode the industry’s financial and political world (coaling stations and mines—a era of American geopolitical dominance, power.42 And the opportunity costs of version of the “stranded asset” problem). but that is a short-sighted perspective that delaying action must not be overlooked. Finally, Britain had to restructure its naval assumes the future will mimic the past. The United States stopped investing in and maritime power by converting from The fact of anthropogenic climate means battery technology after World War II coal to oil during a period of financial that any future premised on hydrocar- because oil was so cheap and plentiful. duress. This shift occurred at a time bon-fueled growth is out of the question. Conversely, China currently possesses when Britain was already under pres- Unless the United States recognizes and the lion’s share of minerals essential for sure from rising naval challenges from acts on this fact, oil may end up posing a lithium batteries and has undertaken the Germany, Japan, and the United States. greater risk to its hegemony than coal did leading role in the latter’s construction.43 Even though Britain managed to defeat for British primacy. Perhaps most important, China is its German rival and win Japan as an ally In the United States, the oil and gas poised to take a decisive role in the global during World War I, it did so with U.S. industry has long enjoyed special politi- effort to curtail carbon dioxide emissions. oil and dollars, while the growth in U.S. cal privileges (tax breaks and incentives) On the one hand, this is welcome news naval power and dominance in oil global and has used them to stifle alternatives. from the country with the largest share of production meant that the United States Preserving control over the access to emissions. On the other hand, it is wor- controlled Britain’s access to oil even oil and the global oil market has also rying because American denialism about 34 JPME Today / Hydrocarbons and Hegemony JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 climate change and China’s growing im- lenge to British Hegemony, 1861–1947,” Geo- Maurice Temple Smith Limited, 1972). graphical Review 99, no. 3 (2009), 403–425. 15 Patrick K. O’Brien, “Imperialism and portance within the global economy are 5 Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in the Rise and Decline of the British Economy, both forcing stalwart U.S. allies such as Depression, 1929–1939 (Berkeley: University of 1688–1989,” New Left Review 238 (1999), the Europeans to seek collaboration with California Press, 1986). 48–80. Beijing, even as China’s foreign policy 6 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World 16 Melvyn P. Leffler,A Preponderance of becomes more bellicose.44 Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Power: National Security, the Truman Admin- Press, 1981), 186; Peter J. Hugill, Transition istration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: in Power: Technological “Warfare” and the Stanford University Press, 1992); Elliott V. Hydrocarbons were undeniably a Shift from British to American Hegemony Since Converse III, Circling the Earth: United States necessary condition for Anglo-American 1919 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2018), Plans for a Postwar Overseas Military Base Sys- predominance, but there is a possibil- chapter 1. tem, 1942–1948 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: 7 ity that the latter can thrive only if the Robert E. Hannigan, The New World Air University Press, 2005). Power: American Foreign Policy, 1898–1917 17 Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry world depends on the former for its (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, S. Truman and the Origins of the National energy needs. The era of Euro-American 2013); The Great War and American Foreign Security State, 1945–1954 (Cambridge, UK: predominance was always an outlier in Policy, 1914–1924 (Philadelphia: University of Cambridge University Press, 2000); Aaron human history; until at least the 15th Pennsylvania Press, 2017). L. Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison 8 century, if not the 18th century, Asia Paul M. Kennedy, “Strategy Versus State: America’s Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Finance in Twentieth-Century Great Britain,” Grand Strategy (Princeton: Princeton Uni- accounted for a larger share of global The International History Review 3, no. 1 versity Press, 2000); Benjamin O. Fordham, economy activity because of its larger (1981), 44–61. “Paying for Global Power: Costs and Benefits population and more efficient administra- 9 P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British of Postwar U.S. Military Spending,” in The tive and production techniques.45 What Imperialism: 1688–2015, 3rd ed. (London: Long War: A New History of U.S. National if the transition away from hydrocarbons Routledge, 2016); Lance E. Davis and Robert Security Policy Since World War II, ed. Andrew A. Huttenback, with the assistance of Susan J. Bacevich (New York: Columbia University accelerates the process of the world Gray Davis, Mammon and the Pursuit of Em- Press, 2007), 371–404. returning to a premodern economic pire: The Political Economy of British Imperial- 18 Barry Eichengreen, Exorbitant Privilege: balance of power—that is to say, an Asia- ism, 1860–1912 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future dominated or even Sino-centric world University Press, 1988); Patrick K. O’Brien, of the International Monetary System (Oxford: order? “The Costs and Benefits of British Imperialism, Oxford University Press, 2011); Victoria de 1846–1914,” Past & Present, no. 120 (1988), Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance To return to the introductory thesis, 163–200; Paul Kennedy, “Debate: The Costs Through Twentieth-Century Europe (Cam- it was the combination of American and Benefits of British Imperialism 1846– bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). industrial power and American pre- 1914,” Past & Present 125 (1989), 186–192; 19 Herman Mark Schwartz, “The Dollar and ponderant influence over the global oil Patrick K. O’Brien, “The Costs and Benefits of Empire,” Phenomenal World, July 16, 2020, trade that served as a key pillar of U.S. British Imperialism 1846–1914: Reply,” Past & available at JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Toprani 35 26 Kennedy, “Strategy Versus Finance”; the Third Reich, ed. H.W. Koch (New York: Metals for 100% Renewable Scenarios,” in John Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and St. Martin’s, 1986), 331–359; John Perkins, Achieving the Paris Climate Agreement Goals, Fall of the British World-System, 1830–1970 “Coins for Conflict: Nickel and the Axis, ed. Sven Teske (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1933–1945,” The Historian 55, no. 1 (1992), 2019), available at 36 JPME Today / Hydrocarbons and Hegemony JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 U.S. Air Force Chief Master Sergeant Mario Aceves, Medical Readiness Training Exercise chief enlisted manager, uses Spanish-language skills to speak with woman during exercise New Horizons 2018, May 14, 2018, in Coclé Province, Panama (U.S. Air Force/Dustin Mullen) Linking Foreign Language Capabilities with Expeditionary Requirements By Douglas J. Robb, Brian H. Neese, and Cara Aghajanian hether combined forces are in any shared endeavor goes up expo- jumping out of airplanes nentially. Language, regional expertise, W together, turning wrenches and culture (LREC) capabilities are “an side by side, or providing direct enduring critical competency” and a Dr. Douglas J. Robb is the Joint Medical Chair patient care as a clinical team, security powerful force multiplier.1 at the National Defense University. Lieutenant Colonel Brian H. Neese, USAF, MD, is Deputy cooperation activities must bridge the Department of Defense (DOD) ef- Director of the 81st Medical Group at Keesler Air culture and language divides between forts to train, track, and utilize members Force Base, Mississippi. Cara Aghajanian serves our partner militaries. It is simply a with foreign language competencies are as the Director of Language Analytics, Testing, and Culture at the Defense Language and requirement. When our personnel can a substantial human capital investment in National Security Education Office. speak that other language, their value support of all-domain, globally integrated JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Robb, Neese, and Aghajanian 37 U.S. Air Force Master Sergeant Anthony Sepongviwat, linguist augmentee with Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Accounting Agency, directs other team members during recovery mission, in Laos, April 5, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/George Melendez) operations. These competencies at multiple levels do not identify or task security cooperation and operational strengthen our international alliances and language-enabled personnel. Because readiness skills training mission. This partnerships, inform our joint planning, mission planners compete for limited analysis informs potential improve- and create competitive advantages in a resources, they prefer to keep manpower ments to the joint planning process and rapidly evolving security environment. requirements as broad and generic as ensures that DOD, military Services, The full return on this investment occurs possible. They come to view foreign and individual joint personnel enter the when these skilled individuals participate language capability as extraneous since, virtuous cycle of LREC capitalization, in the combatant commander’s security technically, missions could be executed receiving the full benefit of human capital cooperation mission or other military without this skill set; however, this wedge investment. activities in times of peace or war. A vir- separating requirement and capability tuous cycle of LREC capitalization results, means that we do not capitalize on the Building the Requirement as these participants advance the security initial skills investment, tabling potential Every spring, USSOUTHCOM sends cooperation mission as well as enhance downstream effects on our training, force uniformed medical professionals into their own operational readiness and attest development, and even the security coop- Central and South America to deliver to Service force development efforts. eration mission. We pay the upfront cost; direct patient care to indigenous, high- So it may come as a surprise to we do not reap the full potential benefit. need populations. These efforts, often discover that personnel with existing The U.S. Southern Command called humanitarian missions, are sup- language skills are often purposefully (USSOUTHCOM) annual deployment- ported by a military training exercise not employed in the joint expeditionary for-training exercise known as New that is driven by legal and military environment. Two gaps in the joint plan- Horizons offers a glimpse of this discon- obligations to do two things: develop ning process sideline foreign language nect in real time. Looking specifically at the joint force’s operational readiness capability on missions that this capability New Horizons 2018 in Panama as a case skills that our medics need to deploy, is meant to serve: combatant command study, we evaluate a proof-of-concept execute the mission, and then redeploy planning documents do not request planning effort that fully leveraged home; and advance the combatant com- language-enabled forces; and planners culture and language to accomplish a mander’s theater security cooperation 38 JPME Today / Foreign Language and Expeditionary Requirements JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 agenda in the region.2 The latter objec- As the war on terror progressed, across a range of medical, surgical, tive includes building access and influ- DOD accelerated its language acquisition dental, veterinary, and other health- ence for longer term diplomatic efforts. efforts. Although instructional programs care specialties. The core mission was This objective may also strengthen the such as Rosetta Stone were given away health fair–style events welcoming all multidomain networks so important to through the base library, it became clear comers to receive immunizations as combatting illicit trafficking in a state that language skills were not a fungible well as primary, dental, and optometry or region.3 This was certainly the case commodity easily procured. It was also care. U.S. teams would coordinate during New Horizons 2018. clear that the personnel who needed with Panamanian Ministry of Health As joint operational plans began for language and cultural skills were not just personnel, local police, politicians, New Horizons 2018, task force leader- the intelligence unit’s linguist, the special social workers, and other stakeholders ship considered the role of foreign operator, or the foreign area officer. to care for hundreds of patients every language capabilities in this mission. Language skills were needed, to some day in makeshift clinical spaces such as Leaders saw a preview during planning degree or another, by all general-purpose elementary schools. conferences, when regional health di- forces involved in the counterinsurgency With this concept of operations for- rectors from Panama came to Tucson, effort. Security forces, medical profes- mulating, the next operational planning Arizona, to build the concept of opera- sionals, and many other occupations steps were sourcing the personnel who tions. The English language skills of our were coming into direct contact with would execute the mission and determine Panamanian partners varied widely, as did village leaders. Successfully communicat- how they would communicate with the our team’s understanding of Panamanian ing across language and cultural barriers Panamanians. In spite of the clear need health, ethnic diversity, and geopolitical could make or break missions where lives for personnel with foreign language skills, history. All of these things factored into were on the line and the commander’s USSOUTHCOM’s planning guidance our decisions. If we needed LREC skills theater security cooperation objectives for building the medical teams did not here, in Arizona, at home, how much were at risk. indicate any language requirements. This more would we need them when we That need for foreign language skills was the first of two critical planning gaps. deployed hundreds of joint medics on the is just as valuable today, in support of The plan for communicating with ground in rural Panama? the National Defense Strategy’s posture patients, local healthcare workers, and For that matter, how did New of near-peer competition. Language other stakeholders was to rely on local Horizons military clinicians intend to and cross-cultural communication skills volunteer Spanish language interpreters, practice medicine in that country? How guarantee our ability to establish and usually students from nearby universi- would pediatricians develop the clinical develop allies and partners who then en- ties; however, experience shows a wide history of their patients? How would able our competitive military advantage variation in quality of interpretation and surgeons garner consent from non– and form a “strategic center of gravity.”5 even day-to-day event attendance from English-speaking patients? The answers DOD has therefore institutionalized the such a group. Because these groups are to these questions would be the key to LREC effort, codifying it in various di- not organic assets, New Horizons mis- mission success or failure. The oppor- rectives, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of sion leads have no operational control tunity to advance operational readiness Staff instructions, and a plethora of other to ensure the capability is available when and the combatant commander’s military Service and agency guidance documents. or where it is needed most, or that its objectives hinged on our ability to suc- More important, the recently com- quality is mission appropriate. In clinical cessfully navigate the linguistic matters of pleted Capabilities-Based Requirements settings, patient-provider communica- the mission. Identification Process reviewed important tion can determine whether a medical combatant command mission require- intervention cures an illness or causes DOD Foreign Language Program ments and mission-essential tasks and harm. High-quality, reliable language and Capability Overview identified the required supporting LREC interpretation is a mission require- The current National Defense Strategy capabilities.6 As a result, combatant com- ment—and must be considered one. puts a premium on building partners mand operational plans now have the Between U.S. task force and host- and allies, but this effort is not new baseline to build an LREC annex and nation leadership, activity coordination to DOD. As U.S. military power layer foreign language acquisition into is another area fully reliant on language began projecting into regions around U.S. military activities across the spec- skills and cross-cultural knowledge. the globe in the early 20th century, trum of competition and conflict. Synchronizing mission objectives, build- the ability to communicate in native ing relationships, and coordinating languages became fundamental to our The Sourcing Dilemma force employment through a range of national defense. DOD created various New Horizons mission planners devel- daily, even hourly, problems depend on language schools that over time consoli- oped a concept of operations that effective communication. In this way, dated into today’s Defense Language would deploy in multiple provinces language capability has a direct impact on Institute Foreign Language Center.4 more than 100 uniformed medics the security cooperation mission. JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Robb, Neese, and Aghajanian 39 Without specific requirements in experiences in foreign countries. The to keep 120 foreign languages and dia- USSOUTHCOM’s planning guid- focus languages change over time to suit lects on retainer when needed across a ance, Service component planners could the Strategic Language List and demands broad spectrum of missions around the not justify adding support for foreign expressed by operational organiza- world. language interpreters through either tions to the Air Force Senior Language Given this inventory of capable, eager, civilian contractors or a request for forces Authority.8 Since its founding in 2013, and financially compensated language- (RFF). New Horizons task force leaders LEAP has matriculated more than 3,000 qualified personnel, the question then again stepped back to ask a broader set personnel in 95 target languages.9 becomes how to identify and access them of questions: Does the U.S. military lack Outside the boundary of specific for joint mission requirements. Service relevant language capability in its own training platforms, the language capabil- personnel management systems have ways inventory? Are there not military doc- ity of the force is certified and tracked by of marking and tracking individuals with tors, nurses, pharmacists, and medical the Defense Language Proficiency Test specialized skills that go beyond stan- technicians who speak Spanish? If there (DLPT). This standardized test evaluates dard occupational codes. The Air Force, are, then tasking Spanish speakers would proficiency in the domains of reading, for example, uses Special Experience immediately resolve the vexing question listening, and speaking; it reports the Identifiers (SEIs) to document regional of communication, absolving the need for results using the Federal Government’s expertise as well as participation in LEAP interpreters. It would also build deeper Interagency Language Roundtable and in the International Health Specialist bonds and trust between patients and scale (0 through 5 in ascending level of program. The latter is akin to a medical medical providers, as well as send a signal proficiency). A score of 2 in a language foreign area officer program and requires to our Panamanian partners that the U.S. domain is considered functionally profi- a minimum level of foreign language military is overwhelmingly committed as cient. The Air Force LREC office reports capability. The SEIs are tracked in the a security partner. So, then, if the foreign that its current inventory has more than member’s personnel record and can language capability is out there, how do 14,000 Airmen who tested at a 2/2 or be queried in the Air Force personnel we find it and put it to best use? higher in over 100 languages. system. A key incentive in this system is All language proficiency test results DOD Foreign Language DOD’s foreign language bonus pay. are automatically populated in the Training Pipeline and Congress mandates this pay and sets Defense Manpower Data Center, the Capability Identification the ceiling at $1,000 per month per central DOD source for human resource The DOD foreign language training individual. Determining which languages management. This repository provides pipeline can be roughly divided into receive pay and how much each language visibility for any stakeholder to iden- formal (acquiring a new language) and receives is a matrix that changes over time tify language capability across DOD. sustainment (enhancing language profi- based on the Service-specific Strategic Furthermore, the Defense Readiness ciency) efforts. The Defense Language Language List. This memorandum Reporting System has integrated the Institute Foreign Language Center qualifies a foreign language as Immediate Language Readiness Index, a data is DOD’s premier foreign language Investment, Emerging, or Enduring, visualization tool that shows both the training institute. Using both resident with some languages further qualified as language requirement and the joint and nonresident Language Training Prevalent-in-the-Force. How a language force’s language capability inventory. Detachments, the institute’s efforts are is categorized, as well as the member’s These databases highlight individual for- directly tied to requirements around the DLPT language score, career field, cur- eign language capabilities, ensuring their world for foreign area officers, linguists, rent job billet, and any number of other potential identification by joint planners cryptologists, and other members Service-specific policies, will determine shaping expeditionary force employment. going to units with language-coded whether—and in what amount—a mem- billets. According to the U.S. Army ber receives bonus pay. Pay rates are, Tasking the Language Capability Web site, on a given day this institute is however, the same for officer and enlisted Combatant commanders set the matriculating approximately 3,500 per- without regard to pay grade. requirement for joint force execution. sonnel through curricula in 24 foreign According to data from the Military As such, they are sensitive to discon- languages.7 Personnel Budget Book, the Services nects between mission requirements The Air Force’s Culture and combine to invest about $9 million every and joint force capabilities, readiness, or Language Center is the premier ex- month in foreign language bonus pay. force development. When commanders ample of a Service language sustainment The Army leads the way, carrying more require capabilities from outside of their program. Part of Air University, the than half of DOD’s language pay recipi- assigned forces, they look across the Language Enabled Airman Program ents. At the end of fiscal year 2018, DOD joint force by initiating an RFF. (LEAP) enhances proficiency through had spent $107 million on foreign lan- It is this part of the joint planning a variety of training modules, including guage bonus pay for more than 35,000 process, the RFF, that starts a long bu- online classes as well as full-immersion joint personnel. DOD is therefore paying reaucratic chain identifying qualified and 40 JPME Today / Foreign Language and Expeditionary Requirements JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Soldier with Joint Task Force Mustang, California National Guard, performs medical screening using American Sign Language interpreter on mobile device, at California State University campus in Los Angeles, February 15, 2021, to ensure accessibility of COVID-19 vaccine (U.S. Air National Guard/Neil Mabini) ready personnel from the various Services personnel. First, as discussed, there was Working with the Air Force LREC and then deploying them under the no demand signal for Spanish speakers in office, planners received data from the Air operational control of a joint force com- USSOUTHCOM’s planning guidance. Force Personnel System listing individuals mander. The RFF must reflect everything Second, planners were unaware of the with qualifier columns such as foreign a planner desires out of an individual: language-enabled personnel inventory language, language proficiency test score, occupation, rank, and any specialty skills and how to access it. Under these circum- and any International Health Specialist (such as foreign language capabilities). stances, there was little to no prospect of or LREC-related SEI. This list included The Joint Staff J3, as the Global Force this tasking request delivering a Spanish- 2,770 language-enabled officers and en- Management allocation lead, validates speaking healthcare provider. In the end, listed medics from every specialty in the this capability request and recommends component planners agreed to add line Air Force Medical Service. Drilling down a Service to source the manpower.10 The remarks stating that Spanish language further, 1,027 of them were Spanish request flows down the Service’s chain of skills were “highly desired.” speakers, and 353 held the International command to a specific unit, which assigns As a workaround, task force leader- Health Specialist identifier. Also, officer an individual according to the request. ship asked permission to design a proof specialty consultants and enlisted career The unit then forwards the RFF back of concept intended to layer foreign field managers were able to identify the way it came. There is now a name language capabilities into the manning additional medical personnel with self- for the combatant command to place on solution, which led to implementing two assessed Spanish skills who had not taken the Time-Phased Force and Deployment manpower initiatives: pre-source medical the DLPT. Data sheet, ready for employment on the taskings based on SEIs and DLPT scores; Language-qualified Airmen were then mission. and access additional interpretation sup- vetted by local command, deployment Two factors hindered the New port from nonmedical Airmen with both band obligations, and Major Command Horizons joint planning process in DLPT scores and additional interpreta- Functional Area Managers. Once an finding and tasking language-enabled tion training via LEAP. Airman was cleared for participation, the JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Robb, Neese, and Aghajanian 41 RFF arrived through normal channels to bordering the jungle next to Colombia. in a language they could understand. the individual’s unit. The unit assigned In security cooperation terms, this was Despite a team composition that was only the pre-sourced name and then returned the hot zone for illicit trafficking where 8 percent of the originally planned force, the request as usual. Finally, the Airman’s our humanitarian outreach would have USSOUTHCOM made tremendous name was added to the New Horizons had tremendous impact. Losing this gains in visibility and access in the region. Time-Phased Force and Deployment mission was a significant blow to our Where a once-canceled mission threat- Data sheet for deployment to Panama. overall effort in Panama. ened our security cooperation objectives, Concurrently, New Horizons task The decision was made to rescope foreign language capabilities enabled an force leadership worked with the Air the mission. Although it was true that effort of great strategic value. Force’s LEAP office to identify Spanish we could not send a full medical team to Fortunately, the follow-on medical speakers from any functional community deliver high-volume care, what if we sent and surgical teams were able to execute able to provide interpretation support. a small team of three or four physicians to as planned. This is where the proof- Certain qualified LEAP participants integrate into the local healthcare system? of-concept sourcing intervention fully receive in-country language and cultural They could partner with Panamanian materialized. Of the durational leadership immersion training. The program identi- colleagues to deliver care in hospitals team, 66 percent of them spoke Spanish, fied three high-quality personnel with and clinics throughout the region. They including all members of the command DLPT-certified advanced language skills could learn how locals treat endemic in- staff. Furthermore, an unprecedented and additional training to support New fectious diseases in a resource-constrained 75 percent of Air Force members on the Horizons. This proof of concept dem- environment. In truth, such a mission medical outreach team had Spanish lan- onstrated a well-suited match—applying might offer unprecedented training guage skills—this directly facilitated the training to an operational need. opportunities and advance the overall care of 7,200 patients in just 3 weeks. Layering this language capability into security cooperation effort. It could be Still, such a performance measure the original RFF took manual control done—but not without planners linking is routine for these types of missions. over a systematic, if not automated, directly to the language skills inventory. The impact of language skills is better process. Vetting individuals was time-con- Four Spanish-speaking Air Force reflected in three subtle but important suming and inefficient. Still, the proof of physicians were identified. They were ways: direct and clear communication concept demonstrated that the inventory tasked with and then executed this mis- with patients, expanded medical training of members with documented foreign sion, embedding themselves into three opportunities, and intimate collaboration language skills was readily available in regional health clinics. Over the course of with local healthcare professionals. the force. Uniquely qualified individuals 1 month, they saw 350 patients in busy In these health fair–style events, clini- could be systematically identified in the clinical practices, treating them with local cians, nurses, and medical technicians DOD personnel management system. resources and therapies, and collaborating process hundreds of patients every day. They could also be tasked formally, albeit intimately with physicians, nurses, and The team’s language skills allowed them through a laborious by-name-request staff to manage care. The team also took to largely bypass the need for interpreters, basis. This tasking was the second critical part in a combined medical outreach creating a seamless flow among provid- planning gap—that between language re- event with Panama’s National Border ers, patients, and Panamanian partners. quirement and capability—brought about Service and even linked up with social During patient care episodes, commonly by the joint planning process. However, workers and clinicians to make home used phrases were understood in their the potential was established for the joint visits. Practicing in these resource-con- proper cultural context, minimizing the planning process to cast a wide LREC strained environments challenged the Air risk of misunderstanding and enabling net across a large pool of qualified and Force physicians’ operational readiness a deeper connection to patients. In eligible personnel. If properly utilized, skills, while bilateral exchanges to develop fact, multiple patients and host-nation this net could allow the formal joint plan- treatment plans strengthened clinical staff inquired, incredulously, of our ning process to deliver better results than capacities and interoperability for both Servicemembers, “Do all of you speak would a manual workaround. Panamanian and U.S. clinicians. Spanish?” The team’s Spanish language skills Having the agility that comes with The Language Skills Impact varied from intermediate level to fluent. foreign language capability, the mission As planning reached fever pitch just a All were culturally sensitive and eager to commander carved out small Embedded few months before execution, congres- engage with their patients and profes- Health Engagement Teams to work in sional appropriation delays forced plan- sional colleagues. The task force’s public local area clinics. Ultimately, 27 med- ners to cancel the first medical mission. affairs team broadcast these efforts widely ics embedded into six clinics across This operation was scheduled to send through social media. Each physician also two provinces. This effort exposed 45 medics to execute health fair–style was interviewed on a local radio station: members to local disease burdens and events for 1 month in the Darién The voices of our U.S. Air Force medics pathology not seen in the traditional region, a strategically important location were reaching the ears of Panamanians medical outreach events. As one 42 JPME Today / Foreign Language and Expeditionary Requirements JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Iraqi brigadier general reviews inventory with U.S. Soldier and linguist, as part of U.S. Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund program, as U.S. Soldiers provide Iraqi border guard forces more than $2 million of ammunition for weapons from previous divestment at Al Asad Air Base, April 30, 2021 (U.S. Army/Clara Soria-Hernandez) member’s after-action report noted, Affairs team members—saved these mis- force-enabling function was on full “The severity and complexity warranted sions by facilitating communication with display in the Panamanian hospital oper- constant requests for consultations and local nongovernmental organizations. ating theaters; there they helped process . . . meaningful conversations regarding Similar logistics delays for the surgical patients, interpret for providers, and current clinical practice guidelines, evi- team required heavy LREC lifting to communicate constantly with local staff dence-based medicine, and . . . significant work through challenges and ultimately and logisticians. Their efforts maintained pathology (e.g., lung cancer, elephantia- prevent any mission degradation. Time clinical workflows and protected patient sis, new-onset seizures).”11 The language and again, foreign language capabilities safety standards, directly aiding 315 eye and cultural competency of participants neutralized tactical threats while also and ear surgeries. and key leaders ensured this improved forging deep and lasting partnerships training experience. with Panamanian colleagues in the public Conclusion New Horizons clinical team leaders and private sectors. The National Defense Strategy priori- collaborated on the ground with Ministry The three LEAP-trained Airmen tizes readiness and the strengthening of of Health of Panama personnel to rapidly drew on specialized training and of- our international partnerships. Foreign troubleshoot operational and tactical fered a baseline interpretation capability language capabilities cut to the heart of challenges, of which there were many. that could be controlled and relied on both. DOD and the military Services For example, medical supply shipments every day. These advanced-level Spanish recognize this fact and consider lan- were delayed, leaving veterinary and op- speakers offered a wealth of language guage skills to be a key readiness com- tometry teams with few services to offer. and cultural knowledge that facilitated ponent for executing globally integrated Spanish-speaking personnel—including key leader interactions, provider-patient operations.12 International Health Specialists, LEAP- interviews, and public events such as DOD and individual Servicemembers trained interpreters, and the Marine Civil partner recognition ceremonies. Their invest heavily in acquiring, enhancing, JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Robb, Neese, and Aghajanian 43 Language skills, regional understanding, and sustaining foreign language capa- Notes bilities within the joint force. These and cultural awareness and its implica- members and their language proficiency tions on joint operational planning 1 Department of Defense Directive test scores are identifiable within DOD should be reinforced at various education 5160.41E, Defense Language, Regional Exper- and Service-specific personnel systems. and training levels. When planners move tise, and Culture (LREC) Program (Washing- Efforts are increasing to ensure this into joint operational planning roles, ton, DC: Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness, August 21, 2015). capability is linked more deliberately to they should master how to link foreign 2 Department of Defense Instruction combatant command security coopera- language capabilities with mission re- 2205.02, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance tion objectives and operational plans. quirements. Training should ensure that (HCA) Activities (Washington, DC: Under Combatant commanders can now utilize any planner involved in the RFF process Secretary of Defense for Policy, May 22, 2017). 3 LREC annexes to their operational plans is comfortable identifying and tasking Kurt W. Tidd, United States Southern Command: 2017–2027 Theater Strategy (Doral, in order to send these demand signals to foreign language capabilities. FL: U.S. Southern Command, April 4, 2017). the force providers. Finally, language sustainment 4 Cameron Binkley, The Defense Language Two specific gaps in the joint plan- programs, such as LEAP, as well Institute Foreign Language Center: A Pictorial ning process exist, however, and they as foreign area officer and security History (Monterey, CA: Defense Language keep operational requirements separated cooperation officer training should le- Institute Foreign Language Center, 2011). 5 Joseph E. Dunford, “Allies and Partners from the DOD LREC inventory. The verage recurring combatant command Are Our Strategic Center of Gravity,” Joint combatant commands do not consistently deployment-for-training events, such as Force Quarterly 87 (4th Quarter 2017). demand this capability in their planning USSOUTHCOM’s New Horizons or 6 Gary D. Bauleke, interview with the guidance, and joint planners are largely U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s Pacific Defense Human Resources Activity’s Defense unaware of how to identify personnel Angel, as capstone training measures Language and National Security Education Office about executing the LREC-related with foreign language skills and task for their participants. These events are Capabilities-Based Requirements Identification them appropriately. The root problem is tailor-made to absorb language capability Process, June 29, 2020. scarcity of resources; a Servicemember from across the DOD language training 7 U.S. Army, “Defense Language Insti- tasked to support a security cooperation enterprise, providing a real-world culture tute,” available at 44 JPME Today / Foreign Language and Expeditionary Requirements JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 U.S. Special Operations Soldier returns fire while conducting multiday Afghan-led offensive operations against Taliban, in Mohammad Agha District, Logar Province, Afghanistan, July 28, 2018 (U.S. Air Force/Nicholas Byers) A Lesson from an Ancient Facilitating Retreat and Desertion Among Insurgencies By Joseph N. Rudolphi ven in our modern age we look to onic Wars. This article has two related of his main ideas is controversial: An old ideas for wisdom, but old does objectives: first, to discuss what a spe- enemy’s flight should not be prevented E not mean obsolete, and old voices cific ancient voice has to offer us, and but facilitated.1 Because Vegetius was can offer counsel. For instance, today second, to consider how such old ideas writing about conventional warfare, this Carl von Clausewitz is held in high could be implemented today, thousands idea would not seem relevant to the many regard, though in his own time he was of years later, in modern warfare. commanders throughout history who merely a minor player in the Napole- That ancient voice is Publius Flavius would come to read these words—rarely Vegetius Renatus, more commonly re- has a plan to encircle and completely ferred to as Vegetius, a Roman general destroy an enemy been replaced with a who wrote De Re Militari in the 5th plan to let them run scared. In World Joseph N. Rudolphi is an Emergency Response Technician with the Colorado Springs, Colorado, century, hoping that his counsel would War II, for example, armies made great Police Department. help return Rome to its glory days. One attempts to encircle enemy forces. It JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Rudolphi 45 U.S. Navy Douglas A-4E Skyhawks from Attack Squadrons VA-163 Saints and VA-164 Ghost Riders attack Phuong Dinh railroad bypass bridge, 10 kilometers north of Thanh Hoe, North Vietnam, on September 10, 1967 (U.S. Navy/Jerry Breast) was of great concern rather than a relief, have the route of its withdrawal made for by desertion than by slaughter. especially early on for the Axis powers the opposing force. The opposing force, Extermination does not extinguish a fighting the Soviet Union, that enemies throwing all effort into a retreat, might cause; in some cases, it may further a could escape these encirclements.2 And succeed in saving some of its own but cause in the long run. “Remember the so, because of a historical lack of imple- would be effortlessly cut down. Vegetius Alamo” is a case in which the total exter- mentation, Vegetius’s ideas largely faded would win a battle without forcing a mination of an enemy eventually became into obscurity. slaughter to the death—an effort that a rallying cry. Brutal German atrocities Vegetius, though, believed that an would have the potential to harm his own in the Soviet Union during World War enemy, if trapped, with no hope for army. Vegetius’s strategy is to tempt an II turned enemies of the Communist escape and no hope for mercy, might yet enemy with the idea of saving its own regime into soldiers willing to fight—not find hope in fighting to the death. He forces. Indeed, this approach worked for the protection of the state but for wrote, “Fear itself will arm an enemy, in conventional warfare recently, when themselves and their families.4 Showing and despair inspires courage.” He argued Ukrainian forces, encircled by Russian an adversary that their cause is worthless, that, if left a chance to escape, an enemy and separatist armies in Ilovaisk, were though, and getting them to abandon it would put all its effort into staying alive. offered a corridor for retreat; they took it would be the better strategy. To Vegetius, a perfect victory would and fell into an ambush that had decisive Can a coalition force create a strategy look like this: An opposing force would results. A humiliating defeat led to a to put insurgents in a hopeless situation be put into a situation where withdrawal ceasefire.3 and generate an existential crisis? Can would be seen as a benefit. Rather than Equally important is Vegetius’s they achieve a victory against an insur- cut this withdrawal off, Vegetius would idea that an adversary is more hurt gency that Vegetius sees possible against 46 Commentary / A Lesson from an Ancient JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 conventional forces? It is possible. To initial power surge allowed it to fight in will become liabilities to those nations begin, however, we must recognize that the field as a conventional force; however, where they have found sanctuary. To the strategy of state-building is not the as its territory is diminished and its forces restore capability, these insurgents would strategy to achieve peace in places such defeated in the field, it will begin to fight have to make more conventional moves as Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. joint more like the Afghan and earlier Iraqi in- that would have little chance of success force should instead look to its respective surgents. Coalition combat operations in against coalition forces with vastly supe- Service mission statements. For example, the tactical sense seem overly focused on rior conventional capability. Insurgents the U.S. Army mission statement reads, defeating the product of a logistics system may attempt, for example, conventional “To deploy, fight and win our nation’s capable of making people willing to fight. assaults on border passes, hoping to wars by providing ready, prompt and Despite tactical victories, the strategic reopen them.7 When these assaults fail, sustained land dominance by Army forces plan props up a state unable to achieve its insurgents may try to force their needs on across the full spectrum of conflict as part own victories and unable to combat the their sanctuary state—becoming a liability of the joint force.” Rather than prop up network that produces insurgents. where it once was a tool. a state to fight a war via state-building, To achieve Vegetius’s first precondi- Forcing a sanctuary state to reverse the U.S. joint force in cooperation with tion for power—the insurgent must lack its policy is not without historical coalition forces must look to win a domi- the means to effectively fight—a new precedent. In the late 1960s, Jordan nating, and thus decisive, victory. The strategy must focus on coalition forces provided sanctuary to the Palestinian current strategy of state-building simply combating the logistics. Crippling the lo- group Fatah, led by Yasser Arafat. Soon, props up a state to fight a war, leaving co- gistics of an insurgency is needed to back however, the guerrilla group became alition forces in a support role. A support it into a corner, and then diplomacy will a liability to Jordan. Fatah disregarded role would be fine if the states could both be the avenue out for the lower ranking Jordanian law and tried to undermine the win in the field and create in the nation manpower to take. As Vegetius suggests, government. When Jordan’s government an atmosphere less susceptible to enemy desertion of a cause must be facilitated, decided enough was enough, Jordanian recruitment; however, this has not been not prevented. A campaign that success- forces struck back in September the case, and this strategy has been in use fully brings about high levels of desertion 1970. Historian James Gelvin put it for too long—and enemies have been will harm the insurgency beyond repair. simply: “As can be inferred from the emboldened by its failure. This is the overall strategy. epithet ‘Black September,’ the results Coalition forces must look to a plan How are insurgents having their of Arafat’s decision were disastrous for that would match with Vegetius’s two logistics needs met? Jonathan Owen, the Palestinians.”8 The Palestinians suf- ideas: facilitation of retreat and desertion. a former Marine officer and security fered heavy losses and sought refuge in Insurgents do not fight war convention- and protection expert, noted that in- Lebanon. Contrast the results of having ally, and so these two ideas could be surgencies, including those operating the sanctuary state itself crack down to blended into one: Get the enemy to in Afghanistan, receive support from those of an invasion, an approach Israel abandon the cause. Insurgents must be a neighboring state. This predicament took with Fatah’s new sanctuary state. tempted with the idea of saving them- was true in the Vietnam War, the Israeli- The Israeli invasion succeeded in forcing selves. Two necessary preconditions must Palestinian conflicts, and numerous other the relocation of the Palestine Liberation be in place for such a temptation to work: battles. IS is likewise reportedly receiv- Organization (PLO) and Fatah, but Israel The insurgent must lack the means to ef- ing support from other countries in its also gained new enemies. Arafat, the fectively fight, and the insurgent must see region, and many foreigners are among PLO, and Fatah were able to escape and life outside the insurgency as an improve- its ranks. States that provide support are benefited over the long term from the ef- ment to his or her current state. essential for insurgents; they allow sanctu- fects of Israel’s invasion. The first may be achieved by rec- ary, giving insurgents a place to organize Past failures to secure borders and cut ognizing that insurgents, though they for future movements or rest and regroup off logistics have had decisively negative fight asymmetrically, have conventional after a tactical defeat. Osama bin Laden impacts on the ability of U.S. forces to needs. They need food, money, weapons, himself was killed not in Afghanistan but win a war. In Vietnam, rather than secure communications, supplies, and, most in Pakistan, close to its capital and near a the border to stop infiltration from the important, manpower. Combined, these military academy. The Barack Obama ad- Ho Chi Minh trails, the U.S. Armed elements create and sustain the insurgen- ministration rightly pressed Pakistan for Forces chose to just bomb the trails. The cies that for years have evaded defeat. answers on how he could have operated effectiveness of this strategy was doubted Our current strategy seems to do the unnoticed.5 even at the time, but it proceeded following: Prop up our state ally while Removing state support by way of nonetheless. Even with heavy bomb- fighting and defeating enemy manpower strict border security is Owen’s solu- ing, the number of insurgents getting in search-and-destroy operations. The tion to striking at enemy logistics.6 into Vietnam increased over time. U.S. sole exception in recent years has been Owen believes that once insurgents intelligence estimated that 35,000 guer- the so-called Islamic State (IS), whose are denied freedom of movement they rillas got into South Vietnam in 1965; JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Rudolphi 47 in 1967, estimates put that number at of citizens in countries such as Iraq and secure civilian safety difficult. To secure 90,000.9 The Viet Cong could meet Afghanistan could have two major posi- the people, it is necessary to negotiate its conventional logistic needs to fight tive effects. First, a citizen whose life is directly with them, on a local level, rather its guerrilla war. Its state support from being improved by the campaign will be than with their national leaders. North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia was more invested in its success. Second, an Moreover, the United States should neither effectively hindered nor removed. insurgent who is being paralyzed by the encourage the formation of local com- Attacking conventional needs would campaign—while seeing improvements munities; doing so would not only help force insurgents to refocus. By putting in the lives of those who are not—will protect community members but would states supportive of insurgencies into situ- become more likely to desert the cause. also demonstrate an element of trust ations where they must choose between The United States and the North between the militia and the group it their own security or that of the nonstate Atlantic Treaty Organization do make serves. In the past, disarmament achieved group, the United States could begin to efforts to improve civilian life in missions mixed results—for example, in 2005, maneuver insurgents into the trap that such as Operation Resolute Support, when the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Vegetius recommends. While this strategy which has helped make several enhance- Groups program began. At this time, may have an adverse effect on relations ments to the Afghan quality of life.12 the insurgency was growing and Afghan between the United States and those Despite such efforts in Afghanistan, a sur- forces were weak, resulting in fewer local sanctuary states, it has the potential to vey by the Asia Foundation showed that armies available for achieving security.17 improve relations—as those sanctuary just 36.1 percent of Afghans believe their Achieving security on a local level would states come to realize that the dependent country is moving in the right direction; allow improved economic progress on insurgents are as much of a threat to for those who answered it was moving in a local level, allowing the populace to them as they are to others. the wrong direction, security was cited remain where they are. A fixed popu- Pakistan, for example, has already as the main concern.13 In 2020, attacks lace with both a stable economy and a come to this realization. It has been throughout the month of November local militia is less susceptible to being rightfully accused in the past of being a killed over 400 Afghan government recruited by or becoming part of the lo- sanctuary for the insurgents fighting co- forces and civilians.14 Many Afghans are gistics network of an insurgency. alition forces, just as it was to insurgents nervous about the withdrawal of U.S. Allowing communities a chance to fighting Soviet forces. But the situation forces because of the failure to achieve defend themselves is not abandoning did not evolve as Pakistan expected; security. Some fear the Taliban will regain them to take charge of their own defense; rather than sponsoring other groups as power. Others welcome the withdrawal; rather, it is the same logic the United tools for Islamabad’s agenda, groups they reason that, because the United States uses at home regarding civilians like the Taliban have taken advantage of States has failed to achieve security, and law enforcement. Civilians may arm Pakistan.10 The Pakistanis themselves have the withdrawal may at least lower their themselves with certain weapons and recognized the significance of their bor- chances of being caught in the crossfire.15 can use lethal force to defend themselves der problem and have been constructing The violence has meant that the people under certain circumstances. If they can- barriers on the Durand Line, the border have a continuous grievance against the not, law enforcement is there to help. between Afghanistan and Pakistan.11 counterterror campaign, despite some The long war in Afghanistan has caused This is a great opportunity. Pakistan, security improvements throughout their Afghans to develop a gun culture of their previously the haven of bin Laden, is tak- country. For insurgents to be effectively own. They have referred to their weapons ing steps to address the logistics of the tempted out of their respective organiza- as “an insurance policy,” and disarma- insurgency in Afghanistan. These efforts tions, security and economic progress ment was already controversial and not should be praised by the United States must be achieved in unison. popular early on in U.S. involvement.18 and reciprocated on the Afghan side of The failure to achieve security is itself When communities stood up for their the border because they begin to lock an immense burden on the Afghan econ- own defense, the results were positive. In insurgents into Vegetius’s trap. omy, which further stresses the security 2009, 160 local Shinwari tribal leaders in Just as the freedom of insurgents to problem. In Afghanistan, for example, Nangarhar Province made a deal to pub- move abroad must be hindered, their migration is a strategy the Afghan people licly denounce the Taliban, in the hopes local movements must be hampered by use to cope with insecurity. The migrat- this statement would get them some say addressing civilian security, terrorist re- ers are primarily unemployed males, who over their own security. The coalition, cruitment, and even economic concerns. may resort to measures they deem neces- they hoped, would remove corrupt of- Minimizing the negative impacts of a sary for survival.16 These measures may ficials from the national government and counterterror campaign on the lives of be instigating terror itself or simply doing allow the tribes to have a say over who civilians might help them understand that something that aggravates the problem would lead the Afghan national police in eliminating terror could improve their of establishing stability, such as criminal their area. When the tribal leaders took lives, which could adversely affect recruit- activity. At the same time, the constant this stand, their people stopped assisting ment efforts. Improvements to the lives population movements make efforts to the Taliban, delivering a considerable 48 Commentary / A Lesson from an Ancient JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 U.S. Special Operations Servicemembers conduct combat operations in support of Operation Resolute Support, in Southeast Afghanistan, May 2019 (U.S. Army/Jaerett Engeseth) blow to its capabilities. The stand also control. But this is a risk the United national government; local defense forces gave Afghans a chance to improve local States already runs when it supports may then take more matters into their governance. Despite the success of this certain states with corrupt governments. own hands. approach, encouraging future deals at the This risk could be mitigated by reorganiz- Simply put, local support is essen- tribal level was forbidden thereafter due ing the idea behind the militias in such tial for security progress. Without it, to the complaints of the national govern- states as Iraq and Afghanistan. Militias in insurgents could take advantage of the ment.19 The successes in this example, these war-torn states are rightfully feared disconnect between local and national ef- however, suggest that bypassing national due to their size and political influence. forts to combat them, sustain the means governments to negotiate directly with The United States should ensure that of continued resistance, and therefore the communities where terror takes militias are organized and legitimized as maintain hope for their cause. Against an place could bring about decisive results. smaller units, with limited armaments enemy that still has hope and means to If this approach angers national govern- around their actual communities rather fight, Vegetius’s suggestion of allowing ments, then perhaps the United States than large regions of land. They would an escape would have no effect. could, in the future, encourage national be less of a threat to national govern- Insurgent groups could be weak- governments to make these agreements ment yet still invested in their future ened, however, if state and local support themselves, which would ideally produce through defense of their communities. In is greatly reduced. It is perhaps to the similar results and forge trust between 2009, for instance, coalition and Afghan advantage of U.S. forces that insurgents the national governments and local com- forces—out of concern over militias chal- have organized into groups, such as al munities. Entrusting communities to take lenging the national government—lost Qaeda and the Taliban, and not remained a share of their defense would embolden an opportunity to bring local defense as individuals. An organization needs a them as it did these tribal leaders. initiatives in Nangarhar under their con- logistics system capable of supporting There is a risk, however, in allow- trol.20 The bigger threat to the national it. Clausewitz himself believed that, if ing communities to arm and share in government would be local defense initia- an armed group of individuals became their own defense: Warlords could take tives without legitimization through the organized, it could be crushed, causing JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Rudolphi 49 12 remaining individuals with similar hopes will have great difficulty operating un- Resolute Support Mission, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Mission,” available at to see the war as already decided, ceas- detected; their cause will be an uphill 50 Commentary / A Lesson from an Ancient JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 U.S. Army paratroopers assigned to 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade, emplace brazier charge during exercise Rock Shock 2, in Grafenwoehr Training Area, August 12–13, 2019 (U.S. Army/Ryan Lucas) Deconflicting Exercises and Experimentation Under Global Integration By Francis J.H. Park ince its introduction to the tion, expressed through the 2016 NMS of the future force that might appear joint force in the 2016 National and the 2017 Joint Strategic Campaign in the “out years” of the FYDP.1 Two S Military Strategy (NMS), global Plan, focused primarily on force instruments to realize global integra- integration has led to sweeping changes employment in the years of execution tion exist in exercises and experimenta- not only in strategy but also in the pro- of the Future Years Defense Program tion. While they may look similar, they cesses and instruments that implement (FYDP). As it matured in subsequent serve different purposes, and the dis- it. Initial explorations of global integra- strategic directions, including a major tinctions between the two are often not revision of the Joint Strategic Planning apparent to those participating in these System in 2018 and the 2019 Capstone activities. However, the Department of Colonel Francis J.H. Park, USA, is a Historian in Concept for Joint Operations, global Defense (DOD) literature that guides the Joint History and Research Office. integration started to address aspects exercises and experimentation is not JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Park 51 well known outside of the joint force one authoritative source for definitions and experimentation activities. In the ab- development and joint capability devel- of these terms, the definitions that do sence of publicly available reporting from opment communities. A fuller under- exist are more descriptive than norma- more recent exercises or experiments, standing of those activities and their tive. Joint doctrine provides a starting three case studies illustrate the comple- differences will better enable those point, but it is not sufficient to define mentary relationships that exist across responsible for visualizing tomorrow’s this taxonomy. force employment, force development, force and the strategic choices that will Exercises. Consistent with its defini- and force design and, in one case, high- shape the future U.S. military. tion in doctrine, exercises build readiness light the hazards of conflating the three. against an established standard, which Strategic Context suggests training against an existing plan Exercises for Force The 2018 National Defense Strategy or mission-essential task.4 Given their ori- Employment: III Corps (NDS) contains a charter to DOD “to entation on readiness, exercises primarily Battle Command Training out-think, out-maneuver, out-partner, support force employment. Exercises Program Exercise (1989) and out-innovate revisionist powers, may also identify capability gaps that can During the Cold War, the U.S. Army’s rogue regimes, terrorists, and other inform force development work. III Corps had a follow-on mission to threat actors.”2 Implementing that Experiments. In the absence of deploy from its bases in the United charter to the Services and combatant a formal or normative definition, States, draw prepositioned stocks, and commands (CCMDs) occurs through experimentation explores unknown rela- reinforce the North Atlantic Treaty the 2018 NMS. tionships and outcomes that result from Organization (NATO) defense of The 2018 NMS introduces a con- new technologies and concepts, new northern Germany against a Warsaw tinuum of strategic direction comprising applications of existing capabilities, and Pact invasion.8 In light of that mission three strategy horizons to visualize the cur- emerging threats. Experiments drive fur- and the Army’s capstone doctrine of rent and future strategic environment. The ther research and inform decisions on the AirLand Battle, Lieutenant General first, force employment, focuses on attain- future force.5 Thus, defense experimenta- Crosbie Saint, commanding III Corps, ment of the NDS’s near-term objectives, tion is the appropriate process for matters developed a vision of a mobile armored typically from the present to 3 years in relating to force design and its associated corps that could fight after deploying the future. The second, force development, concepts and capability development. with its own or prepositioned equip- adapts the current joint force for greater Defense experimentation generally falls ment, be able to road-march over 100 capability, generally 2 to 7 years in the fu- into three broad methods: workshops, miles, and then fight from the march. ture. The innovation required to maintain wargames, and field experiments. All Expressed through a concept paper competitive advantages over future adver- three share the exploration of unknown written in 1987 by Lieutenant Colonel saries is a function of the third, force design, relationships and outcomes, but their L. Donald Holder, that vision became which typically looks out 5 to 15 years.3 conduct varies considerably. Workshops the focal point for training the corps The reason for these overlapping are forums for discussion of potential and its subordinate units.9 time horizons is their interdependent threats, technologies, and concepts, The first collective training event relationship. Whereas force employ- and they often form the basis for more that allowed III Corps to exercise its ment addresses immediate problems in detailed experimentation. Wargames are corps-level command functions for an the security environment, the lessons simulations that allow for evaluation of attack from the march occurred at Fort learned and readiness assessments in technology, concepts, and concepts of Hood, Texas, in January 1989, during force employment inform the conduct of operation, a common example of which the first corps-level exercise conducted force development to address near-term are tabletop exercises.6 Field experiments by the Army’s Battle Command Training capability gaps. Similarly, the evolutionary involve the use of military personnel and Program (BCTP). That exercise was changes in force development also serve equipment in the anticipated operational predicated on Saint’s vision, Holder’s as a bridge to the more disruptive and environment.7 A clear distinction between concept paper, and the exercise’s own revolutionary change that occurs in force exercises and experiments and the varieties implementation through a series of train- design. Vetting activities across the con- of experimentation will create clarity and ing events. Evaluated tasks for the corps tinuum of strategic direction requires a direction for their respective purposes, included movement control, a corps-level clear eye as to which activities serve which while helping stave off a conflation of the refuel on the move, coordination of horizons of the military strategy. two. Allocating time and resources against close air support and air interdiction, and force employment activities may not bear command and control of the corps while Differentiating Exercises fruit if applied uncritically to force devel- facing long-range artillery fires and spe- and Experiments opment and force design activities. cial operations forces raids.10 Exercises and experiments may look While the continuum of strategic The true validation for Saint’s vision outwardly similar but differ materially direction is a recent construct, it provides and Holder’s concept occurred against an in their purposes. In the absence of any a lens to recontextualize previous exercise adversary far removed from the plains of 52 Features / Deconflicting Exercises and Experimentation JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 M-557 communication vehicles form one wall of command center at new location of 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment during Operation Desert Storm, February 12, 1991 (U.S. Army/David Faas) northern Germany. The theoretical and What had started as a vision and of Staff command post exercise called practical work that had come out of the concept paper in 1987 had been fleshed Nifty Nugget, which occurred October III Corps BCTP exercise bore fruit when out into procedural rigor 2 years later. 10–31, 1978, and simulated a short- VII Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps The January 1989 BCTP was an exercise warning Warsaw Pact attack on NATO. conducted those approach marches not in the classical sense of the term—it was It also coincided with a national exercise once, but twice during Operation Desert oriented on readiness for combat. The to drill interagency partners in conjunc- Storm. The first was to set the corps and missions and requirements that III Corps tion with DOD.12 all subordinate maneuver forces into the faced in that exercise were known; the Nifty Nugget certainly did not attack positions prior to the “left hook” of challenge remained to build readiness to produce the envisioned outcomes. the main attack. That movement required execute those missions to standard. By Occurring a year after the Defense XVIII Airborne Corps to pass through VII 1991, that readiness had spread across Transportation System had been Corps, a challenging task made even more enough of the force to the point where declared ready for operations, Nifty difficult by the need to screen the former’s two other corps did exactly what Saint Nugget saw the majority of the forces movement prior to the attack. The second and Holder had originally envisioned. deploying to Europe arriving piecemeal, was the left hook itself, which included, without their equipment, or far too late among other activities, a corps-level refuel Exercises for Force to be operationally relevant.13 Units on the move (while in contact, in the case Development: Nifty Nugget deploying from the United States coin- of VII Corps).11 Both corps had aug- (1978) and Its Successors cided with a noncombatant evacuation mentation from III Corps units that were The principal mission facing the operation of more than a million depen- deployed to the Desert Storm theater of U.S. military in Western Europe was dents from Europe, which generated a operations. Holder, promoted to colonel reinforcement of NATO’s defense of demand for airlift 10 times larger than in 1989, would eventually put his money the region. The first comprehensive the available mobility airlift force. In the where his mouth was: His 2nd Armored examination of the readiness of the meantime, in the words of an unnamed Cavalry Regiment was at the vanguard of U.S. military for that wartime rein- high-level Pentagon official, “The Army the VII Corps attack in Desert Storm. forcement mission was a Joint Chiefs was simply attrited to death.”14 JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Park 53 U.S. Marines assigned to Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team Central Command conduct close-quarters battle training during exercise Neon Defender 21, in Ras al Qarain, Bahrain, April 4, 2021 (U.S. Marine Corps/Victor A. Mancilla) In the wake of Nifty Nugget, the shortfalls of the JDA, became a touch- joint trainer, providing tailored pack- Joint Chiefs of Staff established the Joint point for discussions within DOD and ages as a joint provider, and developing Deployment Agency (JDA), a combat in Congress. The first substantive step to concepts and interoperability standards support agency to coordinate deploy- filling the capability gaps appeared with as a joint integrator so that other ment procedures among the Services. the establishment in April 1987 of the CCMDs could employ those capabili- Unfortunately, the JDA had no authority U.S. Transportation Command, whose ties worldwide. Those authorities also to direct the Services or CCMDs to ad- efforts were pivotal to deploying and sus- uniquely complemented USJFCOM’s dress identified deficiencies. To add insult taining the joint force during Operations role as the DOD executive agent for to injury, the Services fought successfully Desert Shield and Desert Storm and their joint experimentation.19 to keep their logistics and transportation spectacular tactical and operational suc- The 1999 Defense Planning Guidance planning systems separate from the JDA.15 cesses.18 That success would have been directed USJFCOM to develop a new In 1980, a successor exercise named impossible without the force develop- joint operations concept, called rapid Proud Spirit involved a much less ambi- ment work to address the problems in the decisive operations (RDO), that would tious NATO reinforcement scenario, with DOD logistics enterprise first identified tie together effects-based operations and equally dismal results. Proud Spirit ex- in exercises. network-centric operations as part of posed critical gaps in the defense industrial DOD transformation efforts.20 To vet the base and DOD command and control sys- A Demonstration Packaged as RDO concept, USJFCOM planned to tems at the national level.16 Improvements an “Experiment”: Millennium integrate Service-level transformation ex- to those systems and some associated Challenge (2002) periments in a series of field experiments processes led to better results in 1982 in The onetime U.S. Joint Forces called Millennium Challenge, the first of the Proud Saber exercise, which involved a Command (USJFCOM) was unique which occurred in 2000.21 global crisis response scenario.17 among CCMDs. Rather than focusing Two years later, Millennium The issues raised by Nifty Nugget on employment of the force, it was Challenge 2002 (MC02) would be the and its successor exercises, as well as the responsible for preparing forces as a largest joint military experiment ever 54 Features / Deconflicting Exercises and Experimentation JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 conducted. It involved 13,500 personnel Figure 1. Continuum of Strategic Direction from all Services; 8 live land, sea, and air ranges; and 17 simulation sites—and it integrated those live and virtual activities Force Force Force into a single exercise.22 The integration Employment Development Design fulfills the defense enables the joint force enables the joint force to of live activities required some training objectives of the NDS to do what it does better do what it does differently value for the tactical forces involved that resulted in limited availability of certain 0–3 years ~2–7 years ~5–15 years essential platforms.23 That confluence of training and experimentation created artificialities in the experiment, which the nature of the underlying relation- risk, and decisionmaking across multiple included an opposing force (OPFOR) ships between exercises and experiments CCMDs.29 that would be allowed to operate freely, (and especially their subcategories For decades, combatant commanders within the constraints of the scenario.24 of wargames and field experiments) have conducted exercises to train their Unexpectedly, the OPFOR destroyed remains unchanged. The challenges joint mission-essential task lists, exercise most of the blue force maritime surface in scheduling events among multiple CCMD contingency plans, and maintain combatants minutes after commence- CCMDs that span the entire continuum trained and ready forces. It is entirely ment of experiment play. The maritime of strategic direction leave little room possible for those exercises to address the component was resurrected with a for wasted effort when developing exer- transition from a CCP to a contingency change in the rules of engagement to cises and experiments. It is possible for plan, but given limited time for training, prevent the OPFOR from initiating con- them to intersect, but it cannot be done it is more likely that an exercise will focus tact. Furthermore, the experiment had haphazardly, as both will suffer. on actually fighting the CCMD with its been designed so that the first 15 days of assigned and attached forces in combat force flow were already complete. Doing Global Integration for Today: operations. so avoided real-world interference with Exercises for Force Employment Since 2018, the Joint Staff has the Defense Transportation System but In force employment, the 2018 NMS conducted globally integrated exercises eliminated any antiaccess/area-denial play introduces the notion of joint com- (GIEs) to assess readiness across the that might have undermined the RDO bined arms, defined as “the conduct of joint force for contingencies and validate concept.25 operational art through the integration operational plans and mature joint con- Rather than an experiment, MC02 of joint capabilities in all domains.” cepts. GIEs involve multiple CCMDs in was really a demonstration: highly The basis of joint combined arms is operations against strategic challenges. scripted and orchestrated activities that premised on competitors and adversar- Akin to the role that contingency plans minimize the likelihood that a solution ies operating across multiple CCMD play for combatant commanders, a GIF is will fail.26 That admission is buried in the areas of responsibility and domains to the logical input into exercising execution middle of the USJFCOM official report: offset or erode traditional joint force across multiple CCMDs in a GIE. “As the exercise progressed, the OPFOR advantages.28 Readiness to meet those free-play was eventually constrained to challenges starts with the adaptations Global Integration for the the point where the endstate was scripted. that have been made to the joint plan- Future: Experiments for Force This scripting ensured a Blue operational ning processes to address campaign and Development and Force Design victory and established conditions in the contingency planning requirements that The 2011 disestablishment of exercise for transition operations.”27 The span more than one CCMD. USJFCOM eliminated the DOD execu- desire to retain some value for MC02’s For day-to-day activities, global tive agent for joint experimentation, and live participants, who were conducting campaign plans (GCPs) guide the the responsibility for joint experimenta- exercises for training, came at the expense development of combatant command tion that accreted back to the Joint of the experiment’s stated main objective campaign plans (CCPs), which are the Staff was in turn eliminated in 2013. to vet an unproven concept. instruments for implementing the di- A subsequent revision of Chairman of rection in the GCPs. For contingency the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction Placing Exercises and planning, global integration frameworks 3010.02, Guidance for Developing and Experimentation Within (GIFs, formerly known as globally in- Implementing Joint Concepts, in 2016 Global Integration tegrated base plans) unify the direction removed almost all language related to While global integration has entailed of multiple war plans directed in the experimentation, replacing that umbrella major changes to the joint force’s Contingency Planning Guidance and term with references to tabletop functions and processes to account for the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan. Both exercises and wargames.30 Implement- strategic challenges that outstrip the GCPs and GIFs provide a common view ing global integration through force ability of a single CCMD to address, to requirements, resource allocation, development and force design has led to JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Park 55 a resurgence of interest in experimenta- between the Joint Staff and the CCMDs. the concept reflects the assumed future tion; the 2018 NMS explicitly tasked The risk exists that CCMD-internal ex- strategic environment before it might be the Joint Staff with reinvigorating ercise requirements may not correspond considered mature. Only after the con- experimentation to identify and refine to or even conflict with the GIE training cept matures should it be incorporated emerging capabilities, concepts, doc- objectives. If not resolved, neither the into an operational plan and subsequently trine, and lessons learned. The basis for Joint Staff nor the CCMD will gain train- assessed in an exercise. that work is the force development and ing benefit from the GIE. The Full Scope of Joint investment priorities in the NDS. The second dichotomy is in the rela- Experimentation Will Require a True The first tangible step toward that tionship between a GIF and its CCMD Joint Force Trainer and Joint Force revitalization occurred in 2019 with the plans. The distributed execution of a GIF Provider. The disestablishment of Joint Staff’s inaugural globally integrated through subordinate plans may result in USJFCOM led to a substantial weak- wargame (GIWG), which was intended different focuses of effort. Global integra- ening of its former joint force trainer, to establish baseline areas for exploration tion generally focuses on strategic choices provider, and integrator roles. The dimi- in future exercises, experiments, and and decisionmaking at the national level, nution of those roles saw little fanfare; analysis. Building on the 2019 Capstone while CCMDs exercise the consequences the Services reoccupied the training space Concept for Joint Operations and the of those national decisions and execution where joint priorities were trained only by GIWG, work is now under way on a joint of their concepts of operations in a region consensus, while the Joint Staff assumed warfighting concept that will provide a or domain. The risk exists that many of oversight of force management and in- basis for further experimentation across the tasks to be exercised in a GIF may not teroperability work. After USJFCOM’s multiple CCMDs.31 In turn, experimen- correspond to the tasks in a contingency disestablishment, the demand and tation results provide a deep look at new plan that a CCMD would exercise. If not functions for joint experimentation disap- capabilities to be validated through the reconciled, exercising global integration peared entirely. Command post exercises, Joint Requirements Oversight Council can become difficult, if not impossible. workshops, or wargames are now focused for inclusion into the FYDP. Concepts Must Reach Maturity at the CCMD level or conducted internal Before Inclusion in an Exercise. The to the Joint Staff. While the Services have Some Propositions for complexity and scope of a CCMD conducted some field experiments, there Exercises and Experimentation exercise are already challenging. That have been no joint field experiments since in Global Integration complexity increases significantly for MC02. Global integration offers an opportunity a GIE that integrates the activities of There is one other implication to to unify exercises and experimentation multiple CCMDs. That scope and the global integration from joint experimen- in a way that will contribute to a unified demands of coordinating exercises with tation that actually stems from recent view of readiness and future invest- senior leaders’ schedules make GIEs nec- changes in global force management. ments across all CCMDs and Services. essarily uncommon. Consequently, the The introduction of dynamic force em- Future work toward that end suggests size and audience for a GIE may also lead ployment in the 2018 NDS suggests an a number of propositions to ensure to the temptation to exercise concepts emergent need for a combined joint force that future exercises and experiments that have not matured. In many cases, trainer and provider given the competing complement rather than impede one those concepts will not have been written demands among CCMDs in the security another. into the execution of GIFs or CCMD environment. Should DOD embark A Globally Integrated Base Plan plans and may have to be “shoehorned” on joint field experimentation, such a and Its War Plans Must Be Reconciled into an existing plan. Doing so may con- relationship would empower the task Before a GIE. A critical prerequisite for fuse or misrepresent combat capability organization and training of experimenta- a GIE is a close relationship between that actually detracts from the readiness tion forces while minimizing disruption its evaluated GIF and its complemen- that should come out of an exercise. to their wartime readiness. Additionally, tary CCMD plans because execution Maturing concepts require ex- field experimentation provides a mecha- of a GIF occurs through distributed perimentation to vet them for capability nism to directly balance the allocation of execution by multiple CCMDs. In the development or further exploration. forces across employment, development, absence of that close relationship, there More likely than not, those transfor- and design, rather than leaving that deci- is no basis to integrate CCMD exercises mational concepts, while benchmarked sion up to the mercy of internal Service into a GIE. Additionally, a GIE and its against the force development and priorities. complementary efforts at the CCMD investment priorities of the NDS, will level correspond to the same conceptual be set against the strategic environment While exercises and experimentation activity in the global campaign. described in the joint operating environ- have long been a part of joint force activi- There are two dichotomies in exercise ment and other futures documents. ties, the challenges of global integration design that should be addressed for a Another reason to distinguish exercises across the continuum of strategic direc- GIE. The first is reconciling activities from experimentation is to ensure that tion emphasize the need to maximize the 56 Features / Deconflicting Exercises and Experimentation JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 8 17 effectiveness of both. Ensuring that the Thomas D. Morgan, “BCTP: Preparing Canan, “Up from Nifty Nugget.” for War,” Military Review 69, no. 11 (Novem- 18 Matthews and Holt, So Many, So Much, two complement each other is a neces- ber 1989), 6–7. So Far, So Fast, 2, 237–241. sary first step, in spite of the temptation 9 General Crosbie E. Saint, senior officer 19 Edward J. Drea et al., History of the Uni- to combine some of their aspects. A joint oral history program interview by Robert fied Command Plan 1946–2012 (Washington, force trainer and provider with authori- Wilson, General Crosbie E. Saint papers, vol. DC: Joint History Office, 2013), 77. ties to train and source across the entire II (Carlisle, PA: Army Heritage and Education 20 J92 Concepts Division, A Concept Frame- Center, 1994), 137–138; Lieutenant General work for Rapid Decisive Operations, Version 0.5 joint force would assist in balancing Leonard D. Holder, USA (Ret.), interview by (Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, resources for experimentation for force author, December 23, 2011. 1999), 4–5, 15. development and force design with those 10 In an armored unit refuel on the move, 21 Office of the Command Historian,Com - allocated to force employment. Mixing subordinate elements may stop long enough to mand History: September 2000 Through October exercises and experiments requires an refuel and rearm, but the larger organization 2002 (Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Com- never stops moving. See Priscilla Offenhauer mand, n.d.), 26. informed perspective to opportunities and David L. Osborne, History of the U.S. 22 Millennium Challenge 2002: Executive and risks in order to preserve readiness Army Battle Command Training Program, Report: Thinking Differently (Norfolk, VA: for combat, while ensuring that the joint 1986–2003 (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2003), 4–5. force can best prepare for the future secu- Department of the Army and Library of Con- 23 “Gen. Kernan and Maj. Gen. Cash Dis- rity environment. JFQ gress, Federal Research Division, 2007), 79–80. cuss Millennium Challenge’s Lessons Learned,” 11 Colonel Richard Hart Sinnreich, USA Global Security, February 17, 2002, available (Ret.), interview by author, January 9, 2012, at JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Park 57 U.S. Air Force nurse assigned to 18th Operational Medical Readiness Squadron talks with other medical personnel while participating in simulated mass casualty aeromedical evacuation during exercise Cope North 21, at Northwest Field, Guam, February 10, 2021 (U.S. Air Force/Duncan C. Bevan) Thrust and Agility from Trust and Antifragility A Combatant’s Guide to Expeditionary Medical Leadership By James A. Chambers ccording to Mihnea Moldoveanu uncertain, complex, and ambiguous and Das Narayandas, leader- environment . . . need leadership skills A ship development represents and organizational capabilities different an increasingly critical component from those that helped them succeed in Colonel (Dr.) James A. Chambers, USAF, is of national readiness, and its impor- the past.”1 Specifically, modern training Command Surgeon, U.S. Strategic Command. tance is not restricted to the military. should increasingly emphasize indi- His previous assignment was Commander, 380th Expeditionary Medical Group, Al Dhafra Air Base, Moldoveanu and Narayandas assert vidual initiative, relational and com- United Arab Emirates. that businesses in the current “volatile, munication skills, and organizational 58 Features / A Guide to Expeditionary Medical Leadership JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 capabilities. Moldoveanu and Narayan- increasing need for agile decisionmak- Boyd’s (with Thomas P. Christie) 1966 das note traditional training succeeds ing and care, U.S. military medical care energy-maneuverability (EM) theory in several domains of cognitive develop- will need to deepen abilities to serve as provides the mathematical basis for his ment but is “far less [useful] in teaching a “team of teams,” linking combatant well-known observe, orient, decide, act people how to communicate and work commands, component commands, and (OODA) loop. EM theory calculates with one another effectively.”2 fielded medical teams, oiled by the trust the energy state of an aircraft to quan- In 2018, Chairman of the Joint of shared intelligence, perspective, and tify aircraft performance and uses the Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford strategic intent that empowers responsive thrust-to-weight ratio as a proxy for outlined changes in the character of war tactical decisionmaking and executions. ability to accelerate and engage targets. and strategic landscape.3 He asserted Relatively isolated medics in austere con- that operations in multiple domains, ditions may be required to provide care Fighter Performance relative loss of air superiority, less reliable at a level for which they have not been Parameter: Agility logistics, cyber degradation, increased historically trained or expected to manage History teaches that agility—that is, the dependence on host-nation support, and dependent on a network to provide ability to rapidly transition from one novel or more effective weapons, and consultation and assistance. In parallel, maneuver to another—is an enabler medical consequences in the future mean expeditionary medical leaders need to for victory. Boyd’s 1966 paper on EM the “decision space has collapsed.”4 He enhance their abilities to adjust to rapidly theory indicates that, to effectively stressed that Department of Defense changing scenarios. maneuver, a pilot must understand (DOD) planning must enable “execution factors intrinsic and extrinsic to the 11 of military campaigns with flexibility and Boyd’s Observations on aircraft and be able to adjust priorities. speed that outpaces our adversaries.”5 Combat Advantage EM theory uses wing loading (aircraft General Dunford concluded his assess- A Korean and Vietnam War veteran mass/wing surface area) as a proxy for ment emphasizing the need to optimize and engineer, John Boyd pioneered the maneuverability. how future teams are led: “We must fur- development of modern fighter aircraft, Aircraft with low-wing loading (that ther develop leaders capable of thriving at guided by goals to “out-accelerate, out- is, an F-15) tend to have superior sus- the speed of war—leaders who can adapt turn, and out-endure any existing air- tained turn performance because they can to change, drive innovation, and thrive in craft in the range of speeds actually seen generate more lift for a given quantity of uncertain, chaotic conditions. The nature in combat.”8 All three parameters are engine thrust. In contrast, aircraft with of war has not changed, and, in a violent also relevant for expeditionary medical high-wing loading (that is, an F-16) clash of wills, it is the human dimension care. Boyd observed, “The outcome of typically provide excellent instantaneous that ultimately determines the success of combat is determined not by the bigger turn performance but poorer sustained any campaign.”6 cannon or even by the larger force, but turn performance. In other words, planes Compared with the business world of by the shrewdest combination of equip- that nimbly respond to control input Moldoveanu and Narayandas and in-gar- ment, training, and ideas toward the and resist wind gusts are often unable to rison medicine, expeditionary medicine is end of adaptability.”9 This article advo- sustain tight turns. Thus, wing loading distinguished by several factors. These in- cates for the shrewdest combination is a tradeoff between stability (the ability clude exposure to significant physical risk, of approaches to field high-reliability to sustain intended performance when diminished resources (including potential medical teams led by well-prepared change is imposed by the pilot or chal- cyber degradation), a compressed time professionals, and it also examines thrust lenged by the external environment) and cycle, fewer options for timely referral for and agility (General Dunford’s “speed” agility. It should also be stressed that a complex cases, and a higher expectation and “flexibility”) as they apply to plane’s inherent agility depends on the of relatively inexperienced person- medicine and recommends actions that pilot’s ability to “read” the environment nel to care for patients suffering from enhance sustainability as well. and the aircraft’s reactions in real time. polytrauma or chemical, biological, radio- Boyd’s term for this is Fingerspitzengefühl logical, nuclear, or explosives (CBRNE) Fighter Performance (German for “finger tips feeling”).12 injuries than at home stations and in Parameter: Thrust higher volumes. In short, the stakes are Boyd determined that of the top four Expeditionary Force often higher for both the provider and design goals for an air-superiority Performance Parameter: Trust the patient in austere, ambiguous, and fighter, the most important was to In Team of Teams, General Stanley volatile settings. obtain the first sighting of the enemy. In McChrystal cites wisdom from the Appropriately, in the past 2 years, each order, the other three were to outnum- Harvard Business School: “Great teams military department has begun modern- ber the enemy, outmaneuver the enemy, consist of individuals who have learned 10 izing expeditionary medical platforms, and achieve split-second kills. Thrust to trust each other . . . enabling them to including materiel, team composition, supports the pilot’s ability to rapidly play as a coordinated whole.”13 Boyd’s and clinical care training.7 To meet the see, identify, and engage enemy targets. biographer similarly notes command- JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Chambers 59 Sailors aboard Military Sealift Command hospital ship USNS Mercy clear tie-down equipment from MV-22B Osprey assigned to Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 21 of Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland, on ship’s flight deck, April 18, 2020, Pacific Ocean (U.S. Navy/Luke Cunningham) ers can fully exploit opportunities only training. Creech expected his leaders to the term antifragile to indicate that when subordinates understand their be lead performers; wing commanders which actually improves rather than intent (Schwerpunkt) and are empow- routinely flew with their teams to dem- weakens or simply returns to status quo ered to execute it. Both commanders onstrate technical proficiency. He insisted after adversity.18 Taleb asserts that anti- and subordinates share a common that to achieve lasting change, ideas and fragility is increased by: outlook and trust, “the glue that doctrine had to be developed in parallel sticking to simple rules holds this apparently formless effort with advances in equipment and training • building layers of redundancy together.”14 as well as organization and leadership.17 • looking to exploit changes in the Fighter pilot General Wilbur Creech These precepts also apply to expedition- • environment was born the same year as Boyd, ary medicine. paying heed to only those with “skin fought in the same wars, and shared • in the game” the same value for trust, derived from Expeditionary Force tinkering: high volume of experi- one’s perceived intent and capability. Performance Parameter: • ments to learn through small errors Creech insisted leaders groom other Antifragility for potentially large gains leaders through careful selection and The U.S. military has appropriately avoiding risks that would result in mentoring.15 He dramatically improved focused on increasing individual and • complete destruction Tactical Air Command’s efficacy, qual- unit resiliency in recent years. Especially keeping options open ity, and safety record by training small for deployed units, antifragility is an • respecting habits and rules that have teams as they would fight together even more compelling aim. According • endured for a long time and emphasizing clear communication to Nicholas Taleb, fragility implies suf- avoiding overplanning; build in and expectations as well as instilling a fering or destruction from volatility, • intent to adapt. decentralized control philosophy.16 He whereas resiliency enables continuity in engendered confidence through realistic a disruptive environment. Taleb coined 60 Features / A Guide to Expeditionary Medical Leadership JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Taleb uses tinkering to create heu- focus and calm in the face of adversity execution, empowering frontline teams ristics—“simple, practical easy-to-apply that Sir William Osler hailed as the to rapidly respond. They aggressively rules of thumb that make life easy”—to supreme quality of effective medical pro- seek improvement and celebrate learn- help make rapid decisions.19 Heuristics fessionals.24 Levelheadedness dissipates ing from small failures. Leaders who are designed to be expedient, not perfect; the friction of anxiety and facilitates proactively engage host-nation, coalition users need to remember they are using data-driven decisions, inspires confidence, nation, and other partners to identify a shortcut rather than trying to absorb and will be drawn on during times of and achieve shared goals are also more all the information in a time-constrained personal or institutional transition as likely to survive turbulent times. This environment.20 Antifragility thrives when well as physical and professional risk. It includes becoming acquainted with team members embrace making numer- varies among individuals’ constitutions other’s capabilities and resources, from ous small mistakes as a learning process. but can be strengthened by training and protocols to materiel. Deployed medi- Taleb stresses that cultures that value experience in appropriately stimulating cal teams with small footprints depend bottom-up responsiveness and owner- environments. greatly on external resources from the ship thrive under stress and disorder, Expeditionary Medical Performance U.S. Government, host-nation, and, whereas excessive top-down control can Parameter: Agility from Antifragility. potentially, coalition partners; meaningful increase fragility and hinder growth.21 The agility of a medical group is most joint and international exercises should Antifragile thinkers can function with affected by judgment and culture. An routinely test communication pathways, ambiguity, incomplete information, immediate and intuitive understand- transportation platforms, and medi- and acknowledgment of limits on one’s ing of how to prioritize and sequence cal capabilities—especially patient care understanding. medical resources at both individual and handoffs—to strengthen interoperability population levels enables teams to rapidly and procedural knowledge tailored to pri- Application maneuver. A strong clinical background oritized threats. Basic field medical skills The remainder of this article examines requiring responsibility for outcomes can such as nine-line reports, litter carries, analogous performance parameters for provide some advantage, but the keys and stanchion loading should be prac- effective medical leadership in deployed that engender success are mutual respect ticed by every team member, regardless settings. Changes in technology and and open communication between the of rank or position. the operational battlespace create new commander and the frontline clinicians, Antifragile teams prepare to diversify challenges and opportunities for expedi- as well as preparing medics to take on logistical channels by understanding tionary medical care, an environment in roles they are not required to fill in gar- how to resource needs from a variety which thrust and agility are increasingly rison, providing depth, redundancy, of U.S. as well as regional/local suppli- important to achieve. and resiliency for small-footprint teams. ers and potentially even 3-D printing.25 Expeditionary Medical Performance Leaders require skills in anticipating, DOD should evaluate the feasibility of Parameter: Thrust from Trust. The detecting, diagnosing, treating, and developing an electronic library of com- thrust of a deployed medical team enables rehabilitating problems in team perfor- monly used or critical supplies that could it to—like a fighter aircraft—quickly mance just as clinicians do for individual be replicated via 3-D printing. Prior to deploy, understand, and respond to patients’ health. deployment, teams should anticipate initial conditions. It is degraded by lack Commanders need to gain Boyd’s options for task execution in differently of autonomy, excessive bureaucratic Fingerspitzengefühl to attain the utility of resourced scenarios and proactively seek control, inadequate information and con- his OODA loop. This ability to read the counsel from more experienced military nectivity, poor logistics, and insufficient environment and immediately apply ap- medics, many of whom have developed confidence. To generate thrust from propriate reactions is obtained by getting practical heuristics for managing unex- trust, medical leaders need to believe to know the team both as individuals and pected challenges. Medical leaders must in their mission and unit competence, in terms of their organizational strengths, ensure their teams take full advantage and team members need to believe in weaknesses, and daily challenges. Teams of Web- and phone-based resources, their leader’s abilities and intent; lead- need to work together and communicate such as the Joint Trauma System’s mul- ers need to be manifestly proficient and often and openly, both internally and tidisciplinary consultation service and out front.22 For millennia, leaders have with outside organizations, and, when clinical practice guidelines (CPGs).26 inspired teams by demonstrating excel- appropriate, up their chain of com- CPGs and other critical information lence and self-sacrifice, or at least the mand. When crises erupt, less time will should be downloaded and/or printed willingness to take personal risk on behalf be needed to explain the rationale and before deployment to mitigate risk from of a shared goal.23 Trust is enhanced by priorities for teams that have trained and cyber degradation. Information agility is leaders’ respect for others, fairness, and worked intensely together. enhanced with local surveillance, from ability to achieve meaningful if small early Effective leaders deliberately establish leaders getting out and acquainted with wins for the team. Trust is reinforced by culture. They advance antifragility by the community on and, as appropriate, a leader’s equanimity, the dispassionate delegating authority and decentralizing off base first-hand, as well as instituting JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Chambers 61 real-time surveys of behavioral and per- while and reachable target.29 Leading loading” performance by operating as ceptual trends (if needed). expeditionary medical groups demands a networked team of teams, leverag- In this way, antifragility clearly corre- that energy be invested in four domains ing the strengths of each. Effective sponds with a hallmark of high-reliability before and during deployment. leadership of a deployed medical team organizations (HROs), deferring to ex- Clinical: Overseeing the demands knowledge, skills, and abilities pertise and seeking out the best data from Prioritization and Provision of Care for that enable maneuver and engagement all sources—often frontline personnel of Seriously Injured and Ill Individuals. within one’s tactical medical unit, comparatively lower rank—to inform key If leaders are not clinicians, they must coupled with the resources (intel- decisions. Another HRO principle, com- quickly develop trust and effective com- ligences, materiel, personnel) of the mitment to resiliency, clearly corresponds munication pathways with clinicians on larger fighting team, deployed forces with the aspirations of antifragility. The the team. If leaders are clinicians, they under other commands, component other three HRO principles—preoccupa- may provide helpful additional perspec- commands, geographic combatant tion with failure, sensitivity to operations, tive, but more important, they must have commands, military department agen- and reluctance to simplify—are byprod- the humility to listen to other clinicians, cies, coalition forces, and host-nation ucts of actions required to establish and defer to relevant expertise regardless organizations to achieve one’s goals. maintain trust.27 All grease the OODA of rank or position (and process that This requires proactively developing loop to help medical leaders make the data along with potential simultaneous and maintaining a network of personal best decisions as quickly as possible. operational or command concerns), and and professional relationships informed Commitment to provide trusted care as establish a culture in which all medics by an understanding of logistics and an expeditionary HRO is equally impor- know they are empowered and expected joint operating principles, along with tant as in garrison, and the tools used to do the best thing for their patients at a the interpersonal skills to understand for care at home installations should be relevant tempo according to their train- and successfully navigate competing adapted to the deployed environment. ing and judgment. demands within a complex bureaucracy. Antifragile cultures keep options open Expeditionary: Performing in a Such leadership enables medical teams and constantly innovate to test potential Differently Resourced Environment in the best chance to “out-accelerate, out- improvements or new safeguards for a Different Culture. turn, and out-endure” their challenges. critical needs. Leaders must ensure team Tactical: Optimizing Individual For example, when Al Dhafra members respect each other and outside Performance and Team Dynamics, Air Base in U.S. Central Command agencies to keep bridges open and seek Especially in a High-Risk Environment. (USCENTCOM) encountered a to understand and effectively interface This optimization may require advanced COVID-19 outbreak in 2020, it was with other cultures. Effective medical technology or other innovative means if able to immediately reprioritize its medi- commanders integrate into the leader- aspects of care are dispersed or isolated in cal services and change its posture due ship community at their installations in the field. to cross-training of its deployed medical both formal and informal settings (and, Institutional: Maneuvering Within personnel weeks prior to cover common when possible, local host nations) to gain a Large Organization (or Meta- critical tasks and recently accomplished trust and seek multisectoral solutions Organization) to Obtain Resources to expansion of clinical care space. Both for shared challenges. They translate the Meet Enterprise Needs. This maneuvering required clear communication internal to “why” from the line to the medical side may require nuanced intercultural and the medical group of the need for anti- and vice versa. political understanding to navigate and fragility and to the installation command obtain joint, interagency, and/or interna- to achieve buy-in. Its agility was enabled The Importance of tional support. by an OODA loop fed by information Energy Management from its own frontline medical personnel As discussed, energy is a key determi- Optimizing Energy Through of all ranks and backgrounds (a radiology nant of thrust and agility. Energy is the Hybrid Performance technologist, not one of the providers, also a critical asset for leaders, especially of a Team of Teams gave the first indication of the outbreak), during combat.28 Effective leaders invest Aircraft engineers must often choose USCENTCOM and component com- their personal energy to transform between competing goals, such as mand staff, as well as the local embassy and members’ passion and potential into instantaneous versus sustained turn partner-nation personnel in local hospitals performance and a sense of belonging performance in selecting design param- through relationships that had been proac- and identity. Perhaps the most consis- eters for an isolated airborne platform. tively developed through trauma-oriented tent determinant of a team’s morale— Similarly, there are competing advan- exercises in the preceding months. and psychological energy—is a sense of tages and limitations in operating as The base networked with other bases a positive, meaningful group achieve- small teams versus large organizations. in-theater to procure diagnostic materiel. ment. This occurs when values and Fortunately, deployed medical groups It gained trust among the personnel on resources align on a common worth- can gain the best in hybrid “wing- base through the transparent reporting of 62 Features / A Guide to Expeditionary Medical Leadership JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 U.S. Soldiers in 30th Armored Brigade Combat Team perform field run and litter carry as part of Hickory Cup competition held in U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, March 1, 2020 (U.S. Army National Guard/Cindi King) information at the speed of relevance and for competence in their profession as leadership perspectives. This preparation collaboratively identified needs with line well as an appetite to serve in deployed helps leaders evaluate the competence commanders to secure needed additional combat support missions, need to be of their team members and efficiently resources on base originally allocated provided opportunities—through early communicate and gain their trust and to other units. All these behaviors and career deployment, DOD global health respect. Leaders also enhance trust relationships had been developed in the engagement missions, and/or volun- through their degree of perceived skin in prior months to prepare for potential teer overseas service—to develop skills the game.34 Selection and development regional state actor aggression and were functioning in unpredictable, differently pathways should provide opportunities successfully translated to address a novel resourced, demanding environments for medics to directly support field opera- threat.30 As a result, the outbreak was to help them build strength. They also tions early in their career to assimilate eliminated without adversely affecting the require the ability to rapidly assess and the risks of deployed service. This will installation’s combat readiness or sortie motivate deployed team members whom enhance understanding, confidence, and generation rate. they likely had neither any role in select- the ability to effectively communicate ing nor the opportunity to serve with with line warfighters. More frequent but Readiness Recommendations before. As Moldoveanu and Narayandas shorter deployment cycles would support Selection and Development. Lord write, “Learning is less a function of add- this goal, and noncombat experience Moran, Winston Churchill’s physi- ing something that isn’t there than it is such as short-term DOD global health cian, wrote in Anatomy of Courage of recognizing, reinforcing, and refining engagement missions, use of permissive that “the art of selection is the secret what already is.”33 temporary duty for international humani- of leadership.”31 General James Mattis Leaders must not only be confident tarian service, and exchange programs emphasized the Marines’ axiom, “Recruit in their primary career field but also should also provide helpful perspective. for attitude, train for skill.”32 Future have meaningful experience and study expeditionary leaders, selected in part to broaden clinical, administrative, and JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Chambers 63 Staff nurse assigned to one of Naval Medical Center San Diego’s internal medicine wards helps general duty corpsman don personal protective equipment, including 3D-printed face shield donated to hospital by Naval Information Warfare Systems Command, before entering COVID-19-positive, noncritical patient’s room, August 4, 2020 (U.S. Navy/Jake Greenberg) Training. familiarization and desensitization to less and burn victims, DOD has no Level 1 Personal Learning Cloud. The cor- common but potentially catastrophic trauma centers. As prescribed in the 2017 porate sector is embracing the “personal and/or emotionally stressful events such National Defense Authorization Act learning cloud,” an online portfolio as managing CBRNE casualties or ex- (Public Law 114-328), Section 708, units of courses and events tailored to user pectant patients. During deployment, VR need to develop long-term relationships 35 needs. This approach is proving less provides a means to maintain cognitive with high-volume civilian trauma centers expensive, more personalized (pace, and limited psychomotor skills for high- as training and currency platforms, even if media, topic, modular), socialized yield scenarios as well as to maintain focus this means transferring some beneficiary (geared toward solving problems to- on the purpose for serving abroad during care outside military treatment facilities. gether, project-based, “action-learning”), calm periods.36 The 2019 Pandemic and All-Hazards contextualized (directly relevant), able to Cross-Training. Redundancy and re- Preparedness and Advancing Innovation track outcomes and trends, and able to siliency could be enhanced by proactively Act (Public Law 116-22) establishes measure skill acquisition and transfer at cross-training medics. Deployed medical Federal grants to offset civilian trauma individual and group levels. teams often rely on a single medic for center costs from integrating DOD Virtual Reality. Just as the Army, certain specialty functions. Cross-training teams into their institutions; it also sup- Navy, and Air Force have demonstrated other medics to perform the most com- ports the Centers for Disease Control cost savings as well as faster results for mon and/or critical tasks could offset risk and Prevention and preparedness for pilot training with virtual reality (VR), of failure when certain personnel are not national medical disasters such as the this platform offers several attractive available, incapacitated, or overwhelmed current COVID-19 pandemic. However, benefits to medics. Predeployment, VR by demand. no funds have yet been appropriated for would allow disaggregated medics to Civilian Partnerships. With the trauma center incentivization, and senior train together on common scenarios exception of the San Antonio Military military leaders should advocate for this to identify weaknesses and enhance Medical Center, which benefits from re- to be realized. In addition to embed- group dynamics. It would also provide ceiving both military and civilian trauma ding within U.S. civilian centers, military 64 Features / A Guide to Expeditionary Medical Leadership JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 medicine gains may also be obtained by host-nation personnel, noncombatants, in expeditionary environments. The rotations in less developed nations to and enemy combatants. thrust and agility for deployed medical identify adaptive approaches to care in Knowledge/Situational Awareness. teams come from trust (confidence in less resourced areas potentially similar to General McChrystal observes that the the intent and capability of oneself and more austere deployed environments.37 speed of information and change as others) and antifragility (the ability to DOD must continue funding medi- well as modern interdependence create improve with disruptions). Effective cal education, training, and casualty-care unprecedented complexity. He argues leaders need to be developed, selected, research in civilian academic and Veterans the challenge is countered by adaptabil- trained, networked with other commit- Affairs hospitals. Because of staff stability ity, and to foster this, “an organization ted leaders, and provided the resources and typically larger volumes of complex should empower its people, but only after to succeed. clinical cases, these partners provide it has done the heavy lifting of creating Hippocrates wrote, “Life is short, the outstanding clinical experience. They can shared consciousness.”39 Art long, opportunity fleeting, experience also generate meaningful cutting-edge re- To create this shared consciousness, treacherous, judgment difficult. The phy- search when their priorities are informed component commands—and when pos- sician must be ready, not only to do his and incentivized by DOD. Lessons sible, combatant commands—should duty himself, but also to secure the coop- learned from these partnerships need to provide expeditionary medical leaders eration of the patient, of the attendants be captured and integrated into evolving a predeployment orientation to com- and of externals.”40 To optimally care DOD research priorities and practices. mand operations, priorities, and relevant for combatants entrusted to their teams, Hiring experienced civilians to serve at regional intelligence. Medical security medical leaders must be competent in the military treatment facilities for mentor- cooperation activities (including relevant essentials of their own career fields. Even ship and continuity of in-garrison care points of contact and command relation- more important, however, senior leaders when Active-duty medics are deployed or ships) for the region and host nation must be able to effectively coordinate training at high-volume centers also posi- should be discussed with global health the resources “of the attendants and of tively supports expeditionary leadership. engagement staff; these activities should externals”—their team members as well Formal Courses. All three Services also be reviewed with the Embassy as networked professionals in the U.S. provide trauma team members prede- country team on arrival. Predeployment Government, host nation, and coalition ployment refresher training. Training is just-in-time cultural and focused language authorities. also important for commanders of expe- orientation is valuable, but DOD should Thucydides, a contemporary of ditionary medical units who may or may further incentivize and assist medical Hippocrates, provides insights from the not be clinicians to prepare them for lead- professionals in gaining deep regional Peloponnesian War that remain valid for ing multidisciplinary direct clinical care and, if possible, linguistic familiarization us today: “In practice we always base our and support personnel while deployed, over their careers. Relationships with preparations against an enemy on the as- facing unique challenges such as inter- host-nation medical institutions should be sumption that his plans are good; indeed, cultural communication and operating tracked by the component command at it is right to rest our hopes not on a belief in a resource-constrained environment the level of the ministries of defense and in his blunders, but on the soundness of at high tempo for prolonged periods. health as well as leading local hospitals our provisions. Nor ought we to believe To meet this demand, the Air Force’s and public health offices and shared with that there is much difference between Expeditionary Medical Support course the deployed medical leadership team to man and man, but to think that the supe- was recently intensified to simulate the empower them with an understanding of riority lies with him who is reared in the anticipated future combat environment; the full context of the operational situa- severest school.”41 commanders, especially those without tion and strengthen partnerships. Both General Mark A. Milley outlined prior deployed experience, should be before and during deployment, medical in his first communiqué as the 20th required to participate in such courses leaders should be required to read rel- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff his to enhance understanding their team’s evant after-action reports, lessons learned, focus areas to achieve force agility. They needs and reinforce effective leadership and real-time intelligence, and evolving include improving joint warfighting behaviors. The Navy provides a catalog of plans for the theater and host nation to be readiness, developing the joint force of predeployment medical training that has prepared to contribute to multiple inter- the future, developing and empowering also been tailored to the roles in which dependent OODA loops of commands joint force leaders, and taking care of our deployers will serve, whether in the fleet and allied forces. warriors.42 For the military health system or in support of the Marine Corps.38 to take care of our warriors, DOD must Formal precommand courses should also Conclusion apply the first three areas to medical lead- address concerns unique or especially rel- In a world of accelerated change of ers. We must fulfill Office of the Secretary evant to the deployed Service, including opportunities and risks, DOD more of Defense manpower priorities and pre- leading and caring for joint and coali- than ever needs to deploy leaders pare our medical force by giving them, tion troops and issues related to care of able to rapidly assess, decide, and act beginning as early as possible in their JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Chambers 65 careers, opportunities to gain combat in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 (Fort Eustis, Medicine 185, nos. 5–6 (May–June 2020). VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Com- 26 See Joint Trauma System, “Clinical Prac- support–relevant experience to acquire mand, December 6, 2018). tice Guidelines,” n.d., available at 66 Features / A Guide to Expeditionary Medical Leadership JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 or some, the end of the Cold War in 1991 was a vindication F of democracy’s supremacy over dogmatic Marxist ideology—a victory underwritten by the free flow of capital leading to sustained improvements in prosperity wherever capitalism was embraced. Euphoria was so high that, by 1992, ideologically driven war had become a relic, or what Francis Fuku- yama called the “end of history.”1 In the years immediately following, an explosion of freely moving capital across opening markets underwrote the great- est growth of prosperity and reduction in poverty the world had ever seen. That period in history is over, however, having been replaced with the stark realism of Great Power competition. Today’s Great Power competition is over control of economies and the under- lying global rules-based order—in other words, state capitalism versus democratic capitalism rather than an ideological com- petition of governing systems. The stakes are high, and democracy alone does not guarantee success in this strategic compe- tition. As Seva Gunitsky states, “Material success . . . often creates its own legiti- Sailor monitors subsurface contacts while macy: regimes become morally appealing standing watch in sonar control room aboard simply by virtue of their triumph.”2 In Arleigh Burke–class guided-missile destroyer USS this contest, China’s economic success John S. McCain during target-tracking training evolution as part of Malabar 2020, Indian Ocean, and skepticism of democracy are potently November 3, 2020 (U.S. Navy/Markus Castaneda) captured in the words of Hu Xijin, editor in chief of the state newspaper, Global Times. Hu tweeted, along with a photograph of the latest mobile intercon- tinental ballistic missile, “China was just fine forgoing the ‘good stuff’ of electoral Avoiding Great Power democracy on display in ‘Haiti, Libya, Iraq, and Ukraine.’”3 A consequence of this material success, as president of Phony Wars the World Bank Jim Yong Kim stated in September 2018, was that historic reduc- tions in poverty since the Cold War began By Brent D. Sadler to slow. These problems are coincidental with the return to Great Power competi- tion and the incipient fracturing of global History does not repeat itself, but it rhymes. markets and common rules-based dis- course along evolving modern spheres of —Mark Twain (attributed) influence. The challenge for democratic capitalism is to regain global economic dynamism. Failure to do so could usher Captain Brent D. Sadler, USN (Ret.), is a Senior Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology in in a new era of what Fukuyama labeled an the Center for National Defense at the Heritage Foundation. JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Sadler 67 Soviet prisoners of war dressed in new clothes near Arctic Circle at Rovaniemi, Finland, during Winter War, January 6, 1940 (Courtesy Military Museum of Finland) age of pessimism, blinding many to the national security policies. The 2017 Kong challenge the “One Country, Two inherent weaknesses of totalitarianism. National Security Strategy and 2018 Systems” premise for peaceful unification In this unfolding age of pessimism, National Defense Strategy, however, between China and Taiwan. In this envi- the United States and its key security indicate that such assumptions no longer ronment, Taiwan’s January 2020 national partners are rethinking their foreign poli- inform competitive approaches to China elections renewing President Tsai Ing- cies. The role of hard power is ascendant and Russia. In contemplating a New wen’s leadership have further agitated and, with it, risks to destructive dema- Cold War, it is necessary to weigh the Beijing’s suspicions that Taiwan’s gov- goguery in place of reasoned strategy, as opportunity costs, as Derek Leebaert ernment might abandon the long-term Kurt Campbell and Jake Sullivan argued does in The Fifty-Year Wound.6 Based on goal of unification. In the wider context in “Competition Without Catastrophe.”4 such lessons, Great Power competition of Great Power competition, Chinese In this new reality, our competitors, today, specifically with China, requires military modernization and expansion, namely Russia and China, will constrain a comprehensive, coherent approach to diplomatic efforts to isolate Taiwan, approaches and have a vote on outcomes. succeed—or, as Patrick Cronin and Ryan and diversifying economic reliance on As Mark Miles and Charles Miller argue, Neuhard argue, total competition, which One Belt, One Road initiatives support this new era of Great Power competition encompasses economic, legal, psychologi- Beijing’s objective of unification with will likely follow historical precedent and cal, military, and information spheres.7 Taiwan—including by force. However, be global in scale and comprehensive In Asia, longstanding assumptions the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in scope of national power as opportu- and security constructs are being ques- would prefer this objective be settled nistic competitors seek any advantage.5 tioned and overturned. Confronted with well below the threshold of war with the Acknowledging this reality has been long myriad challenges and uncertainty about United States. This approach channels in coming. U.S. security and diplomatic assurances, Chinese strategic culture as stated by Sun Since the end of the Cold War, as- Japan under Prime Minister Shinzo Tzu: “Hence to fight and conquer in all sumptions based on U.S. preeminent Abe shook off pacifism for a proactive your battles is not supreme excellence; military and economic power have comprehensive regional strategy. At the supreme excellence consists in breaking encouraged generally passive or reactive same time, ongoing protests in Hong the enemy’s resistance without fighting.”8 68 Features / Avoiding Great Power Phony Wars JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Effective gradual day-to-day com- Great Britain and France refrained without required defense investments. petition, such as the actions of Russia in from directly engaging the belligerent Meanwhile, hatred for the Versailles Ukraine and China in the South China Germany in the so-called Phony War. Treaty ending the Great War blos- Sea, has shifted the status quo, disadvan- Why attacking was held off rests on fac- somed in newly revisionist nations, most taging U.S. and allied interests. Lessons tors present today with similarly dire notably apparent in Germany’s foreign of the interwar period (1920–1940), cul- consequences. Then, as today, defense policy under the guidance of Foreign minating with the Phony War (October industry was unprepared for a rapid Minister Gustav Stresemann (1923– 1939–May 1940), illustrate that failure expansion in armaments production, and 1929) and later Adolf Hitler (1933– to be militarily postured for a crisis with the military was ill postured to preempt 1945). Erosions of postwar peace were a revisionist Great Power makes it more an adversary’s fait accompli action and at first gradual and then accelerated likely to occur. Failing this, it can rap- not resourced for a prolonged major war. into unstoppable torrents unleashed in idly develop into a global conflict with As the United States once again 1939. As a reflection of political leaders’ significantly dire consequences, as both enters an era of Great Power competi- predilections, military contingency plan- sides seek advantage through horizontal tion, important lessons can be gained ning did little to inform needed invest- escalation. With this in mind, leaders can from examining the Phony War. Those ments or convince leaders of any course take important lessons from this period lessons are most apt for East Asia. That correction that would have precluded as Great Power competition once again said, events since 2014 in Europe provide the Phony War. heats up, especially regarding contests a cautionary tale of “hybrid warfare” However, it is unfair to judge interwar with China over forced unification with waged by Russia in Ukraine.9 However, leaders without considering the horrors Taiwan. Looking ahead, a key lesson is with U.S. military support provided and living memories of World War I. So the imperative to forward posture the to Ukraine, the proximity of North immense was the scale of destruction and military and to resource it to deliver on Atlantic Treaty Organization forces to death enabled by new weapons, such as diplomatic promises to allies as well as the country, and ceasefires holding the the airplane and poison gas, that there invest in the depth of arsenal to wage war peace, the danger of major war appears was little faith that technology could solve should deterrence fail. greater in Asia. In this region, U.S. treaty the world’s problems. At the same time, networks’ disposition of opposing forces politics of the Big Lie propaganda and The Phony War and potential flash points for major war scapegoating too often enabled oversim- National security strategy is evolving make a better, but still imperfect, modern plified policies that channeled class or race to meet the changes of the recent past. analog for the Phony War. Just as navies differences to solve complex problems.10 It has been almost 30 years since the and air forces were most active globally As a frontline Great Power defending United States had to contend with during the brief Phony War period, the the Versailles Peace Treaty, France rarely the Soviet Union. Today’s challenge is same would hold true for a contemporary managed the needed consistency of compounded as we confront two Great confrontation with China. Moreover, as policy and investment. Between 1920 Power competitors: Russia and China. armies and marine corps introduce new and 1940, the average life expectancy of Simply repeating Cold War approaches power projection systems, they too will a French government was 7 months.11 is unrealistic; China is integrated be critical players in gaining early posi- Wartime ghosts simultaneously haunted into the world economy, and Russia tional advantage as major conflict unfolds domestic politics in France, where 17.6 is unconstrained by ideology. As the in the future. The lessons of the Phony percent of the armed forces were killed United States, China, and Russia all War are therefore particularly relevant as and 1.1 million were left catastrophically vie for worldwide influence, preparing national leadership considers the costs of injured.12 In the case of France, going it for at least some degree of conflict is building larger and more lethal militaries. alone in building the military needed to prudent. At the same time, we must To better understand the implications of bolster forceful diplomacy in defense of now contend with deterring one oppor- the Phony War today, it is important to Versailles was unsustainable. tunistic Great Power while remaining in consider its origins in the forces weighing France retained military supremacy conflict with the other. Thus, any future on national leaders during the interwar in continental Europe for some time Great Power confrontation must be years of 1920–1940. while acting to defend Versailles. In minimized in scope, duration, and scale 1923, France unilaterally occupied in order to husband needed resources. Interwar Wishful Thinking the Rhineland to extract reparations In this new era, as in the past, early and In the period immediately following from Germany in accordance with the decisive action in the transition from World War I, seeds of the Phony War Versailles Treaty. The result was coun- crisis to conflict can avert or geographi- were planted with optimism and faith terproductive, resulting in pressure on cally constrain a prolonged major war. that major war would never again be the franc and, most important, a rift In the Phony War, this was not the case. considered by any rational nation. with Britain on Versailles enforcement.13 For 8 months following the Germinations of faith in collective self- France’s failure in the Rhineland gave September 1939 invasion of Poland, defense never materialized, however, way in 1925 to alliance-building. The JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Sadler 69 Council of Four at World War I Paris Peace Conference, in Versailles, May 27, 1919; from left, David Lloyd George (UK), Vittorio Emanuele Orlando (Italy), Georges Clemenceau (France), and President Woodrow Wilson (U.S. Army Signal Corps/Edward N. Jackson) Locarno Treaties of October 1925 were Europe, thereby reducing the potential of British faith in the deterrent value of originally envisioned as an alliance to a two-front war.16 strategic bombing, the study of its war- safeguard against German aggression in French and British war-planning time use was never adequate to convince Western Europe. However, in acquiesc- consequently became increasingly de- political leadership that its use would not ing to German fears of encirclement—not fensive and eventually succumbed to the imperil its moral high ground—critical to unlike contemporary Chinese complaints economic realities of the 1930s Great ensuring the flow of vital resources in a of U.S. strategy—the treaty devolved to a Depression, Great Britain garrisoning prolonged war of attrition. The result was toothless collective security arrangement forces contended with anticolonial chal- that, when planning for strategic bombing that included Germany in the end.14 In lenges across its empire, and France built campaigns began in 1938, there was little September 1926, German entry into this the Maginot Line.17 At the same time, warfighting capacity behind deterrence.19 treaty and the League of Nations buoyed the interwar period witnessed continu- Fortifications, such as the Maginot Line in British Prime Minister David Lloyd ous technological change—changes that France, planned for a Belgium extension George’s earlier claim in the House of military planners sought to harness in and compensated limited Allied forces Commons that the last Great War had cost-effective ways, such as strategic across a continuous front from which been fought.15 Belgium, unimpressed bombing while utilizing the full power of the Germans might attack in “integral with the protections offered by Locarno, a mobilized industrial nation for deterring defense.”20 Critical to success was de- instead pursued determined neutrality a future war through economic strength veloping something not achieved in the as a defense against German invasion. or a rapid victory.18 For the British, stra- interwar years, a militarily effective collec- Overall, Locarno greatly strengthened a tegic bombing mitigated the need for a tive defense mechanism among the Low bitter and revisionist Germany by weak- large continental army and rationalized Countries, principally Belgium.21 ening France’s commitments in Eastern weak investments in armaments. Despite 70 Features / Avoiding Great Power Phony Wars JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Nonetheless, united, the victors of develop countermeasures for a wide range Europe was on the horizon, needed to World War I—Italy, Great Britain, and of German fait accompli actions, produce secure both his Far Eastern flank and France—retained deterrence advantage a family of war plans better appreciating his European borders by moving forces over revanchist Germany. However, the uncertainties of war, or forcefully west. After being kept a state secret until events in 1935 accelerated the dete- inform the electorate of the strategic 1994, the Russian government confirmed rioration of Versailles. That year, Hitler consequences of their decisions.27 that the Soviet special archives did in reintroduced conscription while mak- Incrementally over the 20 interwar years, fact record a controversial August 19, ing no secret of his designs on Austria. political decisions shaped the methods 1939, Politburo session with Stalin. That This stoked Benito Mussolini’s fear of and means available to war planners and discussion concluded it was in Soviet German demands for return of ethnically diplomats alike. Specific shortcomings in- interests to enter into an agreement with German South Tirol, leading to the final cluded failure to legitimatize the cause to Germany over the fate of Poland, thereby agreement in April of the victors to resist uphold the Versailles Treaty; paralysis in instigating a war between Germany and German attempts to change the Versailles the face of the terrors of modern warfare, France and Great Britain. Moreover, Treaty by force.22 This so-called Stresa notably aerial bombing demonstrated that war should be prolonged so as to Front almost immediately proved tenu- in 1937 during the Spanish Civil War at maximize Soviet strategic advantage in ous when Mussolini invaded present-day Guernica; operational paralysis against an a later anticapitalist war.30 With this in Ethiopia that October and became totally overrated or misunderstood adversary; mind, following early Soviet successes useless in deterring German annexa- poor coordination with neutral powers to in the August 20 Nomonhan offensive, tion of Austria in March 1938. French affect adversary strategic calculations; and Stalin gave the go-ahead to proceed with and British ineffectiveness over Austria failure to fully resource and exercise the negotiations of the Molotov-Ribbentrop bolstered Mussolini’s conviction that military for potential counterattacks that Pact with Germany. That pact, sealed on Germany was the better ally.23 might end or deescalate conflict.28 August 24, was followed with Hitler’s During the 1930s depression in Events of the interwar years—ac- order on August 27 to commence opera- London, rather than investing in rearma- celerating with Hitler’s 1933 rise in tions in Poland.31 With the Red Army ment and the concepts of airpower and Germany—convinced revisionists in massed on the Polish border, and despite mechanized warfare espoused by Basil Berlin, Tokyo, Rome, and Moscow that German protests on September 3, Stalin Liddell Hart, the predominant thinking war was inevitable to achieve their aims. withheld his forces. Foreign Minister was that defense was strongest because Vyacheslav Molotov responded days of a strong economy. Proliferate expen- Positional Prelude later that the time for Soviet action was ditures followed foreign exchanges in Flush with the successful 1938 annexa- not opportune.32 That time would come an effort to prop up the sterling at the tions of Austria and Czechoslovakia, September 17, after the Japanese agreed expense of critical investment in arma- Hitler focused next on conquering to a ceasefire on September 15 and the ments. Liddell Hart eventually resigned Poland. Hitler’s theory of victory was a French Saar offensive wound down.33 from his position as personal advisor to limited war in which intervention by the While Hitler and the Allies were focused Minister for Coordination of Defense French and British would be unlikely on Poland, Stalin proceeded to solidify Thomas Inskip.24 Unfortunately, British or irrelevant through a fait accompli Soviet military positions in the Baltic in reporting from Berlin failed to inform operation (a dynamic that bears striking the winter of 1939. such investment choices. From 1937, similarities to China’s contemporary Because of the success of blitzkrieg in in Berlin, British Ambassador Nevile theory for victory over Taiwan).29 Key 1940, France’s defeat is often assumed. Meyrick Henderson acted as a willing to Hitler’s plan was isolating Poland However, in reality it was a very closely conduit for Nazi propaganda vindicating diplomatically, employing the untested played German gamble, relying on time German designs on Czechoslovakia in his blitzkrieg concept of operations for to shift forces from Poland to meet reports to London, while complaining to rapid military victory, and thus leverag- the Allies in the West and on untested his Nazi counterparts of Czech intransi- ing political discord in London and Paris technologies and concepts of operation. gence.25 Only after the September 1938 to delay an Allied attack from the west. The risk was made starker by Germany’s Munich Agreement, while Ambassador However, uncertainty about Russia’s limited mechanization of its army, seem- Henderson was in London for medi- reaction constrained Hitler for a time. ingly mitigating any advantage blitzkrieg cal treatment from November 1938 to Hitler’s machinations in Poland were would afford through 1940. In fact, at February 1939, was London finally able conditioned on outcomes of a bloody that time, net assessments of military to form a realistic picture of German poli- border battle raging a world away. Since power between France and Germany cies, which decisively effected a change of May 1939, Soviet and Mongolian forces were relatively balanced, with an edge government threat perceptions.26 had been engaged in a battle with the given to France.34 Given this balance, Interwar military planners and their Japanese along their Manchurian bor- it was critical that Hitler isolate Poland political leaders suffered a malaise. By es- der, known as the Battles of Khalkhin diplomatically while deterring Allied chewing their responsibility, they failed to Gol. Joseph Stalin, calculating a war in intervention—a key element being the JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Sadler 71 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. This relative armor and artillery to divert German November 30, beginning the Winter balance contributed to Allied confidence forces engaged in Poland. In actuality, War—a notable example of military op- in fighting a defensive war and ensuing only 11 divisions were committed from portunism. The publics in London and relative inaction during the Phony War. September 7 to 17 and advanced a mere Paris immediately called for action to 5 miles into German territory.37 The of- defend the brave Finns. With no good The Eastern War fensive stalled because French military options, London’s military chiefs were On September 1, 1939, Hitler invaded commander in chief General Maurice relieved when the Moscow Peace Treaty Poland, calculating correctly that the Gamelin’s assessed advantage rested was signed March 12, 1940.41 In Paris, Allies would not intervene. Weak politi- on fighting a defensive war on known however, the mood was unforgiving and cal leadership and shaky domestic politi- ground—assumed to be in Belgium per resulted in the March 20 resignation cal mandates played out in the delayed “integral defense.” To achieve this posi- of Prime Minister Édouard Daladier, declaration of war on Germany in both tion, French planning centered on the which ushered in the more energetic London and Paris.35 After a prolonged Maginot Line and combined operations Paul Reynaud.42 The speed of events in back and forth, the two Allies finally to bolster a defensive line in Belgium, the Baltic, and the lack of good military agreed on September 3 to declare war which proved too little, too late. This options, compounded the underlying against Germany. No appreciable assis- missed opportunity in the Saar was made political confusion and distracted military tance ever made its way to Poland. clear in testimony by German chief of preparation for the main battle to come However, the seeds of Hitler’s even- operation staff General Alfred Jodl at his in France. Next to feel the political pinch tual downfall were also planted at this Nuremberg trial: “If we did not collapse at home would be London. time. Hitler, confident of a limited war, already in the year 1939 that was due failed to shift Germany’s economy to pre- only to the fact that during the Polish Too Little, Too Late pare for what would be a major sustained campaign, the approximately 110 French British military interests in neutral war. Albert Speer eventually shifted and British divisions in the West were Norway were an open secret. For Germany’s economy in 1942, almost 3 held completely inactive against the 23 months, British politicians and military years after invading Poland. German divisions.”38 Wartime German leaders had publicly signaled the need As Hitler solidified gains in the east, General Siegfried Westphal further stated, for action, including the mining of Nor- political confusion in Paris and London “Had the French attacked in force in wegian harbors.43 Norway was impor- provided him an unmolested period September 1939 the German Army tant because of geography—a long in which to regroup and redirect his would have only been able to hold out coastline affording access to the North forces for the conquest of France. In the for two weeks.”39 Atlantic—and as a major transshipment months before and during the Phony source of German steel. The Febru- War, governments in Paris and London Opportunism ary 1940 Altmark incident, however, had weak mandates, culminating in new Driven by revanchist aspirations and catalyzed German concerns into action. governments in Paris (March 1940) fears of a German advance through the German ship Altmark had escaped and London (May 1940). However, by Baltic states, Stalin launched a pressure the Battle of River Plate in December 1938 France and Great Britain realized campaign of intimidation and coercion 1939, carrying British prisoners taken that to check any German onslaught on to reestablish a Baltic presence through during commerce raiding by the cruiser Versailles, they would have to threaten a military basing and access rights. Stalin Admiral Graf Spee.44 Hitler was enraged two-front war. received his pretext after a day of opera- when Altmark was seized in Norwegian tions against Poland. On September territorial waters by a British boarding Missed Opportunity 18, a Polish submarine was allowed to party. The result was the freeing of 300 By late 1938, the Poles realized the depart Estonia—a violation in Stalin’s British prisoners, and Hitler’s green- threat of invasion was imminent and eyes of Estonia’s declared neutrality. lighting of German support of a Nor- looked for assurances of support from This event triggered a Soviet ultimatum wegian coup led by Norwegian military the French and British. The genesis for on September 24. Latvia and Lithu- officer and Nazi collaborator Vidkun this assurance was Hitler’s annexation ania followed suit by agreeing to host Quisling. of Czechoslovakia. Subsequently, on Russian bases by October 10, with Confusion and wasted time ensued March 31, 1939, Paris and London allowance for 75,000 Red Army soldiers in March, as Prime Minister Neville made commitments to Poland and in these three countries.40 These Baltic Chamberlain redirected an expeditionary Romania that their militaries were ill sites would only regain their indepen- force readying for action in Finland to positioned to deliver.36 Among those dence more than 50 years later with the instead invade Norway. However, Hitler commitments was the Saar offensive. dissolution of the Soviet Union. outmaneuvered the Allies and invaded Originally, the Saar offensive in the Only Finland refused Stalin’s de- Denmark and Norway on April 9. The Rhine River Valley was to include upward mands. On the heels of Poland’s October ill-prepared and limited British forces of 40 French divisions and associated dissolution, Russia invaded Finland on were caught off guard. This failure would 72 Features / Avoiding Great Power Phony Wars JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 bring Winston Churchill to the pre- military actions remains unchanged. This has resulted in both nations miership on the same day the Germans Today, this notion is compounded by committing to active and continuous col- opened the Western Front. space and cyber actions that would figure laboration of national policy and military prominently during the opening phase of operations through the newly established The Un-Phony War conflict. During the Phony War, British Alliance Coordination Mechanism and During the Phony War, all the belliger- global naval presence and German com- Bilateral Enterprise. While the alliance ents’ navies and air forces were actively merce attacks on the high seas ensured with Japan is rapidly evolving, more is engaged, thus making it a Phony War maritime forces were actively engaged needed to modernize and network our only in name for these services: early in battle. However, in the near alliances to avoid the mistakes of 1939 future, as U.S. ground forces invest in Belgium. Sinking of the British aircraft carrier • new long-range strike and antishipping Russian and Chinese naval activity HMS Courageous by a U-29 on Sep- capabilities unencumbered by the now- deep in the Pacific is challenging as- tember 17, 1939; 519 killed. defunct Intermediate-Range Nuclear sumptions of free movement by forces Sinking of the British battleship • Forces Treaty, the Army and Marine critical to East Asia contingencies. This HMS Royal Oak by a U-47 on Corps will be critical and active early reality makes Pacific island nations vital October 14, 1939; 833 killed. players in any future East Asia conflict. partners in any showdown in Asia. Yet Luftwaffe air raids on Great Britain • The Army has already moved forward on many of these nations are challenged began on October 16, 1939, when developing Deep Strike missiles for at- to adequately police their economic Junkers Ju-88s attacked British tacking moving targets out to 309 miles, exclusion zones, which has resulted in warships at Rosyth on the Firth of making the Army a future power to con- significant financial and environmental Forth. tend with in maritime Asia. losses.47 In the face of growing Chinese Following a months-long hunt • influence, there is an opportunity for across the South Atlantic and Indian Where Is Today’s the Department of the Interior and the oceans, in September–December Decisive Theater? Department of Defense to revitalize 1939 German commerce raider On May 10, 1940, the Phony War came historical relationships and recapitalize Admiral Graf Spee was engaged and to an abrupt close with Hitler’s stun- outdated infrastructure. Such investments scuttled at the Battle of the River ning and successful move through the are important to bolstering local econo- Plate off the coast of Uruguay. Ardennes. Once massed armies of the mies while facilitating the cost-effective On February 19, 1940, failed • belligerents came into contact, what U.S. presence needed to secure vital sea German Operation Wikingera followed was a prolonged, brutish, and and air lines. intended to disrupt British North bloody war lasting another 5 years and Closer to coastal China in the Sea maritime activity around the resulting in horrific losses of life. These Western Pacific, allies and the balance of Dogger Bank. Two destroyers were losses were not inevitable, and condi- U.S. Pacific forces are within range of lost to mines and friendly fire from tions around contemporary flash points thousands of Chinese ballistic and cruise the Luftwaffe; 600 German sailors have some similarity to preconditions of missiles. Countering this threat and un- were killed without encountering the Phony War. dermining Chinese counterintervention Allied forces. Belgium’s actions during the Phony strategy represent the most significant During the Napoleonic Wars, com- War are instructive and belie the im- challenges to securing long-term U.S. in- petition between land power France portance of having practiced access and terests.48 Overcoming the challenges will and naval power Great Britain was often posture with Allies well in advance of inform future defense investments for the imagined as a fight between a whale and a crisis. In the global competition with foreseeable future. elephant, in which both were dominant China, U.S. alliances are our greatest An important question, then, is where in their domains but limited in where asset, but they must be modernized to the modern version of an Ardennes will they could bring their force to bear on remain relevant in a changing security occur. During the Cold War, this was the other. The analogy will not apply in a environment.45 Consider recent efforts in a strike from the Eastern Bloc through modern conflict with effective long-range the Philippines, where Japan has joined the Fulda Gap. Determining the decisive strike capabilities targeting land, sea, and U.S. efforts to improve the Philippine theater is critical to informing military air forces. Moreover, long-range strike coast guard and navy.46 This has been posture and capability investments as well and cyber capabilities proliferate so thor- possible only because Japan made leg- as focusing diplomatic initiatives to secure oughly today that U.S. forces no longer islative and constitutional adjustments proximate allies. Given technological and enjoy the luxury distance provides from for a proactive regional role. Critical geopolitical dynamics today, determin- attack. in this Japanese endeavor has been the ing the decisive theater is complicated by The notion that proximity and ac- 2015 revision of the U.S.-Japan Defense the fact that two geographically separate cess to enemy forces for strikes from Guidelines and constitutional reinterpre- Great Powers must be considered. The sea or air determine the pace of early tations allowing collective self-defense. latest National Military Strategy and JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Sadler 73 National Defense Strategy embrace Great A2/AD umbrella has a chilling effect the cost of any Chinese revisionist Power competition with China and on any prospective Southeast Asian moves in East Asia.56 The Philip- Russia, yet both fall short by too broadly partner. Given these challenges, during pines, South Korea, and Japan are identifying today’s decisive theaters as the the initial weeks of potential crisis, formal U.S. allies at different levels Indo-Pacific, Europe, and Middle East. the chance of a modern Phony War is of military competency and special- Missing is more specific mention of a appreciable. With this in mind, consider ization. In the face of rapid Chinese modern Fulda Gap. That said, informed the following: military growth and modernization, by Departments of Defense and State coordinated operations among all Diplomatic efforts, such as the public statements, the greater challenge is • Asian allies, including Australia, Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and the China’s pointing to the decisive theater in are imperative for modern integral absence of Allied forces in Eastern maritime East Asia. defense in maritime East Asia. Moves Europe in 1939 precluded military Similar to Berlin’s position in the to make existing exercises increas- support for Poland. A contemporary Cold War, Taiwan would likely be a ingly multilateral, such as 2019’s example is China’s diplomatic efforts catalyst today for any Great Power war. Exercise Balikatan in the Philippines, to flip countries’ recognition of This position is made urgent considering are a step in the right direction but Taiwan. Moreover, not unlike 1939– that 2020 national elections returned to arguably could be scaled up.57 Also 1940 Europe, opportunism and Taiwan a government that Beijing con- hopeful is the increasing operation- uncertainty over the outcome of any siders suspect. Similar suspicions led to a alization in the 2020 iteration of Asian contest likely would engender 1996 crisis, when the Chinese employed the maritime Malabar Exercise by a high degree of diplomatic duplicity missile tests to intimidate Taiwan during the United States, Australia, Japan, during the early phases of a future elections. This might occur again today, and India.58 Likewise, standardizing contest. It would be a contemporary but China has improved its capacity for and routinizing logistics and access dynamic of Mao Zedong’s “Fight, war at long range, elevating potential for among allies could speed the flow Fight, Talk, Talk” 1940s approach, miscalculation and escalation. and sustainment of forces early in a which, while placating U.S. pressure future crisis. to negotiate with nationalist forces, Rhyming with Taiwan Resolution of distant conflicts, such continued waging a prolonged and • Like Stalin’s and Hitler’s revanchist as at Nomonhan, can alter strategic successful civil war.51 Today, as in the aims in Poland, the Chinese Com- calculations and pique an aggressor interwar period, the United States munist Party is similarly motivated to to act. For China, effectively resolv- and its allies are striving to preserve rein in Taiwan and end its de facto ing its border dispute and turning the status quo—the rules-based independence. The CCP’s motiva- strategic competition into a compre- order—in a politically defensive envi- tion is more than revanchism—it is to hensive strategic partnership with ronment.52 China’s military buildup erase an example of successful Chinese Russia has enabled newfound mili- and displays of ballistic missiles have, democratic capitalism that threatens the tary confidence. Following China’s like the Soviet buildup of theater legitimacy of communist dominance entry to the World Trade Organiza- nuclear weapons in the Cold War and in China. In this context, the 2016 tion in 2001, economic growth and Hitler’s Siegfried Line, won political election of independence-minded Tsai inflows of capital accelerated China’s victories while paralyzing effective Ing-wen as Taiwan’s president agitates military modernization. By 2008, responses to gray zone challenges of the CCP. Triggering a resumption of China and Russia had resolved their the status quo.53 Plans that assume Chinese efforts to isolate Taiwan, six borders; China’s military capacity fixed alliances and constellations of nations dropped diplomatic relations outstripped Russia’s, giving China partners will fail, as did assumptions with the island from 2016 through a freer hand to invest in naval and of German-Soviet enmity in 1939.54 late 2018.49 Phony War parallels are strike capabilities critical in a war Belgium’s steadfast neutrality and relevant here: In a potential Taiwan • with Taiwan. Before this time, the failure to allow French forces to conflict, allies’ militaries optimized for majority of Chinese naval vessels enter and bolster defenses during defense near the conflict are likely to were considered obsolete or suitable the Phony War prevented adequate assume a passive posture as the United only for coastal missions. However, combined operations ahead of States musters forces, ramps up arma- by 2015 following a remarkable Hitler’s invasion. A modern version ment production, rallies political will, building program, China’s navy had of integral defense gaining traction and moves forces through a substantial become overwhelmingly a blue water today is what Andrew Krepinevich Chinese antiaccess and area-denial (A2/ fleet, the majority of which was con- calls “Archipelagic Defense,” which AD) umbrella stretching hundreds of sidered modern.59 Compared with employs land-based long-range miles into the Philippine Sea.50 More- the U.S. Navy’s rather static build strike platforms across the First over, China’s recent South China Sea rate in 2008–2019, China’s navy Island Chain.55 Such forces elevate island-building as an extension of its commissioned on average nine new 74 Features / Avoiding Great Power Phony Wars JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Finnish Maxim M/32-33 machine gun nest 100 meters from Soviet forces, located approximately 5 kilometers north of Lemetti (area of the modern Pitkyarantsky District, Russia), during Winter War, February 21, 1940 (Courtesy Military Museum of Finland) modern warships annually.60 Mea- tal escalation by all sides, potentially tool of statecraft. Moreover, for the sured another way, the total annual distracting from the main effort in past several years, the United States tonnage of new warships China East Asia. has been victimized by a Russian put to sea in 2008 was more than • So-called “fifth columns” softened influence campaign to undermine 29,000 tons, growing to more than targets, such as the Sudeten German faith in our democracy.68 China, too, 187,000 tons by 2017—roughly Free Corps in 1938 Czechoslovakia, has been active in this realm, with doubling that of U.S. production while influence campaigns sought controversial donations to politicians over 2015–2017.61 Should China to benefit from or sow domestic in Australia and New Zealand, pur- succeed in its ongoing suppression political disunity. These campaigns chases of Western media firms, and a of the Uighurs62 and resolve border included political assassinations global network of schools ostensibly disputes with India,63 Beijing could aimed to usher in favorable gov- spreading Confucius’s teachings.69 be further emboldened to act more ernments—one example was the China’s reach today is pervasive; aggressively in its maritime periphery. 1937 killing of antifascists during for example, CCP leaders pressured • Strategic initiatives to isolate a bel- severe national strikes in France by Marriot to fire Roy Jones, a social ligerent from needed resources right-wing terrorist group Cagoule media manager, for using a company broadened the war through hori- at the behest of Mussolini’s Italy.65 Facebook account to “like” a post zontal escalation. China’s One Belt, Sadly, there has in recent years about Tibet.70 Rob Joyce, a former One Road initiative, begun in 2013, been a similar rise in attempted and senior cybersecurity advisor to the has multibillion-dollar development successful political assassinations National Security Council, sum- projects in over 126 countries, and by Russia (for example, Aleksei marized this environment: “Russia at 2019’s Belt and Road Forum, new Navalny, Aleksander Litvinenko, is the hurricane: It comes in fast and programs worth $64 billion were Sergei Skripal66) and abductions by hard . . . China is climate change: penned.64 This portends a growing the CCP (for example, Gui Minhai, long, slow, pervasive.”71 China’s range of enticing venues for horizon- Xiao Jianhua, Peng Ming67) as a threat today is real and empowered JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Sadler 75 through social media, which makes • Overconfidence in dated or untested and refine a range of dynamic new ways it much more challenging than concepts of operations and theories of war. Most necessary is substantially 1939 Germany.72 Moreover, CCP of victory—principally France’s testing these concepts in the field to influence today is often obscured adherence to a defensive posture accelerate learning and planning that en- by self-censoring. One example is when pressing the Saar attack—could compass a dynamic range of crises. Hollywood moguls cutting material have halted World War II in 1939. Managing crises among competing unacceptable to CCP censors as a Today, excessive confidence in Great Powers is vital to avoid—and, if way to gain access to the lucrative untested concepts at scale in con- needed, constrain—conflict imperiling China market. Another example is tested environments has potential today’s rules-based order. At premium a late 2019 commotion involving for disastrous outcomes in a Taiwan will be the ability to effectively predict the National Basketball Association. crisis. For China, this is its reliance and posture forces to preempt a would- This began with Houston Rockets on A2/AD backed by antiship bal- be challenger’s fait accompli offensive. general manager Daryl Morey’s listic missiles. For the United States, Doing so requires renewed investment October 4, 2019, tweet in support this is its reliance on Third Offset in alliances, military presence, and expe- of Hong Kong democracy protesters advanced warfighting technologies ditionary capabilities. At the same time, and ended when star player LeBron and concepts such as multidomain reinvigorating democratic capitalism James publicly excoriated Morey.73 operations and maritime distributed is vital to afford the prolonged cost of If unchecked, such caustic influence operations.78 competition, while also attracting partner on the electorate risks becoming • Third-party opportunism, such as nations in common causes. Likewise, conventional thinking, in turn con- Stalin’s Winter War, will be a feature access to and contributions from partner straining political leaders’ options. of contemporary Great Power com- nations will be critical to ensure our com- At worst, this can imperil effective petition. Moreover, Russia could bined forces are postured to peacefully political decisionmaking at critical once again seek gains while China protect and enhance global democratic moments of a crisis. and the United States are preoccu- capitalism. • When Hitler shifted the German pied in crisis. More likely, and more The Phony War demonstrated economy to a war footing in 1942, perilous, would be if Russia or China the consequences of being unable to this led to severe armament and fuel acts as a spoiler in order to prolong employ forces where most effective for shortages by 1944.74 Hardening U.S. a crisis in which the United States deterrence—and inevitably for combat. industry requires building bulwarks finds itself—a ploy Stalin attempted Ensuring this fallacy is not repeated is against cyber attack and intellectual when he encouraged the 1950 critical, as Elbridge Colby testified before theft and bolstering the diversifica- Korean War.79 Congress in January 2019.80 Defeating tion of supply chains and the home- the CCP’s plausible theory of victory steading of critical production. At Conclusion requires rapid action under an A2/AD the same time, counterproliferation umbrella, which is intended to make War need not be a foregone conclu- and counterillicit arms production U.S. intervention too costly and provide sion between today’s Great Powers. tools need sharpening. During the time for a CCP fait accompli.81 Retaining However, failure to heed historical interwar years, German company the posture advantage can confound insights from the Phony War could Krupp reconstituted a submarine competitors’ strategies but necessitates allow a crisis to become a long war. force virtually out of thin air based in accepting A2/AD threats in peacetime Given that the nature of competition in the Netherlands to avoid constraints and crisis—the goal being to deter fait Asia is largely maritime, our naval and of the Versailles Treaty.75 Today, the accompli actions, contain crises, and pre- expeditionary forces must be prepared extent to which global production clude a prolonged conflict with another for sustained and significant operations lines have been integrated will have Great Power. from the earliest onset of crisis. This unforeseen implications, likely com- Chance aside, the outcome of war necessitates protecting the homeland plicating prosecution of conflict in will be determined before the fighting from caustic influences such that unexpected ways.76 A recent example actually starts: the better-postured, -re- political will and military options remain was during the start of the COVID- sourced, and -trained Great Power will aligned, therefore enabling prompt 19 crisis, when China (where the win. Being appropriately positioned avails action when opportunity avails. United States sources over 80 time and options for taking the most ef- There is arguably much work to percent of its antibiotics) threat- fective military actions, which 1939 Paris be done to educate the electorate ened to withhold pharmaceutical and London lacked. Doing so also signals on the stakes of today’s Great Power exports.77 Hardening industry and to an adversary that keeping competi- competition. In the meantime, it is the global supply chains would be vital in tion within peaceful means is mutually responsibility of our military, in concert sustaining prolonged operations in a beneficial. Failing to have a clear idea of with our allies, to develop, exercise, modern crisis. how to deter a conflict and options for 76 Features / Avoiding Great Power Phony Wars JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 38 responding in crisis makes strategic mis- Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington, VA: Potomac Trial of the Major War Criminals Before Institute for Policy Studies, December 2007), the International Military Tribunal, vol. 15 direction and paralysis likely during the available at JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Sadler 77 coast of China stretching from Indonesia’s JPs and Joint Doctrine Policy Documents Revised (signed within last 6 months) JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Volumes 1 and 2 JP 3-36, Joint Air Mobility and Sealift Operations 78 Features / Avoiding Great Power Phony Wars JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Falcon 9 Starlink L24 rocket successfully launches from SLC-40 at Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, Florida, April 28, 2021 (U.S. Space Force/Joshua Conti) cholars and practitioners in the area of cyber strategy and con- Cyber Threats and S flict focus on two key strategic imperatives for the United States: first, to maintain and strengthen the current Vulnerabilities to deterrence of cyberattacks of significant consequence; and second, to reverse the tide of malicious behavior that may not Conventional and rise to a level of armed attack but never- theless has cumulative strategic implica- tions as part of adversary campaigns. The Department of Defense (DOD) Strategic Deterrence strategic concept of defend forward and U.S. Cyber Command’s concept By Mark Montgomery and Erica Borghard of persistent engagement are largely directed toward this latter challenge. While the United States has ostensibly deterred strategic cyberattacks above the threshold of armed conflict, it has failed to create sufficient costs for adversaries below that threshold in a Mark Montgomery is Executive Director of the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission and Senior way that would shape adversary behav- Director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation. Dr. 1 Erica Borghard is a Senior Fellow in the Technology and International Affairs Program at the Carnegie ior in a desired direction. Effectively, Endowment for International Peace. this tide of malicious behavior repre- JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Montgomery and Borghard 79 sents a deterrence failure for strategic adversaries is its technological edge in Deterrence in U.S. Strategy cyber campaigns below the use-of-force the conventional weapons realm—even Throughout successive Presidential threshold; threat actors have not been as its hold may be weakening.6 Indeed, administrations, even as the particular dissuaded from these types of cam- this is why adversaries prefer to contest details or parameters of its implementa- paigns because they have not perceived the United States below the level of tion varied, deterrence has remained an that the costs or risks of conducting war, in the gray zone, and largely avoid anchoring concept for U.S. strategy.9 them outweigh the benefits.2 This direct military confrontation where they Deterrence is a coercive strategy that breakdown has led to systemic and perceive a significant U.S. advantage. At seeks to prevent an actor from taking pervasive efforts by adversaries to lever- the same time, adversaries are making an unacceptable action.10 Robert Art, age U.S. vulnerabilities and its large substantial investments in technology and for example, defines deterrence as “the attack surface in cyberspace to conduct innovation to directly erode that edge, deployment of military power so as to intellectual property theft—including while also shielding themselves from it by be able to prevent an adversary from critical national security intellectual developing offset, antiaccess/area-denial doing something that one does not property—at scale, use cyberspace capabilities.7 Moreover, adversaries are want him to do and that he otherwise in support of information operations engaging in cyber espionage to discern might be tempted to do by threaten- that undermine America’s democratic where key U.S. military capabilities and ing him with unacceptable punishment institutions, and hold at risk the critical systems may be vulnerable and to poten- if he does it.”11 Joseph Nye defines infrastructure that sustains the U.S. tially blind and paralyze the United States deterrence as “dissuading someone economy, national security, and way of with cyber effects in a time of crisis or from doing something by making them life. conflict.8 believe the costs to them will exceed U.S. strategy has simultaneously Therefore, while technologically their expected benefit.”12 These defini- focused on the longstanding challenge advanced U.S. military capabilities form tions of deterrence share a core logic: of deterring significant cyberattacks that the bedrock of its military advantage, namely, to prevent an adversary from would cause loss of life, sustained disrup- they also create cyber vulnerabilities that taking undesired action through the tion of essential functions and services, adversaries can and will undoubtedly use credible threat to create costs for doing or critical economic impacts—those to their strategic advantage. To support a so that exceed the potential benefits. activities that may cross the threshold strategy of full-spectrum deterrence, the However, one notable distinction is constituting a use of force or armed at- United States must maintain credible and Art’s focus on the military instrument tack. Indeed, Congress chartered the capable conventional and nuclear capa- of power (chiefly nuclear weapons) as U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission in bilities. However, adversaries could hold a tool of deterrence, whereas Nye’s the 2019 National Defense Authorization these at risk in cyberspace, potentially concept of deterrence implies a broader Act to “develop a consensus on a stra- undermining deterrence. If deterrence set of capabilities that could be mar- tegic approach to defending the United fails in times of crisis and conflict, the shalled to prevent unwanted behavior. States in cyberspace against cyberattacks United States must be able to defend and Indeed, Nye’s extension of deterrence of significant consequences.”3 There is surge conventional capabilities when ad- to cyberspace incorporates four deter- also a general acknowledgment of the versaries utilize cyber capabilities to attack rence mechanisms: “threat of punish- link between U.S. cyber strategy below American military systems and functions. ment, denial by defense, entangle- and above the threshold of armed conflict In this way, cyber vulnerabilities that ment, and normative taboos.”13 This in cyberspace. Specifically, efforts to de- adversaries exploit in routine competition is precisely because of the challenges fend forward below the level of war—to below the level of war have danger- associated with relying solely on military observe and pursue adversaries as they ous implications for the U.S. ability to power and punishment logics to achieve maneuver in “gray” and “red” space, deter and prevail in conflict above that cyber deterrence. Our working defini- and to counter adversary operations, threshold—even in a noncyber context. tion of deterrence is therefore consistent capabilities, and infrastructure when au- The strategic consequences of the weak- with how Nye approaches the concept. thorized—could yield positive cascading ening of U.S. warfighting capabilities Credibility lies at the crux of suc- effects that support deterrence of strate- that support conventional—and, even cessful deterrence. The target must gic cyberattacks.4 more so, nuclear—deterrence are acute. believe that the deterring state has both Less attention, however, has been Additionally, the scope and challenge the capabilities to inflict the threaten- devoted to the cross-domain nexus be- in securing critical military networks ing costs and the resolve to carry out a tween adversary cyber campaigns below and systems in cyberspace is immense. threat.14 A deterring state must therefore the level of war and the implications for Therefore, urgent policy action is needed develop mechanisms for signaling cred- conventional or nuclear deterrence and to address the cyber vulnerabilities of key ibility to the target.15 Much of the Cold warfighting capabilities.5 The most criti- weapons systems and functions. War deterrence literature focused on cal comparative warfighting advantage the question of how to convey resolve, the United States enjoys relative to its primarily because the threat to use 80 Features / Cyber Threats and Vulnerabilities JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Company fire support officer assigned to 2nd Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, monitors computer system showing target locations at Dona Ana Range Complex, New Mexico, March 8, 2021 (U.S. Army/Elijah Ingram) nuclear weapons—particularly in sup- U.S. strategy focuses on the credible deterrence as a strategic concept is again port of extended deterrence guarantees employment of conventional and nuclear at the crux of U.S. strategy but with new to allies—lacks inherent credibility given weapons capabilities, and the relative applications and challenges. As the 2017 the extraordinarily high consequences sophistication, lethality, and precision of National Security Strategy notes, “deter- of nuclear weapons employment in these capabilities over adversaries, as an rence today is significantly more complex comparison to any political objective.16 essential element of prevailing in what to achieve than during the Cold War. This raises questions about decisionmak- is now commonly described as Great Adversaries studied the American way of ers’ willingness to follow through on a Power competition (GPC).18 Setting aside war and began investing in capabilities nuclear threat. However, the credibility important debates about the merits and that targeted our strengths and sought conundrum manifests itself differently limitations of the term itself, and with to exploit perceived weaknesses.”21 In today. Specifically, the potential for cyber the important caveat that GPC is not a this new environment, cyberspace is a operations to distort or degrade the strategy but rather describes a strategic decisive arena in broader GPC, with ability of conventional or even nuclear context, it is more than apparent that significant implications for cross-domain capabilities to work as intended could the United States faces emerging peer deterrence.22 undermine the credibility of deterrence competitors.19 This may be due to The literature on the feasibility of due to a reduced capability rather than changes in the military balance of power deterrence in cyberspace largely focuses political will.17 Moreover, given the secret that have resulted in a relative decline in on within-domain deterrence—in other nature of cyber operations, there is likely America’s position, or China and Russia words, the utility and feasibility of using to be information asymmetry between reasserting their influence regionally (or threatening) cyber means to deter the deterring state and the ostensible and globally—or a combination of these cyber behavior.23 Scholars have identified target of deterrence if that target has factors.20 While the current strategic land- a number of important impediments to undermined or holds at risk the deterring scape is distinct from both the Cold War this form of cyber deterrence.24 For in- state’s capabilities without its knowledge. and the period immediately following, stance, the challenges of discerning timely JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Montgomery and Borghard 81 Chief Information Security Officer for Acquisitions Katie Arrington discusses Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification with Norwegian National Defense and Security Industries Association, from the Pentagon, Washington, DC, January 13, 2021 (DOD/Brittany A. Chase) and accurate attribution could weaken fleeting nature of cyber operations and explore how offensive cyber operations cyber deterrence through generating effects.29 Others offer a more sanguine that target a state’s nuclear command, doubt about the identity of the perpetra- take. For instance, deterrence may have control, and communications could un- tor of a cyberattack, which undermines more favorable prospects when it focuses dermine strategic deterrence and increase the credibility of response options.25 on deterring specific types of behavior or the risk of war.32 Similarly, Austin Long Uncertainty about the effects of cyber specific adversaries rather than general notes potential pathways from offensive capabilities—both anticipating them ex cyber deterrence.30 cyber operations to inadvertent escalation ante and measuring them ex post—may Notably, there has been some (which is by definition a failure of deter- impede battle damage assessments that important work on the feasibility of rence) if “attacks on even nonmilitary are essential for any deterrence calculus.26 cross-domain deterrence as it pertains to critical systems (for example, power sup- This uncertainty is further complicated the threat of employing noncyber kinetic plies) could impact military capabilities by limitations in the ability to hold tar- capabilities to deter unwanted behavior in or stoke fears that military networks had gets at risk or deliver effects repeatedly cyberspace. As Jacquelyn Schneider notes, likewise been compromised.”33 over time.27 A deterring state may avoid this type of deterrence “involves the use Nevertheless, policymakers’ atten- revealing capabilities (which enhances the of punishment or denial across domains tion to cyber threats to conventional and credibility of deterrence) because the act of warfighting and foreign policy to nuclear deterrence has been drowned of revealing them renders the capabilities deter adversaries from utilizing cyber out by other concerns—some of which impotent.28 Finally, the target may simply operations to create physical or virtual ef- are inflated—in the cyber domain. For not perceive the threatened cyber costs to fects.”31 The literature has also examined instance, the typical feared scenario is the be sufficiently high to affect its calculus, the inverse aspect of cross-domain deter- equivalent of a “cyber Pearl Harbor” or a or the target may be willing to gamble rence—namely, how threats in the cyber “cyber 9/11” event—a large-scale cyber- that a threatened action may not produce domain can generate instability and risk attack against critical U.S. infrastructure the effect intended by the deterring for deterrence across other domains. For that causes significant harm to life or state due to the often unpredictable and example, Erik Gartzke and Jon Lindsay property.34 This line of thinking, however, 82 Features / Cyber Threats and Vulnerabilities JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 risks missing the ostensibly more signifi- cybersecurity vulnerabilities that exist in Even more concerning, in some cant threat posed by stealthy cyberspace COTS items.”40 instances, testing teams did not attempt activities that could undermine the stabil- Therefore, a fundamental issue is to evade detection and operated openly ity of conventional or nuclear deterrence. that both individual weapons programs but still went undetected. Moreover, already under development and fielded some DOD operators did not even Cyber Risks to Conventional systems in the sustainment phase of the know the system had been compro- and Nuclear Deterrence acquisition life cycle are beset by vulner- mised: “[U]nexplained crashes were The cyber vulnerabilities that exist abilities. Prior to 2014, many of DOD’s normal for the system,” and even when across conventional and nuclear cybersecurity efforts were devoted intrusion detection systems issued alerts, weapons platforms pose meaningful to protecting networks and informa- “[this] did not improve users’ awareness risks to deterrence.35 It is likely that tion technology (IT) systems, rather of test team activities because . . . warn- these risks will only grow as the United than the cybersecurity of the weapons ings were so common that operators States continues to pursue defense themselves.41 Protecting IT systems is were desensitized to them.”46 Existing modernization programs that rely important in its own right. Federal and testing programs are simply too limited on vulnerable digital infrastructure.36 private contractor systems have been the to enable DOD to have a complete These vulnerabilities present across four targets of widespread and sophisticated understanding of weapons system vul- categories, each of which poses unique cyber intrusions. For instance, former nerabilities, which is compounded by a concerns: technical vulnerabilities Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer shortage of skilled penetration testers.47 in weapons programs already under described naval and industry partner Individual weapons platforms do not development as well as fielded systems, systems as being “under cyber siege” by in reality operate in isolation from one technical vulnerabilities at the systemic Chinese hackers.42 Yet of most concern another. Rather, most modern weap- level across networked platforms (“sys- is that the integrity and credibility of ons systems comprise a complex set of tem-of-systems” vulnerabilities), supply deterrence will be compromised by the systems—systems of systems that entail chain vulnerabilities and the acquisitions cybersecurity vulnerabilities of weapons “operat[ing] multiple platforms and sys- process, and nontechnical vulnerabilities systems. tems in a collaborate manner to perform stemming from information operations. In recent years, while DOD has military missions.”48 An example is the Connectivity, automation, exquisite undertaken efforts to assess the cyber Aegis weapon system, which contains a situational awareness, and precision vulnerabilities of individual weapons variety of integrated subsystems, includ- are core components of DOD military platforms, critical gaps in the infrastruc- ing detection, command and control, capabilities; however, they also present ture remain. For example, there is no targeting, and kinetic capabilities.49 numerous vulnerabilities and access permanent process to periodically assess Therefore, vulnerability assessments that points for cyber intrusions and attacks. the vulnerability of fielded systems, de- focus on individual platforms are unable Innovations in technology and weaponry spite the fact that the threat environment to identify potential vulnerabilities that have produced highly complex weapons is dynamic and vulnerabilities are not may arise when these capabilities interact systems, such as those in the F-35 Joint constant. This means that a singular static or work together as part of a broader, Strike Fighter, which possesses unparal- assessment is unlikely to capture how vul- networked platform. The challenge of leled technology, sensors, and situational nerabilities may evolve and change over securing these complex systems is com- awareness—some of which rely on time.43 Relatedly, a 2018 Government pounded by the interaction of legacy vulnerable Internet of Things devices.37 Accountability Office report found and newer weapons systems—and most In a pithy depiction, Air Force Chief of pervasive and significant mission-critical DOD weapons platforms are legacy plat- Staff General David Goldfein describes vulnerabilities across most weapons forms. Poor or nonexistent cybersecurity the F-35 as “a computer that happens to systems already under development.44 practices in legacy weapons systems may fly.”38 However, the increasingly com- Between 2012 and 2017, DOD penetra- jeopardize the new systems they connect puterized and networked nature of these tion testers—individuals who evaluate to, and the broader system itself, because weapons systems makes it exponentially the cybersecurity of computer systems adversaries can exploit vulnerabilities more difficult to secure them. Moreover, and uncover vulnerabilities—discovered in legacy systems (the weakest link in the use of commercial off-the-shelf “mission-critical cyber vulnerabilities in the chain) to gain access to multiple (COTS) technology in modern weapons nearly all weapon systems under develop- systems.50 Without a systematic process systems presents an additional set of ment.”45 Penetration testing teams were to map dependencies across complex vulnerability considerations.39 Indeed, able to overcome weapons systems cy- networked systems, anticipating the cas- a 2019 DOD Inspector General report bersecurity controls designed to prevent cading implications of adversary intrusion found that DOD purchases and uses determined adversaries from gaining ac- into any given component of a system is a COTS technologies with known cyber- cess to these platforms and to maneuver challenge. security vulnerabilities and that, because within compromised systems while suc- Another pathway through which of this, “adversaries could exploit known cessfully evading detection. adversaries can exploit vulnerabilities in JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Montgomery and Borghard 83 weapons systems is the security of the DOD issued the Cybersecurity Maturity weapons systems. However, adversar- DOD supply chain—the global constel- Model Certification, which created ies could compromise the integrity of lation of components and processes new, tiered cybersecurity standards for command and control systems—most that form the production of DOD defense contractors and was meant to concerningly for nuclear weapons—with- capabilities—which is shaped by DOD’s build on the 2016 DFARS requirement.54 out exploiting technical vulnerabilities in acquisitions strategy, regulations, and However, this has resulted in confusion the digital infrastructure on which these requirements. DOD and the Department about requirements, and the process for systems rely. Instead, malicious actors of Energy have been concerned about independently auditing and verifying could conduct cyber-enabled information vulnerabilities within the acquisitions pro- compliance remains in nascent stages of operations with the aim of manipulating cess for emerging technologies for over a development.55 At the same time, in the or distorting the perceived integrity of decade.51 Insecure hardware or software 2019 National Defense Authorization Act command and control. This could take at any point in the supply chain could (NDAA), Congress took legislative ac- place in positive or negative forms—in compromise the integrity of the ultimate tion to ban government procurement of other words, perpetrating information product being delivered and provide a or contracting with entities that procure as a means to induce operations to er- means for adversaries to gain access for telecommunications technologies from roneously make a decision to employ malicious purposes. specific Chinese firms, including Huawei a capability or to refrain from carrying However, there is no clear and con- and ZTE, and affiliated organizations. out a lawful order. The consequences sistent strategy to secure DOD’s supply This led to a backlash, particularly among are significant, particularly in the nuclear chain and acquisitions process, an absence small- to medium-sized subcontractors, command and control realm, because not of a centralized entity responsible for about their ability to comply, which re- employing a capability could undermine implementation and compliance, and sulted in an interim clarification.56 positive and negative control over nuclear insufficient oversight to drive decisive Moreover, ownership of this pro- weapons and inevitably the stability of action on these issues. There is instead curement issue remains decentralized, nuclear deterrence. decentralized responsibility across DOD, with different offices both within and coupled with a number of reactive and ad without DOD playing important roles. Policy Recommendations hoc measures that leave DOD without Significant stakeholders within DOD in- Recognizing the interdependence a complete picture of its supply chain, clude the Under Secretary of Defense for among cyber, conventional, and nuclear dynamic understanding of the scope and Acquisition and Sustainment, the Under domains, U.S. policymakers must priori- scale of its vulnerabilities, and consistent Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and tize efforts to reduce the cyber vulner- mechanisms to rapidly remediate these Security, the Defense Counterintelligence abilities of conventional and nuclear vulnerabilities. and Security Agency, the Cybersecurity capabilities and ensure they are resilient Until recently, DOD’s main ac- Directorate within the National Security to adversary action in cyberspace. Cyber quisitions requirements policy did not Agency, the DOD Cyber Crime threats to these systems could distort or systematically address cybersecurity Center, and the Defense Industrial Base undermine their intended uses, creating concerns. For instance, it did not call for Cybersecurity Program, among others. risks that these capabilities may not be programs to include cyberattack surviv- Within the Intelligence Community, reliably employable at critical junctures. ability as a key performance parameter.52 the National Counterintelligence and Additionally, cyber-enabled espionage These types of requirements are typically Security Center within the Office of conducted against these systems could established early in the acquisitions pro- the Director of National Intelligence allow adversaries to replicate cutting- cess and drive subsequent system design also plays a role in supply chain security edge U.S. defense technology without decisionmaking. If cybersecurity require- through its counterintelligence mission, comparable investments in research ments are tacked on late in the process, or which includes the defense industrial and development and could inform the after a weapons system has already been base. The Department of Energy also development of adversary offset capabil- deployed, the requirements are far more plays a critical role in the nuclear security ities. Vulnerabilities such as these have difficult and costly to address and much aspects of this procurement challenge.57 important implications for deterrence less likely to succeed.53 In 2016, DOD Absent a clearly defined leadership and warfighting. Deterrence postures updated the Defense Federal Acquisition strategy over these issues, and one that that rely on the credible, reliable, and Regulations Supplement (DFARS), es- clarifies roles and responsibilities across effective threat to employ conventional tablishing cybersecurity requirements for this vast set of stakeholders, a systemic or nuclear capabilities could be under- defense contractors based on standards and comprehensive effort to secure mined through adversary cyber opera- set by the National Institute of Standards DOD’s supply chain is unlikely to occur.58 tions. And, if deterrence fails, cyber and Technology. Then, in part due to Risks stemming from nontechnical operations to disrupt or degrade the inconsistencies in compliance, verification, vulnerabilities are entirely overlooked in functioning of kinetic weapons systems and enforcement in the cybersecurity strategies and policies for identifying and could compromise mission assurance standards established in DFARS, in 2019 remediating cyber vulnerabilities in DOD during crises and conflicts. 84 Features / Cyber Threats and Vulnerabilities JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 More than 100 players from around the Nation participate in Defend Forward: 2019 Critical Infrastructure War Game, at U.S. Naval War College, July 25, 2019, in Newport, Rhode Island (U.S. Navy/Tyler D. John) As adversaries’ cyber threats become legislative measures to assess the cyber interdependent and networked nature of more sophisticated, addressing the cyber- vulnerabilities of weapons systems to ac- multiple independent weapons systems, security of DOD’s increasingly advanced count for a number of important gaps. merely assessing individual platforms and networked weapons systems should The ultimate objective is to enable DOD misses crucial potential vulnerabilities that be prioritized. The Cyberspace Solarium to develop a more complete picture of may arise when platforms interact with Commission’s March 2020 report details the scope, scale, and implications of cyber one another. Therefore, DOD must also a number of policy recommendations to vulnerabilities to critical weapons systems evaluate how a cyber intrusion or attack address this challenge.59 We now unpack and functions. Past congressional action on one system could affect the entire mis- a number of specific measures put forth has spurred some important progress on sion—in other words, DOD must assess by the Cyberspace Solarium Commission this issue. Specifically, in Section 1647 vulnerabilities at a systemic level. that Congress, acting in its oversight role, of the FY16 NDAA, which was subse- Given that Congress has already set along with the executive branch could quently updated in Section 1633 of the a foundation for assessing cyber vulner- take to address some of the most pressing FY20 NDAA, Congress directed DOD abilities in weapons systems, there is an concerns regarding the cyber vulnerabili- to assess the cyber vulnerabilities of each opportunity to legislatively build on this ties of conventional and nuclear weapons major weapons system.60 Although this progress. The commission proposed systems. We also describe the important process has commenced, gaps remain that Congress amend Section 1647 of the progress made in the fiscal year (FY) must be remediated. For example, there FY16 NDAA (which, as noted, was 2021 NDAA, which builds on the com- is no permanent process to periodically amended in the FY20 NDAA) to include mission’s recommendations. assess the cybersecurity of fielded systems. a requirement for DOD to annually assess In terms of legislative remedies, the Additionally, the current requirement major weapons systems vulnerabilities. Cyberspace Solarium Commission report is to assess the vulnerabilities of indi- In the FY21 NDAA, Congress incorpo- recommends Congress update its recent vidual weapons platforms. But given the rated elements of this recommendation, JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Montgomery and Borghard 85 Colonial Pipeline halted operation of its 5,500 miles of pipeline, stretching from Texas to New York, after being hit by randsomware cyber attack on May 7, 2021 (Photo courtesy J.B.) directing the Secretary of Defense to efforts to address cyber vulnerabilities of and control, coupled with ongoing institutionalize a recurring process for cy- interdependent and networked weapons nuclear modernization programs that bersecurity vulnerability assessments that systems in broader mission areas, with may create unintended cyber risks, the “take[s] into account upgrades or other an intent to gain mission assurance of cybersecurity of nuclear command, modifications to systems and changes these platforms. Moreover, the process of control, and communications (NC3) in the threat landscape.”61 Importantly, identifying interdependent vulnerabilities and National Leadership Command Congress recommended that DOD as- should go beyond assessing technical Capabilities (NLCC) should be given sign a senior official responsibilities for vulnerabilities to take a risk manage- specific attention.65 In Section 1651 of overseeing and managing this process—a ment approach to drive prioritization the FY18 NDAA, Congress created a critical step given the decentralization given the scope and scale of networked requirement for DOD to conduct an of oversight detailed herein—thus systems. The objective would be to annual assessment of the resilience of clarifying the National Security Agency’s improve the overall resilience of the all segments of the nuclear command Cybersecurity Directorate’s role in sup- systems as well as to identify secondary and control system, with a focus on porting this program.62 In a different and tertiary dependencies, with a focus mission assurance. The FY21 NDAA section of the FY21 NDAA, Congress on rapid remediation of identified vulner- makes important progress on this front. updated language describing the Principal abilities. In addition to assessing fielded Specifically, Congress now calls for the Cyber Advisor’s role within DOD as the systems vulnerabilities, DOD should creation of a concept of operations, as coordinating authority for “cybersecurity enforce cybersecurity requirements for well as an oversight mechanism, for the issues relating to the defense industrial systems that are in development early in cyber defense of nuclear command and base,” with specific responsibility to the acquisition life cycle, ensuring they control.66 This effectively broadens the “synchronize, harmonize, de-conflict, remain an essential part of the front end assessment in the FY18 NDAA beyond and coordinate all policies and programs of this process and are not “bolted on” focusing on mission assurance to include germane to defense industrial base cy- later.64 Doing so would essentially create a comprehensive plan to proactively bersecurity,” including acquisitions and a requirement for DOD to institutional- identify and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities contract enforcement on matters pertain- ize a continuous assessment process of of each segment of nuclear command ing to cybersecurity.63 weapons systems’ cyber vulnerabilities and control systems. Establishing an Work remains to be done. To and annually report on these vulnerabili- explicit oversight function mechanism strengthen congressional oversight and ties, thereby sustaining its momentum in will also hopefully create mechanisms drive continued progress and attention implementing key initiatives. to ensure that DOD routinely assesses toward these issues, the requirement to Additionally, in light of the poten- every segment of the NC3 and NLCC conduct periodic vulnerability assess- tially acute and devastating consequences enterprise for adherence to cybersecurity ments should also include an after-action posed by the possibility of cyber threats best practices, vulnerabilities, and evi- report that includes current and planned to nuclear deterrence and command dence of compromise. 86 Features / Cyber Threats and Vulnerabilities JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Inevitably, there is an inherent ten- including U.S. Cyber Command, U.S. toward restoring confidence in the se- sion between Congress’s efforts to act Strategic Command, and the geographic curity and resilience of the U.S. military in an oversight capacity and create ad- combatant commands. In order for capabilities that are the foundation of the ditional requirements for DOD, and a force structure element for threat- Nation’s deterrent. JFQ the latter’s desire for greater autonomy. hunting across DODIN to have more Nevertheless, the stakes remain high seamless and flexible maneuver, DOD to preserve the integrity of core con- should consider developing a process Notes ventional and nuclear deterrence and to reconcile the authorities and permis- 1 warfighting capabilities, and efforts thus sions to enable threat-hunting across Summary: Department of Defense Cyber Strategy 2018 (Washington, DC: Depart- far, while important, have not been suf- all DODIN networks, systems, and ment of Defense [DOD], 2018), available ficiently comprehensive. programs. at JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Montgomery and Borghard 87 United States and its allies. For example, China and Projecting Images,” in Political Psychol- 2019, available at 88 Features / Cyber Threats and Vulnerabilities JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 ing Cyber Conflict: 14 Analogies, ed. George 48 Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 58 For a strategy addressing supply chain Perkovich and Ariel E. Levite (Washington, DC: Research, Development, and Acquisition, Chief security at the national level, beyond DOD Georgetown University Press, 2017), 147–157; Systems Engineer, Naval “Systems of Systems” and defense institution building, see Angus and Justin Sherman, “How the U.S. Can Prevent Systems Engineering Guidebook, Volume II, Ver- King and Mike Gallagher, co-chairs, Building the Next ‘Cyber 9/11,’” Wired, August 6, 2020, sion 2.0 (Washington, DC: Headquarters De- a Trusted ICT Supply Chain: CSC White Paper available at JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Montgomery and Borghard 89 Jedburghs get instructions from Briefing Officer in London, England, ca. 1944 (Office of Strategic Services/U.S. National Archives and Records Administration) Force Integration in Resistance Operations Dutch Jedburghs and U.S. Alamo Scouts By Kevin D. Stringer oint special operations forces (SOF) integration with conven- tional forces (CF) is a difficult Colonel Kevin D. Stringer, USA, Ph.D., is assigned to U.S. Special Operations Command Europe. He is an J affiliated Faculty Member at the General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania in Vilnius. undertaking in missions ranging from 90 Recall / Force Integration in Resistance Operations JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 humanitarian to combat, yet all future to catalyze the establishment of such contact to build trust and enduring military operations against peer adver- teams, and NATO’s Enhanced Forward personal relationships between SOF saries will require the close coopera- Presence (EFP) formations in Estonia, and CF formations. Finally, the actual tion of SOF and CF for success. This Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland could implementation of SOF-CF integration axiom is especially true for liberation provide the ideal pilot platforms for their has often led to ad hoc organizational operations entailing collaboration launch. After NSHQ pilots this concept, arrangements or mechanisms, both in with national resistance groups in the United States and selected Asian allies training and in wartime. This expedi- occupied territories, where the latter could consider a similar model for the ency promotes poor mission execution will be engaged by U.S. SOF forma- Indo-Pacific theater of operations. The and complicated command and control tions as part of their unconventional World War II historical examples of the relationships. warfare mandate. With the return of Dutch Jedburgh teams in Europe and the In general, the prospect of con- Great Power competition, the threat Alamo Scouts in the Pacific demonstrate ducting combat operations to liberate of Russian or Chinese territorial the value of such SOF liaison elements occupied territory presents a complex aggression and occupation becomes a between conventional forces and resis- landscape for the conventional joint national security anxiety for a number tance groups, while framing a possible force commander, who must integrate of states, which generates the require- modern approach. surviving national resistance groups into ment to consider SOF-CF integration a concept of operations that aims for a in liberation operations where friendly Integration Challenges common operational and strategic end- resistance groups are present. The SOF-CF integration has been an state. At the same time, the commander Baltics, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, enduring problem since the advent of needs to mitigate risks associated Taiwan, Burma, and Tibet are all modern-era special operations forces with these armed groups conducting examples that demonstrate this pros- in World War II. In canvassing the rel- independent actions that might be coun- pect of Russian or Chinese aggression evant literature on the topic, a number terproductive to operations or harmful and occupation. of practitioners and academics have to the civilian population. The latter Proper SOF-CF integration and identified the issues and obstacles asso- point ranges from resistance groups synchronization depends on effective co- ciated with achieving optimal SOF-CF taking punitive actions against actual or ordination and liaison for greatest effect.1 integration.2 The challenge is to extract perceived collaborators to committing Effective liaison between liberating con- the relevant historical examples of this war crimes against civilians and property. ventional forces and friendly resistance phenomenon while culling the rest. The solution is the preconflict establish- elements in an ambiguous battlespace With integration doctrinally defined ment of small, multinational SOF teams is necessary to avoid fratricide and to as “the arrangement of [conventional to liaise and coordinate with an allied na- unify all regular and unconventional and special operations] forces and their tional military and its planned resistance elements toward a common objective. actions to create a force that operates components to support CF actions. Multinational SOF elements are the by engaging as a whole,” this article In the NATO setting, this peacetime logical choice to provide this bridging identifies four obstacles for SOF-CF planning and coordination would pri- function given their inherent expertise collaboration.3 First, doctrine and marily occur with host-nation SOF and with irregular forces—militias, local secu- policy do not comprehensively define territorial forces, elements that have lead- rity forces, and resistance members—as how SOF-CF integration should ing roles in wartime resistance operations. well as their ability to blend into local occur.4 This deficit causes organiza- This situation goes beyond the generic populations. Unfortunately, an estab- tional friction when this collaboration Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, lished joint organizational unit of action is mandated by operations. Second, recommendation that “special operations does not currently exist for this mission. when concepts such as SOF-CF syn- commanders provide liaison to compo- This article proposes the establish- chronization are defined, they tend to nent commands to integrate, coordinate, ment of multinational Jedburgh-like SOF rigidly focus on combat missions and and deconflict SOF and conventional teams to link CF units to national resis- do not account for operational fluidity force operations” because resistance op- tance organizations during operations. In between unconventional, conventional, erations imply that “language differences, World War II, the Jedburghs were multi- or humanitarian scenarios.5 This latter cultural diversity, historical animosities, national, three-person teams designed to situation characterizes liberation opera- and uneven allied and partner capabilities conduct sabotage and guerrilla warfare tions on occupied territory. Third, will further complicate these activities.”7 in Axis-occupied territory as well as liaise there is a lack of mutual understanding These future multinational SOF liaison between resistance groups and the Allied between SOF and CF, creating a sense teams would train and exercise with war effort. In today’s North Atlantic of SOF “otherness vis-à-vis the conven- relevant national forces in peacetime to Treaty Organization (NATO) context, tional forces from which the personnel prepare for occupation situations in com- NATO Special Operations Headquarters were originally drawn.”6 This percep- bat or conflicts below the threshold of (NSHQ) would be the organization tion necessitates habitual and frequent armed conflict. JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Stringer 91 Military Assistance and Liaison resistance. Despite the mixed historical provides three specific lessons on using with Resistance Elements record on SOF-CF collaboration, the fol- SOF to coordinate the activities of In the NATO SOF context, this resis- lowing historical vignettes illustrate how partisan forces in support of future con- tance liaison assignment falls under the to successfully accomplish this mission ventional campaigns.17 umbrella of the military assistance task, with dedicated SOF liaison teams. Foremost, against a highly sophis- which is a broad category of activities ticated and repressive occupier such as that support and enable critical friendly The Dutch Jedburgh Nazi Germany, Russia, or China, team assets—in this case, resistance organiza- Liaison Mission members must have superb language ex- tions in occupied territory.8 The military As noted, the Jedburghs were three- pertise and cultural acumen to blend into assistance mission is well understood by man, multinational special operations the local population. As Hooiveld noted both NATO SOF and CF; therefore, teams from the Office of Strategic for the Dutch Liaison Mission, “Any such a liaison element would not be Services that parachuted into occupied non-Dutch member of the [Jedburgh] doctrinally unfamiliar. Resistance, as Europe to establish a link between party was a liability to the resistance defined by the Swedish Defence Univer- local resistance forces and the Allied movement unless his presence there had sity’s Resistance Operating Concept, is command.12 This concept provided the some absolute justification.”18 Second, blueprint for the modern SOF mission SOF liaison teams must educate conven- a nation’s organized, whole-of-society of enabling resistance forces in support tional force commanders on resistance effort, encompassing the full range of ac- of conventional and unconventional force capabilities and the requirements tivities from nonviolent to violent, led by a warfare missions.13 While used through- to attain the necessary integration. Team legally established government, potentially out Europe, several teams, with Dutch Clarence was able to achieve this objec- exiled, displaced, or shadow, to reestablish personnel, were allocated as the Dutch tive, but the success also had much to do independence and autonomy within its Liaison Mission to advise corps and with Major General James M. Gavin, 82nd sovereign territory that has been wholly or division commanders on the utilization Airborne Division commander, having partially occupied by a foreign power.9 of the Dutch resistance in combat oper- confidence in the team.19 Finally, the CF ations in the Netherlands.14 Holland’s commander must have an understand- The significance of this definition is geography complicated resistance opera- ing of SOF activities and missions as well twofold. First, resistance in the NATO tions given its lack of sanctuary—moun- as a willingness to trust the SOF liaison environment is not about insurgency, but tains, forests, wilderness—and the pres- element to operate in his or her interest rather the armed and unarmed efforts of ence of skilled German internal security with resistance forces. Unfortunately, in a legitimate NATO member government forces. For Operation Market Garden, Market Garden, the British airborne corps to restore its sovereignty in the face of Special Forces Headquarters attached leadership had neither, and its assigned adversarial aggression and occupation. Jedburgh teams to the British airborne team was ignored, resulting in no leverag- Second, this approach to resistance re- corps and each participating airborne ing of resistance assets and resources. quires peacetime planning, establishment, division. This decision resulted in the and organization of national resistance teams deploying jointly for the first time Alamo Scouts in the components as part of a comprehensive with conventional forces, which led to Philippines: Liaison with defense concept. Even with peacetime two teams playing significant liaison Guerrillas on Leyte and Luzon planning, resistance organizations be- roles in integrating resistance forces into Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, come messy and complex once faced ongoing conventional operations.15 commander of the U.S. Sixth Army, with an occupying enemy. According In his book Dutch Courage, re- established the Alamo Scouts as a special to U.S. Army doctrine, “The primary searcher Jelle Hooiveld examines how reconnaissance force in the Southwest components of the resistance model are Jedburgh teams Edward and Clarence Pacific during World War II.20 This the underground, the guerrilla or armed were extremely successful in making small 140-person unit contributed to force, the auxiliary support to the un- resistance services available to their Allied combat operations by providing tacti- derground and guerrilla or armed force, forces in their operating sectors, with cal intelligence and conducting special and the public component.”10 While all Team Edward organizing and manag- operations within enemy-held areas.21 In these resistance actors are important, ing a diverse group of rival resistance this latter role, the Alamo Scouts pro- there is no neat division between these groups to augment Allied units, while vided essential liaison with the disparate components, and a CF commander needs Team Clarence engaged with and armed Filipino resistance organizations on the to engage with all of them to harness assorted local groups to unify efforts islands of Leyte and Luzon to support their capabilities for common objectives.11 on orders from the U.S. 82nd Airborne the Sixth Army’s conventional force This situation increases the commander’s Division commander.16 Reviewing these combat operations in its efforts to liber- need for a connecting liaison element that Market Garden Jedburgh teams in the ate the Philippines. can advise him or her and facilitate com- context of modern-day SOF support On Leyte, the U.S. Sixth Army munication and collaboration with the to conventional liberation operations directed the Scouts to contact and 92 Recall / Force Integration in Resistance Operations JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 U.S. Soldiers assigned to 3rd Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, conduct door breach demolition qualification training in support of North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group–Poland, in Bemowo Piskie, Poland, May 14, 2020 (U.S. Army/Timothy Hamlin) synchronize guerrilla elements to sup- even China. Both of these revisionist For implementation, NATO’s port campaign objectives. In a shift from powers employ a mixture of national Enhanced Forward Presence formations their original reconnaissance mission, the power instruments to achieve significant could serve as the pilot platforms to Alamo Scouts “consolidated five guerrilla strategic advantages over other nations, establish the multinational Jedburgh-like groups, established operational sectors for while avoiding the international thresh- teams, since these are conventional mul- them, and created intelligence reporting olds for armed conflict.26 In Europe, a tinational battlegroups already operating networks.”22 During the Luzon campaign, number of states are directly threatened in countries facing Russian aggression. the work of the Alamo Scouts broadened by Russian gray zone action, which Besides exercising the liaison and coordi- to include the organization and direction could include the occupation of ter- nation with national militaries and their of guerrilla activities, in which Scout teams ritory. The Donbass and Crimea in planned resistance initiatives in peace- engaged with guerrilla units and organized Ukraine, Transnistria in Moldova, and time, these small SOF teams would also their actions in support of the regular Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia contribute to greater SOF-CF interoper- forces.23 Alamo Scout liaison activities are examples of this threat. ability within the EFP construct. enabled guerrilla elements to support both To prepare for this scenario and In July 2016, in response to the the 43rd Division and XI Corps in expand- enhance an already existing NATO deter- Russian occupation of Crimea and the ing combat operations and to set the rent posture, NATO Special Operations Donbass, NATO decided to establish an conditions for future operations.24 Headquarters could work with its SOF EFP in the eastern part of the Alliance, The Alamo Scouts example provides member nations to create multinational with four multinational battlegroups in an excellent proof of concept for the Jedburgh-like SOF liaison teams that Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. advantages that accrue from having an can provide the critical link between These battlegroups, led by the frame- established, rather than ad hoc, special CF and national resistance elements in work nations of the United Kingdom, operations liaison team linking resistance times of crisis. NSHQ is ideally suited Canada, Germany, and the United States, elements—in this case, rather sizable for this brokerage role. Created in 2009, respectively, are multinational and com- guerrilla forces—to division-, corps-, and NSHQ provides strategic SOF advice to bat-ready, demonstrating the strength army-level conventional formations in the the Supreme Allied Commander Europe of the transatlantic bond. Their presence execution of a liberation campaign. As and the NATO chain of command. At makes clear that an attack on one Ally Stephen Ryan notes, “The Alamo Scouts the same time, NSHQ offers a collabora- will be considered an attack on the whole were able to harness the combat power tive, interdependent platform to enhance Alliance. The battlegroups form part of of the guerrilla forces. . . . When the con- and expand the Alliance SOF network, the biggest reinforcement of NATO’s ventional force landing began, the Scouts while developing the SOF capability and collective defense in a generation.28 These directly integrated guerrilla activities to interoperability of Allies and partners.27 battlegroups, together with local national support the ground force main effort.”25 This Jedburgh-like approach would be a defense forces, provide both strategic The Scouts were also well embedded in method for multinational special opera- deterrence and initial defense for their the U.S. Sixth Army’s structure and had tions and conventional forces to combine host countries.29 Adding a small multina- a habitual and trusting relationship with in a habitual way to further increase tional SOF Jedburgh-like element would the conventional commander. Such a NATO capacity to conduct SOF-CF enhance the EFP forces and extend their case could be easily projected onto any operations in an unconventional warfare capabilities into the unconventional war- scenario in which an allied country is environment. fare space. This idea finds support from confronted with partial occupation from Structurally, an ideal team would several European researchers who argue a peer adversary, and NATO or coalition consist of three to four personnel with that the “EFP deployments in the Baltic conventional forces need to integrate resis- obligatory host-nation participation to region could serve as an experiment for tance elements—guerrillas, underground, guarantee language and cultural exper- wider defence cooperation among clus- or auxiliaries—into the overall concept of tise. The remaining team members would ters of NATO countries.”30 The creation operations. A SOF unit of action, already be expected to possess requisite language of multinational resistance liaison mis- emplaced within a conventional construct and cultural knowledge. The team sions would be a step in this direction. and by virtue of its expertise and capabili- would have a joint composition since ties, would be the connecting mechanism maritime operations and airpower play While SOF-CF integration could to achieve greatest effect. significant roles in resistance and libera- be daunting in all types of operations, tion operations. For the air component, campaigning to liberate occupied terri- Creating a Multinational SOF infiltration and joint terminal attack tory adds the complication of managing Jedburgh Testbed controller knowledge is needed. Similarly, a resistance interface with disparate stay- The historical examples of Dutch Jed- maritime expertise in littoral activities and behind groups and guerrillas. With the burgh teams and Alamo Scouts offer infiltration techniques would be invalu- existence of both Russian and Chinese potential for adaptation in the current able. Team members could be a mix of aggression toward neighboring countries security environment with Russia and SOF operators and enablers. in their geographical space, prudent 94 Recall / Force Integration in Resistance Operations JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 preparation would recommend evaluat- Jr., SOF/Conventional Force Light Footprint In- chael E. Krivdo (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army terdependence in Asia and Beyond (Carlisle, PA: University Press, 2019), 111–130. ing and experimenting with the concept U.S. Army War College, 2013); Mike Findlay, 22 Ibid. of establishing small multinational SOF Robert Green, and Eric Braganca, “SOF on the 23 Eustace E. Nabbie, “The Alamo Scouts,” liaison teams to manage the resistance Contemporary Battlefield,”Military Review CIA Historical Review Program, September interface for conventional forces. The two 83, no. 3 (2003), 8–14; Mark Jones and Wes 22, 1993, available at JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Stringer 95 War produced enduring, substantive the policy-academy divide beyond a plea cooperation in areas such as arms control for more policy-oriented research. and strategic stability. This cooperation For those serving in America’s joint also gave rise to new institutions—for force, then, the most important question example, federally funded research and is should I add Cult of the Irrelevant to development centers such as RAND— my “must-read” list of books. The answer in an attempt to further strengthen is largely no, with a few important excep- ties between the academic and policy tions. First, Desch’s book is useful to communities. U.S. defense personnel heading to civilian Desch goes on to argue that despite master’s degree programs in security or these temporary peaks in cooperation, the strategic studies. These interdisciplinary social sciences are increasingly irrelevant programs are popular in the national se- to policymakers. He places the blame for curity community precisely because they this slow, sporadic, yet relentless slide into are policy- and practitioner-focused. For irrelevance squarely on the shoulders of that reason, the academy is not especially social scientists themselves. These aca- keen on them, except, unfortunately, as demics, he asserts, increasingly insist on potential revenue sources. But Desch’s asking non–policy relevant questions and book would help explain where these then rigidly adhering to strict method- programs fit in the larger academic ological approaches to address them. The universe. Moreover, if defense policy academy’s waning influence continues personnel are tackling a Ph.D., Desch’s despite America’s involvement in two book provides context for the challenges Cult of the Irrelevant: The wars since September 11, 2001. Desch of finding an advisor willing to take on Waning Influence of Social contends that even the most noteworthy a student interested in policy-relevant Science on National Security post-9/11 example of cooperation, research. the Department of Defense–sponsored Second, for individuals in the policy By Michael C. Desch Minerva Research Initiative, experienced realm, it helps to explain why the acad- Princeton University Press, 2019 only marginal success in bringing the emy is largely irrelevant to so many policy 368 pp. $35.00 academy’s expertise to bear on policy debates. The incentive structure, includ- ISBN: 978-0691181219 problems. ing pay, promotions, and prestige, largely Reviewed by Paula G. Thornhill Desch offers an important argument, encourages social scientists to veer away however, and it would resonate more from policy issues. In short, why should with the practitioner if, first, it looked less social scientists focus on policy issues an the policy and academic com- at the impact of individuals (for example, when their peers disdain such an under- munities work together more Bernard Brodie, Walt Rostow, Thomas taking? It also provides some context C effectively to address America’s Schelling) and more into where, when, for the complicated relationship among toughest national security problems? In and how scholarly work best insinuates the policy community, the academy, and Cult of the Irrelevant, Michael Desch itself into the policy process. Second, the think tank world. As Desch points takes readers on a 100-year exami- surprisingly, his argument excludes major out, the latter emerged to provide policy nation of the relationship between international programs in security and relevance and academic rigor. The extent national security practitioners and strategic studies, especially those in the to which the think tank community ac- social scientists in an effort to answer United Kingdom. These international complishes this is continually debated. this question. Desch, an international programs offer a different and perhaps Finally, those in command action relations professor at Notre Dame more compelling example for how to groups or their equivalents might want to University, captures the ebb and flow in merge academic rigor and policy rel- read Desch’s book before their principals this relationship by examining the rise evance. Anecdotally, from my years in the host an academic. They will find insights of think tanks, the emergence (and dis- Pentagon and professional military edu- in Cult of the Irrelevant, especially in appearance) of university-based national cation, scholars such as Michael Howard, chapters 1 and 9, that will help their security programs, the extent of Federal Lawrence Freedman, Hew Strachan, and principal engage their visitor on a more funding, and the appearance of policy Colin Gray have had a profound, albeit substantive, realistic level. Especially recommendations in scholarly journals. unquantifiable, influence on American when it comes to the latter, it prepares Not surprisingly, Desch finds that national security policy. Finally, Desch’s their principal for the likelihood that a more cooperation exists between academ- work would find a warmer welcome in visiting academic would neither be able ics and practitioners during wartime. In the policy community if he offered spe- to nor even care about answering key particular, World War II and the Cold cific recommendations on how to bridge policy-relevant questions such as “So 96 Book Reviews JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 what?” and “What’s next?” Recognizing greatest rivalries, and it overwhelm- that a social scientist would likely steer ingly succeeds. away from the policy realm allows staff Gods of War highlights six rivalries to calibrate their principals’ expectations, between some of the most revered and and thus, paradoxically, create a better studied military figures. The book is opportunity to gain useful insights. Given evenly divided between war in the an- this tradeoff, it also raises the possibility cient world, the Middles Ages, and the that turning to a practitioner-scholar modern era. There are two chapters that in the first place, the kind the academy introduce the concept and a conclusion, eschews, might ultimately be more useful. and the first rivalry considers Hannibal In Cult of the Irrelevant, Desch does versus Scipio Africanus during the trans- an admirable job exploring the gap formation of Rome into a Mediterranean between the policy community and the power. The succeeding chapters follow social sciences. Perhaps because he is an in chronological order: The political and academic himself, however, the enduring military rivalry between Julius Caesar and relevance of his book rests solely with the Pompey the Great. The Middle Ages get academy, not with policy practitioners. attention with the rivalry between King Does the academy feel a need to leave Richard I and Saladin during the Third its ivory tower to reinvigorate its policy Crusade. The modern era begins with the relevance? Absent significant change, Napoleonic Wars and the multiple con- Desch leads the reader to a resounding flicts between Napoleon and the Duke “no.” While the book will be interest- of Wellington, followed by the bloody ing to policymakers and their staffs, Gods of War: History’s contest between Ulysses S. Grant and Servicemembers’ reading time is better Greatest Military Rivals Robert E. Lee in the American Civil War. spent on works that help them under- The discussion of World War II shifts By James Lacey and Williamson Murray stand and solve policy problems, rather gears and focuses on the rivalry between New York: Bantam Books, 2020 than on academic programs and individu- Erwin Rommel, Bernard Montgomery, 402 pp. $32.00 als irrelevant to their solutions. JFQ and George S. Patton. ISBN: 978-0345547552 There is no discussion of rivalries in Reviewed by Jon Mikolashek World War I or conflicts post-1945, but Brigadier General Paula G. Thornhill, USAF (Ret.), the theme of the book is to examine the Ph.D., is the Associate Director of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins University School of rivalries between equally great command- Advanced International Studies, and the author ince humanity has waged war, ers. To put it in a sports context, this is of Demystifying the American Military (Naval scholars have debated the greatest akin to Larry Bird versus Earvin “Magic” Institute Press, 2019). S captains, commanders, and war- Johnson, Tom Brady versus Payton riors. Continuing this long tradition Manning, and Roger Federer versus Rafael of friendly and sometimes competitive Nadal. There are plenty of great athletes, discussion is James Lacey and Wil- but not all great athletes had peers they liamson Murray’s Gods of War. In this competed with equally, and more than highly accessible book, both esteemed once. So while great military commanders historians take the reader through such as Alexander and Gustavus Adolphus the millennia to examine not only are indeed “great,” they had no near peers the greatest commanders in military to repeatedly compete with over the ages. history but also the greatest rivalries. Despite the emphasis on rivalries and The book focuses on contests between commanders, Gods of War offers some peers because they often are the great- depth to strategic thought and plan- est rivals. Gods of War does not examine ning. While there is a focus on tactics one-off battles, but focuses instead on and tactical outcomes, the two authors campaigns in which either side shared discuss the idea of “master strategists” victories and defeats. Those expecting and how even the greatest commanders more on figures such as Gustavus Adol- often lacked strategic thinking. Lacey and phus and Alexander the Great will be Murray conclude that out of all the com- slightly disappointed that their favorite manders covered in Gods of War, only commander did not make the cut, but Saladin and Grant possessed a strategic the focus of Gods of War is about the vision and won. Renowned figures such JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Book Reviews 97 as Hannibal, while a master tactician, lost acknowledgments and should be a lead- his war to a better strategic commander ing reflection of the policy prescriptions in Scipio Africanus. one will find within. The joint force will find worthwhile According to Lissner and Rapp- lessons in this discussion of “strategic ge- Hooper, global openness is a “novel nius.” As we focus on the operational and strategic framework” that diverges from strategic levels of war, the United States past grand strategies and falls somewhere and the Western world in general are between Neo-Isolationism and Primacy. often overly focused on creating master It is an approach resigned to the fact that strategists or the next god of war. In real- the United States will not remain the ity, that is impossible. sole global superpower. Therefore, to As wars grew in size and scope follow- maintain global order, the authors argue ing the rise of nation-states and the rapid that the United States needs to remain evolution of technology, it is unlikely that globally engaged by courting new and a Napoleon, Grant, or George C. Marshall emerging relationships, reinvigorating at- will ever again emerge to fully command rophied relationships, or developing new war as some historical figures appeared to and unconventional relationships that are do. And even if the next god of war arises, favorable to U.S. objectives. The United it will likely have little to do with what States will not be able to rely on its mili- school of joint professional military educa- tary primacy or rest on old institutional tion he or she attended or if every known laurels; it must advocate for creative ways joint publication was successfully digested. to maintain order and reform legacy insti- That does not mean we should not try. But An Open World: How America tutions—or create new ones. perhaps we should shift away from canned Can Win the Contest for The authors offer a foundational lessons, pedantic rubrics, and poor assess- Twenty-First-Century Order perspective on the post–World War II ments and toward a clearer focus on history, international order and its evolution into Rebecca Lissner and Mira Rapp-Hooper writing, and critical thinking. That is, per- the current state of affairs. Lissner and Yale University Press, 2020 haps, the greatest lesson of Gods of War to Rapp-Hooper take the time to examine 202 pp. $22.93 joint military education professionals. domestic issues such as political polariza- ISBN: 978-0300250329 Gods of War is an excellent example tion, disinformation, income inequality, of what professional military historians Reviewed by Christopher P. Mulder technology investment, and workforce should strive to write. It is easy to read and challenges, alongside global issues such neither pretentious nor overwrought. It as technology governance, China’s rise, strikes a fine balance between popular or n An Open World, Dr. Rebecca Russia’s slow descent, and other regional narrative history and scholarly or profes- Lissner and Dr. Mira Rapp-Hooper challenges, pulling these threads together sional history. Joint professional military I provide a compelling argument for a with a unique strategy (and thoughtful education students and professors will new U.S. strategy of “global openness.” policy recommendations) that ultimately see elements of Williamson Murray’s Readers will find much to consider as attempts to “prevent closed spheres of edited collection The Dynamics of Military the book is presented as an executable influence, maintain free access to the Revolution: 1300–2050 (Cambridge blueprint for a new Presidential admin- global commons, defend the political University Press, 2001) throughout the istration. It is worth noting that many independence of all states, modernize text, which is still read by all students at elements of their strategy are already in existing institutions, and build new forms the U.S. Army Command and General motion on the global stage. of order.” In essence, “openness” is a nu- Staff College. While the book lacks rival- The authors bring a wealth of foreign anced strategy with the flexibility to adapt ries between naval commanders or any policy experience and fresh perspectives to evolving global dynamics. discussion of airpower, Gods of War is a to the topic. Rebecca Lissner is an as- The authors illustrate how a global useful book that will appeal to the most sistant professor at the U.S. Naval War approach based on openness would apply scholarly of historians and nascent strate- College and Mira Rapp-Hooper is a to each of the world’s primary regions— gists, as well as to those who simply desire senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Asia, Europe, the Middle East, the a more cerebral book for the beach. JFQ Relations and Yale Law School. Familiar Western Hemisphere, and Africa. They names such as Jake Sullivan (President broadly outline the goals, aspirations, and Joseph Biden’s National Security limitations inherent to their strategy in Dr. Jon Mikolashek is a Professor in the Joint Advisor), Michèle Flournoy, James each region. The authors were thought- Forces Staff College at the National Defense University in Norfolk, Virgina. Mattis, Stephen Hadley, Emma Ashford, ful in their examination of potential and Chris Preble were listed in the downsides. Projecting winners and losers 98 Book Reviews JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 and weighing the potential negative ef- explicit link between the domestic context fects are difficult, but their openness to and U.S. foreign policy and strategy builds critique should generate useful discussion on the prior narrative that Rapp-Hooper among strategists and policymakers. has advanced in her recent book, Shields Of course, Lissner and Rapp-Hooper of the Republic (Harvard University Press, highlight China as the number one for- 2020), in which she also argues that both eign policy challenge facing the United U.S. domestic strength and its inter- States—something our nation’s leaders national objectives must properly align seem to agree on regardless of political to maintain alliances that advance U.S. affiliation. How best to approach the interests. challenge of China, however, is still up While well researched and argued, for debate. The current framing based some will certainly contend that An Open on Great Power competition often boxes World does not give enough credence the United States, allies, and partners into to the Russian threat, which the authors a win-or-lose proposition. Instead, the argue does not pose a fundamental threat authors argue that the United States must to “openness.” Russia is saddled with learn to live with an authoritarian near- many challenges that may weaken its peer in Asia while continuing to protect position in the coming decades, but it vital interests: “American strategy must still wields formidable nuclear and gray hedge against the possibility that China’s zone tools with considerable effect. This regional aspirations are fundamentally ir- will require significant attention by the reconcilable with openness.” At this point, United States and its allies. Finally, the readers will recognize that the strategy of authors rightly acknowledge that existing Net Assessment and Military openness diverges significantly with more global institutions need to be modern- Strategy: Retrospective hawkish approaches and is sure to generate ized, but they argue that the domestic and Prospective Essays useful discussion and debate about the support to accomplish this task will need Thomas G. Mahnken, ed. goals of U.S. strategy toward China. to come from the private sector. This ap- Amherst, NY: Cambria 2020 As An Open World suggests, this will proach may solve some short-term U.S. 272 pp. $39.99 require a more nuanced U.S. strategy foreign policy challenges, but long-term ISBN: 978-1621965398 toward China. In his seminal work On challenges will need “We the People” China (Penguin, 2011), Henry Kissinger buy-in to have a lasting effect. Reviewed by Frank Hoffman compares Chinese strategy with the game An Open World is an enjoyable and Go, in which strategic encirclement is nuanced read that offers an alternative used to generate strategic flexibility. The strategic vision with significant implica- et Assessment and Military metaphor is apt for Lissner and Rapp- tions for future U.S. foreign policy. Strategy, a timely collection of Hooper, as their proposed strategy hinges Anyone interested or currently engaged N essays, offers an important look on preventing China from strategic en- in U.S. national security and defense chal- at the history, application, and future of circlement, dominating key regions, and lenges should read An Open World. Jim the multidisciplinary analysis approach closing off vital commons. Mattis has called it “mandatory reading.” called net assessment. In American A key and often overlooked contribu- And when the “warrior monk” identifies practice, net assessments aim to capture tion the authors make is a discussion on a book as mandatory reading, warrior- the dynamics of national or coalition “building strength at home,” acknowledg- scholars should take note. In the current military strengths and weaknesses for ing that some of the greatest challenges geopolitical environment, it is more comparison with the capabilities of affecting any potential U.S. strategy in important than ever to read, think about, competitors and adversaries. Net assess- the next 10 to 15 years will come from and discuss different options and view- ments offer critical insights to senior within. They recommend reinvesting points. An Open World provides exactly leaders on the relative military power of in the American people, economy, and that—a chance for the joint force to view the United States over time. democracy to bolster the foundations of the world differently and consider new The purpose of net assessments is to our national power. Taken to their fullest options for foreign policy and national help senior decisionmakers break through extent, these ingredients might constitute security. JFQ the fog of uncertainty that can paralyze a nascent National Resilience Strategy. decisions on defense investments in order While this kind of investment does not to allocate scarce resources where they represent traditional thinking on foreign Lieutenant Colonel Christopher P. Mulder, USAF, have the biggest payoff. Such diagnostic is a Senior Military Fellow in the Scowcroft Center policy, it is crucial to the success of a strat- for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. analyses can help define strategic advan- egy based on openness. Drawing a more tages or uncover vulnerabilities in an JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Book Reviews 99 adversary for opportunistic exploitation. its willingness to anticipate the future, Yet the range of issues attendant to a Such analyses are critical at focusing at- and Adamsky rightfully notes, “the time long-term geostrategic competition with tention and investment dollars into areas might be ripe for the next round of antic- a state the scale of China suggests recon- where sustained competitive advantage ipation.” Defense analyst Jeff McKitrick sideration of where future net assessments against specific adversaries can be directed produced the most important chapter on should be best positioned. It is not purely by Department of Defense leadership. specific techniques used in conducting an intelligence function, which focuses on Net Assessment and Military Strategy this form of analysis. His summation of an adversary. The “net” in net assessment was initiated and curated by Dr. Thomas the many activities that undergird good requires equally hard-nosed evaluations Mahnken, the chief executive officer net assessments is extensive. Greater in- of our own strengths and weaknesses. of the Washington-based Center for sights into historical examples on how to Given its storied history and past contri- Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. structure a diagnostic assessment would butions, alterations to the office’s scope He has extensive teaching experience have been useful but is probably beyond and location would risk subverting the at the U.S. Naval War College and has the scope and classification level of this independence and objectivity of this valu- previously served as Deputy Assistant book. Readers will find suggestions in able cell. Best to leave well enough alone Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning Barry Watts’s chapter on Cold War assess- and exploit ONA’s convening power and from 2006 to 2009. ments that will point them to declassified resources to best leverage the power of Related to this current volume, Dr. historical documents. net assessments. Mahnken edited Competitive Strategies The last chapter assesses the future In all, Mahnken and his contributors for the 21st Century: Theory, History, of net assessment. Andrew May, the should be congratulated for an informa- and Practice (Stanford University Press, present deputy director of ONA, offers tive product. The art and science of net 2012). He is also the editor of two rele- several keen insights on the methodol- assessment is critical to success in a new vant books on strategic competition with ogy as we approach a new era. Dr. May age of strategic competition. Such con- China, including The Gathering Pacific acknowledges that nonmaterial factors— tests are ultimately about national systems Storm: Emerging U.S.-China Strategic “including military doctrine, training, skill and institutions, and keeping score is Competition in Defense Technological and level and operational competence”—are a challenge. Thus, Net Assessment and Industrial Development (Cambria Press, ripe for study and that “history indicates Military Strategy is exceedingly relevant 2018), and Strategy in Asia: The Past, matter as much or more than the technical to policymakers and military strategists as Present, and Future of Regional Security characteristics of weapons systems.” they seek to conceive of appropriate mili- (Stanford University Press, 2014). One complicating element in the tary strategies to preserve U.S. security. Net Assessment and Military Strategy application of a truly strategic net as- This is a timely topic and an important explores the practice and techniques of sessment is the need to explore factors resource as the next defense and military net assessment and persuasively argues beyond the pure military challenge, strategy are developed. JFQ the method has been a valuable approach including strategic culture, econom- to U.S. national strategic planning. The ics, underlying resource constraints, anthology offers a range of chapters and arcane national capacities such as Dr. Frank Hoffman is a Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research, on the history and current state of this productivity, innovation ecosystems, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the analytical process. The foreword from and human capital trends. The best loca- National Defense University. the late Andrew Marshall, who served as tion for this critical function is the one director of the Office of Net Assessment important issue untapped in this volume. (ONA) for nearly 40 years, underscores As detailed in Mr. Marshall’s foreword, the role and history of his tenure in the it was originally placed at the National Cold War. ONA, despite its small size, Security Council, where it would be able continues to burnish its reputation over to task and integrate perspectives from the last several years with numerous stud- across the U.S. Government, particularly ies that materially shaped the Pentagon’s in international and domestic economics. plans, including the 2018 National Mr. Marshall was asked to move to the Defense Strategy. Defense Department in the 1970s at the There are many notable contributions height of the Cold War by leaders who to the anthology. Dima Adamsky’s chap- had a keen appreciation for rigorous and ter on the role of ONA in exploring the independent thinking. Given the short- revolution in military affairs highlights term and crisis du jour focus of the NSC the invaluable role played by Mr. Marshall staff, such long-range thinking is shunted in raising critical intellectual questions to away from the critical longitudinal analy- offset complacency or outdated assump- ses that Marshall implanted at the Office tions. Surely one of ONA’s signatures is of the Secretary of Defense. 100 Book Reviews JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 New from the Joint History and Research Office The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1949–2019 2021 • 360 pp. As the Nation’s highest-ranking military officer, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pre- sides over the Joint Chiefs and provides military advice to civilian leadership. While the roots of the position can be traced to World War II, the Chairmanship was formally established in 1949 by President Harry S. Truman. This revised edition of The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff commemorates the 70th anniversary of the creation of the position. It examines the evolving roles of the Chairman and Vice Chairman through an updated historical essay and contains career biographies of all 20 Chairmen and 11 Vice Chairmen. It also includes sections on the Joint Chiefs’ conference room (known as “The Tank”), the Chairman’s and Vice Chairman’s flags, the Joint Chiefs of Staff badge, and the Chairman’s quarters. Lavishly illustrated with color and black and white photo- graphs, it is a fitting textual and visual tribute to the Nation’s most senior military officers. Free digital version at http://www.jcs.mil/ About/Joint-Staff-History/ Print version available for purchase in the GPO Bookstore at https://bookstore.gpo.gov/ JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE ONE HUNDRED TWO, 3RD QUARTER 2021 Flickr Pinterest Facebook Twitter You can also find us on: can also find You Visit us online at: https://ndupress.ndu.edu Visit articles, occasional papers, books, and other publications. site is a great place to find information on new and upcomingsite is a great place to find information With 40,000 unique visitors each month, the NDU Press WebWith 40,000 unique visitors each month, JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY National Defense University, Washington, DC National Defense University, Washington, Authors include scholars from National the National Defense University and the Institute for Strategic Assessment 2020 providesStrategic Assessment an expert of the most and nuanced understanding Strategic Studies who have been directly pioneers engaged as thought leaders and policymaking the new era of GPC. Chapters and combinations ofgrappling with the strategic contours of international relations, and of national security, chapters will be not only useful for students foreign affairs academic setting, but also of great in an to policy practitioners. value important between the three dimensions of GPC emerging Great the United Powers in 2020: stands atop the triumvirate, with It establishes that the United States States, China, and Russia. for top-level prestigeChina a rising competitor and Russia vying signs of while facing clear dyad is likely to be the dominant Greatdecline. The Sino-American competitive rivalry Power into the future. Great Chapters focus on the critical activities among these Powers and develop nonstate actors, and global institutions. major implications for other state actors, New from NDU Press New from Competition 2020: Into a New Era of Great Power Strategic Assessment III Lynch Edited by Thomas F. Great relations is a framework for understanding interstate Power competition that dominated Past GPC eras have featured II. multiple powerful War prior to World geopolitics for centuries states jockeying for relative status and position. After lying dormant period during a two-decade of GPC the dynamics globalization and American international primacy, of post–Cold War returned to international relations security studies in earnest and during the late 2010s. Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff University Press by National Defense Have you checked out NDU Press online lately? Have you checked