“Montgomery and his Legions:” A Study of Operational Development, Innovation and Command in 21st Army Group, North-West Europe, 1944-45 Charles James Forrester Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Ph.D. The University of Leeds School of History December, 2010 ii The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others. This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement The right of Charles James Forrester to be identified as Author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 © 2010, The University of Leeds and Charles James Forrester iii Acknowledgements I would like to express my gratitude to those who gave me access to family-held papers; in particular my thanks go to Mr George Barker for access to the letters and papers of his father General Sir E.H. Barker. My thanks are also due to Mr John Brown for a copy of the diary of his father Captain J.R. Brown; Mrs Penelope Cameron (née Whistler) for supporting my work in materials held in the West Sussex Record Office relating to her father General Sir L.G. Whistler; Mr David Rennie and Mrs Elizabeth Preston (née Rennie) for papers and materials relating to their father Major-General T.G. Rennie and the Earl of Rosse, for sight of papers of his father, Captain the Earl of Rosse. My appreciation is also due to those who gave me time for interviews, and also corresponded with me during my research for this thesis: (Major) Charles Farrell; General Sir David Fraser; (Lieutenant) Timothy Gilpin; (Captain) the Earl of Harrington and Sir (Major) Carol Mather. I also appreciate the help I received from Mr Patrick Delaforce who was an officer with British armour in North-West Europe and is the author of many books on the units and formations of 21st Army Group. I thank several authors of biographies and other works for discussion of their works and materials, in particular Sir John Baynes and Professor Ken Startup for discussions regarding General Sir Richard O‟Connor, also Mr Ian Daglish, and Colonel Robin McNish. I also acknowledge the help of: Colonel Brian Leishman; Colonel I.H. McCausland and Colonel Roddy Riddell. I would also like to thank the following and their staffs: the National Archives; the National Army Museum; the Imperial War Museum and the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King‟s College, London. I also acknowledge the assistance of other archivists, librarians and experts across the British Isles, especially Mr David Fletcher of the Tank Museum; Mr James Stevenson at Lincolnshire Archives and Mr Ralph Thompson, The Light Dragoons (15th/19th King‟s Royal Hussars) Museum Collection. Finally, I recognise the help of staff and friends at the University of Leeds, School of History, particularly Ms Maria Di Stefano, Postgraduate Secretary, and my supervisor, Professor John Gooch. iv Abstract This thesis considers armour and infantry unit organization and structure in the British Army during the Second World War, specifically in Montgomery‟s 21st Army Group in North-West Europe. The strengths and weaknesses of how corps and divisions responded to Montgomery‟s command system – and in particular the commonality of doctrinal practice – has become an issue of debate among historians. This thesis examines and analyses the factors that produced both an effective weapon and a functional doctrine for combining armour and infantry. It does this by tracking how 21st Army Group moved from „anarchy‟ to „problem solving‟ under Montgomery‟s direction. It shows that far from being either authoritarian or anarchic, Montgomery‟s ultimate command system actually encouraged commanders to use their initiative within the goals set out by Montgomery in late 1944 in a series of pamphlets. He believed in the imposition of doctrine, but this overlooks mid-July to end-of-September 1944 when he was open to the „bubble-up‟ of new ideas: albeit post- pamphlets the subsequent price of uniformity of doctrine was a certain apparent inflexibility. By late 1944 when Montgomery‟s 21st Army Group „stood at the door of Germany‟, armour-infantry co-operation practice is shown to have involved the coordination of armour originally intended to play different roles; infantry, and artillery on the basis of commonly agreed upon understandings which had been reached by an essentially collaborative process. Once set out in Montgomery‟s pamphlets, however, no deviation from this framework was subsequently permitted. Simultaneously, success in action depended on commanders exercising their initiative to be proactive to a greater extent than has hitherto been suggested: Montgomery wanted to constrain choices yet he allowed armoured commanders enough freedom of action to respond to challenges within the „master plan‟. This thesis thus makes an original contribution to the debate on Montgomery‟s command style, and its consequences, and more widely on the role of a great commander. v CONTENTS page Acknowledgements iii Abstract iv Contents v List of figures and maps viii Abbreviations ix Introduction 1 Chapter 1: The Army, Armour, and Montgomery before 1944. 21 British thought and thinking about motorization and 23 armoured divisions before 1940 Training, teaching and the principles of war 32 The threads of experience in 1941-42 33 Montgomery – the developing mind ... 36 ... and the „uneducated mind‟ 45 Chapter 2: „A Technique, a Mystery and Almost a Vocabulary‟. 52 Desert-Influenced Methods of Combat, „D-Day‟ and the Early Campaign in Normandy The legacy of the western desert, lessons of north Africa, 56 and the creation of doctrine Early battles for Caen: manoeuvre (PERCH) and pitched 66 battle (EPSOM) Chapter 3: The Defeat of the German Panzers: Further 83 Responses to the Problems of Fighting in Normandy GOODWOOD: infantry and armour tactics and 86 employment BLUECOAT: middle-level command responses to new 95 problems of combat TOTALIZE: high level command responses 111 vi Chapter 4: From „Anarchy‟ to Problem-solving (1): Dimensions of 119 Operational Practice in Late 1944 and Before the Rhine Crossing The strategic and operational scene after Arnhem 121 Interactions within the corps-division-brigade hierarchy 123 Command, doctrine and organization for and in the 140 advance to the Rhine Chapter 5: From „Anarchy‟ to Problem-solving (2): Montgomery‟s 159 Management and its Practical Expression, September 1944 to April 1945 New circumstances and new ideas 165 The perceived need for and importance of doctrine 165 The orchestration of response 168 Montgomery‟s two pamphlets of November and December: 171 What the doctrine actually said Factors affecting the doctrine‟s shape, and its application 183 The pamphlets: their doctrine in action 185 Conclusion 198 The factors that produced a functional doctrine 200 „Bubble up‟ 203 From „anarchy‟ to problem solving 207 Roles of commanders old and new in the development of 210 doctrine Operational development, innovation and command-and- 213 control in the context of the move from anarchy to problem solving A different explanation 220 vii Bibliography 224 Primary sources (Unpublished) 224 Primary sources (Published) 227 Secondary sources 235 Appendix I: Analytical Framework of the Choices Available to 247 Armoured Commanders Co-operating with Infantry as to Proximity and Purpose – mid- 1920s to mid-1940s Appendix II: Note on Approaches, Sources and Methods 252 Appendix III: The Terrain of Normandy 258 Appendix IV: Tank Descriptions 260 Appendix V: The Independent Armoured Brigades (1945) 261 viii Figures and Maps page Figure 0.1: The selection of commanders including Montgomery 19 Map 2.1: Operation EPSOM 75 Map 3.1: Operation BLUECOAT 97 Figure 3.1: The „old‟ or standard organisational structure 102 Figure 3.2: The „new‟ or emergent organisational structure 102 Map 3.2: Operation TOTALIZE 114 Figure 5.1: The development of new doctrine, mid- to late 1944 165 Figure 6.1: The process of translation of experience into 208 method, late 1944 Figure 6.2: Metamorphosis of experience into method (Effect) 216 Figure App.I.1: Proximity versus purpose for armour infantry 250 co-operation Figure App.II.1: the commanders of 7th Armoured Division and 256 component Brigades over time in North-West Europe Figure App.II.2: the same data as Figure AppII.1 but showing 257 how extending down to regimental/battalion commands can help to complete the picture Photo App.III.1 Typical „bocage‟ countryside of the Calvados 258 region southwest of Caen Photo App.III.2 Close up of the bocage countryside 258 Photo App.III.3 The apparently more open countryside south of 259 Caen towards the town of Falaise Photo App.III.4. A typical Normandy farm just outside Falaise 259 Appendix IV: Tank descriptions – including pictures 260 Fig App.V. Types A & B Independent Armoured Brigade, 1945 261 ix Abbreviations used in text 2 pdr British 2-pounder tank/ anti-tank gun 6 pdr British 6-pounder tank/ anti-tank gun 17 pdr British 17-pounder tank/ anti-tank gun firing AP/HE 25 pdr British 25-pounder gun/Howitzer 88 German 88mm calibre tank/ anti-tank gun A/T (AT) Anti tank AGRA Army Group Royal Artillery AP armour-piercing shot APC Armoured personnel carrier Armd Div Armoured Division Armd Bde Armoured Brigade Armd Recce Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment Regt Armd Rgt Armoured Regiment BGS Brigadier, General Staff Bty (artillery) battery C-in-C Commander in Chief CLY County of London Yeomanry CO commanding officer CRA Commander, Royal Artillery Div Division DLI Durham Light Infantry DP dual purpose (able to fire AP and HE) FSR Field Service Regulations GHQ General headquarters GOC General Officer Commanding GTB Guards' Tank Brigade H Hussars (retained in the title of some armoured regiments, e.g.