sign in sign up
<<
Home , 21st Army Group, Bernard Montgomery, Ivan Konev, March 1945, National Redoubt, Soviet occupation zone

n , British Field Mar- value. Except for a token presence, the the Allied powers would share control of shal Bernard L. Montgomery Reich ministries had moved out already. the city. Eisenhower was not willing to stood on the with visions The was camped on the , expend tens of thousands of lives for the of a triumphal entry into 35 miles from Berlin, with more than a prestige of taking territory that would be dancing in his head. It was Mont- million troops in position to attack. turned over to the Soviets as soon as the gomery’s expectation that in ad- The in December war ended. Idition to his own 21st , he had sapped German strength in the west, Eisenhower also wanted an orderly would have command of the US Ninth but 61 divisions remained, with additional linkup with the Soviet forces, whose Army and an absolute priority on fuel pockets of strength in the Baltic states. emotions were running high as they swept and supplies. He would then make a Eisenhower’s plan was to advance on a through . “What are your ideas 250-mile dash across the north German broad front, capture the industrial heart- on control and coordination to prevent plain to capture Berlin. land of the , split Germany down the unfortunate incidents and to sort out the Prime Minister middle, and consolidate Allied gains on two advancing forces?” Gen. George C. agreed with Montgomery’s assumptions the fl anks. A diversion of resources for a Marshall, US Army Chief of Staff, asked but the , Gen. single thrust by Montgomery would have Eisenhower. “One possibility is an agreed Dwight D. Eisenhower, did not. brought operations elsewhere along the line of demarcation.” Ike understood his mission to be de- line to a stop. Over the objections of Montgomery stroying the German armed forces and The , Britain, and the and Churchill, Eisenhower decided against ending the war in Europe as soon as pos- had agreed in 1944 on the an all-out push for Berlin and elected to sible. Berlin had political, symbolic, and boundary lines for postwar occupation meet the Soviet forces on the Elbe. Harsh psychological importance but it was a of Germany. Berlin lay more than 100 criticism of the decision followed in the bombed-out hulk with almost no military miles inside the Soviet zone, although years ahead. It dogged Eisenhower in The Halt on the Elbe

64 AIR FORCE Magazine / July 2013 his run for the presidency in 1952 and built up Montgomery.” He was immensely The British pushed constantly for ap- still pops up occasionally in theories that popular with the British public and the pointment of a “land forces commander” Ike’s failure to take Berlin delivered the Army rank and fi le. to be inserted between Eisenhower and city into Soviet hands. The Americans were less impressed the Allied army groups. This would by Montgomery and his egotism. The have effectively made Ike a fi gurehead. Eisenhower and Montgomery relationship hit bottom in Their choice for the job was, of course, In the fi rst part of the war, Britain had when Montgomery held a press conference Montgomery. been the dominant partner in the western at which he essentially claimed credit for Eisenhower had appointed Montgom- , but by 1945 the Americans were winning the Battle of the Bulge. Churchill ery coordinator of the ground forces providing most of the troops and resources tried to repair the damage with a speech during the initial move inland after and had taken over the leadership role. in the House of Commons, acknowledg- the invasion, but by March The British did not handle the change ing that the Americans had done most of 1945, he had resumed operational com- gracefully. the fi ghting and had taken most of the mand of the seven Allied armies—four It rankled that Eisenhower was the su- casualties. American, one British, one Canadian, preme commander. “I would never class Nevertheless, Churchill was also an- and one French. Ike as a great soldier,” Montgomery sniffed. guished by the decline of British pres- Up to then, the leading element of the El Alamein in North Africa “was the tige. According to Field Marshal Alan offensive had been Montgomery’s 21st only victory the British had in the Brooke, chief of the Imperial Army Group on the northern fl ank, sup- fi rst three years of the war,” said historian Staff, Churchill “propounded strategies on ported by the 12th Army Group under US Stephen E. Ambrose. “The British public ensuring that British troops were retained Gen. Omar N. Bradley and the 6th Army had desperately needed a hero and after in the limelight, if necessary at the expense Group under US Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers. El Alamein the government deliberately of the Americans.” The Ninth US Army had been attached to

Left: The Gate in , after the Soviet army took Berlin. Below: Field Marshal , fl anked by Gen. Dwight Eisenhower (l) and Gen. (r), in 1946. Montgomery was loved by the British public, but many Al- lied military leaders were not so enamored.

Eisenhower did not regard Berlin as an The Halt on the ElbeBy John T. Correll important military target. He would not expend tens of thousands of Allied lives to take it.

Carl Weinrother photo via Bundesarchiv, Germany

AIR FORCE Magazine / July 2013 65 The Cable to Stalin On —in an initiative that would reverberate for years—Eisen- hower sent a cable to Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, the US military liaison in , with a message to be deliv- ered to Stalin. Ike said operations had reached the point where it was essential Staff illustration by Zaur Eylanbekov by Staff illustration for him to know Russian intentions so actions of the advancing forces could be coordinated. His own immediate plan, he told Sta- lin, was to encircle the Ruhr and isolate it from the rest of Germany, then “divide the enemy’s remaining forces by join- ing hands with your forces. ... For my forces, the best axis on which to effect this junction would be Erfurt-Leipzig- Dresden.” Contrary to the legend that Eisenhower’s message conceded Berlin to the , the cable did not men- tion Berlin at all. However, it could be reasonably inferred from the context that Ike did not regard Berlin as a major goal. He was aiming for Dresden, some 100 miles to the south. Concurrently, Eisenhower sent tele- grams to Marshall and Montgomery about the latest developments. The Ninth US Army would revert to Bradley, whose army group would become the spearhead of the advance. The British complained furiously that Eisenhower had exceeded his authority by contacting a head of state directly. When Eisenhower established a bridgehead on the Elbe, Montgomery was still 60 miles short of the goal. Eisenhower was concerned that Montgomery’s plodding Eisenhower said he wrote to Stalin in pace might allow the Russians to reach Luebeck first and keep going into . his capacity as head of the , not as head of state. Besides, Churchill had always felt free to deal Montgomery for the drive to the Rhine. Furthermore, primacy in the offensive with Eisenhower directly. Montgomery assumed the arrangement was about to shift from Montgomery More to the point was the diminution to be permanent. to Bradley. On , elements of of the British role. Churchill told the When Montgomery did not get the Bradley’s 12th Army Group seized an British chiefs of staff that Montgomery orders he wanted, he gave the directions intact bridge over the Rhine at had been “deprived of the Ninth United himself. In a message to Eisenhower and expanded the bridgehead deeper States Army” and that the British “might , he said, “Today I issued or- into Germany. Meanwhile, Montgom- be condemned to an almost static role” in ders to army commanders for operations ery paused at the Rhine and did not get the final phase of the war. In a message to eastward which are about to begin.” He across until . Eisenhower —sent directly, as would “drive hard” toward the Elbe and Bradley, steady and reliable, could be usual—Churchill expressed his dismay “thence by autobahn to Berlin, I hope.” counted on to exploit the bridgehead, at “the relegation of His Majesty’s forces He had miscalculated on several whereas Montgomery’s reputation for to an unexpected restricted sphere.” points. methodical plodding inspired little confi- Delivery of the message to Stalin As recently as , Eisen- dence. “Monty wanted to ride into Berlin was held up temporarily, but Marshall hower had recognized Berlin as a principal on a white charger,” said British Maj. Gen. and the US military chiefs, weary of objective, but back then, the John F. M. Whiteley, deputy operations British complaining, stood staunchly had been outside Warsaw. In a massive chief at Supreme Headquarters Allied behind Eisenhower. Montgomery’s new effort in , the Soviets surged Expeditionary Force, but “the feeling was assignment was to protect Bradley’s almost 300 miles westward to draw within that if anything had to be done quickly, left flank, seize Luebeck in northern artillery range of Berlin, where they were don’t give it to Monty.” Germany, cut off German troops in the busily building up their stores of munitions British Lt. Gen. Frederick E. Morgan, Danish peninsula and Norway, and take and supplies. It appeared likely that the deputy chief of staff for Supreme Head- the crucial ports on the North Sea. Soviets would take Berlin, and Eisenhower quarters Allied Expeditionary Force, said, Bradley pushed into central Germany, had turned his attention to other pressing “Monty would have needed at least six encircled the Ruhr, and trapped Field objectives. months to prepare.” Marshal ’s 66 AIR FORCE Magazine / July 2013 in the pocket, capturing 325,000 troops and an enormous amount of supplies. Deane delivered the message to Stalin March 31. Stalin declared his full agree- ment with Eisenhower and said the Soviet photo ITAR-TASS high command planned to “allot second- ary forces in the direction of Berlin.” In actuality, Stalin did not believe a word that Eisenhower had said and ordered the Soviet attack on Berlin to begin.

The Issue of Berlin Eisenhower had not completely ruled out Berlin as an objective. “At any time that we can seize Berlin at little cost, we should, of course, do so,” he said in a wire to Marshall April 7. Ike’s original orders from the Combined Chiefs of Staff in directed him to “undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces.” Nothing was said in the instructions, then American soldiers (l) and Russian soldiers greet one another on the Elbe in Torgau, or later, about political considerations. Germany, in April 1945. The American advance halted there. The Russians went on to “I am the first to admit that a war is take Berlin, a prize with little military value to offer but a high price in lives. waged in pursuance of political aims, and if the Combined Chiefs of Staff should the surrendered, and he did not stalwarts might be gathering for a final decide that the Allied effort to take Berlin want them pulled out until he was certain stand. The redoubt did not in fact exist, but outweighs purely military considerations Stalin would give something in return,” Eisenhower could not ignore the possibil- in the theater, I would cheerfully readjust said Ambrose. ity. It did not, however, seriously hamper my plans and thinking so as to carry Although Eisenhower regarded it as the advance into central Germany. out such an operation,” Eisenhower told “militarily unsound” to make Berlin a By April 11, US forces had closed the Marshall. major objective, he kept the issue open. 200-mile distance from the Rhine to the There was no change in orders. In According to Bradley, “the capture of Elbe. The next day, elements of Lt. Gen. fact, there is no indication the Combined Berlin was still under active consider- William H. Simpson’s Ninth Army crossed Chiefs ever considered such a change. ation by us as late as April 15,” the day the river near Magdeburg, 50 miles from Nevertheless, Churchill continued to press before the Russians began their assault Berlin, and established a bridgehead on the the issue. He said the fall of Berlin would on Berlin. other side. Simpson pleaded for permission “be the supreme signal of defeat to the “I never suggested going back on our to keep going to Berlin. German people” and that leaving it to the word over the agreed zones provided The bridgehead on the Elbe was at Soviets would strengthen their conviction other agreements were also respected,” the end of a long supply line, with few “that they have been the overwhelming Churchill said in his memoirs. “I became bridges available. Forward units had to be contributor to our common victory.” convinced however that before we halted, supplied by air from support bases on the For Churchill, the focus of the war or still more withdrew, we ought to seek Rhine. A German force of about 50,000 had evolved from a pure defeat of the a meeting with Stalin face-to-face and stood between Simpson and Berlin with Germans to establishing the postwar make sure that an agreement was reached more in terminal defense lines around the balance of power in Europe. This was about the whole front. It would indeed be city, ordered by Hitler to hold and fight of far less importance to the Americans, a disaster if we kept all our agreements to the death. who did not intend to stay in Europe in good faith while the Soviets laid their “At that time we could probably have after the war and were anxious to shift hands upon all they could get without the pushed on to Berlin had we been willing their military effort to finishing off the slightest regard for the obligations into to take the casualties Berlin would have Japanese in the Pacific. which they had entered.” cost us,” Bradley said. “[Soviet Marshal The irony was that the occupation zones The Russians, who had suffered enor- Georgi Zhukov] had not yet crossed the were mostly a British creation. The initial mously during the German invasion Oder and Berlin now lay almost midway plan, called “Rankin C,” was drawn up of their country, were determined to between our forces. However, Zhukov’s by the British in 1943 and submitted in have their vengeance on Berlin. Had the eastern approaches were infinitely more 1944 for consideration by the three-power Americans and British challenged them negotiable than the waterlogged path that European Advisory Commission. The for capture of the city, it is inconceivable confronted us in the south.” United States had some doubts, but the that they would have acquiesced passively. Meanwhile, on the northern flank, Soviets agreed right away. The zones were Montgomery was making his usual slow promulgated in the Occupation Protocol of At the Elbe progress and was still 60 miles short of the September 1944 and confirmed at the Big In the spring of 1945, SHAEF intel- Elbe when Simpson got there. Eisenhower Three meeting at Yalta in February 1945. ligence created a distraction with reports was concerned that the oncoming Russians Churchill “most definitely wanted Al- of a “National Redoubt” in the Bavarian might beat Montgomery to Luebeck and lied troops within the Russian zone when where SS divisions and other Nazi keep going into Denmark. Ike offered AIR FORCE Magazine / July 2013 67 “Washington Merry-Go-Round” column reported breathlessly that American patrols reached the Berlin suburb of

ITAR TASS photo TASS ITAR Potsdam on April 13, 1945, but were ordered back to the Elbe because of demands by the Russians. In reality, US forces got nowhere near Potsdam. The issue also arose in 1952 when Eisenhower ran for the Republican nomination for President. Supporters of opposing GOP candidate Sen. Robert A. Taft sent Eisenhower a list of questions, including: “Was it yours or the late FDR’s decision to forbid Gen. George Patton from taking or Gen. W. H. Simpson’s Ninth Army from taking Berlin?” “Berlin was a destroyed city,” Ike said. “What was the great point in attacking Bradley (r), US commander of 12th Army Group, and Marshal Ivan Konev (l), com- it and capturing it, particularly as our mander of the First Ukrainian Front, confer in April 1945. political bosses had already told us that the line we must occupy was 200 miles to Montgomery additional forces, but the liberate Prague, both for political reasons the west? ... Marshal Zhukov—a slightly pace did not improve. and, I am certain, for the headlines.” different type of Russian—told me that With the bridgehead on the Elbe open, “To avoid possible incidents, [Soviet] he used 22 divisions, 2,500 guns, and Ike asked Bradley for his judgment about General Antonov asked General Eisen- suffered about 10,000 casualties taking casualties. hower not to move his forces in Czecho- this destroyed city of Berlin. Now, none “When Eisenhower asked me what I east of the line Budejovice- of these brave men of 1952 have yet of- thought it might cost us to break through Pilsen-Karlsbad,” said historian Forrest fered to go out and pick out the 10,000 from the Elbe to Berlin, I estimated 100,000 C. Pogue Jr. “He pointedly reminded the American mothers whose sons should casualties,” Bradley said. “‘A pretty stiff Supreme Commander that the Red Army have made the sacrifice to capture a price to pay for a prestige objective,’ I had stopped east of on the Baltic worthless city.” said, ‘especially when we’ve got to fall at his request [leaving Luebeck to Mont- Then there was Henry A. Kissinger, back and let the other fellow take over.’ ” gomery] and hoped by the same token who opined breezily in Diplomacy in To Simpson’s great and lasting dis- that the Allies would stop their advance 1994 that, “General Eisenhower took it appointment—and a key part of the in . General Eisenhower upon himself to write directly to Stalin Eisenhower and Berlin legend—the agreed not to move farther. Thus he left on March 28, 1945, to inform him that US Army advance went no farther. On Prague to be liberated by the Russians,” he would not advance on Berlin and to April 21, the Americans linked up with who completed the operation May 12. propose that American and Soviet troops elements of Marshal Ivan Konev’s First With the war over, all forces retreated meet near Dresden. No doubt astonished Ukrainian Front at Torgau on the Elbe, without incident to the agreed-upon de- that a general would address a head of state 65 miles south of Berlin and well inside marcation lines for the occupation and the on any subject, let alone a matter of such the Soviet occupation zone. Americans and British proceeded to their political importance, Stalin was also not Berlin fell to the Russians on May assigned sectors in Berlin. in the habit of turning down free political 2. Zhukov later said it cost him 10,000 gifts.” Kissinger did not say exactly what casualties to take Berlin, but his figure Second Guessers the “free political gifts” were. may have been those killed in action, The recriminations began soon after the In 2008, author Robert Wilcox claimed not counting wounded. Konev, attack- war ended. In his memoirs, Montgomery that Patton was killed in 1945 by the ing alongside Zhukov, probably took grumbled that the postwar political balance American OSS and the Soviet NKVD to an equal or greater number of casual- in Europe had “meant getting possession of keep him from revealing that Eisenhower ties. Various estimates set the toll for certain political centers in Europe before collaborated with the Russians to prevent the Red Army at Berlin considerably the Russians—notably Vienna, Prague, US capture of Berlin or Prague. higher, between 50,000 and 100,000 and Berlin. If the higher direction of the “The major myth in regard to Berlin total casualties. war had been handled properly by the is that if the Americans had captured the Germany surrendered May 7, but Ger- political leaders of the West, and suitable city they would have held it and there man forces in Czechoslovakia refused instructions had been given to Supreme would be no Berlin problem today,” to believe the news and kept fighting. Commanders, we could have grabbed all Ambrose has pointed out. “This is pa- Churchill clamored for the continuation of three before the Russians.” tently nonsense.” Critics do not explain the offensive deeper into Czechoslovakia, At least three times between 1945 what difference an American capture of as did Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, com- and 1965, Drew Pearson’s syndicated Berlin would have made. n mander of the US Third Army. “From a military point of view, Prague, John T. Correll was editor in chief of Air Force Magazine for 18 years and is now a like Berlin, had no strategic significance,” contributor. His most recent article, “Roosevelt Builds the Arsenal,” appeared in the Bradley said. “Patton wanted desperately to June issue. 68 AIR FORCE Magazine / July 2013