• Abstract and Figures
• Public Full-text

n March 1945, British Field Mar- value. Except for a token presence, the the Allied powers would share control of shal Bernard L. Montgomery Reich ministries had moved out already. the city. Eisenhower was not willing to stood on the Rhine with visions The Soviet army was camped on the Oder, expend tens of thousands of lives for the of a triumphal entry into Berlin 35 miles from Berlin, with more than a prestige of taking territory that would be dancing in his head. It was Mont- million troops in position to attack. turned over to the Soviets as soon as the gomery’s expectation that in ad- The Battle of the Bulge in December war ended. Idition to his own 21st Army Group, he had sapped German strength in the west, Eisenhower also wanted an orderly would have command of the US Ninth but 61 divisions remained, with additional linkup with the Soviet forces, whose Army and an absolute priority on fuel pockets of strength in the Baltic states. emotions were running high as they swept and supplies. He would then make a Eisenhower’s plan was to advance on a through Germany. “What are your ideas 250-mile dash across the north German broad front, capture the industrial heart- on control and coordination to prevent plain to capture Berlin. land of the Ruhr, split Germany down the unfortunate incidents and to sort out the Prime Minister Winston Churchill middle, and consolidate Allied gains on two advancing forces?” Gen. George C. agreed with Montgomery’s assumptions the fl anks. A diversion of resources for a Marshall, US Army Chief of Staff, asked but the supreme Allied commander, Gen. single thrust by Montgomery would have Eisenhower. “One possibility is an agreed Dwight D. Eisenhower, did not. brought operations elsewhere along the line of demarcation.” Ike understood his mission to be de- line to a stop. Over the objections of Montgomery stroying the German armed forces and The United States, Britain, and the and Churchill, Eisenhower decided against ending the war in Europe as soon as pos- Soviet Union had agreed in 1944 on the an all-out push for Berlin and elected to sible. Berlin had political, symbolic, and boundary lines for postwar occupation meet the Soviet forces on the Elbe. Harsh psychological importance but it was a of Germany. Berlin lay more than 100 criticism of the decision followed in the bombed-out hulk with almost no military miles inside the Soviet zone, although years ahead. It dogged Eisenhower in The Halt on the Elbe 64 AIR FORCE Magazine / July 2013 his run for the presidency in 1952 and built up Montgomery.” He was immensely The British pushed constantly for ap- still pops up occasionally in theories that popular with the British public and the pointment of a “land forces commander” Ike’s failure to take Berlin delivered the Army rank and fi le. to be inserted between Eisenhower and city into Soviet hands. The Americans were less impressed the Allied army groups. This would by Montgomery and his egotism. The have effectively made Ike a fi gurehead. Eisenhower and Montgomery relationship hit bottom in January 1945 Their choice for the job was, of course, In the fi rst part of the war, Britain had when Montgomery held a press conference Montgomery. been the dominant partner in the western at which he essentially claimed credit for Eisenhower had appointed Montgom- Alliance, but by 1945 the Americans were winning the Battle of the Bulge. Churchill ery coordinator of the ground forces providing most of the troops and resources tried to repair the damage with a speech during the initial move inland after and had taken over the leadership role. in the House of Commons, acknowledg- the Normandy invasion, but by March The British did not handle the change ing that the Americans had done most of 1945, he had resumed operational com- gracefully. the fi ghting and had taken most of the mand of the seven Allied armies—four It rankled that Eisenhower was the su- casualties. American, one British, one Canadian, preme commander. “I would never class Nevertheless, Churchill was also an- and one French. Ike as a great soldier,” Montgomery sniffed. guished by the decline of British pres- Up to then, the leading element of the El Alamein in North Africa “was the tige. According to Field Marshal Alan offensive had been Montgomery’s 21st only major victory the British had in the Brooke, chief of the Imperial General Army Group on the northern fl ank, sup- fi rst three years of the war,” said historian Staff, Churchill “propounded strategies on ported by the 12th Army Group under US Stephen E. Ambrose. “The British public ensuring that British troops were retained Gen. Omar N. Bradley and the 6th Army had desperately needed a hero and after in the limelight, if necessary at the expense Group under US Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers. El Alamein the government deliberately of the Americans.” The Ninth US Army had been attached to Left: The Brandenburg Gate in June 1945, after the Soviet army took Berlin. Below: Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, fl anked by Gen. Dwight Eisenhower (l) and Gen. Omar Bradley (r), in 1946. Montgomery was loved by the British public, but many Al- lied military leaders were not so enamored. Eisenhower did not regard Berlin as an The Halt on the ElbeBy John T. Correll important military target. He would not expend tens of thousands of Allied lives to take it. Carl Weinrother photo via Bundesarchiv, Germany AIR FORCE Magazine / July 2013 65 The Cable to Stalin On March 28—in an initiative that would reverberate for years—Eisen- hower sent a cable to Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, the US military liaison officer in Moscow, with a message to be deliv- ered to Stalin. Ike said operations had reached the point where it was essential Staff illustration by Zaur Eylanbekov by Staff illustration for him to know Russian intentions so actions of the advancing forces could be coordinated. His own immediate plan, he told Sta- lin, was to encircle the Ruhr and isolate it from the rest of Germany, then “divide the enemy’s remaining forces by join- ing hands with your forces. ... For my forces, the best axis on which to effect this junction would be Erfurt-Leipzig- Dresden.” Contrary to the legend that Eisenhower’s message conceded Berlin to the Russians, the cable did not men- tion Berlin at all. However, it could be reasonably inferred from the context that Ike did not regard Berlin as a major goal. He was aiming for Dresden, some 100 miles to the south. Concurrently, Eisenhower sent tele- grams to Marshall and Montgomery about the latest developments. The Ninth US Army would revert to Bradley, whose army group would become the spearhead of the advance. The British complained furiously that Eisenhower had exceeded his authority by contacting a head of state directly. When Eisenhower established a bridgehead on the Elbe, Montgomery was still 60 miles short of the goal. Eisenhower was concerned that Montgomery’s plodding Eisenhower said he wrote to Stalin in pace might allow the Russians to reach Luebeck first and keep going into Denmark. his capacity as head of the Soviet armed forces, not as head of state. Besides, Churchill had always felt free to deal Montgomery for the drive to the Rhine. Furthermore, primacy in the offensive with Eisenhower directly. Montgomery assumed the arrangement was about to shift from Montgomery More to the point was the diminution to be permanent. to Bradley. On March 7, elements of of the British role. Churchill told the When Montgomery did not get the Bradley’s 12th Army Group seized an British chiefs of staff that Montgomery orders he wanted, he gave the directions intact bridge over the Rhine at Remagen had been “deprived of the Ninth United himself. In a message to Eisenhower and expanded the bridgehead deeper States Army” and that the British “might March 27, he said, “Today I issued or- into Germany. Meanwhile, Montgom- be condemned to an almost static role” in ders to army commanders for operations ery paused at the Rhine and did not get the final phase of the war. In a message to eastward which are about to begin.” He across until March 23. Eisenhower March 31—sent directly, as would “drive hard” toward the Elbe and Bradley, steady and reliable, could be usual—Churchill expressed his dismay “thence by autobahn to Berlin, I hope.” counted on to exploit the bridgehead, at “the relegation of His Majesty’s forces He had miscalculated on several whereas Montgomery’s reputation for to an unexpected restricted sphere.” points. methodical plodding inspired little confi- Delivery of the message to Stalin As recently as September 1944, Eisen- dence. “Monty wanted to ride into Berlin was held up temporarily, but Marshall hower had recognized Berlin as a principal on a white charger,” said British Maj. Gen. and the US military chiefs, weary of objective, but back then, the Red Army John F. M. Whiteley, deputy operations British complaining, stood staunchly had been outside Warsaw. In a massive chief at Supreme Headquarters Allied behind Eisenhower. Montgomery’s new effort in February 1945, the Soviets surged Expeditionary Force, but “the feeling was assignment was to protect Bradley’s almost 300 miles westward to draw within that if anything had to be done quickly, left flank, seize Luebeck in northern artillery range of Berlin, where they were don’t give it to Monty.” Germany, cut off German troops in the busily building up their stores of munitions British Lt.

Load more

  5

Copy Link