Civil-Military Coordination During Counterinsurgency and Reassessing the Efficacy of the Security Committees in Malaya and Palestine

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Civil-Military Coordination During Counterinsurgency and Reassessing the Efficacy of the Security Committees in Malaya and Palestine Cooperation or Control? Civil-military coordination during counterinsurgency and reassessing the efficacy of the security committees in Malaya and Palestine Joshua R. Goodman Abstract The importance of civil-military coordination during counterinsurgency has long been a tenet of faith, but civil-military conflict and coordination failures are ubiquitous in modern counterinsurgency, presenting serious obstacles to campaign success. These challenges stem from the complex and often contradictory nature of counterinsurgency, composed of multiple, overlapping operations that have the potential to work at cross purposes. In a principal-agent framework, the challenge of coordination stems from the contradictory preferences of multiple agents responsible for these lines of operation combined with of agency slack, the ability for agents to pursue their preferred courses of action in an uncoordinated manner. Historically, two institutional solutions to promote civil-military cooperation have been articulated, a committee system bringing together multiple agents in forums for joint planning, and a single-commander system that integrates chains of command, granting one agent the authority to direct and monitor other agents at the strategic and operational levels. Principal-agent theory suggests that when the problem is conflicting preferences, the committee system will not produce coordinated campaigns, despite the widespread praise they have received in contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine and the conventional historical wisdom. A comparison of the Malayan Emergency (1950-1952) and the Palestinian Rebellion (1937-1939) demonstrates that these coordinating committees failed to produce civil-military coordination in critical moments, necessitating a shift towards a single-commander system and more intrusive forms of monitoring and control. 1 Introduction The importance of civil-military coordination during counterinsurgency has long been a tenet of faith. In the works of both scholars and practitioners, as well as in military doctrine, the need for close cooperation between civilian and military authorities always ranks among the top best practices.1 Given that counterinsurgency is a complex, multifaceted campaign consisting of a combination of “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions,” the need to coordinate the various lines of operation, as well as the actors tasked to carry them out, seems obvious.2 But despite the unanimity of advice, recent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan were undermined by widespread civil-military conflict. Planning for the Iraq war and its early management were characterized by clashes between Rumsfeld’s Defense Department and Powell/Rice’s State Department, resulting in the State Department’s consistent marginalization.3 While sidelining the administration’s best source of diplomatic and political expertise, 1 For the prescriptive scholarship, see 1) the practitioners: Gwynn, Charles, Imperial Policing, 2nd Edition (London: Macmillan, 1939); Simson, H. J., British Rule and Rebellion (London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1937); Robert Haining, “Report on Military Control in Palestine.” April 1939. WO 191/89, pg 23. British National Archives, Kew Gardens, UK (TNA); David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964); Robert GK Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (London: F. A. Praeger, 1966); Julian Paget, Counterinsurgency Campaigning (London: Faber and Faber, 1967); Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-Keeping (London: Faber and Faber, 1971); Komer, Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy At War: U.S. Performance In The Vietnam Conflict (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1985). 2) the scholars: John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counter-Insurgency (London: Faber, 1969); Thomas Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency 1919-60. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990); Hoffman, Bruce, and Jennifer Taw. “A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency:” RAND, 1992; Robert Egnell, “Civil–Military Coordination for Operational Effectiveness: Towards a Measured Approach,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 24, no. 2 (2013): 237–56; David C. Gompert, John IV Gordon, Adam R. Grissom, David R. Frelinger, Seth G. Jones, Martin C. Libicki, Edward O’Connell, Brooke Stearns Lawson, and Robert E. Hunter. “War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency.” RAND, 2008; David Ucko and Robert Egnell, Counterinsurgency in Crisis: Britain and the Challenges of Modern Warfare.(New York: Columbia University Press, 2013). For field manuals and doctrine, see United States Marine Corps. FMFRP 12-15 Small Wars Manual. (Washington, D.C: Department of the Navy, 1940); Keeping the Peace: Duties in Support of the Civil Power (London: HMSO, 1957); Army Field Manual (UK) Combined Arms Operations - Counter-Insurgency Operations, (London: Ministry of Defence, 2001); Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 2006); British Army Field Manual: Counter-Insurgency Operations, Army Code 71749 (London: Ministry of Defence, 2009). 2 FM 3-24, JP 1-02. 3 Gerald Seib, and Carla Robbins. “Powell-Rumsfeld Feud Is Now Hard to Ignore.” Wall Street Journal, April 25, 2003; Walter LaFeber, “The Rise and Fall of Colin Powell and the Powell Doctrine.” Political Science Quarterly 124, no. 1 (2009): 71–93. 2 Rumsfeld’s leadership also came under fire from within the military. In 2006 an august group of retired generals publicly criticized his management of the war, calling on him to resign.4 Similar tensions marked the relationship between the Obama administration and top officers in Afghanistan, culminating in the sacking of ISAF commander General Stanley McChrystal following an interview with Rolling Stone seen as highly critical of top administration officials.5 These clashes and the challenge they presented to civil-military coordination are not isolated incidents. The history of modern counterinsurgency has been one of civil-military conflict, and cooperation has been the exception rather than the rule.6 During the Boer War in South Africa, High Commissioner Alfred Milner famously clashed with Lord Kitchener, the military commander, over political and military strategy.7 Similar tensions emerged between the British army and the government during the Irish War of Independence, leading to the army chief to vent, “My contempt for their brains, knowledge, pluck and character deepens every day … Whew! Were there ever such ignorant and miscalculating fools?”8 Political-military clashes in France over Algeria culminated in two coup attempts.9 In Vietnam, conflict between the State and Defense Departments as well as between the Joint Chiefs and the Cabinet undermined coordination and planning.10 Persistent civil-military conflict during counterinsurgency campaigns has often resulted in coordination failures, the absence of a developed strategy, and ultimately, campaign stalemate and strategic failure; overcoming these challenges has been central to campaign success. This 4 Thomas Ricks “Rumsfeld Rebuked By Retired Generals,” Washington Post, April 13, 2006; David S. Cloud, Eric Schmitt, and Thom Shanker. “Rumsfeld Faces Growing Revolt by Retired Generals;” The New York Times, April 13, 2006. 5 Michael Hastings, “The Runaway General: The Profile That Brought Down McChrystal,” Rolling Stone, June 22, 2010; Mackubin Thomas Owens, “The McChrystal Affair and U.S. Civil-Military Relations,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2010. 6 Taken here to begin with the British campaign in South Africa in 1899. 7 Keith Surridge, Managing the South African War, 1899-1902: Politicians v Generals (London: Boydell & Brewer Ltd., 1998). 8 Wilson Diary, December 29, 1920. Henry Wilson Papers, 73/1/6. Imperial War Museum, London, UK (IWM). 9 John S. Ambler, The French Army in Politics, 1945-1962. (Ohio State Univ Pr, 1966). 10 Leslie H. Gelb with Richard K. Betts, “The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked,” (Washington DC: Brookings, 1979); H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (New York: Harper Perennial, 1998). 3 raises three pressing questions regarding the link between civil-military conflict and campaign coordination. First, what is the reason for widespread civil-military tension? Second, how does it undermine campaign coordination? And finally, what is the ideal solution? The tendency of these tensions to manifest as interpersonal conflict perhaps suggests the problem is simply poor relationships. However, far from being a clash of personalities, civil- military conflict stems from the complex nature of counterinsurgency itself, arising from the need to reconcile competing military and political objectives, conflicts between political interests and operational imperatives, and the division of labor.11 Civilian and military actors often prefer and pursue their immediate objectives, including, inter alia, battlefield success, local development objectives, or political transformation/preservation, in ways that interfere or undermine one another, reflect organizational priorities at the expense of overarching objectives, and undermine the capacity for joint planning, strategic assessment, and the reconciliation of political interests with realistic operational capacities.12 However, this does not inevitably doom a counterinsurgency campaign. While it is unlikely that these
Recommended publications
  • PCT Gazette, Weekly Issue No. 42, 2000
    42/2000 19 Oct/oct 2000 PCT Gazette - Section III - Gazette du PCT 15475 SECTION III WEEKLY INDEXES INDEX HEBDOMADAIRES INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION NUMBERS AND CORRESPONDING INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATION NUMBERS NUMÉROS DES DEMANDES INTERNATIONALES ET NUMÉROS DE PUBLICATION INTERNATIONALE CORRESPONDANTS International International International International International International Application Publication Application Publication Application Publication Numbers Numbers Numbers Numbers Numbers Numbers Numéros des Numéros de Numéros des Numéros de Numéros des Numéros de demandes publication demandes publication demandes publication internationales internationale internationales internationale internationales internationale AT CA CZ PCT/AT00/00046 WO 00/62393 PCT/CA99/00330 WO 00/61824 PCT/CZ00/00020 WO 00/61419 PCT/AT00/00064 WO 00/61240 PCT/CA99/00840 WO 00/61209 PCT/CZ00/00023 WO 00/61645 PCT/AT00/00068 WO 00/61896 PCT/CA99/00892 WO 00/61154 PCT/CZ00/00024 WO 00/61408 PCT/AT00/00079 WO 00/61820 PCT/CA99/00893 WO 00/61155 PCT/AT00/00080 WO 00/61319 PCT/CA00/00076 WO 00/61189 DE PCT/AT00/00081 WO 00/61973 PCT/CA00/00219 WO 00/62144 PCT/DE99/01102 WO 00/62274 PCT/AT00/00082 WO 00/61032 PCT/CA00/00312 WO 00/60983 PCT/DE99/01153 WO 00/61486 PCT/AT00/00084 WO 00/62040 PCT/CA00/00336 WO 00/62396 PCT/DE00/00114 WO 00/61504 PCT/AT00/00085 WO 00/61403 PCT/CA00/00352 WO 00/61826 PCT/DE00/00410 WO 00/61933 PCT/AT00/00087 WO 00/61428 PCT/CA00/00358 WO 00/61618 PCT/DE00/00478 WO 00/62330 PCT/AT00/00090 WO 00/61170 PCT/CA00/00359 WO 00/60981 PCT/DE00/00505
    [Show full text]
  • Tragic Orphans: Indians in Malaysia
    BIBLIOGRAPHY Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, Tunku. Looking Back: The Historic Years of Malaya and Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1977. ———. Viewpoints. Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia), 1978. Abdul Rashid Moten. “Modernization and the Process of Globalization: The Muslim Experience and Responses”. In Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social and Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century, edited by K.S. Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali. Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2005. Abraham, Collin. “Manipulation and Management of Racial and Ethnic Groups in Colonial Malaysia: A Case Study of Ideological Domination and Control”. In Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in Malaysia, edited by Raymond L.M. Lee. Illinois: Northern Illinois University, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1986. ———. The Naked Social Order: The Roots of Racial Polarisation in Malaysia. Subang Jaya: Pelanduk, 2004 (1997). ———. “The Finest Hour”: The Malaysian-MCP Peace Accord in Perspective. Petaling Jaya: Strategic Information and Research Development Centre, 2006. Abu Talib Ahmad. “The Malay Community and Memory of the Japanese Occupation”. In War and Memory in Malaysia and Singapore, edited by Patricia Lim Pui Huen and Diana Wong. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000. ———. The Malay Muslims, Islam and the Rising Sun: 1941–1945. Kuala Lumpur: MBRAS, 2003. Ackerman, Susan E. and Raymond L.M. Lee. Heaven in Transition: Innovation and Ethnic Identity in Malaysia. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1988. Aeria, Andrew. “Skewed Economic Development and Inequality: The New Economic Policy in Sarawak”. In The New Economic Policy in Malaysia: Affirmative Action, Ethnic Inequalities and Social Justice, edited by Edmund Terence Gomez and Johan Saravanamuttu.
    [Show full text]
  • (June 1941) and the Development of the British Tactical Air Doctrine
    Journal of Military and Strategic VOLUME 14, ISSUE 1, FALL 2011 Studies A Stepping Stone to Success: Operation Battleaxe (June 1941) and the Development of the British Tactical Air Doctrine Mike Bechthold On 16 February 1943 a meeting was held in Tripoli attended by senior American and British officers to discuss the various lessons learned during the Libyan campaign. The focus of the meeting was a presentation by General Bernard Montgomery. This "gospel according to Montgomery," as it was referred to by Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder, set out very clearly Monty's beliefs on how air power should be used to support the army.1 Among the tenets Montgomery articulated was his conviction of the importance of air power: "Any officer who aspires to hold high command in war must understand clearly certain principles regarding the use of air power." Montgomery also believed that flexibility was the greatest asset of air power. This allowed it to be applied as a "battle-winning factor of the first importance." As well, he fully endorsed the air force view of centralized control: "Nothing could be more fatal to successful results than to dissipate the air resource into small packets placed under the control of army formation commanders, with each packet working on its own plan. The soldier must not expect, or wish, to exercise direct command over air striking forces." Montgomery concluded his discussion by stating that it was of prime importance for the army and air 1 Arthur Tedder, With Prejudice: The war memoirs of Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder (London: Cassell, 1966), p.
    [Show full text]
  • Copyright by John Michael Meyer 2020
    Copyright by John Michael Meyer 2020 The Dissertation Committee for John Michael Meyer Certifies that this is the approved version of the following Dissertation. One Way to Live: Orde Wingate and the Adoption of ‘Special Forces’ Tactics and Strategies (1903-1944) Committee: Ami Pedahzur, Supervisor Zoltan D. Barany David M. Buss William Roger Louis Thomas G. Palaima Paul B. Woodruff One Way to Live: Orde Wingate and the Adoption of ‘Special Forces’ Tactics and Strategies (1903-1944) by John Michael Meyer Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Austin in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Texas at Austin May 2020 Dedication To Ami Pedahzur and Wm. Roger Louis who guided me on this endeavor from start to finish and To Lorna Paterson Wingate Smith. Acknowledgements Ami Pedahzur and Wm. Roger Louis have helped me immeasurably throughout my time at the University of Texas, and I wish that everyone could benefit from teachers so rigorous and open minded. I will never forget the compassion and strength that they demonstrated over the course of this project. Zoltan Barany developed my skills as a teacher, and provided a thoughtful reading of my first peer-reviewed article. David M. Buss kept an open mind when I approached him about this interdisciplinary project, and has remained a model of patience while I worked towards its completion. My work with Tom Palaima and Paul Woodruff began with collaboration, and then moved to friendship. Inevitably, I became their student, though they had been teaching me all along.
    [Show full text]
  • Research Report | 2016
    RESEARCH REPORT | 2016 CONTENTS Introduction 01 Collaborative Doctoral Partnership 02 Research projects 05 Publications and advice 08 Exhibitions 11 Conferences, lectures and talks 13 INTRODUCTION 2016 was a further busy year, with our staff and PhD students involved in research across a wide spectrum of activities. Our first Arts and Humanities Research Council-funded international network, Listening to the World, which sought to establish the academic value of the BBC Monitoring Service transcript collection, showed us how invigorating such networks can be. The project concluded with the firm conviction on the part of all participants that the collection was indeed of huge value, and our webpages now carry papers and filmed interviews with the participating academics explaining why this is the case. It was especially rewarding - a few months after our project had finished - to take part in Dr Simon Potter’s workshop Connecting the Wireless World (under the auspices of a newly-awarded Leverhulme Trust research network) run by Bristol and York universities, with which we found a lot of shared interest. A joint publication drawing on both projects will appear as a Media History special issue on radio-monitoring in 2019. A restructure at IWM has seen our curatorial staff and historians redistributed into four new teams – broadly First World War, Second World War, Cold War and late 20th Century, and Contemporary. With fresh thinking on historical topics now made easier through co-locating subject specialists in this way, new possibilities arise, and meeting and talking to those teams was a key feature of 2016. The new Public Engagement and Learning Department has also produced a new and innovative approach to public programming, with themed seasons across all IWM sites now the backbone of the public programme, and we anticipate that the planning of such seasons will produce rich opportunities for research projects.
    [Show full text]
  • Sao Phải Lo Lắng!
    THERAVĀDA (PHẬT GIÁO NGUYÊN THỦY ) K. SRI. DHAMMANANDA Pháp Minh Trịnh Đức Vinh dịch SAO PHẢI LO LẮNG! PHỤC VỤ ĐỂ HOÀN TOÀN, HOÀN TOÀN ĐỂ PHỤC VỤ NHÀ XUẤT BẢN HỒNG ĐỨC HỘI LUẬT GIA VIỆT NAM NHÀ XUẤT BẢN HỒNG ĐỨC Địa chỉ: 65 Tràng Thi, Quận Hoàn Kiếm, Hà Nội Tel: (04) 39260024 Fax: (04) 39260031 Email: [email protected] CÔNG TY CỔ PHẦN DOANH NGHIỆP XÃ HỘI SAMANTA 16 Dương Quảng Hàm, Cầu Giấy, Hà Nội Website: www.samanta.vn Công ty CP DNXH Samanta giữ bản quyền dịch tiếng Việt và sách chỉ được phát hành để tặng, phát miễn phí, không bán. Quý độc giả, tổ chức muốn in sách để tặng, phát miễn phí xin vui lòng liên hệ qua email: [email protected]/[email protected] Chịu trách nhiệm xuất bản: Giám đốc Bùi Việt Bắc Chịu trách nhiệm nội dung: Tổng biên tập Lý Bá Toàn Biên tập : Nguyễn Thế Vinh Hiệu chỉnh: Lê Thị Minh Hà Sửa bản in: Bảo Vi Thiết kế bìa: Jodric LLP. www.jodric.com In 5000 cuốn, khổ 14,5 x 20,5 cm tại Xí nghiệp in FAHASA 774 Trường Chinh, P. 15, Q. Tân Bình, Tp Hồ Chí Minh. Số ĐKNXB: .........Số QĐXB của NXB Hồng Đức: .....Cấp ngày .......... In xong và nộp lưu chiểu Quý I/2016. Mã số sách tiêu chuẩn quốc tế (ISBN): 967-9920-72-0 Nội dung Lời tri ân Lời giới thiệu Lời dẫn nhập PHẦN 1: LO LẮNG VÀ CÁC NGUỒN GỐC CỦA NÓ 30 Chương 1: Lo lắng và sợ hãi Nguyên nhân của lo lắng Sợ hãi và mê tín Lo lắng ảnh hưởng đến chúng ta như thế nào? 40 Chương 2: Các vấn đề của chúng ta Đối diện với khó khăn Phát triển lòng can đảm và sự hiểu biết Đặt vấn đề vào đúng bối cảnh 56 Chương 3: Tại sao chúng ta đau khổ Bản chất của
    [Show full text]
  • The US Army Air Forces in WWII
    DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE Air Force Historical Studies Office 28 June 2011 Errata Sheet for the Air Force History and Museum Program publication: With Courage: the United States Army Air Forces in WWII, 1994, by Bernard C. Nalty, John F. Shiner, and George M. Watson. Page 215 Correct: Second Lieutenant Lloyd D. Hughes To: Second Lieutenant Lloyd H. Hughes Page 218 Correct Lieutenant Hughes To: Second Lieutenant Lloyd H. Hughes Page 357 Correct Hughes, Lloyd D., 215, 218 To: Hughes, Lloyd H., 215, 218 Foreword In the last decade of the twentieth century, the United States Air Force commemorates two significant benchmarks in its heritage. The first is the occasion for the publication of this book, a tribute to the men and women who served in the U.S. Army Air Forces during World War 11. The four years between 1991 and 1995 mark the fiftieth anniversary cycle of events in which the nation raised and trained an air armada and com- mitted it to operations on a scale unknown to that time. With Courage: U.S.Army Air Forces in World War ZZ retells the story of sacrifice, valor, and achievements in air campaigns against tough, determined adversaries. It describes the development of a uniquely American doctrine for the application of air power against an opponent's key industries and centers of national life, a doctrine whose legacy today is the Global Reach - Global Power strategic planning framework of the modern U.S. Air Force. The narrative integrates aspects of strategic intelligence, logistics, technology, and leadership to offer a full yet concise account of the contributions of American air power to victory in that war.
    [Show full text]
  • Operation Market Garden WWII
    Operation Market Garden WWII Operation Market Garden (17–25 September 1944) was an Allied military operation, fought in the Netherlands and Germany in the Second World War. It was the largest airborne operation up to that time. The operation plan's strategic context required the seizure of bridges across the Maas (Meuse River) and two arms of the Rhine (the Waal and the Lower Rhine) as well as several smaller canals and tributaries. Crossing the Lower Rhine would allow the Allies to outflank the Siegfried Line and encircle the Ruhr, Germany's industrial heartland. It made large-scale use of airborne forces, whose tactical objectives were to secure a series of bridges over the main rivers of the German- occupied Netherlands and allow a rapid advance by armored units into Northern Germany. Initially, the operation was marginally successful and several bridges between Eindhoven and Nijmegen were captured. However, Gen. Horrocks XXX Corps ground force's advance was delayed by the demolition of a bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal, as well as an extremely overstretched supply line, at Son, delaying the capture of the main road bridge over the Meuse until 20 September. At Arnhem, the British 1st Airborne Division encountered far stronger resistance than anticipated. In the ensuing battle, only a small force managed to hold one end of the Arnhem road bridge and after the ground forces failed to relieve them, they were overrun on 21 September. The rest of the division, trapped in a small pocket west of the bridge, had to be evacuated on 25 September. The Allies had failed to cross the Rhine in sufficient force and the river remained a barrier to their advance until the offensives at Remagen, Oppenheim, Rees and Wesel in March 1945.
    [Show full text]
  • Churchill, Wavell and Greece, 1941*
    Robin Higham Duty, Honor and Grand Strategy: Churchill, Wavell and Greece, 1941* In our previous works, then Capt. Harold E. Raugh and I took too limited a Mediterranean view of the background of the Greek campaign of 6-26 April 19411. Far from its being Raugh’s “disastrous mistake,” I argue that General Sir Archibald Wavell’s actions fitted both traditional British practice and the general policy worked out in London. In 1986 and 1987 I argued after long and careful thought since 1967 that Wavell went to Greece as part of a loyal deception of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, whose bellicose way at war was the antithesis of Wavell’s own professionalism. Further, whereas Raugh took the narrow military view, mine was a grand-strategic approach relating ends to means. My argument here is that a restudy of the campaign in Greece of 6-27 April 1941 utilizing the Orange Leonard ULTRA messages reconfirms my thesis that going to Greece was a deception and that far from being the miserable defeat which Raugh imagined, the withdrawal was a strategic triumph in the manner of a Wellington in Spain and Portugal or of the BEF’s in France in 1940. For this Wavell deserves full credit. In this respect, then, the so-called campaign in Greece must be seen not as an ignominious retreat in the face of superior forces, but rather as a skilful, carefully planned withdrawal and ultimate evacuation. It was a successful, though materially costly, gamble. * This paper was accepted for publication in late 2005 but delayed by the Balkan Studies financial crisis.
    [Show full text]
  • Smith, Walter B. Papers.Pdf
    Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library & Museum Audiovisual Department Walter Bedell Smith: Papers 66-299--66-402-567; 68-459--68-464; 70-38; 70-45; 70-102--70-104; 70-185-1--70-185-48; 70-280-1--70-280-342 66-299-1 Color Guard at a convocation in honor of Walter Bedell Smith at the University of South Carolina on October 20, 1953, in Columbia, South Carolina. Copyright: unknown. One 5x7 B&W print. 66-299-2 A convocation in honor of Walter Bedell Smith at the University of South Carolina on October 20, 1953, in Columbia, South Carolina. L to R: Major General John A. Dabney, Commanding General, Fort Jackson; Lt. General A. R. Bolling, Commanding General, the 3rd Army; Captain W.L. Anderson, commanding officer of the Naval ROTC; General Smith, Colonel H.C. Mewshaw, commanding officer of the South Carolina Military District; University President Donald S. Russell; Brigadier General C.M. McQuarris, assistant post commander at Fort Jackson; Colonel Raymond F. Wisehart, commanding officer, Air Force ROTC; and Carter Burgess, assistant to the University president. Copyright: unknown. One 5x7 B&W print. 66-299-3 A convocation in honor of Walter Bedell Smith at the University of South Carolina on October 20, 1953, in Columbia, South Carolina. L to R: General Smith, Dr. Orin F. Crow, dean of the University faculty; University President Donald S. Russell; and Dr. L.E. Brubaker, Chaplain of the University. Copyright: unknown. One 5x7 B&W print. 66-299-4 A convocation in honor of Walter Bedell Smith at the University of South Carolina on October 20, 1953, in Columbia, South Carolina.
    [Show full text]
  • Qualified, but Unprepared: Training for War at the Staff College in the 1930S
    QUALIFIED, BUT UNPREPARED Qualified, but unprepared: Training for War at the Staff College in the 1930s EDWARD SMALLEY University of Kent Email: [email protected] ABSTRACT This article aims to show the Staff College at Camberley was an elite establishment for officer training in name only; it failed to select the best candidates for entry and it failed to teach students how to undertake either routine duties or operations relevant to continental conflict. The syllabus lacked clarity of purpose whilst the learning environment was largely devoid of pressure. This compounded the institution’s small output which prevented the army developing a pool of elite officers which could monopolise command within future expeditionary forces. Consequently, in 1939, both Camberley and its individual graduates were unprepared for war. The passed Staff College qualification (PSC) was considered the pinnacle of an Army officer’s education. Recipients were expected to gain sufficient skills to perform all future command and staff duties to an unparalleled level of excellence. This article explores how these same elite officers were individually ill-equipped for future first- class conflict and, collectively, were even unable to dominate command positions within the small British Expeditionary Force sent to France in 1939-40. The Camberley Staff College was established in 1858 to address the obvious deficiencies in British Army staff work witnessed in the recent Crimean War. The institution was deliberately called the Staff College to emphasise its primary function of providing a formal staff education. The potential benefits of having qualified staff officers providing capable administration for the needs of a modern army were notably revealed by the success of the Prussian General Staff in the 1870s.
    [Show full text]
  • Eisenhower and Montgomery: Strategy, Leadership, and Tension at the End of World War II Bradley J
    Student Publications Student Scholarship Fall 2016 Eisenhower and Montgomery: Strategy, Leadership, and Tension at the End of World War II Bradley J. Klustner Gettysburg College Follow this and additional works at: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/student_scholarship Part of the European History Commons, Military History Commons, and the United States History Commons Share feedback about the accessibility of this item. Klustner, Bradley J., "Eisenhower and Montgomery: Strategy, Leadership, and Tension at the End of World War II" (2016). Student Publications. 492. https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/student_scholarship/492 This is the author's version of the work. This publication appears in Gettysburg College's institutional repository by permission of the copyright owner for personal use, not for redistribution. Cupola permanent link: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/student_scholarship/ 492 This open access student research paper is brought to you by The uC pola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College. It has been accepted for inclusion by an authorized administrator of The uC pola. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Eisenhower and Montgomery: Strategy, Leadership, and Tension at the End of World War II Abstract In late 1944, two legendary generals stood at the helm of the Allied Expeditionary Force as it plunged into Nazi Germany in an effort to end the Second World War. While the relationship between the United States and Britain, and more specifically the relationship between Generals Dwight Eisenhower and Bernard Montgomery are portrayed as cooperative, smooth, and friendly, personal memoirs of the two men and their close confidants reveal that these myths could not be further from the truth. A debate between the two men, which began as one regarding military strategy, escalated into a full blown feud; this tension was a reflection of the overlaying tensions of a changing Western world.
    [Show full text]