Cooperation or Control? Civil-military coordination during counterinsurgency and reassessing the efficacy of the security committees in Malaya and Palestine Joshua R. Goodman Abstract The importance of civil-military coordination during counterinsurgency has long been a tenet of faith, but civil-military conflict and coordination failures are ubiquitous in modern counterinsurgency, presenting serious obstacles to campaign success. These challenges stem from the complex and often contradictory nature of counterinsurgency, composed of multiple, overlapping operations that have the potential to work at cross purposes. In a principal-agent framework, the challenge of coordination stems from the contradictory preferences of multiple agents responsible for these lines of operation combined with of agency slack, the ability for agents to pursue their preferred courses of action in an uncoordinated manner. Historically, two institutional solutions to promote civil-military cooperation have been articulated, a committee system bringing together multiple agents in forums for joint planning, and a single-commander system that integrates chains of command, granting one agent the authority to direct and monitor other agents at the strategic and operational levels. Principal-agent theory suggests that when the problem is conflicting preferences, the committee system will not produce coordinated campaigns, despite the widespread praise they have received in contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine and the conventional historical wisdom. A comparison of the Malayan Emergency (1950-1952) and the Palestinian Rebellion (1937-1939) demonstrates that these coordinating committees failed to produce civil-military coordination in critical moments, necessitating a shift towards a single-commander system and more intrusive forms of monitoring and control. 1 Introduction The importance of civil-military coordination during counterinsurgency has long been a tenet of faith. In the works of both scholars and practitioners, as well as in military doctrine, the need for close cooperation between civilian and military authorities always ranks among the top best practices.1 Given that counterinsurgency is a complex, multifaceted campaign consisting of a combination of “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions,” the need to coordinate the various lines of operation, as well as the actors tasked to carry them out, seems obvious.2 But despite the unanimity of advice, recent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan were undermined by widespread civil-military conflict. Planning for the Iraq war and its early management were characterized by clashes between Rumsfeld’s Defense Department and Powell/Rice’s State Department, resulting in the State Department’s consistent marginalization.3 While sidelining the administration’s best source of diplomatic and political expertise, 1 For the prescriptive scholarship, see 1) the practitioners: Gwynn, Charles, Imperial Policing, 2nd Edition (London: Macmillan, 1939); Simson, H. J., British Rule and Rebellion (London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1937); Robert Haining, “Report on Military Control in Palestine.” April 1939. WO 191/89, pg 23. British National Archives, Kew Gardens, UK (TNA); David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964); Robert GK Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (London: F. A. Praeger, 1966); Julian Paget, Counterinsurgency Campaigning (London: Faber and Faber, 1967); Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-Keeping (London: Faber and Faber, 1971); Komer, Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy At War: U.S. Performance In The Vietnam Conflict (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1985). 2) the scholars: John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counter-Insurgency (London: Faber, 1969); Thomas Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency 1919-60. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990); Hoffman, Bruce, and Jennifer Taw. “A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency:” RAND, 1992; Robert Egnell, “Civil–Military Coordination for Operational Effectiveness: Towards a Measured Approach,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 24, no. 2 (2013): 237–56; David C. Gompert, John IV Gordon, Adam R. Grissom, David R. Frelinger, Seth G. Jones, Martin C. Libicki, Edward O’Connell, Brooke Stearns Lawson, and Robert E. Hunter. “War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency.” RAND, 2008; David Ucko and Robert Egnell, Counterinsurgency in Crisis: Britain and the Challenges of Modern Warfare.(New York: Columbia University Press, 2013). For field manuals and doctrine, see United States Marine Corps. FMFRP 12-15 Small Wars Manual. (Washington, D.C: Department of the Navy, 1940); Keeping the Peace: Duties in Support of the Civil Power (London: HMSO, 1957); Army Field Manual (UK) Combined Arms Operations - Counter-Insurgency Operations, (London: Ministry of Defence, 2001); Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 2006); British Army Field Manual: Counter-Insurgency Operations, Army Code 71749 (London: Ministry of Defence, 2009). 2 FM 3-24, JP 1-02. 3 Gerald Seib, and Carla Robbins. “Powell-Rumsfeld Feud Is Now Hard to Ignore.” Wall Street Journal, April 25, 2003; Walter LaFeber, “The Rise and Fall of Colin Powell and the Powell Doctrine.” Political Science Quarterly 124, no. 1 (2009): 71–93. 2 Rumsfeld’s leadership also came under fire from within the military. In 2006 an august group of retired generals publicly criticized his management of the war, calling on him to resign.4 Similar tensions marked the relationship between the Obama administration and top officers in Afghanistan, culminating in the sacking of ISAF commander General Stanley McChrystal following an interview with Rolling Stone seen as highly critical of top administration officials.5 These clashes and the challenge they presented to civil-military coordination are not isolated incidents. The history of modern counterinsurgency has been one of civil-military conflict, and cooperation has been the exception rather than the rule.6 During the Boer War in South Africa, High Commissioner Alfred Milner famously clashed with Lord Kitchener, the military commander, over political and military strategy.7 Similar tensions emerged between the British army and the government during the Irish War of Independence, leading to the army chief to vent, “My contempt for their brains, knowledge, pluck and character deepens every day … Whew! Were there ever such ignorant and miscalculating fools?”8 Political-military clashes in France over Algeria culminated in two coup attempts.9 In Vietnam, conflict between the State and Defense Departments as well as between the Joint Chiefs and the Cabinet undermined coordination and planning.10 Persistent civil-military conflict during counterinsurgency campaigns has often resulted in coordination failures, the absence of a developed strategy, and ultimately, campaign stalemate and strategic failure; overcoming these challenges has been central to campaign success. This 4 Thomas Ricks “Rumsfeld Rebuked By Retired Generals,” Washington Post, April 13, 2006; David S. Cloud, Eric Schmitt, and Thom Shanker. “Rumsfeld Faces Growing Revolt by Retired Generals;” The New York Times, April 13, 2006. 5 Michael Hastings, “The Runaway General: The Profile That Brought Down McChrystal,” Rolling Stone, June 22, 2010; Mackubin Thomas Owens, “The McChrystal Affair and U.S. Civil-Military Relations,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2010. 6 Taken here to begin with the British campaign in South Africa in 1899. 7 Keith Surridge, Managing the South African War, 1899-1902: Politicians v Generals (London: Boydell & Brewer Ltd., 1998). 8 Wilson Diary, December 29, 1920. Henry Wilson Papers, 73/1/6. Imperial War Museum, London, UK (IWM). 9 John S. Ambler, The French Army in Politics, 1945-1962. (Ohio State Univ Pr, 1966). 10 Leslie H. Gelb with Richard K. Betts, “The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked,” (Washington DC: Brookings, 1979); H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (New York: Harper Perennial, 1998). 3 raises three pressing questions regarding the link between civil-military conflict and campaign coordination. First, what is the reason for widespread civil-military tension? Second, how does it undermine campaign coordination? And finally, what is the ideal solution? The tendency of these tensions to manifest as interpersonal conflict perhaps suggests the problem is simply poor relationships. However, far from being a clash of personalities, civil- military conflict stems from the complex nature of counterinsurgency itself, arising from the need to reconcile competing military and political objectives, conflicts between political interests and operational imperatives, and the division of labor.11 Civilian and military actors often prefer and pursue their immediate objectives, including, inter alia, battlefield success, local development objectives, or political transformation/preservation, in ways that interfere or undermine one another, reflect organizational priorities at the expense of overarching objectives, and undermine the capacity for joint planning, strategic assessment, and the reconciliation of political interests with realistic operational capacities.12 However, this does not inevitably doom a counterinsurgency campaign. While it is unlikely that these