Operation Market Garden Netherlands 17–25 September 1944

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Operation Market Garden Netherlands 17–25 September 1944 SECOND WORLD WAR TH 60ANNIVERSARY Operation Market Garden Netherlands 17–25 September 1944 ‘The Allies’ attempt to establish a bridgehead into Germany’ No.7 Operation Market Garden NETHERLANDS NETHERLANDS London • Berlin NORTH SEA • BELGIUM GERMANY Paris• NETHERLANDS FRANCE Amsterdam • The Hague • Arnhem • Nijmegen Rotterdam• • KEY FACTS • Eindhoven Arnhem is: GERMANY BELGIUM • Capital of Gelderland province • Situated on the banks of the Neder Rhine FRANCE • 62 miles from Amsterdam • Paris • 10 miles from Nijmegen Cover image: Two American soldiers on Nijmegen bridge watch tanks of the Guards Armoured Division moving north on 22 September. IWM B 10172 OPERATION MARKET GARDEN | 1 Foreword by the Under Secretary of State for Defence and Minister for Veterans, Ivor Caplin MP I see commemoration not only as a way of respecting those who fought, and in many cases gave their lives, but also as a way of educating younger generations about the debt of gratitude we all owe our veterans. These booklets combine education with remembrance, they serve to give a detailed yet lucid account of some of the key Second World War battles and operations. As inspiring as they are informative, I am sure they will be of as much relevance to younger people hearing about these events for the first time, as they are for those of the generation who served. This, the seventh book in the series, commemorates the combined airborne and ground efforts of Operation Market Garden. The Allies’ daring aim was to pave the way for the capture of the Ruhr, the German industrial heartland, by striking a decisive blow that would bring the war in Europe to an end by Christmas 1944. The intention was to capture the bridges on the key routes through Holland to Germany near Arnhem, by inserting three airborne divisions behind enemy lines. However, the German Army provided stubborn resistance that prevented support reaching those who were initially deployed to hold the vital bridges and the crucial high ground that overlooked the lower Rhine with the result that the evacuation of 1st Airborne Division became necessary. In recognition of the freedoms we enjoy today, I remember the ability, valour and heroism of all those involved in the Market Garden operation. The story of their exploits serves as a means to pass on the baton of remembrance to future generations. 2 | OPERATION MARKET GARDEN The background to Operation Market Garden Map showing the advance of Second Army and the objectives of the airborne divisions OPERATION MARKET GARDEN | 3 Market Garden continues to be one of the In trying to halt the Allied advance into France, most controversial Allied operations of the the Germans suffered very heavy casualties Second World War. Much of the emotion can, and, by 3 September 1944, both Paris and perhaps, be explained by the way in which Brussels had been liberated. General Dwight D the British perceive the operation to have been Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied a ‘glorious British failure’ and a singular event Expeditionary Forces, employed a broad-front containing all of the ingredients of a great strategy during the campaign, and the speed tragedy. Market Garden was the brainchild of the Allied advance during the late summer of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, and led many Allied soldiers to think that the war his association with the operation is one of in Europe was as good as won. However, its outstanding attractions to British audiences. Eisenhower’s success during this period belied Seen by even his most staunch supporters as a number of growing problems that had to be one of the darkest stains on his military record, sorted out with some urgency. These problems, the operation has come to overshadow many ironically, were to a very large extent caused of Montgomery’s European successes. The by the success of the Allied advance across question of Montgomery’s reputation, when France and Belgium – as Montgomery’s 21st combined with the issues surrounding the Army Group, led by Second British Army, was romance of a bold operation involving ground finding out. troops racing against time in order to relieve the beleaguered airborne forces of three nations, KEY FACTS goes some way towards explaining why the episode has proved so irresistible to the close List of commanders attention of academics, soldiers and the media, Supreme Allied Commander and continues to enthral the British public. Gen D Eisenhower 2Ist Army Group – FM B Montgomery The Battle of Normandy was a disaster for Second British Army – Lt-Gen M Dempsey Adolf Hitler and the German Military Command. XXX Corps – Lt-Gen B Horrocks IWM B 5337 XII Corps – Lt-Gen N Ritchie VIII Corps – Lt-Gen R O’Connor 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division Maj-Gen I Thomas 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division Maj-Gen D Graham Guards Armoured Division Maj-Gen A Adair First Allied Airborne Army – Lt-Gen L Brereton I British Airborne Corps – Lt-Gen F Browning I0Ist US Airborne Division Maj-Gen M Taylor 82nd US Airborne Division Brig-Gen J Gavin Ist British Airborne Division Maj-Gen R Urquhart Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, the Ist Polish Parachute Brigade commander of British 21st Army Group Maj-Gen S Sosabowski 4 | OPERATION MARKET GARDEN Lieutenant-General Sir Brian Horrocks’ XXX Britain, to get Second Army moving again. Corps, the spearhead of Second Army, was Operation Market Garden sought to insert three advancing at an amazing rate of 50 miles airborne divisions behind enemy lines to seize a day in late August, a rate of advance a number of vital bridges in the Netherlands that just could not be sustained with supplies over which Second Army would advance: the having to be brought up from the Normandy American 101st Airborne Division (‘Screaming beaches some 300 miles to the rear. Halting Eagles’) around Eindhoven; the American 82nd for resupply, however, would have given the Airborne Division (‘All American’) around Germans exactly the sort of breathing space Nijmegen; and the British 1st Airborne Division that they required to reorganise themselves, with the attached 1st Polish Independent a situation that Montgomery thought could Parachute Brigade around Arnhem. The aim be avoided if Eisenhower allowed a narrow- was to pave the way for the capture of the Ruhr, fronted thrust by 21st Army Group to crack Germany’s industrial heartland, and to end the open the German front before a rapid advance war in Europe in just a few months. Planning to Berlin. Montgomery continually badgered started immediately on 10 September; the Eisenhower for a reorientation in strategy from operation was to take place just seven days later. mid-August onwards, but to no avail, and on 4 September Second Army’s advance ground The Germans facing this Allied onslaught were to a halt around Antwerp for want of supplies. Field Marshal Walther Model’s German Army Group B. It was Model’s job to turn chaotic Nevertheless, six days after this loss of Allied withdrawal into capable defence – and to do momentum, Eisenhower finally agreed to some it quickly. Under his command, Model used the of Montgomery’s wishes and to a scheme that meagre forces of Colonel-General Kurt Student’s aimed to use Lieutenant-General Lewis Brereton’s First Parachute Army and General Gustav von First Allied Airborne Army, sitting in reserve in Zangen’s Fifteenth Army to defend up to IWM B 9461 XXX Corps advancing through a badly-damaged French village in August 1944 OPERATION MARKET GARDEN | 5 IWM HU 72434 strengths and dispositions. Although not privy to Ultra intelligence, First Allied Airborne Army did know of the existence of II SS Panzer Corps at Arnhem and that it was very weak. However, although Operation Market Garden commanders did not necessarily lack information about the enemy, many did underestimate what the enemy was still capable of achieving. Model had created order out of disorder very quickly and, faced with defenders of the calibre of Student and Bittrich, Allied optimism was not well founded. KEY FACTS A British airborne division consisted of 12,416 officers and men. They were armed with: •2942 pistols and revolvers •7171 rifles •6504 Sten guns The commander of I British Airborne Corps, •966 Bren guns Lt-Gen Frederick Browning, and Brig-Gen James Gavin, commander of 82nd US Airborne Division, •46 Vickers machine guns just outside Groesbeek •474 2-inch mortars •56 3-inch mortars •5 4.2-inch mortars Nijmegen, while Kampfgruppe (battle group) •392 PIATs ‘von Tettau’ and Lieutenant-General Willi Bittrich’s II SS Panzer Corps, specialists in defence against •38 flamethrowers airborne landings, were located around Arnhem. •23 20mm cannon The two battered armoured divisions that made •27 75mm Pack Howitzers up Bittrich’s II SS Panzer Corps, 9th SS Panzer •84 6-pounder anti-tank guns, and Division and 10th SS Armoured Division, •16 17-pounder anti-tank guns amounted to no more than 3000 men each and had only about 12 functioning tanks between them. As a consequence, they were Major-General Robert ‘Roy’ Urquhart, the reconfigured as SS-Kampfgruppe ‘Hohenstauffen’ commander of British 1st Airborne Division, and SS-Kampfgruppe ‘Frundsberg’ respectively was well aware that his troops would need (a ‘Kampfgruppe’ or ‘battle group’ being an speed and surprise if they were to attain their improvised formation smaller than a division). objectives, and had more reasons than most to be worried about the enemy’s potential. The Allies were aware of German weaknesses, His division, which had never fought together although the euphoria of their speedy advance before, was being inserted some 64 miles and the amount of information flowing into behind enemy lines in daylight and up to various headquarters did tend to muddy the 8 miles from their objectives on the lower intelligence waters.
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