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JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, 23 March 2012

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JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, 23 March 2012 Joint Publication 3-01 T OF THE N A E W E ' L L I S D E F E R H N D M T M T Y R • A P A E C D I U • R N E I T M E A D F S O TAT E S Countering Air and Missile Threats 21 April 2017 PREFACE 1. Scope This publication provides doctrine for joint operations to counter air and missile threats. 2. Purpose This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives. 3. Application a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies. b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the US, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine. For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: KEVIN D. SCOTT Vice Admiral, USN Director, Joint Force Development i Preface Intentionally Blank ii JP 3-01 SUMMARY OF CHANGES REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-01 DATED 23 MARCH 2012 Discusses the relationship between counterair and integrated air and missile defense. Modifies counterair description and definition to place focus on gaining and maintaining control of the air to meet joint force commander objectives. Discusses theater and global aspects of integrated air and missile defense. Incorporates global missile defense into main body of document (eliminates appendix). Discusses global strike in the context of countering air and missile threats. Modifies definition of global missile defense (eliminates term global ballistic missile defense). Discusses counter-rockets, artillery, and mortars. Combines selected air defense and ballistic missile defense discussions under air and missile defense. Expands definitions of weapons engagement zones, missile engagement zones, and joint engagement zones to include provisions for ballistic missiles. Discusses cyberspace operations support to countering air and missile threats. Consolidates discussion of identification. Discusses countering unmanned aircraft systems. Modifies terms, definitions, and acronyms. iii Summary of Changes Intentionally Blank iv JP 3-01 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... ix CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION General ........................................................................................................................ I-1 Air and Missile Threats ............................................................................................... I-1 Counterair ................................................................................................................... I-3 Supporting Homeland Defense ................................................................................... I-8 Global Operations ....................................................................................................... I-9 Integrated Air and Missile Defense .......................................................................... I-10 The Relationship Between Counterair and Integrated Air and Missile Defense ...... I-11 CHAPTER II COMMAND AND CONTROL General .......................................................................................................................II-1 Section A. Command Relationships and Responsibilities ..............................................II-1 Command Relationships ............................................................................................II-1 Support Relationships ................................................................................................II-1 Joint Force Commander .............................................................................................II-2 Component Commanders...........................................................................................II-4 Joint Force Air Component Commander ...................................................................II-8 Area Air Defense Commander.................................................................................II-10 Deputy Area Air Defense Commander ....................................................................II-12 Regional and Sector Air Defense Commanders ......................................................II-12 Airspace Control Authority......................................................................................II-15 Global Command Relationships Considerations .....................................................II-15 Section B. Command Relationships .............................................................................II-17 General .....................................................................................................................II-17 Multinational Command Relationships ...................................................................II-17 Organization .............................................................................................................II-18 Section C. Command and Control Systems and Functions ..........................................II-19 General .....................................................................................................................II-19 Requirements, Infrastructure, and Resources ..........................................................II-20 Situational Awareness ..............................................................................................II-26 Battle Management ..................................................................................................II-27 v Table of Contents CHAPTER III PLANNING General ..................................................................................................................... III-1 Section A. Intelligence Preparation .............................................................................. III-1 General ..................................................................................................................... III-1 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace .............................................................. III-2 Section B. Airspace Control Considerations ................................................................ III-4 General ..................................................................................................................... III-4 Planning and Coordination Requirements ............................................................... III-5 Coordination Measures ............................................................................................ III-8 Other Considerations ............................................................................................... III-8 Section C. Rules of Engagement/Rules for the Use of Force ....................................... III-9 General ..................................................................................................................... III-9 Criteria ................................................................................................................... III-10 Planning ................................................................................................................. III-11 Section D. Identification ............................................................................................. III-12 General ................................................................................................................... III-12 Methods of Identification ....................................................................................... III-12 Identification, Commit, and Engagement Authorities ........................................... III-13 Combat Identification ............................................................................................ III-14 Multinational Identification Considerations .........................................................
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