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ON FOREIGN REPORT RELATIONS ecfr.eu WHAT EUROPEANS REALLY WANT: FIVE MYTHS DEBUNKED

Ivan Krastev, Mark Leonard & Susi Dennison

“Populists are whipping up a storm as faces lurch to the right”; “Explained: the rise and rise of populism in Europe”. Headlines about the European SUMMARY Parliament election in scream that 2019 is set to • The 2019 election will be be Act Three in the Donald Trump and drama, radically different from the tales in the headlines: this time across the . They warn of it will not be a referendum on migration. a grand showdown between those who believe in an • New ECFR/YouGov research reveals huge open Europe and those who believe in closed national fluidity in current voting intentions: 70 percent societies, with migration as the key mobilising issue. of Europeans certain to vote are yet to make their choice. Nearly 100m swing voters are up for grabs. But are the headline-writers correct? Is this really • The big divide is not ‘open Europe’ versus what is brewing? New research by the European ‘closed nation states’ but between status quo Council on Foreign Relations and YouGov suggests not. and change. Record numbers of people now support the EU – and even Eurosceptic parties It is true that the last decade has seen a splintering have repositioned themselves. of national party systems across the EU. • There is no single issue on voters’ minds; indeed, Anti-system parties have grown in strength at many are more worried about emigration than almost every national election, campaigning on the immigration. And many are more concerned promise to give voice to those the current system about: Islamic radicalism (87m, 22 percent does not represent. Nine governments in Europe of the EU voting population); the rise of now include anti-European parties. And, after the nationalism (45m, 11 percent); and the economy forthcoming European Parliament election, at least (63m, 16 percent). Just under 59m highlight one-third of parliamentarians are projected to come from migration as one of the top threats to Europe: anti-European parties. Were they to form a single bloc, only 15 percent of the EU voting population. they would be the largest in the parliament and would • These findings shed light on the issues that will easily outnumber either the Christian Democrat European decide Europeans’ votes and the battlegrounds People’s Party or the Socialists & Democrats group. that moderate mainstream politics can engage them on. Crucially, voters right now are ready It is often said that generals are always preparing to to move in many different directions – so fight the last war. As Europe’s political parties kick off even last-minute events could shape the final their campaigns for the European Parliament election, make-up of the European Parliament. it does indeed appear that their strategies are informed by lessons learned from recent votes they have observed. April 2019 2 ECFR/282 April 2019 www.ecfr.eu WHAT EUROPEANS REALLY WANT: FIVE MYTHS DEBUNKED concerns reallyare–notwhattheyimaginethemtobe. thesewhat understand to need they successfully, urgently, toaddressvoters’ concerns. But, todoso adapt,should and can parties Mainstream change. the farleftorright–buttheyareseeking survey showsthatvotersarenotseekingchangefrom election basedonthesemythsarelikelytofail. The wrong. PoliticianswhofighttheEuropeanParliament YouGov demonstratesthatalltheseassumptionsare But alarge-scaleopinionsurvey fromECFRand this; pro-Europeanpartiesaremobilisingtocounterit. the Trumpianrevolution. Anti-Europeanpartieshail Bannon –fosteredtheideaofaEuropeanstaging coordinated byformerUSpresidentialadviser Steve an internationalallianceofEuroscepticparties of theMovement–Europe arrival to noisy The affair thathasnotransnationalorpan-Europeanaspects. is boundtobeapredominantlynational,low-turnout values. Finally,thereisalingeringmyththatthevote eastern EuropeandawesternthatsupportsEU – ofagrowingsplitbetweenanilliberal, anti-migration more walls.Orbanisalsoresponsibleforthefourthmyth migration, resultinginoffersfrompoliticianstobuild European Parliamentelectionwillbeareferendumon strength ofOrbanhasengenderedtheideathat the continuingthis myth.Thirdly, of the emergence of theFrenchpresidentialelectionhascontributedto closed Europe.Macron’s experienceinthesecondround and nationalists–betweenadvocatesofanopenor divide isgivingwaytoasplitbetweenpro-Europeans to tribes.Thesecondmythisthattheoldleft-right partiesfrom years four past the in shifted have States, as withthoseintheUnitedKingdomand tribal politics: thatcontinentalEuropeanpolitics, This firstisthatthiselectionrepresentsadescentinto the shapeofEuropeanpoliticsaredefiningdebate. generally. Asaresult, fivehighlymisleadingideasabout coloured theirexpectationsandthoseoftheelitemore Brexit, Trump,Viktor Orban, andEmmanuelMacronhave 2 ,wheretheelectorate isdistinctlypolarised,theexception tothis. Among million. Bishop, MarinerBooks,2004. 97 the up 1 make who people these is – anditparty another might switchto they they say preference voting are swingvoterswhohave not decidedontheirchoice: a have who those of percent 70 But probably vote. 30-50 percentoftheseundecidedswill electors donothaveanypreferenceyet; andbetween so unsurprising.Equally,between15-30percentofall to likely less turn outintheEuropeanParliamentelection. Sofar, are percent 57 other The vote. definitely The pollshowsthatonly43percentofvoterswill voters. undecided and confused these of million 97 than best singleindicatorofwhetherUKcitizensarepro-Brexit. support forthedeathpenaltyhasbeenidentifiedas and demographicdifferencesarereinforcedbyculture: from non-graduates. AsintheUS, thesegeographic young fromold, townsfromcities, and, aboveall, graduates the tribaldivisionsoverBrexitthatsplitnorthfromsouth, party splitislessimportantformanypeoplethansomeof In theUK, followingtheBrexitreferendum, theleft-right partisan mediaoutletstheyrelyuponforinformation. access todifferentfactsthatareproducedbythe groups aredividednotjustbytheirviews–theyhave work, marry,onlywithpeoplelikethemselves. involves peoplemovingintoparallelworldsthatpray, and bluevotershavebeenshapedbya“bigsort”that on identity. IntheUS, tribaldividesbetweenred parties basedonclassandtowardsnewtribes the fearthatpeopleareflowingawayfrommainstream Recent politicaleventsintheUSandUKhaveheightened for grabs The truth:97millionvotersare up becoming tribal Myth 1:Europe’s politicsare not yet made uptheir minds. not yet feature ofthepoliticallandscapeisvolatility: votershave In fact, theECFR/YouGovpollrevealsthatdefining vote intheupcomingEuropeanParliamentelection. help muchinpredictinghowpeopleareplanningto age, levelofeducation, leftandright, andreligion– elections andvotesintheUSUK–geography, of theclassicindicatorsthathavedefinedtribesinrecent yet tribal.Theresearchdemonstratesthatnone a complexandshiftingwhirlpool, theyarenot show that,whileEuropeansocietiesarecurrently set outtoidentifythetribesofEurope. Ourfindings So, afterallthetalkoftribesinUSandUK, we will nowshapepoliticsacrossEurope. trendsthat these assume to easy It wouldbe TheBigSort:WhytheClusteringofLike-Minded AmericaisTearingusApart, 2 Andtherearenofewer 1 These Bill those who are planning to turn out in countries such the usual rules for predicting how voters are likely to as , , , and , 6-7 behave no longer apply. Whereas vote choice and turnout percent of mainstream party voters are tempted by are usually analysed as a function of socio-demographic an anti-European party. In , this is as high as 9 factors, the upcoming election is driven more by issues. percent. As the chart overleaf shows, even venerable The probability of turning out in the election depends parties such as the Christian Democratic Union and the on what issues you care about, and there is also strong Social in Germany can only count on evidence for issue-based voting. But it is not only the 8.6 percent and 3.4 percent of German voters position that leaders take on issues that matters; it is respectively as a solid base. And this plays both ways: also their leadership and personalities, and the trust 6 percent of anti-European voters across Europe that people have in them. In other words: do leaders are tempted by the mainstream (see overleaf). appear to embody the values and feelings of voters? Electoral movement is thus not just in one direction, Simply put, the rules of the election game have evolved. but in all directions among the very same people.

Political analyst Gilles Finchelstein has explored how politics have shifted in France, from a situation in which clearly organised political parties represented social structures to one that reflected the realities of the post-cold war period.3 In that period, politics became “liquid”, as society itself became more complex and a growing group of voters turned into swing voters, switching their support between mainstream parties in elections. However, politics today have now gone a stage further and entered the “gaseous era”, according to Finchelstein. It is a shapeless agglomeration of unpredictable, atomised units that can come together momentarily to form compounds before disappearing once again into the ether. As in other gaseous conditions, it can be toxic or explosive and is very difficult for parties and leaders to get under control.

Our research shows that, in this gaseous era of politics,

3 See, for example, Piège d’identité, by Gilles Finchelstein, Fayard, 2016. 3 4 ECFR/282 April 2019 www.ecfr.eu WHAT EUROPEANS REALLY WANT: FIVE MYTHS DEBUNKED But the ECFR/YouGov poll shows that the core divide in Myth 2: The European election will EU countries will not be one that pits supporters of the EU be a clash between those who against nationalists, as the chart below suggests. Instead, believe in (open) Europe and those for the majority of citizens, this is not a choice they feel the who believe in the (closed) nation need to make: for them, being European is as important state as their national identity. Only 25 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement that their European identity The truth: What matters is for is as important to them as their national identity. Further parties to be agents of change analysis is needed to dig into the extent to which this identification is with the European project or is rooted in The EU risks slipping into a populist-nationalist an ethno-religious definition of being European. But it “nightmare” unless centrists win greater public backing shows that most EU citizens believe European and national for the European cause: such was the warning issued by identities to be complementary rather than in conflict. the leader of the European Parliament liberal group, . This is the mirror image of what the far right Nationalist parties have learned this lesson as well. In the have argued as they portray the elections as a battle between last few months, most of them have tried to reposition globalists and nationalists. On either side, pro-Europeans themselves on Europe and abandoned their previously and anti-Europeans mount strikingly similar arguments. expressed desire to take their countries out of the . This is not just true of the Rassemblement National but also of the The contest that pitted the pro-European Macron against League and the Five Star Movement in . Their goal is not Marine Le Pen, the anti-European leader of Rassemblement to appear anti-European but rather to offer a refoundation National, in the second round of the French presidential of Europe – one that will allow countries to resist migration election has contributed to this sentiment. In an electrifying and reclaim sovereignty from the institutions in . It debate ahead of that poll, Macron broke with the timidity allows them to avoid alienating the pro-European majority, of pro-Europeans and directly challenged Le Pen on but at the same time to portray themselves as champions her severe and her advocacy of France of change rather than nostalgic defenders of the status quo. quitting the euro. This put the National Front leader on the back foot. Macron’s camp sees that confrontation The poll shows that people have come to regard the EU as as the critical moment when his victory became certain. part of their system of government, with some seeing it as

5 6 ECFR/282 April 2019 www.ecfr.eu WHAT EUROPEANS REALLY WANT: FIVE MYTHS DEBUNKED some settings.InDenmark, menaccountfor64percentofthisgroup;inAustria, 62percent.However, Male/female: Average age: political systemworksbutEurope’s doesnot,constituting14percentoftheEUelectorate. this grouphavethesameaverageincomeasthoseinHouseofStark. Other definingcharacteristics: Where found: Male/female: Average age: European andnationalpoliticalsystems,theyconstitute38percentoftheEUelectorate. Other definingcharacteristics: , Hungary, andtheCzechRepublic. Where found: Male/female: Average age: systems basicallywork,theyconstitute24percentoftheEUelectorate. Where found: in ItalyandHungary, thegrouphasstrongfemalerepresentation. national systemisbroken,constituting24percentoftheEUelectorate. The Daeneryses The Sparrows The HouseofStark The Free Folk are largelymadeupofMillennialsandGenerationX. Other definingcharacteristics: Where found: ,theNetherlands,andSweden. Male/female: Average age: The European electorate:Fourgroups highconcentrationsinAustria, Denmark,andItaly. strongestinFrance,Greece,andItaly. the oldestgroupoverall,asisespeciallyclearamong theengagedvotersinthisgroup. aretheyoungestgroupofall,withanaverageage41. disengaged Daeneryses most mobilisedSparrowsareolderthan50. nearing 50;butmanyyoungermembersoftheHouseStarkarenotplanningtovote. this group is fairly evenly balanced between men and women, but men predominate in slightly morewomenthanmen,andsignificantlyfemaleinFranceItaly. majority-male, butfairlyrepresentativeofmenandwomen. highest concentrationsinHungary, Poland, ,,andSpain. this groupisfairlyevenlybalanced,butwithmorefemalerepresentationinAustria, greatest representationinGermany, Denmark,andSweden;canalsobefoundin (Nationalist Eurosceptics) (the ‘GiletsJaunes’) (the Pro-European LeftBehind) (the ‘SystemBelievers’) comfortably off, usuallywithanupper-secondary comfortablyoff, educationormore. The Daeneryses have the lowest average income of all the groups, and The Daeneryses Sparrows areneitherleft-wingnorright-wing;thedisengagedvotersin : Desperaterevolutionarieswhohavelostfaithinboththe : NationalistEuroscepticswhofeelthattheircountry’s – – – : Believing thatboththeEuropeanandnational : : ConvincedEuropeanswhofeelthattheir a constraint on that system’s ability to deliver and others Game of Thrones, whose bottom-up political as a check on excesses and failures. But this division does movement uses violence to humble the corrupt not fit with the stereotype of a pro-European west and elites who have controlled political life for centuries. an anti-European east. When asked about the perceived • “The Daeneryses” (the Pro-European Left consequences of EU membership, Poland, Hungary, and Behind). Like Daenerys Targaryen, mother of Romania were (along with ) the countries with dragons, who frees slaves, these people wish to liberate the strongest responses, saying that EU membership Europeans from their shackles in restrictive nation protects against the excesses and failures of national states with a positive international vision; these government. The bottom line is that the real division is people are looking for salvation in a transnational not between pro- and anti-Europeans but rather comes project. They think that their national systems are from how people feel about their political systems. broken and look to a Brussels political system they still believe in to cure their country of its disease. At this time of uncertainty, a spectre is haunting European • “The Free Folk” (Nationalist Eurosceptics). electoral politics: the yellow peril. In the late nineteenth These people think that the EU is a dangerous century, the Russian sociologist Jacques Novikov coined illusion that undermines national sovereignty. They the term “yellow peril” to conjure a fear of . But for want to return to self-governing member states. European leaders, the yellow peril is not about invaders In this sense, they echo the fiercely independent from China – it is about protesters wearing yellow vests. Free Folk, who value self-reliance over idealistic attempts to unite humanity or the grandiose They have become the new face of political insurgency alliance-building of other political leaders. and anger. Though their direct impact on the upcoming election is as yet unclear, they have captured the Cross-referencing the four groups with the parties imagination of frustrated voters across Europe and have their members say they are interested in supporting encouraged the fringes of the centre to vote more radically. provides the best predictor of how voters assess Rather than comprising a stable, predictable electoral some of the key challenges facing Europe today. community of citizens who are organised into parties, the European political system has descended into an As the tables overleaf demonstrate, the core divide is not one unpredictable battleground of constantly shifting alliances of wanting either an open Europe or a closed nation state, but between groupings that come together momentarily before between voters who think that the system is broken and those who blowing up again afterwards. Some groupings are formed by think the status quo still basically works. France and Denmark people coming together from below and others are mobilised are polar opposites in this respect – 69 percent of people in by strong leaders, operating according to different rules and France think both the national and the European systems are cultures. In this brutal contest for influence, many are willing broken, while 55 percent in Denmark think both systems work to use underhand tactics and conspiracy theories to gain the well. This dynamic take has a highly local flavour, one which does advantage. In this sense, European politics look less like the not necessarily result in a shift against mainstream parties. In ideals of Athenian democracy and more like Game of Thrones. countries where anti-Europeans are in power, they are the status quo – but, in countries where they are in opposition, they have Through analysis of our survey of attitudes to significant influence. However, the key lesson from the study is whether the political system works well at the that success in this election depends on the ability to position national and European levels, we have identified oneself as a credible agent of change. It is about offering good four big groups in the European electorate: positions on issues people care about. But equally important is whether voters trust politicians to bring about this change. • “House of Stark” (the System Believers). This is the complacent class who believe that the system still works at both a national and a European level. For them, politics continue to operate by the usual rules. By voting, they can have their voice heard and influence their future. In Game of Thrones, the House of Stark continues to be bound by the traditional norms and customs – even as the House of Lannister and other families turn these rules on their heads • “The Sparrows” (the Gilets Jaunes). These people have given up hope in both their national political systems and in the EU, because they think that all political systems are broken and cannot see how anything good can come of them. The only solution, therefore, is revolution – a popular uprising to cleanse society and start again. This is the vision of the High Sparrow in 7 8 ECFR/282 April 2019 www.ecfr.eu WHAT EUROPEANS REALLY WANT: FIVE MYTHS DEBUNKED polled do not regard it as one of the top two issues facing Myth 3: This will be a referendum their country (see overleaf). Hungary is the only country on migration where immigration is still felt to be the number one threat to the EU. This is little wonder given the endless stream The truth: Voters have a wider mix of propaganda that Orban puts out through his state- of issues on their minds controlled media. But in every other one of the 14 countries polled one of at least five other themes emerged that are Bannon, Orban, and League leader Matteo Salvini equally, if not more, important to Europeans. Rather have tried to turn the election into a referendum on than being a referendum on migration, this election will migration, mobilising a sovereigntist coalition to dismantle see European voters make up their minds on six thematic the EU from inside. They think that the 2015 migration European election issues – with migration not among them. crisis upended European politics, and that this was the beginning of a permanent change, putting mainstream The poll reveals that Europeans fear Islamic radicalism parties on the defensive and going to the heart of than any other threat. But this does not automatically European insecurity about identity. They are hoping for mean that a political party adopting an anti-migration an increase in migration pressure in the coming weeks posture will sweep up such voters: Islamic radicalism is that will shift the balance of the discussion in their favour. a far greater preoccupation among voters who align with centre and centre-right parties than among anti-system But the study findings show that the world of 2019 parties, which are far more concerned about migration is radically different to that of 2015. The poll asked and the number people arriving in Europe. Those who voters what they think the biggest threats to the oppose migration, meanwhile, are more likely to support EU are; what issues are of biggest concern to them; far-right parties such as Alternative für Deutschland and what would constitute a good election result. (AfD), Rassemblement National, and the (see chart on page 11). Notably, Islamic radicalism The campaign for a ‘fortress Europe’ will is the highest concern for voters who identify as Catholic not be winning strategy, for three reasons. or Protestant – implying the importance of integration and social cohesion policies as a response for these voters – Firstly, migration is not a defining issue. The survey results whereas nationalism is the largest concern among atheists. show that a majority of people in every single country

9 10 ECFR/282 April 2019 www.ecfr.eu WHAT EUROPEANS REALLY WANT: FIVE MYTHS DEBUNKED 11 12 ECFR/282 April 2019 www.ecfr.eu WHAT EUROPEANS REALLY WANT: FIVE MYTHS DEBUNKED still fears the inflow of outsiders, majorities inGreece, majorities outsiders, of inflow the fears still While northern Europe map opposite). and western (see in thenationalpopulation toadecline emigration leading worry about who those and countries immigration intheir significant who worrypredominantlyabout those divide between a revealed research our Indeed, immigration. “migration”withemigrationrather than likely associated respondents countries, it. Insome talk about they when things different radically mean issue a top migration as see who those even year’s election: this at turnout driver of key work asa to reason migrationisunlikely There isasecond Poland,andRomania. Republic, Czech Denmark, the countries. Finally,RussiaisaleadingconcerninSweden, majorities acrossall 14 spectacular polled change issue, climate it asastandalone about asked when threats amongothers.But, this issueasoneoftwotop cited Danes Only change. climate is surprise big One is performingwell. of votersthinktheireconomy apart fromDenmark and Germany,aminority prominent issue.Ineverymemberstate, is ahugely economy and Slovakia, In Italy,Romania, the Greece, turn out. to are likely say they voters who important to Poland, andSpain.Nationalismisespecially , to –migrationin Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, the in importance equal as moreimportantthan–oratleast this Voters see EU. the destroy nationalism will that fear the migration is out is squeezing that Another importantissue It is also a reflection of the fact that allmainstream that fact borders. open advocates border –andnoneofthem the of reflection EU’s on the stronger controls advocate now parties a also is It borders. uncontrolled than Brexit of chaos the by occupied be to more likely are now screens arrivals: of television since numbers in the 2015. collapse The mostobviousoneisthe inpolitics bigchanges the of some reflect may This change. orclimate population, ageing economy, the from other fearsasadriver, such asworriesaboutthe stand out not particularly chart below).Migrationdoes areas ofconcern, policy suchasfearofnationalism(see is muchlessofadriver of willingnesstovotethanother Crucially, ouranalysisshowsthatconcernaboutmigration after theBerlinWallfell. decades – justthree themselves for migration wall anew readytocreate behind seem left Those decade. last the in country their left has citizens five isstriking. for self-imprisonment In desire Romania, one in a travel, such free and promoting borders down tearing on itself that prides chart bottom-right).In a Europe (see of time leave forlongperiods to own citizens for their illegal inall make it to governments their like would countries these majorities double-digit that finding spectacular the more worriedabouttheircitizensleaving. This leads to and Romaniaaremuch Italy, Spain,Hungary,Poland, But they need to go beyond talking about border controls to border controls talking about beyond go to need they But issues. other on to listened be to right earning the of part be will on this credible something on migration–saying be silent should not meanthatmainstreamparties This does 13 14 ECFR/282 April 2019 www.ecfr.eu WHAT EUROPEANS REALLY WANT: FIVE MYTHS DEBUNKED to pack his bags and permanently return to the US. the return to and permanently bags pack his to to OrbanandSalvini – andmightevenconvinceBannon blow ultimate the be alike. Thatwould immigration and on emigration focused in countries normalise politics help could it tackling but challenge, a huge This is asquestionsofcitizenshipandlanguage. as well anxiety, policing,andintelligence, cultural that addresses and tonationalandregionaldifferences, that issensitive migrants of integration the and security around an agenda develop countries. Theyshould many European affecting brain with fearofIslamicradicalismandthe drain engage just citizens in the west who are preoccupied with suchwith preoccupied are who west the in citizens just is brokendownbymemberstate,itnomeans respectively (seemaponpage16).However, whenthis top answersacrossEurope, at20percentand18 theamong were democracy, and law of rule the of and to fallaparttomorrow, theprotectionofhumanrights, When askedwhatthegreatestlosswouldbewereEU polling showsthatthissupposeddivisiondoesnotexist. YouGov’sEurope. ECFR’s and than thoseinwestern values setoutinArticleTwooftheTreatiesEU member statesarefundamentallylessfavourabletothe Underlying thiswasanenduringmyththateastern a populistmarchacrosscentralandeasternEurope. haltingfor her acclaimed and lawyer anti-corruption president inMarch2019portrayedherasaprogressive Reportage onZuzanaCaputova’selectionasSlovakia’s and within,northsouth important differences between, homogeneous, andthere are The truth:Eastandwestare not is betweeneastandwest Myth 4:ThedividinglineinEurope in Hungary and 32 percent in Romania, comparedRomania, in percent 32 and Hungary in protection ofhumanrights, thefigureswere33percent problem, comparedtojust11percentinFrance. Onthe of protectiondemocracyandrulelawasamajor issues. Thirty-threepercentofHungarianssawtheloss to just 17 percent in Germany, 16 percent in Italy, 15 average in Austria, the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, percent in France, and 13 percent in the Netherlands. Italy, Slovakia, and . It was below average in Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, EU citizens in newer member states also seem less wary and Spain. And it was exactly the average, at 14 percent, than their counterparts in older ones about the EU as in Denmark. So, there is no clear pattern indicating a a constraining force. This is perhaps explained by high heightened preoccupation with migration in eastern levels of mistrust in corrupt national elites and weak Europe. That said, citizens in central and eastern Europe national institutions in the east – meaning that they rate are far more concerned about corruption in their country the EU higher by comparison. EU financial transfers may than they are about migration. The differences in Poland also play a role. And, when asked about the perceived and Slovakia were particularly stark: 19 percent of Poles consequences of EU membership, voters in Poland, name corruption, and just 7 percent migration, as a top Hungary, and Romania (along with Spain) were the most threat. In Slovakia, 37 percent cite corruption as their forceful in saying that EU membership protected against greatest worry and just 2 percent opt for migration. the excesses and failures of national governments (see chart on page 14). In other countries – including France, The data show that the west is not homogeneous either. Italy, Germany, and Sweden – the most common responses There is a fairly significant divide between southern were that the EU constrained national governments and northern member states in their concerns about the in doing what is best for its citizens. Citizens from the world. The question of whether states are more concerned same group of states, along with those from Slovakia about immigration or emigration clearly shows this. and Greece, also indicated that they are more likely to trust in the European Parliament to look after their There are many more states that are preoccupied with interests than they are in their national governments. emigration in the south of the EU than other regions, while those in the north are more concerned about As the political crisis in the EU peaked from 2015, immigration than most others. Respondents in Spain, growing coordination between Visegrad states (the Czech Italy, and Greece all expressed stronger concerns about Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) contributed to fellow nationals leaving their country than they did about an image of these central and eastern European countries new arrivals; this was most pronounced in Greece, at 28 as more closed to newcomers, and less supportive of percent to 7 percent. Meanwhile, the opposite is true in international commitments to protect refugees, than Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands (the starkest those in the west of the EU. In fact, the survey suggests that difference was in the Netherlands, with 6 percent this image does not have a strong underpinning either. concerned about emigration and 55 percent about immigration). In general, countries in the south and When asked about the biggest threats facing the EU, east of the EU fear both immigration and emigration; the response level for “migration” was above the EU countries in the north and the west tend to fear neither.

15 16 ECFR/282 April 2019 www.ecfr.eu WHAT EUROPEANS REALLY WANT: FIVE MYTHS DEBUNKED would refoundEuropeonthebasisofilliberalvalues. integration fromtheinside.Intheirgrandvisions, they institutions inBrusselssothattheycanreverse European more mainstreamforces. Theyseektocapturethe stances, aimingtoprovideapowerfulalternative to alliance thatmarriesanti-austerityandanti-migration and Salviniarestrivingtobuildapan-Europeanpopulist that hasdisruptedpoliticsacrosstheAtlantic. Orban provide aEuropeananswertotheTrumpianrevolution and theextremerightbehindpopulistleaders, andto Orban andSalviniinhisquest tounitetheextremeleft is helpingits predecessors.ThisispartlybecauseBannon transnational, evenpan-European, elementthananyof Europe –theupcomingelectionpromisestohaveagreater no While therearelotsofnationaldynamicsatplay–and national politicians. to a message deliver to voters use that elections In are low-turnout words, other they national elections”. “second-order of tag carried the have long elections their name,European Despite Parliament election truly transnationalEuropean The truth:Thiscouldbethefirst exclusively national Myth 5: All European elections are Spitzenkandidat hasachievedrecognitionacross the threat of nationalism to the EU’s future among people EU’s future threat ofnationalismtothe the In many memberstates,therearehighlevelsofconcernabout action. and requirescollective nationstate the beyond goes that as anissue it recognise they because perhaps EU, the views of to havemoreoptimistic tend change climate about who worry that people voters. Thedatasuggest pro-European to beimportantinmobilising potential has the This issue change. in tacklingclimate role EU’s the appreciate and Austria, Netherlands with the EU members, together Scandinavian three US andChina. Finally, citizensofthe the counter to ability EU’s Denmark, and Italyvaluethe their concerns:votersinFrance,Germany,Austria,Spain, rights asvital. But thereisalsoagreatpowerdimensionto democracy, the ruleoflaw,andhuman EU’s roleinprotecting the Romania see Hungary, Poland,and as such in countries above, voters map below).Asnoted single currency(see the as to to othercountries, and totradeacrossborders–aswell to livein, work in, freedom single marketand travel –the the relating to on issues concern centres exist, inmostcountries to ceased EU be ifthe loss would biggest When askedwhatthe EU. the survival of the about voters concerned pro-European of a counter-mobilisation to lead also could movement this of threat The chaos. Moreover, even people who have come to termswith have come who chaos. Moreover,evenpeople the UKintothisself-imposed member statewantstofollow – andnoother is akeyfactorin the backdroptothiselection Brexit saga the who arelikelytovote.Thisispartlybecause

17 18 ECFR/282 April 2019 www.ecfr.eu WHAT EUROPEANS REALLY WANT: FIVE MYTHS DEBUNKED member state could affect the election result in another result election the affect could state member May 2019in oneEU of the vote:morethanever,anevent unpredictability contagionaddstothe Europe. Thispotential in elsewhere by debates affected nationally grounded,but – ‘hybrid election’ kind of a new be will outcome The 17). page on chart (see debate” “lively a of option vanilla the to oursurvey –after among respondents election” of a“good definition popular most second the is right far the stopping in Parliament other EUmemberstates.And election European of the course the than everarefollowing people voters nolongertaketheEUforgranted.Indeed,more in 2014, Parliament election, last European is that since the What haschanged states. in othermember Euroscepticism worried about in theircountriesarestill nationalist parties . concern about corruption – place more corruption –place concern about today’sEuropeanvoters–whohaveastrong past, and party votersareathingofthe Dyed-in-the-wool of openmarriage. the concept their votershaveendorsed and manyof over – is marriagecatholic of moment the them, that, for realise to have strategists party In addition, vote. to turning out to justify enough are high stakes the that is showing challenge biggest the people, to these voters). Inappealing undecided includes (this election voting inaEuropean bother will they whether sure not are but parties anti-European by tempted are not who EU in the on the149million people focus will parties political minds. Forthisreason,many trying tochangepeople’s to votethanon theircurrentsupporters on persuading nowadays, politicalpartiesfocusmore In all elections back intothesystem. Nationalist Eurosceptics Jaunes and Gilets to bringsome how Pro-European LeftBehind.And,secondly, Believers or of votersmembers ofthe whoareSystem turnout maximise the to things. Firstly,how two understand to need they election, this win to For pro-Europeans Conclusion: Recapturingthefuture coming just from the far left or the far right.InFrance, or the far left from the just coming change that not see do voters wantchange,but Most leaders. ofpolitical integrity on the emphasis

19 20 ECFR/282 April 2019 www.ecfr.eu WHAT EUROPEANS REALLY WANT: FIVE MYTHS DEBUNKED not necessarily call for a new grand vision butvision grand new a for call necessarily not doessystem the into back voters these Bringing election.the before shortly events by shaped be could many differentdirections. Asaresult,thewaytheyvote European partiesisthattheyarereadytomovein are firmlycommittedtotheirtribes, theproblemfor votersand theUSisthat UK in the the problem If and theirdecision-makingisquitedriven byemotion. voters haveideasthatarecontradictoryinmanyways, greatly betweenpoliticalparties. Theseconfused bring themtheirpreferredpast. Yetthispastdiffers Behind, citizenswanttovoteforchangethatwill Eurosceptics, butalsoamongthePro-EuropeanLeft So, particularlyamongtheGiletsJaunesandNationalist • • • • • areas (seealsochartsonpages18-19): Their feeling that the deal is broken is most manifest in five is nowbroken. that deal by animplicit underpinned were think thatnationalpolitics Brussels. Manypeople in institutions European with disillusionment about fear thefuture.Thisisnotjust past. NowEuropeans their feared that by societies wascreated The EU system. back intothe and nationalistEurosceptics revolutionaries desperate central tobringingsomeofthe this is to operate’. Understanding recover their‘licence hasbecome the crisis to parties need that, inmanyplaces,political so deep that show findings YouGov’s and voters haveleft.ECFR’s nothing haschanged,butthe if as out it battle to continue parties mainstream the stadium –where an empty called consultant PhilipGould British political late what the voters, itwillbecome only ontheirexisting only focused like this,withparties continue politics European is adangerthat,if there But for Europe. future and moresecure for abetter necessary changes make the to ready quo andatthe status the as partiesofreform, standing against themselves present must parties pro-European election, at the succeed most convincedthattheEUisbroken. If they wantto who intendtovoteforMacronareamongthose those corruption is very high across the EU. across the very high is corruption The politicalsystem them; and represent truth the tell to and politicians a through Information future like them; people parties thatrepresent your influence for can vote you in which system political can you Voice system; welfare social the of advantage take to are able that toomanypeople also believe they offoreignersareprioritised overtheirs; needs the that believe like them,andoften people defends Fairness – thisis no longertrue; better progressively Economics – Citizens no longer believe that believe no longer –Citizens – People do not believe thegovernment do notbelieve –People – If you play by the rules, life gets rules, life –Ifyouplaybythe – People no longer trust the media no longertrustthe –People –Concernabout seen the certainties that defined their lives collapsing: the collapsing: lives their defined that certainties the seen have people and control.Many craving forborders clear a is there melting, be to seem boundaries many settled so where Europe, And,intoday’s walls”. of epidemic the against border is“avaccine a well-protected that has argued Debray Régis philosopher French The protects”. that Europe “a of safe again. That meansgivingrealmeaningtotherhetoric make interdependence to needs EU and countries,the people that existstoripdownbordersbetween project a European only selling of action. Instead defensive some To win ahearing, to take pro-European partieswillalsoneed states. from such threats about is fearful that in aEurope channel a further offer could US and the such asChina Pushing backagainstsuperpowers companies thatareexploitingourfuture. on digitaltough action to take EU efforts inseen as economy isanotheroption– The foracommon, quo future. into hope sustainable channel fordoingthis–turningthefearofstatus one environment offers that the Our datashows proposing changesthatresonatewiththem. will insteadrequireassemblingsupportby with citizens – one that they are capable of delivering. of capable are they that one – citizens with that resonates project European for the a future out setting operate, to licence their regain to need more. They once election an failing voters to pro-Europeans lead on immigrationwill fight to call simple a as boundaries for desire this However, misinterpreting women. and men between social structures, and moral codes –eventhedifference worlds, anddeveloping developed the barriers between Notes

21 22 ECFR/282 April 2019 www.ecfr.eu WHAT EUROPEANS REALLY WANT: FIVE MYTHS DEBUNKED Notes About the authors Acknowledgements Ivan Krastev is chair of the board of the Centre for Liberal The authors of this report are hugely grateful to Strategies, a think-tank based in . He is a Council colleagues across the ECFR network for all of Member and founding board member of the European their inputs into the research and production of Council on Foreign Relations. Krastev is contributing this report. In particular we would like to thank: opinion writer for the International New York Times and his Vessela Tcherneva, Susanne Baumann, Adam Lury, books include “After Europe” and “Democracy Disrupted: Sunder Katwala, Simon Hix, Jose Ignacio Torreblanca, and The Politics of Global Protest”. Jeremy Shapiro for their advice and insights on framing the research and analysis; Pawel Zerka and Philipp Dreyer Mark Leonard is co-founder and director of ECFR. He for their invaluable support in actually doing the analysis; writes a syndicated column on global affairs for Project Swantje Green, whose inspiring and tireless management Syndicate and his essays have appeared in numerous other of the Unlock project ensured this publication happened; publications. Leonard is the author of “Why Europe Will William Davies for his time, insights, and help in framing Run the 21st Century” and “What Does China Think?”, our focus groups; Nicu Popescu for sharing his profound and and the editor of “Connectivity Wars”. He presents ECFR’s unrivalled knowledge of Game of Thrones and developing weekly World in 30 Minutes podcast and is a former chair the group names; Katharina Botel-Azzinarro for her work of the World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council on on the graphics; and Adam Harrison and Chris Raggett Geo-economics. for their amazing editing. We would also like to thank the Susi Dennison is a senior policy fellow at the European team at YouGov for their patient collaboration with us in Council on Foreign Relations and the director of ECFR’s developing and analysing the data set. Despite all these European Power programme. Her topics of focus include many and varied inputs, any errors in the report remain the human rights, rule of issues, and the EU’s authors’ own. response to the 2015 refugee crisis.

The ‘Unlock’ project The ‘Unlock Europe’s Majority’ project aims to push back against the rise of anti-Europeanism that threatens to weaken Europe and its influence in the world. Through polling and focus group data in 14 European Union member states with representative sample sizes, ECFR’s analysis will unlock the shifting coalitions in Europe that favour a more internationally engaged EU. This will show how different parties and movements can – rather than competing in the nationalist or populist debate – give the pro-European, internationally engaged majority in Europe a new voice. We will use this research to engage with pro-European parties, civil society allies, and media outlets on how to frame nationally relevant issues in a way that will reach across constituencies as well as the reach the ears of voters who oppose an inward-looking, nationalist, and illiberal version of Europe.

23 24 ECFR/282 April 2019 www.ecfr.eu WHAT EUROPEANS REALLY WANT: FIVE MYTHS DEBUNKED www.ecfr.eu institutions. or individuals to grants make not does but with otherworks in think partnership tanks and organisations ECFR policy. EU foreign avalues-based for advocate and ideas our publish to us allow donors These entities. corporate and andFoundations other foundations, generous individuals Society Open by the funded charity aregistered is ECFR •  • •  that defineitsactivities: ECFR hasdevelopedastrategywiththreedistinctiveelements values-based Europeanforeignpolicy. across Europeonthedevelopmentofcoherent,effectiveand objective istoconductresearchandpromoteinformeddebate pan-European think-tank.LaunchedinOctober2007,its first the is European Council on The Foreign Relations (ECFR) ABOUT ECFR and communications. Our officesareplatformsforresearch,debate,advocacy in Berlin,London,Madrid,,Rome,SofiaandWarsaw. ECFR, uniquelyamongEuropeanthink-tanks,hasoffices Emma BoninoandMabelvanOranje. within theirowncountries.TheCouncilischairedbyCarlBildt, and feedbackonpolicyideashelpwithECFR’s activities thematic taskforces,membersprovideECFRstaffwithadvice meets onceayearasfullbody. Throughgeographicaland from theEU’s memberstatesandcandidatecountries–which politicians, decisionmakers,thinkersandbusinesspeople distinguished CouncilofovertwohundredMembers– A physical presence in the main EU member states. A physicalpresenceinthemainEUmemberstates. A pan-EuropeanCouncil.ECFRhasbroughttogethera reaches out to strategic media outlets. reaches outtostrategicmediaoutlets. debates, and“friendsofECFR”gatheringsinEUcapitals; publishes policyreports;hostsprivatemeetings,public with apan-Europeanfocus.ECFRproducesoriginalresearch; out innovativeresearchandpolicydevelopmentprojects researchers andpractitionersfromalloverEuropetocarry ECFR hasbroughttogetherateamofdistinguished Developing contagiousideasthatgetpeopletalking.

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