Legislative Power of the European Parliament Committees: Plenary Adoption of Committee Reports Nikoleta Yordanova European University Institute
[email protected] Paper prepared for the 11th Biannual Conference of the European Union Studies Association Los Angeles, California, 23-25 April 2009 This paper questions the claim that the European Parliament (EP) is a legislature with strong committees. It examines to what extent the plenary adopts committee reports as the official parliamentary legislative positions under codecision. The committees’ impact is expected to be substantially weakened when an informal early agreement is reached with the Council. Furthermore, following the predictions of congressional theories, committees are expected to be more successful if the legislators drafting their reports have no special outlying interests, have relevant expertise, and are affiliated with big party groups. These hypotheses are tested on an original data set on all codecision reports which passed first reading in the 6th EP so far (2004- 2009). The findings suggests that indeed informal trilogue agreements significantly undermine committees’ legislative influence, which is somewhat counteracted by the expertise of rapporteurs. First draft. Please do not cite before consulting the author. Introduction For over a decade the European Parliament has served as an equal co-legislator with the Council of Ministers in drafting the European legislation falling under the codecision procedure. The latter procedure has significantly changed since it was first introduced in the Maastricht Treaty (1992). Most importantly, the Amsterdam Treaty (1999) abolished the Council’s ability to reinstate its position after three readings of unsuccessful negotiations with the EP and allowed for an early conclusion of codecision acts already in the first reading.