OPENING PANDORA's BOX David Cameron's Referendum Gamble On
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OPENING PANDORA’S BOX David Cameron’s Referendum Gamble on EU Membership Credit: The Economist. By Christina Hull Yale University Department of Political Science Adviser: Jolyon Howorth April 21, 2014 Abstract This essay examines the driving factors behind UK Prime Minister David Cameron’s decision to call a referendum if the Conservative Party is re-elected in 2015. It addresses the persistence of Euroskepticism in the United Kingdom and the tendency of Euroskeptics to generate intra-party conflict that often has dire consequences for Prime Ministers. Through an analysis of the relative impact of political strategy, the power of the media, and British public opinion, the essay argues that addressing party management and electoral concerns has been the primary influence on David Cameron’s decision and contends that Cameron has unwittingly unleashed a Pandora’s box that could pave the way for a British exit from the European Union. Acknowledgments First, I would like to thank the Bates Summer Research Fellowship, without which I would not have had the opportunity to complete my research in London. To Professor Peter Swenson and the members of The Senior Colloquium, Gabe Botelho, Josh Kalla, Gabe Levine, Mary Shi, and Joel Sircus, who provided excellent advice and criticism. To Professor David Cameron, without whom I never would have discovered my interest in European politics. To David Fayngor, who flew halfway across the world to keep me company during my summer research. To my mom for her unwavering support and my dad for his careful proofreading. And finally, to my adviser Professor Jolyon Howorth, who worked with me on this project for over a year and a half. Thank you for all your guidance and for never doubting my repeated assertions that I could translate what was in my head into a complete senior essay. 1 Table of Contents I. Introduction .......................................................................................................................................................... 3 II. Case-by-Case: Prime Ministers and Europe Harold Macmillan and the First Application for EEC Membership ............................................................. 7 Harold Wilson’s 1975 Referendum ................................................................................................................... 10 Thatcherism and the Conservative Transformation ...................................................................................... 14 John Major and the End of the Conservative Era .......................................................................................... 17 New Labour in the European Union ............................................................................................................... 19 III. The General Election of 2010: An Unlikely Coalition Forms Coalition Government ........................................................................................................................................ 22 The 2010 General Election ................................................................................................................................ 23 Negotiating a Compromise on Europe ............................................................................................................ 25 The UK Deficit and the Eurozone Crisis ........................................................................................................ 28 IV. Cameron’s Divided Tories The Impact of the Tory Euroskeptics .............................................................................................................. 30 Cameron’s Promise of a Referendum .............................................................................................................. 34 The EU Budget and National Interests ............................................................................................................ 38 Alienating Allies ................................................................................................................................................... 40 V. Euroskepticism and the Rise of UKIP Why Vote UKIP? ................................................................................................................................................. 44 A Surge in Electoral Success .............................................................................................................................. 47 VI. Countering UKIP: An Examination of Electoral Strategy The Conservative Party and the Vote of the Right ........................................................................................ 49 Electoral Benefits for the Labour Party? ......................................................................................................... 53 The Liberal Democrats and Third Party Status .............................................................................................. 55 The 2014 European Election and 2015 General Election ............................................................................ 56 VII. Fueling Euroskepticism: Rupert Murdoch and the British Tabloid Press “The Murdoch Effect” ....................................................................................................................................... 61 The Public and the Press .................................................................................................................................... 64 VIII. The Power of the British Voter British, Not European ......................................................................................................................................... 66 Graphical Analysis of Public Opinion Polls .................................................................................................... 69 IX. Conclusion and Implications of a “Brexit” Future of the Special Relationship .................................................................................................................... 77 Consequences for Trade and Foreign Direct Investment ............................................................................. 80 Conclusion: Moving Britain Forward ............................................................................................................... 83 X. References .......................................................................................................................................................... 87 XI. Appendix ........................................................................................................................................................... 93 2 I. Introduction At midnight on January 1, 1973, the Union Jack was raised at the headquarters of the European Economic Community (EEC) in Brussels, marking the accession of the United Kingdom to the Common Market. In Brussels, there were festivities honoring the new member states, which also included Ireland and Denmark. One of the UK’s newly chosen European Commissioners joined in the celebrations, walking in a torch-lit parade.1 For the United Kingdom, the road to EEC accession had been fraught with adversity, as French President Charles de Gaulle had denied two previous applications for membership in 1963 and 1967. The raising of the Union Jack in Brussels should have marked a moment of triumph for Britain, but, as one headline from The Guardian noted, “We’re in—but without the fireworks.” In contrast to all the celebration in Brussels, the United Kingdom had a barely measurable reaction to finally achieving membership in the EEC. An opinion poll held the previous day showed that 38 percent of British people felt positively about membership in the EEC, 39 percent would rather not have joined, and 23 percent had no opinion.2 What should have been a day of revelry marking a new beginning for the United Kingdom as a fully integrated partner in the EEC foreshadowed the persistence of an age-old struggle between the UK and Europe, a legacy that has continued to be a problem for Prime Ministers from Winston Churchill to David Cameron. Britain has historically expressed an ongoing reticence with regards to the European project. Following World War II, Churchill declared, “We have our own independent task…We are with Europe but not of it.”3 The UK has always been a proud nation accustomed to having a position at the forefront of major world affairs but has not, as Churchill maintained, seen itself as a part of 1 “Britain joins the EEC.” BBC On This Day—1 January. Web. 2 McKie, David and Barker, Dennis. “We’re in - but without the fireworks.” The Guardian. 1 Jan 1973. Print. 3 Winston Churchill as quoted in Young, Hugo. This Blessed Plot. New York: MacMillan Publishers, 1998. Print. 13. 3 Europe. Through its imperial legacy, its ‘special relationship’ with the United States, and its avid participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United Kingdom has achieved and maintained a prominent role in history. United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson famously once said, “Great Britain has lost an empire and not yet found a role.”4 For much of the twentieth century, Britain saw its global role fulfilled as the steadfast American ally in the U.S.-dominated Western world order. In the twenty-first century, as the forces of globalization and the rise of new powers have challenged the Western world order, Britain once again finds itself without a coherent role. Former Prime Minister Tony Blair believed that in order to be “a major global player,” the UK needed to define its leadership