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VANISHING ACT: the Eurogroup's Accountability VANISHING ACT: The Eurogroup’s accountability Benjamin Braun and Marina Hübner Editor: Leo Hoffmann-Axthelm Transparency International EU is part of the global anti-corruption movement, Transparency International, which includes over 100 chapters around the world. Since 2008, Transparency International EU has functioned as a regional liaison office for the global movement and as such it works closely with the Transparency International Secretariat in Berlin, Germany. Transparency International EU leads the movement’s EU advocacy, in close cooperation with national chapters worldwide, but particularly with the 24 national chapters in EU Member States. Transparency International EU’s mission is to prevent corruption and promote integrity, transparency and accountability in EU institutions, policies and legislation. www.transparency.eu Title: VANISHING ACT: the Eurogroup’s accountability Authors: Benjamin Braun and Marina Hübner, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne Editor: Leo Hoffmann-Axthelm, Transparency International EU, Brussels Cover photo: © European Union / beëlzepub Page 39: © aesthetics of crisis Page 6: © European Union Page 41: © The Council of the European Union Page 11: © The Council of the European Union Page 43: © The Council of the European Union Page 16: © Didier Weemaels Page 45: © NASA Page 22: © European Union Page 47: © Governo Italiano Page 24: © Maryna Yazbeck Page 49: © The Council of the European Union Page 25: © aesthetics of crisis Page 52: © European Union Page 26: © The Council of the European Union Page 54: © The Council of the European Union Page 28: © Leo Hoffmann-Axthelm Page 57: © European Parliament Page 35: © Marylou Hamm Page 58: © Jordan Whitfield Page 38: © jeffowenphotos Page 61: © Alice Pasqual Design: www.beelzePub.com Every effort has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in this report. All information was believed to be correct as of October 2018. Nevertheless, Transparency International EU cannot accept responsibility for the consequences of its use for other purposes or in other contexts. © 2019 Transparency International EU. All rights reserved. Printed on 100% recycled paper. Supported by a grant from the Open Society Foundations. This publication reflects the views of the authors only, and the funders cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein. www.opensocietyfoundations.org VANISHING ACT: The Eurogroup’s accountability CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................................................4 RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................................................................................................................6 EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE FROM ROME TO THE EURO CRISIS ...............................8 THE SECOND DECADE, AND THE SCOPE OF EUROGROUP ACTIVITIES TODAY ......................13 ORGANISATION AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESS ................................................................................... 22 TRANSPARENCY .............................................................................................................................................................................. 29 ACCOUNTABILITY ............................................................................................................................................................................ 33 CASE STUDY: EXCESSIVE DEFICIT? THE CONFLICT OVER ITALY’S 2019 BUDGET .........44 TOWARDS STRONGER POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY ................................................................................ 55 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We would like to thank Nicolas Véron, Michele Chang, Adina Maricut, Mark Dawson, Diane Fromage, Eva Marlene Hausteiner, Donato Di Carlo, as well as Carl Dolan and Daniel Freund for their comments on earlier drafts of this report. Quincy Stemmler, Sarah Boualani, and Cong Tu Nguyen have contributed excellent research assistance. We gratefully acknowledge the cooperation of the institutions involved in the Eurogroup, and in particular our interview partners, including Eurogroup President Mário Centeno and his team, in particular Luís Rego and Hugo Coelho, Klaus Regling, Wolfgang Proissl and Florian Zinoecker (European Stability Mechanism), Marion Salines and Stefan Pflueger (EWG-Secretariat, European Commission), the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, Jeffrey Franks (International Monetary Fund) and Thomas Wieser (former EWG-President). This is the fourth and final report in Transparency International EU’s series on Eurozone governance institutions, following in-depth studies on the independence, transparency, accountability, and integrity of EU economic governance institutions: European Central Bank (ECB) Two sides of the same coin? Independence and accountability of the ECB This study looks into the fine balance between the ECB’s vastly expanded mandate, its unrivalled independence, and its democratic accountability. It analyses the transparency provisions, which may compensate a lack of democratic control, and the TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN? ECB’s integrity framework, making far-reaching recommendations. INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK www.transparency.eu/ECB European Stability Mechanism (ESM) From crisis to stability: How to make the ESM transparent and accountable Our study of the governance and accountability of the ESM provides the first comprehensive analysis of the newest European economic governance institution, and makes a number of concrete recommendations. To make the ESM accountable, more FROM CRISIS transparency is in order, about where decisions are taken and who calls the shots. Is it TO STABILITY HOW TO MAKE THE EUROPEAN STABILITY MECHANISM the ESM, the Eurogroup, the Commission, or a coalition of Member States? TRANSPARENT AND ACCOUNTABLE www.transparency.eu/ESM European Investment bank (EIB) Investing in Integrity? Transparency and democratic accountability of the EIB The study on the EIB takes a closer look at “the EU’s bank” and the Juncker investment fund it administers, giving an overview of the EIB’s independence, transparency, integrity and accountability, looking at both the legal provisions and their practical application. It makes a number of concrete policy recommendations to improve the EIB’s governance and accountability. www.transparency.eu/EIB For further information, please contact: Leo Hoffmann-Axthelm Research & Advocacy Coordinator, Eurozone [email protected] +32 (0) 2893-2463 2 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AMR Alert Mechanism Report BEPG Broad Economic Policy Guidelines CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union CONT Budgetary Control Committee CSRs Country-Specific Recommendations ECB European Central Bank ECOFIN Economic and Financial Affairs Council ECON Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee EEC European Economic Community EFC Economic and Financial Committee EFSF European Financial Stability Facility EMS European Monetary System EMU Economic and Monetary Union EPC Economic Policy Committee ESM European Stability Mechanism EU European Union EWG Eurogroup Working Group GDP Gross Domestic Product IMF International Monetary Fund MIP Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure MoU Memorandum of Understanding NIS National Integrity System OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OGWG Output Gaps Working Group PEG President of the Eurogroup QMV Qualified Majority Voting SEA Single European Act SGP Stability and Growth Pact SRM Single Resolution Mechanism SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism SWD Staff Working Document TEU Treaty on European Union TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union TSCG Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY For an institution whose decisions have had an group part-time, on top of his or her job as national impact on the lives of millions of Europeans, there minister of finance, and the group focuses on is much about the Eurogroup that is mysterious. topics which largely remain of national competence: It rose from obscurity following the eruption of the economic and fiscal policy. Yet Klaus Regling, euro crisis ten years ago to become the central Managing Director of the European Stability actor in the drama surrounding a series of bail- Mechanism (ESM) and one of the architects of the outs – setting the conditions attached to European euro, is in no doubt: “The Eurogroup already works financial assistance to Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, as a government of sorts.”1 Portugal and Spain. It’s a drama that continues to this day in hard-fought negotiations over Under EU law, the Eurogroup is just a consensus- Italy’s national budget. And yet what exactly the building organ without the authority to take Eurogroup is, what decisions it takes (if any), and decisions. The EU’s treaties only mention the how it operates are questions that are still all too Eurogroup in an annex. But decisions pre-agreed unclear. It is this lack of clarity that has profound by the Eurogroup are adopted by the Council consequences for its accountability and, therefore, without further debate, and even if a vote is needed, its legitimacy. Indeed, one of our main findings is only euro-area ministers vote2 – that is, Eurogroup that the Eurogroup has evaded, and continues to members. It also adopts formal decisions by evade, the accountability that its European-wide
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