Eurozone Crisis & EU Democratic Deficit

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Eurozone Crisis & EU Democratic Deficit - Eurozone Crisis & EU Democratic Deficit: EU and Greece in Multilevel Perspective Alexandros Kyriakidis Dissertation submitted for Master of Philosophy (M.Phil.) degree in Politics 2016 First Supervisor: Prof. Simon Bulmer, FAcSS Second Supervisor: Dr. Owen Parker Department of Politics University of Sheffield Sheffield, UK Eurozone Crisis & EU Democratic Deficit – Alexandros Kyriakidis | i Table of Contents List of Tables ................................................................................................................ iv List of Graphs ............................................................................................................... iv List of Figures ............................................................................................................... iv Abstract .......................................................................................................................... v List of Abbreviations .................................................................................................... vi Chapter 1: Introduction .............................................................................................. 1 SECTION A: RESEARCH FOUNDATIONS, METHODS & LITERATURE ......... 11 Chapter 2: Review of Relevant Existing Literature ............................................ 11 2.1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 11 2.2. EMU & Democracy: Supranational Level .................................................... 12 2.3. Eurozone Crisis: National Level.................................................................... 21 2.4. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 22 Chapter 3: EU Democratic Deficit Evaluative Framework ............................... 25 3.1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 25 3.2. The EU Democratic Deficit Approaches ....................................................... 26 3.2.1. Input ........................................................................................................ 28 3.2.2. Output ..................................................................................................... 31 3.2.3. Throughput .............................................................................................. 34 3.3. The Foundations of the EU Democratic Deficit ............................................ 35 3.3.1. Democratic Theory ................................................................................. 36 3.3.2. EU Integration Theories .......................................................................... 38 3.4 Ontological Concerns ..................................................................................... 41 3.5. Construction of an EU DD Empirical Evaluation Model .............................. 44 3.5.1. Key National Policy Areas, Redistribution & Delegation ...................... 46 3.5.2. Majoritarian/Representative Institutions’ Influence ............................... 47 3.5.3. Processes of EU institutions.................................................................... 48 3.5.4. Direction of EU policies & Opposition .................................................. 49 3.6. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 53 Chapter 4: Research Methods & Design .............................................................. 56 4.1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 56 4.2. Research Design ............................................................................................ 56 4.2.1. The EU Level .......................................................................................... 59 4.2.2. The National Level ................................................................................. 62 4.3. Research Methods.......................................................................................... 66 4.3.1. Document Analysis ................................................................................. 67 4.3.2. Enquiries relating to additional information ........................................... 68 4.3.3. Interviews ................................................................................................ 68 Eurozone Crisis & EU Democratic Deficit – Alexandros Kyriakidis | ii 4.4. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 71 SECTION B: SUPRANATIONAL LEVEL & EU DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT ......... 73 Chapter 5: Supranational Timeline ...................................................................... 73 5.1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 73 5.2. The onset of crisis – USA .............................................................................. 73 5.3. EU & Eurozone ............................................................................................. 75 5.4. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 81 Chapter 6: Overview of Supranational Measures ............................................... 83 6.1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 83 6.2. Pre-Crisis Mechanisms .................................................................................. 83 6.2.1. Medium-Term Financial Assistanceee ................................................... 83 6.2.2. Stability and Growth Pact ....................................................................... 84 6.3. EU/Eurozone Crisis Measures ....................................................................... 86 6.3.1. European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism ......................................... 86 6.3.2. European Financial Stability Facility Société Anonyme ......................... 87 6.3.3. TFEU Article 136 Amendment & ECJ Case C-370/12 .......................... 89 6.3.4. Euro Plus Pact ......................................................................................... 90 6.3.5. European Stability Mechanism Treaty.................................................... 92 6.3.6. European Supervisory Authorities .......................................................... 93 6.3.7. Six-Pack .................................................................................................. 94 6.3.8. Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Growth ....................................... 97 6.3.9. Two-Pack ................................................................................................ 98 6.3.10. Banking Union .................................................................................... 100 6.4. Conclusion ................................................................................................... 100 Chapter 7: Supranational Measures Evaluation ............................................... 103 7.1. Introduction ................................................................................................. 103 7.2. Indicator A: Key national policy areas, redistribution, delegation .............. 103 7.2.1. Key national policy areas, redistribution .............................................. 103 7.2.2. EC Delegation/Decision-Making Capacity........................................... 118 7.2.3. ECB Delegation/Decision-Making Capacity ........................................ 125 7.2.4. ECJ Delegation/Decision-Making Capacity ......................................... 129 7.2.5. Interim Conclusion on Indicator A ....................................................... 131 7.3. Indicator B: Parliamentary authority (EP and national Parliaments) .......... 134 7.3.1. European Parliament ............................................................................. 134 7.3.2. National Parliaments ............................................................................. 138 7.3.3. Interim Conclusion on Indicator B ....................................................... 139 7.4. Indicator C: Processes of EU institutions .................................................... 140 7.5. Indicator D: Direction of EU policies & EU Citizens Rights ...................... 141 Eurozone Crisis & EU Democratic Deficit – Alexandros Kyriakidis | iii 7.6. Conclusion ................................................................................................... 142 SECTION C: NATIONAL LEVEL & EU DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT .................... 146 Chapter 8: National Timeline.............................................................................. 146 8.1. Introduction ................................................................................................. 146 8.2. 2009-2011: Deficit Issues and 1st Economic Adjustment Programme ....... 146 8.3. 2011-2012: 2nd Economic Adjustment Programme ..................................... 156 8.5. 2012-2013: First post-2009 elections & Coalition government .................. 156 8.6. Conclusion ................................................................................................... 161 Chapter 9: Overview & Evaluation of National-level Measures ..................... 162 9.1. Introduction ................................................................................................. 162
Recommended publications
  • Calendar of Fabio Panetta, August - September 2020 1 Tuesday, 15 September Executive Board ECB
    Calendar of Fabio Panetta Member of the ECB’s Executive Board August - September 2020 Date Meeting / Event (incl. topic / meeting participants, as applicable) Location Friday, 7 August Meeting with London Stock Exchange Group, on developments in global financial markets – teleconference Monday, 10 August Annual board meeting of International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies (ICMB) – teleconference Tuesday, 25 August Financial Stability Board (FSB) Cross-border Payments Coordination Group – teleconference Thursday, 27 August 44th Economic Policy Symposium of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, on “Navigating the Decade Ahead: Implications for Monetary Policy” – teleconference Friday, 28 August 44th Economic Policy Symposium of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City – teleconference Wednesday, 2 September Executive Board By phone Thursday, 3 September Central bank digital currency (CBDC) Steering Group – teleconference Attendance at virtual ECB Annual Research Conference Friday, 4 September Eurogroup Working Group – teleconference Attendance at virtual ECB Annual Research Conference Tuesday, 8 September Executive Board ECB Meeting with the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) – teleconference Wednesday, 9 September Governing Council – teleconference Thursday, 10 September Governing Council – teleconference Friday, 11 September Attendance at virtual conference on “Banking and Payments in the Digital World”, organised by the Deutsche Bundesbank Calendar of Fabio Panetta, August - September 2020 1 Tuesday, 15 September Executive
    [Show full text]
  • UC Berkeley UC Berkeley Electronic Theses and Dissertations
    UC Berkeley UC Berkeley Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title La comunita' mutilata: Embodiment, Corporality, and the Reconstruction of the Italian Body Politic in the Works of F.T. Marinetti and Gabriele D'Annunzio Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/492903f9 Author Martire, Anthony John Publication Date 2012 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California La comunità mutilata: Embodiment, Corporality, and the Reconstruction of the Italian Body Politic in the Works of F.T. Marinetti and Gabriele D'Annunzio By Anthony John Martire A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Italian Studies in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Barbara Spackman, Chair Professor Mia Fuller Professor Harsha Ram Spring 2012 Abstract La comunità mutilata: Embodiment, Corporality, and the Reconstruction of the Italian Body Politic in the works of F.T. Marinetti and Gabriele D’Annunzio By Anthony John Martire Doctor of Philosophy in Italian Studies University of California, Berkeley Professor Barbara Spackman, Chair “La comunità mutilata: Embodiment, Corporality, and the Reconstruction of the Italian Body Politic in the works of F.T. Marinetti and Gabriele D’Annunzio”, is a study in how discourses of technological modernism, nationality, and woundedness operate on the longstanding metaphor of the body politic. It focuses on the writings of two of Italy’s most controversial, and influential, figures during and after the First World War. I show how mutilated and prosthetic bodies become powerful political metaphors for both Marinetti and D’Annunzio, which upend and transform the notion of the body politic in posthuman, postliberal and antidemocratic ways.
    [Show full text]
  • Vol. 16 No. 4 Jun. 1995 Sect 3 Page
    ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol 16, No 4, 1995 Pushingpolyarchy: the US± Cuba case andthe Third World WILLIAMI ROBINSON Sincethe late 1980s US policy makers haveargued that the basis ofthe long-runningUS disputewith Cuba is thelack of `democracy’in the Caribbean islandnation. The Clinton Administration has madeit clear that its policy, includingany eventual normalisation of relations,will be basedon democratisa- tioninside Cuba. Yet, from the triumph of the Cuban revolution in 1959 to the late1980s, the US± Cuba con¯ ict was presentedin Washington as aproductof Cuba’s `securitythreat’ , emanatingfrom Cuba’ s foreignpolicy of active engage- mentin the international arena, including its support for Third World national liberationmovements and its alliance with the now defunct Soviet bloc. Therefore,the current assertion in Washingtonthat the dispute is overdemocracy representsa little-perceivedyet signi® cant change in US policy towards Cuba. Thisshift in policy,from an emphasis on external`security’ factors condition- ingUS± Cuban relations, to the emphasis on internal factorsÐ that is, on Cuba’s internalpolitical systemÐ is importanton two accounts. First, it is centralto an analysisof current US± Cuba relations and to prognostication on how these relationswill unfold in the coming years. Second, it re¯ ects anessential change inUS foreignpolicy that dates back to the 1970s, came tofruition in the 1980s, is nowbeing consolidated, and promises to play a majorrole in US foreign policyin the `new world order’ . Thischange has beendescribed by policy makers,scholars and journalists as ashifttowards `democracy promotion’ . The StateDepartment now de® nes `democracypromotion’ as oneof the three basic planksof USforeignpolicy, along with the promotion of `free markets’and the maintenanceof a USmilitary capacity around the world.
    [Show full text]
  • Democracy and the Death of Knowledge Suzanna Sherry
    Vanderbilt University Law School Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 2007 Democracy and the Death of Knowledge Suzanna Sherry Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Suzanna Sherry, Democracy and the Death of Knowledge, 75 University of Cincinnati Law Review. 1053 (2007) Available at: http://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/307 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. DEMOCRACY AND THE DEATH OF KNOWLEDGE Suzanna Sherry* Judges are under unprecedented attack in the United States. As former Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote in the Wall Street Journal last month, "while scorn for certain judges is not an altogether new phenomenon, the breadth and intensity of rage currently being leveled at the judiciary may be unmatched in American history."' Popular unhappiness with particular decisions-which began even before the Constitution and has occurred continuously since then-has turned into something deeper: a rejection of judicial review itself and a belief that judges should bow to the wishes of the popular majority. A few years ago, I diagnosed this phenomenon as the result of a misconception that all law is politics. I suggested that it was now conventional wisdom to believe that "constitutional adjudication is simply politics by another name.",2 And because politics is the province of the people and their representatives, judges should stay out of it.
    [Show full text]
  • Volume 24 1997 Issue 73
    Review of African Political Economy No.73:307-310 © ROAPE Publications Ltd., 1997 ISSN 0305-6244; RIX #7301 Commentary Ray Bush & Morris Szeftel This issue continues the critical evaluation of aspects of Africa's economic and political crisis offered in previous editions of the ROAPE Review of Books in the hope of an effective alternative to prevailing notions. In the present conjuncture, the dominant forces of global capitalism restrict the policy agenda with regard to arresting economic decline, ethnic conflict and state disintegration. Structural adjustment (imposing externally-regulated liberalisation) and liberal democratic political reform (largely confined to electoral competition among a small elite and the sponsorship of civil society) have been the only games in town. The evidence is everywhere that this narrow agenda is inadequate for the task. Its apologists defend it, not by pointing to their successes or their intellectual coherence and elegance, but by reiterating that there are no alternatives. Hence the need to encourage the widest range of critical contributions in that hope that, from them, alternatives will begin to emerge. The need for a new agenda is manifest. Economic restructuring, after 25 years of failure and despite the continuing brutality of its social impact, draws only muted criticism. Despite these failures, and notwithstanding occasional hand-wringing by the World Bank (as it accepts that mistakes have been made and launches a new slogan), Africa continues to be 'adjusted' to fit it for its station on the margins of world capitalist markets. The disappointments of democratisation are more recent and thus less fully explored. But the limitations of political pluralism as a means of promoting democratisation and overcoming the instability, ineffectiveness and corruption of post-colonial states, are already clear.
    [Show full text]
  • Democratization Through the Looking-Glass Democratization Has Become a Central Political Theme in the Post- Cold War World
    Burnell/28.5.jkt 30/7/03 12:20 pm Page 1 DEMOCRATIZATION I I I I ON PERSPECTIVES DEMOCRATIZATION I PERSPECTIVES ON I PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRATIZATION Democratization through the looking-glass Democratization has become a central political theme in the post- Cold War world. This series considers democratization as a concept, bringing together interest both in the processes of democratic institutional reform and in the under- lying theoretical issues defining I IPERSPECTIVES ON these processes—rights, citizenship, PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRATIZATION representation and participation. I DEMOCRATIZATIONI Democratization through the looking-glass argues that our perspectives on democratization reflect the intellectual origins of the inquiry. What we see and how we understand it are influenced by what we bring to the table. A range of disciplines from anthropology Democratization to economics, sociology and legal scholarship, as well as different area studies, offer a rich combination of analytical frameworks, distinctive insights and leading points of concern. through On one level the book provides for anyone interested in democratization a wide-ranging distillation of the main themes, issues, and topics, concisely written by leading experts in their field. the looking-glass On a second level the book advances the case for a broadly-based comparative study that includes Europe and North America alongside developing regions, while maintaining that multi- disciplinarity enhances our understanding of democratization far more than a narrow political science approach. I I The book is aimed at students of politics willing to explore the boundaries of their subject and all social scientists who need an BURNELL ed. introduction to this important contemporary phenomenon.
    [Show full text]
  • Pandemic Crisis Support Eligibility Assessment Prepared by the Commission Services
    EUROPEAN COMMISSION DIRECTORATE GENERAL ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS Brussels, 6 May 2020 Pandemic Crisis Support Eligibility assessment conducted by the Commission services in preparation of any evaluation pursuant to Article 6 Regulation (EU) No 472/13, Article 13(1) ESM Treaty and Article 3 of ESM Guideline on Precautionary Financial Assistance (Note for the Eurogroup Working Group) Pandemic Crisis Support Eligibility assessment prepared by the Commission services This note summarises the outcomes of the preliminary assessments conducted by the Commission services at technical level on the eligibility of euro area Member States for the Pandemic Crisis Support provided by the European Stability Mechanism. The assessments are annexed to the note. In their meeting of 23 April 2020, the Heads of State and Government of the euro area Member States endorsed the Eurogroup Report of 9 April 2020, in which Ministers of Finance of the euro area Member States had agreed to establish yhe “Pandemic Crisis Support”. The Support is to be based on the existing Enhanced Conditions Credit Line (ECCL) of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), adjusted in light of the specific challenge posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Importantly, this Support is to be available to all euro area Member States until the crisis is over. The Support is to have “standardised terms agreed in advance by the ESM Governing Bodies, reflecting the current challenges, based on up-front assessments by the competent European institutions. The only requirement to access the credit line will be that euro area Member States requesting support would commit to use this credit line to support domestic financing of direct and indirect healthcare, cure and prevention related costs due to the COVID-19 crisis.
    [Show full text]
  • A Euro Area Budget: Another Seedling?
    Maastricht Law Faculty of Law 201/0 Maastricht Centre for European Law 201/0 MCEL Working Paper series A Euro area budget: another seedling? Dr. M. van der Sluis* Table of Contents 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 2 2. Plans for a Euro (Area) budget ................................................................................................................. 4 2.1. The Four and Five Presidents’ reports ............................................................................................ 4 2.2. The European Parliament Resolution ............................................................................................. 4 2.3. The Commission proposals (2018) .................................................................................................. 5 2.4. The Meseberg Declaration & the New Hanseatic League .............................................................. 6 2.5. The Eurogroup agreements on the BICC ........................................................................................ 8 2.6. The Commission proposal (2019) ................................................................................................... 8 2.7. The Eurogroup’s October Term Sheet ............................................................................................ 9 3. Legal aspects of the BICC .......................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • 011137/EU XXVII. GP Eingelangt Am 13/02/20
    011137/EU XXVII. GP Eingelangt am 13/02/20 Eurogroup ANNOTATED AGENDA Brussels, 12 February 2020 ecfin.cef.cpe(2020)934222 Draft Eurogroup annotated agenda1 17 February 2020 Starting time 15h00, Brussels 1. Presentation of the Commission priorities for the EMU The Commission will present its priorities for the EMU. 2. Presentation of the Commission Six- and Two-Pack review – euro area related issues The Commission will present the main points of its economic governance review Communication, focusing on those relevant for the euro area. Some elements of EU economic governance are applicable only to the euro area, notably the so- called “2-pack” reforms that were introduced in 2013 to establish a framework for dealing with Member States facing financial stability difficulties and to strengthen budgetary co-ordination. The Eurogroup and Eurogroup Working Group have specifically-defined roles in their implementation. 3. Thematic discussion on growth and jobs – Tax wedge on labour – focus on tax shift from labour to other forms of taxation As part of the thematic discussions on growth and jobs, the Eurogroup will continue to exchange views on the tax wedge on labour, focusing on shifting from labour to other forms of taxation. This discussion will look more particularly at the shift from labour to environmental taxation. The aim is to foster the sharing of good policy practices. A technical note by the Commission and an oral presentation by Professor Ottmar Edenhofer, Director of the Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (MCC) and of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, (PIK) will inform the debate.
    [Show full text]
  • Local Democracy and Participation in Post-Authoritarian Chile1
    European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 83, October 2007 | 3-18 Local Democracy and Participation in Post-Authoritarian Chile1 Herwig Cleuren During the past decade an intensive debate has emerged in Latin America about new forms of citizen’s participation in local political affairs. It has generally been argued that the neo-liberal reforms implemented in the 1980s and 1990s have led to the atomization of the citizenry, and hence disarticulated most forms of existing collective action. Many scholars involved in this debate have adopted a strong pro- participation attitude demanding the transformation of ‘delegative democracies’ into ‘deliberative democracies’ with an increased civic participation (O’Donnell 1994, Avritzer 2002). Since the early 1990s the idea of increasing citizens’ direct participation in the decision-making process has also emerged as a guiding principle of what was for- merly the radical Left and of social movements in Latin America. They consider it a reaction to top-down neo-liberal regimes that would have the momentum to deepen democracy and empower poor and excluded groups to overcome their lack of political clout (Castañeda 2006, Roberts 1998). In the same vein, the participa- tory budgeting scheme in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre is referred to as an out- standing mechanism of grassroots participation, which enables deprived social groups to demand better public services (Abers 2000, Fung and Wright 2003). In recent years, hundreds of municipalities all over Latin America have adopted the basic principle of participatory budgeting – often with altered features and with different results – in order to permit citizens to have a say about public investments (Cabannes 2004).
    [Show full text]
  • Eurogroup: Hans Vijlbrief Appointed President of the Eurogroup Working Group
    PRESS Council of the EU EN PRESS RELEASE 25/18 22/01/2018 Eurogroup: Hans Vijlbrief appointed President of the Eurogroup working group The Eurogroup today appointed Hans Vijlbrief as the new President of the Eurogroup working group (EWG). He will take office as of 1 February 2018 and will serve a two-year term. He will succeed Thomas Wieser who was the first full-time EFC/EWG president and held the position since 2012. The President of the Eurogroup Working Group is elected by its members and then appointed by the Eurogroup. He was elected to this position by the EWG on 15 December 2017. The office of the President of the EWG is located at the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, in Brussels. The EWG prepares the meetings of the Eurogroup and coordinates on euro-area specific matters. It is composed of representatives of the euro-area member states of the Economic and Financial Committee, the European Commission and the European Central Bank. Hans Vijlbrief will also serve as the President of the Economic and Financial Committee, which prepares the ECOFIN Council and promotes policy coordination among EU member states. He was elected to this position by the EFC on 15 December 2017. Until now, Hans Vijlbrief has held numerous positions at the ministry of economic affairs and at the ministry of finance of the Netherlands. Since October 2012, he has been serving as treasurer general at the ministry of finance of the Netherlands and a principal adviser to the minister of finance of the Netherlands on Eurogroup matters.
    [Show full text]
  • A Crisis of Déjà Vu How a Host of Divisions Caused a Seemingly Unending String of Setbacks to a Deal for a New Greek Bailout
    SPecIAL REPORT A CRISIS OF DÉJÀ VU How a host of divisions caused a seemingly unending string of setbacks to a deal for a new Greek bailout. First of three parts. NEW MAN, SAME STORY: Greek Finance Minister Evangelos Venizelos set off a new mini-crisis upon taking office. REUTERS/JOHN KOLESIDIS BY Luke BAKER, PAUL TAYLOR his debut at an emergency meeting of Monetary Fund inspectors. Greece needed AND DINA KYRIAKIDOU euro zone finance ministers on June 19, easier terms, he said. BRUSSELS, OCT 5 his country was teetering on the brink of “Venizelos started with excuses as to bankruptcy and desperate for more aid why they have to change some parts of the REEK FINANCE MINISTER Evangelos to avoid default. The burly constitutional programme to buy parliamentary support,” Venizelos came into office offering a lawyer began his presentation by seeking said one participant in the confidential freshG start in his nation’s financial crisis. But to renegotiate an austerity programme his Sunday-night meeting in Luxembourg. he began with more of the same. predecessor had only recently concluded The euro zone’s point man in the talks, When the 54-year-old politician made with European Union and International a normally mild-mannered Finn named octoBER 2011 DejA VU OCTOBER 2011 Olli Rehn, exploded. The EU’s executive how the second Greek bailout was reached differences among the euro zone countries, arm would refuse to sign off on Greece’s -- and why a third bailout now looks almost personality clashes among their leaders, compliance with its bailout programme, the inevitable -- Reuters spoke to dozens of denial in Greece about the extent of the 49-year-old economic and monetary affairs ministers, officials, central bankers and other problem and political paralysis that has commissioner told Venizelos.
    [Show full text]