ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol 16, No 4, 1995 Pushingpolyarchy: the US± Cuba case andthe Third World WILLIAMI ROBINSON

Sincethe late 1980s US policymakers haveargued that the basis ofthe long-runningUS disputewith Cuba is thelack of `democracy’in the Caribbean islandnation. The Clinton Administration has madeit clear that its policy, includingany eventual normalisation of relations,will be basedon democratisa- tioninside Cuba. Yet, from the triumph of the Cuban revolution in 1959 to the late1980s, the US± Cuba con¯ ict was presentedin Washington as aproductof Cuba’s `securitythreat’ , emanatingfrom Cuba’ s foreignpolicy of active engage- mentin the international arena, including its support for Third World national liberationmovements and its alliance with the now defunct Soviet bloc. Therefore,the current assertion in Washingtonthat the dispute is overdemocracy representsa little-perceivedyet signi® cant change in US policytowards Cuba. Thisshift in policy,from an emphasis on external`security’ factors condition- ingUS± Cuban relations, to the emphasis on internal factorsÐ that is, on Cuba’s internalpolitical systemÐ is importanton two accounts. First, it is centralto an analysisof current US± Cuba relations and to prognostication on how these relationswill unfold in the coming years. Second, it re¯ ects anessential change inUS foreignpolicy that dates back to the 1970s, came tofruition in the 1980s, is nowbeing consolidated, and promises to play a majorrole in US foreign policyin the `new world order’ . Thischange has beendescribed by policy makers,scholars and journalists as ashifttowards `democracy promotion’ . The StateDepartment now de® nes `democracypromotion’ as oneof the three basic planksof USforeignpolicy, along with the promotion of `free markets’and the maintenanceof a USmilitarycapacity around the world. `Support for democ- racy’, declaresone State Department policy document, `is becomingthe new organizingprinciple for American foreign policy’ . 1 Thischange is largelyunexplored. Many have applauded `democracy pro- motion’, witha surprisingshallowness in theoretical analysis, as apositiveand long-overduechange for the better in US policy.Those who have opposed US interventionabroad, while more sceptical regarding US intentions,have tended toview `democracy promotion’ as merelya continuation,under new rhetoric, of thesame USinterventionismof thepast. In fact,both positions are offthe mark, andre¯ ect the failure to appreciate the profound changes at every level that are accompanyingthe rise ofglobal capitalism, including changes in international politicalrelations and transnational class formation. Iwillpresent a theoreticalargument in this paper which runs contrary to conventionalwisdom and mainstream thinking on US `democracypromotion’ , yetone which, I believe,will elucidate not only the context in whichUS± Cuban William IRobinsonis at theCentral American Universityin Managua, Nicaragua, andthe University of New Mexicoin Albuquerque.

0143-6597/95/040643-17 Ó 1995Third World Quarterly 643 WILLIAMI ROBINSON relationswill unfold into the 21st century, but also the general dynamic of US foreignpolicy in the `new world order’ . Thispaper is dividedinto ® veparts. First,I willdiscuss inhistoric perspective the shift to what policy makers describeas `democracypromotion’ . Second,I willgive brief theoretical treat- mentto the concepts of democracy, and de® ne exactly what US policymakers meanwhen they say theyare promoting`democracy’ in Cuba and elsewhere. Third,I willprovide an explanation for this shift. Fourth, I willanalyse the concretemechanisms, in particular, `political aid’ programmes, through which thisshift is takingplace. Finally, I willlink this analysis and the theoretical discussionto the case ofCubaand speculate on howUS± Cuban relations might unfold.It must be emphasised that space limitationspreclude a fullexploration ofthe theoretical and analytical issues athand. What follows is bynecessity a simpli®cation of complex issues andconcepts.

Frompromoting dictatorship topromoting `democracy’ `Wehave 50 percent of theworld’ s wealth,but only 6.3 percent of itspopulation ¼Inthis situation we cannotfail to betheobject of envy and resentment,’ noted GeorgeKennan in 1948, one of themost important architects of post-World War IIUnitedStates foreign policy. `Our real task in the coming period is todevise apatternof relationships which will allow us tomaintain this position of disparity,’said the then-Director of Policy Planning of the Department of State. `Weshould cease totalk about the raising of the living standards, human rights, anddemocratization. The day is notfar offwhen we are goingto have to deal instraight power concepts. The less weare thenhampered by idealistic slogans, thebetter.’ 2 Kennan’s candidstatement, contained in a top-secretdocument which dis- cussed USstrategyin the aftermath of WorldWar II, is highlyinstructive on two accounts.First, it underscores the fact that the strategic objective of US foreign policyduring the Cold War was less tobattle a `communistmenace’ than to defendgross inequalitiesin theinternational order (inequalities which were seen as underchallenge by thespread of socialism)and the tremendous privilege and powerthis global disparity of wealth brought for the United States as the dominantworld power. Second, Kennan’ s statementsuggests that democracy abroadwas nota majorconsideration for the United States in the formative years ofthe post-World War II order. Fourdecades after Kennan’ s 1948counsel, Carl Gershman, the President of theNational Endowment for Democracy ( NED),anewagency in theUS foreign policyapparatus created in 1983, admonished in a speechto the American PoliticalScience Foundation: `In a worldof advanced communication and explodingknowledge, it isnolongerpossible to rely solely on forceto promote stabilityand defend the national security. Persuasion is increasinglyimportant, andthe United States must enhance its capacity to persuade by developing techniquesfor reaching people at many different levels.’ Gershman went on to emphasisein his speech, in sharp contrast to Kennan, that `democracy’ abroad, shouldbe a majorconsideration for the United States, in its effort to `enhance itscapacity to persuade’ around the world. 3 644 PUSHING POLYARCHY

TheEast± West prism in which Kennan and his generation had cast the North±South divide in foreign policy dictates evaporated with the end of the ColdWar. Yet, as Gershman’s statementsuggests, the fundamental objective of maintaininginternational asymmetries in an unjust global system, to which Kennanalluded nearly half a centuryearlier, did not change with the collapse of theSoviet system. What has changedare themethods and strategies for securing thisobjective. What US policymakers term`democracy promotion’ , andthe ideologicaldimensions it entails, is beingdeveloped as aneffective instrument of`persuasion’ , incontrast toÐ or more often, alongsideÐ force in assuring `patternsof relationships’ that protect US interests(and, increasingly, the collectiveinterests of the North) in an unjust international system. In other words,this shift from `straight power concepts’ to `persuasion’ is predicatedon thedevelopment of a newcomponent in US foreignpolicyÐ `democracy promotion’. TheUnited States had risen from the ashes ofWorld War II as thedominant worldpower, and policy makers hadset aboutconceiving, developing and defendingan international order largely under US-led Western domination. From WorldWar II tothe end of the Cold War, the United States employed military forceacross itsborders over 200 times, became embroiled in largescale wars in Koreaand Indochina and in `small wars’ , counterinsurgencycampaigns and covertoperations throughout Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Europe,including, as iswelldocumented, against Cuba. 4 Globalinterventionism was rationalisedby the Cold War and the need to confront communism. But perceivedcompetition from the former Soviet Union, while signi® cant, was not thedriving force behind foreign policy. Behind the `communist threat’ there has alwaysbeen another, more fundamental threat: a challengeto `patterns of relationships’which underpinned domination by theUS-led bloc of corecapital- istpowers in the international system andprerogative derived from privileged positionin an asymmetric international order. NationalSecurity Council ( NSC)Memorandum68, one of the key US foreign policydocuments of the postwar era, stated that postwar policy embraces `two subsidiarypolicies’ . Onewas tofoster `a worldenvironment in which the Americansystem cansurvive and ¯ ourish’, andthe other was containmentof the SovietUnion, which `seeks tofoster the seeds ofdestruction within the Soviet system’ .TheMemorandum went on: `Even if there was noSoviet Union we wouldface thegreat problem’ of achieving global `order and security’ . 5 Revealingly,a majorfocus of NSC-68was notthe Soviet Union at all, but securingUS andWestern access totheraw materials, markets and labour power ofthe Third World, and on assuring a politicalenvironment propitious to the operationof an increasingly international capital. Behind East± West relations, therefore,North± South relations were always intrinsic and central to the whole ColdWar era. 6 Although`democracy’ often entered the foreign policy-making vocabulary for reasons ofconvenience, or underthe circumstances of speci® c moments,it was not theprincipal political form which the United States promoted in the Third Worldin thepostwar years. In fact, as thehistorical record shows, the principal formwas thedevelopment of strategicalliances with authoritarian and dictatorial 645 WILLIAMI ROBINSON regimes.The outcome of intervention, whether intentional or an incidental byproduct,was theestablishment and defence of authoritarian political and socialarrangements in the Third World. The USA promotedand supported a globalpolitical network of civilian±military regimes and outright dictatorships in LatinAmerica, white minority and one-party dictatorships of post-colonial elites inAfrica, and repressive states inAsia(the Batista regime was butone example). Authoritarianpolitical and social arrangements were judged to be the most expedientform of assuring stability and social control in the Third World requiredfor the free operationof international capital. However, by the 1970s, mass popularmovements were spreading against repressive political systems and exploitativesocioeconomic orders established during the years oftheCold War. Thestructures of authoritarianism and dictatorship began to crumble, above all, inUS clientregimes, and a generalcrisis ofelite rule in the South began to develop.As the`elective af® nity’between authoritarianism and US-led Western dominationbegan to unravel, `democracy promotion’ was substitutedfor `na- tionalsecurity’ as thevernacular in Washington. A `democracypromotion’ apparatuswas createdfrom the late 1970s to the early 1990s, including new governmentaland quasi-governmental agencies and bureaus (including, but not limitedto, the NED),policystudies and conferences by government and private policyplanning institutes to draft and implement `democracy promotion’ pro- grammes.7 Whereit had earlier supported dictatorship, such as inChile, Nicaragua,Haiti, the Philippines, Panama, Southern Africa and elsewhere, the USAnowbegan to `promote democracy’ . Democracypromotion promises to play a vitalrole in shaping a new internationalsystem. Under the rubric of promoting democracy, the USA has developednew modalities of engagement abroad in order to intervene in the crises, transitionsand power vacuums resulting from the break-up of the old orderand to try to reshape political and economic structures as a`newworld order’emerges. These modalities constitute precisely those newfound `tech- niquesfor reaching people at many different levels’ to whichGershman referred. Democracypromotion, as analysedbelow, is awayto relieve pressure from subordinateclasses formore fundamental political, social and economic change. Theimpulse to promote democracy is therearrangement of national political systems inthe South so as tomaintain elite based status quos in an unjust internationalsystem andto suppress mass aspirationsfor more thorough going democratisationof sociallife in thenew world order. In more theoretical terms, theshift from backing authoritarianism to promoting`democracy’ represents the replacement,in a transnationalsetting, of coercive means ofsocial control with consensualones.

Polyarchyversus populardemocracy Democracypromotion has acrucialideological dimension, given that democracy is auniversalaspiration and the claim to promote it has mass appeal.The term `democracy’is thrownaround very loosely. But de® nitions can, and should, be precise.What US policymakersmean when they use theterm democracy is actuallywhat political scientist Robert Dahl has termed polyarchy, a system in 646 PUSHING POLYARCHY whicha smallgroup actually rules and mass participationin decision making is con®ned to leadership choice in electionsthat are carefullymanaged by compet- ingelites. The polyarchic de® nition of democracy, building on early 20th centuryelitism theorists such as GaetanoMosca andVilfredo Pareto, developed inUS academiccircles closely tied to thepolicy-making community in theUSA inthe post-World War II years.According to Samuel Huntington, this `rede®nition’ of the classical de® nition of democracy as rule,or power ( cratos) ofthepeople ( demos)tomakeit more `realistic’ and `compatible’ with `modern society’, culminatedin Dahl’ s 1971study, entitled Polyarchy.8 Bythe time the USArose toworld power after World War II, thepolyarchic de® nition of democracyhad become established in Western academy. When US of®cials speakof `promoting democracy’ , whatthey really mean, therefore, is the promotionof polyarchy,or what has elsewherebeen referred to as `low-intensity democracy’. 9 Itmust be emphasised that democracy is whatphilosopher WB Galliehas termedan `essentially contested concept’ . Thisrefers toa conceptin which differentand competing de® nitions exist, such that terms themselvesare prob- lematicsince they are notreducible to `primitives’ . Eachde® nition yields differentinterpretations of socialreality. 10 Inthis context, any attempt to address theissue ofdemocracyand the US± Cuban dispute runs up against the following problematic:one particular de® nition of democracy, that of polyarchy, has achieved,in the Gramscian sense, hegemonyamong scholars, journalists, charis- matic® gures,policy makers anddiplomats, not just in the USA, butin the internationalcommunity and public discourse in general. As anessentially contested concept, the polyarchic de® nition competes with theconcept of populardemocracy .Thevarious views on populardemocracy are traceableto the original Greek de® nition of democracy and rooted in Rousseauian±Marxist traditions. Popular democracy posits a disbursalthrough- outsociety of political power through the participation of broad majorities in decisionmaking or forms ofparticipatory, or direct, democracy, linked to representativeforms ofgovernmentand formal elections. Popular democracy is seen as anemancipatory project at whose heart is theconstruction of a democraticsocioeconomic order. Democratic participation, in order to be truly effective,requires that democracy be a toolfor changing unjust social and economicstructures. In sharp distinction to polyarchy, popular democracy is concernedwith both process andoutcome. Elitism theories claim that democracy rests exclusivelyon process, so thatthere is nocontradiction between a `democratic’process andan anti-democratic social order punctured by sharp socialinequalities and minority monopolisation of society’ s materialand cultural resources.Thus, under the polyarchic de® nition, a system canacquire a demo- craticform without a democraticcontent or outcome. Popular democracy, in contrast,posits democracy as botha process andas ameans toan endÐ atool forchange, for the resolution of such material problems as housing,health, education,land ownership, social inequalities and so forth.(It should be emphasised,however, that, although there is anabundance of literature on the conceptof populardemocracy, there is nofullyelaborated theory.Sucha theory wouldhave to address themuch-discussed issue oftheinstitutional structures of 647 WILLIAMI ROBINSON populardemocracy and the relation betweenprocess andoutcome in a popular democracy.11) Polyarchy’s emphasison process anddisregard for outcome ¯ ows,in turn, fromthe theoretical premise of structural-functionali sm thatdifferent spheres of thesocial totality are independentand linked externally to each other, and that thepolitical sphere of the social totality, therefore, is separatefrom the social andeconomic spheres. US socialscientists Larry Diamond, Juan J Linz,and SeymourMartin Lipset, in their introduction to awidelycirculated, four-volume series fundedby the National Endowment for Democracy and entitled Demo- cracy inDeveloping Countries ,explain:`We use theterm democracy in this studyto signify a politicalsystem, separate and apart from the economic and socialsystem ¼Indeed,a distinctiveaspect of our approach is toinsist that issues ofso-called economic and social democracy be separated from the questionof governmental structure.’ 12 Whattheoretical or historical justi® cation exists for the separation of the politicalsystem fromsocioeconomic matters is notclear. What is clearis that, owingto the hegemony enjoyed by the polyarchic de® nition of democracy, scholars,journalists, diplomats and so on,routinely refer toLatin America as `democratic’in thewake of the 1980s `transitions’ (with the exception of Cuba). Yet,if we replace the polyarchic de® nition with the popular de® nition of democracy,we could argue, as USpoliticalscientist Carl Cohen does, that democracyis nota `constant’(either existing or not) but a `variable’(more or less ofit), and democracy can be measured along the three dimensions of `breadth,depth and range’ of mass participationin societaldecisions, voting for representativesbeing only one aspect of participation in decision making. 13 In thisframework, Cuba is less ofademocracyat one level than the United States (eglack of multiparty elections), but is adeeperdemocracy at other levels, measuredby the breadth, depth and range of mass popularparticipation in decisionmaking, and by a muchmore democratic socioeconomic order that contrastssharply with the gross inequalitiesin power and wealth that character- ise theUnited States and the vast majority of `democratic’ states inLatin Americaand the Third World. Although Cuba falls short of themodel of popular democracyin many respectsÐ the subordination of civil society to the state, a weakdevelopment of mechanisms in which state of® cials are helddirectly accountableto mass constituencies,a lackof multiparty pluralism, and so forthÐthe point here is thatit isnotparticularly meaningful, either theoretically orin any practical sense, tojudge democracy or the lack of it in Cuba by the polyarchicconception applied by the United States. Theimplications of substitutingthe literal (or classic) de®nition of democracy withthe institutional de® nition embodied in polyarchy are vast.It means that suchissues as whocontrols the material and cultural resources ofsociety, in whoseinterests is societyorganised, and so forth,become irrelevant to the discussionof democracy.What is relevantis simplypolitical contestation among elitefactions through procedurally free elections,no moreno less. Itmeans that asymmetriesand inequalities both among groups within a singlenation and amongnations within the international order bear no relation to democracy.The notionthat there may be averitablecontradiction in terms betweenelite or class 648 PUSHING POLYARCHY rule,in which wealth and power is monopolisedby tiny minorities, on the one hand,and democracy, on the other handÐ a contradictionwhich would ¯ ow fromthe original Greek de® nition of power of the peopleÐ does not enterÐ by theoretical-de®nitional ® atÐinto the polyarchic de® nition, rooted in thepluralist modelof power and structural-functional isttheory. Itshouldbe clearthat popular democracy, including mass participation,social justice,economic equalities and national sovereignty, challenges an unjust internationalsocial and economic order, and is athreatto US interests.Behind contestedconcepts are contestedsocial orders .Populardemocracy is antithetical tothe `low-intensity democracy’ which the USA seeks topromote. Popular democracythreatens elite status quos and US/ Northerndomination. In Haiti, in Chile,in the Philippines, in South Africa and elsewhere, people have been strugglingto replace dictatorshipsÐ sustained by strategic alliances between localelites and the USAÐ withemancipatory projects along the lines of the modelof populardemocracy. In crucial moments in thesestruggles, Washington steppedin, through various forms ofdemocracypromotion programmes, to seek polyarchicoutcomes. And in Nicaragua under the Sandinistas and Haiti under Aristide,democracy promotion and other forms ofUS interventionsought to effecttransitions from experiments in popular democracy (regardless of the de®ciencies and weaknesses internalto these experiments) to elite-based poly- archies.14 Iwillargue below that US policytowards Cuba seeks asimilar outcome.

Globalisation, promotingpolyarchy, and consensual dominationin the `new worldorder’ Strugglesfor popular democracy around the world are profoundthreats to the privilegesof US-led Northern elites and their junior counterparts in the South. (Iviewthe USA, inthe age of globalisation, not as actingon behalf of a US elite,but as playinga leadershiprole on behalf of a transnationalhegemonic con®guration representing transnational capital; however, such a discussionis beyondthe scope of this article.) Yet the methods and policies pursued during theCold War years toconfront these challenges have proved increasingly ineffectiveand untenable. This process has ledUS policymakers toinitiate a shiftin the dominant form through which the USA seeks toassure stabilityin aworldsystem underNorthern elite hegemony, from promoting authoritarian to promoting`democratic’ political and social arrangements in Third World coun- tries.Both polyarchy and authoritarianism/ dictatorship,as distinctforms ofelite ruleand social control, stand opposed to popular democracy. The shift in US foreignpolicy from promoting authoritarianism to promoting polyarchy is ashift fromcoercive to consensual methods of social control in the South, intended to address thepost-World War II crises ofelite rule. This assertion requires an expansionof the theoretical discussion. Thede® ning features of our epoch, which frames theshift from authoritarian- ism topolyarchy, is theemergence of a capitalistglobal economy. The emergenceof a globaleconomy brings with it the material basis forthe emergenceof a singularglobal society, including the transnationalisation of civil 649 WILLIAMI ROBINSON societyand of political processes. Theold units of analysisÐ nation statesÐ are increasinglyinappropriate for understanding the dynamics of our epoch, not only interms ofeconomic processes, butalso social relations and political systems. Promotingdemocracy can only be understood as partof abroaderprocess ofthe exerciseof hegemony, in the sense meantby Antonio Gramsci, within and betweennations in the context of the transnationalisation of the economy, politicalprocesses andcivil societies. `Low intensity democracy’ is astructural featureof the new world order: it is aglobalpolitical system correspondingto aglobaleconomy under the hegemony of atransnationalelite which is theagent oftransnational capital. The shift from authoritarian to consensual mechanisms ofsocialcontrol corresponds to the emergence of the global economy since the 1970sand constitutes a politicalexigency of macroeconomic restructuring on a worldscale. Theglobal economy has beenwell-researched and a discussionis beyondthe scopeof thisarticle. Suf® ce ittopoint out here that over the past several decades theworld has beenmoving from a situationin which nations have been linked viacapital ¯ owsand exchange in an integrated international market to the globalisationof the process ofproduction itself. This involves the restructuring ofthe international division of labour and the reorganisation of productive structuresin eachnation, and has majorconsequences for the social and political textureof each society. As Cubahas discovered,no single nation state can remaininsulated from the global capitalist economy or prevent the penetration ofthesocial, political and cultural superstructure of globalcapitalism. Globalisa- tion,made possible by several post-World War II wavesin the `scienti® c and technologicalrevolution’ , is transformingthe very nature of the industrial productionprocess and,along with it, the role of human labour. It has allowed forthe decentralisation across theglobe of complex production processes simultaneousto thecentralisation of decisionmaking and management of global production,that is, the complete separation of the site of management from the siteof production and the geographic fragmentation of production and capital. Capitalnow has themeans tomove with total mobility across theglobe in the search forthe cheapest labour and the most congenial conditions for the different circuitsin theprocess ofproductionand distribution, without regard for national borders.In this reorganised world economy, the rich countries of the North are increasinglybased on control of technology, information and services ina `globalfactory’ , whereasthe labour-intensive phase of international production is shiftedto the South through the `comparative advantage’ of abundant cheap labour.The globalisation of production, which involves a hithertounseen integrationof nationaleconomies, brings with it atendencytowards uniformity, notjust in the conditions of production,but in thecivil and political superstruc- turein which social relations of production unfold. The agent of the global economyis transnationalcapital, managed by a class-conscioustransnational elitebased in the `centre’ countries of the world system, and led by the USA. Theaccelerated concentration of capital and economic power around this transnationalelite in centre countries has profoundeffects onarrangements betweenexisting social groups, class constellationsand political systems in everycountry of the world system, including a redistributionof quotas of 650 PUSHING POLYARCHY accumulatedpolitical and economic power towards new groups linked to transnationalcapital and the global economy. In every region of theworld, from EasternEurope to Latin America, states, economies and political processes are becomingtransnationalised and integrated under the guidance of this new elite. Thistransnational elite has itsexact counterpart in each nation of the South, in anewbreed of `technocratic’ elite in Latin America, Africa and Asia who are thelocal counterparts to the global elite, and who are overseeingsweeping processes ofsocial and economic restructuring. 15 Thistransnational elite has aneconomic project and a politicalcounterpart to thatproject. The economic project is `neoliberalism’, amodelwhich seeks to achieveconditions which permit the total mobility of capital. This model includesthe elimination of state intervention in the economy and the regulation byindividual nation-states over the activities of capital in their territories. The neoliberal`structural adjustment’ programmes currently sweeping the South seek macroeconomicstability (price and exchange-rate stability, etc) as anessential requisitefor the activity of transnational capital, which must harmonise a wide rangeof ® scal,monetary and industrial policies among multiple nations if it is tobe able to function simultaneously, and often instantaneously, between numerousnational borders. In turn, the political project of thistransnational elite is theconsolidation of political systems whichfunction through consensual mechanismsof social control, that is ofpolyarchic political systems. Itis preciselythese new elites in the South who have entered into alliances to promotedemocracy, or todevelopdemocratic consensual forms ofsocialcontrol intheir countries in contrast to the earlier forms ofauthoritarian or dictatorial control.It isinthiscontext that democracy promotion and the promotion of free marketsthrough neoliberal restructuring has becomea singularprocess inUS foreignpolicy. The US Agencyfor International Development ( USAID) explains thatpromoting democracy in the latter part of the 20th century `is complemen- taryto and supportive of the transition to market-oriented economies’ . 16 Butwhy consensual over coercive mechanisms of control? Authoritarianism anddictatorship had become a fetterto the emergent patterns of international capitalaccumulation corresponding to the global economy. Globalising forces havebeen disintegrating previously embedded forms ofpolitical authority. Transnationalcapital has becomesuf® cientlydisruptive and intrusive as tobreak downall the old barriers that separated and compartmentalised groups in and betweensocieties, while mass communicationsis integratingwhat were once secludedsocial and cultural experiences of different peoples within the world system.The communications revolution has penetratedeven the most remote andisolated regions of the world and linked them with an increasingly global civilisation.The globalisation of social life has broughtwith it new social movementsand revolutions in civil society around the world. In short, people havebeen pushed by theglobal economy into new roles as economicand social protagonists,and in this process, have been demanding the democratisation of sociallife. Thisis whatthe Trilateral Commission, in itslandmark 1975 report The Crisis ofDemocracy ,referredto as `theexplosion of social interaction, and correlatedly atremendousincrease of socialpressure’ .Socialand economic developments in 651 WILLIAMI ROBINSON theworld over the past several decades `have made it possiblefor a greatmany moregroups and interests to coalesce ¼ theinformation explosion has madeit dif®cult if not impossible to maintain the traditional distance that was deemed necessary togovern’. Thereport went on to notethat the `democracy ethos make itdif® cult to prevent access andrestrict information, while the persistence of the bureaucraticprocesses whichhave been associated with the traditional governing systems makes itimpossible to handle them at a lowenough level’ . 17 Inother words, authoritarian political systems are unableto manage the expansivesocial intercourse and ¯ uidsocial relations associated with the global economy.Social interaction and economic integration on a worldscale are obstructedby the political framework of authoritarian or dictatorial arrange- ments; underthe hegemony of transnational capital, they require consensual arrangements.The imperative for democracy as far as eliteinterests are con- cerned,lies in the view that democracy is themost effective means ofassuring stability.The interest is notdemocracy, but stability, the former seen as buta mechanismfor the latter. This is incontrast to earlier periods in US foreign policyhistoryÐ and correlatedly, to the historic norm in centre± periphery rela- tionspredicated on coercivemodes of domination, as inthecolonial eraÐ when militarydictatorships or authoritarian client regimes were seen as thebest guarantorof stability. Theextremes of military regimes and highly unpopular dictatorships, like thoseof Somoza in Nicaragua, the Shah in Iran, Marcos inthe Philippines, the Duvaliersin Haiti and Pinochet in Chile, engendered mass oppositionmove- mentsthat became transnational in their signi® cance as globalisationproceeded, thatthreatened to lead to more fundamental social, economic and political changesand that were no longerguarantors of socialcontrol. Thus the challenge inpromoting polyarchy is toremovedictatorships and pre-emptmore fundamen- talchanges. The Iranian revolution, followed shortly afterwards by the Nicaraguanin July 1979, were compelling events that brought home this lesson toUS policymakers. Polyarchy is seen as thepreferred means ofconfronting, oratleast controlling, popular sectors andtheir demandsÐ or asKennanwould say,their `envy’ and `resentment’ Ð inthe framework of an unjust world system. Supportedupon the foundations of what Gramsci referred to as ideological hegemony,consensual arrangements are atplay for the resolution of con¯ icts withinthe parameters of a givensocial order .Ontheone hand, says Gershman, `traditionalautocrats simply cannot adapt to the pace of change and con¯ icting politicalpressures ofthe modern world’ . Ontheother is `thedeclining utility of conventionalmilitary force in thecontemporary world’ . Inthis context, `compe- titionis likelyto continue to shift from the military to the political realm, and itwill become increasingly important for the West to developa sophisticatedand long-termstrategy for democratic political assistance’ . 18 Formal democratic structuresare thereforeseen as moredisposed to diffusing the sharpest social tensionsand to incorporating suf® cientsocial bases withwhich to sustain more stableenvironments under the con¯ ict-ridden and ¯ uidconditions of emergent globalsociety. This new political intervention is moresophisticated than earlier forms ofinterventionby theUSA andother former colonial powers. The process tendsto be less acrudedesign hatched in Washington and other Northern 652 PUSHING POLYARCHY capitalsthan a complexconvergence of interestsamong an increasinglycohesive transnationalelite headed by a US-ledNorthern bloc and incorporating elite constituenciesin the South. The demands, grievances and aspirations of the popularclasses tendto become neutralised or redirected less throughdirect repressionthan through ideological mechanisms, political cooptation and the limitsimposed by the global economy and the legitimising parameters of polyarchy. Thedistinction between authoritarianism and polyarchy should not be be- littled,either in a normativeor a theoreticalsense. However,the trappings of democraticprocedure in a polyarchicpolitical system donotmean that the lives ofthose in nations where the USA is promotingdemocracy become ® lledwith authenticor meaningful democratic content, much less thatsocial justice or greatereconomic equality is achieved.Seen in the light of popular democracy, USdemocracyand democratisation, have nothing to do with meeting the authenticaspirations of repressed andmarginalised majorities for political participationand for greater socioeconomic justice. But polyarchy may prove to bea moredurable means ofsocial control. US democracypromotion, as it actuallyfunctions, sets aboutnot just to secure andstabilise polyarchy but to havethe USA andlocal elites thoroughly penetrate not just the state, but civil societyas thelocus of a Gramscianhegemony, and from therein assure control overpopular mobilisation and mass movements.In other words, seen through thelens of the promotion of polyarchy, the composition and balance of power incivil society in a givenThird World country is nowjust as importantto US interestsas whocontrols the governments of thosecountries. This is ashiftfrom socialcontrol `from above’ to social control `from below’ (and within), for the purposeof managing change and reform so as topre-empt any elemental challengeto the social order. This explains why the new political intervention, conductedby the NED andother agencies, does not target governments per se, butgroups in civilsociety itselfÐ trade unions, political parties, the mass media, professionalguilds, peasant associations, women’ s, youth,student and other mass organisations.

Theintroduction of`political aid’ Thepolicy shift from promoting authoritarianism to promoting polyarchy has beena lengthyprocess drawnout over several decades. In addition, it involved thedevelopment of new modalities, instruments and agencies for actually accomplishingthe transition, from authoritarian to polyarchicpolitical and social systems inthird world countries where intervention had taken place. This reorientationentailed, in particular, the introduction and expansion of anunder- developedand underutilised instrument in US foreignpolicy, politicalaid , which has cometo supplement the two main tools of US foreignpolicy since World WarII, militaryand economic aid programmes. `Programsto strengthen friendly political movements in other countries are oneof theforeign policy arms ofa moderngreat power’ , notedtwo participants inProject Democracy, a semi-secret programmelaunched in the early 1980s underthe auspices of the NSC todevelop democracy promotion programmes. 19 653 WILLIAMI ROBINSON

`Untilthis century, there were three instruments for such efforts: diplomacy, economic,and military. This triad retains its primacy today, but it has been supplementedby two additional instruments,’ they explained. `One is propa- ganda¼ Theother new policy instrumentÐ aid to friendly political organiza- tionsabroad ¼ helpsbuild up political actors in other polities, rather than merelyseeking to in¯ uence existing ones.’ 20 BetweenWorld War II and1990, the USA spentsome $400billion in such foreignmilitary and economic `aid’ (over a trilliondollars at 1990 dollars). 21 The purposeof military aid was tobolster local repressive forces whichcould suppress dissentand maintain social control. US economicaid programmes, beyondgaining political in¯ uence, were intended to integrate the economies of recipientcountries into the world capitalist market. 22 Thepolicy shift has notin theleast bit eclipsed the two traditional foreign policy instruments; to the contrary,they have been refurbished and widely deployed. However, the key ingredientwas stillmissing. It was theintroduction of thisthird category which wouldplay a centripetalrole in facilitating the shift in policy. Thosearguing for the introduction of political aid, including a commission supervisedby the NSC underProject Democracy to create the NED, made broad referenceto theconclusions of a 1972book by William A Douglas, Developing Democracy.23 Inhis study, Douglas reviewed the debates in US intellectualand policy-makingcircles over whether authoritarianism or `democracy’ is best suitedto meeting US interests.Douglas coined the term regimenteddemocracy todescribe the type of political system theUS shouldpromote in place of authoritarianism. 24 Comparingthe populations of developing nations with `chil- dren’, andcalling underdevelopment a resultof their `traditional attitudes’ , Douglasargued that the peoples of the Third World required `tutelage’ , `regi- mentation’and `social control’ , butthat `democracy’ could achieve these goals moreeffectively than authoritarianism. `That a ®rm handis neededis unde- niable’, but`democracy can provide a suf® cientdegree of regimentation,if it can buildup themass organizationsneeded to reachthe bulk of thepeople on adaily basis.Dictatorship has nomonopoly on the tutelage principle.’ 25 Douglaswent onto develop detailed recommendations on how `political aid’ programmes shouldbe introduced. Just as economicaid addressed economic underdevelop- ment,reasoned Douglas, political aid `should address politicalunderdevelop- ment’ .26 Heemphasised:`We should undertake an active policy of political aid, forboth developmental and security reasons’ . 27 Thetrick, said Douglas, was todevisethe correct `transplanting mechanisms’ forestablishing polyarchy in the Third World. 28 Includedamong the recom- mendationswere the establishment of aspecialisedagency (later to become the NED);theparticipation of the private sector in democracy promotion abroad; andthe modi® cation of existing government institutions and programmes so as tosynchronise overall foreign policy with `political aid’ . Twodecades afterhis study, the `transplanting mechanisms’ and `insulating devices’ which Douglascalled for became embodied in the new democracy promotion programmes.Douglas himself went on to become a seniorconsultant to the NSC’sProjectDemocracy, which led to the creation of the NED.Theoperation andconcrete mechanisms of democracy promotion operations in countries in 654 PUSHING POLYARCHY whichthe USA has intervenedhave been well-documented in a growingbody ofempirical studies. 29 Thepoint here is thatpolitical aid, administered through the NED, USAID,andother channels, has becomea sophisticatedinstrument for penetratingthe political systems andcivil society of othercountries down to the grassrootslevel. NED presidentGershman has categorisedUS politicalintervention programmes intothose aimed at `long-term democratic political development’ , andthose aimedat securing a `democratictransition’ , thatis, a changeof regime. 30 The ®rst categorysigni® es programmesaimed at stabilising and consolidating polyar- chicpolitical systems insocietiesalready considered `democratic’ , bybolstering eliteforces inpolitical and civil society, and by inculcating what the operatives andtheoreticians of the new political intervention consider to be the `political culture’of polyarchy.Programmes under this category in the 1990s include most LatinAmerican nations, as wellas theformer Soviet bloc countries, all of which wereconsidered `democratic’ . Inthe second category, `transitions to democ- racy’, USpolicymakers identifytwo types of transitions: from authoritarian or right-wingdictatorships to elitist civilian regimes; andfrom left-wing, popular, nationalistor socialist regimes, considered adversaries, to elitist regimes allied withthe US-led transnational elite. Chile, Haiti, Paraguay and the Philippines, fellunder the ® rst typein the1980s and, in the 1990s, many African and several Asiannations fall under this type. Nicaragua fell under the second, as didHaiti underAristide and as doesCuba at the moment.

TheUS challenge in Cuba:imposing a transition tocapitalist polyarchy Thechange in USpolicytowards Cuba, from an emphasison external`security’ concernsto an internal `democratisation’ focus, is thecombined product of the shiftto democracy promotion and the end of the Cold War and US± Soviet competition.The US objectivein Cuba since 1959, beneath and beyond real or perceivedsecurity concerns, has beento recover historic US dominationover the countryand to neutralise the threat that Cuba represented (a threatcaused by Cuba’s foreignpolicy practice and the revolutionary example it set, and thus a politicalas wellas anideological threat). This objective has notchanged under theBush or Clinton administrations. The destruction of the Cuban revolution willremain the US goalthroughout the 1990s. In theearly 1990s a remarkable, iflargely unnoticed, consensus emerged in Washington across themainstream politicalspectrum, from liberal to conservative, regarding a shiftin Cuba policy towardsdemocracy promotion. This consensus was expressedin a series of high-levelpolicy reports, and has sincebeen af® rmedin actual policy. 31 The followingobservations are presented,by wayof conclusion, as asynopsisof the USdemocracypromotion strategy towards Cuba. However, it shouldbe empha- sised thatCuba is aspecial,enigmatic and exceptionally complex case. Theoperationalising assumption in Washington is thatthe Cuban revolution can,and will, be undermined over the mid term, and that Washington stands a betterchance than ever in the 1990s of reimposing its historic domination over thecountry (this distinguishes the current conjuncture from that of the late 1970s,when US andCuban of® cials dabbled in negotiations over a real modus 655 WILLIAMI ROBINSON vivendi).Butthis goal will be pursued in the context of the new policy of democracypromotion. The banners of anti-communistand national security have alreadybeen discarded. The new policy focus involves a shiftfrom aggressive destabilisationfrom without to political penetration and cooptation from within, inwhich the target is as muchCuban civil society as itis theCuban state. The undertakingwill be largely along the lines of the `Nicaragua model’ . Inthat model,US objectiveschanged dramatically from 1987 onward, from an attempt tomilitarily overthrow the Sandinistas through an externally-based counterrevo- lutionarymovement seeking an authoritarian restoration, to new forms of politicalintervention in support of an internal `moderate’ opposition. This opposition,organised and trained through large-scale US politicalaid pro- grammes,operated through peaceful (non-coercive) means incivil society to undermineSandinista hegemony. The shift from hard-line destabilisation to `democracypromotion’ in Nicaragua,culminating in the1990 electoral defeat of theSandinistas, a conservativerestoration and the installation of a polyarchic politicalsystem, the reinsertion of Nicaragua into the global economy, and far-reachingneo-liberal restructuring, has beenwell-documented elsewhere. 32 USpolicymakers haveacknowledged that a strategicweakness in their policy overthe past 35 years has beenan emphasis on hard-line destabilisation from abroad,without concern for establishing and stabilising any viable alternative to therevolution. In this sense, Washingtonis learningwhat revolutionaries have alwaysargued: in order to overthrow a regimeand install a newsystem, two factorsmust be met. First, the existing regime and its system mustbe in crisis (thisis theapproximate situation in Cuba). Second, a viablealternative must be inplace, ready and capable of taking over and mounting a newsystem (thisis theUS challenge). Thisshift implies an effort to transfer the nucleus of anti-Castro opposition forces fromMiami to Cuba in order to ensure that the opposition becomes headquarteredÐphysically and institutionallyÐ inside Cuba. This shift also re- quiresa greater¯ owofhuman,material and ® nancialresources andcommunica- tionsbetween the United States and Cuba. It means transferringUS supportfrom theextreme-right political and paramilitary groups, such as theCuban American NationalFoundation and Alpha 66, towards opposition groups considered moderateand centristÐ and even leftist, by USstandards.In this regard, the US strategymight lead to quiet negotiations on speci® c `line-item’points, such as immigrationand telephone lines. But such bargaining should not be confused witha USintentionto negotiate a modusvivendi . Promotingdemocracy in Cuba, to date, has involvedlarge sums ofpolitical aid,mostly for Cuban groups located outside Cuba. These political aid pro- grammes havebeen handled so far mostlyby the NED,andhave involved some $20million between 1986 and 1993. 33 Theobjective of these programmes is to createthe `in-country’ agents of a transnationalproject for Cuba. Through the newmodalities of political intervention it has developed,Washington has alreadybegun to foment a nationalopposition network inside and outside Cuba, backedby a broadinternational support network, and including human rights groups,political parties, trade unions, communications media, youth and women’s groups,civic associations and so forth,along the same linesas the 656 PUSHING POLYARCHY

`Nicaraguamodel’ . Thesepolitical aid programmes would strive to provide this oppositionnetwork with a politicalaction capacity and a publicprojection amongthe Cuban population. Such an opposition network would be interlocking inits leadership, sharing a commonprogramme. It will not be acovertor violent opposition.Its publicdiscourse will be moderate,even nationalist, and it willnot callfor the overthrow of the Cuban government but for dialogue, a political openingand peaceful change. It will raise sensitiveissues amongthe Cuban population,emphasising the current economic hardships and the aspirations of Cuba’s post-1959youth generation. US strategistswill attempt to cultivate a socialbase forpolitical opposition among those within the Cuban population tied tothe emergent external sector of the bifurcated economy, exploiting incipient internalsocial strati® cation, resentments and legitimate grievances. It should be notedin thisregard that leadership and supporters of theseopposition groups in Cubancivil society should not bedepicted as mere puppetsof US intervention, butas Cubanconstituencies whose endogenous pursuits are incorporatedthrough USpolicyinto a largerstrategy which manipulates problems and limitations stemmingfrom objective conditions and from weaknesses internalto the Cuban revolution. Thetremendous constraints imposed on Cubaby theglobal capitalist economy makes morefavourable the terrain on which the USA willpursue its objective. Irrespectiveof particularUS policies,Cuba, like most other nations in theworld, has littlechoice but to insert itself into the global capitalist economy under terms whichare largelydictated from the principal Northern capitalist powers and their transnationaleconomic and political instruments. The USA isplayingthe role of leadershipin the emergence of a newtransnational historic bloc, and Cuba’ s insertioninto the `brave new world’ of globalcapitalism is thoroughlylinked to US-Cubanrelations. Inthis regard, the economic embargo of Cuba is anessential ingredient in overallUS policy.If itis lifted,it will be in exchange for such Cuban concessionsas permittingthe free ¯owof US supportfor internal groups. And itwill probably not be lifted in the short, or even mid term. 34 TheUS strategy is toseek toarrest Cuba’s effortsat reinsertion into the world economy and penetrationof capitalist markets, so as toperpetuate economic attrition. The entirestrategy rests onassuringthe continuity of Cuba’ s severe economiccrisis, atpreventing recovery, since the underlying strategy is toconvert an economic crisis intosocial discontent, and then to give a politicalexpression to this discontentÐthat is, to fomenta `criticalmass’ .Thisis predicatedon maintaining theembargo, while simultaneously achieving a `demonstrationeffect’ and a sense of`relative deprivation’ among the Cuban population through mass communications,image creation and symbolic manipulation. Thepolicy shift will help reduce the long-standing tactical differences over howto confront the Cuban revolution that have existed between the dominant groupsin theUSA, ontheone hand, and the dominant groups in WesternEurope andLatin America, on theother. The call for Washington’ s versionof `free and fairelections’ will be ongoing. Nevertheless, the efforts to foment an internal politicalopposition will move forward with or without multiparty elections in Cuba.Washington will rely heavily on `third-country’ participation in its 657 WILLIAMI ROBINSON policies.For instance, support for internal opposition groups will be channelled throughother Latin American countries, and the call for `free andfair elections’ willbe made through multilateral forums. Despitethe claim that it is onlyinterested in process andnot in outcome, the UnitedStates is actuallyinterested, in Cuba and elsewhere, in outcome. In Nicaraguathe 1984 elections were impeccably free andfair as regardsprocess, butwere rejected by Washington because of their outcome: a Sandinista electoralvictory. In 1990, the elections were again impeccable in process, but thistime the United States welcomed the process becauseit obtainedits desired outcome:the removal of the Sandinistas from power. Similarly, we should not assume thatUS hostilitywould cease andrelations normalise if Cuba were to holdelections tomorrow which were procedurally correct if the outcome were a rati®cation of thecurrent government, since the United States is concernedwith outcomein Cuba, not process.

Notes Thisarticle is amodi®ed version of a paperpresented at theConference on Democracy andthe US± Cuban Dispute,held in Havana, Cuba, in April 1994 under the joint sponsorship of the Centro de Estudios sobre America (Havana) and CRIES (Managua).William Robinsonteaches Sociologyat theUniversity of New Mexico,and is authorof PromotingPolyarchy: Globalization and US Intervention , and Democracy inthe 21st Century,CambridgeUniversity Press, forthcoming,1996. 1 Department ofState, `Democracy inLatin America andthe Caribbean: The Promise and the Challenge’ , Washington,DC: Bureau of PublicAffairs, Department ofState, Special Report No 158, March 1987, p 13. 2 PolicyPlanning Study ( PPS)23,Department ofState, dated 24 February 1948, in ForeignRelations of the UnitedStates (FRUS),I(2),1948, p 23. 3 `Fosteringdemocracy abroad:the role of theNational Endowment for Democracy’ ,speech deliveredby Carl Gershman tothe American PoliticalScience FoundationConvention, 29 August 1986. 4 William IRobinson& KentNorsworthy, Davidand Goliath: The US WarAgainst Nicaragua , New York: MonthlyReview Press, 1987,p 15.For a goodsummary of CIA interventionsand a chronologyof US wars since thefounding of the US republic,see William Blum, The CIA:AForgottenHistory ,London:Zed Press, 1986.For overall analysis and description of USforeignpolicy in the post war period,including the policy ofpromoting authoritarianism, see, amongother works, Thomas J McCormick, America’sHalfCentury: UnitedStates Foreign Policy in the Cold War ,Baltimore,MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1989;and William ApplemanWilliams, Empireas a Wayof Life ,New York:Oxford University Press, 1980. 5 NationalSecurity Council Memorandum NSC-68,dated 7 April1950, in FRUS,I,1950,pp 252, 263, 272. 6 Fora detailedanalysis of the creation of the post-World War IIorder,see Laurence HShoup& William Minter, ImperialBrain Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy , New York:Monthly Review Press, 1977. 7 Fordetails on this `democracy promotion’apparatus, see, amongother studies, William IRobinson, US Interventionin the Nicaraguan Elections and American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era , Boulder, CO: Westview,1992, ch 1, `The new intervention’; TonySmith, America’sMission:The United States and theWorldwide Struggle for Democracy inthe Twentieth Century ,Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1994;Council on Hemispheric Affairs, NationalEndowment for Democracy ( NED):AForeignPolicy Branch Gone Awry,Washington,DC, 1990;and General AccountingOf® ce ( GAO), PromotingDemocracy: Foreign Affairsand Defense AgenciesFunds and ActivitiesÐ 1991 to 1993 ,Washington,DC: GAO, 1994. 8 See RobertA Dahl, Polyarchy:Participation and Opposition ,New Haven,CT: Yale UniversityPress, 1971. ForHuntington’ s analysis,see Samuel Huntington,`The modest meaning of democracy’ ,inRobert A Pastor, Democracy inthe Americas: Stoppingthe Pendulum ,New York:Holmes andMeier, 1989. 9 See, eg,Robinson, USInterventionin the Nicaraguan Elections ,ch8, `The future: low intensity democ- racy?’ ;andBarry Gills, Joel Rocamora &RichardWilson (eds), LowIntensity Democracy: PoliticalPower inthe New WorldOrder ,Boulder,CO: Westview Press, 1993. 10 WBGallie, `Essentiallycontested concepts’ , AristotelianSociety ,56,1956, pp 167± 198. 11 Afulllisting of literature referringto popular democracy is impossiblehere. Antonio Gramsci andRosa Luxemburgwould be the classical thinkersin the Marxist tradition on democracy. Forgeneral discussions whichcontrast polyarchy (referred toas `liberaldemocracy’ )andpopular democracy, see, amongother 658 PUSHING POLYARCHY

works,David Held, PoliticalTheory and the Modern State: Essays onState, Power, and Democracy , Stanford,CA: StanfordUniversity Press, 1989;and David Held & ChristopherPollitt (eds), New Forms of Democracy,London:Sage Publications, 1986. 12 LarryDiamond, Juan J Linz& SeymourMartin Lipset (eds), Democracy inDeveloping Countries , Boulder, CO: LynneRienner and the National Endowment for Democracy, pxvi. 13 Carl Cohen, Democracy,New York:The Free Press, 1971. 14 ForNicaragua, see Robinson, USInterventionin the Nicaraguan Elections .ForHaiti, see, amongothers, PaulFarmer, TheUses ofHaiti ,Monroe,ME: Common Courage Press, 1994;James Ridgeway(ed), The HaitiFiles: Decodingthe Crisis ,Washington,DC: AzulEditions, 1994; and Worth Cooley-Prost, Democracy Interventionin Haiti: The USAID Democracy EnhancementProject ,Washington,DC: Washing- tonOf® ce onHaiti, 1994. 15 William Robinson,`The Sao Paulo Forum: is there anew LatinAmerican left?’ , MonthlyReview , 44, 1992, pp 1±12. 16 `Thedemocratic initiative’, Washington,DC: USAgencyfor International Development, Department of State,December 1990. 17 MichelCrozier, Samuel PHuntington& JojiWatanuki, TheCrisis ofDemocracy: Reporton the Governabilityof Democracies totheTrilateral Commission ,(New York:New YorkUniversity Press, 1975, p 13. 18 Carl Gershman, `TheUnited States andthe world democratic revolution’, TheWashington Quarterly , Winter 1989. 19 There has beenmuch written on Project Democracy andthe origins of the NED.See, forinstance, Council onHemispheric Affairs, NationalEndowment for Democracy ; Robinson, USInterventionin theNicaraguan Elections;andHolly Sklar & ChipBerlet, ` NED, CIA,andthe Orwellian Democracy Project’, Covert Action InformationBulletin ,39,Winter 1991± 92. 20 MichaelA Samuels &William ADouglas,`Promoting democracy’ ,in WashingtonQuarterly , Summer 1981,pp 52± 53. Samuels andDouglas were ProjectDemocracy consultants. 21 See DougBandow, `Economic and military aid’ , inPeter JShraeder(ed), Interventionin the 1980s: US ForeignPolicy in the Third World ,Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner, 1989, p 63.Note that if US aidchannelled throughmultilateral agencies is included,the ® gurenearly doubles. 22 NSC-68described economic aid as `a major instrumentin the conduct of United States foreignrelations. It is aninstrument which can powerfullyin¯ uence theworld environment in ways favorable’to US interests. NationalSecurity Council Memorandum NSC-68,dated 7 April,1950, in FRUS,I,1950,p 258. 23 William ADouglas, DevelopingDemocracy ,Washington,DC: Heldref Publications,1972. 24 Ibid,p 122±123. 25 Ibid,p 16±22. 26 Ibid, p 16. 27 Ibid,p xiii. 28 Ibid, p 43. 29 Amongnumerous works which document US democracy promotionprogrammes indiverse countries in LatinAmerica, Africa, Asia, theMiddle East andcountries of Eastern andSouthern Europe, see Robinson, USInterventionin the Nicaraguan Elections ;Sklar& Berlet, ` NED, CIA’ ; Farmer, TheUses ofHaiti ; Cooley-Prost, Democracy Interventionin Haiti ;Councilon Hemispheric Affairs, NationalEndowment for Democracy;andBeth Sims, Workers ofthe World Undermined ,Boston,MD: South End Press, 1993. 30 Gershman, `TheUnited States andthe world democratic revolution’. 31 Three suchhighly in¯ uential reports were `Cubain the Americas: reciprocal challenges’, issuedby the liberalInter-American Dialogue(Washington, DC, October 1992), `Hastening Castro’ s downfall,’issued by theconservative Heritage Foundation(Washington, DC, 2 July1992), and a `non-partisan’ RAND report, `Cubaadrift in a postcommunistworld’ , preparedfor the Undersecretary ofDefense forPolicy (by RAND analystsEdward Gonzalez &DavidRonfeld, RAND,SantaMonica, CA: 1992).Several members ofthe Inter-American Dialogue,including President Richard E Feinberg,went on to occupy positions concerning LatinAmerica policyin the Clinton Administration State Department andNational Security Council. 32 Robinson, USInterventionin theNicaraguan Elections .Alsosee AngelSaldomando, ElRetorno de la AID, Casode Nicaragua: Condicionalidad y ReestructuracionConservadora ,Managua:Ediciones CRIES, 1992. 33 See NationalEndowment for Democracy, AnnualReports, 1986± 1993 (Washington, DC). For discussion, see alsoThe Inter-Hemispheric EducationResource Center,`Turning the screws onCuba’ , The NED Backgrounder ,1(3)1992; and Jack Colhoun,`Washington goes shopping for Cuban ª democracyº’ , Guardian,25December 1991,p 7. 34 Thethree policyreports mentioned above all coincidedin calling for such a selective liftingof the embargo. Thisposition was reiterated ina September1994 follow-up RAND reportby Edward Gonzalez &David Ronfeldt, StormWarnings for Cuba (RAND Corporation,Santa Monica), and has beenfollowed in the US±Cuban negotiations that have taken place, onan on-again, off-again basis since 1993over various bilateral issues. 659