ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol 16, No 4, 1995 Pushingpolyarchy: the US± Cuba case andthe Third World WILLIAMI ROBINSON Sincethe late 1980s US policy makers haveargued that the basis ofthe long-runningUS disputewith Cuba is thelack of `democracy’in the Caribbean islandnation. The Clinton Administration has madeit clear that its policy, includingany eventual normalisation of relations,will be basedon democratisa- tioninside Cuba. Yet, from the triumph of the Cuban revolution in 1959 to the late1980s, the US± Cuba con¯ ict was presentedin Washington as aproductof Cuba’s `securitythreat’ , emanatingfrom Cuba’ s foreignpolicy of active engage- mentin the international arena, including its support for Third World national liberationmovements and its alliance with the now defunct Soviet bloc. Therefore,the current assertion in Washingtonthat the dispute is overdemocracy representsa little-perceivedyet signi® cant change in US policy towards Cuba. Thisshift in policy,from an emphasis on external`security’ factors condition- ingUS± Cuban relations, to the emphasis on internal factorsÐ that is, on Cuba’s internalpolitical systemÐ is importanton two accounts. First, it is centralto an analysisof current US± Cuba relations and to prognostication on how these relationswill unfold in the coming years. Second, it re¯ ects anessential change inUS foreignpolicy that dates back to the 1970s, came tofruition in the 1980s, is nowbeing consolidated, and promises to play a majorrole in US foreign policyin the `new world order’ . Thischange has beendescribed by policy makers,scholars and journalists as ashifttowards `democracy promotion’ . The StateDepartment now de® nes `democracypromotion’ as oneof the three basic planksof USforeignpolicy, along with the promotion of `free markets’and the maintenanceof a USmilitary capacity around the world. `Support for democ- racy’, declaresone State Department policy document, `is becomingthe new organizingprinciple for American foreign policy’ . 1 Thischange is largelyunexplored. Many have applauded `democracy pro- motion’, witha surprisingshallowness in theoretical analysis, as apositiveand long-overduechange for the better in US policy. Those who have opposed US interventionabroad, while more sceptical regarding US intentions, have tended toview `democracy promotion’ as merelya continuation,under new rhetoric, of thesame USinterventionismof thepast. In fact,both positions are offthe mark, andre¯ ect the failure to appreciate the profound changes at every level that are accompanyingthe rise ofglobal capitalism, including changes in international politicalrelations and transnational class formation. Iwillpresent a theoreticalargument in this paper which runs contrary to conventionalwisdom and mainstream thinking on US `democracy promotion’ , yetone which, I believe,will elucidate not only the context in whichUS± Cuban William IRobinsonis at theCentral American Universityin Managua, Nicaragua, andthe University of New Mexicoin Albuquerque. 0143-6597/95/040643-17 Ó 1995Third World Quarterly 643 WILLIAMI ROBINSON relationswill unfold into the 21st century, but also the general dynamic of US foreignpolicy in the `new world order’ . Thispaper is dividedinto ® veparts. First,I willdiscuss inhistoric perspective the shift to what policy makers describeas `democracypromotion’ . Second,I willgive brief theoretical treat- mentto the concepts of democracy, and de® ne exactly what US policy makers meanwhen they say theyare promoting`democracy’ in Cuba and elsewhere. Third,I willprovide an explanation for this shift. Fourth, I willanalyse the concretemechanisms, in particular, `political aid’ programmes, through which thisshift is takingplace. Finally, I willlink this analysis and the theoretical discussionto the case ofCubaand speculate on howUS± Cuban relations might unfold.It must be emphasised that space limitationspreclude a fullexploration ofthe theoretical and analytical issues athand. What follows is bynecessity a simpli®cation of complex issues andconcepts. Frompromoting dictatorship topromoting `democracy’ `Wehave 50 percent of theworld’ s wealth,but only 6.3 percent of itspopulation ¼Inthis situation we cannotfail to betheobject of envy and resentment,’ noted GeorgeKennan in 1948, one of themost important architects of post-World War IIUnitedStates foreign policy. `Our real task in the coming period is todevise apatternof relationships which will allow us tomaintain this position of disparity,’said the then-Director of Policy Planning of the Department of State. `Weshould cease totalk about the raising of the living standards, human rights, anddemocratization. The day is notfar offwhen we are goingto have to deal instraight power concepts. The less weare thenhampered by idealistic slogans, thebetter.’ 2 Kennan’s candidstatement, contained in a top-secretdocument which dis- cussed USstrategyin the aftermath of WorldWar II, is highlyinstructive on two accounts.First, it underscores the fact that the strategic objective of US foreign policyduring the Cold War was less tobattle a `communistmenace’ than to defendgross inequalitiesin theinternational order (inequalities which were seen as underchallenge by thespread of socialism)and the tremendous privilege and powerthis global disparity of wealth brought for the United States as the dominantworld power. Second, Kennan’ s statementsuggests that democracy abroadwas nota majorconsideration for the United States in the formative years ofthe post-World War II order. Fourdecades after Kennan’ s 1948counsel, Carl Gershman, the President of theNational Endowment for Democracy ( NED),anewagency in theUS foreign policyapparatus created in 1983, admonished in a speechto the American PoliticalScience Foundation: `In a worldof advanced communication and explodingknowledge, it isnolongerpossible to rely solely on forceto promote stabilityand defend the national security. Persuasion is increasinglyimportant, andthe United States must enhance its capacity to persuade by developing techniquesfor reaching people at many different levels.’ Gershman went on to emphasisein his speech, in sharp contrast to Kennan, that `democracy’ abroad, shouldbe a majorconsideration for the United States, in its effort to `enhance itscapacity to persuade’ around the world. 3 644 PUSHING POLYARCHY TheEast± West prism in which Kennan and his generation had cast the North±South divide in foreign policy dictates evaporated with the end of the ColdWar. Yet, as Gershman’s statementsuggests, the fundamental objective of maintaininginternational asymmetries in an unjust global system, to which Kennanalluded nearly half a centuryearlier, did not change with the collapse of theSoviet system. What has changedare themethods and strategies for securing thisobjective. What US policy makers term`democracy promotion’ , andthe ideologicaldimensions it entails, is beingdeveloped as aneffective instrument of`persuasion’ , incontrast toÐ or more often, alongsideÐ force in assuring `patternsof relationships’ that protect US interests (and, increasingly, the collectiveinterests of the North) in an unjust international system. In other words,this shift from `straight power concepts’ to `persuasion’ is predicatedon thedevelopment of a newcomponent in US foreign policyÐ `democracy promotion’. TheUnited States had risen from the ashes ofWorld War II as thedominant worldpower, and policy makers hadset aboutconceiving, developing and defendingan international order largely under US-led Western domination. From WorldWar II tothe end of the Cold War, the United States employed military forceacross itsborders over 200 times, became embroiled in largescale wars in Koreaand Indochina and in `small wars’ , counterinsurgencycampaigns and covertoperations throughout Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Europe,including, as iswelldocumented, against Cuba. 4 Globalinterventionism was rationalisedby the Cold War and the need to confront communism. But perceivedcompetition from the former Soviet Union, while signi® cant, was not thedriving force behind foreign policy. Behind the `communist threat’ there has alwaysbeen another, more fundamental threat: a challengeto `patterns of relationships’which underpinned domination by theUS-led bloc of corecapital- istpowers in the international system andprerogative derived from privileged positionin an asymmetric international order. NationalSecurity Council ( NSC)Memorandum68, one of the key US foreign policydocuments of the postwar era, stated that postwar policy embraces `two subsidiarypolicies’ . Onewas tofoster `a worldenvironment in which the Americansystem cansurvive and ¯ ourish’, andthe other was containmentof the SovietUnion, which `seeks tofoster the seeds ofdestruction within the Soviet system’ .TheMemorandum went on: `Even if there was noSoviet Union we wouldface thegreat problem’ of achieving global `order and security’ . 5 Revealingly,a majorfocus of NSC-68was notthe Soviet Union at all, but securingUS andWestern access totheraw materials, markets and labour power ofthe Third World, and on assuring a politicalenvironment propitious to the operationof an increasingly international capital. Behind East± West relations, therefore,North± South relations were always intrinsic and central to the whole ColdWar era. 6 Although`democracy’ often entered the foreign policy-making vocabulary for reasons ofconvenience, or underthe circumstances of speci® c moments,it was not theprincipal political form which the United States promoted in the Third Worldin thepostwar years. In fact, as thehistorical