EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN SCORECARD FLASH RELATIONS ecfr.eu THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTION: HOW ANTI-EUROPEANS PLAN TO WRECK EUROPE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO STOP IT

Susi Dennison & Paweł Zerka

Europeans have a growing litany of worries. With US President Donald Trump dismantling the fundamentals of SUMMARY the multilateral system and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, conducting a large-scale misinformation campaign • With anti-Europeans on their way to designed to undermine European political systems, the winning more than one-third of seats in the European Parliament (EP) election scheduled for May 2019 next European Parliament, the stakes in might seem like a relatively minor concern. The EP is, after the May 2019 election are unusually high. all, only one of the European Union’s governing bodies and, in many ways, the least powerful of them. In its legislative • While there are significant divides between them role, the institution cooperates with the Council of the EU on substance, anti-European parties could align (comprising national ministers from EU member states) and with one another tactically in support of a range bases its work on proposals from the European Commission. of ideas. This would put at risk Europe’s capacity And, despite having the ability to pass resolutions on a wide to defend its citizens from external threats. range of subjects, the EP has no formal role in foreign policy.

• This paper marks the start of ECFR’s campaign Unfortunately for beleaguered internationalist Europeans, to strengthen Europe in the face of efforts by the election really does matter. The vote could see a group anti-European parties to divide it. We analyse, in of nationalist anti-European political parties that advocate a detail, the political situation in each of the EU’s return to a “Europe of the nations” win a controlling share 27 member states ahead of the 2019 EP election. of seats in the EP. Among them number many figures who are strongly sceptical of free trade, in favour of pulling • For supporters of an outward-looking Europe, the drawbridge up against migration, and supportive of we offer a strategy to fight back: by driving a Moscow’s arguments about the need to flout international wedge between anti-European parties, exposing law in the Russian national interest in Ukraine. They are not the real-world costs of their key policy ideas, currently a unified alliance but, in an EP in which their voices and identifying new issues that could inspire entered the mainstream, and in an EU in which transactional voters: from the rule of law and the environment decision-making was commonplace, they could let all these to prosperity and Europe’s foreign policy goals. ideas shape European policy in the medium term. And, in the longer term, their ability to paralyse decision-making at • In the coming months, ECFR will explore these the centre of the EU would defuse pro-Europeans’ argument issues at a more granular level through quantitative that the project is imperfect but capable of reform. At and qualitative surveys across the EU27. this point, the EU would be living on borrowed time. February 2019 February 2 ECFR/278 February 2019 www.ecfr.eu THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTION: HOW ANTI-EUROPEANS PLAN TO WRECK EUROPE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO STOP IT show how different parties and movements can –rather and movements parties different how show to and world, the in influence its and Europe weakens that anti-Europeanism of rise the back against to push project Majority UnlockEurope’s up the set ECFR has,therefore, history. EU’s in the parliamentary vote consequential election, itisalreadyclearthatthiswillbethemost preparing forthe of early stages in the is still Europe though Even manifestos. andparty voter segmentation, in analysing opinion polls,patterns experts, while policy parties, policymakers,and political interviewed capitals in May2019.EU researchers Our networkofassociate polls thatwillgotothe 27 member states in the a study theimplicationsofvote, To ECFR conducted understand for thosewhoseektounderminetheproject. opponent an easy and becoming sentiment popular European misunderstanding risk fatally shaping. Indoingso,they are currently that bothsides debate polarised in the engage quo or status the defend cannot simply they succeed, to attack. the But, to repel potential forces havethe European for yearstocome.In landscape both contests,pro- political Europe’s reshape to are launchinglooksset that they ideas of battle European partiesincreasetheirshareofEPseats,the anti- whether of And, regardless climate. political current quo inthe status the of a rejection of power mobilising the 2016 shows of the Brexit referendum The experience parliament. new in the out drowned be majority will silent of numbers significant views ofEurope’s to vote,the turnout their supporters and arguments loudest clearest, marshal the fare. Ifnationalistparties forces European how anti- seats, turnoutwillbecriticalindetermining for EP battle In the EU. the across internationalists liberal for cost have averyhigh could election this of importance the underestimating Consequently, as ontheEU’soverallinstitutionalreadinessandits as well policy, foreign EU’s the of content on the impact damaging much morecumbersome–withapotentially legislation new of adoption make the and procedures EU’s block someofthe to formaminoritythatcould them enable Winning would ofseats more than33 percent liberty ofexpression,therulelaw,andcivil rights. to preserveEuropeanvaluesrelating EU’s capacity limit the of movement,andcould reform, and freedom the EP’sworkonforeign policy,eurozone to obstruct seats of share increased this use could parties for, anti-European and processes key decisions. Judgingbywhatmanyofthemhavecampaigned over influence forces anti-European will give Simply put,winningacertainnumberofseats one. isamathematical election EP in the succeed are to they if understand must pro-Europeans challenge first The No ordinaryEPelection inward-looking, nationalist, and illiberal version of Europe. version of inward-looking, nationalist,andilliberal an and reachtheearsofvoterswhooppose constituencies reach across will that in away nationally relevantissues to frame on how allies, andmediaoutlets civil society parties, pro-European with this researchtoengage use will ECFR in decline. lay outwhatwouldbeatstakewithanEU as EU, aswell that favouramoreinternationallyengaged about thevariouscoalitionsinEurope tribesandshifting data group polling andfocus informed by analysis depth in- and months, Over the comingweeksECFRwilldevelop voice. a new majority inEurope internationally engaged pro-European, and givethe rally, knittogether, effectively – in debate the nationalistor than competing populist political credibility to take initiatives in the area. The need to adopt new international trade agreements, table above outlines the possible procedural consequences nationalists could significantly slow down the EU’s of crossing this threshold.1 Below, we explore in more external trade agenda. This would curb the union’s ability detail the challenges for the EU’s foreign policy writ large. to use trade as one of its major instruments for boosting prosperity in Europe and pursuing its foreign policy goals.2 Foreign trade The rule of law When the leader of Italy’s Five Star Movement, Luigi di Maio, criticises the EU’s external trade agenda – saying, “if One of the key procedural powers that flows from controlling so much as one Italian official continues to defend treaties at least 33 percent of EP seats is that to block the EU’s like CETA, they will be removed” – he expresses a view Article 7 mechanism, which is designed to defend the rule of shared by several of Europe’s anti-European parties on law in member states. Currently, Article 7.1 procedures are both the far left (La France Insoumise) and the far right open against the governments of Poland and Hungary. In (Rassemblement National). In the next parliament, trade September 2018, the EP voted by an overwhelming margin could become a consensus issue on which they display – 448 to 197, with 48 abstentions – that there was a “clear an image of unity, challenge the mainstream’s capacity to risk of a serious breach” of the EU’s values in Hungary. The seek wider compromises, and influence the EU’s policies. matter then went to the Council, which, before making a determination about whether there is such a risk, must hear The role of the EP in international trade agreements has from the Hungarian government, make recommendations continuously grown in recent years. The Lisbon Treaty to it, and assess its response. In the case of Poland, the gives the EP veto power over almost all trade and other procedure was initiated by the Commission. But, in March international agreements, due to the consent procedure 2018, the EP voted by a large majority – 422 to 147 – in – which requires an absolute majority. (The procedure favour of a non-binding resolution that supported the is also used for the accession of new EU member states Commission’s decision to trigger Article 7 against Poland and arrangements for withdrawal from the EU, as seen for undermining the independence of the judiciary, calling in the EP’s role in the Brexit process.) Thus, the EP upon the Council to swiftly determine whether there can provide or deny consent for the conclusion of an is a “clear risk of a serious breach” of the EU’s values. agreement prior to authorisation by the Council of the EU. This shows the extent to which progress with the EU’s The EP was quick to use its new powers, rejecting in rule of law procedures depends on the support of both the February 2010 the initial version of the SWIFT agreement. EP and the Council – which is one of the reasons why the It has also exercised a strong influence elsewhere – notably, Article 7 mechanism is mostly an instrument of political in negotiations on free trade agreements with South pressure rather than anything that could realistically lead to Korea, Canada, and the United States (it is expected to the suspension of a member state’s voting rights. But that play a vital role in a future trade agreement between the is exactly the point: with the EP unable to initiate rule of EU and the United Kingdom). The EU’s agreement with law investigations against member states, and with a rising Singapore led to temporary uncertainty on the scope of number of member states in the Council represented by the union’s exclusive competence on trade. Following governments that are reluctant to support it either, the EU the European Court of Justice’s Opinion 2/15, which would have severe limits on its capacity to defend democracy distinguished between EU-only and mixed agreements, within its borders. And such procedures could even be there is a widespread expectation that most of the EU’s completely blocked if some anti-European parties successfully upcoming trade agreements will now include only those translate their gains at the EP election into a position elements that are within the EU’s exclusive competence, in government at home (as seems possible in Denmark, to avoid a lengthy ratification process in member states. Estonia, and Slovakia). Aside from its internal consequences,

such a development would further erode Europe’s global The threat of a parliamentary veto is enough to shape the credibility as a champion of democracy and the rule of law. EU’s trade policies. Therefore, controlling the majority of EP seats is crucial, as it can otherwise be difficult to gain the EP’s consent. According to VoteWatch, the balance Migration of power on trade-related decisions is unlikely to change much in the next EP, mostly because several anti-European The EP has mostly non-legislative competences in migration parties either do not oppose free trade outright (Alternative policy – one of the issues on which anti-European parties for Germany) or are among its most stable supporters (Law focus. The EP has a consultation (rather than co-decision) and Justice, or PiS). But, given the risk that they could seek role in this area. In those subject to the consultation tactical alliances, and the fact that the current mainstream procedure, the Council has to ask the EP for its opinion. in the EP – composed of the European People’s Party (EPP) It is not legally obliged to take the opinion into account. and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats However, in line with the case law of the European (S&D) – will no longer have the absolute majority they Court of Justice, it must not take a decision without

1 For a demonstration of procedural effects of two other scenarios – more 2 For an explanation of abbreviations and of the political divisions in EP, see than 50 percent and less than 33 percent – see Annex. glossary at the end of this paper. 3 4 ECFR/278 February 2019 www.ecfr.eu THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTION: HOW ANTI-EUROPEANS PLAN TO WRECK EUROPE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO STOP IT hearings with the high representative forforeign affairsand hearings withthe highrepresentative and regular changes) and staff budgetary approve EEAS EP hasto the (giventhat pressure budgetary include this Action Service(EEAS)andthe Council.Itsothertoolsfor foreign policy–throughboth theEuropeanExternal EU’s the influence can EP the which with tools the of one are also resolutions are non-binding,such they Although for anyresolutionitadopts. support as possible wide as demonstrate EP must the This iswhy policy. foreign EU’s of the as anexpression perceived are increasingly important, asthey US, andRussia–arealso China, the – including issues on other countries. ButEP’sresolutions to candidate funds allocation ofaccession voice onthe a crucial has it purse”: the of EP’s “power the to related is This as Montenegro. such accession countries by followed closely are they in question.Forexample, or region issue on the varies depending resolutions importance ofthese tomajorityvoting.The that aresubject of resolutions EP’s activityonforeignaffairstakestheform Usually, the acts). and delegated reports many more legislative adopted latter the (although active one most second the committee, and monetaryaffairs economic as manythe twice almost 58 reportsonitsowninitiative – 2017, December it adopted July 2014 and and isoneofitsmostactive.Between foreign affairshasmoremembersthanothercommittees on TheEP’scommittee issues. policy active onforeign EP isincreasingly the competences, its limited Despite Foreign policy world andatthegloballevel. in otherregionsofthe challenges of resolution the to to contribute credibility EU’s limit the of lawandfreetrade,thiswould issue. Asontherule the securitising of – instead migration challenges towards approach a humanitarian Council toseek and solidarity-based and the states member of capacity the limit could which are today, voices wouldbecomemuchstrongerthanthey anti-immigrant inthenextparliament, their MEPs present many more isthat,with 2019 EP election from the stemming Therefore, themajor threat totheEU’smigration policies migration”. to approach EU for aholistic need and the Mediterranean in the situation on “the resolution a adopted of migration. aspects For example,on12 April 2016, the EP role –includingmost where itlacksaco-decision issues on non-binding resolutions active inadopting increasingly Still, apartfromprovidingopinions,EPhasbeen the theEP supports. EP the on amendments agreement its secure the Council, by Commission to on the pressure aim toexert often will agreement final of moment the proposal until Commission canamendthe insofar asthe Secondly, by referringthembacktocommittees. support not it does proposals delay The EPcanalso proceeding. which preventstheCouncilandCommissionfrom – an opinion give to can refuse Council. Firstly,it for the difficult things make can EP the said, That vote. majority a by is decided EP’s opinion,which the having received talks are always difficult, as they set net contributors and netcontributors set they as difficult, always are talks Of course,these EU’s nextmultiannualbudget. of the shape and size on the pressure to exert able be parliament will next in the parties MEPs fromanti-European meaning that election, the before MFF next on the agreement a rough even reach to unlikely seems EU the But as possible. soon as plans forvarioussectors, spending accompanying the with next MFF,together the toadopt pressure intense in 2019 come inquick succession and2020. This creates will MFF current the of end the and election, EP Brexit, the policy). available tovarious anddevelopment areasofforeign (by, forexample,limitingthefunds as its policies as well significant has EU’s priorities, the to shape tools attheirdisposal budgetary majority EP’s the controls whoever all, in All policy. foreign EU’s the of priorities on the an impact and staffchanges.In this way,theEP mayhave budgetary organisation’s EEAS,asitmustapprovethe ofthe design the facto Forexample,theEPhasade elsewhere. powers of itsbudgetary use EP alsomakesextensive Finally, the of spending. types and determining in layingdownguidelines preparationstage,notably processfromthe in thebudgetary The EPisinvolved procedure. ordinary legislative the form of a to subject is now annual budget in this.TheEU’s Council the with footing on anequal EP the putting expenditure, compulsory andnon-compulsory between distinction the The Lisbon Treaty eliminated in theEU’sannualbudget. The EPalsoplaysakeypartin the allocationofexpenses negotiations. in MFF its role package, strengthening as asingle elements three these far presented so has EP EP the role, the limited MFF. Whilethisgivesitarelatively the finally, And, funds. within EU’s resources an opiniononthe to issue needs and programmes various to allocate will MFF what the a strongroleindeciding procedure, theEPhas the ordinary legislative following MFF. Secondly, of the adoption for the is needed members EP’s component of amajoritythe MFF. Thesupport the of adoption the facilitate to necessary measure any take to Commission the Council, and EP, the the This requires MFF. around the process negotiating in the participate the EPtoalso European Unionenables Functioning ofthe Treaty onthe the 312(5) of EP’s consent,Article the only adopting aproposalfrom the Councilformallyrequires Financial Framework (MFF), in Firstly, while three respects. Multiannual EU’s the The EPhasacrucialroleinshaping EU budget used. Nordic GreenLeft(GUE/NGL)grouphavesometimes –a Left/ United European far-left that membersofthe tactic text final the down water or motion) the against vote still could (after whichthey process the to eitherdelay of amendments a longlist table could they resolutions, policy EP’s foreign on the support possible widest for the on looking insistence usual the given area. Forexample, in this processes can obstruct parties EP, nationalist the security policy.Thus, even withoutholdingmany seats in veto over net beneficiaries against each other – as they do supporters of votes cast. However, prior to this, the commissioners- of various elements of the budget, ranging from cohesion designate appear for hearings before parliamentary policy, agricultural funds, and research to migration, the committees in their prospective fields of responsibility. eurozone, and defence and foreign policy. Nonetheless, an Each committee meets to produce an evaluation of the EP in which nationalists have a strengthened voice may candidate’s expertise and performance, which is then sent only add an additional hurdle to an already complicated to the president of the EP. The threshold for suspending process – even if they pursue contradictory goals such the process of nominating a candidate is relatively low: as shrinking the budget, increasing cohesion funds, and more than one-third is enough to hamper the committee’s defunding foreign policy and development projects. In approval of a candidate. The candidate may still be elected this scenario, there is a heightened risk that the EU’s as part of the entire College of Commissioners in a plenary foreign policy will fall victim to cuts or compromises. vote. However, a negative evaluation has prompted previous candidates to withdraw from the process. Appointment of the next Commission Although it is up to member states to propose commissioners- The result of the May 2019 election will be instrumental to designate, the presence of anti-Europeans in several national the composition of the next European Commission (the EU’s governments poses a serious risk that the next European main executive body), including the president and the high Commission will become less internationalist and principled representative for foreign affairs and security policy. Once on the main global issues Europe faces, such as free trade, the Council nominates a candidate for the president of the human rights, the rule of law, and multilateralism. But the Commission (with a qualified majority), he or she will need to result of the 2019 EP election will also be decisive for whether be approved by a majority of the EP’s component members – and how the selection of the president of the European that is, at least 353 of 705 MEPs in the post-Brexit EP. If the Commission will follow the Spitzenkandidat procedure. candidate does not obtain the required majority, the president (For example, the appointment of the EPP’s Manfred of the EP will invite the European Council to propose a new Weber as the next president of the EP could mean various candidate, who would have to follow the same procedure. things depending on which political groups support him.) In 2014, a Spitzenkandidat was appointed for the first time, And it would have an impact on the chances for candidates with the Council’s nomination of Jean-Claude Juncker with a relatively internationalist world view – such as the (the leader of the winning EPP group) as candidate for the next high representative – to obtain a positive evaluation presidency of the Commission. This practice is meant to not in committee. In short, the European Commission’s just provide democratic legitimacy to the EU’s executive, foreign policy outlook also depends on this election. but also to facilitate the EP’s approval of the nominee.

The next step is the election of the entire College of The spoils of cooperation Commissioners. Here, the EP has a significant opportunity for disruption. The EP elects or rejects the College of Anti-European parties’ capacity to obstruct the work of Commissioners as a whole, in one vote, with a majority the EP in the ways described above will largely depend on

5 6 ECFR/278 February 2019 www.ecfr.eu THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTION: HOW ANTI-EUROPEANS PLAN TO WRECK EUROPE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO STOP IT National, AlternativeforGermany, (as and Italy’sLeague of Rassemblement success totheexpected due year, largely next ofEPseats. Thissharemayriseto19 10 percent percent more than slightly holds Hungarian nationalists–currently as Greek and Farage, aswell Le PenandtheUK’sNigel Marine Nationalleader Rassemblement right –including To start with,adie-hardanti-EUcoalitionofonlythefar parties arepossible? of cooperationbetween What types works. in the spanner another throw 2019 could in May British MEPs of participation position, the UK’s on the clarity adistinctpossibilitywiththelack of negotiations seems May 2019 election. However, as an extension toArticle50 in in the this paperassumethattheUKwillnotparticipate signify aqualitativechangeintheEU.ECFR’scalculations would this threshold, one-third the cross If they join them. mainstream the of members fringe the of some or if grow to continues popularity their if seats of 30 percent than more gain even could They 28 percent. to from 23percent rise will, ifcurrent pollingisaccurate, right-wing Eurosceptics from thefarrightand seat shareofrepresentatives collective worryingly, the seats. More EP of more thanone-third acquire to certain almost time first the for are Eurosceptics, right-wing far right,including the to far left ranging fromthe parties anti-European of a variety current polls, According to strengths. their of one has neverbeen that – something can coordinate theiractivitieswithoneanother they whether pro-Russian stanceofLePen andtheLeague’sMatteo issues: the They maydisagreeonsome foreignpolicy about most,particularlymigration andtheruleoflaw. easy relatively it they care with oneanotherontheissues to cooperate find would Eurosceptics conservative coalition of the far right and Members ofapossible as Viktor Orbán’sEPP. Fidesz,whichremainsamember ofthe Conservatives andReformists(ECR)groupintheEP–aswell Party – all of which are currently affiliated with the European Danish People’s Democrats, andthe Sweden Poland’s PiS,the include parties Europe. These central Scandinavia and in those right, particularly on the parties Eurosceptic from MEPs also allywith could This corefar-rightgroup seats. of share their double they if change could this But work). EP’s daily in the participate actively to reluctance (as hastheir processes European far right fromaffecting the prevented has often unity lack of parliament. Andthis in most others to relative internalcohesion very weak issues. Thesetwopoliticalgroupshavedemonstrated and personal to ideological divided, due right hasbeen Nations andFreedom–or are non-aligned.Sofar, the far of Freedom andDirectDemocracy(EFDD)Europe of EP –Europe groups inthe political of two one with affiliated are MEPs far-right Most right). far EP’s the with as thatoftheFiveStarMovement,whichmaynotalign well Salvini has discouraged PiS leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski unite the far left and the far right. Nonetheless, it is still from joining a unified sovereigntist block in the run-up more common for them to take different approaches. to the EP election. But they may still put their differences For example, in September 2018, most MEPs affiliated aside to reach two shared tactical goals: curbing the EU’s with the far-left GUE/NGL voted with the mainstream in liberal orientation and returning power to member states. favour of the Sargentini Report, which criticised Orbán’s government for undermining the rule of law in Hungary. Europe’s right and far right could even formally establish a new political group, which would be the second-largest Therefore, opportunities for cooperation between the far political family in the EP. In any case, the right and the right and the far left are limited and will vary from party to far right will likely be forced to realign in 2019 due to the party. For example, Portugal’s Left Bloc may be critical of loss of British MEPs and to requirements for forming a the EU in many ways, but it also aims to counter xenophobia parliamentary political group that the ECR and the EFDD and nationalism in Europe. Podemos and Syriza have been may struggle to meet. Furthermore, it is unclear whether much more willing to cooperate with mainstream parties on Fidesz will leave the EPP. As it stands, neither Orbán nor European issues since they became part of their countries’ the EPP have an interest in announcing a divorce before political establishments. In turn, La France Insoumise May 2019. But, after the election, there is a high likelihood could play a different role: its leader, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, that the nationalist camp will become more unified. refused to tell his supporters not to vote for Le Pen in the second round of France’s 2017 presidential election. Finally, there is also a possibility of an “all against the establishment” alliance of the far right, Eurosceptics, In this context, a significant threat to the European and the far left. If parties such as Germany’s Die Linke project comes not so much from an “all against the and La France Insoumise joined the cause, this coalition establishment” alliance (especially given that the far left could make life very difficult for pro-European forces have few things in common with the Eurosceptic right), given that, for the first time, they are almost certain or from a stable alliance between the far left and the far to collectively win more than one-third of MEP seats. right, but rather from unplanned alignment on key aspects of the EU’s agenda, or a readiness to cooperate on the two The far right and the far left have worked together in the tactical goals discussed above. Whenever the far right, EP before, largely in areas where either the ECR voted with the far left, and the EU-sceptic right vote together, the the mainstream (such as on Russia, the US, and trade) mainstream will have a relatively slim margin of error, or the mainstream demonstrated significant internal forcing it to be disciplined and to build coalitions around discipline (such as on migration). Love of Russia, hatred individual issues. In recent years, pro-Europeans across of sanctions, and strong protectionist inclinations can the political spectrum have rarely exercised such discipline. 7 8 ECFR/278 February 2019 www.ecfr.eu THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTION: HOW ANTI-EUROPEANS PLAN TO WRECK EUROPE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO STOP IT 2019 EP election), they are already uniting behind three main three uniting behind are already 2019 they EP election), the of Bannon inanticipation adviser Steven presidential US by former organisation created Movement (apan-European from the support receive logistical eventually they whether of nationalists. Regardless Europe’s imagery tolead of thiskind of confrontational power she willharnessthe Salvini andOrbán, with Together system.” a totalitarian fighting against Europe, but against the EU, which has become Le Penclaimed Europe. than arguments foraunited,internationally engaged appeal mobilise theanti-Europeancampcanhaveamuchsimpler that ideas draw votes,the increasingly change of promises and easy policy candictate tweets Arguably, inaworldwhere Allowing anti-Europeanstoframethedebate be broughttolife? poses Can thethreatthatelection and livingstandards. about: jobs,security, care they issues the in thecorridors negotiations of powerand no link see between Poland –demonstratesthatan increasing numberofvoters in Hungary,Italy,and governments EU-sceptic of election the in Franceto vests) stand-off jaunes (yellow gilets from the – EU real world? Politicsacrossthe EP meaninthe in the anti-European parties cooperation between But whatwould the Europeanprojectaregoingwrong The idealopponent:wheredefendersof in October 2018 that “we are not “we 2018that inOctober votes and12 out of109 in theregional parliament, seats of 11 percent in Andalusialastyear–which itobtained election in aregional far-right Voxparty the of performance momentum. The appear tohavelentitconsiderable media campaign core messageanditstargeted, well-funded on the focus to itscause.Butrelentless 40 orsoparties To date,theMovementhasonlyralliedahandfulofEurope’s for them. issue this of power the to – testify management to migration to advocateincreasinglydraconianapproaches on therightandleft mainstreamparties which hascaused – years in recent member state EU every migration inalmost on have generated they that fear political the Indeed, policy. they are disunited on justbecause the specifics of migration management tomigration approach EU’s the on influence have no will that anti-Europeans be amistaketoassume would it Therefore, electorate. nationalist core the beyond of internal unity andtoreachout to strengthentheirsense on theright, anti-European parties,mostlythose enables which areanti-immigration”. and those This framing are pro-immigration which those a divisionbetween with will bereplaced parties intothoseoftherightandleft campaign. their of main focus the is becoming – that more broadly migration of topic – andthe third belief is the However, it border controls. requires tighter on security,andEurope emphasis a greater place to governments want citizens European power, have toomuch institutions EU beliefs: According to Orbán, “the conventional division of conventional Orbán, “the to According allowing it to join a regional coalition – provided the pro-European camp. It seems that most European voters Movement with a significant success story. The organisation would prefer to reduce immigration, but they differ also benefits from the alignment of its objectives with those on how, and to what extent, they should do so. This of the American alt-right and the Putin government, as well has prompted pro-European parties to deal with these as a worldwide revolutionary zeitgeist evidenced by the voters as distinct camps. Not so the anti-Europeans. latest presidential elections in the US and Brazil. Given the ECFR’s research confirms that in all EU member states Russian interference in recent national elections in Europe, except Portugal, Ireland, and Lithuania, migration and the tension in EU-Russian relations arising from will feature prominently in the debate on the May 2019 hostilities in the Sea of Azov in November 2018, it is highly election. And there are signs that mainstream parties – likely that Moscow will attempt to manipulate the EP vote. mostly members of the centre-right EPP – are already conceding ground on migration. With Eurosceptic If the nationalists’ focus on migration is well chosen, this forces having taken them to task on the issue, moderate is because the issue not only resonates with voters but parties increasingly appear to view a relatively hard line also demonstrates the divides within the much larger on migration as the price they must pay to retain power.

9 10 ECFR/278 February 2019 www.ecfr.eu THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTION: HOW ANTI-EUROPEANS PLAN TO WRECK EUROPE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO STOP IT representatives ofthecentre-leftS&D, theALDE, andthe and westerncountrieswithintheEPP. Incomparison, easternof representatives between divide clear a was there parliamentary voteontheeurozonebudgetheldin2017, on issuesinvolvingtheeurozone.Forinstance, ina members oftheEPPoftenvoteagainstoneanother Eurosceptics’ wishforlessEuropeaneconomicgovernance, In whatmaybeanothersignthattheyarebowingto GERB, and Spain’s Partido Popular–votedagainstit. (CDU/CSU), ForzaItalia, Les Républicains,Bulgaria’s Union Christian DemocraticUnion/ChristianSocial some fromnotjustFideszbutalsoGermany’s – including abstentions. Butmorethanone-quarterofEPPmembers by amargin of 448votesto197,with48 Report passed the todivide EU’s economicgovernance.TheSargentini and the easy relatively it law of rule the as such issues, on other pro-Europeans find also Nationalists camp. pro-European on divisionswithinthe to play anti-immigration parties’capacity demonstrated episode the was adopted, resolution the Even though rebelled. resolution. WithintheS&D,fourCzechsocialdemocrats –votedagainstthe member ofFrance’s LesRépublicains Czech, Slovak, one several andLatvianand even MEPs; andRomania’sHungary’s Fidesz NationalLiberalParty; of representatives – including grouping of the members However, theEPP’s internal cohesionwasrelativelylow:33 Greens. (ALDE), and the Liberals andDemocratsforEurope Alliance of S&D, the EPP, the of the support thanks tothe passed resolution on asylum,the EP’s mainpositions the of migration” inApril2016. to Providinganoverview approach EU for aholistic need the and Mediterranean in the situation on “the resolution 206, –ofthe to with 52abstentions votes since theadoption–byamargin This hasbeenclear of 459 end. The bigger prize forthemisapositionfromwhich end. Thebigger as ameans toan shouldbeunderstood May 2019 election in the parties,winningmoreseats For anti-European election Underestimating theimportance oftheupcoming European strategiesintheelectionandafterwards. months, layingthegroundworkformoreeffectivepro- qualitative publicsurveysacrosstheEUincoming will exploreatagranularlevel throughquantitative and a pluralistpoliticaldebate. TheseareissuesthatECFR – what voters view astheEU’sgreateststrengths–whilesustaining values European core defend and define them intheelectioncampaignandnextEPwillbeto losing theirdistinctidentities. Oneofthechallengesfor internal cohesionoftheirEPpoliticalgroupstoavoid project. Theywillalsohavetotryharderpreservethe with oneanothertocollectivelydefendtheEuropean parties willneedtobecomemoreopencompromise Despite theirdifferentideologicaltraditions, pro-European an see advantagein it aftertheelection. them ifthey between a focalpointforcooperation could become but eachissue positions, parties –noonepartyholdsallthese European of anti- the broadmanifesto out abovesets table The issues. these voters onanyof polarise to seeks that parties European against anattackfromanti- work together to struggle mainstream will political of Europe’s face, members they challenge existential the recognise they Therefore, unless Brexit.after Europe protectionist more a for way the paving perhapsEurosceptics, with partner to them of some lead parties’ persistentdivisionsontradeliberalisationcould introduction ofaeurozonebudget.Nonetheless, left-wing Greens weremuchmorecohesive, largelysupportingthe they can challenge pro-Europeans in a wider battle of about the importance of the EP election (which, in the past, ideas. They mean to use this as a springboard for fighting may have been somewhat justified). In an ideal scenario, national elections across Europe in the coming years. their goals of winning both European and national elections should be mutually reinforcing. But there is a risk that some For instance, if it is successful in the EP election, PiS will generally pro-European parties – such as those in Denmark, improve its position in the run-up to Polish parliamentary Belgium, Spain, Austria, and the Netherlands, to name just a vote scheduled for autumn 2019. Equally, a poor result few – will enter into a vicious circle: flirting with populist ideas for the party would increase the likelihood that Kaczynski, ahead of the May 2019 election to strengthen their position Poland’s de facto leader, will soon lose power. In Bulgaria, at home. This would only provide more legitimacy to these the outcome of the EP election may determine whether ideas in a broader European debate and could later backfire the government will hold a snap national election. Such at home, if voters decided that they preferred the original to a a vote could occur if the ruling, centre-right GERB copy – switching their support from Partido Popular to VOX; performs poorly in the EP election, precipitating a political from the New Flemish Alliance to Vlaams Belang; from the crisis. While GERB has signalled rapprochement with Austrian People’s Party to Freedom Party of Austria; from Les Orbán in the past year, a new election could pave the Républicains to Rassemblement National; from the CDU/CSU way for a government led by the Socialist Party, which to Alternative for Germany; and from Dutch Prime Minister is a far more strident advocate of anti-immigration and Mark Rutte to Geert Wilders or Thierry Baudet, leaders of the nationalist policies (and more pro-Russian) than its rival. Party for Freedom and the Forum for Democracy respectively.

The EP election could also have a significant effect on Denmark’s political dynamics. With the country planning Fighting back to hold a national election by June 2019, its mainstream Social Democrats have increasingly adopted an anti- immigration and Eurosceptic posture. And the populist Despite the scale of the challenge they face, Danish People’s Party stands a chance of entering the next internationalist Europeans should not give up on this government (having provided parliamentary support to the fight before they have even properly begun. Below, current one). A similar pattern may emerge in Belgium, we lay out a strategy to prevent the EP election from with the conservative New Flemish Alliance (the country’s setting off a broader shift in the European political leading party) growing increasingly anti-immigrant ahead landscape. The strategy centres on the following ideas: of a federal election scheduled for the same day as the EP election. In December 2018, the party’s ministers quit the • Driving a wedge between anti-European parties. government in protest against Belgium’s participation in the United Nations’ Marrakesh migration pact. • Demonstrating the costs of their proposals in the real world. In Finland and Estonia, the EP election will likely coincide with fresh negotiations on forming a coalition government, • Framing the election within a pro-European agenda. raising the prospect of the far right forming part of the next Estonian government. And, by 2020, there will have Driving a wedge between anti-European parties been a new parliamentary election in Greece (with an early election in May 2019 increasingly likely), Croatia, As discussed above, the anti-European camp is much more Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Portugal, and Spain. divided than meets the eye. During the EP election campaign, There is also a growing possibility of a snap election in pro-European forces should expose these divisions to Italy, which would almost certainly benefit the League. undermine nationalists’ capacity to cooperate. They could even play one anti-European party against another – using All in all, if Eurosceptics retain their power in Poland and tactics similar to those that have divided the mainstream. Italy and acquire at least some influence over ruling coalitions in countries such as Denmark, Estonia, and Slovakia, this For example, while the parties of Orbán, Kaczynski, and could help the illiberal camp obstruct the EU’s work through Salvini may all agree that migration is the EU’s major the European Council. In this scenario, governments in problem, they seek radically different solutions: the Budapest, Warsaw, and Rome would feel empowered by Hungarian and Polish governments refuse to accept the association, perhaps helping them break EU rules with relocation of immigrants to their countries, while the impunity. And the risk is all the more serious given that Italian government seeks greater cooperation and solidarity the European Council (which is already a dominant player between European states in relocating immigrants. in the EU’s inter-institutional power game) could gain even Salvini and Kaczynski also hold irreconcilable views of greater power after the May 2019 election – at the expense the EU’s policy on Russia. The former does not conceal of an EP that will likely be grappling with nationalist parties. his admiration for Putin, while the latter views Russia as posing the greatest threat to his country. Unsurprisingly, This suggests that neither pro-European parties nor their they also disagree on NATO. The Austrian, German, and supporters can afford to indulge in the usual complacency Dutch far right would like to slash the EU’s structural funds, 11 12 ECFR/278 February 2019 www.ecfr.eu THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTION: HOW ANTI-EUROPEANS PLAN TO WRECK EUROPE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO STOP IT are particularly suspicious of multilateralism,asexpressed are particularlysuspicious They debate. as acrucialpartofpluralistpolitical change climate to mitigate rights, othercultures,ormeasures rights, LGBT women’s to opposition their present they that extent – tothe correctness” critical of“political usually counterpart, Jair nationalists are Bolsonaro, European Brazilian roles. LikeTrumporhis in gender and changes by migrants,secularism, posed dangers and ignorethe policy. Fortheright, liberals damagetraditionalvalues and austerity trade, globalisation, free for promoting blame things byit. For several different the left,liberalsareto mean word “liberal” asagrievousinsult,evenifthey the use on individualcountries.They heavy costs and imposing project, underminingnationalsovereignty, an elitist being the EUforallegedly heavilycriticise Most anti-Europeans real world. the in effects significant has – seem may this that avotefor nationalist parties–asnovelandexciting make clear should voters’ lives.They affect will EP election the how also committoshowing should Pro-Europeans proposals intherealworld Demonstrating thecostsofanti-Europeans’ to say. have little or simply appealing, or muchless divided much more are either nationalists on which jobs, issues growth, and anddefence, policy, climatechange,security as foreign areas such to discussion the extend try to should on migration.Instead,they debate all-encompassing in an entangled become themselves not let should pro-Europeans same time, interests. Atthe one voicebuthaveopposing about migration–onwhichOrbán and Salvini speak with narrative alternative in the and contradictions ambiguities uncover the should at risk. They values European putting of migrationwithout challenge political the with to cope EU the enable that policies forward practical put should parties campaign, pro-European This iswhy,duringthe on migration. disunited far, countries havebeen European that, so observed have accurately parties Anti-European they offer. in the viabilityofalternativetheybelieve confidence promote to create to trying are others and Pen, Bannon, that Salvini, alliance Le monolithic anti-European image ofa the goal ofdestroying the with differences, these inflow emphasise of structuralfunds.Themainstreamshould an maintaining while within from EU the reshape aiming to to issues, on ruleoflaw institutions’ focus or EU common currency the disliking to outright EU the abolish to of Euroscepticism:fromseeking all shades represent and northernEurope. Last butnotleast,nationalistparties in western parties comparable for case the always not is this –suchasLBGT conservative aboutsocialissues rights – Estonia,Italy,andSpain)aredeeply Czech Republic, the in (including those parties incentralandsouthernEurope anti-immigrant while not. And are others while change, climate are reluctanttoaddress Some anti-Europeans governments ofItaly,Hungary, and Poland. Eurosceptic which continuetobeacrucialsourceofrevenueforthe should not bypass politics, presenting the EU’s policies as policies EU’s the presenting politics, bypass not should halting theprogressofnationalists acrossEurope.Butthey to playarolein will need institutions National andEU problem. toapolitical solution of atechnocratic example in which theEUcouldsatisfythem.Butthisisaperfect ways and the oncitizens’expectations grand consensus kind of some to lead this could that in 2018,hope inthe organised states various member that issues on European consultations citizen in the seen be This approachcould opinions. level ofisolated the or donotgofarbeyond representative not fully are they when them to importance or –andattachexcessive consultations as plebiscites –such tools democracy direct through deficit democratic so-called EU’s the address to try they when methods anti-Europeans’ adopt leaderships and EU Thirdly, national rivals appear smaller. mainstream partiestotheirpopulist far right, from and making and the the leap centre-right the between for cooperation potential increasing the twofold, theanti- of is this of The effect positions. immigrant orEU-sceptic elements adopting by Europeans’ agenda, particularly in veering towardsanti- afloat stay to hope establishment political the of some members Secondly, too far?”. know that Brusselswilltamehimifhegoes they like Kaczynskiif fear someone Poles should asking “why Europe, Ivanin central Krastevobserved paradox that a prompt voters’recklessness: membership could EU importance.Even secondary of being as elections EP to takeinMay2019, see generally given thatEuropeans willing be could voters risk that of level the underrepresent may Moreover, nationalelections insecurity. growing migration, to austerity,increased and due decade past in the endured have voters that hardship the of much for andasresponsible of globalisation, process for aruthless apologists as distant,ineffective institutions an imageofEU in constructing successful have been forces Anti-European establishment. a voteagainstthe with to gamble willing and ItalyhaveshownthatEuropeansareincreasingly in France,Germany,Sweden, national elections recent has changed: the unknown. landscape But thepolitical towards thestatusquo out offear in a pivotalelection commentators believed political many referendum, 2016Brexit the Before stations. polling at the to punishthepoliticalestablishment are tempted who French callit–amongmanycitizens , asthe général frustration – is widespread Firstly, there reasons. three far left,foratleast and the far right the of core electorate the beyond growing has been messages and anti-establishment for anti-European Support in nationalists’manifestos. implicit policies the of consequences the out spell costs. Pro-Europeansshould incurring major without EU the can exit countries their that promise a with citizens lure to continue them of Brexit –some of cautionary tale the pact. And–despite Marrakesh migration the and agreement Paris climate in the that voters would gravitate thatvoterswould un ras-de-bol apolitical, pragmatic, and without alternatives – as this at worst, dangerously disruptive for established channels would only weaken the mediating role of political parties of political activism (as is currently seen in countries such and civil society. Political parties on the national and as the Czech Republic, Italy, and France). Mainstream European levels must do most of the work. Arguably, one of political parties’ task is to insert multiple policy options the main reasons behind the rise of the far left and the far back into the public debate, on issues ranging from right in almost all parts of Europe is that mainstream parties migration to trade, the eurozone, and pan-European have often become too indistinguishable from one another. solidarity. Political parties will also need to argue that elected representatives are indispensable to making sense Attempts to unite the left and the right in a kind of of very complex issues, against anti-Europeans’ claim that pragmatic alliance have been, at best, disappointing and, people can rule directly (as promised by Italy’s Five Star

13 14 ECFR/278 February 2019 www.ecfr.eu THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTION: HOW ANTI-EUROPEANS PLAN TO WRECK EUROPE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO STOP IT • pro-Europeans: mobilise that could approaches different research across the EU27 suggests that there are at least five with there.Our todeal EU that voterswantthe issues the to according setting national in each debate election the frame should And they project. European hopeful creative inconstructinganimageofareinvigorated, that the issues on be should forces favour, pro-European anti-Europeans defensively fight simply than Rather This isoneofthegoalsECFR’sworkincomingmonths. that drivetheopinionsexpressedincitizens’consultations. political landscapeandunderstandthefeelingsexperiences emotional mapofEurope,tohelppro-Europeansnavigatethe themselves. Deeperresearchisalsonecessarytoprovidean There aremanylessonstheyshouldlearnfromthepopulists for howpro-Europeanpartiesshouldcommunicatewiththem. are currentlyfeelingaswellthinking,andwhatthismeans this, theyneedafardeeperunderstandingofwhatEuropeans the issuesthattheycareaboutenoughtovoteonthem.Todo can mobilisethesilentpro-Europeanmajoritythrough they The successofpro-Europeanpartieswillalsodependonwhether Framing theelectionwithapro-Europeanagenda Movement, the

in economic,social, andculturalrights.They should the ruleoflaw;freedomexpression; andequality believe inandassociatewiththe EUproject,including defend thefundamentalvalues thatthesilentmajority A valueselection:pro-Europeans shouldexplicitly , or the Forum forDemocracy). jaunes, orthe gilets • • •

regulations. multilateral leadershipinsetting environmental the riskthatEUwillnolonger beabletoprovide as theguardiansofgreen agenda, andemphasise important forpro-Europeans to positionthemselves who areconcernedaboutthese issues,itwillbe Sweden, andothermemberstates.Tomobilisevoters air qualityarehighontheagendainFrance,Poland, A greenelection:issuessuchasclimatechangeand European protests. rich andpoorisanissuethathaspromptedmany could beeffectivegiventhatthegrowinggapbetween large techcompaniespaytheirfairshareoftax.This institutions arecriticalinthefighttoensurethat Europeans couldwinvotesbyemphasisingthatEU A taxjusticeelection:inmanymemberstates,pro- A prosperityelection: from manynationalistparties. make cleartheextenttowhichtheseareunderthreat Europeans shouldexplicitlymakethislink. such asthoseincentral, eastern, andsouthernEurope, of lifeinmanypartstheEU. Insomecountries, it provides), thiswillhavearealimpactonvoters’ quality agreement onthenextMFF(andstructuralfunding underdeveloped regions.IfparalysisintheEUprevents false one, anddefendtherecordofEUinvestmentin nationalists’ promisetobringprosperitytheEUisa pro-Europeans should stress that pro-Europeansshouldstressthat • An enemy from within election: the argument that In Hungary, the opposition is much weaker than its Polish anti-Europeans are doing the job of the Kremlin for counterpart. Nonetheless, a recent wave of protests provides them, destabilising Europe from within, could prove the opposition with some momentum to expose the problems powerful among voters who are concerned about with Orbán’s Europe policy, including his government’s evidence of political interference and information reluctance to join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. manipulation from Russia in recent European elections. Pro-Europeans should draw attention to the The situation in Italy is much less clear-cut than that foreign policy agenda of many nationalist parties. in either Poland or Hungary: there are sharp divisions within the government separate to those between it In some settings – particularly large cosmopolitan cities; and the pro-European parties of the centre-left and regions in which the tangible benefits of EU membership the centre-right opposition. But the Democratic Party are still highly evident; and member states unsettled by the and Emma Bonino’s new Più Europa should question turbulent international environment and the unreliability of whether the government’s aggressive Europe policy – the US security guarantee under Trump, such as Germany – on economics and migration, as well as their anti-elitist mainstream parties could also fight an “existential threat to stance – actually benefits the country and its citizens. Europe” election. In these settings, the desire for l’Europe qui protège is strong, and the logical case should be made that the EU cannot protect its citizens if the internal destruction agenda Conclusion of the anti-Europeans goes ahead. All in all, political parties should not shy away from looking for novel approaches that The battle of ideas in which Europeans are engaged will reflect their political orientation while enabling them to move doubtlessly continue after the EP election. But the result the debate onto a wide spectrum of issues. In this way, they of the May 2019 contest will largely set the boundaries could inspire their countries’ pro-European silent majority. of this battle for years to come. The key battles in May 2019 will take place in Germany, France, Italy, Poland, In the three countries in which anti-Europeans lead the and Spain, which collectively account for more than government rather than just pose a distant political threat – 50 percent of EP seats. Nonetheless, preserving a pro- Poland, Hungary, and Italy – there are strong reasons for the European majority in the EU in the medium and long term pro-European forces to emphasise their unity. For example, will require hampering the rise of nationalists elsewhere, the Polish government may currently be trying to present a from Sweden and the Netherlands to Estonia and Croatia. pro-European face, but with Poland’s rule of law controversies far from being resolved, and the European Court of Justice In this sense, pro-Europeans from all EU member states ruling on Poland expected in March 2019, there is a genuine have no time to lose. EU heads of state and government threat that Poland will leave the EU, if only by accident. plan to adopt a new document on the future of Europe The Polish opposition must emphasise this if it is to stand a at an informal summit in Sibiu, Romania, in May 2019. chance of defeating PiS in the EP election, and to establish And there are European leaders who occasionally a lead ahead of a national parliamentary election in autumn signal a possible opening, as with Juncker’s recent this year. However, with many voters worried about the expression of support for European unemployment direction in which the EU is moving, Poland’s pro-Europeans insurance. But these efforts are insufficient given the cannot focus their campaign on only the spectre of an exit task at hand. Pro-European parties and groupings from the EU. Instead, they may also have to redefine Poland’s should realise that the fight is now under way. If they national interests – on energy, defence, and migration, allow Eurosceptics to seize the initiative and frame the among other areas – and realign them more closely with the discussion, and gain further political momentum at home, rest of the EU, given the changing regional and global context. this will be a strategic error they cannot recover from.

15 16 ECFR/278 February 2019 www.ecfr.eu THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTION: HOW ANTI-EUROPEANS PLAN TO WRECK EUROPE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO STOP IT ANNEX

17 18 ECFR/278 February 2019 www.ecfr.eu THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTION: HOW ANTI-EUROPEANS PLAN TO WRECK EUROPE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO STOP IT government coalition and polling first with 35 percent of the The ÖVP isthemainpoliticalforceinAustria, leadingthe The mainstream and arelikelytoappealforstrongerEuropeancooperation. intend torefocusthedebateonsocio-economicchallenges opposition parties–liberalsandsocialdemocratsmay purported Islamisationofthecountry. Inturn, themain campaign moreaggressivelyagainstimmigrationandthe of Austria(FPÖ)–thecoalition’sjuniorpartnerwill migration. Heinz-ChristianStrache’s FreedomParty that thecountry’s borderswillbeprotectedagainstillegal EU andaguarantor the reforming actors in key the of one as itself present will – party main coalition’s ruling the – (ÖVP) Party People’s Austrian Kurz’s Sebastian Chancellor Migration andsecurityconcernswillbethemaintopics. a centralisedpoliticaldebateaheadofthe2019 EPelection. Austria isasmallpoliticalmarketand,therefore,itwillhold Main battles in 2019 government policy–tothebenefit ofoppositionparties. against to protest occasion an as EP elections used often too muchemphasisonthepollasAustrianvotershave putting from refrain coalition may ruling the time, the same see experiencedpoliticiansrunningforthemainparties.At surprises inAustrianEPelectionsgiventhattheynormally no usually are vote.There the of stakes usual than higher the percent. Itisunlikelytogobeyondthatlevelin2019–despite Turnout atthelasttwoEPelectionsinAustriastood45-46 Projected voterturnout AUSTRIA FPÖ isprojectedtowinfive MEPseats. – whichis,moreorless, itscurrentlevelofsupport.The vote the of percent with 26 election, parliamentary Austrian opinion pollsbutendedupcomingthirdinthe2017 Poland. Between2015and2017,theFPÖledinAustria’s Justice in and Law and in France, Rassemblement National Pen’s Marine LeDeutschland, für Alternative to links close of NationsandFreedomgroupintheEP, theymaintain trade liberalisationinitiatives.MembersoftheEurope union”, butalsotheEU’sfocusonruleoflawandits immigration andEurosceptic, opposingnotjust“evercloser partner intherulingcoalition, theFPÖisstronglyanti- The FPÖisthemainpartyofAustria’sfarright. Thejunior The Eurosceptics trade liberalisation. European integration,ittendstobedividedontheissueof Mostly infavour ofmigration,therulelaw, andcloser seats. MEP six or five win may it centre-left; Spanish and Democrats groupintheEP, itcooperateswiththeItalian mainstream partyinAustria. AmemberoftheSocialistsand seven MEPseatsin2019. TheSPÖistraditionallytheother internally divided ontheissueofmigration. Itislikelytowin – butisreluctanttosupportfurtherEUintegrationand trade liberalisationandtheEU’sfocusonruleoflaw Horst Seehofer’sChristianSocialUnion. TheÖVP favours conservatives: AngelaMerkel’sChristianDemocratsand group withintheEPandmaintainscloselinkstoGerman (SPÖ). TheÖVP isamemberoftheEuropeanPeople’sParty Democrats Social the than more points percentage nine vote, BELGIUM

Projected voter turnout of a patchwork. Altogether, 12 different parties are Belgium and Luxembourg usually have higher turnouts in projected to win one or more seats, half of them just one EP elections than any other country (regularly more than MEP. Therefore, it makes sense to discuss the projected 90 percent). However, given that voting is obligatory in both changes in the balance between representatives in the states, this is not a useful indicator of voters’ interest in EU EP’s political groups. From this perspective, the number affairs. Judging by the low profile of European issues in the of Belgian liberal MEPs may fall from six to four following Belgian political debate, EP elections are of little interest the decline in the polls of both Le Mouvement Réformateur to voters. That may especially be the case in 2019 due to and the Flemish Liberals (Open VLD). The Greens – who recent fallout over the Marrakesh Pact, and given that the are gaining popularity in Flanders and Wallonia – may add EP election will coincide with federal and regional elections, another MEP seat to their current two. Belgian members of which most citizens consider to be much more important. the European People’s Party, the Socialists and Democrats, This is quite paradoxical, since some of the most topical and the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) – issues in the coming national ballot (such as security and which have four MEPs each – should maintain their overall the refugee crisis) are, to a large extent, dealt with at the EU positions. level. The Eurosceptics Main battles in 2019 One dynamic that is playing out on the right of the political Belgium (along with Italy, Poland, and Ireland) is one of spectrum is crucial in Flanders. There, the right-wing New a handful EU members that will be divided into several Flemish Alliance (NVA), a member of the ECR, is trying not constituencies at the 2019 EP election. Its three constituencies to lose ground to the far-right Vlaams Belang (VB), a member will comprise the Dutch- (12 MEPs), French- (eight MEPs), of the Europe of Nations and Freedom group. As it does so, and German-speaking (one MEP) electoral colleges. At the the NVA is becoming increasingly hardline on migration – same time, the debate will be strongly polarised between the and it left the ruling coalition in December 2018 in protest country’s three main regions: Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels. against the country’s support for the UN Global Compact on As Flanders is a right-leaning region, migration and security migration. Current polls suggest that the NVA and the VB will should feature prominently there, especially since these will be win four MEP seats and one MEP seat respectively, but this the first federal, regional, and EP elections in Belgium since may change. Meanwhile, on the left of the spectrum is the the March 2016 Brussels bombings. Wallonia is a left-leaning far-left PTB/PVDA, which is a member of European United region where socio-economic issues will be at the heart of the Left–Nordic Green Left group, and which has been critical debate, although migration will feature as well. of the EU. Seeking its first MEP, it has already pulled the region’s Socialist Party further to the left. At a federal level, The mainstream this growing polarisation will likely complicate the formation Given the lack of electoral threshold, and the fact that the of the next Belgian government: the main Flemish party, country is divided into three electoral colleges, Belgium’s the NVA, refuses to govern with the main Walloon one, the political representation in the EP is likely to be something Socialists.

19 20 ECFR/278 February 2019 www.ecfr.eu THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTION: HOW ANTI-EUROPEANS PLAN TO WRECK EUROPE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO STOP IT about. but thattheyshoulddebatethewaysinwhichitcouldcome avoided, be should Europe multi-speed a of prospect that the orientation. ThereisaconsensusamongBulgarianparties EU’s policyvis-à-vis Russia,giventheirlargelypro-Moscow sentiment inthecountry. Theyarealsolikelytocriticisethe and borderprotection, exploitingariseinanti-refugee migration on more focus may coalition, ruling the in partner opposition party, andright-wingUnitedPatriots, ajunior Area. Inturn,theBulgarianSocialistParty(BSP), asthemain eurozone andtheSchengen of the membership country’s in Bulgaria.Itmayalsopromisefurtherprogressonthe message aboutthenextroundofEuropeaninvestments Framework, aswellcohesionpolicy,withapositive likely concentrateontheEU’snextMultiannualFinancial national andEuropeanissues.Therulingcentre-rightwill The campaignfortheEPelectionwillfocusonamixtureof Main battles in 2019 EU memberstates. percent) thaninmostothercentralandeasternEuropean and mayboostturnout–whichwashigherin2014(at36 is neededinBulgaria. Thisraisesthestakesof2019vote election willdecidewhetheranothersnapnational March 2017. Someexpertssaythattheoutcomeof2019EP support forpoliticalpartiessincethesnapgeneralelectionin it. Bulgarianshave nothadanopportunitytoexpresstheir deliberation abouttheEUandBulgaria’smembershipof next generalelection, ratherthanaperiodofin-depth of nationalpolitics, orassomethingofarehearsalforthe Most BulgariansseetheEPelectionsasacontinuation Projected voterturnout BULGARIA – buttheyarealsomiredininternalinfighting. parties are,tovaryingdegrees, pro-RussianandEurosceptic Patriots United The three 2019. seat in MEP win one to hopes national government. With9percentsupportinthepolls, it and Ataka), andwhichservesasajuniorpartnerinthecurrent National Movement, the SalvationofBulgaria, theBulgarian coalition ofthreenationalistparties(theNationalFrontfor particularly withintheUnitedPatriots, whichisaloose there arestronglyEuroscepticpoliticiansinBulgaria– following theleadofViktor Orbán’s Hungary. Theseaside, nationalist, andevenEuroscepticpositionsinrecentyears, extent, GERB)have veeredsharplytowardsconservative, Bulgaria’s twomainparties(especiallytheBSPand, toalesser Despite representingthemainstream, factionswithin The Eurosceptics one remainingBulgarianseatintheEP. MEP seat.Allotherpartiesareprojectedtocompeteforthe third with8percentofthevote, whichwouldearnitone is oftenreferredtoastheTurkishminoritypartyandpolls and Freedoms(amemberoftheEPgroupingLiberals) for Rights Movement is stronglypro-Russian. The which the BSP, is considered a unifying figure for the country’s left, became thecountry’s presidentin2017withthesupportof would provideitwithsevenMEPseats. RumenRadev, who in Bulgaria, pollingsecondat33percentofthevote, which and DemocratsgroupintheEP, isthesecond-largestparty eight MEPseatsin2019. TheBSP, membersoftheSocialists the pollswith38percentofvoteandisprojectedtowin leads which member), Party People’s European GERB (a The rulingcoalitionisledbyBoykoBorissov’s centre-right Themainstream CROATIA

Projected voter turnout The mainstream Turnout in the 2014 EP election was just 25 percent in Croatia. The ruling centre-right HDZ party (a member of the This year, it is likely to be more than 30 percent, largely European People’s Party) dominates Croatia’s political because the current prime minister, Andrej Plenković, used landscape and could secure around 35-40 percent of the to be an MEP and because Croatia will take over the EU’s vote, giving it five or six MEP seats. The other parties of rotating presidency in early 2020. There have been rumours the country’s mainstream include the Social Democratic about Plenković calling a snap parliamentary election to Party of Croatia (the SDP, a member of the Socialists and benefit from his current popularity. That may enable his Democrats). It has, however, lost a considerable number party to govern alone, without the need to enter a coalition of supporters in recent years due to internal infighting. It with smaller partners. If such an election took place at the is projected to obtain around 15-20 percent of the vote and same time as the EP vote, turnout would be even higher. This three MEP seats. Both parties – as well as the liberal GLAS/ would largely benefit the ruling Croatian Democratic Union IDS (a member of the EP’s liberal group), which is projected (HDZ). But it currently appears unlikely that there will be a to gain a vote share of 5-10 percent and one MEP seat – snap election. are pro-European: in favour of ever closer union, trade liberalisation, and a focus on European values. Main battles in 2019 The campaign is likely to focus on economic issues: how to The Eurosceptics boost Croatia’s weak growth, make better use of the EU’s The decline of the SDP in recent years has provided space for structural funds, increase youth employment, and slow new parties, such as the centre-right MOST and the anti-EU the emigration of Croats to other EU member states. But Human Shield. The latter is rising in the polls, largely due immigration will also be a hot issue, especially if another to its anti-migration discourse, which finds fertile ground wave of refugees arrives at the country’s borders in the spring. in Croatia’s growing xenophobia. Human Shield is not Xenophobia is on the rise in Croatia: in 2017, one survey just Eurosceptic but also anti-establishment, pro-Russian, showed that 80 percent of Croats believed that “migrants and critical of NATO and of integration with the West. Its and refugees should go to countries with similar culture”. If members do not conceal their close links to Moscow nor migration becomes a central topic, this will benefit the two contact with former US presidential campaign adviser Steve anti-refugee parties: MOST and Human Shield. The ruling Bannon and the Movement. If Human Shield enters the party used to flirt with far-right ideology but Plenković has EP in 2019, this will provide a strong boost to the party’s positioned it as an ally of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, popularity at home. with a much softer stance on migration.

21 22 ECFR/278 February 2019 www.ecfr.eu THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTION: HOW ANTI-EUROPEANS PLAN TO WRECK EUROPE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO STOP IT far rightforthefirst time. race forthesixthMEPseat, whichmayfalltothecountry’s countries. Theupcomingelectionwilllargelybeaboutthe hosts fewrefugeesincomparisontootherEuropean given thatCyprus(anislandoutsidetheSchengenArea) Immigration willbediscussed, butitisnotacentralissue employment, securityanddefence,humanrights. that shouldalsofeatureincludeeconomicgrowthand major politicalpartyinthe2019EPelection. Othertopics Turkey-EU relationswilldominatethecampaignsofeach Main battles in 2019 other partiestourgetheirsupportersvote. to seizeoneofCyprus’ssixMEPseats. Thisshouldprompt Front (ELAM), isprojectedtomobiliseitssupporterstry country’s emergingfar-rightparty, theNationalPopular a similarorslightlyhigherturnoutthaninthelastvote.The EU membershiptheircountryhasbecome. Thismayherald Turkey) haveledmanyCypriotstorealisehowdependenton neighbouring Greeceand have majorimplicationsfor (which hydrocarbon exploration. Still, Brexitandtherefugeecrisis notably reunification and the current crisis with Turkey over percent in2014.Localproblemsdominatethepublicdebate, in rapiddeclineCyprus: from72percentin2004to44 Despite compulsoryvoting, turnoutatEPelectionshasbeen Projected voterturnout CYPRUS march againstTurkishCypriotsandmigrants. exhibits neo-fascistleanings. In2010,thepartyorganiseda worryingly, however, italsopromotesGreeknationalismand integration andadvocates aEuropeofnationsinstead. More the supportofsixpercentvoters.ELAM opposesEuropean one MEPseat. Currently, thepartypollsinfourthplace,with with Greece’sGoldenDawn,standsarealchanceofgetting affiliated is which ELAM, Eurosceptic ultranationalist, The The Eurosceptics for thecountry’ssixthMEPseat. solution totheCyprusproblem–willcompetewithELAM other mainstreampartiesduetoitsoppositionafederal Democracy (EDEK)–whichdistinguishesitselffromthe such. Anotherleft-wingparty,theMovement forSocial “neoliberal” orientationbutisnotopposedtotheEUas the leftandcentrerespectively.AKEL criticisestheEU’s DIKO (amemberoftheSocialistsandDemocrats)dominate Green Leftof EuropeanUnitedLeft–Nordic group)and centre-right ofthepoliticalspectrum. AKEL (amember People’s Party)isCyprus’smainpartyanddominatesthe one MEPsrespectively. DISY(amemberoftheEuropean Democratic Party(DIKO)–areprojectedtogettwo, two,and the ProgressivePartyofWorkingPeople(AKEL), andthe The threemainpartiesinCyprus–DemocraticRally(DISY), The mainstream CZECH REPUBLIC

Projected voter turnout Liberal group), which may win twice as many votes in Turnout in EP elections in the Czech Republic is regularly 2019 as any other party and obtain nine MEP seats as a among the three lowest in the EU. This year, it is widely result. Babiš won the 2018 general election with promises expected to be little more than 20 percent, and only slightly to stand up to Brussels and fight illegal migration. But higher than in 2014. Migration issues might have a mobilising he has softened his stance since, favouring the principle effect on the electorate. But, at the same time, voters may of free movement while seeking stronger controls on the already be tired of going to the polls: in 2018, they have had to EU’s border. Two established parties of the Czech pro- vote in presidential, senatorial, and local elections. Low turnout European mainstream – the Christian Democrats and the usually favours pro-European parties, whose supporters are Social Democrats – may win just one MEP seat each. The relatively interested in European issues. It may also enable pro-European Czech Pirate Party (a member of the Greens smaller parties (such as the pro-European centre-right TOP 09 in the EP) should finish in second or third place, winning party, which is currently polling below the threshold to enter three or four MEP seats. parliament) to vie for a seat if they invest in the campaign. The Eurosceptics Main battles in 2019 Various degrees of Euroscepticism are evident on the A strong Eurosceptic element will feature in the 2019 EP Czech political scene. On the far right, Tomio Okamura’s election in the Czech Republic due to the presence of the Freedom and Direct Democracy party will likely campaign far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy party in the Czech against migration, eurozone accession, and Czech EU parliament, and an overall rise in anti-refugee sentiment across membership in general. Supported by 8-9 percent of the country. Migration will become the most controversial voters, it is projected to gain one or two MEP seats. issue in the campaign, perhaps leading politicians to link it Interestingly, similar messages (and an analogous pro- to security and the fight against terrorism. Other topics that Russian orientation) will feature in the campaign of the Eurosceptics are likely to raise include the country’s accession far-left Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, which to the eurozone as well as “Czechxit”. Still, ANO 2011, the party may win one MEP seats. These two radical parties aside, of Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, should be the clear winner the conservative Civic Democratic Party (a member of the of the election (despite allegations of corruption against the European Conservatives and Reformists in the EP) will call prime minister). It is expected to campaign on a pro-European for a return of competencies to member states and for the ticket, especially given recent signs of cooperation between Czech Republic to obtain opt-outs from the EU’s common Babiš and French President Emmanuel Macron. asylum policy and eurozone accession. Currently polling second, it should win four MEP seats. Still, the party might The mainstream shift closer to the European mainstream if, after the 2019 The pro-European mainstream in the Czech Republic is election, it joins the European People’s Party. currently dominated by ANO 2011 (a member of the EP

23 24 ECFR/278 February 2019 www.ecfr.eu THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTION: HOW ANTI-EUROPEANS PLAN TO WRECK EUROPE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO STOP IT elections occurinashortspaceoftime). to nationalratherthanEuropeantopics(particularly, ifboth Denmark byJune 2019, thiscouldshiftthepoliticaldebate national parliamentaryelectionisscheduledtotakeplacein should alsoprominentlyfeatureinthedebate. However, asa analogous referendumonthecountry’s EUmembership– implications forDenmark–andthedesirabilityofholdingan wing partieswilllikelydrawattentiontoclimateissues. Brexit’s started competingonimmigration-relatedissues. Mostleft- Mainstream parties, includingtheSocialDemocrats, havealso right. far country’s the of popularity rising the in reflected is the debatecentringon,forexample, “welfaretourism”). This is increasinglyveeringtowardsanti-migrationpositions(with become thecentralissueofEPcampaign. Danishsociety Immigration –andtheEU’spoliticalcrisisarounditwilllikely Main battles in 2019 national ones,asisoftenthecaseinDenmark. parties willagainprove morepopularinEPelectionsthan seen whetherfringe their intentiontostand. Itremainstobe announced have politicians national influential of number and theUK’s “opt-outs”withintheEU. Anunusuallylarge Denmark’s between given theparallels boost turnout, also and possiblyevenmorethan60percent. Brexitshould set tocontinuethisyear,withturnouthigherthanlasttime problems withDenmark’s EUmembership. Thistrendis and “against”theEU,butincreasinglytouchingonconcrete European issueswerediscussed: nolongerreducedtoa“for” had alreadybeenaremarkablechangeinthewaythat highest everinEPelections. Eveninthatcampaign, there second- country’s the still but earlier years five than lower At the2014EPelectioninDenmark, turnoutwas56percent: Projected voterturnout DENMARK grounds. reasons ofdemocraticlegitimacyratherthanonanti-refugee for mostly Eurosceptic, but also single seat)is a secure may or threeMEPseats.Thefar-rightRed-GreenAlliance(which two obtain to projected is Party People’s Danish The issues. government, largelybecauseoftheiropposingviews onEU country’s centre-rightrulingcoalitionbutisnotpartofthe broadly. Thepartyprovidesparliamentarysupporttothe critical ofinstitutionalisedinternationalcooperationmore and Eurosceptic,EP, the Sweden Democratsin of the biggest partyinthecountry’s parliament. Itisanally of Denmark’sfarright–andiscurrentlythesecond- The DanishPeople’sPartyisthemainrepresentative The Eurosceptics The SocialDemocratsshouldwinthreeMEPseats. has veeredtowardsanti-immigrantpositions.leadership, it party. However, afterthemigrantcrisisandundernew polls since2015–wouldbewidelyviewedasamoderate biggest left-wingpartyinDenmark, andtheleaderin In normalcircumstances, theSocialDemocrats– ruling partiesarelikelytowinoneMEPseateachatmost. is projectedtogainthreeMEPseats, whiletheothertwo wing nationalistsfromtheDanishPeople’s Party, and Party competesforsecondplaceinthepollswithright- the EU.TheLiberalwith should integratemoreclosely but, overall, theyareratherreticentonwhetherDenmark differEU the on positions Their Party. People’s Socialist with theleft-wingDanishSocialLiberal Partyandthe alongmainstream, pro-European current country’s the constitutingParty formthecentre-rightrulingcoalition, The Liberal Party, theLiberal Alliance, andtheConservative The mainstream ESTONIA

Projected voter turnout The mainstream Estonians will choose just seven MEPs in 2019, comprising Two liberal parties – the Centre Party and the Reform Party – one of the four smallest delegations in the EP. Estonians dominate Estonia’s political mainstream. Both are members of consider EP elections to be a second order concern, as the ALDE liberal group in the European Parliament, and they demonstrated by the much lower turnout in these votes (36.5 currently jointly lead in the polls with the support of around percent in 2014) than in national parliamentary elections 27-28 percent of voters each. In 2019 they look set to win two (64.2 percent in 2015). Yet recent debates about Brexit and MEP seats each. The Centre Party has led the ruling coalition migration have boosted public interest in EU issues, which since 2016, while the Reform Party is the main opposition – together with the introduction of e-voting – could push force. The former’s current MEP, Yana Toom, has announced turnout to more than 45 percent. However, the EP contest her intention to seek re-election. It is widely expected that could also be overshadowed by a national parliamentary Andrus Ansip, current European commissioner for the digital election planned for March 2019. single market and vice-president of the European Commission, may head the Reform Party list. The Social Democrats, the Main battles in 2019 Centre Party’s current coalition partner, are a mainstream As the campaign for the EP election will take place in a short political force that is likely to win at least one MEP seat. All period after the country’s parliamentary election, it may three parties are pro-European: in favour of ever closer union, therefore be dominated by issues related to the domestic trade liberalisation, the rule of law, and migration. context, including negotiations on forming a government. At the same time, the composition of a coalition government The Eurosceptics may limit major parties’ room for manoeuvre (currently, The Conservative People’s Party is the only genuine far-right there is speculation that one of the centre-liberal parties party in Estonia. Its popularity has skyrocketed in the last could form a coalition with the far right). As a result, the four years. From less than 5 percent in the polls before 2015, campaign may yet be dominated by European issues, such it now stands at almost 20 percent today. If it maintains this as the implications of Brexit for the future of the EU, the level of support, this anti-European (not just Eurosceptic) impact of the refugee crisis on solidarity in Europe, the EU’s party will claim one or two MEP seats – and may also enter competitiveness, and the EU-financed Rail Baltica project. the next national government. The party opposes further Hotly debated national issues such as tax reform may also EU integration, migration, and Brussels’s focus on the rule feature. of law. It claims to defend the sovereignty of states and national cultures.

25 26 ECFR/278 February 2019 www.ecfr.eu THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTION: HOW ANTI-EUROPEANS PLAN TO WRECK EUROPE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO STOP IT and theCentreParty–BlueReformtogetherform Two centre-rightparties–theNationalCoalitionParty The mainstream economic andhumanitarianreasons. improving theprospectsforlegalmigrationintoEU migration. Allmajorpartieswouldbereadytoconsider party BlueReform, Finnshaveamoderateattitudetowards the exceptionoffar-rightFinnsPartyandsplinter due tothepreparationsforFinland’sEUpresidency. With of theEUmorebroadly, mayreceiveadditionalattention topics. Thecountry’s placeandroleintheEU, andthefuture on campaign impact significant a have also could election defence policy.However, thenationalparliamentary policy andenvironmentalprotection, andsecurity crucial Europeanissuesarecounter-terrorism,climate According toEurobarometer,thetopicsthatFinnsseeas Main battles in 2019 due toFinland’s EUpresidency,whichstartsinmid-2019. remains tobeseen. InterestinEUaffairsmayriseslightly and howthiswillaffecttheelectoraldynamicsturnout two majorelectionsinlessthansixweeks. However, whether during theEPcampaign. Finnswillbegoingtothepollsin main partieswill, therefore,beengagedincoalitiontalks parliamentary electioninApril2019. SomeofFinland’s most significant effects on the 2019 vote is Finland’s national to have the likely factor The the election. to weeks leadingup to generatepoliticaldebateandmediainterestonlyinthe the EU-wideaverage(41percentin2014). EPconteststend Finland’s turnoutatEPelectionshasbeenconsistentlybelow Projected voterturnout FINLAND that theybothcriticisethecurrentstateofEU. prospect ofcooperationbetweenthetwo, despitethefact also expecttowinoneMEPseats. Thereis, however,no can It group). Left Green Left–Nordic United European of European) leftisrepresentedbytheLeftAlliance(amember with atleastoneMEP. Finland’sradical(butstilllargelypro- around 10percentoftheelectorate. Thisshouldprovideit increasingly anti-globalisation, ithasthesteadysupportof from SwedenandDenmark. Anti-refugee, Eurosceptic,and parties Eurosceptic other like Reformists, and Conservatives of theEuropean is amember It radical right. the towards ruling coalition,theFinnsPartyhasdriftedeven further members, whocreatedBlueReformandjoinedthe parliamentary term.Afterthedepartureofmoremoderate The FinnsPartyhassplinteredduringthecurrent The Eurosceptics gain anyseats. tounlikely are Democrats Christian the and Party People’s should secureoneortwoseats.Thecentre-rightSwedish The GreenLeague, supportedby11-14percentofvoters, seats.MEP four or three win to projected also is it percent, is oneofthethreemajorpartiesinFinland. Pollingat20-22 Party (amemberoftheSocialistsandDemocratsEPgroup) other sideofthepoliticalspectrum,SocialDemocratic vote andhasnochanceofwinninganyMEPseats. Onthe Party butitiscurrentlypollingatjust1-2percentofthe Reform includesmoderateformermembersoftheFinns and areprojectedtowinthreeorfourseatseach. Blue respectively) belongtoFinland’s pro-Europeanmainstream European People’s PartyandtheliberalALDE grouping the of (members two first The coalition. ruling current the FRANCE

Projected voter turnout minded MoDem) has dominated France’s political centre. In France, EP election turnout has always been just below the Mirroring the recent decline in the president’s popularity, EU average – around 40 percent on the last two occasions. La République En Marche! is projected to come second in Turnout is expected to increase to 43-45 percent in 2019, the 2019 EP election in France. Macron’s party recently mostly due to the Europeanisation of several national announced a coalition with ALDE with the aim of uniting issues, such as migration and the economy, under President European progressives, reaffirming its strong ties with Emmanuel Macron. As usual, many voters will treat this Ciudadanos in Spain. In turn, the two parties of the election as a referendum on the government’s policies (to the country’s former mainstream – Les Républicains and benefit of far-right and far-left anti-European parties), while the Socialist Party – are struggling to find a new identity many others will vote for their preferred smaller parties and will largely consider this election to be something of (such as the Greens), refraining from the kind of tactical a survival test. Les Républicains are now divided between voting more common in the country’s presidential elections. a moderate faction, which aligns with the government The 2018 reform of the electoral system ended France’s on European issues, and a more radical one, led by party division into eight constituencies for the EP election, which president Laurent Wauquiez, which flirts with right-wing should facilitate a nationwide debate during the campaign. rhetoric on migration and identity. Les Républicains may win nine MEP seats while the Socialists risk winning only Main battles in 2019 a few seats, polling at barely more than the 5 percent Macron’s credibility for the rest of his presidential term threshold. The Greens – who are pro-European – should (which runs until mid-2022) will be at stake in the 2019 EP also gain six or seven seats. election. Following the gilets jaunes (yellow vests) protests, France will likely fail to meet some of the Maastricht criteria The Eurosceptics – notably, the deficit-to-GDP ratio limit of 3 percent in 2019. Rassemblement National (formerly the Front National) Beyond this, the campaign of his La République En Marche! dominates the Eurosceptic camp in France and is projected will probably address social issues and aim to respond to the to win the EP election. Like Italy’s Lega (with which it demonstrations. The protests will have repercussions for the maintains close links), Le Pen’s party will campaign for broader themes of the campaign, as well as for the French border controls, greater national sovereignty, and a “union political landscape: the possibility of a gilets jaunes party of European nations”. It is projected to win around 22 running for the 2019 EP election should not be discounted. MEP seats. Nicolas Dupont-Aignan’s Debout La France Macron has recently adjusted his strategy of confrontation will try to draw support from “all the country’s patriots with anti-European parties and is now trying to redirect his and republicans”, hoping to take some votes from both agenda towards the defence of Europe’s sovereignty. Whether Le Pen’s party and the divided Républicains, and to pass La République En Marche! or Marine Le Pen’s party wins the the 5 percent threshold. Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s La France election could have significant political consequences. Apart Insoumise – polling at 11 percent – has established a from the president’s capacity to govern France, core themes hegemonic position on the country’s far left, largely due to of the election are likely to be immigration (for the right and the decay of the Socialists. It is projected to win ten seats. the far right), as well as growth and jobs (for the left and the While there is no possibility that the country’s far right far left). and far left will agree on a common agenda for Europe, there are remarkable parallels between them on economic The mainstream issues (anti-trade; critical of the euro) and their use of anti- Since the 2017 presidential and legislative elections, establishment rhetoric. La République En Marche! (in alliance with the like-

27 28 ECFR/278 February 2019 www.ecfr.eu THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTION: HOW ANTI-EUROPEANS PLAN TO WRECK EUROPE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO STOP IT members of Germany’s governing coalition have struggled in members ofGermany’s governingcoalitionhave struggledin The the euro. and EU’s institutionalset-up the within work to want parties mainstream all positions, policy parties’ While thereisconsiderable variationbetweenGerman The mainstream security; andtheEU’svalues. to European challenges change; climate social policy; and issues suchastheeuro, trade,andotherfeaturesofeconomic feature to also likely campaign is The years. recent in right of debate,largelyduetotheanti-refugeerhetoricfar topics high-profile most the among be will controls border will signalhowthesechangesareunfolding. Migrationand Bundestag sincethe2017federalelection. TheEPelection in the been represented parties have seven shifts: major Linke. Germany’s partylandscape iscurrentlyundergoing potential supporterbaseineasternGermany, asdoesDie Alternative fürDeutschland(AfD). Thepartyhasitslargest for support of tests important be will Thuringia and Saxony, have animpactatthefederallevel, thevotesinBrandenburg, to centreondomesticissues.Asstateelectionstraditionally The mainpoliticalbattleinGermany’sEPelectionislikely Main battles in 2019 small partieswillhaveanopportunitytowinMEPseats. the wholecountryconstitutesasingleconstituency,relatively 43 percent. Asthereisnoelectoralthresholdinthevoteand Turnout inthe2019EPelectionisprojectedtobeataround in theeasternstatesofBrandenburg, Saxony, andThuringia. elections upcoming important and Merkel, Angela Chancellor uncertainty overthefateofcurrentrulingcoalitionledby debates. Thistrendmightcontinuein2019, especiallygiven meaning thatnationalissuesusuallydominateEPcampaign elections aslessimportantthannationalorregionalones– population intheEU), theGermanpublicstillperceivesEP more MEPsthananyothercountry(asithasthelargest its traditional beliefintheEUsystem.AlthoughGermanyhas reflects which class, political German the of parts large of responsibilityassociatedwiththeEPelectionsamong German, helpedmobiliseGermanvoters. Thereisasense People’s PartySpitzenkandidatJean-ClaudeJunckerspeaks and DemocratsEPgroup, andthefactthatEuropean as Schulz Martin of profile The ago. years five percent 48 to rising 2009, and 2004 in Voter turnoutinGermany’sEPelectionsstoodat43percent Projected voterturnout GERMANY of the Socialists Spitzenkandidat oftheSocialists campaign. British Labour PartyleaderJeremyCorbyn’sMomentum movement, whichisinspired byLa FranceInsoumiseand Wagenknecht, becameoneof the foundersofaufstehen overall direction: in2018itsleadertheBundestag, Sahra undergoing anotherroundof internalcompetitionoverits currently is party The seats. MEP eight retain its to likely is Linke Die percent, 9 at Polling euro. the and institutions EU on Russia–buthasnotabandoneditsoverallcommitmentto NATO –withsomeofitsmemberssupportingasofterpolicy policy. Thepartyadvocatesanalternatesecuritysystemto and ahumanitarianapproachtoasylummigration a populistbent, despitegenerallyfocusingonsocialEurope has left, DieLinke far On the at least13MEP seats. to win the EuropeanParliament.Thisyear, thepartyisprojected group holdingonlyoneseat,theAfDdoesnotplayarolein EP Democracy Direct and Freedom of Europe the with now, federal election(whichgaveit91seatsintheBundestag).For it woninthe2017 12.6 percent polls –higherthantherecord the 15 percentin at off levelled of thevotehas share AfD’s party isstilldebatingthisposition. Inrecentmonths,the with fundamentalreforminthenextelectoralcycle. Butthe pushing forGermanytoleave theEUifitdoesnotsucceed is it suggests that election EP for the manifesto the AfD’s Germany’s farrightintheBundestag. Arecentdraftof Islam, nationalist, anddeeplyconservative–represents anti- anti-immigration, Eurosceptic, is which – AfD The The Eurosceptics the ALDE EPgroup’s seattallybyfour. 2017, iscurrentlypollingat9percentandlikelytoboost Free DemocraticParty,whichreturnedtotheBundestagin fortunes athome,gaining19seatsintheEPelection. The The GreenPartyisprojectedtocapitaliseonitsimproving SPDis the projected tolosemorethantenseats,bringingitstotal14. level: the European at effect significant a have Party’s 20percent. ThisshiftinGermanpoliticsislikelyto in fourthplace, justaheadoftheAfD, butbehindtheGreen (SPD) arenowpollingatjust14-15percent–puttingthem its voteshareof20.5 percentin2017, theSocialDemocrats this year’sEPelection. Althoughitwasdisappointedwith CDU/CSU willlosefourseats, bringingitstotalto30, in around 30percent. Accordingtocurrentprojections,the vote inthe2017federalelection, andiscurrentlypollingat Christian SocialUnion(CDU/CSU)won33percentofthe the pollsinrecentmonths.TheChristianDemocraticUnion/

GREECE

Projected voter turnout The mainstream Greece is one of four EU member states that has compulsory New Democracy – a member of the European People’s Party voting, which partly explains its high (if declining) turnout – is expected to win the EP elections in Greece, obtaining at EP elections. The 2019 EP election will coincide with nine seats. Syriza – which is often seen externally as a regional and municipal polls in Greece, which should populist left-wing party and is a member of European United ensure a high turnout. There is even a possibility that the Left–Nordic Green Left – currently occupies the centre-left government, led by the left-wing Syriza, may call a snap of the political spectrum in Greece. It should finish second parliamentary election the same day in hope of remaining and gain seven seats. Both parties favour deeper European in power nationally. The party expects that voters upset with integration and focus on strengthening the rule of law austerity will cast protest votes in the EP election, but not the across the EU. However, the former is divided on the issue national one. If that happens, it should boost turnout even of migration, and the latter on trade liberalisation. Another further – to the benefit of pro-EU parties, whose supporters mainstream party that could secure some representation are relatively unlikely to turn out. in the next EP is the centre-left Movement for Change, a member of the Socialists and Democrats group, and Syriza’s Main battles in 2019 arch-rival. It should win two EP seats. Former minister of Given the timing of regional and municipal elections, and finance Yanis Varoufakis will seek election to the EP, but will even the chance of a general election the same day, the run in Germany. campaign may focus even more than usual on local and national issues. Still, there is also likely to be a focus on The Eurosceptics economic issues, including Greece’s cooperation with its Two Eurosceptic Greek parties are expected to win seats creditors, the prospect of relaxing austerity measures, and in the EP in 2019. Golden Dawn – a neo-Nazi, anti-EU Europe’s economic direction more broadly. Syriza will outfit – could win two MEP seats, just as it did in 2014. campaign for less austerity and higher taxes on companies. The Communist Party of Greece – which advocates for the The conservative New Democracy (the main opposition country’s withdrawal from the EU – should gain one seat. party, which is leading in the polls) may campaign for less There is no plausible way in which these two Eurosceptic taxation, more investment, and more Europe. The question parties will collaborate. However, they share many key of EU migration policy will be debated too, particularly in standpoints, opposing: trade liberalisation; Brussels’s focus the context of expectations of greater cooperation with other on the rule of law; ever closer union; and new legal pathways EU countries on the issue. The 2018 deal between Greece for immigration. and North Macedonia, settling a decades-long dispute over the latter’s name, is also a hotly debated and divisive issue.

29 30 ECFR/278 February 2019 www.ecfr.eu THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTION: HOW ANTI-EUROPEANS PLAN TO WRECK EUROPE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO STOP IT political scene. Currentpollsprojectthatitwillwin12-14 The right-wingFideszcompletelydominatestheHungarian The mainstream hampered thecountry’s sovereignty. – which Office Orbán’s governmentavoidedin2017onthegroundsthatit Prosecutor’s Public European the join to use ofEuropeanfundsandarelatedinitiativeforHungary cases withinthegovernment. Theseincludecasesonthe corruption as such issues, other on attention focus to try may This puts opposition parties in a very difficult position. They the effortsgovernmenthasmadetoaddressproblem. with satisfied is population the of share same The worrying. consider the flow of illegal immigrants into their country to be Századvég, Fidesz’s think-tank,almost70percentofcitizens campaign. AccordingtoaFebruary2018surveyreleasedby the currentEUleadershipcentralissuesofEPelection The governmentwillmakemigrationandthecalltochange Main battles in 2019 23-41 percentoftheentireelectorate. will receivethesupportof48-59percentactive voters, or the EPelectioncouldfavourFidesz.Currentpollssuggestit in SerbiaandUkraine. Asitstands,increasedparticipationin Hungarian citizenswholiveoutsidetheEU,includingthose ruling partyFidesz’srecentproposaltograntvotingrights the ruleoflawinHungary. Thisisalsothemainreasonfor its legitimacyinEurope, includingoncontroversiesabout EU inyearstocome. Therulingpartyseekstostrengthen on whetherpro-oranti-migrationforceswilldominatethe referendum a as election the frame to efforts transnational higher thanusual,largelyduetoPrimeMinisterViktor Orbán’s not forindividualcandidates.Still, thistimeturnoutmaybe at home. HungarianscanonlyvoteforlistsatEPelections, known widely not are exceptions, notable some with MEPs, in 2014.MostHungarian 29 percent 2009 and percent in than nationalorlocalelections: theyhadaturnoutof36 inHungary interest lower significantly attract elections EP Projected voterturnout HUNGARY alliance betweenthetwo. of theOrbángovernment, sothereisnopossibilityofan anti-immigrant andEurosceptic, Jobbikisastaunchcritic Althoughseat. MEP one least at claim to needed threshold – althoughwithlittlechanceofpassingthe5percent but couldeventuallydrawsomesupportawayfromJobbik Home Movement, whichpollsatjust1-2percentcurrently members ofJobbikhaveestablishedanewparty,Our for HungarytoleavetheEU). Moreextremistformer moderate toneontheEU(forexample, itnolongerargues of deradicalisingtheparty’slineandadoptingamore The party’s newleadershipcontinuesVona’s strategy election. Itsformerleader, GáborVona, stooddown. Jobbik brokeupafterthe2018nationalparliamentary The Eurosceptics the partytosecureoneMEPseat. may mobiliseatthe2019EPelection, potentiallyenabling percent ofthevote, butitsurbanandeducatedsupporters centrist partyestablishedin2017–ispollingat3-5 would reallybe.Momentum–anew, pro-European effectsits what unclear is it and unlikely looks currently be animportantshockinthecampaign.However, this 2019, orhaditsmembershiprightssuspended, thiscould bloc. IfthepartywasexcludedfromEPPbeforeMay EPP afterthe2019voteorwilljoinanewanti-European law. ItremainstobeseenwhetherFideszwillremaininthe criticised theOrbángovernmentforbreachingruleof in favour oftheEP’s Sargentinireport, whichharshly Spitzenkandidat –albeitreluctantly, asWeber voted group andsigneduptosupportManfredWeber asits each. FideszisamemberoftheEuropeanPeople’s Party win 6-10percent(1-2seats)and2-4(0-1seat) and thegreenPoliticsCanBeDifferentareprojectedto CoalitionDemocratic centre-left The each. MEPs 2-3 or 12-15 percentand10-16ofthevoterespectively, Jobbik andthesocialdemocraticMSZP –willgainjust MEP seatsin2019, andthatitsmainrivals–thefar-right IRELAND

Projected voter turnout potentially leaving just one or two to smaller parties or Participation in EP elections in Ireland is regularly higher independent candidates. The ruling Fine Gael, together with than the EU average. This should also be the case this year, the main opposition, Fianna Fail, dominate the centre-right. with turnout almost certain to exceed 50 percent, and The former is a member of the European People’s Party and possibly close to 60 percent. There are three good reasons to considers German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian expect a high turnout. Firstly, the EP election will coincide Democratic Union to be its closest European ally. The latter with local elections across the country. Secondly, the stakes is formally a member of the ALDE group but feels closest are slightly higher this time following an increase in the to other conservative parties, such as Les Républicains number of Irish MEPs, from 11 to 13. And Brexit has already in France and the People’s Party in Spain. Both parties had the effect of bringing greater awareness of EU issues are in favour of further European integration, EU trade to the Irish public. This renewed focus on Europe should liberalisation, the rule of law, and migration. A fourth Irish drive mainstream parties to appoint relatively high-profile mainstream party, Labour, was once the third-largest party candidates. and the main party of the left in Ireland, but lost support after its role in the ruling coalition that imposed austerity Main battles in 2019 measures after the eurozone crisis. It currently has no MEPs There is no scarcity of European topics that may feature in and may struggle to change this in 2019. Ireland’s 2019 EP campaign. The main parties will likely discuss ways to ensure that taxation remains a national The Eurosceptics competence rather than a European one, resisting proposals Sinn Féin is a party of the left and a member of the Greens in to introduce an EU digital tax. As usual, the future of the EU’s the EP. It currently polls third, at 23 percent, which should common agricultural policy will remain a concern for the give it three MEPs. Sinn Féin is critical of trade liberalisation country’s rural voters. European defence cooperation will be and of ever closer union, and maintains loose links with an important issue for voters worried about its implications Syriza and Podemos. But it is still a long way from being a far- for Ireland’s neutrality. And, last but not least, the country’s left party, and has adopted a reformist approach to Europe. post-Brexit future will be the centre of attention, given the It will almost certainly emphasise the issue of protecting sense that without the United Kingdom (with which Ireland Ireland’s neutrality. It may also campaign on introducing shared many key interests in the EU) Ireland could become a fairer tax system and its usual ticket of a “Europe of more exposed within the EU – particularly with respect to equals”. Still, all its positions on these topics have a clear the single market, trade, taxation, and other economic issues. pro-European dimension. Despite Brexit, there is no serious Eurosceptic voice in Ireland’s public debate. A new anti-EU The mainstream party called Irexit Freedom to Prosper has emerged recently Ireland’s three largest parties – Fine Gael, Fianna Fail, and and will enter a candidate in the 2019 EP election – but it is Sinn Féin – should between them take 11-12 MEP seats, a fringe initiative whose chances of success are close to zero.

31 32 ECFR/278 February 2019 www.ecfr.eu THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTION: HOW ANTI-EUROPEANS PLAN TO WRECK EUROPE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO STOP IT split beforethen). election (itcurrentlyappearsunlikelythatthepartywill primaries willdetermineitsleadershipforthe2019EP from popularsentiment.ThePD’s upcominginternal message, althoughthisriskscomingacrossasdetached popular support–willlikelyprovideamorepro-European someregain to opportunity an is election this which for – PDfor amajorreformoftheEU’sThe tradeagreements. sovereignty hasprecedenceover globalisation, andcalling end totheEU’s austeritypolicies,makingsurethatnational Movement willfocusmoreoneconomicissues: puttingan domestic andEuropeansecurityproblems.TheFiveStar for acommonasylumpolicy, stronglylinkingmigrationto politician MarineLe Pen,Lega willemphasisetheneed Hungarian PrimeMinisterViktor OrbánandFrench of a part Salvini, Matteo them willframethisproblemdifferently. Withitsleader, an overhaulofthemechanismsEU. Still, eachof and theDemocraticParty(PD)–willlikelycampaignfor All thethreemainparties–Lega, theFiveStarMovement, Main battles in 2019 of theelectorate. critics andsupportersratherthanthelesspartisansections approach totheEU, therebylargelymobilisingitsgreatest election risksbecomingareferendumonthegovernment’s approaching apermanentelectoralcampaigninItaly, theEP national andEuropeantopics. However, amidsomething makes itvirtuallyimpossibletodistinguishbetweenpurely are currentlyamongItalianvoters’leadingconcerns. This policy, andgeneraldissatisfactionwithEUintegration future oftheEU’scountry’s 2019budget, migration the on the Commission European the and government the debate. Onthecontrary, topicssuchastensionbetween because EuropeanissueslacksalienceintheItalianpublic 73percent the for thelastnationalparliamentaryelection. Thisisnot than less significantly percent, 50 around Italy’s turnoutinthe2019EPelectionisexpectedtobe Projected voterturnout ITALY alliance that includesthat alliance sovranista Christian DemocraticUnion/ChristianSocialUnion. Germany’s EP, alongside national parties inthenext biggest poised foraclearvictory–possiblybecomingoneofthetwo in apan-Europeancoalitionofright-wingEurosceptics, andis also crossthe4percentthreshold. In2019Lega willcampaign may who Italy”), of “Brothers the of supporters as (such right serves asaplatformformoreradicalrepresentativesofthefar also traditional Euroscepticright-wingpartythat turn, Legaisa wing Kukiz’15andCroatia’s HumanShieldmaysuggest.In the 2019election, asitsrecentinteractionswithPoland’s right- a coalitionofEuropeananti-establishmentpartiesahead This mayprompttheFive StarMovement’sleadershiptoform have beendisappointedwithitscoalitionthefarright. radical left.Large partsoftheFiveStarMovement electorate agenda isinmanyrespectsmuchclosertotheEuropean anti-austerity and anti-trade EP, its the group in Democracy a memberoftheEuroscepticEuropeFreedomandDirect second placeafterwinninglastyear’sgeneralelection.While in differentways.TheFiveStarMovementispolling Italy’s twolargestpartiesarebothdeeplyEurosceptic, albeit The Eurosceptics an MEPseatmaychangethisoutlook. Yet Berlusconi’srecentannouncementthathewillrunfor set towinnomorethansevenMEPseats, downfrom15. ago butisnowlanguishingatamere8-10percentandlooks – dominatedthecountry’s politicsadecade People’s Party Berlusconi’s ForzaItalia–amemberoftheEuropean should give it16MEPseatsthisyear,downfrom31.Silvio the EP–haslevelledoffatonlyaround18percent, which for thePD–amemberofSocialistsandDemocratsin the supportofalmost60percentvoters. Inturn, support now formthegoverningcoalitionand, takentogether, have parties two latter The Star Movement. establishment Five in thepopularityofright-wingLega andtheanti- centre-left PDandcentre-rightForzaItalia, andasurge in thepastfewyears, withthedeclineofestablished overhaul thatthecountry’spoliticalscenehasexperienced It ishardtotalkofa“mainstream”inItaly, given theradical The mainstream LATVIA

Projected voter turnout Development/For! are EU federalists, as is the centre-right, Around 40 percent of Latvian voters are expected to pro-Russian, and social democratic Harmony. The Union participate in the 2019 EP election, significantly more than of Greens and Farmers, the New Conservative Party, and the 30 percent in 2014 but short of the 54 percent five years the National Alliance support EU intergovernmentalism. before that. EP elections are less prominent in Latvia than In October 2018, for the third time in less than ten years, national parliamentary or municipal ones. At the same time, Harmony won the largest vote share of any party in the however, MEP candidates are usually high-profile politicians, national election but was again excluded from negotiations such as former prime ministers or ministers of foreign affairs. on the formation of a new government. The party is a As there are only eight seats at stake, personalities matter member of the Socialists and Democrats in the EP even and people do not vote for parties per se. This should hold though it represents conservative left politics. It may win true in the 2019 election, particularly given that the October as many as three MEP seats this year, up from its current 2018 general election ejected from office many prominent one. In turn, Unity – which dominated the country’s politicians from the previous government who might now be political scene for more than a decade – is now in decline tempted to seek MEP seats. If the catch-all Who Owns the and may lose all three of its MEP seats. The liberal and State? (KPV LV) party runs a dynamic campaign, as it did in pro-European Development/For! may become one of the national election, this should further increase media and beneficiaries of Unity’s decline, helping it obtain one MEP voter interest in the EP election. seat. The Union of Greens and Farmers should also win one MEP seat. Main battles in 2019 The EU’s post-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework The Eurosceptics should feature strongly in the campaign, given that the Latvia’s political scene is very dynamic but has not seen the ongoing negotiations over it could have a big impact on emergence of Eurosceptic parties. KPV LV, which finished Latvia’s economic development. There will also be a debate second in the general election, has so far managed not to over security and Russia, given the unstable geopolitical express its opinion on the EU or foreign policy matters situation and the pro-Kremlin positions of the Latvian left. in general. Like the New Conservative Party, the KPV Migration and refugees were not hot topics during the last LV is a dark horse in the 2019 contest; each hopes to win general election but MEP candidates searching for publicity at least one MEP seat. The KPV LV, established in 2016, may raise them. Apart from these issues, the battle will is an anti-establishment party that often veers towards largely be about the mainstream coming under increasing right-wing populism, akin to Poland’s Kukiz’15. The New pressure from two emerging parties: KPV LV and the New Conservative Party, formed in 2014, is pro-European but Conservative Party, both of which will appeal to voters who intergovernmentalist, which could make it a potential ally for are disillusioned with EU membership and blame Latvian Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Polish leader politicians for this perceived setback. Jaroslaw Kaczynski in the EU. One of Latvia’s mainstream parties, National Alliance, is already close to Poland’s Law The mainstream and Justice, as part of the European Conservatives and All political parties represented in the new Latvian Reformists group in the EP; it expects to retain its one MEP parliament are pro-EU. The centre-right parties Unity and seat.

33 34 ECFR/278 February 2019 www.ecfr.eu THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTION: HOW ANTI-EUROPEANS PLAN TO WRECK EUROPE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO STOP IT (a memberoftheGreens/EuropeanFreeAlliancegroup scene. TherulingLithuanian PeasantsandGreensparty Two mainstreampartiesdominateLithuania’s political The mainstream electoral campaign. agenda, immigrationissuesareunlikelytofeatureinthe positions. DuetotheirabsenceontheLithuanian political is likelythattheirdiscoursewillovershadowanyradical presidential candidatesremainstronglypro-European,it EU’s plansfordeeperintegration. Nonetheless, asmost nationalist rhetoricandcampaignintensivelyagainstthe right-wing/far-right OrderandJusticeparty, mayadopt the parties, particularly political Some election campaign. The presidentialelectionislikelytodominatetheEP Main battles in 2019 will bedistributedacrossalargenumberofparties. issues. Thehighertheturnout, themorelikelyitisthatvotes the EPelectionwillfocusalmostexclusivelyondomestic However, thisalsomeansthatthepoliticaldebateaheadof percent. 47 turnout to ago, whichraised years four coincided of thepresidentialelection. TheEPandpresidentialelections because theEPelectionwillcoincidewithsecondround these votes. Still, turnoutshouldbe40-50percentin2019, reflects This percent. 21 the lowlevel ofimportanceLithuanian votersattributeto elections: EP in turnout lowest In 2009Lithuania wastheEUmemberwithsecond- Projected voterturnout LITHUANIA is closetoPoland’sLaw andJustice. Itmaywinoneseat. member oftheEuropeanConservatives andReformists a is Poles Lithuanian of Action Electoral Finally, seat. Centre Party, anotherEuroscepticgroup, aimstowinone group. Itisprojectedtowin1-2MEPseats. TheLithuanian far-right EuropeofFreedomandDirectDemocracyEP right positionsandisamemberoftheanti-establishment, immigrant rhetoric. OrderandJustice tendstoadoptfar- ALDE grouping–istheonlymajorpartytohaveusedanti- bent despitebeingcentristandamemberoftheliberal populist a has which – Party Labour The platform. based) socio-economic ratherthanananti-European(oridentity- public debate. Thisiswhypartiesmostoftencampaignona the EU, thereislittleroomforanti-Europeanrhetoricinthe As Lithuania hasoneofthemostpro-Europeansocietiesin The Eurosceptics and theLithuanian CentreParty. of Lithuanian Poles, theMovementofLithuanian Liberals, Action as Electoral well as coalition), current members ofthe Social DemocraticPartyandOrderJustice(bothjunior should getoneseateach.TheseincludetheLithuanian migration andever closerunion.Several smallerparties parties arepro-Europeanbuttheyinternallydividedon meaning itislikelytowinjust2-3MEPseats. Overall, both polls. Butithasonlyaminimalleadover therulingparty, member oftheEuropeanPeople’sPartyinEP),leads right HomelandUnion–Lithuanian ChristianDemocrats(a win 2-3MEPseats. Themainoppositionparty, thecentre- in theEP)currentlypollsat17-25percentandlookssetto LUXEMBOURG

Projected voter turnout Green Party – which, like many of its counterparts in other As citizens are obliged to vote in Luxembourg, turnout is a EU countries, has recently acquired positive momentum – poor indicator of the importance they attach to EP elections. is a member of the Greens/European Free Alliance group Most prominent politicians remain in national politics. in the EP and should win 1-2 MEP seats. A member of the European matters have only a secondary importance in Socialists and Democrats, the Socialist and Labour Party the public debate. Until 2009, EP elections and national may win one MEP seat (although it may not win any). The elections took place on the same day – but a national snap Pirate Party made a surprise entry into parliament with two election in 2013 changed this. The shift has made it easier MPs (out of 60), although it is unlikely to pass the threshold for parties to focus their EP campaigns on European rather for representation in the EP election. There is a strong than national issues. consensus among mainstream parties on the rule of law, migration, and further EU integration. Trade is relatively Main battles in 2019 controversial, with the two left-wing parties more critical of Putting the EU back on track will be the major issue of the the existing trade system than the Democratic Party. debate ahead of the 2019 EP election. In particular, the debate will focus on three issues: Brexit, rule of law controversies The Eurosceptics in other EU member states, and the EU’s fiscal policy, Properly speaking, there is no far-right party in Luxembourg. which could have serious implications for Luxembourg’s The right-wing Alternative Democratic Reform Party (ADR; economy. Refugees and migration are not a major issue in a member of the European Conservatives and Reformists in Luxembourg’s public debate; there is an overall consensus the EP) is Eurosceptic in that it opposes deeper European that the country should remain open to refugees from war- integration and prefers intergovernmental cooperation on torn regions. Indeed, the minister for foreign affairs and trade and security. It is also the only voice on the country’s migration, Jean Asselborn (who is also the country’s most political scene that is sceptical of immigration, although popular politician), is often applauded for his implacable it supports accepting refugees from war-torn regions and response to European nationalists, such as Italy’s Matteo did not treat migration as a major issue in the last national Salvini. election. The party’s Euroscepticism was one of the key reasons behind the centre-right CSV’s decision to rule out a The mainstream possible coalition with it after the October 2018 election. On The centre-right Christian Social Party (CSV; a member the other side of the political spectrum, Dei Lenk (the Left; of the European People’s Party in the EP) has the largest part of the European United Left–Nordic Green Left group supporter base in the country. It is polling at 30 percent and in the EP) is mildly Eurosceptic, but for different reasons: it looks set to win 2-3 MEP seats in 2019. Three other parties – campaigns for a greater focus on a common European social which agreed in December 2018 to form a new government agenda within the EU. ADR is projected to win one MEP following an two months earlier – constitute the remainder seat at best, while Dei Lenk is most likely to not win any. of Luxembourg’s political mainstream and should also obtain Aside from the communists (who received just 1 percent of MEP seats in 2019. The Democratic Party is a member of the the vote in this year’s general election), no party advocates liberal ALDE grouping and will likely win 1-2 MEP seats. The Luxembourg’s exit from the EU.

35 36 ECFR/278 February 2019 www.ecfr.eu THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTION: HOW ANTI-EUROPEANS PLAN TO WRECK EUROPE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO STOP IT frequent useofanti-immigrantrhetoric. debate, largelyduetoNationalistleaderAdrianDelia’s the in prominently feature to likely is migration irregular problems, domestic Beyond falsified. be to out turned later government’s allegedinvolvement inthecorruptionscandal MEPs calledonthegovernmenttoresign. Butevidenceofthe investigative journalistDaphneCaruanaGalizia, Nationalist of bomb car by assassination the and revelations Papers Party –toaccuseeachotherofcorruption. AfterthePanama the country’stwomajorparties–Labour andtheNationalist because theEPhas,inrecentyears, served asaforumfor be themajortopicsof2019EPelection. Thisislargely Government corruptionandmoney-launderingwilllikely Main battles in 2019 Malta. which Party, draws muchofitssupportfromrelativelypoorsouthern Labour centre-left ruling the benefit should will alsocoincidewithlocalcouncilelections.Highturnout migration –intheMaltesepoliticaldebate. TheEPelection irregular and law, of rule the corruption, services, financial the salienceofEuropeanissues–suchasregulation year shouldbecomparabletothatinthe2014 election, given from 82 percentin2004to752014. Itslevelthis decline, steady in been has voting.turnout Still,compulsory turnout ofanymemberstateasidefromthosethathave since its2004accessiontotheEU, Maltahashadthehighest elections three all In debate. substantial generate elections Malta isoneoftherarespotsonEuropeanmapwhereEP Projected voterturnout MALTA Alternative. anathema totheprogressivesupportersofDemocratic and xenophobicrhetoricofMalta’sfar-rightpartiesis the nationalparliamentorEP. Theextremenationalist around 3percentoftheelectorate, ithasnever entered primarily onenvironmentalissues. Withthesupportof is theonlyfar-leftpartyinMalta.Itbuildsitsplatform them. DemocraticAlternativeof either with coalition a that thecentre-rightNationalistPartywouldcountenance chance ofenteringtheEP. Likewise, itishighlyunlikely astands Moviment PatrijottiMaltin.However,neither Malta hastwofar-rightparties: ImperiumEuropaand The Eurosceptics Party winningtheremainingtwo. expecting towinfourMEPsin2019, withtheNationalist granting Labour anevengreateradvantage. Labour is Alternative, maysapvotesfromtheNationalistParty,thus the DemocraticParty,togetherwithfar-left due toresistancefromthelatter’snewleadership. Asaresult, Nationalist Party, butsuchascenarioisunlikelythisyear election, theDemocraticPartyjoinedacoalitionwith unless itisalliedwithoneofthem. Duringthe2017national election EP 2019 the in party standsachance other No each. three have currently They seats. MEP won ever have Maltese politicalscene.Indeed, theyaretheonlypartiesto member oftheSocialistsandDemocrats)–dominate of theEuropeanPeople’sParty)andLabour Party(a Two pro-Europeanparties–theNationalistParty(amember The mainstream THE NETHERLANDS

Projected voter turnout projected to win at least six MEP seats in 2019, doubling its Among the six founding members of the EU, the Netherlands current tally. In October 2018, Rutte and French President has always had the lowest turnout in EP elections. There Emmanuel Macron announced plans to form a unified liberal are reasons to expect a slight increase in turnout this year front ahead of the EP election. Still, while pro-European in comparison to 2014, when it stood at 37.3 percent: EU and pro-trade, Rutte’s conservative liberals are reluctant issues, particularly migration, have become central to Dutch to increase legal pathways for migration to the EU. Under political debate since then due to the rise of right-wing his government, the Netherlands is a leading member of the political parties that are critical of the EU. Besides, as a so-called “New Hanseatic League” of fiscally conservative member of the eurozone and a net payer into the EU budget, northern EU member states. The VVD is campaigning for the Dutch have been carefully watching the EU’s struggles a smaller EU budget after Brexit. This puts it at odds with in the eurozone crisis. They will be paying close attention to Macron’s and German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s plans the negotiation of the EU’s post-2020 Multiannual Financial for greater eurozone integration. A few other parties in the Framework. Still, the EP election may also be overshadowed Dutch mainstream – such as the Christian Democrats, the by regional elections planned for spring 2019. progressive liberal D66 party, and the Labour Party –may win 7-8 seats collectively. Main battles in 2019 The EP election will encompass issues that are salient in the The Eurosceptics Dutch political debate such as migration policy, security, There are two right-wing nationalist parties in the the country’s contribution to the EU budget, and the power Netherlands: Geert Wilders’s Party for Freedom, which of Brussels vis-à-vis member states. The main dividing line is currently polling in second place (with 20 percent of may set pragmatically pro-European parties – conservative the vote) and could secure four or five seats; and Thierry liberals and Christian Democrats, pro-European progressive Baudet’s Forum for Democracy, which may obtain two liberals, and green leftists – against Eurosceptics on both seats. Both parties are strongly Eurosceptic, calling for the sides of the political spectrum, particularly those on the far Netherlands to leave the EU, but they compete for the same right that take up openly anti-EU positions and call for the voters. The Dutch far left also consists of two main parties: Netherlands to leave the EU. the pro-European Green Left, which is currently polling in third place (with 17 percent) and could win four seats; and The mainstream the Socialist Party, which is critical of the EU and may win Conservative liberals from Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s two seats. While all four parties oppose trade liberalisation, People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) are there is little chance they will cooperate with one another – currently the leading force on the Netherlands’ diverse most of all because the far right wants to dismantle the EU political scene. A member of the ALDE grouping, VVD is while the Socialist Party only seeks reduced EU integration.

37 38 ECFR/278 February 2019 www.ecfr.eu THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTION: HOW ANTI-EUROPEANS PLAN TO WRECK EUROPE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO STOP IT of law, whichcouldaffectboththecampaignandresults. to rulebeforetheelectionthatPolandisinbreachof Muslim immigrants. TheEuropeanCourtofJusticeislikely only realguaranteethatPolandwillnotbeoverwhelmedby Franco-German domination, andpresentingitselfasthe sovereignty, defendingPolishinterestsagainstalleged national of the importance underlining by campaign the economic success. But,atsomestage, itmaytrytoradicalise country’s the to attention drawing by image its soften to accidentally leaving theEU. PiSthusfacesadilemma. Italreadytries ofPoland threat the flag may opposition The thus strengtheningitspositionaheadofthegeneralelection. rallying supportfromagenerallypro-Europeansocietyand of theEU. ItmayalsopresentPiSasanti-EU,inthehopeof election asadefactoreferendumonPoland’s membership pro-European oppositionwilltrytoframetheupcomingEP sense agrowing that PolandisbecomingmarginalisedwithintheEU, the and Brussels with conflict government’s (Nowoczesna) andthePolishPeople’s Party(PSL). Giventhe other partiesinthepro-Europeanopposition,suchasliberals In Poland’smainelectoralbattle,POmaycooperatewith Main battles in 2019 results ofregionalelectionsinOctober2018). the by confirmed was (which cities big in strength its given (PiS) andtherivalCivicPlatform(PO)–especiallylatter, both ofPoland’slargestparties, therulingLaw andJustice presidential poll. Anunusuallyhighturnoutshouldfavour before acrucialparliamentaryelection, andayearbeforethe months of couple a just place take will vote EP The law. of rule tension betweenthegovernmentandEUinstitutionsover become centraltothepublicdebateinPolandduerising perhaps morethan30percent.Europeanissueshaverecently – turnout shouldbehigher exceeding 25percent.Thistime, turnout hasbeenatoneofthelowestlevels intheEU, never EP elections, in Each ofthethreetimesPoleshavevoted Projected voterturnout POLAND in theEP. may enablethemtopassthethresholdforrepresentation list, whichcommon a create to are trying Democracy group) (including Liberty, amemberoftheEuropeFreedomandDirect right parties radical Other seats. MEP five or fourwin also may Movement) Star Five Italy’s with touch the anti-migrationKukiz’15(whichhasrecentlybeenin but moreideologicallyengaged,anti-establishment, and party’s performanceintheEPelection.Themuchsmaller corruption scandalsinvolvingPiSpoliticiansmayharmthe of thenationalistcampinEP. Butseveralhotlydebated or soMEPsmayplayanimportantroleintherealignment given theuncertainfutureofECRgroup, theparty’s 24 with Brusselsovertheruleoflaw. Afterthe2019election, the party’smildEuroscepticismgoesfarbeyondtension integration backinthenameofnationalsovereignty. Thus, realists” buttheywouldliketoseriouslyshiftEuropean “EUas themselves present politicians PiS Poland. in PiS iscurrentlythemostimportantsoftEuroscepticparty The Eurosceptics ten percentofvotes. projected tocomethirdintheEPelection,withmorethan early February2019.Accordingtosomepolls, Wiosnais “Polish Macron”–launchednewpartyWiosna(Spring)in left-liberal formerMEP, mayorofSlupsk,andaself-styled a – Biedroń Robert Meanwhile, 2019. in seats MEP three Still, theAllianceofDemocraticLeftmaywinasmany currently noleftorcentre-leftpartyinthePolishparliament. with POaspartofthepro-Europeanopposition.Thereis liberal ALDEgrouping.Boththesepartiescooperateclosely of theEPP,andliberalNowoczesna, amemberofthe The mainstreamalsoincludesthePSL, anothermember People’s Party, formpartofPoland’s politicalmainstream. Reformists group(ECR),andPO,amemberoftheEuropean Both PiS, amemberoftheEuropeanConservatives and The mainstream PORTUGAL

Projected voter turnout right and a member of the European People’s Party in the While the Portuguese tend to be more enthusiastic about the EP. They poll at around 36-39 percent and 17-20 percent European project than most other Europeans, voter turnout of the vote respectively. This should provide them with ten in EP elections is relatively low and declining in Portugal, and six MEP seats respectively. They share a significant from 40 percent in 1999 to just under 34 percent in 2014. pro-European consensus, including on trade, migration, The 2019 EP vote will take place just four months before and the rule of law. However, in the last general election, the country’s quadrennial legislative election, which should held in 2015, the Socialist Party reached an unprecedented lead to a slight increase in turnout. However, if the 2019 EP agreement with far-left parties to sustain a parliamentary election become something of a rehearsal for the national alliance, breaking its 40-year practice of not allying with electoral contest, the campaign will focus on national issues. parties to its left. Another mainstream party that should This may be even more likely given that European issues win 2-3 MEP seats this year is the conservative People’s create little political polarisation in Portugal. Party (CDS), which, unlike in the 2014 EP election, will run separately from the Social Democratic Party. Main battles in 2019 Eurozone issues, the structure of the EU’s post-2020 The Eurosceptics Multiannual Financial Framework, and the EU’s global Because it experienced many decades of authoritarian rule, role should feature in the 2019 EP debate in Portugal – but Portugal has no far right. Having flirted with Euroscepticism they will mostly be discussed in relation to national politics. in the mid-1990s, CDS has now firmly abandoned it and Environmental issues and Portugal’s economic growth is committed to a pro-EU agenda and to the defence of will also be of interest, especially for left-wing parties. transatlantic relations. Portugal has two far-left parties that Immigration is unlikely to be a central issue, as there is a are strongly critical of the EU: the Portuguese Communist strong domestic political consensus that Portugal must Party and the Left Bloc. Both are members of European receive and integrate migrants. United Left–Nordic Green Left group in the EP; they are projected to win 2-3 and 1-2 MEP seats each. Left Bloc The mainstream is seen as a “new left” party, similar to Spain’s Podemos In contrast to most countries in the EU’s south, Portugal or Greece’s Syriza, in its criticism of capitalism and of has not seen a radical change in the structure of its political bureaucratic procedures that restrict popular participation. system in the aftermath of the eurozone crisis. Two parties At the same time, however, both are strong opponents of dominate the political system: the Socialist Party, which is racism as well as of a xenophobic and nationalist narrative centre-left and a member of the Socialists and Democrats in the EU, making them improbable partners for the EU’s in the EP; and the Social Democratic Party, which is centre- far right in Brussels and Strasbourg.

39 40 ECFR/278 February 2019 www.ecfr.eu THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTION: HOW ANTI-EUROPEANS PLAN TO WRECK EUROPE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO STOP IT the World Bank. emigration ofanyEUmemberstatesince1990, accordingto freedom ofmovement. Romaniahasseenthebiggestrisein EU average, becausetheyoftenassociatethistopicwiththeir country for the outside Europethan to migrationfrom open more also a transit being immigrants travellingtowesternEurope. Itscitizensare despite refugees, of influx permanent significant no experienced has Romania issue. border withSerbia). However, migrationwillnotbeasalient policy orimmigrationissues(especiallythoseclosetothe Romania willbemoreinterestedinacommonagricultural rights, andsocialprotectionsforEUcitizens. Somepartsof unemployment, human concern areyouth of topics Other struggle betweenRomania’s government anditsjudiciary. issue intheEPcampaignRomania, alongsidethepower The fight against political corruption will become the central Main battles in 2019 European voters gotothepolls). on thefutureofEU,scheduledfortwoweeksbefore half of2019(whichwillinvolveaninformalsummitinSibiu first the in EU the of Council the of presidency Romania’s is political corruption.Anotherissuethatcouldboostturnout hadsince have 2016 tovote ontheirdissatisfactionwithhighlevelsof they opportunity first the be will election on ruleoflawissues. ForRomanianvoters, the2019EP Hungary and Poland with similarities its for and corruption, criticism fromEUinstitutionsforitsapproachtotackling turnout in2019. Firstly,Romaniahasreceivedgrowing increase in slight a expect to reasons major two are There with voterturnoutusuallystandingataround30percent. Romanians havevotedinEPelectionsonthreeoccasions, Projected voterturnout ROMANIA mainstream thanoutsideit. context, Romaniahasabiggerproblemwithpopulisminthe local seatsin2013 buthasbeenonthedeclinesince. Inthis Party isthecountry’smostpowerfulfar-leftparty: itwon34 Socialist Romanian The years. post-communist early the large municipalities, duringtheeconomiccatastropheof political groupsformedpartofthegovernment, orran most oftheelectorate.Thisislargelybecausefar-right Romania PartyandNouaDreapta–donotappealto The leadersofthetwomostprominentones–Greater There are no significant strong far-right parties in Romania. The Eurosceptics European the with affiliated and Conservatives andReformists,mayalsowin2-3MEPseats. Ponta Victor minister Pro Romania,asocial-democraticpartyledbyformerprime MEP seatseach, orpossiblymoreiftheyformacoalition. the SaveRomaniaUnion–areprojectedtowintwoorthree and Movement Together Romania Ciolos’s Dacian – parties is expectingfourMEPs. Twonewpro-Europeancentre-right Liberals andDemocrats, whichispollingat10percentand in itspopularity. Thecountry’scentreincludestheAllianceof also latelyfacedmajorintegrityissues, whichledtoadecline to thecountry’sprevailingauthoritariansocialvalues. Ithas catering issues, identity and sovereignty on “Orbánised” deeply being apro-Europeanmainstreamparty, thePSDisalso However, despite each. 11 MEPs around with provide them poll at29percentand22respectively, whichshould (member oftheEuropeanPeople’sParty).Theycurrently Democrats), andthecentre-rightNationalLiberal Party Democratic Party(PSD; amemberoftheSocialistsand Romania’s twomainpoliticalpartiesaretherulingSocial The mainstream SLOVAKIA

Projected voter turnout The mainstream On all three occasions when Slovaks have voted in EP The centre-left SMER-SD, led by former prime minister elections, the country has had the lowest turnout in the EU. Robert Fico, is the main party in Slovakia. Its deputy leader, Having never exceeded 20 percent, turnout reached an all- Peter Pellegrini, is the current prime minister. The party time low of 13 percent in 2014. This trend could easily lead belongs to the Socialists and Democrats EP group and is likely to unusual results in 2019 – perhaps benefiting right-wing to win four MEP seats in 2019. It leads a governing coalition parties, whose supporters are relatively active in politics. If that also includes the nationalist Slovak National Party these parties succeed in framing migration as the main topic (SNS) – which is close to Italy’s Lega and Poland’s Law and of the campaign, even more of their voters could go to the Justice – and the inter-ethnic Most-Hid party, which has the polls – perhaps pushing turnout above 20 percent. However, support of much of the country’s ethnic-Hungarian minority. there is also a risk that, by the time of the EP election, voters This combination lends a mildly Eurosceptic orientation will be tired of their trips to the polling station, having to the coalition, despite the pro-Europeanism of the social turned out for local elections in November 2018 and the democrats. The country’s centre-right is divided between presidential election in March 2019 (both of which they treat several parties, including Freedom and Solidarity and the as more important than EP elections). Ordinary People party. Both of these parties are members of the European Conservatives and Reformists in the EP. They Main battles in 2019 are projected to win three and two MEP seats each this year. The Slovak public does not debate European issues – apart from migration – to any significant extent. As a result, The Eurosceptics right and far-right parties are almost certain to focus on People’s Party Our Slovakia, led by Marian Kotleba, is migration and security. They will seek to raise the issue of the most influential far-right party in Slovakia, and the member states’ sovereignty vis-à-vis Brussels. Some of them, only one with a countrywide support. Having obtained especially the far-right People’s Party Our Slovakia, will more than 8 percent of the vote in the 2016 parliamentary deploy anti-EU and anti-refugee rhetoric. With a clear lead election, it may win one or two MEP seats this year. It has in the polls, the ruling social democrats (SMER-SD) may try gained in popularity through anti-Roma rhetoric. But it to refocus the debate on economic issues, such as eurozone also campaigns against the EU, refugees, NATO, and the reform and cohesion funds. Like most of its rivals in the establishment. The SNS, the second-strongest partner in the country, the party opposes immigration. ruling coalition, was formerly considered to be close to the far right but, under the leadership of Andrej Danko, it has recently moved towards the centre-right – while remaining critical of some aspects of European integration.

41 42 ECFR/278 February 2019 www.ecfr.eu THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTION: HOW ANTI-EUROPEANS PLAN TO WRECK EUROPE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO STOP IT out for, effectively, thegovernment. turn to voters progressive young, mobilising difficulty have social issues. However,partiesintherulingcoalitionmay drawing attentiontoenvironmental,humanitarian, and debate, political the of securitisation the against campaign referendum onEuropeanintegration. Thefar-leftLevica will “Orbánisation” oftheSDSandframingvoteasadefacto may concentrateonEuropeanvalues, denouncingthe would normallystayathome. Incontrast, centre-leftparties avoid puttingoffyoungpro-Europeanvoters,manyofwhom from emphasisingitscurrentanti-migrationorientationto a coalitionofcentre-leftparties.Thepartyislikelytorefrain by office of out kept be to only election, parliamentary 2018 government’s domesticpolitics. TheSDSdominatedthe the against campaign election to the use will (SDS) Party National conservativesfromtheSlovenianDemocratic are settodominatethe2019 EPdebateinSlovenia. Regional development, migration, andEuropeanvalues Main battles in 2019 likely benefitpro-Europeanparties. turnout mayriseabove30percentthisyear,whichwould should haveslightlyincreasedthisinterest. Asaresult, the Slovenian-Croatianborderdispute. Buttherefugeecrisis politics, suchasEuropeanfundsortheEU’sroleinresolving in theEUisusuallylimitedtoissueslinkeddomestic have arealimpactonthecourseofEUaffairs. Publicinterest can representatives their that confidence little voters gives number ofMEPsrepresentingthecountry–justeight consider Brusselstobedistantandabstract, whilethelow usual turnoutatnationalparliamentaryelections. Slovenians percent, thefourth-lowestinEU. Thisisjusthalfofthe a turnoutofjust24.5 had election, Slovenia 2014 EP In the Projected voterturnout SLOVENIA and lookssettowinoneMEPseat. provides parliamentarysupporttothecentre-leftcoalition others, suchassocialaffairsanddevelopment. Itcurrently on pro-European and security, and foreign policy,union, Levica isEuroscepticonsomeissues,suchasmonetary Europe. ThepartyisprojectedtowinthreeMEPseats. EU, aswellBrussels’sfocusonruleoflawissuesacross Viktor Orbán. SDSstronglyopposeslegalmigrationintothe illiberal ideologyreminiscentofHungarianPrimeMinister leadership ofJanezJanša, ismovinginthedirectionofan divisive highly the under but, Party People’s European the into thecategoryofright-wingpopulism. Itformspartof SDS, whichhasledthepollssince2015,increasinglyfalls has noprospectsofwinninganyMEPseatsthisyear.Yetthe and percent 3 just at polls it However,country. the in group The SlovenianNationalPartyistheonlygenuinefar-right The Eurosceptics law issues. to SDSpositions: opposingmigrationanddivided onruleof the EuropeanPeople’s Partybuthasrecentlymovedcloser Slovenia mightwinoneMEPseatin2019. Itisamemberof any chanceofenteringtheEP. TheliberalCatholicNew seats. Othermembersofthecoalitionaretoosmalltohave seats thisyear. TheSocialDemocratsmaywintwoMEP the ALDEgroupinEPandisprojectedtowintwoMEP catch-all partyListaMarjanaŠarca, whichisamemberof election. MarjanŠarecleadsboththegovernment and apro-European government followingthe2018nationalparliamentary formed which of five parties, centre-left and liberal of range a includes mainstream Slovenia’s The mainstream SPAIN

Projected voter turnout The mainstream In Spain, EP elections tend to act as second order national For several decades, two parties dominated Spain’s political elections. They centre on national issues, with Spaniards mainstream: the People’s Party, which is a member of the normally supporting the same parties in both votes. Turnout European People’s Party EP group, and the Socialist Party, is usually less than 50 percent; it was 45 percent in 2009 and which is a member of the Socialists and Democrats. The 44 percent in 2014. However, 2019 may see it rise to as much right is now fragmented between the People’s Party and as 60 percent, for two main reasons. Firstly, local council Ciudadanos. Polling at around 20 percent each, the parties elections and regional elections will take place on the same day are projected to win 12 MEP seats this year. They compete in most parts of the country. And, secondly, the EP election for right-wing voters even as they cooperate with each other will serve as a test of support for Spain’s main parties. This is in parliament. Ciudadanos, a close ally of La République especially true given that the country has recently shifted from En Marche!, appeals mainly to young voters. The left-wing a two-party system to a four-party one – and that, since 2018, Podemos constitutes the remainder of the mainstream. it has been ruled by a minority government, which came into Polling at 22-25 percent, the Socialist Party is projected to power without a general election. Thus, the stakes are high win 14-16 MEP seats, which could make it one of the two in this year’s vote, as it may speak to the outcome of the next biggest national parties in the Socialists and Democrats, general election – due to occur by July 2020 at the latest. alongside Italy’s Democratic Party. Spain’s mainstream parties are strongly pro-European. Main battles in 2019 Spain is currently in a rather unusual political situation. The Eurosceptics Following the June 2018 vote of no confidence that removed With the unexpected rise of new far-right, anti-EU party the prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, then head of the right- Vox in recent months, the Spanish exception to right- wing People’s Party, Socialist Party leader Pedro Sanchez wing populism seems to be coming to an end. After its became prime minister. This was only possible with support surprisingly strong performance in the December 2018 from anti-austerity and nationalist parties. As a result, regional elections, Vox entered parliament and supported the 2019 EP election campaign will likely serve as a mid- the coalition government in Andalusia, which includes the term election in which voters have their say on the current People’s Party and Ciudadanos. Vox could win six or seven government and focus on national issues, including social MEP seats in May. This would be the second time that a party welfare and immigration – although the latter should be with no representation in the Spanish national parliament relatively uncontroversial as it is in many other parts of the EU. acquired seats in the EP – after Podemos did so in 2014. Meanwhile, Europe is unlikely to be a central issue for Spain Podemos itself could increase its number of MEP seats in the EP election. Regional and local dynamics will also play from five to more than ten. However, after securing seats an important role, given that local elections are taking place in the national parliament in 2016, Podemos has become at the same time. Catalonia’s independence crisis will feature more moderate in its ideology and discourse, making it an prominently if Catalan separatists, counting on support from improbable partner for the far right in the EP. the EU, try to put the issue at the heart of the debate.

43 44 ECFR/278 February 2019 www.ecfr.eu THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTION: HOW ANTI-EUROPEANS PLAN TO WRECK EUROPE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO STOP IT may focusonclimatechange, humanrights, andtheEU’s parties mainstream pro-European Meanwhile, EU. the leave Sweden Democratsmayevencampaignforthecountryto strong feelingsinSweden,boostingtheparty’schances. The Sweden Democratsopposethis.Theissuemayprovoke asylum seekersattheEUlevel, buttheanti-migration parties foraEuropeanmigrationsystemthatrelocates 2019 EPcontest.Thereisstrongsupportamongmainstream issue inthepublicdebate. Thesamethingmayhappeninthe In the2018generalelection, migrationbecamethecentral Main battles in 2019 20 percentofthevote. Sweden Democrats,whichispollinginsecondplace, with parties, includingtheEuroscepticandanti-immigration Therefore, lowparticipationmayfavournon-mainstream elections.general EP electionsthatin more poorlyin the SocialDemocratsandModerates–tendtoperform boost turnout. Sweden’stwomajormainstreamparties– issues suchasBrexit, migration,andclimatechangecould government formationtalkswillaffecttheEPelection. Yet Yet thereisariskthatvoters’fatigueafterlongmonthsof the parliamentarybackingofCentreandLiberal parties. with2019, January in a newgovernment formed eventually September 2018. TheSocialDemocratsandtheGreenParty form anewgovernmentafteraninconclusiveelectionin the publicdebateiscurrentlydominatedbyeffortsto Turnout maybeeven lowerinthisyear’s EPelection,as elections –whichusuallyrisestomorethan80percent. 50 percentismuchlowerthanthatforparliamentary than Europeanissues, whiletheaverageturnoutofaround In Sweden, EPelectionstendtofocusonnationalrather Projected voterturnout SWEDEN association withtheSwedenDemocrats. membership, butitcoulddropthisissuein2019toavoidany has traditionallycalledforareferendumonSweden’s EU On theothersideofpoliticalspectrum, theLeft Party barely anychancethattheywillcrossthe4percentthreshold. is there But election. EP 2019’s in candidates field will party för Sverige, inspiredbyAlternativefürDeutschland. Thenew former membersoftheSwedenDemocratssetupAlternativ for leavingtheunioninpopulationatlarge. In2017some Swedish EUmembership, despiteverylowlevelsofsupport several occasions,On theSwedenDemocratshaveopposed it hasgrowninpopularitysincethe2015 migrationcrisis. its currenttwo. Asthemostanti-migrationpartyinSweden, EP group. Thepartyisprojectedtowin4-5MEPseats, upfrom which belongstotheEuropeanConservatives andReformists The country’sfarrightisrepresentedbytheSwedenDemocrats, The Eurosceptics government, andtoasplitwithinthecentre-rightbloc. right. This has led to prolonged difficulties in forming a new the twomainpartiesandariseinthatfornationalistfar 2018 parliamentaryelectionsawadeclineinsupportfor means forSweden’sintegrationintotheEU. However, the what Brexit and trade,migration, on nuanced positions more with but values, European of supportive pro-European: are two traditionalcoalitionswithsmallerparties. Bothblocs group, andtheEuropeanPeople’s Party, respectively–lead Moderates –membersoftheSocialistsandDemocratsEP The centre-leftSocialDemocratsandthecentre-right The mainstream important forSwedishvotersatEPelections. social policies–issuesthathavetraditionallybeenmost This page has been left intentionally blank

45 46 ECFR/278 February 2019 www.ecfr.eu THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTION: HOW ANTI-EUROPEANS PLAN TO WRECK EUROPE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO STOP IT Marin Lessenski Society Under35 Lukas Lausen, Laurynas Jonavicius, in Paris Nadia Issolah, Affairs , Tuomas Iso-Markku Studies Teodor Gyelnik, Affairs Andrew Gilmore, Lívia Franco, Affairs , Bjorn Fägersten Simon Desplanque, Robin-Ivan Capar, Affairs (LIIA) Karlis Bukovskis, Policy , Vladimir Bartovic Adam Balcer, Associate researchers Catholic UniversityofPortugal University ofWarsaw German Marshall Fund of the United States GermanMarshall Fundofthe UnitedStates Chairman of the Danish Foreign Policy Foreign Danish ofthe Chairman , OpenSocietyInstitute Institute of International and European InstituteofInternationalandEuropean European InstituteofCross-border European Swedish Institute for International researcher andadviser Latvian Institute ofInternational Institute Latvian EUROPEUM Institute for European Louvain University Vilnius University Finnish Institute for International International FinnishInstitutefor Zsuzsanna Végh, Viljar Veebel, Niels vanWilligen, George Tzogopoulos, University inScotland , Solfrini Federico Hüseyin Silman, Institute forEuropeanandSecurityPolicy Sofia Maria Satanakis, the GermanMarshall Fundofthe UnitedStatesinParis Quencez Martin Astrid Portero, Jonathan Ponchon, Ylva Petterson, Luka Orešković, Studies Christine Nissen, Daniel Mainwaring, Marko Lovec, EstonianNationalDefenceCollege UniversityofLjubljana independentresearcher Swedish InstituteofInternationalAffairs freelanceresearcher andadviser independentresearcher , EuropeanUniversityViadrina Fellow and Senior Program Officer at Officer Program Senior and Fellow Danish Institute for International for Institute Danish Leiden University PhD candidate at Saint Andrews UniversityofLuxembourg GlobalPolicyResearcher DemocritusUniversity ofThrace Research Fellow at Austrian About the authors Acknowledgements

Susi Dennison is a senior policy fellow at ECFR and The authors would like to thank their ECFR colleagues, director of the European Power programme, which especially José Ignacio Torreblanca, Mark Leonard, and focuses on the strategy, politics, and governance of Carla Hobbs for their helpful comments. Special thanks European foreign policy at this challenging moment for go to Chris Raggett, Adam Harrison, and Katharina the international liberal order. She previously led ECFR’s Botel-Azzinnaro for editing, and to Marta Pellón European Foreign Policy Scorecard project for five years, Brussosa for research support. This report relies more and worked with ECFR’s MENA programme on north than anything on the tireless work of our 27 researchers Africa. Before joining ECFR in 2010, Susi worked for across the EU, to whom the authors are deeply indebted. Amnesty International in its European Union office. Susi began her career in HM Treasury in the United Kingdom.

Pawel Zerka is a programme coordinator at ECFR based in the Paris office. He coordinates ECFR’s European Power programme. Pawel holds a PhD in economics and an MA in international relations. His main areas of expertise include EU affairs, Latin American politics, international trade, and Poland’s European and foreign policy. Before joining ECFR in 2017, Pawel worked as an expert in foreign affairs in two private think-tanks in Poland: WiseEuropa, and demosEUROPA-Centre for European Strategy.

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