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Codebook Indiveu – Party Preferences

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Codebook Indiveu – Party Preferences Codebook InDivEU – party preferences European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies December 2020 Introduction The “InDivEU – party preferences” dataset provides data on the positions of more than 400 parties from 28 countries1 on questions of (differentiated) European integration. The dataset comprises a selection of party positions taken from two existing datasets: (1) The EU Profiler/euandi Trend File The EU Profiler/euandi Trend File contains party positions for three rounds of European Parliament elections (2009, 2014, and 2019). Party positions were determined in an iterative process of party self-placement and expert judgement. For more information: https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/65944 (2) The Chapel Hill Expert Survey The Chapel Hill Expert Survey contains party positions for the national elections most closely corresponding the European Parliament elections of 2009, 2014, 2019. Party positions were determined by expert judgement. For more information: https://www.chesdata.eu/ Three additional party positions, related to DI-specific questions, are included in the dataset. These positions were determined by experts involved in the 2019 edition of euandi after the elections took place. The inclusion of party positions in the “InDivEU – party preferences” is limited to the following issues: - General questions about the EU - Questions about EU policy - Questions about differentiated integration - Questions about party ideology 1 This includes all 27 member states of the European Union in 2020, plus the United Kingdom. How to Cite When using the ‘InDivEU – Party Preferences’ dataset, please cite all of the following three articles: 1. Reiljan, Andres, Frederico Ferreira da Silva, Lorenzo Cicchi, Diego Garzia, Alexander H. Trechsel, Longitudinal dataset of political issue-positions of 411 parties across 28 European countries (2009–2019) from voting advice applications EU profiler and euandi, Data in Brief, Volume 31, 2020, 105968, ISSN 2352-3409, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dib.2020.105968. 2. Polk, Jonathan, Jan Rovny, Ryan Bakker, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Jelle Koedam, Filip Kostelka, Gary Marks, Gijs Schumacher, Marco Steenbergen, Milada Anna Vachudova and Marko Zilovic. 2017. "Explaining the salience of anti-elitism and reducing political corruption for political parties in Europe with the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey data," Research & Politics (January-March): 1-9. 3. Bakker, Ryan, Catherine de Vries, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Anna Vachudova. 2015."Measuring party positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill expert survey trend file, 1999-2010." Party Politics 21.1: 143-152. General variables COUNTRY_NAME = Alphabetic country identifier COUNTRY_CODE = Numeric country identifier EASTWEST = 0: party from Central/Eastern Europe, 1: party from EU-15 EUANDI_WAVE_ELECTION_YEAR = The year in which the party was placed by EU Profiler or euandi. EUANDI_ID = EU Profiler/euandi unique party identifier EUANDI_PARTYNAME = EU Profiler/euandi party name, short version or acronym EUANDI_PARTYNAME_LONG = EU Profiler/euandi EnGlish translation of party name, lonG version EUANDI_PARTY_FAMILY = party family membership, accordinG to the followinG classification: 1 = Radical Right 2 = Conservatives 3 = Liberal 4 = Christian-Democratic 5 = Socialist 6 = Radical Left 7 = Green 8 = Other This is based on CHES’ General classification and extended to parties that are not included in it, with the followinG modification: families of reGionalist, confessional and aGrarian / center parties are not included due to very low number of parties that belonG to these party families. These and any other parties that do not fall under any of the seven distinGuished families, are compiled into the ‘Other’ category. EUANDI_EPVOTE = The vote share of the party in the respective European Parliament election. EUANDI_EPVOTE_COALITION = Vote share of a party coalition that the respective party was part of (in case when the separate party vote share is not discernible). CHES_WAVE = The year in which the party was placed by CHES. CHES_ELECTION_YEAR = The year in which the last national election took place CHES_ID = CHES unique party identifier CHES_PARTYNAME = CHES party acronym or short version CHES_VOTE = vote percentage received by the party in the last national election CHES_SEAT = seat share of the party in the last national election CHES_GOVT = government participation 0= Party not in government 0.5= Party in government for part of the year 1= Party in government full year MARPOR_ID = Manifesto Project unique party identifier A) EUandI Party positions on each statement were coded accordinG to the followinG answer cateGories: No opinion = . Completely disaGree = 0 Tend to disaGree = 25 Neutral = 50 Tend to aGree = 75 Completely aGree = 100 Common statements 2009 S6_09 ImmiGrants from outside Europe should be required to accept our culture and values. S12_09 The EU should acquire its own tax raisinG powers. S15_09 The EU should drastically reduce its subsidies to Europe’s farmers. S21_09 On foreiGn policy issues, such as the relationship with Russia, the EU should speak with one voice. S22_09 The European Union should strenGthen its security and defence policy. S23_09 European inteGration is a Good thinG. S24_09 [Your country] is much better off in the EU than outside it. S25_09 The European Union should be enlarGed to include Turkey. S26_09 The European Parliament should be Given more powers. S27_09 Individual member states of the EU should have less veto power S28_09 Any new European Treaty should be subject to approval in a referendum in [your country] Common statements 2014 S2_14 It should be harder for EU immiGrants workinG or stayinG in [your country] to get access to social assistance benefits than it is for [your country's] citizens S4_14 To fiGht the problem of illeGal immiGration, the European Union should take responsibility in patrollinG its borders S12_14 The EU should acquire its own tax raisinG powers S16_14 The EU should relax its austerity policy in order to foster economic Growth S22_14 The European Union should strenGthen its security and defence policy S23_14 On foreiGn policy issues the EU should speak with one voice S24_14 European inteGration is a Good thinG S25_14 To tackle the sovereiGn debt crisis, the member states of the Eurozone should be allowed to issue common bonds (Eurobonds) S26_14 The sinGle European currency (Euro) is a bad thinG S27_14 Individual member states of the EU should have less veto power S28_14 Any new European Treaty should be subject to approval in a referendum in [your country] Common Statements 2019 S3_19 The EU should riGorously punish Member States that violate the EU deficit rules S4_19 Asylum-seekers should be distributed proportionally among EU Member States throuGh a mandatory relocation system S6_19 ImmiGrants from outside Europe should be required to accept our culture and values S11_19 The EU should acquire its own tax raisinG powers S17_19 The European Union should strenGthen its security and defence policy S18_19 On foreiGn policy issues the EU should speak with one voice S19_19 European inteGration is a Good thinG S20_19 The single European currency (Euro) is a bad thing S21_19 Individual member states of the EU should have less veto power S22_19 In European Parliament elections, EU citizens should be allowed to cast a vote for a party or candidate from any other Member State Statements continuity (2009; 2014; 2019) S6_09 S6_14 S6_19 ImmiGrants from outside Europe should be required to accept our culture and values. S12_09 S12_14 S11_19 The EU should acquire its own tax raisinG powers. S21_09 S23_14 S18_19 On foreiGn policy issues, such as the relationship with Russia, the EU should speak with one voice. S22_09 S22_14 S17_19 The European Union should strenGthen its security and defence policy. S23_09 S24_14 S19_19 European inteGration is a Good thinG. S27_09 S27_14 S21_19 Individual member states of the EU should have less veto power B) CHES General Questions on European Integration EU_POSITION = overall orientation of the party leadership towards European inteGration in YEAR. 1 = Strongly opposed 2 = Opposed 3 = Somewhat opposed 4 = Neutral 5 = Somewhat in favor 6 = In favor 7 = Strongly in favor EU_SALIENCE = relative salience of European integration in the party’s public stance in YEAR. 0 = European Integration is of no importance. : 10 = European Integration is of great importance. EU_DISSENT = degree of dissent on European integration in YEAR. 0 = Party was completely united. : 10 = Party was extremely divided. EU_BENEFIT = position of the party leadership in YEAR on whether COUNTRY has ben- efited from being a member of the EU [3-point scale]. (Asked in 2010 and 2014) 1 = Benefited 2 = Neither benefited nor lost 3 = Not benefited Specific EU Policy Questions EU_EP = position of the party leadership in YEAR on the powers of the European Parliament. 1 = Strongly opposes 2 = Opposes 3 = Somewhat opposes 4 = Neutral 5 = Somewhat favors 6 = Favors 7 = Strongly favors EU_INTMARK = position of the party leadership in YEAR on the internal market (i.e. free movement of goods, services, capital and labor). 1 = Strongly opposes : 7 = Strongly favors EU_BUDGETS = position of the party leadership in YEAR on EU authority over economic and budGetary policy. 1 = Strongly opposes : 7 = Strongly favors EU_COHESION = position of the party leadership in YEAR on EU cohesion or reGional
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