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Europe's Integration Myths

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Europe's Integration Myths Future of Europe Programme EUROPE’s INTEGRATION MYTHS A guide for successfully debunking myths surrounding the European Union 02 EUROPE’s IntEGRATION MYTHS EUROPE’s IntEGRATION MYTHS 03 CREDITS CONTENT INTRODUCTION GLOBSEC Policy Institute Introduction 03 Polus Tower II, Vajnorská 100/B 831 04 Bratislava, Slovakia Myth #1: The European Union is falling apart 04 What people think matters in our increasingly high-speed, post-truth, well-connected world. However, what people choose to think is sometimes based on false assumptions. An overwhelming abundance of www.globsec.org Myth #2: Member states are under information is as counter-productive as the lack of it. Few people have time to sieve through the flood of a ‘Brussels diktat’ 06 information they receive every minute; even fewer strive to verify ‘facts and figures’. That is why GLOBSEC The GLOBSEC Policy Institute is a policy- decided to develop a concise guide that helps address some of the most common myths about the oriented think-tank analysing foreign policy and Myth #3: The European Union European Union (EU) in a succinct and comprehensible manner. international environment. It focuses on research is a ‘bureaucratic monster’ 07 which is relevant to decision-makers, business ⊲ Who is it for? leaders and all concerned citizens. The Institute Myth #4: France and Germany wants to make an impact so that values of the dominate the European Union 08 This short guide is primarily aimed at politicians, communication and media officers, public officials, civil GLOBSEC organisation – liberal and democratic society activists and teachers frustrated by the use of alternative facts to undermine their work in building order in the transatlantic world – are deeply Myth #5: The euro is the cause of all evils 09 a better EU for everyone. They can use it as a reference point. But in the end, the messages are for all embedded in the agenda of governments. concerned citizens. Myth #6: The European Union is “naïve” about free trade 11 ⊲ Why have a copy? AUTHORS Myth #7: Complicated privacy regulations People demand direct communication from their public officials. It takes time to select and highlight ⊲ Kinga Brudzińska, Senior Research make European businesses uncompetitive 13 the necessary information or construct a logical argument. Indeed, it is almost impossible to remember Fellow Future of Europe Programme, everything surrounding every issue. This guide will be your reliable and time-saving companion on GLOBSEC Policy Institute Myth #8: We are experiencing occasions when you are faced with a difficult question or find it necessary to correct faulty assumptions. the Islamisation of Europe 15 ⊲ A lena Kudzko, Deputy Research Director, And these occasions will be more and more frequent. Elections to the European Parliament are only GLOBSEC Policy Institute Myth #9: The European Union a year away. Discussions about reform of the EU are accelerating, and citizens need to be convinced is a paradise for refugees 17 of their meaningfulness and value. National conventions are happening in more and more countries. ⊲ O rsolya Raczova, Research Fellow Journalists never stop asking questions. Future of Europe Programme, Myth #10: Refugees are the main GLOBSEC Policy Institute cause of terrorist attacks in Europe 19 ⊲ Why focus on the following myths? Myth #11: The European Union suffers First, our Strategic Communication team, which monitors disinformation, has highlighted these myths as © GLOBSEC from terrorism because we are too soft the most popular misconceptions currently circulating in public discourse. Second, these myths correlate © GLOBSEC Policy Institute 2018 on extremists 21 with the most popular EU-related searches on Google – areas, events and topics. Third, we included old and new questions frequently raised at press conferences or in the media. Some of them are not new but have been given a new life by social media and bots. ⊲ Do facts matter? Yes, more than ever. But it is of course also about how facts are communicated. Facts are regularly used as part of a personal story or passionate address. Similarly, social media and communication strategies disseminate ideas and ‘truths’. A tweet can by funny, touching, trustworthy and reality-based all at the same time. We aim to help with the latter part of the mix. We prepared this guide as a supplement to discussions at GLOBSEC 2018 Bratislava Forum. We hope you will find formal and informal discussions at the Forum inspiring and informative. But we also wanted you to walk away with something that supplements intricate messages with digestible, reasoned and seasoned answers that you can easily offer to media, constituents and others. ● 04 EUROPE’s IntEGRATION MYTHS EUROPE’s IntEGRATION MYTHS 05 high-profile projects in recent years is the response to our citizens and show that we can MYTH #1: THE EUROPEAN European Union defence pact, otherwise known protect them in this changing world”.6 as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The initiative aims to deepen defence cooperation It is true that some citizens are disappointed UNION IS FALLING APART among ‘capable and willing’ member states (so far with the EU’s policies and initiatives. Austerity 25) in order to jointly develop capabilities and make measures implemented by the so-called troika - them available for EU military operations.4 the International Monetary Fund, European Central Popular thinking: In the past decade the European 247 decisions. What is more, the EU amended 32 Bank and European Commission – have been Union (EU) has been hit by many serious regulations, 3 directives and 74 decisions over the Such an extensive range of initiatives reflect a major source of discontent Greece, Italy and challenges. The global financial crisis, the influx of same period. That means Brussels delivered 363 that the EU is like a living creature which learns Spain. Brexit happened because British citizens refugees and Brexit referendum sent shock waves binding acts across 2017 - 25% of all acts adopted from its mistakes, adapts to new developments felt that the EU is inefficient and represents the across Europe and cast doubt on the future of the by the EU (1338)1. This is a similar number to the and adjusts its outlook. For instance, following interests of a cosmopolitan elite. European project. Every crisis has been followed ‘pre-economic crisis’ EU of 2007, which adopted Greenland’s decision to separate from the EU increasingly vocal predictions that the EU’s days 1275 acts, from which 217 were binding. in 1985 (after 3 years of negotiations)5, Brussels Yet such negative perceptions are increasingly at are well and truly numbered. Today, the number embarked on a review process culminating in the odds with the opinion of many Europeans. According of people disillusioned with Brussels has grown The European Council also works to a similar level Lisbon Treaty (2009). For the first time in its history, to opinion polls conducted by Eurobarometer, and Eurosceptic voices can be heard from Lisbon of speed and decisiveness. It meets in Brussels the EU developed procedures for member states optimism for the future of the EU grew from 49% in to Warsaw. on a monthly basis. Last year, the heads of state to voluntarily withdraw from the Union. In his April 2012 to 56% in 2017. The EU’s public image is also or government of all EU countries met nine times 2018 speech to the European Parliament, French improving, with 40% viewing today the organisation Reality check: It is true that the UK’s departure is for regular sessions, twice for informal meetings, President Emmanuel Macron also highlighted ‘weak positively against 21% negatively (10% increase of historic significance. Yet, it is an exaggeration to as well as topical summits on the Digital Agenda in points’ within the EU that necessitate “building since 2012)7. ● state that the EU is falling apart. By many counts the Tallinn and Growth and Employment in Brussels.2 a new European sovereignty which will give a clear EU is doing quite well. The EU is also successful in negotiating trade The EU has delivered more than half a century of deals with third countries and has emerged as peace, stability, prosperity and helped raise living a key driver in efforts to maintain the global The future of the European Union: Optimism on the rise Would you say that you are very optimistic, fairly optimistic, fairly pessimistic or very pessimistic about the future of the EU? (%) standards. Member states’ GDP has grown from trading system. So far, Brussels has brokered 37 $3.8 trillion in 1980 to $16.5 trillion in 2016. Indeed, trade agreements, 47 are partly in place and 9 80 the International Monetary Fund predicts that GDP are pending. At the time of writing, member states 70 will reach $24 trillion in 5 years. have access to 84 markets outside the EU. These 60 50 does not include the promising trade deals with 40 Mercosur countries or with India. European Union – GDP, current prices 30 20 25000 10 EU trade agreements 0 20000 50 2007 2010 2013 2016 2017 ■ Total Optimistic ■ Total Pessimistic ■ Don't Know 15000 40 Source: Standard. Eurobarometer. 87. Key trends. The European Commission. 10000 30 47 5000 20 37 Billions of U.S. dollars Billions of U.S. 10 19 0 9 1980 1990 2000 2005 2016 2023 5 0 Source: IMF, 2018. Being Being Pending Partly Agreements negotiated updated in place in place Moreover, the EU is adept at following through 3 on the aims of its treaties. In 2017, for example, Source: The European Commission, 2018. Brussels adopted 254 binding legislative acts, Finally, member states remain keen to cooperate including 6 Council regulations, 1 directive and on developing new initiatives. One of the most 06 EUROPE’s IntEGRATION MYTHS EUROPE’s IntEGRATION MYTHS 07 MYTH #2: MEMBER MYTH #3: STATES ARE unDER THE EuropEAN UNION a ‘BrussELS DIKTAt’ Is a ‘BUREAUCRATIC Popular thinking: The Brussels diktat myth sovereign authority within a process of constant is timeless and returns like a boomerang on negotiation with each other and the EU institutions.
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