F EATURE The Saturn-Apollo Launches: The Man Who Built Stage Zero and Lit the Fuse for Stage One

By Dr. Edgar J. Manton and launch the assembled Saturn V rocket (Lighting the Fuse for Introduction Stage One).1 In July 2019, there will be a national celebration to recognize * * * one of the most significant techno- The dedication and superb logical achievements by mankind, efforts of the men and women the Apollo 11 lunar landing, which involved in launching the Saturn V took place on 20 July 1969. This rocket from KSC must be recog- was the fulfillment of the goal set nized. For it was at KSC where all by President John F. Kennedy on 21 elements of the Apollo Program May 1961, to send a man to the came together for the launch – the Moon and return him safely by the ground support facilities and equip- end of the decade. Almost fifty ment, the rocket stages, and the years have passed since the occur- spacecraft. The KSC engineers and Rocco Petrone. Credit: NASA rence of this proud national event. technicians had to bring these ele- Between 1968 and 1972 twenty- ments together and assure that four Americans traveled to the every component and system func- Moon, including three who flew tioned properly. Without the dedi- twice, with twelve of them walking cation, planning, and engineering There was not much excite- on its surface. All were brought expertise of the KSC rocket launch ment generated by the launch back safely to earth. team, the Apollo Moon missions process until rocket ignition, which This celebration will appro- would not have been possible. The was shown to the public in real time priately focus on the astronauts, NASA and contractor personnel at and on television newscasts. Then Houston Mission Control, and the KSC provided the technical skills shortly after liftoff, the mission American success in the space race and the engineering environment responsibility was shifted from between the U.S. and the Soviet that made things work.2 KSC to the Manned Spacecraft Union. But another contribution to There have been many books Center (MSC) in Houston, which the effort to reach the Moon must and TV documentaries produced by after Apollo ended was renamed the not be minimized or forgotten. This and about the astronauts, the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center is the fascinating story of the work Houston flight controllers, news- (JSC). Interest in the Apollo space- performed at the John F. Kennedy casters, and others that focus direct- craft flight progress and the safe Space Center (KSC) concerning: ly on the activities involved with return of the astronauts understand- achieving the mission, but little is ably became much higher and was • The tremendous technological available describing what occurred accompanied by greater TV and achievement in building the at KSC in preparation for a launch. news coverage as the flights pro- unique and massive launch facili- As Gordon Harris, a KSC publicist gressed. But it was at KSC where ties needed to stack, integrate, and back then noted, “During manned the unique and gigantic facilities checkout the gigantic Saturn V space missions the press was led to and ground support equipment rocket and the Apollo spacecraft believe that NASA began and ended (GSE) for the Moonport had to be (Building Stage Zero). in a Texas control center. Little constructed and where new and recognition came to the thousands innovative launch concepts and • The development of the intri- who built the rockets and space- procedures required to check out cate, precise, and dangerous craft, who launched them, and those and launch the mighty Saturn I, process to checkout, countdown, who manned a world-wide network Saturn IB, and Saturn V rockets had of communication stations.”3 to be developed.

Q U E S T 26:1 2019 8 www.spacehistory101.com The public was generally unaware of the five-month marathons required to prepare a Saturn V to launch an Apollo space- craft. Before a launch took place, all the stages and spacecraft of the revolutionary rocket had to be indi- vidually checked out and then erected, mated together, checked out as a unit in a huge assembly building, and then be transported in an upright position to the launch site. Rarely witnessed by the TV viewing audience was the awesome sight of moving the massive 36- story Saturn V rocket in a vertical position from its checkout facility The Saturn V on the Crawler Way. Credit: NASA to its launch site. The author worked at the Kennedy Space ous phase of the mission was, happened without their bold pro- Center from 1963 until 1972 and Astronaut Buzz Aldrin answered, posals.5 can personally attest to the magnif- “The launch.”4 There were others whose con- icent sight of a Saturn V, the size of tributions to the success of the pro- a Navy destroyer, being slowly Unsung Apollo Heroes gram were also crucial. At KSC transported in an upright position There were several Apollo there were Dr. Kurt Debus, the cen- three and a half miles to its launch Program leaders whose contribu- ter director, and Rocco Petrone, the site. tions were essential for the Moon director of Launch Operations. Complicating matters for landing to have been achieved in These men were well known and KSC were the accelerated launch 1969. Among these were: John respected within NASA, but they schedules, which called for two or Houbolt—who was critical to mak- have not received the public recog- three launch vehicles to be ing the lunar orbit rendezvous deci- nition that they deserved for their processed simultaneously. sion, which allowed the use of the efforts.6 Modifications and changes were Saturn V rocket for the Moon mis- Unquestionably the key per- continuously being made by the sion, rather than waiting for a more son for the Apollo Program at KSC rocket and spacecraft designers, powerful rocket required by other was Rocco Petrone. Debus provid- which necessitated that correspon- methods; Dr. George Mueller— ed the overall management of KSC ding changes to facilities, support who pushed for the “all up” testing and the vision for the launch equipment, and launch procedures of the Saturn V stages and the process, but Petrone was the person be made at KSC. Apollo spacecraft simultaneously, who implemented and assured the Then there was very signif- rather than sequentially, saving successful launch process for the icant danger involved in launching valuable time, rockets, and funding; Saturn V. He was responsible for the Saturn rockets, especially the and George Low—who recom- overseeing and coordinating the Saturn V. A fully fueled Saturn V mended switching the Apollo 8 and construction of the Saturn I and IB held six million pounds of propel- 9 missions, which allowed Apollo 8 rocket Launch Complexes 34 (LC- lants and, along with the presence to orbit the Moon, before the 34) and 37 (LC-37) and for building of high-pressure gases, an extreme- delayed lunar landing vehicle was the massive Launch Complex 39 ly hazardous situation was created. ready for flight, a major decision in (LC-39), from where the Saturn V An explosion on the launch pad achieving Kennedy’s deadline. would be launched. would have incurred the damage of What these men recommended After completion of the con- a medium sized nuclear bomb. involved considerable risk, but the struction of LC-39, Petrone was When asked what the most danger- 1969 lunar landing would not have named Director of Launch

Q U E S T 26:1 2019 9 www.spacehistory101.com Operations, and he directed all true leader and a dedicated under consideration for traveling to Saturn-Apollo launches through American whose unheralded contri- the Moon. The direct method Apollo 11. All were highly success- bution to the space program has involved flying the spacecraft ful, except for Apollo 6, which never been recognized. Without directly to the Moon and returning experienced engine failures in the him, I doubt that the lunar landing to Earth. This approach would second and third stages, but still would have occurred within require the powerful Nova rocket, reached orbit.7 Kennedy’s timeline.”11 which was in very early conceptual The overall success of these Isom A. “Ike” Rigell, Deputy stages. The Earth orbit rendezvous launches was a remarkable achieve- Director of KSC Launch Vehicle method would require sending mul- ment by KSC personnel. It was an Operations, stated: tiple rockets into Earth orbit to unheard record in rocketry at that deliver stages, spacecraft, and pro- time, as evidenced by the many And I can’t say enough about visions to assemble a vehicle to failures of the Thor, Atlas, and Titan Rocco Petrone, the Director of travel to the Moon.13 missiles launched from the Cape Launch Operations for Dr. Debus. The lunar orbit rendezvous during the late 1950s and early I am not sure that many people approach would employ a rocket 1960s.8 know or appreciate what Rocco having multiple stages with the It is a commonly held belief meant to the success of the Apollo Apollo spacecraft linked to the among retired workers at the Program, but we never would lunar landing vehicle, which would Kennedy Space Center that have gotten to the Moon on time, contain a descent stage and an President Kennedy’s goal would or maybe never got there at all, ascent stage. Together the space- not have been achieved without without Rocco. I attended craft and the lunar landing vehicle Petrone’s dedicated leadership. Rocco’s staff meeting every would travel to the Moon. After KSC retiree Ed Fannin, the chief of morning and I observed what he entering lunar orbit, the lunar land- KSC’s Mechanical, and Propulsion did to shape up not only KSC but ing vehicle would descend from the Division, explained: “Petrone was also Houston and Huntsville.12 Apollo spacecraft to the Moon’s the person who kept everyone’s surface for lunar exploration, while eyes on the ball and was totally This article will discuss what the spacecraft remained in orbit. committed to the program. He was was achieved at KSC to support the The ascent stage of the lunar land- unquestionably the right man for Saturn rocket launches and the ing vehicle would lift off from the the job. Without his effort the Moon tremendous accomplishments of Moon’s surface and rendezvous landing would not have happened the personnel at KSC under the with the orbiting spacecraft, which in 1969.”9 Another NASA retiree, project management skills of Rocco would bring the astronauts back to Graydon Corn, stated: “I served at Petrone. The primary focus will be Earth.14 After much debate, the NASA, KSC, as an engineer. My on the efforts to build the launch lunar orbit rendezvous approach duties allowed me to observe complex facilities and to develop was selected in June of 1962. With Rocco in nearly every facet of his the countdown procedures required this approach, the Saturn V rocket, varied positions. He was a 100 per to launch the Saturn V rocket. which was already in development, cent, no-nonsense, manager, and set could be used for the Moon mis- an example to all who worked for How to Fly to the Moon, Which sion, crucially saving time and him. Without Rocco's leadership, it Rocket, and From Where? money.15 is doubtful that the space program Several major questions need- The next question was, from would have survived.”10 ed to be answered before construc- where should the Saturn V be In another tribute, John Tribe, tion of the Moonport could begin. launched? After a lengthy study of North American Rockwell Corp. Which rocket would be used? From eight possible locations, Debus and engineer said: “I had the privilege where would it be launched? How Petrone recommended that Merritt of working with Dr. Petrone would the rocket be assembled, Island be the launch site. It had throughout the Apollo program at checked out, and launched? And, available land, a small population, KSC and again when he headed up how was this all to be done within the advantage of the Earth’s rota- Rockwell Space Division. To my nine years? tion, established tracking stations of mind, he was a giant among men, a There were three methods the U.S. Air Force, and was adja-

Q U E S T 26:1 2019 10 www.spacehistory101.com cent to LC- 34 and LC- 37 at the teams featured Doc Blanchard and Cape, where the Saturn I and IB Glen Davis, who respectively won rockets would be used to test the the Heisman Trophies in 1945 and Saturn V’s third stage, the S-IVB, 1946. In 1951 he received a mas- and the Apollo spacecraft.16 ter’s degree in mechanical engi- neering from the Massachusetts Major Factors Affecting the Institute of Technology.18 Kennedy Space Center Debus considered Petrone to Immediately after President be a dynamic, forceful, and tough Kennedy’s announcement for the no-nonsense leader who could get Dr. Wernher von Braun (Marshall Moon Mission, Debus, who was the launch site and rocket checkout Space Flight Center Director 1960- then the director of the Launch and launch procedures ready to 1970) and Dr. Rocco Petrone Operations Directorate (LOD) at meet President Kennedy’s goal of a (Marshall Center Director 1973-1974) talk during a lull in the preparations of the Marshall Space Flight Center Moon landing by 1969. He had a Saturn 1 vehicle launch at Cape (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama, shown himself to be a dedicated, take-charge, and detail-oriented Kennedy's Launch complex 37 Control which was responsible for launch Center. 25 May 1965. Credit: NASA operations at Cape Canaveral, made manager who would obsessively focus on the launch preparation a crucial decision. He placed U.S. In March 1962, the Launch task. Debus realized the attention Army Major Rocco Petrone in Operations Directorate was separat- to detail that would be required to charge of all planning and opera- ed from MSFC and was reconstitut- land a man on the Moon by the end tions for the Saturn/Apollo launch ed as the Launch Operations Center of the decade, and he knew that effort for the LOD. As the new (LOC), which reported directly to Petrone was the man for the job.19 director of the Heavy Space Vehicle NASA’s Washington When he accepted this posi- Systems Office, Petrone had Headquarters.22 Debus became the tion, Petrone turned down an responsibility for all Saturn LOC’s director and the recently important career progression Program resources and quality con- promoted Lt. Colonel Rocco assignment to the Army’s trol efforts related to launching the Petrone was appointed to be the Command and General Staff Saturn rockets. This position gave director of the Apollo Plans, School. This decision somewhat him extraordinary powers over all Programs and Resources Office. limited his advancement in the NASA Saturn rocket launch prepa- This position gave him virtual con- Army. He retired from the Army in ration efforts at Cape Canaveral. He trol over all Apollo Program activi- 1966 as a Lt. Colonel, a relatively was responsible for the planning ties at LOC.23 After the death of modest retirement rank for a West and activation of all launch facili- President Kennedy in November Point graduate.20 ties at the Cape and on Merritt 1963, the LOC was renamed the To assure the success of the Island, including LC- 34 and LC- John F. Kennedy Space Center.24 37 for the Saturn I and IB rockets Apollo Program, NASA required a strong presence at the launch site. and for LC-39 on Merritt Island, The Mobile Concept The launch organization needed to from where the Saturn V rocket The gigantic Saturn V at LC- would be launched.17 be at the center level to permit its personnel to effectively interact and 39 required the development of rad- Major Petrone had previously ically new checkout and launch been assigned to the Army communicate with the other NASA centers and with the launch vehicle procedures. The enormous size of Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville the rocket, the power it generated, Alabama in 1953 and had been stage and spacecraft contractors. This center would also have to con- the need for the highest level of involved in the development and reliability, and the need to support launches of the Army’s Redstone, tract directly for its launch support and base support contractors and varying launch rates had to be Jupiter, and Juno missiles. He grad- addressed.25 uated from West Point in 1946, would have to work directly with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers It was determined that it where he had been a tackle on the would be impractical to erect the Army national championship foot- and the U.S. Air Force operations at the Cape.21 large rocket stages and the space- ball teams of 1945 and 1946. These craft at the launch site as had been

Q U E S T 26:1 2019 11 www.spacehistory101.com done with earlier rockets. This like vehicle being used to carry the that notion. They were required to method would expose the launch Saturn V from the VAB to the make many modifications and vehicle to storms, heavy winds, launch pad. At a conference held changes to facilities and ground lightning, and corrosion. Due to the between 12-13 June 1962, at KSC, support equipment (GSE) while stresses on the missile frame and its attended by NASA Headquarters, they were being constructed, and systems, assembling and checking MSFC, KSC, and private industry make modifications to launch vehi- out the large launch vehicle in a representatives, the three methods cles during preparations for launch. horizontal position in a hangar and of transport were discussed and And after each launch was complet- then transporting it to and erecting compared. The barge and rail sys- ed, there would be modifications it on the launch pad would not be tems were considered to be prob- and changes dictated by issues and feasible.26 lematic and too expensive. The pre- problems arising from the flights Petrone and Debus focused on senter, Donald Buchanan, recom- which would have to be performed the “mobile concept,” where the mended using the crawler-trans- by KSC.30 Saturn V stages and the Apollo porter method and it was decided spacecraft would be stacked, inte- that the large tank-like vehicle, the Apollo Program Tasks for the grated, and checked out in a huge crawler-transporter, would be Kennedy Space Center enclosed building and then be trans- developed to perform the task of MSFC had already been ported to the launch pad in a verti- delivering the mammoth Saturn V authorized in 1960 to construct cal position. The size of the Saturn to the launch pad on a specially Launch Complexes 34 and 37 at V necessitated the construction of a developed roadway.28 Cape Canaveral to launch the gigantic assembly building. To The mobile concept was Saturn I and IB rockets, which launch the number of rockets need- viewed skeptically by NASA would perform initial tests and ed to meet the mission schedule, the Headquarters, but Petrone present- launches of the Apollo spacecraft building would have to be large ed a strong case for it by citing and the third stage of the Saturn V, enough to process four Saturn rock- lower costs, less staffing, greater the S-IVB, in Earth orbit. These ets simultaneously. Thus, Petrone reliability, and more flexibility in tests and launches were necessary recommended that NASA construct launch rates that would be provided for the Apollo spacecraft and the the largest enclosed building in the by this method. Through his zeal, third stage to be ready when the world at that time. It was originally logic, and persuasive powers, first and second stages of the Saturn known as the Vertical Assembly Petrone was able to overcome the V became operational.31 Building (VAB), and later called objections of the NASA Office of The effort to design and build the Vehicle Assembly Building.27 Manned Space Flight in LC-39 for the countdown and The mobile concept required Washington D.C., and Congress, launch of the Saturn V would pro- developing a revolutionary mode of and authorization to proceed with ceed simultaneously with the transport to bring the giant Saturn V the mobile launch procedure for launch activities occurring at LC- from the VAB to the launch site. A LC-39 was approved.29 34 and LC-37. To launch the Saturn barge system using a canal and The rocket and spacecraft V, Petrone would have to develop another employing a rail system design engineers at MSFC and JSC and implement the critical and were initially considered, but these assumed that they completely complex procedures to receive, methods posed significant prob- understood how their systems stack, integrate, checkout, and lems. A chance encounter with an would perform when launched. launch it. To do these tasks, he drew employee of the Bucyrus-Erie KSC merely had to assemble and extensively upon his experience, Manufacturing Company and a checkout the rocket stages in the dating back to his service with subsequent visit by MSFC and VAB, transfer the vehicle to the Wernher von Braun and his U.S. KSC officials to the Peabody Coal launch pad, and launch it—referred Army team during the development Company in Paradise, Kentucky, to as “ship and shoot.” But the KSC of the Redstone rocket in the early led to another possibility. They experts’ experience during facility 1950s.32 observed the operation of a large construction and the previous rock- crawler coal shovel, which led to et checkout and launch operations the consideration of a large tank- caused them to differ vastly from

Q U E S T 26:1 2019 12 www.spacehistory101.com Petrone’s Vision and Operational while all this was taking place on current and accurate status reports. Guidelines LC-39, checkout and launches of Petrone was an excellent Petrone was determined to the Saturn I and IB rockets would judge of character, and he could meet President Kennedy’s national be occurring simultaneously at find capable individuals whom he goal to land a man on the Moon by Launch Complexes 34 and 37. could trust. He relied more on his the end of the 1960s. His efforts at Petrone had the tremendous respon- personal experience with individu- KSC were guided by an often-stat- sibility for coordinating and inte- als than on an organization struc- ed vision statement and two opera- grating all of these activities.36 ture. He assembled a strong team tional guidelines that permeated his that provided him confidence in sta- actions and decisions throughout Petrone’s Management Style tus reports and would deal directly the Apollo Program. As headlined Though he occupied various with a government or contractor in several of his early professional positions at KSC during the Apollo engineer, whoever knew specifical- presentations, his vision boldly pre- Program, Petrone determined his ly what was happening and could dicted that “One day within this responsibilities to be whatever provide accurate information. decade an American will land on needed to be done to accomplish Petrone worked through the the Moon.”33 This statement the task. A title or an organization line organizations directly contact- described his complete dedication chart did not constrain his decisions ing and working with people in the to achieving Apollo’s goal and his relating to the program. He had a organization who could get the job view of man’s place in space explo- “take charge” personality, and he done. He did not want people who ration. ruled everything at KSC with an did not keep up with daily opera- An important guideline for his iron hand.37 According to Ike tions and tests attending meetings decisions was that “the flight vehi- Rigell, Ray Clark, director of to provide status. He would routine- cle has got to dominate.” This Technical Support Operations ly call NASA officials and contrac- meant that the design of the special- Directorate, lamented that “Rocco tor management to replace people ized launch facilities and the com- would be running the Saturn who were not up to date on their plex and detailed launch count- Program if he was in charge of the activities. There was no doubt who down procedures required for the Motor Pool.”38 was in charge of this activity. It was Saturn V would be dictated by the Early in the program, contrac- Rocco Petrone. His leadership and vast size of and the massive power tor and NASA personnel who management style was legendary. generated by this rocket.34 attended meetings to brief Petrone He was very visible, involved and The second guiding principle were high-level executives, overall demanding.39 was “concurrency,” which Petrone program managers, financial man- Petrone was very knowledge- felt was the real challenge of the agers, or contractor management able about the Saturn launch vehi- program. This meant that every- personnel. These executives were cle systems and the associated thing had to come together at the typically not familiar with the status GSE. He delved very deeply into same time and function properly at of their systems to the level he the rocket launch systems and com- KSC. The rocket stages, spacecraft, demanded. They were prepared to ponents to assure safety, reliability, ground support equipment (GSE), discuss the overall condition of and launch readiness. His strong and their components came from all their systems related to budget and and focused questioning on the over the country, and they were not contracts. Petrone demanded details of system readiness reflect- tested together before arriving at more—much more. He sought in- ed this. He could be intimidating KSC. The rocket stages and their depth insights into a system or com- and his probing could be severe. He equipment had to fit together and ponent and identification of any had no problem challenging per- interact with the KSC facilities and impact upon an upcoming test or sonnel, even his superiors.40 GSE.35 launch. He insisted that NASA and Al Koller, engineer retiree Concurrency also meant that contractor management officials from the Launch Vehicle to meet launch schedules, two or provide personnel who were inti- Operations Directorate, commented three Saturn V’s would be mately knowledgeable with the sys- on Petrone’s focus on details. He processed simultaneously while in tems and components under their speculated that “…had Petrone still the VAB or on the launch pads. And responsibility and who could give been in charge at KSC, the

Q U E S T 26:1 2019 13 www.spacehistory101.com Challenger disaster would not have ponent level. Perhaps it could be a For all tests, Petrone required happened.” He added “Petrone was major issue dealing with the S-II a pretest briefing. System engineers too thorough to have missed the stage, the latest report on the Lunar had to be well prepared and have a booster problems, and he kept Module (LM), or down to a compo- complete report. The thoroughness things headed in the right direction nent level dealing with a solenoid of these reviews enabled Petrone to while he was at KSC.”41 (In fact valve, a faulty instrument, a propel- exert his complete will and control Petrone, who had become the pres- lants leak, or a defective switch. He over the launch preparation ident of Rockwell Corp. Shuttle knew the launch vehicle systems process. Every procedure had to be Operations after leaving NASA, and GSE intimately, and his ques- certified as current and all operators had been at KSC for the launch of tions were laser focused. Through had to have the final printed copies the Challenger, but had returned to these meetings, he would be well in their possession. Open items California when the launch was informed about system status and from previous tests were included. delayed. Prior to the re-scheduled test results. He had very high No write-in “markups” were launch on 26 January 1986, he held expectations of professionalism allowed. John Talone, of the KSC a top-level telephone conference from the members of the launch Test Conductor Office, indicated call with Rockwell program man- team and would not tolerate any that a typical report would include agers at the Cape. Following the system briefer who was unpre- the task to be accomplished, the discussion, he instructed his repre- pared.43 procedure involved, the personnel sentatives at KSC to inform NASA If a briefer tried to deflect assigned, their certification on the that Rockwell recommended delay- Petrone’s attention from an issue, system, and the schedule for com- ing the launch because they had not Petrone would tell him to “Stop pletion. Problems were to be iden- previously launched in such low bugling,” an Army term he used tified with any constraints they pre- temperatures and that falling ice when a presenter wandered off sub- sented and if they would affect the might damage the orbiter.). ject. test. If so, how far could the test In preparing for a launch or a Petrone had a phenomenal proceed before having to stop the test, Petrone had early morning memory. On many occasions, he procedure? Following the briefings, meetings with the Chief Test would catch contradictions in changes could be made through Supervisor to learn what had hap- reports many months apart. He was Launch Vehicle Operations (LVO) pened during the night shifts. Then so good at cross-examination that it or Spacecraft Operations (SCO) he would meet with representatives was suggested he missed his calling management with formal distribu- of the Spacecraft Operations (SCO) as a district attorney. One NASA tion and tracking and then a review and Launch Vehicle Operations manager observed: by Petrone. It was a grueling but (LVO) Directorates and their shift effective and disciplined system, test conductors. In these meetings, Rocco was the only senior which focused upon the status of Petrone would seek to learn in manager I worked with who truly critical items. It had effective detail exactly what had taken place had a photographic memory. If checks and balances and did not at the VAB and the launch pad the you gave him a ‘‘fact’’ related to depend on an extensive documenta- night before and how the launch your program during a briefing, tion system.45 might be impacted. Ike Rigell noted woe unto you if you changed any- Debus held weekly staff meet- that “The meetings were ‘no-non- thing a week, month, or year later. ings with his directorate chiefs, and sense.’ The whole staff meeting was Rocco would catch or challenge Petrone would invariably take the generally Rocco trying to under- you, and he was almost always lead in these discussions, demon- stand what problem they had the right. Rocco’s meetings were strating more knowledge than the night before and why they didn’t lively, especially if there were line organization functional direc- have it cleared up.”42 discussions of delays or unex- tors. He was not beloved by several In the meetings and reviews pected changes. He was never shy of these men. But it did not matter. conducted by Petrone, problems about showing his displeasure, His primary focus was upon the and issues were reviewed broadly and it was reinforced by his mission and whatever it took to at the stage or spacecraft level or in imposing frame.44 achieve it.46 As a high-ranking precise detail to the system or com- staff member noted: “In all the

Q U E S T 26:1 2019 14 www.spacehistory101.com meetings I attended with line direc- to get answers or responses due to know our subjects thoroughly tors there was NEVER any ques- Petrone’s reputation. No one want- from then on.51 tion about Rocco's ABILITY, ed to be called by Rocco.”49 AUTHORITY or REASON to not In another example, Noel FOLLOW him!! He knew what he Petrone’s Confrontations Hinners, a former NASA executive was talking about, and experience On occasion, when a systems and a one-time director of the taught all of us that it was wise to engineer gave incorrect or outdated Smithsonian Air and Space follow his directions. The launch information or tried to bluff him, Museum, related that “Rocco could record speaks for itself.”47 Petrone could be intimidating. be a tyrant in the formal meetings. Petrone was equally effective NASA and contractor engineers On one occasion he demanded I tell at working with JSC and MSFC reporting system status had to be him if it was a Phillips-head or a and their contractors. He was a nat- prepared. Many times he knew straight-head screw in a box under ural program manager who handled more about the situation than the discussion. I annoyingly responded, KSC’s external relations with the briefers. He would accept an engi- ‘How the hell would I know?’ Years other centers and with the stage and neer not being current on an issue later I deduced that this was spacecraft designers very effective- dealing with his system, but the Rocco’s technique for getting you ly. He kept up with the activities engineer needed to admit it. At the to the point where you’d best say, ‘I and schedules of the MSFC, JSC next meeting, Petrone would expect don’t know,’ rather than try to fake and the stage and spacecraft design an answer showing either progress it and was part his ‘pay attention to and manufacturing contractors. or the solution to the problem. As detail’ mentality.”52 There were scheduling issues noted by Ike Rigell, “If you were When the Lunar Module with the other centers and their con- straight up with him that you didn’t (LM) was first delivered to KSC, it tractors. On occasion, JSC and have all the answers, that’s okay – experienced significant problems. MSFC were desperate to meet a just go get them. But you should During a post-test briefing, Petrone schedule deadline, and they would never try to fool him. Chances were was relentless in his criticism of ship open work to be completed by that he already knew more about a Grumman in front of the entire KSC at the launch site so it would situation than you did.”50 briefing audience. Tom Kelly, appear that KSC was delaying the Here are several examples of Grumman LM chief engineer, schedule. Petrone clearly demon- Petrone’s in-depth knowledge of recalls that George Skurla, LM strated to NASA Headquarters systems and his strong reactions to Project Manager, was berated by where the problems were actually inadequate reports or poor tests Petrone because of the LM’s unsat- located and had pressure applied on results. isfactory performance. “George, JSC and MSFC to reduce the Humboldt C. Mandell Jr., a what kind of two-bit garage are you amount of incomplete work sent to retired manager of JSC, recalled running up in Bethpage? That LM KSC. what occurred to one unprepared you sent us yesterday is supposed to Petrone’s knowledge of the systems engineer: fly in space, but I wouldn’t even overall program and status was allow it on the launch pad. Its phenomenal, and he was quickly Rocco was grilling the con- propulsion tanks and plumbing able to assess any delay’s impact tractor people on some program leaked like a sieve. It’s a piece of upon KSC, JSC, or MSFC opera- delays. Rocco, who was never junk, garbage! You should be tions and take necessary action to content with an answer, kept ashamed. And four months late minimize any effect on KSC.48 He probing this one young contractor besides.”53 was able to get answers or reports engineer, who quickly reached Petrone went on “What kind accurately and effectively from the limit of his knowledge. of so-called tests did they do in these Centers on what affected Instead of admitting it, he tried to New York before sending this KSC. Ike Rigell recalled that “in bluff. Rocco took him physically wreck to us? You guys were sup- dealing with the other NASA off the podium. He told the boss posed to be a cut above North Centers or the vehicle and space- that the young man was to be American, but now it seems you’re craft contractors, KSC personnel removed from the program. even worse. NASA won’t stand for who worked for Petrone were able Brutal? Maybe, but it made us all this. They had better get it fixed.

Q U E S T 26:1 2019 15 www.spacehistory101.com Your name is mud around here until Building Stage Zero (1963-1966) massive Saturn V would be you get it fixed.”54 As Chief of KSC’s Apollo stacked and integrated with its On another occasion, a glass Plans, Program and Resources mobile launcher. blast proof plate was installed over Office, Petrone directed and over- a TV monitor which viewed engine saw the planning and construction • Designing and building the seals for gaseous oxygen leaks in of the facilities and equipment that crawler-transporter that would the Saturn V’s first stage’s engines. was required to launch the powerful transport the rocket to the launch It was continuously cracking due to Saturn rockets at LC-34, LC-37 and pad. heat buildup from lamps used to LC-39.56 He was also responsible light the area. John Talone, the for the Apollo Program schedule • Constructing the launch con- engineer in charge, thought the sit- and for assuring that required sup- trol center from where the Saturn uation had been fixed. Two hours port was provided for the Saturn I, V would be checked out, both before a test he had the lights turned IB, and V launches. To carry out while in the VAB and on the on and personally moved into an these responsibilities Petrone had launch pad. uncomfortable position to reach three project offices reporting to into the TV cavity to check the him. One office dealt with both • Building the launch pads, glass. It had not cracked. Later dur- Saturn I and IB launch vehicles and where the vehicles would be ing the propellant preloading brief- Launch Complexes 34 and 37. A checked out, fueled, and ing, he gave a status report of his second project office dealt with the launched.59 system providing all of the informa- Saturn V and Launch Complex 39. tion that Petrone demanded. He felt These two offices planned and eval- To perform the planning and that his report was going well, but uated facilities and GSE develop- coordination of the facilities to during the entire presentation ment and launch operations for implement the “mobile concept,” Petrone had stared intensely at him. their respective rockets.57 the Launch Complex 39 Site At the end of the presentation, The third, but critically impor- Activation Board was established Petrone asked about the glass over tant office was responsible for the with Petrone as Chairman. Its char- the TV in the engine trench. Talone program resources management, a ter stated that “…. the Board was indicated that he had personally reliability program, and scheduling responsible for ensuring that all checked on it and it was OK. Then of U.S. Air Force range support. facilities and support equipment Petrone held up his finger with a Through this office, and the control comprising the Apollo-Saturn V Band-Aid on it and asked: “Then of resources, Petrone wielded operational launch base were con- how come I cut myself when I was extraordinary power over the con- structed, outfitted, installed, inter- out there an hour ago?” From there struction of the launch facilities 34 connected, and tested in preparation Rocco went off. “You guys don’t and 37, and oversight of the early for subsequent operations.”60 take this seriously! I can’t trust you Saturn I and IB rocket launches. In KSC was a functional line for anything!” He continued on a directing the construction of the organization, and the KSC rant for 10 minutes and then turned LC-39 facilities and launch prepa- Directorate chiefs expressed con- to the director of Launch Vehicle rations for the Saturn V, Petrone cerns about the broad powers of the Operations and said “I don’t under- had a completely free hand.58 Site Activation Board. Several of stand why you can’t get this fixed Managing the construction of the KSC Directorate chiefs feared right!” and stormed out of the meet- the LC-39 facilities would be a that Petrone would interfere with ing.55 much more difficult task than their operations and authority, and Petrone could be volatile and Launch Complexes 34 and 37 had voiced strong objections to the role explode when frustrated and dissat- been. For LC-39, Petrone was of the Site Activation Board.61 isfied with a status briefing. But his responsible for the planning and Despite these objections, relentless focus upon safety and implementing the “mobile concept” Debus made it clear that Petrone reliability was all for the good of which required: was the project manager in charge the Program. of KSC Apollo/Saturn operations, • Constructing the Vehicle and in carrying out his responsibili- Assembly Building, where the ty he could cut across organizations

Q U E S T 26:1 2019 16 www.spacehistory101.com to find the people, whether contrac- tured in Massachusetts had to oper- tor or NASA, who had the knowl- ate dials from Wisconsin. Electrical edge to address a problem directly. components from different compa- Thus it was clear that Petrone had nies needed to have the same volt- complete responsibility for coordi- age and current ranges to operate nating all the work necessary to together correctly. Some parts prepare the LC-39 facilities and required high levels of cleanliness, GSE.62 special packaging, and temperature Consider the awesome controls. Every part had to be responsibility this posed for first a checked individually or verified Major, and then Lieutenant within their systems to be opera- Colonel, in the U.S. Army. To man- tional at KSC.66 age the construction of LC-39, Facility and GSE verification The Saturn V outside the Vehicle Petrone would have to deal with the had to be performed simultaneously Assembly Building. Credit: NASA U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the with the ongoing design and devel- other NASA Centers, construction opment of the rocket’s stages and juice, need more wire, and require contractors, stage, spacecraft, and spacecraft. Any design changes to more propellants. You’ve got to be KSC base and launch support con- the spacecraft or the rocket stages in the right rhythm because when tractors. In 1964 there were 7,000 would have to be accommodated in they come together you must all be construction workers building the the KSC facilities and GSE. And in the crossroads at the same LC-39 facilities, and there were fre- conversely, it was crucial for KSC time.68 quent jurisdictional disputes at to identify needed changes discov- KSC between the construction ered during checkout and launch of Saturn-Apollo Checkout and workers, the various Saturn rocket the rockets to the rocket designers Launch Facilities 63 contractors, and NASA. While and manufacturers for incorpora- The Operations and Checkout attending to these matters at LC-39, tion into the follow-on GSE and 67 (O&C) Building, also known as the he would also be responsible for vehicle designs. Petrone com- Manned Spacecraft Operations overseeing the Saturn I and IB pletely understood this situation. Building (MSOB), was located launches from LC-34 and LC-37, We often look at the launch about five miles south of LC-39 and have to deal with the U.S. Air site and those things on the ground (Since 2014, it has been known as Force and its support contractor, that don’t fly as “Stage Zero”. the Neil Armstrong Operations and Pan American. But Petrone was up Rocco Petrone said, “You had to Checkout Building). Here the to the task, and he was accorded have all of the intricacies of a stage, spacecraft would be received, tremendous respect from the KSC things like swing arms, hold down 64 assembled, and checked out prior to launch team. He was a tireless arms, feeding the gases in, all the being moved to the VAB to be lifted hands-on manager who routinely propellants. When you’ve released to the top of and integrated with the worked weekends and late into the your Stage One is flying, but if you Saturn V. The MSOB is a 5-story night when other managers had haven’t done all of these things on 65 building containing offices, labora- gone home. Stage Zero, Stage One would never tories, the astronaut quarters, two There were thousands of com- get a chance to fly.” The Cape’s high altitude chambers, and the ponents and pieces of equipment task was to design and build all the spacecraft processing and checkout that were needed to prepare LC-39 ground support equipment and areas. It has a large conference for the countdown and launch of a facilities even as the Apollo/Saturn room which could accommodate Saturn V. The GSE included some stack itself was being designed. the numbers of NASA and contrac- 40,000 parts, which arrived at KSC “That was a hell of a challenge” tor managers, engineers, and tech- from all over the country, and they Petrone continued, “and I think, a nicians attending the reviews for had to fit and function together challenge not very well understood. launch and flight preparation. properly. A valve fabricated in Here you have the launch vehicle Everything about Launch California had to fit pipes delivered stages going down the road with the Complex 39 was on a large scale. from Louisiana. Switches manufac- spacecraft and they develop more To process the 363-foot Saturn V

Q U E S T 26:1 2019 17 www.spacehistory101.com while it was on the launch pad. Before the launch, the MSS was returned to its standby position by the crawler-transporter.70 A 48-foot tall steel triangle shaped flame deflector was required to deflect the tremendous flames generated by the S-IC stage engines away from the vehicle and ML during ignition and liftoff. It weighed 317 tons and was posi- tioned under the ML by a rail sys- tem.71 The Launch Control Center (LCC) was the nerve center for the Saturn V launches. The launch vehicle stacking and checkout func- The Crawler-Transporter for the Saturn V. Credit: NASA tions performed in the VAB and the Saturn V checkout and launch countdown on the launch pad were controlled from the LCC. The and to hoist and connect the stages, triumph of engineering. It weighed building had four firing rooms. the VAB was 525 feet tall, occupied 3,000 tons, had an adjustable height Ultimately, only three firing rooms 8 acres and contained four high from 20 to 26 feet, and lifted the were activated for Saturn V pro- bays to allow for processing 4 363-foot-tall Saturn V and its ML, cessing. Firing Room #4 became Saturn V’s simultaneously. Each and carried them to the launch pads. the flow processing center to track bay had a cascading roll-up door It was powered by four double- launch preparations, and it included that was 456 feet high. tracked crawlers at each corner and a large floor to ceiling “waterfall” Accompanying the rocket in the had two control cabs on either end flowchart system which depicted VAB was its attendant mobile so it could move forward or back- significant events to track vehicle launcher (ML), which consisted of a ward and did not have to turn system status.72 25-foot-tall launch platform with around. Its top speed was two miles Launch Complex 39 pad A the 4 hold-down arms and a 380- per hour without a load, but when was 3.5 miles from the VAB, and foot umbilical tower, containing 2 carrying a Saturn V with its ML, it LC-39 pad B was 4.2 miles away. elevators, and 18 platform levels. moved at one mile per hour. It had a These were massively large com- The tower had 9 swing arms for level sensing system that kept the plexes, much larger than their pred- access to the vehicle, to load propel- Saturn in a nearly perfect vertical ecessors, LC-34 and LC-37. Both lants, and to provide power and position, even while travelling up were elevated 42 feet from the high-pressure gases to the rocket the incline of the elevated 42-foot crawler roadway and were encir- stages, and it had a 25-ton hammer- high launch pad. cled by propellant and high-pres- head crane at its top. The launch After the launch vehicle was sure gas supply tanks and piping. platform had six 22-foot posts, or in place on the launch pad, the 402- Located around each pad were a mount mechanisms, which allowed foot-high mobile service structure liquid oxygen tank, a liquid hydro- the crawler-transporter access to lift (MSS) was moved to the launch site gen tank, and an RP-1 tank. and lower the ML and Saturn V into by the crawler-transporter. It Nitrogen and helium gases, provid- position. The ML was used to check weighed 12 million pounds and had ed to both launch pads from a cen- out the launch vehicle both while in an elevator and eight adjustable trally located converter-compres- 69 the VAB and on the launch pad. platform levels, providing 360- sion station, were stored in a high- The crawler-transporter was a degree access to the launch vehicle pressure gas storage facility under

Q U E S T 26:1 2019 18 www.spacehistory101.com each launch pad.73 What was achieved between 1963 and 1966 at KSC in completing the activation of the Launch Complex 39 facilities that would be required to carry out the mobile concept was amazing. Under the man- agement of Petrone, KSC had completed the design and construction of the VAB, two crawler-transporters, three mobile launchers, the mobile service structure, launch pads A and B, and the Launch Control Center. And this was done while the various Saturn V stages and the Apollo spacecraft were being designed, built, and checked out at distant locations, and while launches of the Saturn I and IB rockets were occurring at Launch Launch control center at Kennedy Space Center. Complexes 34 and 37. Credit: NASA The successful rollout of the Saturn 500F test role due to his in-depth system knowledge and his vehicle from the VAB to launch pad A took place on 25 familiarity with the launch crews. Coincidentally, May 1966. It was exactly five years to the day from Petrone had retired from the Army in 1966. In his new President Kennedy’s announcement of the goal to send position, the Center’s main operational divisions, a man to the Moon. The Saturn 500F was the facilities Launch Vehicle Operations and Spacecraft Operations, integration vehicle used to test the vehicle stacking and reported directly to him, and he was completely respon- checkout in the VAB and to transport it to the launch sible for directing the testing, checkout, and launch of pad to assure that everything fit.74 The 36-story Saturn all Saturn-Apollo launch vehicles.78 V, with its mobile launcher’s swing arms and hold-down arms connected to the vehicle, was transported to Launch Pad 39A by the crawler-transporter demonstrat- ing that the Launch Complex 39 facilities and GSE were operational and ready to support a Saturn V launch.75 While briefing visiting dignitaries who were observing the spectacular sight of the SA-500F emerging from the VAB, Petrone stated “I guess that’s a sight that speaks for itself. I’ll give no commentary on that.”76

Lighting the Fuse for Stage One (1966—1969) After completing construction of the Launch Complex 39 facilities and the successful rollout of SA 500F, Debus had to make a difficult personal decision. Launch Pad 39A, Kennedy Space Center. Until then he had held two positions—Center Director Credit: NASA and Director of Launch Operations. Due to his increased responsibilities at KSC, the Saturn V work- The Director of Launch Operations at KSC has load, and the fact that Rocco Petrone was participating never received the media or national attention of a directly in the launch director function for the Saturn I Spacecraft Flight Controller at JSC in Houston. The and IB rockets, he realized that he should relinquish his Director’s responsibilities were over when, upon day-to-day launch operations responsibilities.77 launch, the Saturn V cleared the launch tower, about 12 He assigned Rocco Petrone to replace him as seconds after the engines ignited. But what was Director of Launch Operations. Petrone had sat beside involved in the four or five months of preparation for him in the Launch Complexes 34 and 37 blockhouses the launch was formidable, and what was monitored and during launches of the Saturn I and IB rockets. Over controlled during a launch countdown was daunting. time they had evolved into effectively being co-launch Putting three men on a fully fueled Saturn V and launch- directors, but Petrone had become more active in the ing them toward orbit was a pressure-packed situation.

Q U E S T 26:1 2019 19 www.spacehistory101.com The launch of a Saturn V was organizations, and Petrone had to This difference in work cul- much more complicated than any deal with the conflicting manageri- tures required that Petrone deal previous rocket launch conducted al chains of command when inter- with NASA personnel and contrac- at KSC. It involved the efforts of acting with them. Petrone also had tor personnel depending upon who many more organizations and per- to contend with two vastly different knew the system in the detail that sonnel than earlier Saturn I and IB cultures in dealing with NASA and he wanted. For his launch team, he launches. The launches from LC-34 contractor engineers. The space- looked for the engineer who could and LC-37 had included the NASA crafts were the responsibility of get the job done. Organization KSC personnel, two stage contrac- JSC and its contractors, North charts did not matter. He wanted tors, the Instrumentation Unit (IU) American and Grumman, while the direct access to the individuals who contractor, the spacecraft contrac- rocket stages and engines were the knew the systems intimately.83 tor, the U.S. Air Force Cape support responsibility of MSFC and its con- Assembling the stages and the contractor, Pan American, and the tractors Boeing, North American, spacecraft, checking out the overall Air Force’s Eastern Test Range Douglas, and the rocket stages’ Saturn V, delivering the vehicle to Office. engine provider, Rocketdyne. The the launch site, and successfully To perform the checkout and spacecraft contractors were steeped launching the Saturn V working launch efforts for the Saturn V, in the U.S. Air Force contracting with these widely different organi- Petrone would have to coordinate approach, where the government zational cultures presented many and supervise the tasks of the KSC management penetration was not difficulties. That Petrone was able civil service engineers, three stage deep, and much of the work was to integrate and manage the diverse contractors, the IU contractor, two left to the contractor with less over- NASA and contractor organizations spacecraft contractors, along with sight until the product was complet- and meet the aggressive Apollo the efforts of five major support ed and checked for compliance launch schedule was a triumph in contractors, and the U.S. Air Force. with design specifications. They the application of project manage- There were 26,500 workers at KSC worked more of a team approach ment techniques to a challenging in 1968. Bringing all these entities dealing with each system in a broad and complicated task of national and personnel together would be a sense. Quality assurance was a sep- importance.84 challenging task for one man.79 arate function from the design and The Director of Launch To comprehend the complexi- operational organizations. Operations had the ultimate respon- ty of the systems and components On the other hand, the stage sibility of deciding to launch, but if monitored by KSC personnel dur- contractors were managed by during the countdown any systems ing a countdown for launch, the MSFC and KSC engineers who engineer observed a problem he number of manned console posi- were strongly influenced by could call a hold or stop the launch. tions might be considered. During MSFC’s German scientists, who When major a problem occurred the Apollo 11 launch, Firing Room exercised substantial control over causing a hold or a launch post- #1 of the Launch Control Center at their specialized tasks. The German ponement concerned engineers KSC had 463 engineers monitoring managers emphasized personal could convene in the launch vehicle 150 console positions for the responsibility and worked from a documentation room, also referred launch. They were augmented by discipline orientation. They and to as the “woodshed.” This room 50 spacecraft personnel in the their civil servant and contractor was adjacent to each of the four fir- MSOB, and consultant system engineers were deeply involved in ing rooms in the Launch Control engineers from MSFC in a separate the functional operations of the spe- Center. It contained engineering room in the LCC. Additionally, cific components within each sys- system blueprints, manuals, and there were some 5,000 backup per- tem and, thereby, responsible for configuration control documenta- sonnel available on standby their own quality assurance. tion, which were used for trou- throughout the country.80 Complicating matters further, the bleshooting problems. It was a The launch team consisted of spacecraft contractor worked a place where engineering experts about 80 percent contractors and 20 three-shift schedule while the vehi- could study a problem as a team. percent NASA civil service person- cle stage contractors worked a two- During some tests when a serious nel.81 Both had their functional line shift schedule.82 problem arose, Petrone would call

Q U E S T 26:1 2019 20 www.spacehistory101.com for meetings in the woodshed. successful launches of all Saturn and separate the S-II stage from the Sometimes these meetings were rockets stand as a testament to his S-IC, the first stage.91 heated and intense, and some lasted decision making. The third stage, the S-IVB, all night. No doubt these occasions was the built by Douglas Aircraft resulted in the room being referred The Saturn V Stages and the Apollo and used liquid oxygen and liquid to as the “woodshed” and the Spacecraft hydrogen for its propellants. It was expression that “no one wants to be The three stages of the built in Huntington Beach, taken to the wood shed by Rocco.” Saturn V and the Apollo spacecraft California and had a single J-2 When needed, Petrone was relent- involved some 5.6 million compo- engine that developed 200,000 lbs. less in solving the problem at hand nents and parts and 1.5 million sys- of thrust and had to ignite twice in no matter what and how long it tems and sub-systems. All of these space. It was first fired to separate took.85 components and parts had to be itself from the S-II stage and Petrone was in complete checked out individually or within achieve Earth orbit, and later it was charge of the firing room during their assembled systems at KSC.89 restarted to place the spacecraft into tests and launch countdowns. He When assembled, the rocket stages trans-lunar injection.92 maintained rigorous control of the and spacecraft had to fit together IBM built the Instrumentation primary launch control communi- and function correctly with the Unit in Huntsville, Alabama. This cations system. Depending on their launch facilities and GSE. Between was the brain for the Saturn V rock- function some launch team mem- stages, every wire, plug, switch, et, which provided flight guidance, bers could speak over the network connector, and pipe had to join pre- controlled the stage engines for while others were limited to listen- cisely with its counterpart. The flight control, and performed the ing. Petrone demanded that every- instrumentation unit at the top of stage separations.93 one stay on the main communica- the third stage had to send thou- For the Apollo spacecraft, tions loop. He wanted to be aware sands of signals through sensors North American in Downey, of everything said about a and micro switches throughout the California, provided the CSM, problem.86 If someone even stood rocket stages without electrical which was a sophisticated space- up to take a stretch, he would tell interference or change of signal craft consisting of two modules. them to sit down. He demanded a strength. The Command Module (CM) pro- disciplined firing room.87 The three stages of the Saturn vided the work and living area for There was tremendous pres- V were built by different companies the astronauts and would carry sure on the launch team members under contract with MSFC. them back to earth. It had worked the consoles during their The first stage, the S-IC, was Rocketdyne thruster engines for 12- and 13-hour shifts in prepara- developed by Boeing and was pro- maneuvering and earth re-entry. tion for launch. Petrone would be duced in a plant at Michoud, The Service Module (SM) provided constantly vigilant for team mem- Louisiana, near New Orleans. It propulsion, electric power, and stor- ber fatigue. He would walk through used RP-1 (kerosene) and liquid age of consumables for the flight. It the Firing Room 45 minutes prior to oxygen for its propellants. It had had a large engine, supplied by launch to check on the alertness of five Rocketdyne F-1 clustered Aerojet General Corporation for the engineers.88 engines which combined developed mid-course corrections and lunar After analyzing any problem, 7,800,000 lbs. of thrust at liftoff.90 orbit entry and exit. It also had the Launch Director would decide The second stage, the S-II, thruster engines built by Marquardt whether to continue with the count- was built by North American Corp. The propellants for the down and whether or not to launch. Rockwell Corporation in Seal engine and thrusters were hyper- Launching with an unresolved Beach, California. It used liquid golic. These were used for self- problem presented a difficult situa- oxygen and liquid hydrogen as its ignition of the engines to assure tion, but with the expertise of the propellants. It had five Rocketdyne reliability for making mid-course KSC personnel advising him and J-2 engines which developed corrections and for firing when his deep system knowledge, 1,100,000 lbs. of thrust upon sepa- entering and leaving lunar orbit.94 Petrone made such decisions with a ration from the first stage. It would Grumman was responsible for high probability of success. And the operate in near vacuum conditions the Lunar Module, which was built

Q U E S T 26:1 2019 21 www.spacehistory101.com in Bethpage, New York and it con- an interface check was performed. deficiencies recorded during earlier sisted of a descent stage and an The fully assembled Saturn V was mission reviews were carefully ascent stage. The LM’s stages’ then transported to the launch pad analyzed to be sure they had been thruster engines were provided by where, after an overall vehicle end properly addressed. Marquardt. The descent stage to end test, the Flight Readiness After declaring the vehicle engine was provided by Space Test (FRT) was conducted. The launch ready, the launch count was Technology Laboratory, and the FRT would simulate the entire started as scheduled and propellant ascent stage engine was supplied by launch and flight of the vehicle and loading began. Liquid oxygen and Bell Aerospace Corp. These spacecraft, operating valves and liquid hydrogen were loaded onto engines used hypergolic fuels for electrical switches, but propellants the rocket and spacecraft, along reliable operation for landing on were not loaded. The launch with the helium and nitrogen gases and leaving the Moon.95 sequence for the FRT was con- used for pressurization. This was a When assembled, the Saturn trolled from the LCC, while the very hazardous time for launch pad V rocket stood 363 feet tall – about spacecraft was controlled from the workers. Ultra cooled liquid fuels 36 stories. When fully fueled it MSOB. and high-pressure gases were flow- weighed 6,500,000 pounds and Following the FRT, hyper- ing requiring monitoring pressures, generated 7,800,000 pounds of golic fuels were loaded onto the opening and closing of valves, thrust at liftoff.96 CSM and the LM. This was fol- watching for leaks, and testing lowed by the Countdown tanks for temperature and pressure The Saturn V Launches Demonstration Test (CDDT), problems.98 There were a total of thirteen where RP-1 and liquid oxygen were While preparing to launch the Saturn V vehicles launched during loaded onto the S-IC stage and both Saturn V, launches of the Saturn I the Apollo Program. Rocco Petrone liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen and IB were occurring on launch was in charge of the first six of were loaded onto the S-II and the S- complexes 34 and 37. It was on 27 these, culminating with Apollo 11. IVB stages. The countdown test January 1967, during a spacecraft The process for launching the would be taken to 14 seconds test at LC-34 where the tragic acci- Saturn V was considered to be a before ignition, where the count dent of AS 204 / Apollo 1 occurred, “marathon,” starting with an exten- would be terminated. After the and Astronauts Gus Grissom, Ed sive three or four-month checkout CDDT, the liquid oxygen and liquid White, and Roger Chaffee lost their in the VAB, followed by a one- hydrogen would be off-loaded from month preparation period on the the stages, while the RP-1 and launch pad. hypergolic fuels would remain on- Each rocket stage was indi- board for the launch.97 vidually inspected, stacked, and There were two reviews per- mated to the other stages in the formed prior to launch, the Launch VAB, and an end to end electrical Readiness Review (LRR) and the verification was performed and Flight Readiness Review (FRR). controlled from the Launch Control These reviews were held in the Center (LCC). Then the malfunc- MSOB’s briefing room. The LRR tion overall test recovery and “saf- was a review of KSC’s readiness ing” tests were conducted using for launch. This was overseen by plausible malfunctions. Following Rocco Petrone. The FRR was an these tests, a plugs-out-test was per- overall mission review involving formed, which checked the power KSC, MSFC, JSC, Goddard for the launch sequence. Tracking, and the Navy recovery After the plugs-out-test, the forces to indicate readiness for spacecraft, which had been checked launch. Every aspect of the mission out in the Manned Spacecraft from pre-launch preparation to Operations Building (MSOB), was splashdown and recovery was Assembled Saturn V on the launch installed onto the Saturn rocket and reviewed in detail. Action items or pad. Credit: NASA

Q U E S T 26:1 2019 22 www.spacehistory101.com lives. The causes of the accident Kennedy’s goal would be met.101 eliminating the bellows and re- were determined to be a spark ignit- A Saturn IB rocket successful- designing and hard lining the fuel ing material which became com- ly launched Apollo 5, from Launch lines. bustible in the 100 percent oxygen Complex 37 on 22 January 1968. Another issue occurred during environment in the spacecraft This flight carried the LM into the flight. The spacecraft lunar cabin, and the inward opening entry Earth orbit and verified the opera- module adapter (SLA) panels, hatch that was difficult to open tion of the ascent and decent stage which were designed to protect the from inside the spacecraft. The engines and propellant systems.102 LM, broke free while flying accident delayed the program for On 4 April 1968, Apollo 6 was through the atmosphere, due to about nine months while an investi- launched on the second Saturn V trapped air and water buildup in the gation was conducted. The program and it experienced serious prob- panels’ aluminum honey comb underwent heavy scrutiny, and the lems. Early in the flight “pogo” structure. After the flight, the S-IC’s 1969 Moon landing goal seemed oscillations occurred in the first pogo issues and the fuel line prob- very doubtful.99 stage’s F-1 engines, resulting in lems in the S-II and the S-IVB However, on 9 November violent vibrations which would stages were quickly found and cor- 1967, eight months after the Apollo have caused extreme discomfort rected. And an easy fix was made 1 accident, Apollo 4, with an and disorientation for the astro- for the SLA by to drilling small improved Block I spacecraft was nauts. Subsequent analysis found holes into the panels to allow for launched on the first Saturn V. This the cause to be incorrect tuning of expansion of the honeycombs. was a prototype of the Apollo the frequencies among the five first Because of these problems, Apollo spacecraft used to test the flight stage F-1 engines. This would be 6’s mission goals were modified systems in Earth orbit and the effec- easily corrected in future flights. somewhat to emulate the Apollo 4 tiveness of the heat shield in flight Shortly into the S-II stage’s goals and these were successfully and reentry. During checkout of the burn, engine #2, a J-2 engine, shut achieved. So by understanding the vehicle in the VAB, and on the down, followed immediately by first and second stage engine issues launch pad, numerous problems engine #3 also shutting down. It and the SLA problem experienced arose and the CDDT took 23 days was later found that engine #2 shut in the flight, and finding relatively to complete. But this lengthy test down due to in line vibrations rup- easy solutions to them, the flight of proved to be invaluable in molding turing the flexible bellows in the Apollo 6 provided NASA with the launch personnel into an effec- fuel line which fed liquid hydrogen enough confidence to use the tive team and providing valuable to the engine’s spark igniter. The Saturn V for manned launches.103 information for conducting future flow of propellants was stopped to Apollo 7, the first manned launch countdowns. The Apollo 4 engine #2, but the liquid oxygen flight for the reworked Block II flight itself was highly successful pre-valves of engines #2 and #3 had Command Module, was successful- and it verified the effectiveness of been accidently cross-wired, so the ly launched on 11 October 1968, Apollo’s propulsion system and the liquid oxygen flow to engine #3 from LC-34 using the Saturn IB heat shield. The flight was also suc- was also cut off, resulting in its rocket. The CSM flew for 11 days cessful in testing the spacecraft and shutdown. However, the S-II’s and completed 163 earth orbits, all three stages together, including three remaining J-2 engines were proving it could sustain a flight to the S-IVB engine restart in space, able to compensate for the power the Moon. Thus, the Saturn V rock- which was crucial for lunar flight. loss and subsequently, with the S- et and the Apollo spacecraft were This flight validated Dr. George IVB engine burning longer, the now operational and ready to be Mueller’s push for “all up testing,” spacecraft achieved orbit. During combined for manned lunar flights. which tested all Saturn V stages and the flight a similar fuel line bellows Apollo 8 was scheduled to be the spacecraft simultaneously dur- rupture had occurred in the S-IVB launched into Earth orbit to test the ing a launch rather than conducting stage’s single J-2 engine, so later, LM in manned flight and ren- sequential tests. This was a major when an attempt was made to dezvous techniques with the CSM. factor in achieving the goal of land- restart the engine to test for trans- However, the LM was months ing a man on the Moon by 1969.100 lunar injection, it failed. The prob- behind schedule. George Low, at Petrone now felt confident that lem was solved in future flights by that time Manager of the MSC

Q U E S T 26:1 2019 23 www.spacehistory101.com Apollo Spacecraft Program Office, which would significantly diminish from the bounds of Earth in made the bold recommendation to the importance of a U.S. lunar land- Apollo 8, the flying of the lunar switch the Apollo 8 and 9 missions. ing.106 module with men on board in This change in schedule would send The decision to send Apollo Apollo 9, and then Apollo 10 Apollo 8 and three astronauts to the 8 to the Moon had to be made which went to the Moon and did Moon and into lunar orbit prior to quickly to meet the proposed everything short of landing. It all returning to earth. And Apollo 9 December launch date. Petrone led up to that hot July morning in would be manned and used to test called in his key personnel to dis- 1969, when Apollo’s moment of the LM in flight and rendezvous cuss the situation. Ike Rigell, truth was irreversibly upon us.110 techniques while in earth orbit.104 Deputy Director of LVO, recalled NASA management received that “to a man, they knew what he As Director of Launch this proposal with much skepticism wanted to do and they immediately Operations, Rocco Petrone was in because the third Saturn V would be committed to the project.”107 charge of the Apollo 11 countdown used for the Apollo 8 mission to fly Apollo 8 was launched on 21 and launch on 16 July 1969. In to the Moon, and the previous December 1968, and orbited the Firing Room #1 seated next to him Saturn V launch of Apollo 6, had Moon 10 times. It was a tremen- were Kurt Debus, KSC director, experienced significant problems. dous success and restored and Wernher von Braun, director of But since these problems were Congress’s and the countries’ faith MSFC and the designer of the completely understood and reliable in NASA after the tragic accident of Saturn V rocket. The countdown fixes had been made, it was decided Apollo 1. Reversing the Apollo 8 and launch went flawlessly. that the flight would be an accept- and 9 missions was another crucial Four days later, on 20 July, able risk. And by orbiting the decision which contributed to the astronauts Neil Armstrong and Moon, valuable lunar flight infor- achievement of President Buzz Aldrin landed safely on the mation on communications and Kennedy’s goal of landing a man on Moon and gathered lunar rock sam- navigation in space could be the Moon before the end of the ples. They returned to earth safely obtained and photographs could be decade.108 on 34 July. The success of Apollo 11 taken which would provide infor- Apollo 9 conducted the first was the magnificent result of the mation on sites for future lunar manned flight of the LM. It was dedicated efforts of thousands of landings. It was recognized that this launched on the 3 March 1969, and, individuals in government and flight would dramatically increase during nine days of Earth orbit, it industry. Undeniably the personnel the risk for Apollo 8, but that it successfully tested the LM’s ascent at KSC under the stellar leadership would reduce risks for follow-on and decent engines and rendezvous of Rocco Petrone played a huge flights to the Moon.105 techniques with the CSM. Apollo role in achieving Kennedy’s goal. All NASA Centers had to 10 was successfully sent to the One month after Apollo 11, quickly assess their capabilities and Moon on 18 May 1969, to test the Petrone was promoted to be determine what would be required LM in rendezvous operations with NASA’s Apollo Program Director. to launch Apollo 8 in December of the CSM while in lunar orbit. It was He was now in charge of the entire 1968, which had been a tumultuous a full dress rehearsal for Apollo 11. Apollo Program. Debus hailed and challenging year for the nation. The LM descended to about 8 miles Petrone’s appointment by noting The Vietnam War was raging; above the Moon’s surface. All was that “Petrone played a vital role in President Johnson had announced now ready for the Apollo 11 lunar the design, construction and outfit- that he would not seek reelection; landing.109 ting of the LC-39 launch facilities Martin Luther King had been assas- that successfully launched our sinated, causing race riots; and Petrone noted: astronauts to a landing on the Senator Robert Kennedy had been Moon. His service to the program shot and killed during his presiden- At last everything was coming as Launch Director has been so tial campaign. Adding pressure to together—all those elements that superb that he was the logical can- the decision was speculation that had been committed piecemeal— didate to take over the management the Soviet Union was planning a the command module on Apollo of Apollo for the continuing lunar manned launch to orbit the Moon, 7, the first manned flight away exploration missions.”111

Q U E S T 26:1 2019 24 www.spacehistory101.com Conclusion ate the readiness of a system for Rocco Petrone was unques- launch. He also dared to make diffi- tionably one of the most important cult and risky decisions, even when contributors to the success of the under great stress. His methods Apollo Program. He was the key were demanding and sometimes person at KSC for the Apollo harsh, but they achieved the desired Program until Apollo 11. results. The highly successful Without Petrone’s project launch records of the Saturn I, IB, management skills and obsessive and V rockets attest to the work per- commitment to the program, it is formed by the NASA and contrac- doubtful that the Moon landing tor engineers at KSC under his would have taken place by leadership. President Kennedy’s deadline.112 Roger Launius, a former The Apollo Program was a NASA Chief Historian, aptly sum- major national endeavor. It required marized the work done at KSC by the efforts of a vast number of stating that “The value of the work NASA and industry engineers and that Mr. Petrone and other engi- Apollo 11 liftoff. Credit: NASA technicians at KSC to successfully neers and designers contributed to launch the gigantic Saturn V and the success of Apollo cannot be send the Apollo spacecraft on the overstated...he was one of a band of start talking about adventure and lunar mission. Petrone’s ability to brothers captured by the dream of discovery and anyone who tells create an effective launch team, spaceflight. While they didn't get to you what’s going to come out of it which constructed the facilities and go themselves, they are the ones has got to be a fool to try, because 114 developed the complex procedures who made it real.” out of discovery man has moved to safely and reliably launch the In 1973, Petrone became the from the caves to where he is Saturn V, demonstrated extraordi- Director of MSFC, overseeing that today, and we ain’t finished mov- nary project management skills. He Center’s work for Skylab, and the ing. I look upon all those things established an effective process on following year he was appointed to out there (in space) as challenges, how to effectively and efficiently be the Associate Administrator of put there by someone for us to try plan and manage large and complex NASA. He retired from NASA in to understand, and in trying to technical projects under extreme 1975, and in that year he was elect- understand, we’re going to be bet- time limitations.113 ed to the National Academy of ter.116 Petrone did not give many Engineering, which cited him “For interviews, did not write a book, pioneering accomplishments in the After leaving NASA, Petrone does not appear in many historical design, development and imple- spent most of the 1980s working in films or documentaries related to mentation of space launching the Space Shuttle Program as a Apollo, and he is not well known to capacities for the Apollo manager at Rockwell International 115 the general public. But he is highly Program.” before retiring in 1989. Rocco regarded within NASA and the He recognized that Apollo Petrone died in Palos Verdes, aerospace industry. His toughness was the beginning of the explo- California on 24 August 2006. He and intimate knowledge of the ration of space and the universe. In was 80 years old. Saturn-Apollo systems gained him his retirement speech he empha- great respect and admiration from sized the role of space research in About the Author the KSC launch team. During tests the discovery of new knowledge Dr. Edgar Manton is a Professor and launch countdowns, his ques- and the need for man to be involved Emeritus of Texas A&M tioning was keenly focused on safe- in space exploration: University-Commerce, where he ty and reliability issues. He had a served in the College of Business remarkable ability to ask the right I see man in the program as for 43 years. In 2011, he was hon- questions at the right time to evalu- the essential element of adventure ored by being designated Regents and discovery that we need. You

Q U E S T 26:1 2019 25 www.spacehistory101.com Professor of the Texas A&M 7 Charles Murray and Catherine Bly Cox, 26 Murray and Cox, Apollo: Race to the University System. He received his Apollo: Race to the Moon, (New York, NY: Moon, 89-92. Simon and Shuster, 1989), 181. bachelor’s degree in general engi- 27 Ibid., 92. 8 Matthew Travis, “Early U.S. Rocket neering from the U. S. Naval 28 Ibid., 96-99. and Space Launch Failures and Academy and the masters and doc- Explosions,” YouTube video, 9:56, Posted 29 Benson and Daherty, Gateway to the torate degrees in management from [June 2007], https://www.youtube.com/ Moon, 127-128. Florida State University. Upon grad- watch?v=13qeX98tAS8 30 Isom “Ike” Rigell, telephone interview uation from the Naval Academy, he 9 Ed Fanin, email to the author, with the author, 29 June 2017. entered the United States Air Force December 5, 2017. 31 Ward, Rocket Ranch, 9-17. as a missile control officer for the 10 “Rocco Petrone Obituary,” 32 Murray and Bly Cox, 87-88.. Atlas intercontinental ballistic mis- Legacy.com, 31 August 2006, https:// sile. After leaving the service, he legacy.com/obituaries/name/rocco- 33 Petrone, “Saturn V/Apollo Launch petrone-obituary/19067540. Operations Plan,” 1; Rocco Petrone, was employed by NASA at the “Ground Support Equipment and Launch Kennedy Space Center from 1963 11 Ibid. Installations at John F. Kennedy Space until 1972, during the Apollo 12 Jonathan Ward, Rocket Ranch, (New Center, NASA for the Manned Lunar Program. His first position was York: Springer -Praxis Books, 2015), xviii. Landing Program,” (presented at The 15th Annual International Astronautical Chief of the Planning and Technical 13 David Woods, How Apollo Flew to the Congress, Warsaw, Poland, September Moon, (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2011), Support Office of the Launch 1964), 1. Support Operations Division, where 8,9. 34 Lipartito and Butler, 88-90. he was involved in planning, budg- 14 Ibid. 35 Murray and Cox, Apollo, 99. eting, contract management, and 15 David West Reynolds, Apollo the Epic technical support. Later he served as Journey to the Moon, 1963-1972, (San 36 Johnathan Ward, Countdown to a Assistant to the Director of Support Diego CA: Tehahi Books Inc., 2002), 80-81. Moon Launch, ( New York: Springer-Praxis Books, 2015), 12. Operations, and he participated in 16 Charles Benson and William Faherty, the overall management of the Gateway to the Moon, (Gainesville, FL: 37 Thomas Kelley, Moon Lander: How We University Press of Florida, 2001), 89. Developed the Apollo Lunar Module, (New directorate which was responsible York, NY: Penguin Random House, 2009), 17 Charles Murray and Catherine Bly Cox, for the operation and maintenance 165. Apollo: Race to the Moon, 87. of the LC 39 facilities, including the 38 Ike Rigell, telephone interview with 18 Benson and Faherty, Gateway to the VAB facilities equipment, the the author, 29 June 2017. launch pads, and the crawler-trans- Moon, 82. 39 Ward, Rocket Ranch, xx. porter. 19 Nelson, Rocket Men, 5. 40 Lipartito and Butler, 138, 151. 20 Murray and Bly Cox, Apollo: Race to the Moon, 15. 41 Al Koller, e-mail to author, 29 June Notes 2017. 1 Kurt Debus, “Launching the Moon 21 Kenneth Lipartito and Orville Butler, A Rocket,” Astronautics and Aerospace History of the Kennedy Space Center, 42 Ward, Countdown to a Moon Launch, Engineering, no. 1 (March, 1963): 22-32. (Gainesville FL: University of Florida Press, 17. 2007), 55-60. 2 H.C. Dethloff, Suddenly Tomorrow 43 Ibid., 33-34. Came: a History of the Johnson Space 22 Ibid., 60. 44 Donald Beattie, Taking Science to the Center, (Houston, TX: National Aeronautics 23 Charles Benson and William Faherty, Moon: Lunar Experiments and the Apollo and Space Administration, Lyndon B. “Chapter 7: The Launch Directorate Program, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Johnson Space Center, 1993), 98. Becomes and Operational Center,” in University Press, 2003), 204-205. 3 Gordon Harris, Selling Uncle Sam, Moonport: a History of Apollo Launch 45 Ward, Countdown to a Moon Launch, (Hicksville, NY: Exposition Press, 1976), 9. Facilities and Operations, NASA SP-4204, 34. 1978, https://www.history. nasa.gov/ SP- 4 Craig Nelson, Rocket Men, (New York 4204/contents. 46 Lipartito and Bulter, 128.. NY: Penguin Group, 2010), 7. 24 L.B. Taylor, Liftoff: The Story of 47 John Thomas, e-mail to author, 13 5 Charles Murray and Catherine Bly Cox, America’s Spaceport, (New York: E.P. September 2017. “Apollo: Race to the Moon, Twenty Years Dutton & Co. Inc., 1968), 134. On,” Interview by Thomas Frieling, The 48 Lipartito and Butler, 124. Space Review, 20 July 2009, https:// 25 Rocco Petrone, “Saturn V/Apollo 49 Ike Rigell, telephone interview with www.thespacereview.com/article/1421/1. Launch Plan,” (presented at The AIAA the author, 25 July 2017. Space Flight Testing Conference, Cocoa 6 Ibid. Beach, Florida, March 1963), 5. 50 Ward, Rocket Ranch, xviii.

Q U E S T 26:1 2019 26 www.spacehistory101.com 51 Adam Bernstein, “Rocco Petrone, 80,” Operations Plan,” 7. 98 Nelson, Rocket Men, 5. Washington Post, 31 August 2006, 73 Ibid., 9-10. 99 Ibid., 193. https://www.washingtonpost.com/roc- copetrone. 74 Ward, Rocket Ranch, 190. 100 Piers Bizony, The Man Who Ran the Moon: James Webb, JFK and the Secret 52 Noel Hinners, “Management by 75 Murray and Bly Cox, Apollo: The Race History of Project Apollo, (Cambridge: ICON Walking Around: a Potent Arrow in the to the Moon, 181. Books Ltd., 2006) 207-208. Manager’s Quiver,” Appel Knowledge 76 “It Was a Beautiful Sight to All,” 101 Lindsey, Tracking Apollo to the Moon, Services (June 2009), https://www. Spaceport News, 2 June 1966, 3. nasa.gov content/nasa-mourns-the-pass- 168. 77 Lipartito and Butler, 128. ing-of-noel-hinners. 102 Lipartito and Butler, 160. 78 Ibid. 53 Kelley, 165. 103 Ibid. 79 Ward, Countdown to a Moon Launch, 54 Ibid., 166. 104 Murray and Bly Cox, 316-319.. 24-25.. 55 Ward, Rocket Ranch, 181-84. 105 Kluger, Apollo 8, 124. 80 Lindsey, Tracking Apollo to the Moon, 56 Rocco Petrone, “The Cape: The New (London: Springer-Verlag, 2011) 453. 106 Nelson, 106. Shipyard of Space Created for Apollo,” in Apollo Expeditions to the Moon, Ch. 6. ed. 81 Petrone, “Chapter 6: The Cape,” in 107 Rigell, telephone interview with the Edgar M. Cortright. Last modified 13 Apollo Expeditions to the Moon, Ch. 6. ed. author, 29 September 2017. Edgar M. Cortright. Last modified 13 February 2006, https//www. 108 Lindsey, Tracking Apollo to the Moon, February 2006, https//www.history.nasa. history.nasa.gov. /SP-350/cover/html. 189. gov/SP-350/cover/html. 57 Benson and Faherty, Gateway to the 109 Neil Armstrong, Edwin Aldrin and 82 Lipartito and Butler, 119-122. Moon, 141, Michael Collins, First on the Moon, 58 Ibid. 83 Ward, Rocket Ranch, 36. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), 27-31. 59 Rocco Petrone, “Ground Support 84 Roger Launius, “Apollo 11 at 25, Equipment and Launch Facilities at the 1969-1924,” Quest: The History of Space 110 Petrone, “Chapter 6: The Cape,” in John F. Kennedy Space Center, NASA,” 5-9. Flight, Vol 3 # 2-3 (1994): 6. Apollo Expeditions to the Moon, Ch. 6. ed. Edgar M. Cortright. Last modified 13 85 Ward, Countdown to a Moon Launch, 60 Benson and Faherty, “Chapter 15: February 2006, https//www.history.nasa. 272-273. Putting It All Together: LC-39 Site Activation gov/SP-350/cover/html the Site Activation Board,” in Moonport, 86 Ward, Rocket Ranch, 143-144. NASA SP-4204, 1978, https:// www.histo- 111 “Petrone New Apollo Director,” ry.nasa.gov/SP-4204/contents 87 Jeffrey Kluger, Apollo 8, (New York, NY: Spaceport News, 28 August 1969, 4. Henry Holt and Company, 2017), 155. 61 Ibid. 112 William Lucas, “Rocco A. Petrone 88 Petrone, “Chapter 6: The Cape,” in 1926-2006,” National Academies Press, 62 Benson and Faherty, Gateway to ;the Apollo Expeditions to the Moon, Ch. 6. ed. Memorial Tributes, (Washington DC. 2007) Moon, 141-142.. Edgar M. Cortright. Last modified 13 245-47, https://www.nap.edu/ 63 Gordon Harris, Selling Uncle Sam, February 2006, https//www.history.nasa. read/11912chapter/46. gov/SP-350/cover/html. (Hicksville, NY: Exposition Press, 1976), 10. 113 Mark Betancourt, Mark, “We Built the 64 Lipartito and Butler, 138-139. 89 Nelson, Rocket Men, 195. Saturn,” Air & Space Magazine, October/November 2017, https://www. 65 Ibid., 139. 90 Petrone, “Ground Support Equipment and Launch Installations at the Kennedy airspacemag.com/space/we-built–sat- 66 Benson and Faherty, “Chapter 15: Space Center.” 2. urn-v-180964759 Putting It All Together: LC 39 Site 114 “Remembering a Leader from Apollo: Activation” in Moonport, NASA SP-4204. 91 Ibid. Rocco Petrone,” Appel Knowledge 67 Ward, Countdown to a Moon Launch, 92 Ibid., 3. Services, February 2010, https://www. 12. 93 Ibid. appel.nasa.gov/2010/02/27/ao_1- 15_f_remembering- html/. 68 Murray and Cox, Apollo: Race to the 94 Kluger, Apollo 8, 123. Moon, 99 115 Lucas, “Rocco A. Petrone 1926- 95 Ibid., 124. 2006,” 246. 69 Petrone, “Ground Support Equipment and Launch Installations at John F. 96 Ibid., 123. 116 “Remembering a Leader from Kennedy Space Center,” 5-6. 97 Petrone, “Chapter 6: The Cape,” in Apollo,” Appel Knowledge Services. 70 Ibid., 6. Apollo Expeditions to the Moon, Ch. 6. ed. Edgar M. Cortright. Last modified 13 71 Ibid., 7. February 2006, https//www.history.nasa. 72 Petrone, “Saturn V/Apollo Launch gov/SP-350/cover/html

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