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INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text direct^ from the origmal or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are m typewriter free, while others may be from any type of conqmter printer. The quality of this reprodnction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistmct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversety afi&ct rqnoduction. fri the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyri^ material had to be removed, a note wfll indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e g., mq>s, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, b%inning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing fix>m left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photognqthed in one exposure and is included in reduced ft>rm at the bade of the book. Photognq>hs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographicalty in this copy. Ifigher quality fi” x 9” black and Write photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directty to order. UMI A Bdl A Howell &ifoiinati<m Conquiiy 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann A lter MI 48106-1346 USA 313/761-4700 800/521-0600 UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA IMAGES OF DECISION MAKING AND THE LAUNCH OF THE CHALLENGER SPACE SHUTTLE A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY By TERENCE MICHAEL GARRETT Norman, Oklahoma 1997 UMI Number: 9810313 Copyright 1997 by Garrett, Terence Michael All rights reserved. UMI Microform 9810313 Copyright 1997, hy UMI Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arhor, MI 48103 Copyright by Terence Michael Garrett 1997 All Rights Reserved IMAGES OF DECISION MAKING AND THE LAUNCH OF THE CHALLENGER SPACE SHUTTLE A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE TABLE OF CONTENTS Page USTOFTABLES AND FIGURES............................................................. iv-v DISSERTATION ABSTRACT.....................................................................vi-vlli Chapter I. INTRODUCTION: AIM OF THE DISSERTATION................ 1 II. A CRITIQUE OF SCIENCE, META-THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS AND THE METAPHORICAL FRAMEWORK............................................................................ 16 III. EVENTS LEADING TO THE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT.. 38 IV. FUNCTIONALISM AND RADICAL STRUCTURALISM...... 86 V. RADICAL HUMANISM AND INTERPETIVISM......................146 VI. CONCLUSION: KNOWLEDGES AND PARADIGMS......... 194 BIBLIOGRAPHY..........................................................................................198 APPENDIXA............................................................................................... lApp.A USTOFTABLES AND FIGURES TABLES AND FIGURES Page Table 1.1 A Brief Outline of Decision Making in the Challenger Case Study.............................................................................. 13 Table 2.1 The Subjective-Objection Dimension .................................. 20 Figure 2.1 Burrell and Morgan’s Sociological Paradigms Analysis.. 21 Table 2.2 Bensman and Ulienfeld’s Action-Time Analysis ................. 22 IV LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES (Continued) Page Figure 3.1 A Comparison of SRB Joint Designs ...................................... 53 Figure 3.2 Solid Rocket Motor Heating-to-lgnition ................................... 54 Figure 3.3 The Space Shuttle System...................................................... 57 Figure 3.4 The Solid Rocket Booster Assembly. ...................................... 58 Figure 3.5 Plot Comparisons of Flights Affected by Joint Temperature. 68 Figure 3.6 Successive Days Worked ...................................................... 72 Figure 3.7 Van Allen’s Slaughter of the Innocents’ ............................... 75 Rgure 4.1 Summary of NASA Responses and Possible Errors Regarding Launch Decisions ................................................ 99 Figure 4.2 Redundant System in Parallel ............................................... 99 Figure 4.3 Paradigm Influences on Sociological Positivism .............. 102 Figure 4.4 NASA’s FRR Nodes of Contradiction ..................................... 136 Figure 5.1 Interests and Their Types of Knowledges ............................ 189 LIST OF CONTENTS IN APPENDIX A Relevant Organization Charts of NASA and Morton Thiokol ........ 1 Appendix A Thiokol Letters and Memoranda Written after 0-ring Concern Escalates................................................................................................ 6 Appendix A Knowledge Taken and Left Behind by Leading Groups 13 Appendix A Dissertation Abstract Images of Decision Making and the Launch of the Challenger Space Shuttle. Terence Michael Garrett. Ph.D. The University of Oklahoma, 1997. Chair; Professor David G. Camevale. The Challenger space shuttle launch incident on January 28, 1986 is a fascinating topic for comparison of theoretical conceptions offered by organization theorists. By examining this case study we can see the intricate complexities and richness of human activity surrounding a single event in organization theory. The case study method is useful for exploring theories of organization. This study provided me the opportunity to analyze a relatively widely known case within a government agency and make a contribution to the field of public administration. What is notable about this topic is that there was plenty of information concerning problems with the space shuttle system, such as weather-related and technical issues, available to managers prior to the launch to prevent the event from transpiring and yet the decision to launch took place anyway. Many scholarly interpretations have been offered so that this incident (case study) provided much theoretical evidence for consideration. These interpretations were oftentimes conflicting or contradictory in their respective interpretation of events. In order to analyze the disparate theories explaining the launch decision, I used Burrell & Morgan's metatheoretical frameworks method, which consists of functionalism, radical humanism, radical structuralism and interpretivism, to organize the various theoretical explanations about the Challenger space shuttle launch. Furthermore, I found that the interpretation of events leading to the Challenger decision was subject to the analyst’s preconception of what transpired. I confined my research primarily to theoretical interpretations of the the launch event in order to assess the state of the field of public administration V i generally and in particular the subfield of organization theory. There are numerous qualitative theoretical conceptions available to scholars. These theories, or images, are valuable for analyzing a complex event like the Challenger space launch. There is no single theory or paradigm which completely explains the launch as there is no single all-encompassing theory which adequately explains human behavior in a predictable fashion in the social sciences. Instead, we (I mean we. the academic community) render scholarly judgments concerning events that we study using theoretical tools available to us. In a similar fashion. I have presented an analysis of the Challenger space launch decision. We offer judgments to members of organizations, particularly managers, to provide them with insights (the practitioners who live in and depend on the work-world, i.e.. executives, workers, managers, clients and investors) so that tragic consequences may not result to human beings in the future. As such, I used Hummel and Camevale's concept of the “knowledge analytic” to tie together some of the interpretations offered by scholars analyzing the Challenger incident The knowledge analytic provides us with a means to appreciate and recognize that where we are in an organization affects how we perceive ourselves, each other, and the work we are involved in. “Knowledges” incompatibility is a primary cause for people in organizations to not come to an understanding about what should be done in order to accomplish a task in an organization or how we cooperate in completing organizational endeavors. I discovered in my case study analysis of the Challenger launch decision that a failure of recognizing differences in knowledges, particularly between executives, managers and engineers, led to disaster. The framing or “images” method offers scholars the means to analyze in vii a comprehensive fashion theoretical explanations of human events. For example, the richness and complexity of the world we live in is inadequately covered by the simplistic, parsimonious and positivist-scientific theoretical renditions which are often used to explain reality. Human beings and human behavior cannot be scientifically categorized once and for all. Organizations, as human artifacts, similarly cannot be judged completely by science. Science may be useful in describing the superficial appearance of an organization at a single moment in history, but time and space limitations provide only an ephemeral snapshot of reality. The framing method is an appropriate beginning for managers and academicians to recognize and