Apollo 13 Mission Review
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APOLLO 13 MISSION REVIEW HEAR& BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES UNITED STATES SENATE NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS SECOR’D SESSION JUR’E 30, 1970 Printed for the use of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 47476 0 WASHINGTON : 1970 COMMITTEE ON AEROKAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES CLINTON P. ANDERSON, New Mexico, Chairman RICHARD B. RUSSELL, Georgia MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Washington CARL T. CURTIS, Nebraska STUART SYMINGTON, bfissouri MARK 0. HATFIELD, Oregon JOHN STENNIS, Mississippi BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona STEPHEN M.YOUNG, Ohio WILLIAM B. SAXBE, Ohio THOJfAS J. DODD, Connecticut RALPH T. SMITH, Illinois HOWARD W. CANNON, Nevada SPESSARD L. HOLLAND, Florida J4MES J. GEHRIG,Stad Director EVERARDH. SMITH, Jr., Professional staffMember Dr. GLENP. WILSOS,Professional #tad Member CRAIGVOORHEES, Professional Staff Nember WILLIAMPARKER, Professional Staff Member SAMBOUCHARD, Assistant Chief Clerk DONALDH. BRESNAS,Research Assistant (11) CONTENTS Tuesday, June 30, 1970 : Page Opening statement by the chairman, Senator Clinton P. Anderson-__- 1 Review Board Findings, Determinations and Recommendations-----_ 2 Testimony of- Dr. Thomas 0. Paine, Administrator of NASA, accompanied by Edgar M. Cortright, Director, Langley Research Center and Chairman of the dpollo 13 Review Board ; Dr. Charles D. Har- rington, Chairman, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel ; Dr. Dale D. Myers, Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, and Dr. Rocco A. Petrone, hpollo Director -___________ 21, 30 Edgar 11. Cortright, Chairman, hpollo 13 Review Board-------- 21,27 Dr. Dale D. Mvers. Associate Administrator for Manned SDace 68 69 105 109 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIOSS 1. Internal coinponents of oxygen tank So. 2 ---_____-_________________ 22 2. Oxygen tank wiring and lines_-_-_______________-_________________ 23 3. Photograph of switch test -_-_______---____-______________________- 23 4. Photograph of wiring test ___________--_-_________________________- 26 5. Review Board organization chart__-____--_________-_______________ 29 6. Apollo/Saturn space vehicle---_---_--__-_-----__-_----__----___--- 30 7. Service module--_-_---____-__----_-___----_-_-_-_--_--_----__-_-_ 31 8. Arrangement of fuel cells and cryogenic in Bay 4 _______________-___ 32 9. Photograph of Bay 4 showing major elements _____________-______--- 33 10. Photograph of Bay 4 showing major eleineiits _________-____-_______ 34 11. Photograph of Bay 4 showing major elements_______________________ 35 12. Oxygen tank shell__-__-__-----_--__-__------___------_--_-__--_-- 36 13. Routing of Tvires 37 14. Crew photograph shows missing panel _____________-_______________ 39 16. Accident eventu____-_--___-___--__-_-__-___---___-______--___--__-40 16. Flight plan after accident_-_-____-_--_-___--_-_-_____-_____---__--44 17. Flight plan after accident_____________-___--_____________________- 44 18. Thermostatic snitch __--_______________________-_-_____-_____----_47 19. Condition of wires _____________________________--___-________--___ 48 20. Condition of wires _____-___________________________________-_____- 48 21. Review Board Recommendation KO, 1________________-___-__-__---- 59 22. Redesign approach to oxygen system ______--_______--______________ 60 23. Modified oxygen storage system _____________-______________________ 62 24. Review Board Recommendation So. 2 ______________________________ 63 25. Review Board Reconimendation So. 3h_____________________________ 64 26. Review Board Recommendation KO. 3B___-______-____________--_-_ 63 27. Review Board Recoininendation So. 3C____________________________ 65 28. Review Board Recommendation So. 3D____-_____________-_________ 66 29. Review Board Recomniendatioii So. 4 _____________________________ 67 30. Review Board Recommendation So. 3 ________-_____________________ 67 31. Review Board Recomn~endation So. 6 __-___________-_____--____---6' (111) APOLLO 13 MISSION REVIEW TUESDAY, JUNE 30, 1970 UNITEDSTATEE SENATE, COMMITTEEON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACESCIENCES, Washington. D.C. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 235, Old Senate Office Building, Senator Clinton P. Anderson (chairman) presiding. Present : Senators Anderson, Stennis, Holland, Curtis, Goldwater, and Smith of Illinois. *4lso present: James J. Gehrig, staff director; Everard H. Smith, Jr., Dr. Glen P. Wilson, Craig Voorhees, and William Parker, pro- fessional staff members ; Sam Bouchard, assistant chief clerk ; Donald H. Brennan, research assistant, and Mary Rita Robbins, clerical as- sistant. OPENINGSTATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN The CHAIRMAS.The hearing \Till come to order. Today the committee will continue its review of the Apollo 13 mis- sion initiated on April 24,1970, and will hear testimony on the findings of the Apollo 13 Revien- Board and the status of the Apollo program. Dr. Thomas 0. Paine, Administrator of NASA, accompanied by NASA manned space flight officials. Dr. Dde D. Myers, Associate &4dministrator for Manned Space Flight, and Dr. Rocco Petrone, Apollo Program Director, will testify on NAS14 actions to be taken with respect to the findings and recommendations of the Apollo 13 RevieF Board, on NASA plans for modifying the Apollo hardware and 011 plans for resumption of the L4polloflight program. Mr. Edgar M. Cortright, Director of NASA's Langley Research Center, who is Chairman of the Apollo 13 Review Board, will present a brief summary highlighting the Revien- Board activities and pro- vide any additional information that may have developed from tests in process when the Board report was released. Also accompanying Dr. Paine today is Dr. Charles D. Harrington, Chairman of the XASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. Dr. Paine rill submit for the record a copy of a letter he received from Chair- man Harrington giving the Panel's comment on the procedures and findings of the Apollo 13 Review Board. Dr. Harrington will not present a statement but is ]>resent to respond to questions committee members may have regirding the Panel's oversight of the activity of the Review Board. If there is no objection, I will have chapter 5 of the report of the Apollo 13 Revien- Board placed at an appropriate point in the record. (1) 2 This chapter contains the findings, determinations, and recommenda- tions of the Board resulting from several nTeeks of intensive investiga- tion into the cause of the failure n-hich necessitated aborting the Apollo 13 mission. The CHAIRJIAN.Senator Smith is not here at the moment. Go ahead, Dr. Paine. (Chapter 5 referred to above is as follows :) CHBPTER GFISDISGS, DETERMISATIONS, ASD RECObIJIESDATIONS PART1. ISTRODUOTIOX The following findings, determinations, and recommendations are the product of about 7 weeks of concentrated review of the Apollo 13 accident by the hpollo 13 Review Board. They are based on that review, on the accident investigation by the Manned Spacecraft Center (JISC) and its contractors. and on an extensive series of special tests and analyses performed by or for the Board and its Panels. Sufficient work has been done to identify and understand the nature of the malfunction and the direction which the corrective actions must take. All indi- cabions are that an electrically initiated fire in oxygen tank no. 2 in the service module ( SJI) was the cause of the accident. Accordingly, the Board has concen- trated on this tank; on its design, manufacture, test. handling. checkout, use, failure mode. and eventual effects on the rest of the spacecraft. The accident is generally understood, and the most probable cause has been identified. However, at the time of this report, some details of the accident are not completely clear. Further tests and analyses, which will be carried out under the overall direction of MSC, will continue to generate new information relatire to this accident. It is possible that this evidence may lead to conclusions differing in detail from those which can be drawn now. However, it is most unlikely Ohat fundamentally differ- ent results will be obtained. Recommendations are provided as to the general direction \vhich the correctire actions should take. Significant modifications should be made to the SJI oxygen storage tanks and related equipments. The modified hardware should go through a rigorous requalification test program. This is the responsibility of the Apollo organization in the months ahead. In reaching its findings, determinations, and recommendations, it was neces- sary for the Board to review critically the equipment and the organizational elements responsible for it. It was found that the accident was not the result of a chance malfunction in a statistical sense, but rather resulted from an iin- usual combination of mistakes, coupled with a somewhat deficient and unfor- giving design. In brief, this is what happened : (a) After assembly and acceptance testing, the oxygen tank So. 2 which flew on Bpollo 13 was shipped from Beech Aircraft Corporation to Sorth American Rockwell (KR) in apparently satisfadory condition. (b) It is now known, however, that the tank contained two protective thermo- static switches on the heater assembly, which n-ere inadequate and would sub- sequently fail during ground test operations at Kennedy Space Center (KSC). (c) In addition, it is probable that the tank contained a loosely fitting fill tube assembly. This assembly was probably displaced during subsequent han- dling, which included an incident at the prime contractor’s plant in which the tank was jarred. (a) In itself, the displaced fill