DOCSLIB.ORG

THE WACO, TEXAS, ATF RAID and CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION Management, Judgment, and the Knowledge Analytic

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
THE WACO, TEXAS, ATF RAID and CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION Management, Judgment, and the Knowledge Analytic ARPAGarrett / / March ATF RAID 2001 AND CHALLENGER DECISION THE WACO, TEXAS, ATF RAID AND CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION Management, Judgment, and the Knowledge Analytic TERENCE M. GARRETT University of Texas Pan American The author argues that the Challenger space shuttle launch disaster and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) raid on the Branch Davidian compound both offer insights for managers and orga- nization theorists as to how managers make judgments concerning their employees based on concep- tions of how the employees ought to do their work. Managers with a knowledge of “management as sci- ence” objectify the work of employees under them. Workers know their work as craft based on firsthand experience. The author argues that traditional management practice results in decision making that does not take into account the knowledge of all organizational participants, and this leads to catastro- phe. “Worker” knowledge and “management” knowledge, as well as other kinds of knowledge in orga- nizations, are frequently incompatible. This aspect is characteristic of modern organizations but tends to be accentuated during times of organizational crisis. These two cases illustrate well the problems involved in decision making within complex organizations. The Challenger space shuttle launch of January 28, 1986, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) raid in Waco, Texas, on February 28, 1993, are two infamous cases where managers made decisions that resulted in death and destruction in an arguably unnecessary fashion. To come to an understanding con- cerning the management practices of the Waco/ATF raid and Challenger launch decision case studies, I will apply Carnevale and Hummel’s “knowledge analytic.”1 In short, the knowledge analytic is concerned with multiple knowledges in modern organizations: 1. Idealism, two types: (a) the highly abstract and numerical knowledge of high-level managers and executives (pure reason), and (b) the idealism affiliated with investors and citizens; AUTHOR’S NOTE: This article was originally presented to the Issues in Policy Development and Administration Panel at the annual meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association, San Antonio, Texas, 1999. Initial Submission: May 25, 1999 Accepted: June 25, 2000 AMERICAN REVIEW OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Vol. 31 No. 1, March 2001 66-86 © 2001 Sage Publications, Inc. 66 Garrett / ATF RAID AND CHALLENGER DECISION 67 2. The scientific knowledge of managers (application of executive directives to work- ers, or “public management” as it is now constituted); and 3. Realism, two types: (a) the knowledge of workers (experiential), and (b) the knowl- edge of the consumer (recipients who use the goods and service, etc., provided by the organization). The primary tension within most organizations exists within the incompatibility of knowledges based on management science and worker realism.2 Management science as idealism needs constant revision to overcome its tendency to capture itself within its own techniques, which are insensitive to human demands. The lived experience of workers frequently defies the rational constraints placed by managers on their work. When workers present work that is at odds with the “perfect” plans put forward by managers, they tend to be ignored, at best, and/or blamed, at worst, if managements’ plans go awry.3 No total knowledge system yet conceived by idealism can ever be perfect (Carnevale & Hummel, 1996, pp. 69- 70). Imperfection is an ever-present fact of human existence. With the Waco/ATF raid and Challenger launch incidents, I will be comparing two well-known examples of management failure to illuminate in a stark fashion the incompatibility of worker and management knowledges. The two cases were selected because they highlight the crucial nexus between “managers” and the “managed” (i.e., workers). Managers cannot isolate themselves from their work and their workers.4 Worker-manager separation has been promoted in both theory and practice by classic renditions of social science, especially through many analy- ses of the Challenger launch decision. The knowledge analytic transcends these two cases and is useful in beginning to understand the complexity of decision mak- ing in human organizations. The knowledge analytic is not the theory of human organizations, but is useful for practitioners engaged in the art of management to recognize the shortcomings of management science. Both cases share important similarities that provide us (public administrators and the public) with knowledge concerning decision making that is useful in future situations. I believe that the two cases illustrate problems that are faced in many modern organizations, even though the agencies under consideration here deal with missions that involve life- and-death situations, and most other public organizations do not share the same conditions. In the analysis of both cases, I will render a historical judgment of events leading to the ill-fated launch and raid. I examine the Challenger launch decision first. I then follow with the Waco/ATF raid case and conclude with a dis- cussion of the implications of the knowledge analytic. BACKGROUND OF THE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT Numerous interpretations and explanations of the causes of the ill-fated Chal- lenger launch decision have been offered by NASA administrators, the Rogers 68 ARPA / March 2001 Commission, Morton Thiokol engineers, and academicians. All assessments of the launch point to the fact that the launch took place when it was too cold for the O-rings to seat properly, thus allowing for hot gases to escape and ignite the solid rocket boosters (SRBs). The primary question surrounding the event for govern- ment investigators and scholars alike is: Why did the launch have to take place when there was ample evidence for postponement in order not to endanger the lives of the astronauts?5 Briefly and simply, explanations for the “pressure to launch” entail the following: 1. Political pressure. Two types: (a) The Reagan administration wanted to have a public relations coup for the president while the “teacher in space” (Christa McAuliffe) was orbiting, or (b) the Soviet Union might be perceived of as gaining a military advan- tage over the United States. 2. Economic pressure. Two types: (a) The launch delays were costing money and the goodwill of budget committee chairs in Congress, or (b) competition with scientists who believed that the space shuttle program was a waste of scarce resources that would be better spent on sending unmanned space vehicles into orbit. 3. Psychological pressure. The senior NASA executives and managers were either nar- cissistic or arrogant-vindictive, identifying their personal needs with those of the organization where pride and hubris interfered with proper judgment.6 Other theorists, notably risk management theorists,7 claim that the accident was inevitable and part of the problem of human beings operating in the intricate complexities of technology. The key events leading to the ill-fated launch decision include the activities between NASA and Morton Thiokol management and Morton Thiokol engineers. There was a series of meetings between the engineers and management to deter- mine whether the Challenger should be launched under adverse weather conditions occurring at the time. The “penultimate,” or fifth, meeting, which began at 8:45 p.m. (EST) on the evening before the launch, resulted in the presentation of numer- ous charts from Roger Boisjoly, a senior scientist and member of the Seal Task Force at Thiokol, consisting of information about the history of O-ring blow-by and erosion in the SRBs of previous flights and subscale testing an static tests on the O-rings (Charles, 1996, p. 116). Boisjoly opposed the launch, and most of the data he presented supported a no-launch decision. In particular, Boisjoly, an engineer with the Structures Section of Morton Thiokol, gave testimony to the Rogers Com- mission about the launch deliberation process on February 14, 1986: Mr. Boisjoly: I first heard of the cold temperatures prior to launch at 1:00 o’clock on the day before launch, and from past experience, namely the SRM-15 launch, of which I was on the inspection team at the Cape, it just concerned me terribly. And so we started in motion to question the feasibility of launching at such a low temperature, especially when it was going to be predicted to be colder than the SRM-15 [previous cold weather shuttle launch]. Garrett / ATF RAID AND CHALLENGER DECISION 69 So we spent the rest of the day raising these questions. ...Ifelt we were very successful up until early evening, because it culminated in the recommendation not to fly, and that was the initial conclusion. I was quite please with that. ...Iwasbasically con- cerned with how temperature, low temperature, affects the timing function and the ability of the seal to seal. Low temperature—and I stated this for over a year—is away from the direction of goodness. I cannot quantify it, but I know that it is away from the direction of goodness. During the course of the evening, I also produced photos of the SRM-15, and my col- league produced photos of SRM-22. And you could visually see the difference in the amount of soot, as characterized past the O-ring seal. I was asked then on the net to support my position with data, and I couldn’t support my position with data. I had been trying to get data since October on O-ring resiliency, and I did not have it in my hand. We have had tremendous problems in trying to get a function generator and a machine to actually operate and characterize this particular pressurization function rate. So the formal part of the presentation was finished. ...Ibasically had no direct input into the final recommendation to launch and I was not polled. I think Astronaut Crippen hit the tone of the meeting exactly right on the head when he said that, the opposite was true of the way the meetings were normally conducted.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Following Are Edited Excerpts from Two Interviews Conducted with Dr
    Interviews with Dr. Wernher von Braun Editor's note: The following are edited excerpts from two interviews conducted with Dr. Wernher von Braun. Interview #1 was conducted on August 25, 1970, by Robert Sherrod while Dr. von Braun was deputy associate administrator for planning at NASA Headquarters. Interview #2 was conducted on November 17, 1971, by Roger Bilstein and John Beltz. These interviews are among those published in Before This Decade is Out: Personal Reflections on the Apollo Program, (SP-4223, 1999) edited by Glen E. Swanson, whick is vailable on-line at http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4223/sp4223.htm on the Web. Interview #1 In the Apollo Spacecraft Chronology, you are quoted as saying "It is true that for a long time we were not in favor of lunar orbit rendezvous. We favored Earth orbit rendezvous." Well, actually even that is not quite correct, because at the outset we just didn't know which route [for Apollo to travel to the Moon] was the most promising. We made an agreement with Houston that we at Marshall would concentrate on the study of Earth orbit rendezvous, but that did not mean we wanted to sell it as our preferred scheme. We weren't ready to vote for it yet; our study was meant to merely identify the problems involved. The agreement also said that Houston would concentrate on studying the lunar rendezvous mode. Only after both groups had done their homework would we compare notes. This agreement was based on common sense. You don't start selling your scheme until you are convinced that it is superior.
    [Show full text]
  • Apollo 13 Mission Review
    APOLLO 13 MISSION REVIEW HEAR& BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES UNITED STATES SENATE NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS SECOR’D SESSION JUR’E 30, 1970 Printed for the use of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 47476 0 WASHINGTON : 1970 COMMITTEE ON AEROKAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES CLINTON P. ANDERSON, New Mexico, Chairman RICHARD B. RUSSELL, Georgia MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Washington CARL T. CURTIS, Nebraska STUART SYMINGTON, bfissouri MARK 0. HATFIELD, Oregon JOHN STENNIS, Mississippi BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona STEPHEN M.YOUNG, Ohio WILLIAM B. SAXBE, Ohio THOJfAS J. DODD, Connecticut RALPH T. SMITH, Illinois HOWARD W. CANNON, Nevada SPESSARD L. HOLLAND, Florida J4MES J. GEHRIG,Stad Director EVERARDH. SMITH, Jr., Professional staffMember Dr. GLENP. WILSOS,Professional #tad Member CRAIGVOORHEES, Professional Staff Nember WILLIAMPARKER, Professional Staff Member SAMBOUCHARD, Assistant Chief Clerk DONALDH. BRESNAS,Research Assistant (11) CONTENTS Tuesday, June 30, 1970 : Page Opening statement by the chairman, Senator Clinton P. Anderson-__- 1 Review Board Findings, Determinations and Recommendations-----_ 2 Testimony of- Dr. Thomas 0. Paine, Administrator of NASA, accompanied by Edgar M. Cortright, Director, Langley Research Center and Chairman of the dpollo 13 Review Board ; Dr. Charles D. Har- rington, Chairman, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel ; Dr. Dale D. Myers, Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, and Dr. Rocco A. Petrone, hpollo Director -___________ 21, 30 Edgar 11. Cortright, Chairman, hpollo 13 Review Board-------- 21,27 Dr. Dale D. Mvers. Associate Administrator for Manned SDace 68 69 105 109 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIOSS 1. Internal coinponents of oxygen tank So. 2 ---_____-_________________ 22 2.
    [Show full text]
  • Apollo Over the Moon: a View from Orbit (Nasa Sp-362)
    chl APOLLO OVER THE MOON: A VIEW FROM ORBIT (NASA SP-362) Chapter 1 - Introduction Harold Masursky, Farouk El-Baz, Frederick J. Doyle, and Leon J. Kosofsky [For a high resolution picture- click here] Objectives [1] Photography of the lunar surface was considered an important goal of the Apollo program by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The important objectives of Apollo photography were (1) to gather data pertaining to the topography and specific landmarks along the approach paths to the early Apollo landing sites; (2) to obtain high-resolution photographs of the landing sites and surrounding areas to plan lunar surface exploration, and to provide a basis for extrapolating the concentrated observations at the landing sites to nearby areas; and (3) to obtain photographs suitable for regional studies of the lunar geologic environment and the processes that act upon it. Through study of the photographs and all other arrays of information gathered by the Apollo and earlier lunar programs, we may develop an understanding of the evolution of the lunar crust. In this introductory chapter we describe how the Apollo photographic systems were selected and used; how the photographic mission plans were formulated and conducted; how part of the great mass of data is being analyzed and published; and, finally, we describe some of the scientific results. Historically most lunar atlases have used photointerpretive techniques to discuss the possible origins of the Moon's crust and its surface features. The ideas presented in this volume also rely on photointerpretation. However, many ideas are substantiated or expanded by information obtained from the huge arrays of supporting data gathered by Earth-based and orbital sensors, from experiments deployed on the lunar surface, and from studies made of the returned samples.
    [Show full text]
  • Challenger Accident in a Rogers Commission Hearing at KSC
    CHALLENGER By Arnold D. Aldrich Former Program Director, NSTS August 27, 2008 Recently, I was asked by John Shannon, the current Space Shuttle Program Manager, to comment on my experiences, best practices, and lessons learned as a former Space Shuttle program manager. This project is part of a broader knowledge capture and retention initiative being conducted by the NASA Johnson Space Center in an “oral history” format. One of the questions posed was to comment on some of the most memorable moments of my time as a Space Shuttle program manager. Without question, the top two of these were the launch of Challenger on STS‐51L on January 28, 1986, and the launch of Discovery on STS‐26 on September 29, 1988. Background The tragic launch and loss of Challenger occurred over 22 years ago. 73 seconds into flight the right hand Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) broke away from the External Tank (ET) as a result of a burn‐ through in its aft most case to case joint and the Space Shuttle vehicle disintegrated resulting in the total loss of the vehicle and crew. The events leading up to that launch are still vivid in my mind and deeply trouble me to this day, as I know they always will. This paper is not about what occurred during the countdown leading up to the launch – those facts and events were thoroughly investigated and documented by the Rogers Commission. Rather, what I can never come to closure with is how we, as a launch team, and I, as one of the leaders of that team, allowed the launch to occur.
    [Show full text]
  • Nasa Johnson Space Center Oral History Project Oral History Transcript
    NASA JOHNSON SPACE CENTER ORAL HISTORY PROJECT ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT FAROUK EL-BAZ INTERVIEWED BY REBECCA WRIGHT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS – NOVEMBER 2, 2009 WRIGHT: Today is November 2, 2009. This oral history interview is being conducted with Dr. Farouk El-Baz in Boston, Massachusetts, for the Johnson Space Center Oral History Project. Interviewer is Rebecca Wright, assisted by Jennifer Ross-Nazzal. We certainly would like to start by telling you thank you. We know you‘re a very busy person with a very busy schedule, so thank you for finding time for us today. EL-BAZ: You‘re welcome to come here, because this is part of the history of the United States. It‘s important that we all chip in. WRIGHT: We‘re glad to hear that. We know your work with NASA began as early as 1967 when you became employed by Bellcomm [Incorporated]. Could you share with us how you learned about that opportunity and how you made that transition into becoming an employee there? EL-BAZ: Just the backdrop, I finished my PhD here in the US. First job offer was from Germany. It was in June 1964; I was teaching there [at the University of Heidelberg] until December 1965. I went to Egypt then, tried to get a job in geology. I was unable for a whole year, so I came back to the US as an immigrant in the end of 1966. For the first three months of 1967, I began to search for a job. When I arrived in the winter, most of the people that I knew 2 November 2009 1 Johnson Space Center Oral History Project Farouk El-Baz were at universities, and most universities had hired the people that would teach during the year.
    [Show full text]
  • Killer Corsairs How the Navy Got Them in Line
    JAY LENO’S STASH OF AIRPLANE ENGINES JULY 2021 Vought F4U Corsair KILLER CORSAIRS HOW THE NAVY GOT THEM IN LINE Asteroid Threat A Preemptive Strike p.34 AIRSPACEMAG.COM APOLLO 15 ● AT 50 FIRST CARON THE MOON CREDIT 48 AIR & SPACE airspacemag.com BEFORE APOLLO15, ASTRONAUTS COULD EXPLORE ONLY AS FAR AS THEY COULD WALK. ■ BY EARL SWIFT WHEN APOLLO 14 landed astronauts on the moon for the third time in February 1971, it was met with a week-long yawn by the press and the public. The TV networks carried live coverage of the launch and paid some mind to the long translunar coast, where misfortune had called on Apollo 13, but offered only occasional snippets of Alan Shepard and Ed Mitchell’s time on the lunar surface. News from Fra Mauro was dutifully passed along by the country’s newspapers, but with palpable lack of enthusiasm. America had grown jaded about moon missions, it seemed. But fact was, the second and third lunar landings made for lousy TV. To viewers, they looked pretty much the same as Apollo 11: The astronauts were on foot. The TV camera was stationary and positioned near the lun175 Excerpted and condensed ar module. Its low-resolution footage captured the crew from Across the Airless Wilds: The Lunar Rover and bouncing around base camp, doing nothing especially stir- the Triumph of the Final ring. In fact, Apollo 14’s single made-for-TV moment is Moon Landings, by Earl the only thing many older Americans remember about it: Swift. HarperCollins, 2021. Alan Shepard’s golf shot that went for “miles and miles” in the weak lunar gravity.
    [Show full text]
  • Spacewalk Database
    Purchaser First Inscribed First ID Name Purchaser Last Name Name Inscribed Last Name Biographic_Infomation 01558 Beth / Forrest Goodwin Ron & Margo Borrup In 1957 CURTISS S. (ARMY) ARMSTRONG became a member of America's Space Team. His career began with the launch of Explorer I and Apollo programs. His tireless dedication has contributed to America's future. He is truly 00022 Cheryl Ann Armstrong Curtiss S. Armstrong an American Space Pioneer. Science teacher and aerospace educator since 00023 Thomas J. Sarko Thomas J. Sarko 1975. McDonnell Douglas 25 Years, AMF Board of 00024 Lowell Grissom Lowell Grissom Directors Joined KSC in 1962 in the Director's Protocol Office. Responsible for the meticulous details for the arrival, lodging, and banquets for Kings, Queens and other VIP worldwide and their comprehensive tours of KSC with top KSC 00025 Major Jay M. Viehman Jay Merle Viehman Personnel briefing at each poi WWII US Army Air Force 1st Lt. 1943-1946. US Civil Service 1946-1972 Engineer. US Army Ballistic Missile Launch Operations. Redstone, Jupiter, Pershing. 1st Satellite (US), Mercury 1st Flight Saturn, Lunar Landing. Retired 1972 from 00026 Robert F. Heiser Robert F. Heiser NASA John F. Kennedy S Involved in Air Force, NASA, National and Commercial Space Programs since 1959. Commander Air Force Space Division 1983 to 1986. Director Kennedy Space Center - 1986 to 1 Jan 1992. Vice President, Lockheed Martin 00027 Gen. Forrest S. McCartney Forrest S. McCartney Launch Operations. Involved in the operations of the first 41 manned missions. Twenty years with NASA. Ten years 00028 Paul C. Donnelly Paul C.
    [Show full text]
  • Building for the Future
    The Space Congress® Proceedings 1983 (20th) Space: The Next Twenty Years Apr 1st, 8:00 AM Building for the Future Rocco Petrone Assistant Director for Program Management, Kennedy Space Center, NASA Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/space-congress-proceedings Scholarly Commons Citation Petrone, Rocco, "Building for the Future" (1983). The Space Congress® Proceedings. 3. https://commons.erau.edu/space-congress-proceedings/proceedings-1983-20th/session-iv/3 This Event is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Space Congress® Proceedings by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. "Building for the Future" First Space Congress Lt. Col. Rocco Petrone Assistant Director for Program Management Kennedy Space Center, NASA April 20, 1964 Thank you, Mr. Hagan: It is an honor and a challenge for me to speak to this distinguished gruup representing the space community and to undertake an extremely ditiicult task - which is to attempt to substitute for Dr. Kurt Debus, Director oi the John F. Kennedy Space Center, NASA. Dr. Debus asked me to extend his sincere regrets. You may know that Mrs. Debus recently underwent major surgery in Nashville. While she is recuperating nicely, Dr. Debus could not speak to you at this time. Let me add a hearty welcome from NASA to that of John Hagan, the Canaveral Council of Technical Societies, and General Davis. It is very appropriate, of course, that the First Space Congress has convened at the door of the nation 1 s spaceport.
    [Show full text]
  • 1967 Spaceport News Summary
    1967 Spaceport News Summary Followup From the Last Spaceport News Summary Of note, the 1963, 1964 and 1965 Spaceport News were issued weekly. Starting with the July 7, 1966, issue, the Spaceport News went to an every two week format. The Spaceport News kept the two week format until the last issue on February 24, 2014. Spaceport Magazine superseded the Spaceport News in April 2014. Spaceport Magazine was a monthly issue, until the last and final issue, Jan./Feb. 2020. The first issue of Spaceport News was December 13, 1962. The two 1962 issues and the issues from 1996 forward are at this website, including the Spaceport Magazine. All links were working at the time I completed this Spaceport News Summary. In the March 3, 1966, Spaceport News, there was an article about tool cribs. The Spaceport News article mentioned “…“THE FIRST of 10 tool cribs to be installed and operated at Launch Complex 39 has opened…”. The photo from the article is below. Page 1 Today, Material Service Center 31 is on the 1st floor of the VAB, on the K, L side (west side) of the building. If there were 10 tool cribs, as mentioned in the 1966 article, does anyone know the story behind the numbering scheme? Tool crib #75? From The January 6, 1967, Spaceport News From page 1, “Launch Team Personnel Named”. A portion of the article reads “Key launch team personnel for the manned flight of Apollo/Saturn 204 have been announced. The 204 mission, to be launched from KSC’s Complex 34, will be the first in which astronauts will fly the three-man Apollo spacecraft.
    [Show full text]
  • DOC.NO--Moo"" John F
    APOLLQ 5 POST-LAUNCH PRESS CONFERENCE SATURN HISTORY DOCUMENT Univeoityof Alabama Research Institute History of Science G. Technology G~UP $. -,-7. ' Press Site #2 --- ----..-DOC.NO--moo"" John F. Kennedy Space Center National Aeronautics and Space Adrr;inistGijon Monday, January 22, 1968 Major Gci12raI Samuel C. Pllillips, Director, &polio Program Office, Office of Manrred Space iqki, Fl - - NASA Rocco A. Pettone, Director of Laanch Oyoetions, Kennedy Space Center, NASA Colonel Will ian Teir, Manager, Saturn I/iB Program Office, Marsha!! Space Flig!?: Ccnier, NASA Mr. King: The gentlemen from my right, Bill Teir, who is the Saturn IB Project Manager from the Marshall Space flight Center; General Sam Phillips, who is the Apollo Program Manager, Gffice of Manned Space Flight, NASA Headq~rarters; Rocco Petrone, who is Director of Launch Opesa- tions for Kennedy Space Center, also Launch Director for the mission. General Phillips. Gen. Phil lips: Ladies and gentlemen, it's a pleasure to be back hare again. Apollo 5 was successfully launched at 5:48:08 Eastern Standard Time. The performance of the launch vehicle, in terms of the times of the burns, was completely nominal and you can foll~wthe time lines as they were given in the press kit. The shutdown of the S-IVE occurred on time at 9:58 after the launch and orbital insertion was at 10:08. The orbit planned war; 88 by 118, The actual orbit was 87.6 by 119.5. The velocity at orbital insertion was 25,685 feet per second. The sequence, up until the time we left the Flight Director's circuit a few minutes ago, had taken us oiler Carnarvon, where the deployment of the Spacecraft LM Adapter panels was confirmed and the sequence that, was the separation of the Lunar Modtile f.r.oro the booster occurred and was confirmed.
    [Show full text]
  • Nasa's Exploration Initiative: Status and Issues Hearing Committee on Science and Technology House of Representatives
    NASA’S EXPLORATION INITIATIVE: STATUS AND ISSUES HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION APRIL 3, 2008 Serial No. 110–90 Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology ( Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.science.house.gov U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 41–471PS WASHINGTON : 2008 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:02 Aug 02, 2008 Jkt 041471 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 C:\WORKD\SA08\040308\41471 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1 COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chairman JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois RALPH M. HALL, Texas EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR., LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California Wisconsin MARK UDALL, Colorado LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas DAVID WU, Oregon DANA ROHRABACHER, California BRIAN BAIRD, Washington ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland BRAD MILLER, North Carolina VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma NICK LAMPSON, Texas JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona W. TODD AKIN, Missouri JERRY MCNERNEY, California JO BONNER, Alabama LAURA RICHARDSON, California TOM FEENEY, Florida PAUL KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon BOB INGLIS, South Carolina STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington JIM MATHESON, Utah MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas MIKE ROSS, Arkansas MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky PHIL GINGREY, Georgia RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri BRIAN P.
    [Show full text]
  • + Sept. 15, 2006
    September 15, 2006 Vol. 45, No. 18 Spaceport News John F. Kennedy Space Center - America’s gateway to the universe http://www.nasa.gov/centers/kennedy/news/snews/spnews_toc.html Atlantis, STS-115 return to space station construction Landing scheduled delayed previous attempts. “It’s been almost four years, for Sept. 20 at KSC two return-to-flight missions, a tremendous amount of work by oments before the launch thousands of individuals to get the of Space Shuttle Atlantis shuttle program back to where we Mon STS-115, Commander are right now and that’s on the Brent Jett expressed the crew’s verge of restarting the station excitement about the mission from assembly sequence,” Jett said. his seat inside the orbiter. The fuel cut-off sensor system, “We’re confident over the next which delayed Atlantis’ scheduled few weeks, and few years for that Sept. 8 launch, performed normally matter, that NASA’s going to prove the following day. The engine cut- to our nation, to our partners and off sensor is one of four inside the our friends around the world that it liquid hydrogen section of the was worth the wait and the shuttle’s external fuel tank. sacrifice,” Jett said. “We’re ready Atlantis’ flight resumes to get to work.” construction of the station. The Atlantis and its six-member shuttle and station crews will work crew are docked at the Interna- with ground teams to install a tional Space Station after lifting girder-like structure, known as the off from Kennedy Space Center at P3/P4 truss, aboard the station.
    [Show full text]