Captured States in the Balkans ZAGREB BEOGRAD SARAJEVO Skopje Tirana

Home , Balkans, Corruption in Serbia, EURALIUS, Particracy, State capture, Talat Xhaferi

Issue 3 September 2017

SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE captured states in the Balkans ZAGREB BEOGRAD SARAJEVO Skopje TiranA

Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung

Fostering democracy and upholding human rights, taking action to prevent the destruction of the global ecosystem, advancing equality between women and men, securing peace through conflict prevention in crisis zones, and defending the freedom of individuals against excessive state and economic power – these are the objectives that drive the ideas and actions of the Heinrich Böll Foundation. We maintain close ties to the German Green Party (Alliance 90/The Greens) and as a think tank for green visions and projects, we are part of an international network encompassing well over 100 partner projects in approximately 60 countries. The Heinrich Böll Foundation works independently and nurtures a spirit of intellectual openness. We maintain a world wide network with currently 30 international offices. Our work in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia concentrates on the democratization process, political education, and environmental protection and sustainable development. We support and open public fora about topical and marginalized social-political issues and we enable networking of local and international actors close to the Green values. contents

captured state in the Balkans introduction 2 state capture in the Balkans – l’état c’est nous! Marion Kraske 5 introductory note – peculiarities of state capture Srđan Dvornik

who captures what? 7 kidnapped state or state sponsored kidnapping Žarko Puhovski

modes and instruments of state capture 10 BiH’s un-reformable public administration – an instrument of state capture Bodo Weber 15 dismantling Bosnia and Herzegovina’s fractured authoritarianism Jasmin Mujanović 20 state capture: how to save the Macedonian democratic consolidation and EU enlargement Zhidas Daskalovski 26 judiciary as a mechanism of state capture: external actors, party patronage and informality Arolda Elbasani 31 Serbia: hijacked and appropriated state Đorđe Pavićević 35 state capture in the Western Balkans Leon Runje

culture and media 40 ethno-geo-political entrepreneurs and the creation of internal homelands in Bosnia and Herzegovina Sead Turčalo 46 impotent media and potent business-political oligarchy Helena Puljiz 50 uneducation policy: captured education Nenad Veličković

experiences with captured states 53 successfully maintained obstructions Zlatko Dizdarević 56 local captured state – an empirical view Nives Miošić-Lisjak 59 the story of a party’s attempt to prevent democratic alternation of power Jovan Bliznakovski 2 introduction

state capture in the Balkans – l’état c’est nous!

Marion Kraske

removed the safety bar and opened the door The international community, of the building – thereby opening the way especially the EU an its member for the most brutal attack on state institu- states, seems clumsy and even tions in the region in years. over-burdened in light of the This approach was only the latest proof recklessly proceeding patronage that the party of long-serving former Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, along with his sup- networks in the Balkans: The ap- porters, had made it a principle to put them- proach of local ownership which selves above the state. L´état – c’est nous! has been propagated for a long When, like after the parliamentary elec- while is dangerously ignoring the tions in December 2016, there is the pros- real balance of power in those pect of loss of power through democratic means, this power is defended – by all avail- countries. How could citizens able means. The ruling clique surrounding deal with very diffuse networks, Gruevski previously declared the state to be if there are no intact correctives, private property, seized its institutions and no free, no independent justice? degraded them to compliant instruments. The countless abuses of power and office have been documented very well through The attackers came in flocks, they stormed, numerous recorded telephone calls, reveal- some of them masked, the session hall of ing the criminal workings to the public in the Parliament in Skopje. They staged their 2015. attack in the manner of hooligans, one par- State capture by well-connected politi- liament member was pulled by her hair cians and their wide-ranging supporter net- and hurled like a human catapult. The thug works has been far reaching in other Balkan squads chose their victims cautiously: social states as well: In Bosnia and Herzegovina, democrats and members of the Albanian the three nationalistic parties are dividing minority group. After the act of violence, the country painstakingly into three influ- Zoran Zaev, former leader of the opposition, ence zones. The resources, state-owned now Prime Minister, was bleeding from his enterprises, energy providers, banks. And, head, the Albanian MP Talat Xhaferi, who not least: the education system. Every- had been elected Speaker of the Parlia- thing is appropriated and politicised along ment, was dragged like an animal through ethnic-nationalistic dividing lines. There the building and severely injured. His health is almost no practical politics, the concern was a matter of serious concern for days. for the public interest is almost inexistent. A few days after the attack, footage cir- Instead, party leaders claim for themselves culating online verified that the attackers and their entourage increasingly large Marion Kraske had been let into Parliament by members pieces of the cake. Director of the Sarajevo Office of the VMRO-DPMNE party, the party that While 50% of the population remain of the Heinrich Böll Foundation (BiH, Macedonia, Albania). has been in power for years: phone calls unemployed, the infrastructure has not Sarajevo, September 2017. had been made and, shortly after, someone been upgraded since the 1970s, 22 years introduction 3

What is lacking is the non-negotiable conditionality when demanding and securing the necessary reforms (especially in the area of the rule of law and anti-corruption measures) on one side. On the other side, an uncompromising support and revaluation of precisely those change agents has to be realised, who are really interested in democratisation: Those civil society actors who have been largely neglected by international actors and left alone in the battle against the corrupt networks.

since the war ended there are still no state- ance have hardly been implemented. In level ministries of education, cultural affairs point of fact, the concern is with using state and agriculture (in a country with up to 60% resources in an unhindered manner and rural areas), and the health care system veg- with protecting these all so beneficial door- etates at the level of developing countries, ways for friends and family members. Bosnia´s elites have been enriching them- In such oppressive power structures selves for years through their unrestricted there is barely space for those defining access to resources. themselves through performance or creativ- The administrative apparatus thereby ity. Thus, it is precisely this endemic party functions, like everywhere in the region, patronage, the distribution of posts based as the toolkit for the meticulous consolida- on connections, that is driving hundreds tion of power: The one allocating jobs in a of thousands of well educated and trained country where there is normally no work people out of those countries: A mass exo- available, creates an army of subordinate dus is already blazing its trail towards West- supporters, who all profit from the system ern Europe, where, in the best case, what of party patronage. In this way, a sort of neo- counts is the individual work performance, feudalism has developed, in which citizens the know-how, and to a lesser extent belong- do not count, only the will of the big clans, ing to a certain group or party. which got rich already during the Balkan Despite all differences of the political wars through smuggling and para-state framework, the political actors of the region activities. do have one thing in common: Their claim In Serbia, the ruling SPP under Alek- to power is radical, their approach repres- sandar Vucic created a powerful system sive and even authoritarian. Reforms are that absorbed state institutions and state- blocked extensively, critics declared ene- owned enterprises. In this universe there is mies of the state, civilian actors, artists and no space for those who are not loyal to the journalists denounced and marginalised. party. Opposition and civilian actors are, The highest goal is to cement the illiberal in spite of all the pro-European lip service, conditions. Because the political actors rigorously combated, criminalised, and, not know one thing: The more democratic least, threatened. reforms take effect, the more the state, espe- In Albania, the justice system serves as cially the judicial system, moves towards a flourishing source of income for judges functionality, the more dangerous this and public prosecutors and as a devoted becomes for one’s power base, the bigger power consolidation instrument for politics the possibility becomes that one’s actions – so far, all major cases against high-ranking are prosecuted – like in the case of former politicians have been either obstructed or Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, who brought to a standstill by judicial represent- was sentenced to a long prison sentence atives. The judicial system does not function because of corruption. as an autonomous element of the state sys- Against this backdrop, the utterance of tem, but as a friendly accomplice of corrupt political or diplomatic representatives from and criminal civil servants. Berlin to Brussels, which has been repeated The conditions in the Balkans prove time and again, according to which the clearly that the local political caste does not political elites in the Balkans must have have anything in common with politics in "an interest in a fast EU integration," seems the traditional sense: It is not concerned oddly far from reality. Why should groups, with solving social, economic or ecological who have fluid connections to informal and issues, or with increasing general prosper- criminal networks, who define themselves ity – the guiding principles of good govern- solely based on power, whose resonating 4 introduction

environment is the clan or the party, who a dangerous process of backsliding and a have created a land of milk and honey for repeated radicalisation. themselves at the expense of the general While the EU has been dealing with public, have an interest in democratisation internal problems, these political actors, processes, which would restrict precisely who for good publicity like to praise them- this power of the unhindered exploitation selves in discussions as reformers, have of the state system? been accepted as equals for a long time. In order to secure their influence, the These hijackers of state systems have used elites have been making use of old recipes: this to benefit themselves, and, instead of Nationalistic narratives are disseminated, implementing reforms, have strengthened friend-and-foe schemata fuelled purpose- anti-liberal and authoritarian tendencies. fully, in order to divert from one´s failure on Not seldom have the members of the the one side (all the countries are still fac- international community believed this mis- ing high unemployment rates and sweeping conception that this superficial stability, poverty), and on the other, in order to goad the created "stabilocracies" – as a counter- voters and rally them behind themselves. model to true democratisation – could be a Who, like in Macedonia’s case, are warn- recipe for success for the sustainable estab- ing the VMRO-DPMNE of enemies of the lishment of peace in the region. "Macedonian cause", who, like in Bosnia, Quite the contrary has been the case: are perpetuating the victim myth and blam- The non-functioning state systems, the judi- ing other ethnic groups for their misfortune, cial systems barely deserving of the name, who are making calculated use of the divide created new space for actors like Turkey, et impera principle: Thus, a perpetual sys- Saudi-Arabia, Russia and others, going after tem of fear is kept alive. This approach is their geo-strategic goals in the region, which still successful and repeatedly secures the are undoubtedly diametrically opposed to dominant parties victory, not least because the tenets of the European Union. the media landscape is also dysfunctional A change in the attitude of the EU and and seized by parties and politics, and an its member states is necessary: What is objective, balanced media coverage of the lacking is non-negotiable conditionality true issues in the country is truly rare. when demanding and securing the neces- The international community, espe- sary reforms (especially in the area of the cially the EU and its member states, seems rule of law and anti-corruption measures) clumsy and even over-burdened in light of on the one hand, while, on the other, there the recklessly proceeding patronage net- has to be uncompromising support for, works in the Balkans: The approach of local and revaluation of precisely those agents of ownership which has been propagated for a change who are truly interested in democ- long while is dangerously ignoring the real ratisation: Those civil society actors who balance of power in those countries. have been largely neglected by international How could citizens deal with very dif- actors and left alone in the battle against the fuse networks, if there are no functioning corrupt networks. correctives, no free, no independent justice? The Heinrich Böll Foundation, which Or, to put it another way: Who has the power supports democratisation processes in over to confront them in a system, in which the 60 countries worldwide, is convinced that a last corner of society is permeated with the democratic renewal in the Balkans can only influence of parties and clients, where even be achieved by a strong civil society. So far, the simplest posts like kindergarten director a strategic partnership with civil society are allocated by the dominant power appa- actors is lacking. Should they be ignored in ratus, the political parties and their leaders? the future as well, and be left alone in their The restrained approach of the EU has struggle with the elites, even the last brave mainly effectuated one thing in the last few ones will leave the region discouraged, in years: That the reform-resistant elites were order to offer their expertise in some other able to further widen their sphere of influ- place. Then, the reform-resistant power ence. Furthermore, laboriously achieved structures would gain even more space to reform successes were made void. Thereby, hamper any further progress. in the past few years the region underwent introductory note 5 introductory note – peculiarities of state capture

Srđan Dvornik

The metaphor of ‘captured state’ comes In most cases, however, the most pain- handy as a description of the developments ful changes took place in the societies. Civic that have followed since the beginning of societies in a strictly modern sense had not the post-communist transition. While these even existed under communist rule, because changes are generally referred to as ‘demo- development of autonomous horizontal cratic changes’ or ‘transition to democracy’, relations between people, groups, organi- there is a common conviction that demo- sations or enterprises was not allowed. cratic systems in these countries are defec- Hence, with the formal establishment of tive and do not provide for responsible and democracy, the structure of political power accountable politics. Even at first glance, it did not encounter an autonomous ‘sphere’ seems that there are particular groups which of interests, opinions, or socio-economic exercise decisive influence on the formally forces, but a mass of people still dependent democratic systems. However, it should be on state mediation and prone to collectivist kept in mind that the notion of ‘captured identification and authoritarian ideologies. state’ emerged in a specific context, wherein By the same token, the formally pro- World Bank experts were looking for the claimed liberalisation of markets and pri- best way to understand the relations in the vatisation of economies was not carried Russian society and politics in the 1990-ies. out either by selling economic resources to Unlike the collapsed state in that country, independent investors (national or inter- the countries of our region display certain national) or transferring ownership to important differences, which entail differ- employees, but by means of politically con- ent relations between state and society. trolled allocation of economic resources to A good thing about metaphors is that politically loyal beneficiaries. Although such they – being themselves the kind of expres- transfers were formally executed as sales, sion that is based on the transfer of meaning the property was undervalued, new owners – can be further transferred. While the met- were often allowed to pay with great delays, aphor of ‘captured state’ originally referred to generate debts using the newly acquired to newly-emerged holders of economic property as collateral, or simply to resell it power (‘oligarchs’) who used that power and flee abroad. In short, what we nowadays to bribe lawmakers into creating a system call cronyism, clientelism etc. was built into which suited them, we are dealing here with the foundations of the new system. Politi- states which stand in different positions to cal elites remained dominant, and with- their respective societies. In some of them, out independent societal power, political owing to transitional turmoil or war, the opposition remained weak. The prevalence state system did collapse, and was restored of nationalism and authoritarian identifica- on a new basis. In others, electoral victories tion with national political leaders further left in power old parties under new names, reinforced this dominance. Therefore, the endowing their dominance with new legiti- independence of media is doubtful, and macy, or installed new parties which utilised autonomy of the public still precarious. On the old structures of dominance. the opposite side, professional standards in governmental agencies are still subordinate 6 introductory note

to the whims of those with political power, elites. Although nationalist legitimation is and different branches of power do not pro- still strong, corruption and misuse of power vide horizontal responsibility. are perceived as illegitimate in the national To wit, it would be misleading to view public opinion, and there are obvious lim- the ‘captured states’ in the postcommunist its to what people are willing to withstand. part of the world as a mere deviation from Although certain forces still enjoy an inap- the democratic models developed in the propriate level of influence on political West, such as polyarchy, as though the same structures (which justifies the use of the basic conditions existed in these societies – term ‘state capture’), the relations are not from economic autonomy to a civic and par- immutable and stable. ticipative political culture. However, some The analyses presented in this issue of degree of pluralism, as well as the gradual Perspectives show a wide variety of ways integration into international associations how tenets of democracy and rule of law are (most notably the European Union), have distorted or even disabled in different coun- worked in the opposite direction. Civil soci- tries. Whether these countries will converge ety has become more and more assertive to some common standard of pluralism and and open, indeed, autonomous socio-eco- democracy is not yet apparent, but a clear nomic interests are emerging, and the inte- understanding of the current relations and gration into international bodies imposes processes will hopefully be of aid to actors some rules of the game which limit the interested in such development. arbitrary power of the dominant national kidnapped state or state sponsored kidnapping who captures what? 7 who captures what? kidnapped state or state sponsored kidnapping

Žarko Puhovski

The (post-communist) state has effectively colonised (the emerging) society, and that is the reason why political influence on society, especially the economy, was the problem, rather than the other way round (as tirelessly expected by both contemporary liberals and Marxists). Even more, such a "materialist" approach missed the very essence of the transitional countries and was, logically, unable to see the real problems, let alone suggest the solutions.

The phrase ‘state capture’ – first used by ethnic) groups enjoy (economic, political) the World Bank some two decades ago to privileges awarded by modes of state-run describe the situation in central Asian coun- distribution (including different types of tries making the transition from Soviet com- immunity). munism – became rather popular as a tool However, such a framework of interpre- for describing many socio-political situa- tation contains an important – maybe even tions. In the meaning that has developed crucial – ideological element. The point of since the first instances of its use, "state departure is namely an implicit belief that capture occurs when the ruling elite and/or such a condition means a clear distinction powerful businessmen manipulate policy compared to the ideal notion of the state formation and influence the emerging rules (basically, the technical apparatus of politi- of the game (including laws and economic cal power, according to the original liberal regulations) to their own advantage" ( Anne theory). Although this is not in doubt, the Lugon-Moulin, Deputy Head of the CIS problem begins with the other part of the Countries Division, Swiss Agency for Devel- ideological equation; with the presupposi- opment and Cooperation, Federal Depart- tion that such a state of affairs also stands ment of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland, http:// in clear contrast to the really existing types f3magazine.unicri.it/?p=402). of state. That there are political systems in The distinguishing factor in such a which there are no (social, political and framework is in the systematic presump- other) privileges built into the foundations tion that it is merit, rather than the rela- of the given state. In addition, such a notion tionship with the ruler, that determines the is, in principle, not acceptable for numer- distribution of resources when states have ous theoretical approaches – starting with developed beyond tribal organisation (as it the traditional liberal, and many versions of is, for instance, stated in Francis Fukuyama’s the Marxist interpretation of political affairs. Political Order and Political Decay: From the If the concept of state power has for Industrial Revolution to the Globalisation of Locke "no other end but preservation" Democracy, 2014). Of course, state capture (Two Treatises of Government, P. Laslett Žarko Puhovski is characterised by completely diverse situ- (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Professor of philosophy of ations in which specific (social, political, Press, 1988, 2.135), it means, among other politics, Zagreb 8 who captures what? kidnapped state or state sponsored kidnapping

implications, that state power guarantees given social relations, and ultimately that An even bigger obstacle for the it protects the given mode of distribution local (internal) imperialism of of wealth and power. In the very classical the post-communist states, those notion, state power is hence already cap- in Europe in the first place, was tured by the prevailing interests (of owners, concretely). the pressure of "European" (i.e. Starting from such a type of analysis EU) integration. It was one of (and revolutionary programme, of course), the promises given by (almost) Marx and Engels simply (and simplistically) all the post-Yugoslav (or -Soviet) understand the (bourgeois) state as "essen- political elites, and the promise tially a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" ("The that was taken very seriously Communist Manifesto", International Pub- by the population. During the lishers, Moscow 1948, p. 11). In other words, admission process, enthusiasm there is nothing really new in the (post) constantly weakened in the modern understanding of the captured societies of the candidate states. state. What occurs in the post-communist societies is "only" that the major political However, the political will of the processes are more primitive, and conse- citizens was strong enough to quently more transparent (in a perverted make all the escape strategies version of famous ла́сностьг introduced by Gorbachev virtually impossible and, one af- in 1986) than in societies with more institu- ter another, the post-communist tional experience in hiding dominant social countries joined European Union, interests in their political influence. However, the legacy of the real existing or, at least, accepted to partici- socialist regimes is an indisputable birth- pate in the imposed process of mark of all the post-communist countries. accession. The totalitarian aspect of this ancien régime heritage pre-formed all the democratic ter- minological tools that were so fashionable, surplus dealt with traditional social aspects especially in the first phase of the so-called of many people’s lives, primarily the realm transition. Nevertheless, systematically of values at play in the everyday life of the understood, this heritage meant that the country. The ideology of ethnic nationalism, essential modern césure between society which undoubtedly came out victorious in and community (represented by the state) the post-communist competition of weltan- cannot be analytically useful. Consequently, schauungs, made this imperialistic type of state and society had to be (re)constructed state apparatus not only possible, but even before internal differences could be applied. more than that: it made it successful. In a hasty development that occurred The (post-communist) state has effec- after the fall of the old regime, most actors tively colonised (the emerging) society, and were reasonably satisfied with the very fact that is the reason why political influence that new, democratically legitimated insti- on society, especially the economy, was the tutions were built, laws adopted, personnel problem, rather than the other way round changed (more or less). Unfortunately (but (as tirelessly expected by both contempo- somewhat logically) the next lesson was one rary liberals and Marxists). Even more, such of the essential formality of the legal frame- a "materialist" approach missed the very work and the open possibilities in which it essence of the transitional countries and can be misused (or, rather, used) in various was, logically, unable to see the real prob- ways. Nothing new there but the shadow of lems, let alone suggest the solutions. the totalitarian past. Contrary to the liberal A decade or so after the triumphant tradition of the developed democracies, colonisation of (ethno-nationalistically cultivated before the historical emergence primed) societies in the nineties of the of totalitarianism (or imposed on countries twentieth century, new governments were like Germany, Italy, or Japan by the victorious put under pressure from two sides. From forces after World War II), post-communist the slowly emancipating society, on one systems allowed those who had the power (internal) side, and from the daily increas- to play in a much wider field than that of the ing pressure of the globalised (or regional) traditional political "sphere". This political integration, on the other (external) side. kidnapped state or state sponsored kidnapping who captures what? 9

Mostly less than positive effects aside, eco- Effective counter-measures against this nomic globalisation was instrumental in supremacy are starting – for the first time the already mentioned process of economic in the history of the EU – from the outskirts emancipation of society. It meant namely a of the "old Europe", from the new mem- gradual imposition of global rules (terms of ber-states; Hungary and Poland, Slovakia trade, property rights, etc.), which the local and the Czech Republic. There are paral- political elites were not able to stop or at lel movements in the Western parts of the least manipulate in order to maintain their Union (and even if some of these Western unquestioned supremacy. movements are considerably older than the But an even bigger obstacle for the local recent Hungarian or Polish political con- (internal) imperialism of the post-com- struction – they are still much weaker). munist states, those in Europe in the first The new "anti-European EU move- place, was the pressure of "European" (i.e. ments" depend almost entirely on the EU) integration. It was one of the promises radical right wing interpretation of ethnic given by (almost) all the post(Yugoslav, or nationalism (including some elements of Soviet) political elites, and the promise that Nazi, or Fascist ideologies). So, the circle was taken very seriously by the population. has been closed; after two decades of dif- At least at the very beginning; somehow a ferently motivated attempts to introduce new Big Brother was needed against the old liberalisation into the post-communist eth- one, Bruxelles (with Washington as a logical nic nationalism (from the West), nowadays, background) against Moscow or Belgrade. the anti-liberal interpretation of the nation- During the admission process, enthusiasm state plays the role of the defender of the constantly weakened in the societies of the people against the Bruxelles bureaucracy candidate states. However, the political will (coming from the East). of the citizens was strong enough to make At the same time, the new defenders can all escape strategies virtually impossible – again – start with the (re)colonisation of and, one after another, the post-communist the local societies, backed by the ideology countries joined European Union, or, at that understands ethnic unity as the high- least, accepted to participate in the imposed est goal of every political activity. To make process of accession. things almost tragicomic, it has to be men- In both cases, paradoxically more so tioned that some of the "new" right wing in the case of those countries that are still political leaders belong to the same group candidates than in the case of those that are that started the first colonisation in the early already members, local states have become nineties in a more liberal disguise). Within subject to the specific work-in-progress. this institutional framework, the circle is The essence of this procedure was the con- even elegantly perfected: state sponsored stant stripping off of layer after layer from kidnapping of the social resources was the most precious substance of the (ethno- replaced by the process of kidnapping of nationalistically legitimated) concept of the new EU member-states by "Bruxelles", the state – its sovereignty. The very state and now at least some of them are hitting apparatus that was able and ready to spon- back. Of course, they are not hitting only sor kidnapping of the social and economic, the "alienated bureaucrats from Bruxelles", individual and group potentials in these but, even more, "their own" citizens (if not countries is now being kidnapped from subjects). outside (and above). New regulations for legally acceptable practice by institutions and firms, citizens and associations, are coming from Bruxelles – more or less mediated by the local governments and parlia- ments. Fear produced by terrorism (but also by the hysterical notion of the "invasion of migrants") make this dependence even more direct, obvious – and unpleasant. 10 modes and instruments of state capture BiH’s un-reformable public administration – an instrument of state capture

modes and instruments of state capture BiH’s un-reformable public administration – an instrument of state capture

Bodo Weber

In Dayton BiH, it is the public sector, the public administration plus other state institutions as well as state-owned/public enterprises that dominate. They are controlled by the domestic political elites, especially since 2005, when the international community handed full political control over the country back to them, and the elites consistently engaged in rolling back democratic and market reforms initiated by international actors during the post-war decade.

Reforming Bosnia-Herzegovina’s public and academics1 alike to describe these anti- administration, characterized by politici- democratic tendencies. zation, oversizing and inefficiency, is on the international community’s current list of structural reforms, pursued since the concept of state 2015 within the framework of the so-called capture in the context of Reform Agenda. Just as it has been more or the western balkans less throughout the whole post-war era – seemingly without much success. The resil- ience of public administrations in BiH as in Yet in order to use the term "state capture" the wider Western Balkans regions against in the specific geographic and political con- numerous reform initiatives is indirectly text of the Western Balkans, and even more referred to through the use of the term "state so in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), it is nec- capture." The term has been used in recent essary to refer to its original meaning and years to describe the political developments definition. "State capture" is a term origi- of concentration of power that undermines nally coined in 2000 by World Bank experts previous democratic (and market eco- looking into transformation processes in nomic) transformation processes in coun- the context of the post-socialist societies tries still characterized by weak states and of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet underdeveloped civil societies. Control over Union. Analyzing the relationship between state institutions, in particular over public states and firms at the end of the 1990s, they administrations, seems to lie at the core of observed that "after only a decade of transi- these processes that undermine the formal tion, the fear of the leviathan state has been existence of the institutions of pluralistic replaced by a new concern about powerful democracies. With authoritarian tenden- oligarchs who manipulate politicians, shape cies rising in the Western Balkans (in Serbia, Macedonia), but also beyond (for example 1 See for example: https://www.novaeuropa.co.uk/state- in Viktor Orban’s Hungary or Tayyib Recep capture-and-corruption; http://www.suedosteuropa. Bodo Weber uni-graz.at/en/event/2017/party-positions-and-state- Senior Associate of the Democra- Erdoğan’s Turkey), "state capture" has turned capture-western-balkans-marko-zilovic-george-wash- tization Policy Council, Berlin into a catchphrase used by media, analysts ington. BiH’s un-reformable public administration – an instrument of state capture modes and instruments of state capture 11

institutions and control the media," who than state" by extending the capture of state "shape the policymaking, regulatory and institutions by economic actors to political legal environments… to advance and pro- parties. Yet in order to avoid hollowing out tect their own enterprises at the expense of state capture of any concrete meaning in the social interest."2 this broadening of the original term, it is Using the term "state capture" for today’s crucial to highlight the differentia specifica Bosnia and Herzegovina at first sight already when it comes to Bosnia-Herzegovina and reveals that we are dealing with a substan- the Western Balkans – that is, the specific tially different socio-political reality than form of informal action and its linkage to what the original authors from the World ethnicity, as well as its origin in the society Bank were dealing with. In Dayton BiH, it is of real socialism. BiH’s current patronage the public sector, the public administration system has its origin in the evolution of the plus other state institutions as well as state- one-party system in the late socialist era, owned/public enterprises that dominate. in the prominent role of semi-formal net- They are controlled by the domestic political works that were based on para-institutional elites, especially since 2005, when the inter- acting from within state institutions. These national community handed full political networks particularly expanded in the Yugo- control over the country back to them, and slav type of socialism in the context of the the elites consistently engaged in rolling process of authoritarian decentralization. back democratic and market reforms initi- They formed the basis for the distribution of ated by international actors during the post- power and resources, of privileges and cor- war decade. As a result, the political system ruption. Ethnicity in the form of the official enshrined in the Dayton constitution (re) nationality policy became a semi-official gained full strength – a patronage system that source of legitimizing this semi-formal is based on an institutionalized form of ethnic transformation of the socialist system. In power sharing. In this ethno-political system BiH, the so-called "national key" formed the it is the ethnic political parties that, through specific basis of this aspect of power sharing. control over public administrations and the The end of the one-party system and the first wider public sector, exert control over large multi-party elections in 1990 did not remove parts of the economy and the society, instead this semi-formal power sharing system, but of owners of larger companies – oligarchs or rather transformed it. A complex, hetero- tycoons – exerting control over state institu- geneous one-party system was replaced by tions and elected officials. This connection three (ethnic) one-party systems. It was no between political parties’ control over the coincidence that the formation of a post- public sector and ethnic nationalist legiti- election governing coalition started with mization is not restricted to BiH but forms a the division of control over state institutions core aspect of antidemocratic developments among the three ruling ethnic parties. And in large parts of the Western Balkan region. while this "democratization" of the social- In Macedonia, the post-Ohrid power shar- ist "national key" did not spare the country ing arrangement formed the basis for former from the violent breakup of Yugoslavia – Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski’s establish- quite the contrary – its logic of post-socialist ment of an authoritarian regime, while the ethnic power sharing not only survived the name dispute with Greece prevented the EU war, but became institutionalized in the from fighting back against these anti-demo- post-war Dayton constitution of BiH. cratic developments. In Serbia and Kosovo, engagement with the EU in solving the open ethnic status dispute through the so-called public administration in Dialogue served, and continues to serve, rul- post-war BiH ing parties in both countries in legitimizing their authoritarian power as the EU traded Public administrations in Bosnia-Herzego- democracy for the Dialogue. vina seem to have kept their core character- Political scientists have tried to bridge istics since the immediate post-war era, with this gap between the original definition of the situation only getting worse over the "state capture" and the return of the "levia- last decade. The decentralized, fragmented institutional system of the Dayton state has 2 Joel S. Hellmann/ Geraint Jones/ Daniel Kaufmann, set the basis for a burgeoning public admin- "’Seize the State, Seize the Day’ State Capture, Cor- istration. Its exact size, at least until recently, ruption and Influence in Transition," World Bank Sep- tember 2000; available at: https://elibrary.worldbank. has been an unknown. The fact that the exact org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-2444. number of civil servants remains unknown 12 modes and instruments of state capture BiH’s un-reformable public administration – an instrument of state capture

Ethnicization serves as the means for turning public administrations into the core instrument of the systems of patronage, in two ways: First, it is responsible for the fragmentation of public administration in the highly decentralized Dayton state. Second, the legally prescribed ethnic representation in public administrations limits the development of a merit-based civil service. What’s more, it serves as an entry point for the politicization of civil services, especially its leading positions.

to the public speaks to its nontransparent At the same time, BiH has gone through a nature. What is known is that public employ- lengthy public administration reform pro- ment experienced a sharp rise following the cess, which started with the 2000 EU Road- international community’s handover of full map and led to the establishment of the BiH political responsibility to domestic elites in Public Administration Reform Coordinator’s 2005-6. After 2006, public employment rose Office (PARCO) in 2004, and the adoption of a in the Federation too, but it exploded in the country-wide Public Administration Reform RS, where the public wage bill rose by 40% Strategy in 2006, which expired in 2014 within only two years. Despite initial attempts to out any relevant impact. limit public employment, it seems to have Public administrations are still staffed further risen in the first half of this decade. As by relatives and friends of those in power. a consequence, general government expend- Since the introduction of formal educational iture (which includes spending on state- criteria, that hurdle is managed thanks to a owned enterprises) remains extremely high, network of private universities, where the close to 50% of GDP. If one adds other forms sons and daughters of politicians and con- of government’s impact on the economy, like nected businessmen buy their diplomas. public tenders or entity-based development The combined low quality of civil servants’ banks that, too, operate in a highly politi- work performance and their high, privileged cized way, estimates about the share of the salaries distort the labour market in the pri- economy dependent on the government go vate sector and undermine the overall work as high as 80%. ethics in the society. As a politicized public Ethnicization serves as the means for administration and the nationalistically turning public administrations into the core legitimized fragmentation of state institu- instrument of the systems of patronage, in tions continue to reinforce each other, ser- two ways: First, it is responsible for the frag- vice delivery and infrastructure in BiH suffer mentation of public administration in the across the board. In the health care sector, highly decentralized Dayton state. Second, which suffers from an overemployment of the legally prescribed ethnic representation so-called non-medical staff, expenditures in public administrations limits the develop- are near the level of the Eurozone, but ser- ment of a merit-based civil service. What’s vices are extremely bad, while most medi- more, it serves as an entry point for the cines for serious diseases like cancer have to politicization of civil services, especially its be purchased privately by patients. BiH has leading positions. Public employment based one of the worst transport infrastructures in on political party membership, family and the Western Balkan region. The construc- other personal affiliation is primarily main- tion of a highway that would run through tained by exerting political influence over the the whole country from north to south is public administrations’ select committees. It years away from completion. Because of fits into the overall political context of the the lack of a state-level agency to manage strengthening of the patronage system in BiH EU agricultural funds (IPARD), between that employment in public administrations 2007 and 2013 BiH lost 300 million Euro in was more merit-based in 2005 than today.3 IPARD funds alone. Due to the difficulty of access to promising jobs for those who are 3 Sead Maslo, "Politika i javna uprava: aspekti politi- highly educated but have no political con- zacije državne službe u BiH, trendovi politizacije vs. Reformska opredjeljenja," Foundation Public Law nections, there is a constant brain drain Centre; available at: http://fcjp.ba/index.php/15- from BiH. Over the last three years alone, news/251-politika-i-javna-uprava-aspekti-politizacije-drzavne-sluzbe-u-bosni-i-hercegovini-trendovi-politi- an estimated 100,000 young Bosnians and zacije-versus-reformska-opredjeljenja. Herzegovinians left their home country to BiH’s un-reformable public administration – an instrument of state capture modes and instruments of state capture 13

seek jobs abroad. With a mortality rate substantially higher than the birth rate (10.6 ‰ to 8.5 ‰ in 2015), the UN recently estimated that BiH will lose almost half a million of its three and a half million citizens by 2050.4 public administration reform and the reform agenda

Within the Reform Agenda 2015-18, which formed the centerpiece of the 2014 EU BiH initiative, public administration reform constituted one of the seven core areas of structural socioeconomic reform. In the Agenda text, all levels of government com- "Administration" by Edward Bilodeau, CC-BY-NC-NC-2.0 mitted to the creation of a "modern, com- petent, transparent, effective, cost-efficient conditions unmet, the existence of the IMF and accountable public administration".5 credit arrangement is endangered. And with The results of implementing this part of the the campaign for the 2018 election nearing, Agenda so far have however remained lim- the collapse of the entire Reform Agenda ited, and outlooks are grim. In July 2015, the has become a realistic outcome. In that Federation parliament passed a new labour case, BiH political elites would once more law that was presented by the government succeed in averting real structural reform of as ending the privileged position of public public administrations in BiH. employees. Civil servants’ privileged position in regard to salaries and other aspects, however, is not fixed in the labour law at public administration all, but in other laws and regulations. No reform without serious reform of the latter has been taken constitutional reform? place since then. In the RS, the government never even argued about the need to end the privileged position of public servants. Against this background of a burgeoning, The development of a new public admin- costly and inefficient public administration istration reform strategy that is part of the that forms the backbone of Bosnia-Herze- Reform Agenda action plans lags behind the govina’s patronage system, and that resisted set timetable. As the only substantial meas- all reform attempts over the last decade and ure, governments at state and entity levels a half, the question arises whether substan- introduced public wage bill freezes, as well tial, structural public administration reform as freezes on new hiring. These freezes were is at all possible without profound constitu- the result of the leading role of the IMF and tional reforms that would put an end to the the conditionality regarding the downsizing undemocratic ethnic power-sharing sys- of public administrations in BiH that is part tem. This question is even more pressing if of the Fund’s current credit arrangement one looks at the role the RS regime headed with BiH. However, against the background by President Milorad Dodik has played for of the EU watering down conditionality in over a decade in blocking any institutional its BiH initiative, the Reform Agenda fell into reform in BiH. Time and again, Dodik has a crisis in the first half of 2017.6 With reform prevented the establishment of any additional state-level institutions or bodies, 4 "BiH ostaje bez ljudi," Slobodna Evropa, July 11, presenting his position as the defender of 2017; available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/ pad-nataliteta-u-bih/28610637.html. national interests against the "centraliza- 5 Reform Agenda for BiH 2015-2018, working transla- tion of competences." Yet while this ideo- tion; available at: http://europa.ba/wp-content/up- logical approach has hollowed out the loads/2015/09/Reform-Agenda-BiH.pdf. 6 Bodo Weber, Substantial Change on the Horizon? A debate about the meaningfulness of any Monitoring Report on the EU’s New Bosnia and Her- institutional reform, for example in the field zegovina Initiative, DPC Policy Paper, March 2017; available at: http://www.democratizationpolicy.org/ of agricultural policy, leaving exclusive com- summary/substantial-change-on-the-horizon/. petences on the sub-state level has not led 14 modes and instruments of state capture BiH’s un-reformable public administration – an instrument of state capture

to improvement in agricultural policy nor suffering from. While there exists no calcula- service delivery. tion of these indirect costs of the politicized In order to answer the question, it is public administration, one can assume that worth taking a look at the various fiscal they are substantially higher than the direct and economic aspects of the impact of the costs. current state of the public administration. In theory, thus, there should be no Regarding the direct financial costs of a obstacle to a substantial, real reform of fragmented, overstaffed administration, public administrations in BiH even without the figures are substantially smaller than a radical overhaul of its fragmented institu- one would expect. In 2010 the so-called tional setting enshrined in the state’s con- "municipalization" initiative, a grass-roots stitution. There are basically two alternative initiative for constitutional reform, pre- approaches. The first has been proposed by sented an alternative model for a radically the NGO Green Council in regard to agri- decentralized Bosnian state with only a cultural policy. Green Council has found central and a municipal government level. that BiH is missing a state-wide agricultural A financial analysis of the model showed strategy and institutional capacity, due to savings in public administration costs of which it has missed out on enormous funds 500 million BAM, roughly 7 percent of all in the past. The NGO proposed the estab- government spending,7 numbers that are lishment of a state-level agricultural min- surprisingly low when compared to the istry as the best solution to overcome these general public’s perception of BiH’s over- policy- and institutional insufficiencies.9 sized public administration. Yet besides the In 2016, the IMF took another approach, direct, higher costs of a politicized public based on the existing constitutional setting. administration, there is a multitude of addi- As part of its reform conditionality in the tional, more indirect costs. Here, the World framework of the new credit arrangement Bank’s original concept of state capture with BiH, the IMF demanded the strength- can serve as a helpful tool. As the authors ening of banking surveillance, taking a of the 2000 study stressed, while there is a two-step approach. Respecting the consti- direct rent-seeking benefit for the minor- tutional division of competences, the IMF ity of companies linked to state institutions demanded the strengthening of the work and elected officials, the average growth and independence of the existing banking rates of all other private companies, that surveillance agencies in the two entities as are not part of the capture economy, are well as the harmonization of their work. systematically lower. For the economy and Should that demand not be met within a society as a whole, state capture leads to a year, however, the Fund at the same time "vicious circle… that weakens economic announced that it will shift to demanding growth and further undermines the state’s the establishment of a state-level agency. provision of necessary public goods."8 The In the end, either approach could effects of BiH’s patronage system are both be successful. But whatever the initial similar, and worse: Public administrations approach, more important is that any sub- that are characterized by political overem- stantial reform of public administration ployment and high salaries not only put a must lead to the destruction of the patron- heavy burden on public budgets and create age system. This can only happen with a civil service with a low output. High, privi- either the international community, that is leged salaries in the public sector distort the first and foremost the EU, shifting finally to labour market and outprice the private sec- a serious approach in Bosnia-Herzegovina tor in attracting workers. The various links based on a policy of strong, consistent con- between the public sector and the private ditionality, and/or a political revolution sector (through, for example public pro- from within Bosnia and Herzegovina. curement or development banks) further distort the market economy in BiH. The politicization of employment in the public sector undermines the social value system and boosts the substantial brain drain BiH is

9 Green Council, Cost-benefit analiza uspostave Mini- 7 Municipalization: A Popular Governance Model for starstva poljoprivrede, prehrane i ruralnog razvoja Bosnia and Herzegovina, p.46; available at: https:// Bosne i Hercegovine, Sarajevo 2014; available at: de.scribd.com/document/231194321/K-143-Munici- http://green-council.org/publik/Cost_benefit_analiza_ palization-Model-FULL-document-ENG. uspostave_Ministarstva_poljoprivrede_prehrane_i_ru- 8 Joel S. Hellmann/ Geraint Jones/ Daniel Kaufmann. ralnog_razvoja_BiH.pdf. dismantling Bosnia and Herzegovina’s fractured authoritarianism modes and instruments of state capture 15 dismantling Bosnia and Herzegovina’s fractured authoritarianism

Jasmin Mujanović

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is a complex Behind the veneer of dysfunc- administrative state with a surplus of par- liaments and representatives but a dearth tionality are static political lead- of substantive democratic norms. While ers whose longevity at the fore- the Dayton constitutional framework has front of the country’s sectarian ensured peace in BiH, it has proven insuf- politics suggests a deeply sym- ficient to the task of creating a rules-based biotic relationship between the political order. In particular, the non-implementation of the European Court of Human respective ethno-national cliques Rights’ Sejdić–Finci decision of 2009 and the in BiH. While their professed unsanctioned "holiday referendum"1 in the conceptions of the Bosnian Republika Srpska entity (RS) in 2016 high- polity are, essentially, mutually light the de facto lawlessness of contempo- incompatible, Bosniak, Serb, and rary politics in the country. While one logical conclusion from this Croat nationalists have an almost characterization would be that BiH is there- identical conception of power. fore a failing state, a more careful examina- Namely, a conception of power tion of actually existing political practices as fundamentally patrimonial, in the country reveals a more subtle if no dominated by "big men" (what less disconcerting reality: BiH is a fractured I have elsewhere referred to as authoritarian state2. It is a fractured state because of the pervasive sectarian tensions a "baja class"), and by definition among the representatives of the country’s incompatible with democratic respective "constitutive peoples"; the Bos- norms or governance. niak, Serb, and Croat political elites. But it is also doubtlessly an authoritarian state because each of BiH’s territorial and political fragments is administered like a patrimonial fiefdom by these same elites.

Jasmin Mujanović Dr Jasmin Mujanović is a political scientist specializing in the politics of Southeastern Europe and the politics of post-authoritarian and post-conflict democratization. His first book, Hunger and Fury: The Crisis of Democracy in 1 http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/09/26/repub- the Balkans is now available for lika-srpska-referendum/ pre-order from Hurst Publishers 2 https://www.academia.edu/31246982/Fractured_Au- (http://www.hurstpublishers.com/ thoritarianism_in_Bosnia-Herzegovina book/hunger-and-fury/). 16 modes and instruments of state capture dismantling Bosnia and Herzegovina’s fractured authoritarianism

cymakers in Brussels, in particular, to come the theatre of sectarianism to grips with the reality of politics in the region. After all, behind the veneer of dysfunc- So, in order to illustrate these claims it is tionality are static political leaders whose useful to assess them with reference to cer- longevity at the forefront of the country’s tain basic concepts within the study of poli- sectarian politics suggests a deeply sym- tics. To that end, consider Harold Lasswell’s biotic relationship between the respective paradigmatic definition of politics7 as the ethno-national cliques in BiH. While their process by which societies decide "who gets professed conceptions of the Bosnian pol- what, when, and how." Let us take each of ity are, essentially, mutually incompatible, these segments in order and then see what Bosniak, Serb, and Croat nationalists have sort of society they add up to in BiH. an almost identical conception of power. Namely, a conception of power as fundamentally patrimonial, dominated by "big "who gets what, when, and men"3 (what I have elsewhere referred to as how" in BiH? a "baja class"4), and by definition incompatible with democratic norms or governance. Clearly, the ruling "who" in BiH is a fistful of In this sense, Bakir Izetbegović, Milorad individuals. While analysts have in the past Dodik, and Dragan Čović are not avatars of referred to a condominium of six ruling par- their respective nationalist projects; they are ties, as noted, parties in BiH are character- the projects. In other words, the purpose of ized by virtual cults of personality. Internal their politics is their personal enrichment party democracy is non-existent among the and the tightening of their exclusive con- main blocs, at least, and party policy does trol over the state apparatus, the primary not extend beyond the whims of said lead- means of accumulation in the country’s still ers. The fact that intra-party disputes most largely "feudal" economy5 (i.e. an economy often end with the losers being ejected (and in which the coercive state apparatus rather forming their own parties in turn), is a neat than the free market is the primary means illustration of the phenomenon. for wealth (re)distribution). Nor are their The "what" concerns the process of respective political parties – the SDA, the patrimonial redistribution that character- SNSD, and the HDZ – political movements izes the political economy of the Bosnian in the traditional sense of the term. In fact, state; rather than operating on the basis of these blocs bear far more resemblance to free market competition, or even state-led organized crime syndicates6 or mercenary development, BiH’s economy is defined by armies than they do to political parties in cronyism and corruption. Especially impor- other electoral regimes. tant in this respect is the public administra- These are sweeping, provocative claims tion and bureaucracy. Instead of existing to but they are necessary to capture the full provide services for the public, the admin- extent of the complex political situation in istrative state in BiH is the means by which in the country. As it is, too much interna- political elites reward their base; by provid- tional policy and analysis on BiH, and the ing jobs, peddling permits, and (formal and Western Balkans as a whole, remains mired informal) pardons for their clients. in technocratic marginalia; "connectivity," Accordingly, very little is actually pro- "local ownership," and "accession criteria." duced, manufactured, or even provided This turgid jargon obscures an inability, or in BiH. The only semi-functional portions rather, an unwillingness on the part of poli- of the economy are those that are most autonomous of and least dependent on the 3 David B Kanin, "Big Men, Corruption, and Crime", government apparatus: tourism and the https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/palgrave. ip.8800038 nascent IT sector. Taken as a whole, how- 4 Jasmin Mujanović, "The Baja Class and the Politics of ever, BiH’s economy is in a death spiral. Participation", https://www.academia.edu/9018208/ Take only the fact that local governments The_Baja_Class_and_the_Politics_of_Participation 5 Jasmin Mujanović, "Is Feudal Ex-Yugoslavia are now increasingly relying on commercial Incapable of Reform?", http://www.balkaninsight. banks for loans to provide even the most com/en/article/is-feudal-ex-yugoslavia-incapable-of- reform--02-20-2017 6 Jonathan D. Heskett, "Corruption in the Balkans: an 7 Harold Dwight Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, examination of the ties between government and crime When, How, https://books.google.com/books?id=Iah_ in several Southeast European countries", http://cal- NAEACAAJ&dq=harold+lasswell+defined+politics+a houn.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/38946/13Dec_ s&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiuhKTqk6XUAhUJW Heskett_Jonathan.pdf?sequence=1 CYKHSKtAgkQ6AEIKDAA dismantling Bosnia and Herzegovina’s fractured authoritarianism modes and instruments of state capture 17

Only sustained pressure and mobilizing can affect truly entrenched regimes. Thus, for instance, the key mistake of the protests in 2014 was not that they shifted towards the participatory plenum model; indeed, the plenums illustrated the sophisticated capacity of BiH civil society to articulate and advance coherent policy demands. The mistake was in re-locating the plenums to politically insignificant terrain: community centres, meeting halls, art galleries etc. Those meetings should have taken place in public squares and/or on the steps of parliament, forcing the authorities (and the public) to confront and recognize them.

basic social provisions to their constituents: of communist Europe, Yugoslavia’s elites pensions, disability payments, welfare etc. never truly lost power in the wake of 1989. Why is this happening? In short, Instead, the Yugoslav Wars primarily served because unwilling to reform their patrimo- to cement their rule, their regimes amended nial regimes8, local elites can no longer rely only insomuch as they swapped rhetorical on the IMF and World Bank for loans and commitments from the working class to the funds. As a result, these governments are nation. reduced to dealing with predatory – and Thus one party rule in the former themselves unstable – local banks (see only Yugoslavia never actually ended; it merely the recent Bobar Banka collapse9 in the RS). fragmented along republican and ethno- Inevitably, this house of cards will col- national lines, with each unit, as mentioned, lapse. The best case scenario, as remarkable remaining largely authoritarian or at least as this may sound, is the Greek one; that is, profoundly illiberal. In BiH, this process internationally managed bankruptcy10. The was especially pronounced and so today we more likely scenario, however, is outright have the aforementioned surplus of parlia- chaos; a mixture of Argentina’s 2001 default ments, with little in the way of substantive and the unbridled rage of the 2014 protests democracy. While it should technically be in BiH. This is the structural dynamic of possible to ameliorate this situation through BiH’s existing political economy that can- the use of elections (the "how" part of the not be ignored. Genuinely reformist actors equation), in practice, this is a tall order. may emerge from within this maelstrom Owing to Dayton’s ethnocentric design, but even if this crisis consumes the exist- non-nationalist parties are at an inherent ing political establishment, as in much of disadvantage. The period between 2010 and Europe, still more reactionary elements 2014, for instance, illustrated how a party may seize the day. That, after all, was also like the HDZ, which never wins more than the result of the last, locally-produced eco- about 12% to 15% of the vote, was able to nomic crisis in the Balkans, the one in the completely obstruct the functioning of gov- 1980s, which (in)directly precipitated the ernment for no other reason than that they dissolution of Yugoslavia. were excluded from the ruling coalition. In the meantime, the matter of "when" This period provided a succinct summation and "how" is somewhat more complicated, of how nationalist politics in BiH was largely as the origins of the existing elite estab- a smokescreen for kleptocracy; the HDZ was lishment in BiH can be traced back to the upset not because there would be no Croats last days of the Socialist Federal Repub- in the then SDP-led government in Sarajevo lic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ) and, in particular, (there were) but because the HDZ was los- the rampant fraud and corruption of the ing access to lucrative state coffers. late 1980s. Unlike their peers in the rest

8 Dragan Maksimović, "Ko će vraćati dugove BiH?", http://www.dw.com/bs/ko-će-vraćati-dugove- bih/a-37452148 9 "Bobar banka: Optužnice protiv 16 osoba", http:// balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/bobar-banka-optuznice- protiv-16-osoba 10 Dragan Maksimović, "Dug Republike Srpske preko pet milijardi maraka", http://www.dw.com/bs/dug-republike-srpske-preko-pet-milijardi-maraka/a-36112030 18 modes and instruments of state capture dismantling Bosnia and Herzegovina’s fractured authoritarianism

This dynamic also resonates among In other words, when existing institu- ordinary voters. In a country in which tions and processes were incapable of pro- something like one-third of all employed ducing political change, civil society turned persons11 works in some segment of the their efforts to extra-institutional struggles. public administration, which is in turn In this respect, Macedonia’s recent experi- largely politically staffed, elections are not ences very much mirror those of other East- a matter of one’s political (or even ethnic) ern European states in confronting both persuasions. In such a polity, elections are a Cold War era one-party regimes and their matter of guaranteeing one’s own economic illiberal successors (i.e. as during the "Col- survival. In a country with 40% unemploy- our Revolutions" period in the early 2000s ment, if your family’s income depends on and, more recently, during Ukraine’s "Euro- a public sector wage that likewise depends maidan"). Is something similar possible on, say, the HDZ staying in power, you too in BiH? Doubtlessly, but it will require the would likely vote for this bloc; even if, in the embrace of two organizational principles aggregate, you recognized that their admin- by both local activists in BiH and the inter- istration was damaging to your communi- national community present in the country. ty’s overall social well-being. First, sustained democratic protest Bosnian and Herzegovinian voters are is both legitimate and necessary to affect thus compelled to choose between (relative) change in illiberal regimes12. While one- economic security and promissory notes of off moments like the "Baby Revolution" eventual political reform and prosperity. in 2013 and the "Bosnian Spring" of 2014 Unsurprisingly, the former tends to win out. are educational and empowering, they are Besides, the whole idea of "reform" in BiH insufficient. Only sustained pressure and is deeply compromised by the fact that, to mobilizing can affect truly entrenched date, there has been no credible evidence regimes. Thus, for instance, the key mistake that local elites want anything of the sort. All of the protests in 2014 was not that they major post-war reforms in BiH have largely shifted towards the participatory plenum been the result of international (and dispro- model; indeed, the plenums illustrated the portionally American) political pressure. sophisticated capacity of BiH civil society Indeed, the privileged position of said elites to articulate and advance coherent policy in contemporary BiH depends precisely on demands13. The mistake was in re-locating the non-implementation of socio-political the plenums to politically insignificant ter- or socio-economic reforms of any substan- rain: community centres, meeting halls, art tive sort. galleries etc. Those meetings should have taken place in public squares and/or on the turning to civil society steps of parliament (or perhaps within parliament itself as during the Sunflower Move- If even the electoral machinery is compro- ment in Taiwan14), forcing the authorities mised by clientelism and patrimonialism, (and the public) to confront and recognize what options are left in BiH? The recent them. government change in Macedonia provides Secondly, the politics of protest have a a useful avenue for change. Like BiH, Mac- definite shelf life. Eventually, the struggle edonia is an ethnically polarized polity, in to affect change has to take on an electoral which corruption and criminal-political and/or parliamentary dimension. In Mac- linkages are among the most deeply embed- edonia, this meant the establishment of a ded in Europe. Unlike in BiH, however, once kind of détente between civil society and Macedonian civil society was finally driven the centre-left SDSM, which had itself been to the streets they remained there, eventu- implicated in past corruption scandals, in ally forcing the main left bloc in the country order to finally wrest power from the VMRO- to take up their struggle as their own. Or, DPMNE. Whether the new government more to the point, to pin their eventual elec- proves up to the task of rebooting Macedo- toral future on the demands of a burgeon- 12 Jasmin Mujanović, "Democracy blooming at the ing civil society struggle which called for the margins: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ukraine and Taiwan", radical transformation and democratization https://www.opendemocracy.net/jasmin-mujanović/ of Macedonian society. democracy-blooming-at-margins-bosniaherzegovina- ukraine-and-taiwan 13 Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files, https://bhprotest- files.wordpress.com/ 11 Pero Zelenika, "Svaki treći zaposlenik u BiH radi u 14 J. Michael Cole, "Was Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement javnoj upravi", https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/svaki- Successful?", http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/was- treci-zaposlenik-u-bih-radi-u-javnoj-upravi-954862 taiwans-sunflower-movement-successful/ dismantling Bosnia and Herzegovina’s fractured authoritarianism modes and instruments of state capture 19

nia’s democratic project will largely depend grievances of their populace. It will be on the ability of civil society to remain a especially important, however, that the EU vital and relevant "check" on the pervasive and U.S. sanction and curb the reactionary illiberal and authoritarian tendencies in the tendencies of BiH’s elites. Scenes like the society as a whole. VMRO-DPMNE-led sack of the Macedo- For BiH though, this means that the nian parliament would be far more volatile puritan and/or technocratic attitudes of and dangerous in BiH. And, indeed, greater civil society will need to shift if the coun- international engagement (or, at least, reac- try is to make a similar turnaround. Civil tion as with the U.S. Treasury Department society cannot merely be in the business of sanctions15 of Milorad Dodik) can do much monitoring government, nor can it forswear to prepare the social terrain for democratic cooperation with all existing (and emerg- revolt and reform. ing) parliamentary actors. Eventually, civil Threading the democratization-security society will need to become involved in needle16 is thus delicate work, but we can- (and, ideally, to lead) the contentious social not forget that without the former, the latter movements that will open space for new is impossible. The best guarantee of lasting actors and new options to emerge in BiH. security and stability in BiH and the West- Simply, those who are not involved in poli- ern Balkans as a whole is the long overdue, tics – be they the politics of the street or the bottom-up, civil society-led democratiza- politics of parliament – abdicate their right tion of the region as a whole. This will, inev- and ability to steer their own fates. itably, be primarily a domestic effort but When such social manifestations (re) one whose eventual emergence is greatly appear in BiH, as in Macedonia, the inter- assisted by the international community’s national community will likely have to play appreciation and interest in the complexi- a facilitating role; ensuring that entrenched ties of democratic and civil society struggles elites respect and abide by the legitimate in such fractured authoritarian regimes.

15 "U.S. imposes sanctions on Bosnian Serb nationalist leader Dodik", http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa- sanctions-bosnia-dodik-idUSKBN1512WI 16 Jasmin Mujanović, "South-eastern Europe’s descent into chaos", http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_ south_eastern_europes_descent_into_chaos_6017 20 modes and instruments of state capture state capture: how to save the Macedonian democratic consolidation and EU enlargement

state capture: how to save the Macedonian democratic consolidation and EU enlargement

Zhidas Daskalovski

them to 208 million Euros. On the other The achievement of state capture by the captors is a hand, this revamping of urban space is process rather than an event. While the process has ‘purposefully created to counter the Greek been effectively stopped by removing the power from denial and the indifference of the interna- the coalition government of VMRO-DPMNE and DUI, tional community to the Macedonian prob- it is not clear if Macedonia will not fall back into state lems’. (Janev, 2011:34) The Greek objections to the name have capture because the democratic credentials of the new negatively influenced the well-being of the SDSM and DUI government are not much brighter. country. Macedonia was granted EU candidate status in 2005, and since 2009 the Com- mission has consistently recommended Some twenty five years after democratic that negotiations be opened. The European reforms, Balkan citizens have grown tired Parliament has also incessantly supported of electoral promises of a better life in the opening accession negotiations. Nothing future. The long duration of the EU acces- has happened, mainly due to the objections sion process and the declining level of by Greece to the country’s use of the name foreign direct investment in the region ‘Macedonia.’ Greece objects to the use of the heighten the feeling of indifference to the name ‘Macedonia’, arguing that Macedon EU and the whole enlargement project, was an ancient Greek kingdom and Macedo- influencing a political culture of outright nia is the name of a region of Greece adja- hostility between government and opposi- cent to the former Yugoslav republic that tion parties and authoritarian tendencies in bears the same name. A solution to the name domestic politics. Some local elites are again issue remains elusive for all sides, including turning to nationalism. In Macedonia, elites EU officials and the EU High Representa- played with the emotions of the citizens tive for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/ when they revamped the capital city under Vice-President of the European Commis- the Skopje 2014 modernisation project, an sion Federica Mogherini. As far as starting imposing initiative meant to raise national negotiations for membership is concerned, pride and attract tourists. Using neoclas- beyond the Greek blockade over their objec- sical and baroque architectural styles, the tions to the use of the name Macedonia, the project included the construction of almost country faces a serious internal problem 20 new buildings, including museums, thea- regarding democratic consolidation. tres, concert halls, hotels and administrative In February 2015, Macedonia became offices, fountains, colonnades, footbridges immersed in a political imbroglio as the over the Vardar, and Roman galleys on the Social Democrat opposition leader Zoran riverbanks, all invigorated with a multi- Zaev began releasing recordings of illegally tude of bronze and marble statues erected wire-tapped phone conversations. Prime to adorn the surroundings. The costs of the Minister Nikola Gruevski and the Head Zhidas Daskalovski project are disputed, the opposition claim- of the Intelligence Service Sasho Mijalkov Professor of political science at the Univesity of Kliment Ohridski, ing them to be as high as 500 million, while faced accusations that during the past few Macedonia. the VMRO-DPMNE government rounding years they had secretly and illegally wire- state capture: how to save the Macedonian democratic consolidation and EU enlargement modes and instruments of state capture 21

tapped some 20,000 people, including journalists, opposition leaders, business- endangered democracy men, NGO activists, academics, religious leaders, members of the judiciary, and Generally, democracy in Macedonia is prominent intellectuals. The content of the gravely endangered. For some time now wire-tapping conversations was disputed, all aspects of public life, from the bureau- and criminal charges were filed against cracy to public enterprises to civil society Zaev, including incitement to ‘overthrow have been politicized. Complaints of politi- the constitutional order’, and ‘espionage cal dominance over the media system; the and violence against top state officials’. For structural inefficiency of the public admin- some time, all aspects of public life – from istration; the rising costs of entry into poli- the bureaucracy to public enterprises to tics for new subjects; weak execution of the civil society – have been politicised. The regulations concerning the public financ- recordings augmented the fear that the sys- ing of parties; the de-facto arbitrariness of tem of government has been designed with many decision-making processes excluding the objective of maximising wealth, power, wide and efficient public consultation; citi- and impunity for the benefit of particular zens’ lack of confidence in state institutions groups and networks, rather than serving and the political class; the lack of awareness the public interest. on the significance of the state and of con- An agreement, brokered by the European tinuity in planning development policies, Union and the United States, was worked on and the utilisation of public service for nar- in June and July 2015. Early general elec- row party interests are not new phenomena. tions in April 2016 were announced. From The feeling among citizens is that the sys- 20 October 2015, a transitional government tem is designed with the objective of maxi- was installed including the two main parties, mizing wealth, power, and impunity for the VMRO-DPMNE and the Social Democratic benefit of particular groups and networks, Union (SDSM). A new special prosecutor rather than serving the public interest. Since was appointed to investigate alleged crimes 2015, among many in Macedonia a wide- implicated by the wiretapping scandal. As spread ‘sense of impunity’ of the VMRO- part of the agreement, Gruevski resigned in DPMNE and DUI officials exists, amplified January 2016. The investigation into Gruevski by a long-standing absence of alternation and other politicians from VMRO-DPMNE in government. The feeling is that Prime was stopped in April 2016 by a pardon Minister Gruevski and his associates have issued by the President Gjorge Ivanov, which learnt to maximize wealth and power for resulted in several protests. VMRO-DPMNE their own benefits, while practising a large- allegedly did not agree with his action. Zaev scale extraction of resources from the soci- supported the protests to overturn Ivanov’s ety and employing part of these resources pardon, which were referred to by some as through clientelism. All of these actions are the "Colorful Revolution." The protesters seen as being taken in order to ensure that demanded that the government resign, that they remain in their positions, as well as to a technical government be formed, and that ensure their financial gain and impunity: the parliamentary elections planned for 5 direct influence on the judiciary, including June 2016 be cancelled, on the grounds that dismissing criminal charges against govern- the conditions for free and transparent elec- ment ministers, appointment of party-loyal tions are not in place. The government and judges, influence on the media, selective its supporters, who have organized pro- prosecution of political opponents, mass government rallies, maintained that the electoral fraud during past elections using elections on June 5 were the only solution to fictional voters, fake ID cards, buying votes, the political crisis. Finally, early parliamen- registering up to 50 such voters at individual tary elections were agreed upon and were addresses and instructing them to vote for held on 11 December 2016. The elections the ruling party, intimidation of public serv- produced inconclusive results as the ruling ants, including threats to fire them if they do party won 51 of the 120 seats in parliament not vote accordingly, attempts to steal elec- and the SDSM 49, both proclaiming victory tion material, misuse of the police and pub- and insisting they would form the new gov- lic administration for the party agenda, and ernment, which SDSM indeed did in June pressure on individuals and firms. 2017, concluding a coalition agreement with two ethnic Albanian parties. 22 modes and instruments of state capture state capture: how to save the Macedonian democratic consolidation and EU enlargement

If we take the standard definition of "state capture", that "it occurs when the what should be done ruling elite and/or powerful businessmen manipulate policy formation and influence What should be done? For one, we need the emerging rules of the game (including to return politics to a sense of normality and laws and economic regulations) to their decency. Being a politician must not confer own advantage" (Hellman et al, 2000) and special privileges. Politicians must not abuse that the distinguishing feature of state cap- the system, and need to consider humility ture is a high level of secrecy, then we can and accountability as virtues. Macedonian easily confirm that the rule of the previous politicians should not enjoy extraordinary government fits in this category. The wire- incomes; neither should they enjoy various tapping scandal took away the secrecy. hidden privileges as they do at present. (e.g. The extent of state capture in a country is extra income from membership in various assessed by identifying and distinguish- supervisory and governing boards, extrava- ing between the different types of state gant travel expenses and per diems, unlimited institutions that are deemed to have been or unaccounted usage of publicly paid-for captured. For example, in one country one mobile phones, automobiles or meals in res- or just a few of the various arms of govern- taurants). Politics in Macedonia must be an ment and its state-owned enterprises may open and transparent activity, where public be captured, while in others the number goods are not used for private or party ben- may be higher. This gives rise to the concept efits during electoral campaigns and beyond. of ‘degrees’ of state capture ranging from Integrity means playing by the established partial to complete. This means that the rules, not subverting them, even for the sake achievement of state capture by the cap- of ideological or party gain. Politicians are tors is a process rather than an event. While elected by the citizens to make decisions on the process has been effectively stopped the basis of evidence-based policy research by removing the power from the coalition conducted by public servants in cooperation government of VMRO-DPMNE and DUI, it with analysis by experts from think tanks, is not clear if Macedonia will not fall back universities, trade unions, employers’ asso- into state capture because the democratic ciations, business associations and civil soci- credentials of the new SDSM and DUI gov- ety activists, and in communication with the ernment are not much brighter. citizens. Politicians are not elected to seclude themselves and base their decisions on their own or party interests. Macedonians of all creeds must demand further democratization of the political parties. Ethnic parties should adopt more

"lion and fountain" by Franco Pecchio, CC-BY-NC-NC-2.0 state capture: how to save the Macedonian democratic consolidation and EU enlargement modes and instruments of state capture 23

Given the problems witnessed with the wire-tapping affair, various forms of participatory democracy should be taken into consideration. Overall, participatory budgeting which allows the citizens to participate in the conception and/or allocation of public finances should be an aim. Doing so will encourage Macedonians to become part of the ‘public sphere’ rather than to remain mired in the civic disengagement and apolitical cynicism that seems to have plagued our political systems in recent years nuanced party platforms based on political informal pacts between contending politi- ideologies rather than solely on advancing cal actors can move relations from a stage of particular kin interests. The electoral system disruptive confrontation to one of respect- must not only take into consideration the ful, consensus-based political competition role of women, going beyond the current between elite groups. This is needed in Mac- 30% quota, but also present citizens with edonia as soon as possible. choices to elect candidates on the basis of Furthermore, given that there are typical individual virtues, perhaps using the open problems related to corruption and politi- electoral roll model or a combination of cal/party influence on the independence of a majoritarian and PR system as used in public institutions, the media, and the elec- Germany. To reduce inter-ethnic tensions, toral processes, Macedonia should focus the electoral system should induce ethnic on strengthening the independence and the accommodation, for example, vote pooling competences of several public institutions could be used in local or presidential elec- that can influence the mentioned problem- tions. Through vote pooling, politicians in atic areas. These include: the State Audit a heterogeneous society seek support out- Office, the Media Regulatory Body, the Pub- side their own group in order to win elec- lic Broadcasting Service (MRT), the Ombud- tions and voters exchange votes across sperson’s Office, the Public Prosecutor, the group boundaries. Transparency of the elec- Anti-corruption Commission, the State tions must be raised both in terms of party Electoral Commission, the Commission on financing and media coverage. Freedom of Information, Anti-monopoly Macedonian politicians have for a long Commission, and the Commission for Pro- time disagreed about government institu- tection from Discrimination. One could tions, engaged in fighting for dominance, envision a system of election/appoint- and held a "winner takes all" attitude. It is ment of officials in these bodies through a imperative for political and social actors majority vote in the parliament where, for to understand that the consolidation of example, the nominations would be con- democracy comes through cooperation firmed by a strong majority and the candi- not based on self-interest but on society- dates would have very strong qualifications. oriented interests. In order for democracy Among other things, the strengthening of to consolidate, it is imperative for political the efficacy and the role of said institutions parties and politicians to show political will will influence the fairness of elections. Con- in negotiations and institution-building ducting free and fair elections, whereby vot- beyond petty and temporary interests. ing will not be disputed by any party, should Politicians in Macedonia must compre- be a priority for the near future. hend that the consolidation of democracy A key aspect of this engagement is to depends on elite consensus and cooperation. improve monitoring and evaluation of pub- A critical step for successful democratisa- lic policy-making in general. Macedonia tion is the transformation of divided elites should move from traditional monitor- into consensually unified ones through ing which focuses on implementation, i.e. a settlement of the elites’ basic disputes. tracking inputs (money, resources, strate- An elite pact, settlement or political set- gies), activities (what actually took place) tlement is a "relatively rare event in which and outputs (the products or services pro- warring national elite factions suddenly duced). This approach focuses on monitor- and deliberately reorganise their relations ing how well a project, programme or policy by negotiating compromises on their most is being implemented, and is often used basic disagreements". (Burton and Higley, to assess compliance with work plans and 1987:295) Alternatively put, formal and budget. The government should begin using 24 modes and instruments of state capture state capture: how to save the Macedonian democratic consolidation and EU enlargement

results-based monitoring, which involves Consequently, Macedonia must imme- the regular collection of information on diately thoroughly improve fiscal trans- public policy performance. Results-based parency – the comprehensiveness, clarity, monitoring demonstrates whether a given reliability, timeliness and relevance of pub- law, programme or policy is achieving its lic reporting on the past, present, and future stated goals. However, this should not be state of public finances – it is critical for used as an incentive for further enlargement effective fiscal management and account- of the public administration but should be ability. It helps ensure that governments performed through reforming its present and the public have an accurate picture of capacities and efficiency measures to fit the public finances when making economic new results-based monitoring approach. It decisions, including the costs and benefits will inevitably need the establishment of a of policy changes and potential risks to monitoring and evaluation framework that public finances. The current crises revealed is currently lacking, as well as that civil serv- problems that originate from the lack of ants acquire certain sets of skills, as well pre-budget statements and therefore a lack as for public managers to require a level of of debate in Parliament; concerning the knowledge and awareness for results-based central budget, lack of citizens involvement monitoring framework to be enforced. with the budget and therefore user-friendly Performance-based monitoring, evalu- information sharing on the budget with ation and budgeting must include system- ordinary citizens; absence of reporting on atic and continuous data collection on public debt in the budget document and so public policy implementation for perfor- on. The separate reporting of external public mance measurement, and it must include debt is not sufficient; it needs to be included indicator values against which progression in the budget as it is financed and admin- towards meeting targets can be measured istered through the budget, and it needs in line with the objectives set. Furthermore, to include debt not just towards external it should facilitate adjustments and adapta- financial institutions but also commercial tions, thus making for more effective public lenders. Fiscal transparency should provide policy management. This facilitation of full- legislatures, markets, and citizens with the fledged monitoring and evaluation through information they need to hold governments consensus and capacity development – accountable. with a view to increasing the efficiency and By joining the Open Government Part- effectiveness of public policies – should be nership, the government of Macedonia has a priority. Regulatory impact assessments pledged to continuously improve itself on and other steps and commitments to per- the foundations of open, transparent, reli- formance-based budgeting already pre- able and efficient government institutions suppose strategic planning for targets and that communicate and cooperate with the indicator-based measurement. Pertinent to citizens. The obligations of transparent the success of the results-based models of implementation of government activities policy-making is time, for deliberation, for as well as inclusion of NGOs are proclaimed implementation, for adjustment and meas- priorities that should be put into practice. urement of impact and results. The style of It is imperative that the civil sector is more governance promoted in the last decade actively used in policymaking processes. was rather contrary to this, marked by unin- Macedonia needs to develop a culture of clusive policymaking due to the lack of time, inclusion and respect for the rights of all emergency procedures for adoption of new citizens in the policymaking and decision- legislation successfully hidden behind the making processes, including the adoption need to meet the pressures of accelerating of laws and access to information. Better EU accession. Therefore, a new government enforcement of the Law on Free Access to should take it slowly, define several results Information of a Public Character should per sector and devote a period of time for also be a priority, especially providing data implementation that will allow time for to citizens first hand so that there is no measurement of results and deliberation actual need that one should use this Law to on new policy solutions. Due to the cur- ask for certain information. rently low capacities of the government The reform of the judiciary should be a for monitoring and evaluation and perfor- continuous process, important now as in mance budgeting, such improvements can the long run. Enforcement of anti-corrup- be bridged by the inclusion of independent tion legislation requires an efficient, pre- experts and civil society actors. dictable, and accountable judiciary, able to state capture: how to save the Macedonian democratic consolidation and EU enlargement modes and instruments of state capture 25

hold the executive accountable under the Given the problems witnessed with the law, and to interpret and enforce the terms wire-tapping affair, various forms of par- of the constitution. The independence of ticipatory democracy should be taken into the judiciary from direct undue interference consideration. Electronic participation in adjudication by the government and the at the problem-defining level if not at the power to enforce its rulings are crucial in strategic planning and budgeting processes the anti-corruption efforts. In this matter, should be an aim for citizens to be able to enforcement of rulings is the key issue and effectively engage on the local level. Over- Macedonian government must consent to all, participatory budgeting which allows provide the resources needed for enforce- the citizens to participate in the concep- ment. Given its stature, the Constitutional tion and/or allocation of public finances Court could contribute more to the devel- should be an aim. Doing so will encourage opment of public policies. Macedonians to become part of the ‘public Macedonians must also insist on deep- sphere’ rather than to remain mired in the ening the decentralization processes. Deep- civic disengagement and apolitical cynicism ening the principles of equitable and just that seems to have plagued our political sys- representation defined within the Ohrid tems in recent years. Such citizen engage- Framework Agreement to the municipal ment will increase social justice by involving level in combination with moderated elec- the poor and excluded, and help individuals toral campaigns as envisioned above should become better citizens through oversight of have a reconciliatory effect on inter-ethnic public spending, thereby helping to reduce relations in the country. Macedonia should corruption and cronyism, empowering a focus on the implementation of the Strategy more diverse range of political activists, on Integrated Education and have a more reducing elitism and clientelism and, in the proactive approach in order to ensure the end, providing citizens with greater access ethnic, cultural and linguistic identities of to basic services and improved living con- all communities, lowering the threshold of ditions (Moynihan 2007). Overall, if put 20% for official use of minority languages. in place, these reforms and processes will This threshold is one of the contentious greatly contribute to the strengthening of points hovering over the census-taking pro- the democratic consolidation of Macedonia cess. and improve its readiness in the EU enlargement process.

references

Burton, M., and Higley, J., ‘Elite Settle- ments’, American Sociological Review, Vol. 52, No. 3, June 1987 Janev, G., ‘Ethnocratic remaking of public space – Skopje 2014’ in EFLA Journal: Political Implications of the Urban Landscape, 1, 33-36, European Federation for Landscape Architec- ture, 2011 Moynihan, Donald P. (2007) ‘Citizen Participation in Budgeting: Prospects for Developing Countries,’ in Shah, Anwar (2007) Participatory Budgeting. Washington, DC, World Bank 26 modes and instruments of state capture judiciary as a mechanism of state capture: external actors, party patronage and informality

judiciary as a mechanism of state capture: external actors, party patronage and informality

Arolda Elbasani

The actual state of the judiciary as an enabler of corruption, crime and abuse of office is a result of widespread party patronage and rampant informality that characterized the decades of messy transition.

During the last three years, Albanians have issue into the core challenge of his govern- been busy discussing a large scale judiciary ing program. A last minute pre-electoral reform. This would be the most comprehen- agreement involving concessions for the sive reform after the initial reshuffling of the opposition parties in May 2017 seemed to communist-inherited system early into the bring boycotting sections of the political transition. The project aims to depoliticize spectrum to the negotiating table again, but the ranks of the system but also check indi- the future prospects of reform are all but vidual judges for links to corruption and certain. organized crime, a strong feature of the Evidence of the relationship between evolving post-communist system. The cen- the judiciary, crime and political misdeeds tral plank of reform consists of an interna- Accumulated evidence on the function- tionally-led mission with the capacity to vet ing of the Albanian post-communist judicial the individual members of the judiciary. system leaves no doubt that it has gradually Wide popular support for reforming the turned into a mechanism facilitating state system, with the help of an international capture. The data on judiciary corruption mission, draws on ample evidence that the are particularly scary: 80% of Albanian judiciary has gradually degenerated into a career judges can’t justify their own decla- corrupt corporation that stands on two pil- rations of assets.2 Perhaps shocking for any lars – deep politicization and links to organ- career judge in the world, their Albanian ized crime.1 Given the documented links counterparts record ownership of substan- judiciary-politics-crime, any reshuffling of tial business shares, real estate properties, the judiciary is expected to trigger resist- thick bank accounts, dynamic movements ance from powerful players, who have built in their property portfolios and luxurious their careers and of course immense wealth life styles.3 The discrepancies within such on such underground connections. declarations, let alone with undeclared Indeed, the entire process of negotiat- assets, tend to escape any judicial scru- ing and setting up the vetting process was tiny thanks to the cooperation of their col- hindered at each and every stage by vari- leagues within the system. ous parties in the Albanian parliament. The current Prime Minister, Edi Rama, has been a vocal advocate of reform and turned the 2 B. Likmeta, (2016) The Integrity Gap, http://www. balkaninsight.com/en/article/the-integrity-gap-albania- s-appeals-court-judges-asset-disclosures-raise-red- 1 BTI (2016) Albania Country Report, https://www. flags-06-16-2016 (Accessed May 2017). Arolda Elbasani bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Re- 3 Bakillari, (2016) Albanian Judges’ Wealth Escapes Center for European and Mediter- ports/2016/pdf/BTI_2016_Albania.pdf (Accessed Scrutiny, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/ ranean Studies, NYU May 2017). albanian-judges-suspicious-wealth-escapes-scrutiny judiciary as a mechanism of state capture: external actors, party patronage and informality modes and instruments of state capture 27

Yet, Albanians have learned from the privatization process. The High Court of media explosive information on what might Justice, another important institution that is explain at least some of these sources of usually filled with political appointees and wealth: renowned ‘international’ criminals thus has a reputation for serving as a politi- – killers, pimps, drug dealers and leading cal instrument,6 effectively closed down capos of organized crime – are frequently further investigations. A parliamentary released during various stages of "due" committee led by the ruling party, which process. In a recent 2016 case, a notorious was in opposition when the privatization prisoner accused of several killings, inter- was concluded and therefore interested national drug trafficking and orchestrating in disclosing irregularities, continuing to businesses racketeering schemes, activities investigate the involvement of key political which the police found he continued to pur- figures – several then-ministers, then PM, sue from prison, was pardoned for "good his son, and other state officials in the affair. behaviour". Various judges involved in his Accordingly, a third person who mediated decade-long processes had already given the deal received a 7 million Dollar trans- him minimal fines and then systematically fer for "consultancy", a sum he withdrew in shortened his term in prison, decisions cash soon after the deal. The same "consult- which went through and involved various ant", who is neither a public official nor any levels of the judiciary. The US ambassador, kind of noted expert in the field, had regis- then actively involved in the ongoing judici- tered around 100 calls with the then-PM as ary reform, didn’t mince his words: "I want far back as 2006. Neither the recorded calls, to say to the corrupt judiciary that this is nor red-light transfers, nor disclosed com- an unacceptable decision." Other cases of munications and meetings between the judiciary corruption exposed in the media "consultant", Albanian politicians and their indicate paying judges in "cash" for favour- relatives, proved sufficient for the Albanian able rulings; transferring of state-registered judiciary to further investigate the case; properties to private claimants; robbing the indeed, it was a demonstration of how the state with harsh penalties when the state is judiciary often serves to cover up rather a party; deciding in favour of corrupt busi- than disclose political corruption. nesses, soliciting sexual favours, and, in general, doctoring decisions based on who offers the highest price. Indeed, surveys party patronage and show that Albanians rank the judiciary at informality the top of the most corrupt institutions. Another pertinent feature of this post- How did we get here and why the judici- communist model of the judiciary is its per- ary became a key node of state capture by sistent obstructing and ultimately closing of particular political and criminal interests is all cases of abuse of power, an indicator that crucially important to assess the evolving it is the politics that pulls the strings of the resistance and actual stalling of internation- system.4 So far, all high-level cases of abuse ally-sponsored reforms that aim to overhaul of public office were delayed, obstructed, the system. and ultimately closed without proper per- The actual state of the judiciary as an secution.5 How politically "delicate" cases enabler of corruption, crime and abuse of end up nowhere is illustrated by the evolu- office is a result of widespread party patron- tion of a 2016 case on the privatization and age and rampant informality that character- subsequent collapse of the Albanian Power ized the decades of messy transition. From Distribution Company, the so-called CEZ the very start of regime change, Albanian affair. The Attorney General, historically a political parties have treated the state as a key political appointee, who enables cen- piece of property to be distributed among tralized political control over active inves- respective militants and loyalists without tigations, refused to look further into a file any consideration of professional cre- documenting potential abuses by around dentials or requirements for the job.7 The 10 then-state officials involved in the 2009 recruitment of political militants and loyal-

4 Elbasani, A. and Šelo Šabić, S. (2017) Rule of law, 6 Ibid. corruption and democratic accountability in the 7 Elbasani, A. (2009). ‘EU Administrative Condi- course of EU enlargement. Journal of European tionality and Domestic Downloading: The Limits of Public Policy, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10. Europeanization in Challenging Contexts’, Berlin: KFG 1080/13501763.2017.1315162 Working Paper Series, no. 2. http://www.ssoar.info/ 5 BTI 2016. ssoar/handle/document/36563 (accessed May 2017). 28 modes and instruments of state capture judiciary as a mechanism of state capture: external actors, party patronage and informality

the system. Those candidates who went against the party line even when they were party affiliates and nominees – the chair of the High Court in 1994, the attorney general in 2007 and again the attorney general in 2013 – were purged from their posts never to be able to enter the system again.10 In addition to the initial placing of loyalists without professional qualifications throughout the system, the same "anti- communist" establishment that ruled in the period 1992-1996 and again in 2005- 2013 managed to keep hold of the judicial appointments and promotions by controlling the presidency of the country. Out of 5 post-communist presidents, 4 were nomi- nated by that specific party and 3 came from the narrow circle of its leadership. "judiciary" by Yara Kassem, CC-BY-NC-2.0 These politically affiliated presidents who ists in key state institutions – privatization were also in charge of appointments in the boards, public companies, the judiciary, judicial hierarchy made sure to promote security services, public administration, convenient candidates, thus creating an constitutionally independent entities, and informal institutional network that carried even the academic system – was instru- out the party patronage line. Because of its mental in controlling the spoils of the state. control of the presidency, all attorneys gen- The initial stages of transition, when the old eral but one were appointees of the same institutions had collapsed and the new ones party, and so were all leaders of the High were yet to emerge, provided particular State Control, nominations which echoed "openings" for party oligarchs to infiltrate the party agenda across state institutions. their militants into the institutional hierarchy of the state.8 The judiciary was particularly vulner- the feeble role of able to infiltration by party cronies because international actors of its potential role in disclosing and undermining such schemes. Hence, the "initial" Given the actual state of the judiciary and reforms undertaken in the period 1992- its deep, although informal, enmeshment 1994 made sure to remove around 80% withpolitics, any reforms to clean up its of the old personnel, who were branded ranks would require the involvement of communist collaborators without scrutiny international structures. However, whether into their credentials or collaboration with the international community can succeed in the regime. The new batch of judges that pushing forward the ongoing reform is quite replaced the old ones were drawn from the uncertain given the poor record of interna- militants of the anti-communist umbrella tionally-led institution-building experi- party, the Democratic Party, which won ences so far, as well as the inbuilt problems the first free elections in 1992. This group of external projects and the shelf-life of of judges were hastily trained through a institutional transfers across the region. legal course of 3-6 months before being In the case of Albania, the international catapulted into key positions of the judicial community has long been involved and to hierarchy.9 Given that the new contingent some extent implicitly liable for the state lacked education, expertise or any other of the judiciary. After the collapse of state professional qualifications, they served authority in 1997, various bodies of the party patronage schemes to advance their international community took over a lead- careers. Moreover, the incoming batch of ing role in initiating, negotiating and spon- political loyalists could control promotion soring major institutional reforms.11 After of judges, allocation of cases and generally 2000, the European Union emerged as the who was to be included and excluded from leading actor, and EU integration a con-

8 F. Abrahams, Modern Albania, From Dictatorship to Democracy in Europe, NYU Press, New York 2015. 10 Ibid. 9 Elbasani and Šelo Šabić, S., 2017. 11 Abrahams, 2016. judiciary as a mechanism of state capture: external actors, party patronage and informality modes and instruments of state capture 29

Most financial assistance has focused on technical capacities while ignoring the dimension of impartiality, such as independence, corruption and de facto separation of institutions in focus. Much of the assessment conducted under the auspices of international bodies moreover focuses on one-shot, quick and formal assessment of newly built institutions while ignoring the informal and ongoing patronage schemes that keep these new institutions hostage to politics. sensual agenda against which the country’s sion of impartiality, such as independ- progress and stagnation are measured. In ence, corruption and de facto separation of this context, the EU was in the position to institutions in focus.13 Much of the assess- set the priorities, assess relevant reforms, ment conducted under the auspices of use various diplomatic channels to push for international bodies moreover focuses on its priorities, and spend substantial funds in one-shot, quick and formal assessment of target areas of EU integration.12 The judici- newly built institutions while ignoring the ary and other rule of law institutions have informal and ongoing patronage schemes actually received the lion’s share of external that keep these new institutions hostage to assistance and of EU funds in particular. politics. Hence, most external reporting on Since 2005, the EU has also poured assis- the issue remains at the superficial level of tance on a specific international mission formal change and fails to dig deep into the dedicated to "the development of a more actual links, actors and historical processes independent, impartial, efficient, profes- that enable judiciary corruption. sional, transparent and modern justice A related problem has to do with the system in Albania". The so-called Euralius life and nature of international projects. mission is still going strong in its 5th exten- Most projects have a specific timespan and sion. Other projects, funds and advice are concerned with spending the allocated related to the judiciary kept coming in funding while recording a list of demonstra- within the framework of other international ble outputs within that specific time period. organizations, including the Council of Few projects had a long enough timespan Europe, OSCE, World Bank and other foun- to evaluate how the new institutions func- dations. Such focus on rule of law enabled tioned, whether they have changed and/or streams of well-paid international experts were replaced after the project has ended. to suggest new rules, procedures and insti- Besides, most international consultants tutional arrangements. Many projects were employed by such projects are interested successfully concluded and huge amounts in skipping from one position to another of assistance, some of which given as loans, instead of delving into the mud of long- were successfully spent. Although the coun- term informality and corruption, which try received plenty of advice, legal templates would probably also put them on bad terms and actual financing and projects, the for- with domestic politicians whose support mal institutions and laws resulting from they need to pursue yet other consultancy these projects were continuously made and appointments and projects. Certainly, the unmade with little effect in curbing political usual reporting on general institutional control over, and corruption of the judiciary. changes that only skim through the surface A crucial problem of why such interna- of reform is more rewarding than delving tionally-led campaigns have failed to make into how and why those institutions are and a real change is related to the technicalities remain captured. of funding. As Martin Mendelski suggests Last but not least, the international com- on the basis of comparative evidence from munity often proved rather weak to consist- South-East Europe, most financial assis- ently push for its initiatives and counteract tance has focused on technical capacities domestic strategies of resistance. In the case – better infrastructure, improved payment of judicial reform, the EU and US sponsored schemes, clear institutional procedures, the entire legal package and preparatory training etc. – while ignoring the dimen- 13 Mendelski, M. (2015) ‘The EU’s pathological power: 12 Elbasani, A. ed., European Integration and Transfor- the failure of external rule of law promotion in mation in the Western Balkans: Europeanization or South Eastern Europe’, Southeastern Europe 39(3): Business as Usual? Routledge, Abingdon 2013. 318–346. 30 modes and instruments of state capture judiciary as a mechanism of state capture: external actors, party patronage and informality

works. They were also behind the political The Brussels officials proved less deter- negotiating processes and arranged a "con- mined to name and shame sources of resist- sensual" adoption of the necessary constitu- ance. Instead, they reached for a "political" tional changes on June 2016. Yet, secondary offer, which left it to the parties to appoint legislation necessary to implement the con- members of the vetting commissions, a constitutional changes was still blocked and cession that played into the parties’ interest delayed for another year. The exchanges in keeping control of the system. Even with between the US ambassador and the Alba- such concessions, the creation of vetting nian Attorney General bring some clarity structures didn’t go through until a US high on the type of resistance. According to the official could broker a pre-electoral agree- Ambassador: "for 18 months, the Attorney ment that brought all parties to the negotiat- General has spoken persistently and loudly ing table again. In another twist that shows against reform. … Luckily, those who drafted how strong the anti-reform block is, while the reform have foreseen that powerful the parties were seemingly working on the authorities would attempt to manipulate the vetting structures, the Albanian Association new [vetting] councils." Few days before the of Judges appealed the vetting law to the frank exchange, the US embassy had revoked Constitutional Court. The court had already the US visas of 23 key members of the judi- checked and arguably watered down some cial hierarchy. The Attorney General blamed of the key articles of the respective law dur- ambassador’s declaration as "Sorosian pres- ing a previous appeal. Given that the coun- sure to manipulate the public opinion." try will hold general elections in June 2017*, To leave no doubt as to who stands behind the progress of reforms will largely depend his blames, the Attorney General rushed to on the configuration of the future parlia- write a letter of "complaint" and then meet ment, but also on the determination of the the president-elect and the chair of the par- US and EU actors to counteract strategies of liament, both coming from parties that had resistance from powerful actors who have entrusted him with that position and had everything to lose from a proper vetting of actually used all institutional means to block the judiciary system. reform, particularly the vetting process.

* the final version of the article was submitted in mid June (editor’s note) Serbia: hijacked and appropriated state modes and instruments of state capture 31

Serbia: hijacked and appropriated state

Đorđe Pavićević

The concept of appropriation came up in recent political discourse in Serbia as a means of characterizing the particular kind of rule practised by the Serbian government. It is related to efforts of the ruling elite to exclude all means of utilising state authority and institutions other than those that work in the interests of the owners (the ruling elite) and their employees (supporters), as well as the means of utilising them that are used for the delegitimization of their rivals.

During the last three decades, the failures of capture are not comprehensive enough Serbian state were interpreted in different to capture all important elements of the ways. The most popular thesis during the new style. They comprise many important last decade of the twentieth century was the aspects, but they leave many important fea- one that held that Serbia is an unfinished tures out of sight. state, famously advanced by the philoso- A more precise qualification of the pher and first democratic Prime Minister Serbian state could be given in terms of a of the Republic of Serbia Zoran Đinđić. It hijacked and appropriated state. The con- was further developed by political theorists cept of hijacked state is rarely used in politi- Milan Podunavac and Nenad Dimitrijević, cal analysis. To my knowledge, it is used in and historian Latinka Perović. The concept analyses of ruling elites in some African of unfinished state refers to the discrep- states (John Prendergast) and as a charac- ancy between norms of political integration teristic of several American administrations and the institutional structure of the state. (Robert F. Kennedy Jr., Charles H. Ferguson, A consequence of this failure is the emer- Gail Collins). The concept refers to the state gence of a so-called dual state, one that in which "rulers use state authority, institu- acted through the official state apparatus, tions, and deadly force to finance and fortify and another, which relied on non-state and crony networks. In these states, corruption unofficial agents and networks. During the is not an anomaly – it is the foundation first decade of the XXI century, the main of the intended system." The concept of cause of the failure of the state was seen in appropriation is used here in the ordinary the extensive influence of political parties, legal meaning of "to make one’s own" and particracy. Political parties and their elites "to set (something) apart" for particular were blamed for usurping and abusing insti- use. Although the concept of appropriation tutions, public resources, state services, etc. is familiar in political theory in the context Since the elections of 2012 and the change of critique of neoliberal policies and market of government that followed, political sci- practices, I am not familiar with the usage of entists and analysts have been reluctant to the concept of appropriated state. The con- Đorđe Pavićević characterize the new style of rule. The usual cept came up in recent political discourse in Professor at the Faculty of conceptions of authoritarian rule or state Serbia as a means of characterizing the par- Political Science, Belgrad 32 modes and instruments of state capture Serbia: hijacked and appropriated state

ticular kind of rule practised by the Serbian government. It is related to efforts of the The leader of the ruling party in ruling elite to exclude all means of utilising Serbia built a powerful party or- state authority and institutions other than ganization which is able to hijack those that work in the interests of the own- the state and its institutions and ers (the ruling elite) and their employees (supporters), as well as the means of utilis- to use its resources to benefit ing them that are used for the delegitimiza- ruling elites and their supporters. tion of their rivals. All of them are included in the There are at least two advantages to organized political enterprise of using the concepts of hijacking and appro- hijacking the state and protect- priation in relation to the Serbian state. First, unlike the concept of state capture, ing the loyalty network. For this these concepts do not presuppose a clear reason, the future of democracy and simple division of labour between state in Serbia is not guaranteed; the actors and private interests. According to a prospects that the Serbian state simple picture of social division of labour, would became a consolidated failure of the state is seen in systemic influence of private interests on the political democratic state are even more decision making process. The supposedly gloomy given the international neutral state is corrupted by illegitimate environment and support that trespassing between different spheres of the current government is win- action. In this case, it all depends on where ning from important internation- one draws the line it is illegitimate to tres- al actors interested only in the pass. This line is not always clear, especially in the cases of governments with ambitions stability of the region. to transform society. Representatives of the Serbian Government often use messianic rhetoric to describe their historic mission appropriation of the state in changing the society, people, habits, etc. The distinction between public and private In order "to set aside" public resources interests is of little use in evaluation of great for the purposes of promotion of partisan political and historic missions. The second interests and interests of their own leader advantage of using this terminology is that Aleksandar Vučić, the SPP launched an it provides a useful conceptual framework aggressive campaign to delegitimize and for analysing the formation and protection criminalize political opposition. The main of "crony networks" that are created in order target was the previous ruling party, the to put public resources and state services Democratic Party (DP). Ninety-seven party under control. officials, members of the DP were arrested The Serbian state is analysed as an or incriminated for various forms of politi- appropriated and hijacked state in two dif- cal corruption in the first three years of the ferent ways. First, after the parliamentary new government’s rule. Only a few of them elections of 2012, and the forming of the were officially charged for corruption, and new ruling coalition with a thin majority, the only one case has been adjudicated in the largest party in the ruling coalition, the Ser- first degree. Nonetheless, arrests were usu- bian Progressive Party (SPP), monopolized ally carried out in spectacular police actions the political arena and appropriated pub- with designated names and with extensive lic resources for the purpose of running an media coverage. This is only one example of incessant political campaign in favour of the maltreatment of political opposition. Most party leader, as well as a campaign against members of opposition parties were forced the political opposition and non-partisan to become passive or to change affiliation in rivals. Second, after the parliamentary elec- order to save their jobs or to keep their positions of 2014, the SPP formed a supportive tions. It is estimated that one third of all offi- loyalty network built on massive employ- cials in local municipalities were previously ment of its members in state institutions members of parties that are now in oppo- and state-owned companies, severe abuse sition. The remaining membership were of institutions for partisan purposes, and treated as enemies of the state or as rem- the politics of social insecurity for those who nants of the old, corrupt regime doomed to were disloyal or disobedient. disappear. Serbia: hijacked and appropriated state modes and instruments of state capture 33

The other way of excluding the opposi- a) Employment of party members in tion and other rivals from the public arena state institutions and state-owned was colonizing and strict control over most companies. The favourite method of of the media space, including the flow of recruiting new members and keep- information on web sites. Journalists were ing them under control is promising intimidated for their critical view of the gov- the possibility of employment and ernment, and some of them were severely social advancement due to active punished by losing their jobs. The financing party membership. Almost no other of media companies is an extremely sensi- precondition is necessary except loy- tive question because almost all of them alty to the leadership. This method of are heavily dependent on public financing, recruitment and disciplining mem- advertising by state-owned companies and bers has been improved to perfection cooperation with advertising agencies that by the SPP leadership. Prospects for are regularly managed by persons close to employment or promotion are most- the government. A paradigmatic case was ly dependent on contributing to the the cancellation of the most popular and electoral results, on praising the party longest-lasting political talk show in Serbia, as a successful organization, as well "Utisak nedelje" [Impression of the Week], as publicly expressed loyalty to the broadcast on the private TV station B92. The party leadership. Keeping the job or contract with the author and producer was position safe is likewise dependent on annulled at the owner’s expense. The whole contributing and loyalty. In order to operation of cancellation was accomplished keep the membership active, their po- without a legal ban being issued and with- sitions are usually temporary. For ex- out visible political interference. What is ample, in state-owned companies in mysterious about it is that the cancellation Serbia, 21 out of 37 directors are act- was against the commercial interest of the ing directors whose contract duration media company, to broadcast such a popu- is sometimes as short as 3 months, lar and influential talk show, concerning and the government renews them af- that the author’s only "offence" was that she ter the designated period expires. was critical of the Government and espe- b) Selective justice and impunity. High- cially the Prime Minister. ranking officials and active members The absence of credible and effective enjoy a high degree of impunity con- opposition along with effective control over cerning legal prosecution, provided publicly broadcast information allowed the that their deeds were done in order ruling party to appropriate state resources to promote the party and its leader- and use them at its own will and as if they ship. The most prominent examples were its own. are the Helicopter case and the Sava- mala case. At least two Ministers were hijacking the state involved in the case of a fatal crash of a helicopter during a humanitar- The appropriated state resources are used ian rescue mission. It was established for establishing a supportive network in that there were failures in the chain order to keep the party riding and stable in of command, as well as that regular the saddle. The SPP is a massive party with procedures were neglected. A crimi- more than 630,000 registered members. nal investigation did not find criminal This number constitutes approx. 17% of the responsibility on anyone’s part, beside electorate, bearing in mind that the average the disciplinary responsibility of two turnout is about 3.8 million voters. For this army generals who were punished by reason, it is a serious task to keep the mem- having the possibility of further pro- bership in line with party policies and to motion withheld. The sentence was establish party discipline, keeping in mind later annulled. The Savamala case is that the SPP is a party with a strong leader widely known and more publicly ex- and strict rules of conduct. There are several plored, given that more information modes of abusing state authority and state was available. Savamala is a part of resources to fortify the loyalty network of Belgrade located where a controver- the party. sial national project named the Bel- grade Waterfront is under construction. Several buildings were destroyed overnight by workers employed by 34 modes and instruments of state capture Serbia: hijacked and appropriated state

an unknown company, protected by masked security guards and without a conclusion court decision that these buildings are illegal. In addition, a masked security The thesis presented in the essay is more a guard maltreated several passers by result of the direct, everyday experience of and a watchman of one of the build- a careful observer of daily politics in Serbia ings; the police refused to react, and so than based on serious scientific findings. on. There were a number of wrongdo- Given the absence of serious publications ings. All that is publicly known about on political developments in Serbia, the those responsible for the series of mis- author took a risky strategy of trying to deeds is that they are "idiots" and that articulate his own experience and expertise. they are high-ranked officials of the Still, it is surprising that after five years of City of Belgrade. Otherwise, rules and significant changes in the Serbian political regulations are strictly implemented environment it is so difficult to find reliable when the object of implementation is scientific articles on different aspects of ordinary citizens and their property. the political transformation of the Serbian c) Fear and social insecurity. Insecurity state. of income, job or position is an important instrument of widening and fortifying the loyalty network. There is a widespread conviction that the necessary condition for advancing individuals’ private interests is membership in the party. Fear of losing one’s income and job is a powerful tool for mobilizing party members, as well as an incentive to bystanders to join the winning team and stay obedient. The leader of the ruling party in Serbia built a powerful party organization which is able to hijack the state and its institutions and to use its resources to benefit ruling elites and their supporters. All of them are included in the organized political enterprise of hijacking the state and protecting the loyalty network. For this reason, the future of democracy in Serbia is not guaranteed; moreover, the prospects that the Serbian state would became a consolidated democratic state are even more gloomy given the international environment and support that the current government is winning from important international actors interested only in the stability of the region. state capture in the Western Balkans modes and instruments of state capture 35 state capture in the Western Balkans

Leon Runje

introduction The first mode was the use of the corruption of There are many factors that contribute to state institutions to accumulate wealth through the relatively strong ability of political par- its extraction from both the private and public ties in Western Balkan states to perpetrate sectors, whether through outright theft of govern- state capture. The most acute ones, however, ment property or through corrupt dealings with include the socialist legacy of the region, the private enterprises. This activity would not have subsequent international isolation as well as the bloody break-up of Yugoslavia. The been possible without the second mode of mani- ethnic divisions within most states of the festation of corrupt behaviour. This behaviour can region, which arose from the war as well as be best described as corruption with the aim of the region’s strategic position on the Balkan power preservation. The regime would promote route of the refugee crisis which exploded civil servants as well as deal with private compa- in 2015, give the political parties continuing internal and international leverage for nies based exclusively on their displays of political maintaining political power. This power is loyalty as opposed to competence. otherwise based primarily on the support of clientelist networks. Unfortunately, this modus operandi comes from a strong legacy with its claims. Namely, as McRobie points of para-state activity and hostility towards out, low level political corruption tends to government institutions throughout the either correlate with, or be a direct result of region’s history. the metastases of high level political corruption or state capture. (McRobie, 2010: 10) the socialist legacy If the correlation is so strong, how is it that the primary forms of corruption It is widely considered that during the com- recorded in the Western Balkans during munist period, corruption in the Western the communist period were of the low level Balkans was widespread, but was, for the administrative variety? The cause most likely most part, petty. During this period admin- lies in the way corruption was defined in istrative corruption was prevalent, meaning socialist countries during the Cold War. The that it took the form of low level bureaucratic current definition of state capture comes corruption of state and public institutions, from the World Bank and defines the term as opposed to the corruption of centralized as the efforts of a small number of firms (or government bodies and agencies occurs such groups as the military, ethnic groups at the top of the hierarchical structures of and kleptocratic politicians) to shape the government. The first phenomenon can be rules of the game to their advantage through described as "administrative corruption", illicit, non-transparent provision of private while the latter tends to be denoted by the gains to public officials, examples of such use of the term "state capture". (McRobie, behavior include the private purchase of Leon Runje 2010: 5-8) This assertion cannot be empiri- legislative votes, executive decrees, court Graduated political scientist, cally disproved, however; there is a problem decisions and illicit political party fund- Zagreb 36 modes and instruments of state capture state capture in the Western Balkans

ing. This concept links the problem of corruption with vested economic, social and the legacy of war and political interests – which in turn form key isolation obstacles to economic reform. (World Bank, 2001) This of course gets obfuscated in a The twin legacies of war and isolation in socialist system which does not necessar- the Western Balkans are hard to separate, ily value or protect the concept of private although they affected the region’s constitu- property, indeed regardless of the various ents in radically different ways. If one takes dogmas of "social ownership", the major- a moment to consider the definition of the ity of the companies in the Western Balkans Western Balkans (at least as proposed by were state-owned, that is to say, the ruling the European Union, in terms of its expan- communist party was free to control them sion plans), one usually gets the formula of by means of access to key managerial posi- Ex-Yugoslavia minus Slovenia plus Albania. tions within state-owned companies. (Bego- If one accepts this definition, one can notice vic, as cited in McRobie, 2010: 10) Evidence two diverging histories. While Yugoslavia of these practices continuing even after the was generally the most open of the socialist end of the Cold War and the subsequent fall countries during the Cold War, Albania, on of communism can be found in the fact that, the other hand, was subject to a strict self- in certain cases, as was the situation in Ser- imposed isolation by its Cold War socialist bia, large swathes of state property were not regime under Enver Hoxha. Although this privatized but rather became property of the policy was abolished by the 1990’s, it lasted reformed communist party, now called the for a full forty years and made smuggling an Socialist Party of Serbia. (Pešić, as cited in essential economic activity. This is where McRobie, 2010: 14) Furthermore, the ruling the strong link between organized crime parties continued the tradition of directly and Albania’s political elite begins. (McRo- controlling state-owned enterprises; as bie, 2010: 26) Yugoslavia, on the other hand, Pešić points out, the idea that government- had a very different trajectory. The relation- owned companies should be administered ship between the political elites of the indi- by party-elected cadres is alive and well in vidual Yugoslav Republics is also strongly Serbia. (Pešić, as cited in McRobie, 2010: 15) connected with smuggling activities, how- What follows logically from this fact is ever for vastly different reasons. As McRobie that, in the Western Balkans generally, and points out, "the elites of the Yugoslav Repub- in Serbia and Albania specifically, legal lics [during the war] were actively involved in state capture which existed during the com- the development and organization of smug- munist period has, in a sense, been trans- gling channels." (McRobie, 2010: 15) This has formed into party capture. That is to say, a lot to do with international isolation caused special vested interests will focus on sup- by the war itself. That being said, motiva- porting a specific party and then, once it tions for such behaviour diverged between obtains power, use it as a tool to perpetrate the individual Yugoslav Republics. The pri- state capture upon the government sys- mary motivation of Croatia and Slovenia for tem. The development of this approach in engaging in illegal smuggling initially was the Western Balkans is a direct result of the to break the arms embargo imposed by the fact that the authoritarian socialist regimes international community, given the fact that in the region have given way to nominally the Yugoslav People’s Army, which they were democratic ones. In these systems political facing at the time, was far better equipped for parties are forced to contend for power on the imminent conflict. Serbia, on the other the one hand, while on the other, national hand, commanded the Yugoslav People’s election campaigns are becoming ever cost- Army or what was left of it, and therefore lier for them. (McRobie, 2010: 22) As far as hardly had the need for importing weap- government-funded campaigns are con- ons. It was, however, faced with a wide array cerned, particularly in the case of Albania, of economic sanctions due to its war time high tax avoidance rates make it difficult for activities and was, therefore, in dire need of the government to provide this public ser- smuggling services in order to procure cer- vice. tain goods. Both the case of the political isolation of Albania and the case of the former Yugo- slavia cemented the connection between local governments and organized crime. (McRobie, 2010: 15) Furthermore, the war state capture in the Western Balkans modes and instruments of state capture 37

in the former Yugoslavia also strengthened organized crime networks in Albania. This ethnic divisions and state was primarily evident in these crime net- capture works supplying the Albanian Kosovo Lib- eration Army with weapons; however it The states of the West Balkan region are was also simply a way for these networks not only divided by the different variants of to profit from Serbia’s relative isolation socialism they experienced during the Cold through providing smuggling services. The War, or by the various positions they found fact that Albania itself was experiencing an themselves in during the break-up of the institutional crisis which would lead to an Yugoslav Federation. The main difference in institutional collapse in 1997 did nothing to terms of the levels of state capture in indi- alleviate matters. (McRobie, 2010: 21-22) vidual Balkan States stems primarily from the ethnic divisions within their respective societies. Therefore, a key difference arises, power protection and primarily between states where the issues accumulation of ethnic division in society play only a secondary role, such as Serbia and Croatia on When dealing with state capture in the the one hand, and those such as Bosnia, Western Balkans, one would be wise to Macedonia and Kosovo where they domi- introduce a further categorical distinction nate the political landscape. As Vachudova within the terms used to describe the wider points out, "In Serbia and Croatia, office- phenomenon of political corruption. While seeking parties have responded to strong political corruption is broadly defined as incentives to moderate their positions in the use of public power for private benefit order to become EU-compatible. In Bosnia (World Bank, as cited in McRobie, 2010: 7), and Macedonia, however, political competi- there are two ways in which the regimes tion is structured almost entirely on identity, which arose in the Western Balkans after the with parties hardly taking any distinct posi- fall of communism manifested political cor- tions on managing the economy and public ruption in particular. The first mode was the services (...) These party systems have been use of the corruption of state institutions to captured by small groups of elites who profit accumulate wealth through its extraction from illiberal democracy; to protect it, they from both the private and public sectors, keep the EU at bay, and use nationalism and whether through outright theft of govern- chauvinism as a strategy to deflect attention ment property or through corrupt dealings from rampant corruption and the rollback with private enterprises. This activity would of democratic freedoms, transparency and not have been possible without the second the rule of law." (Vachudova, 2017) Further- mode of manifestation of corrupt behaviour. more, as Peter Van Ham points out, "Bosnia This behaviour can be best described as and Herzegovina, as well as Kosovo, remain corruption with the aim of power preserva- (at least partially) internationally adminis- tion. The regime would promote civil serv- tered... Bosnia and Herzegovina are ham- ants as well as deal with private companies strung by a political deadlock between three based exclusively on their displays of politi- main ethnic groups: Bosniaks, Croats and cal loyalty as opposed to competence. This Serbs." (Van Ham, 2014: 8) Furthermore, in would free the regime from a considerable the case of Kosovo and Macedonia, ethnic source of restraint while it was engaging in based state capture is further facilitated by illegal activity as well as create an extensive international circumstances. As Van Ham network of individuals and organizations points out, "Kosovo’s ties with the EU are which would all stand to benefit from the restricted, since the five EU member states regime’s activities. (McRobie, 2010: 8-15) It is (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and hard to separate these two forms of corrupt Spain) refuse to recognize Kosovo’s inde- behaviour by a specific government regime pendence. (Van Ham, 2014: 8) Macedonia is from each other, mainly due to the fact that another example where ethnic based iden- they complement and necessitate each tity politics is not only legitimizing state other. It is therefore difficult to answer the capture at home, but also facilitating it in question of which mode of behaviour came the international arena through provok- first; however, one can make a reasonable ing inter-state confrontation. The clearest assumption that where one of these behav- example of such a phenomenon is Mac- iours exist, the other will follow. edonia’s continuing failure in its attempts to join both the EU and NATO. The main 38 modes and instruments of state capture state capture in the Western Balkans

The collaboration of western states with Balkan autocrats is certainly nothing new. From King Alexander, Marshall Tito to President Milošević, the West has historically been happy to trade in democracy for stability. What differentiates this new form of "stabilocracy" from its previous incarnations is the fact that in the 2000’s, the EU actually did invest a considerable amount of effort and political capital into providing the region with a path to full EU membership. This path was always heavily predicated upon the implementation of the required reforms. The current backsliding towards "stabilocracy" puts all the invested work and political capital in jeopardy.

reason for this is the persistent opposition stabilocracy in the Western to Macedonia’s application bid by Greece, which opposes the use of the name "Mac- Balkans: state capture and edonia" to denote the Former Yugoslav the refugee crisis Republic of Macedonia. The issue for both the Macedonians and the Greeks is in fact Another issue which has helped stabilize one of ethnic identity. (Van Ham, 2014: 8) and strengthen the state capture regimes Another dimension of ethnic based state currently in place in the Western Balkans capture in the Western Balkans is the high has been the refugee crisis. This situation level of kin-trust characteristic of ethnically has provided the weak democracies in the homogenous groups. Since the break-up of region, with autocratically minded lead- Yugoslavia in the 1990’s, the newly created ers governing through informal patron- states, although multiethnic themselves, age networks, with the legitimacy of, once have become home to ever more homog- again, providing the West with stability in enous ethnic groups on the sub-state level. the region. (BiEPAG, 2017: 7) The collabora- Examples of this are the Serb, Croat and tion of western states with Balkan autocrats Bosniak communities in Bosnia, the Serb is certainly nothing new. From King Alexan- and Albanian communities in Kosovo, the der, Marshall Tito to President Milošević, the Serbs and Montenegrins in Montenegro West has historically been happy to trade in as well as the Albanians and Macedonians democracy for stability. What differentiates in Macedonia. In addition to this, there is this new form of "stabilocracy" from its a particular historic legacy in the region, previous incarnations is the fact that in the stemming from centuries of foreign occupa- 2000’s, the EU actually did invest a consider- tion. The region’s history saw the local com- able amount of effort and political capital in munity, the kin or the clan, pitted in a long providing the region with a path to full EU term struggle against the state, which was membership. This path was always heavily considered to be a hostile and foreign actor. predicated upon the implementation of the A culture of familial connections and other required reforms. The current backsliding para-state institutions, which greatly facili- towards "stabilocracy" puts all the invested tated state capture, sprang up from such a work and political capital in jeopardy. It also mentality. (Van Ham, 2014: 11) Given this explains the very different reactions of the history, combined with the aforementioned leaders of Hungary and Serbia to the refu- increasing levels of homogeneity among the gee crisis. Although they both use national- ethnic groups of the region since the Yugo- ism to cement their ever-stronger grip on slav Wars, it is a small wonder that Alan Riley state power, Viktor Orban of Hungary and can claim that what the Western Balkans Aleksandar Vučić of Serbia reacted very dif- have experienced in the last 20 years is akin ferently to the recent refugee crisis. While to a process of "refeudalization". By this Orban rode the populist wave and closed Riley denotes a process whereby "power is off his country’s borders using the crisis to held by informal networks that run through gain political points from his right-wing every state institution and the private sec- base, Aleksandar Vučić had a completely dif- tor". (Van Ham, 2014: 9) ferent agenda. He was primarily interested in demonstrating Serbia’s usefulness to the EU in the crisis, and had therefore behaved accordingly. Consequently, Serbia opened state capture in the Western Balkans modes and instruments of state capture 39

its borders to the refugees and allowed itself petrate state capture for the purpose of to be used as a transit zone. This was wel- servicing the needs of various vested inter- comed in Brussels and Vučić was treated as est groups. The reasons for this vary from EU’s partner and ally. Such a turn of events is historical, cultural to geopolitical. The EU, worrying primarily because it signifies that as the main external actor in the region, is certain events, such as the refugee crisis, both a positive and negative influence in this or certain competitors for influence in the regard. On the one hand, it has the power to region like Russia and China for instance, influence the local regimes into conducting can severely limit the soft power of the EU. reforms through the process of accession Local regimes in the region are now in the conditionality. On the other hand, the EU’s position to play external global actors off dependence on the collaboration of the Bal- against each other, be they the EU, Turkey kan states and Turkey in the recent refugee or Russia. This is the first time since the crisis lead to an additional source of inter- end of the Cold War that local regimes find national legitimacy for the political parties themselves in a position to extract resources currently in power in the region. Finally, the from foreign actors due to their countries’ EU also serves as a means of easing the social strategic position. (BiEPAG, 2017: 8) tensions within the individual Balkan states, being itself a primary destination for work- conclusion ing migrants from the region. The EU allows the dissatisfaction among the population The Western Balkans is currently a region of the Balkan states, fuelled by the failure of of some geostrategic importance, which the captured state institutions to generate lags behind the rest of Europe in terms of prosperity, to be partly diffused by providing economic growth. It is also currently home these countries’ populations with economic to numerous clientelist regimes which per- opportunities within its own borders. bibliography:

Hellman, Joel & Kauffman, Daniel, Vachudova, Milada. "Party Posi- Imf.org (2001) Confronting the Chal- tions and State Capture in the West- lenge of State Capture in Transition ern Balkans" (with Marko Zilovic, Economies, http://www.imf.org/ex- George Washington University). ternal/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/09/hell- University of Graz. 23.3.2017. Lec- man.htm (last accessed 15.6.2017) ture. Available at: https://events.uni- McRobie, Heather (2010) State cap- graz.at/de/detail/cal/event/tx_cal_ ture and political corruption in Serbia phpicalendar/2017/03/23/?tx_cal_co and Albania in: Democracy cluster ntroller[uid]=11059&cHash=b217696 (edit.) Francesco Privitera 47f033da93fbb3e45e2144bd7 Begovic, Boris. ‘Corruption in Serbia: Van Ham, Peter. "Gridlock, Corruption Causes and Remedies.’ Policy brief No. and Crime in the Western Balkans Why 27. The William Davidson Institute at the EU Must Acknowledge its Limits", the University of Michigan Business Clingendael report. Netherlands In- School. Detroit, Michigan. 2005 stitute of International Relations. Oc- Begovic, Boris and Bosko Mijatovic tober 2014. Available at: http://www. (eds). Corruption In Serbia Five Years clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/ Later. Center for Liberal-Democratic Gridlock%20Corruption%20and%20 Studies. Akademija Press. Belgrade, Crime%20in%20the%20Western%20 Serbia. 2007 Balkans.pdf Center for the Study of Democracy. "The Crisis of Democracy in the West- ‘Corruption, Contraband and Organ- ern Balkans. Authoritarianism and EU ised Crime in the Balkans’. Center for Stabilitocracy." BiEPAG Policy Paper. the Study of Democracy Research Pa- March 2017 per. Sofia, Bulgaria. 2003 http://www1.worldbank.org/public- Pesic, Vesna. "State Capture and Wide- sector/anticorrupt/STATE%20CAP- spread Corruption in Serbia", CEPS TURE1.doc Working Document No. 262. Centre for European Policy Studies. March 2007 40 culture and media ethno-geo-political entrepreneurs and the creation of internal homelands in Bosnia and Herzegovina

culture and media ethno-geo-political entrepreneurs and the creation of internal homelands in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Sead Turčalo

Deconstruction of the country is characterized by a constant effort to strengthen the discrimination and marginalization produced by violence and preserve the dominance of the dominant group in exclusive ethnic territories. Ethno-geo-political entrepreneurs frame the complex present state of the country, constituted by the Dayton Peace Agreement, into a discourse about an impossible country, where this seeing of the impossibility is opposite and determined by processes of ethno-territorialisation.

Twenty-two years after the end of the war in course on (ethno-) national identity and Bosnia and Herzegovina the ghosts of geo- conceptualization of a country. politics and nationalism are still haunting The use of the aforementioned strategy the political rhetoric and everyday life of of territoriality creates internal homelands the country. Both ghosts are linked to dif- as ethno-territorialist projects to achieve ferent visions of territory, which leads to the convergence between ethnic identity and creation of divergent, ethnically determined territory (see O’Loughlin & O’Tuathail, 2009: strategies of territoriality. 592; Dahlman & Williams, 2010: 414) which, I use the term ethno-geo-political entre- in the Bosnian and Herzegovinian case, is preneurs to describe the key actors that use attributed as Serbian, Croatian, or Bosniak. territoriality as a spatial strategy for the pur- Internal homelands appear as a space poses of mobilization of their own ethnic for the creation of something both new group and its differentiation from the Oth- and appealing to ancient myths through ers. Ethno-geo-political entrepreneurs do a dichotomy of the past and the present, not live only from or for ethnicity (Brubaker, where the internal homeland is not merely 2004:10) and territory, but also from geopolit- a territory, but a historical category as well; ical visions in which, according to their own the birthplace and the destiny of an ethnic needs, they attribute certain roles to space group. A prerequisite for the creation of an and ethnic groups, ultimately transforming internal homeland is the deconstruction these two categories into the desirable geo- of the state in whose territory the internal political order. By using a hyphen as a figure homeland is to be created. in the phrase ‘ethno-geo-political entrepre- Deconstruction of the country is char- neurs’ I try to point out that all elements of acterized by a constant effort to strengthen our compound word, ethnical, geographical, the discrimination and marginalization pro- and political, are very close to each other and duced by violence and preserve the domi- serve as instruments to entrepreneurs. nance of the dominant group in exclusive The aim of this text is to show that ethnic territories. Ethno-geo-political entre- through the strategy of territoriality, a ter- preneurs frame the complex present state ritory as a real geopolitical category par of the country, constituted by the Dayton Sead Turčalo Assistant Professor, Faculty of excellence becomes a key instrument in Peace Agreement, into a discourse about an Political Sciences, Sarajevo controlling ethnic groups, determining dis- impossible country, where this seeing of the ethno-geo-political entrepreneurs and the creation of internal homelands in Bosnia and Herzegovina culture and media 41

Through ascription of ethno-characterology to the area, the ethnicity, culture, and identity are strengthened in the internal homelands that become new political and psychological battlefields that shape identification with the state as a geopolitical entity and affirm the divergent geopolitical visions of the state. impossibility is opposite and determined by as an additional mechanism, which should processes of ethno-territorialisation. add to the support for the geopolitical In the dominant Bosniak geopolitical demands. Interests represent an ephemeral vision, it is necessary to reform the Dayton instrument, since they are, as suggested by Bosnia and Herzegovina since it is based on Crawford and Lipschutz (1997: 168), nego- injustice and violence and its institutional tiable; compromises can be achieved and and territorial arrangement perpetuates this the like. On the other hand, territoriality as violence. a spatial strategy and the politics of identity The dominant Croatian geopolitical as one of its components are inviolable until vision affirms the ethno-territorial princi- its practices produce a positive result for a ple, which is the basis of the Dayton Bosnia practitioner. (See Crawford and Lipschutz, and Herzegovina, but rejects the structure of 1997: 168) the two entities and three constituent peo- An illustrative example of the benefits ples since, in their view, it is necessary to of a policy of territoriality in Bosnian and complete the ethno-territorial rounding up Herzegovinian conditions over the policy of ethnic groups by creating a third entity. of ethnic interest is the fact that in the Par- In the Serbian geopolitical vision, the liament of Bosnia and Herzegovina entity impossibility of Bosnia and Herzegovina voting was mostly used as a mechanism for stems from its ethnic structure that reflects blocking the adoption of a law (a total of 156 "Yugoslavia in miniature." (See Silber and times, a waste 52.3% per cent of which falls Little, 1996; Kecmanović, 2007; Dodik, 20131) at the feet of the Republic of Srpska and its And from the insight of Serbian ethno-geo- blockade), while according to a Konrad Ade- political entrepreneurs, such an "imposed nauer Foundation study covering the period country" prevents the "millennial" aspira- from 1996 to 2008, the institutions for pro- tion of the Serbs for self-determination. This tection of vital national interests were used discourse of an impossible state is a reaf- only four times. (See Trnka et al. 2009:90-93) firmation of the narrative that the Serbian It actually shows that the territoriality is Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) pro- untouchable since, in the legislative sphere, moted in the 1980s and 1990s about Yugosla- a blockade by deprivation of entity support via being a dungeon for the Serbian people, ends the legislative procedure, while the except that in this case the former Yugoslav use of the mechanism for protecting vital state is substituted by Bosnia and Herzego- national interests unblocks the legislative vina as a framework of detention. In the view process "which, after the mediation of the of Serbian geopolitics, Bosnia and Herzego- Constitutional Court in Bosnia and Her- vina is nothing more than a spatial category zegovina, continues in the Parliamentary within which it is necessary to keep the status Assembly." (Trnka et al., 2009:93) quo and promote Republika Srpska as a tem- The use of territoriality also includes porary internal homeland, which it is neces- a mechanism of demobilization (Gagnon, sary to ultimately transform into a country. 2004:120) and in the post-Dayton Bosnia Territoriality is identified as the key and Herzegovina’s geopolitical trap, protec- strategy for achieving the aforementioned tion (of the territory) of the internal home- different geopolitical visions of Bosnia land is used as a pre-emptive mechanism and Herzegovina. It mobilizes support for in the prevention of the expression of social ethno-geo-political entrepreneurs in their dissatisfaction. competition to win political and economic In this way, the internal homeland power, while the politics of identity is used becomes an instrument of the perpetua- tion of the frozen Bosnian and Herzego- 1 www.24sata.hr. 2013. Milorad Dodik: The Serbs have vinian conflict, and the imagined threat to never truly accepted Bosnia. [online] Available at: "legitimate" ethnoscapes becomes a means http://www.24sata.hr/svijet/milorad-dodik-srbi-istin- ski-nikada-nisu-prihvacali-bosnu-296651 [Accessed: of manufacturing the consent of their own 25 May 2017]. ethnic group at the ballot box. 42 culture and media ethno-geo-political entrepreneurs and the creation of internal homelands in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In order to ensure this consent and While continuity with the previous ideo- empower the imagination of a vulnerable logical movement and the ethnic structure of ethnic area, it is necessary to make the inter- the state were eradicated, continuity with the nal homelands a storage of historical mem- Chetnik movement was established by nam- ories and associations, a place where our ing the streets in Banja Luka after a number wise men, saints, and heroes lived, worked, of Chetnik dukes and ideologues such as Ste- prayed, and fought. (see Smith, 2010: 23) As van Moljević, Duke Momčilo Đujić, Dragiša suggested by David Knight (1982: 517) "the Vasić, etc. In certain ways, the city has also territory is not something given; it is some- been marked by "Piedmont Serbs" (Radović, thing that becomes; the territory itself is pas- 2013: 159) and by Orthodox religion, by sive and human convictions and actions are naming the streets after saints and Ortho- the ones that give the territory its meaning." dox church officials, i.e., Aleja Svetog Save In case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the con- (instead of JNA), Patriarch Makari Sokolović struction of the meaning of space, place, (instead of Ferhat Pašina), and Milan Tepić and territory is monopolized by the political (instead of Vladimira Nazora). class that unites into a conglomerate that I Identical processes took place in Mostar have labelled as ethno-geo-political entre- and Sarajevo. Since Mostar is a divided city preneurs. In their hands, there are instru- in which the western part is presented by the ments that enable "their own reification and views of Croatian ethno-geo-political entre- domination" through "monopoly on plan- preneurs, attempts to establish the identity ning, mapping, and public memorization of of the "capital city" of Croats2 in this part of space." (Radović, 2013: 29) the Herzegovinian city were very intense. Through these practices, a territory This is shown by the information that becomes understandable only for its own even the names of the streets that had a ethnic group, while the Others, even though, geographical or some other ethnically neu- as is the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, tral character were changed (Liska, Rudar- they were born and grew up in that area, are ska, Dalmatinska, Spojna, and Balinovac transferred to the unknown geography. The Square), and all the names that connoted history shaped by changes in the names of socialist ideology or contained Bosniak or streets, districts, or entire cities is natural- Serbian ethnic headings and names were ized and becomes an integral part of the changed. (Radović, 2013:173) This approach growing generations, in whose mental maps was actually meant to mark the borders of the new urban geography becomes the only the Croatian territory within Bosnia and possible geography. Herzegovina. The streets were named after In certain ways, the best examples for Mile Budak, who was an ideologist and the presentation of this "arrangement of Minister of Religion in the Government of authority" (Čusto, 2013:32) are the cities the Independent State of Croatia, to Jure that are perceived as the seats of power of Francetić, the founder of the infamous ethno-geo-political entrepreneurs, that is, Ustasha Black Legion, and lastly to Cardi- Banja Luka, Mostar, and Sarajevo. nal Stepinac, a controversial religious dig- This process took place with two par- nitary who claimed to be, at the very least, allel goals. It was necessary to create a dis- distanced from the crimes against those continuity with the previous identity that who did not ideologically converge with the existed within a certain territory. In Banja Ustasha regime, etc.3 Luka, there was an attempt to erase the 2 Hercegovina.info. "Čović: Mostar is the capital city identity of non-Serb communities, create a of the Croats, Sarajevo of the Bosniaks, and Banja discontinuity with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Luka of the Srbs! We are heading for chaos without compromise!." 2012. http://www.hercegovina.info/ and with the communist ideology as well. vijesti/vijesti/bih/dragan-covic-mostar-je-stolni-grad- For this purpose, only until 1997, the hrvata-sarajevo-bosnjaka-a-banja-luka-srba-bez-dogo- names of 240 out of 416 streets in Banja Luka vora-idemo-u-kaos-top-news (accessed 18 Jun 2013). hrsvijet.net. "Čović: We shall advocate for the third en- were changed, while data from 2007 show tity and Mostar as the capital city until it is realized." that the trend had continued, so out of the 2011. http://hrsvijet.net/index.php?option=com_con tent&view=article&id=16453:ovizalagat-emo-se-za- total number of streets, 338 had names that trei-entitet-i-mostar-kao-stolni-grad-sve-dok-to-ne- "were from the Serbian cultural heritage bude-ostvareno&catid=24:bih-vijesti&Itemid=100 and the Serbian corps, 10 names are geo- (accessed 18 Jun 2013). 3 Tacno.net. "Mostar combating fascism: Announced graphical terms, only 20 of them are linked mass protests, demand for the change of the name to Croatian cultural history, and only three of streets of Nazi criminals." 2013. http://tacno.net/ novosti/mostar-u-borbi-protiv-fasizma-najavljeni- street names were connected with Bosnian masovni-protestitrazi-se-promjena-naziva-ulica-nacis- Muslims." (Radović, 2013: 160) tickih-zlocinaca/ (accessed 18 December 2013). ethno-geo-political entrepreneurs and the creation of internal homelands in Bosnia and Herzegovina culture and media 43

In Sarajevo, urban geopolitics devel- *** oped in a way that made it necessary to Through ascription of ethno-character- make a discontinuity with the previous ology to the area, the ethnicity, culture, and regime in order to affirm the Bosniak iden- identity are strengthened in the internal tity, and to make a connection with crucial homelands that become new political and narratives, by Bosniak ethno-geo-political psychological battlefields that shape identi- entrepreneurs in the post-war period, of fication with the state as a geopolitical entity a historical link between medieval Bosnia and affirm the divergent geopolitical visions and Bogumils with today’s Bosnia and Her- of the state. zegovina and the Bosniaks (King Tvrtko, Space as a geo-political category Kulin ban’s coast). The Youth Allegiance of becomes a crucial factor in mobilizing an Alija Izetbegović was also affiliated, so the ethnic group because groups in the dis- members of the Mladi Muslimani (Young course of ethno-geo-political entrepreneurs Muslims) movement received a number of are rooted in the space, so every speech the streets (Put Mladih Muslimana – the Road official ethnic interpreters translate as being of the Young Muslims, Mustafa Busuladžić, endangering, simultaneously means threat- Hasan Biber, and Halid Kajtaz).4 ening the group. What Radović (2013: 210) points out in Bearing in mind the importance given the context of Sarajevo is that despite the to ethno-territoriality, the logic of territory fact that the trend of "decommemoration in Bosnia and Herzegovina has a strong of terms and persons linked to the previous influence on practical geopolitics. The system is evident", it is still not manifest to aforementioned territorial control becomes the extent present in Banja Luka and Mostar. rooted in political behaviour and institu- However, this return to the medieval past, the tional actions. Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian periods, Both political behaviour and institu- "also testifies to certain strategies of con- tional actions are geographically fixed at structing a national (Bosnian and Bosniak) different levels of identification with the identity that seem to look for a new zero state (canton/entity/state) and conflicts point from which the national symbolism is are produced due to "overlapping territo- further upgraded." (Radović, 2013: 212) rial images" (Vollaard, 2009: 692), in which In addition to renaming the streets and the Bosniak, Croat, and Serbian geopolitical squares, space is also culturally and reli- visions of Bosnia and Herzegovina hold dif- giously rearticulated by the construction of ferent territorial organizations of the state religious buildings of the dominant ethno- as a reference point. religious group, which in effect changes the Through these overlapping images, the way this ethnic group conceptualizes the Bosnian and Herzegovinian space is being space it is living in. Thus, the space is gradu- precisely derogated and relativized, since, ally, step by step, transformed into a place. as Ćurak suggests, (2011: 28) the view is (On this matter, see also Agnew & Smith affirmed that "...Bosnia and Herzegovina is 2002: 5) First, through organized armed not the result of a historically coded space violence, the territory of Bosnia and Herze- in which the state is constituted, but that govina is partially reconfigured by the com- the state is what is determined by political position of new specific territorial units, elites." ethnic regions, which, through everyday Croatian and Serbian ethno-geo-politi- activities and the implementation of urban cal elites perceive the state as a secondary geopolitics, creates a sense of space, or emo- reference point, while the geographical fixa- tional affiliation, among the inhabitants. At tion is directed towards the realized inter- the moment when an emotional affiliation nal homeland (Republika Srpska) and the is created, the space is transformed into a anticipated internal homeland in the Croa- place of subjective territorialization of iden- tian case. tity, while at the same time in a group that The absence of a common vision of cannot build that sense of belonging, space the state among the political elite is also becomes a foreign category, that is, nothing reflected in the manner of identification more than an absolute space, or, "the raw with the state and its acceptance among the physical world." (Radović, 2013: 29) citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4 All new and old names of streets in Sarajevo can be found at SARAJEVO.co.ba. "Ulice grada Sarajeva." 2012. http://sarajevo.co.ba/o-sarajevu/ulice-grada- sarajeva/ (accessed 09 June 2013). 44 culture and media ethno-geo-political entrepreneurs and the creation of internal homelands in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In the case of the Serbs, most of them In the Serbian case, the understanding identify with the entity and not the state. of the Republic of Srpska and the Serbian Some independent surveys among the Serb people as organically connected categories population show that 59.3 percent would is not the result of external interpretation prefer to live in an independent Republika but the self-reflection of Serbian ethno-geo- Srpska, while 11.1 percent would like to see political entrepreneurs about that entity, or RS as part of Serbia. (UNDP, 2013: 41) the experience of its organic territoriality The degree of identification of the Cro- (Vollaard, 2009: 695), where the idea and ats with the Bosnian state is, according to perception is constructed that Serbs are his- the quoted survey, around 20.9 percent. torically rooted in the soil of the existence Their identification is directed more towards of RS. (Ekmečić, 2007: 21; Kuzmanović 2007: the cantons that should form the imagined 42-45; Kunić, 2007: 54) On the other hand, third entity, as an internal Croat homeland the Croats’ understanding of their own geo- in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This idea is sup- political position suggests that they see the ported by 37.7 percent of respondents. Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an This low level of identification with the internal homeland of the Bosniaks, since the state shows a deep polarization of the soci- Bosniaks have given up on Bosnia and Her- ety and proves that affiliation to an ethnic zegovina. (Lučić, 2010: 125) group is preferred over affiliation to the Bos- This Croatian interpretation of the Bos- nian state. niak understanding of Bosnia and Herzego- Bosniaks most strongly identify with Bos- vina is the result of divergent geopolitical nia and Herzegovina (36.7 percent), although discourses produced by the Bosniak politi- a significant percentage of respondents (16.6 cal and religious elite. This divergence is percent) would prefer a particular Bosniak actually paradoxical. The Bosniak political entity or state, or some other form of state elite, since the 1990s onwards, has shown organization (17.3 percent). that it is not capable of thinking strategi- By instrumentalizing people’s attitudes, cally about space, but takes people as its ref- which are nothing else but the reflection erence point, rather than territory. (Ćurak, of geopolitical discourses presented in the 2002: 22-23) On the other hand, the religious media, ethno-geo-political entrepreneurs, elite, like the former Grand Mufti Mustafa ef. in order to perpetuate their own power and Cerić, affirms the spatial thinking that is a produce legitimacy as performers of iden- reflection of the biological imperialism of tity policies, tend to deconstruct the state the majority nation. It shows a "brilliant" of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to con- misunderstanding of the nature of Bos- stitute the internal homelands in historical nia and Herzegovina. Only in this way is it territories, the heritage of fathers. possible to interpret statements according Expressed in classical geopolitical cate- to which it is the "natural right" of the Bos- gories, the affirmation of the entity as a state niaks to have a "nation state." (Cerić, 2012)5 and the affirmation of the completion of an It is clear that, in the last two and a half ethno-territorial setup of the state, respec- decades, in the Bosnian and Herzegovin- tively, promote the "biological imperialism ian case, territoriality has had a significant of the majority nation." (Ćurak, 2011: 28) influence on political behaviour. Ethno- Since territory in geopolitical terms geo-political entrepreneurs produce a spa- represents a physical manifestation of the tial experience that converges with their state’s authority, then that kind of "loyalty to desirable geopolitical order in Bosnia and territory" (Sack, 1983: 62) – in the Serbs’ and Herzegovina. Such a spatial experience is Croats’ case, loyalty to the internal homeland filled with power that reflects the basic, as a form of unaccomplished nation state – underlying structure of authority and their "appears as a source of authority." (Sack, performative geopolitical script of the Other, 1983: 62) This experience of territory as a against which they strive to set boundaries source of authority is fundamentally based in relation to their own ethnic group. on the social-darwinist understanding of territory and, as suggested by Ćurak (2011: 25), the entity appears as a "form of life." 5 Depo.ba. "The Bosniaks have a natural right to a nation state, we are more aware of it than ever." 2012. http://www.depo.ba/vijest/73660 (accessed 11 Nov 2013).; Vijesti.ba. "The Bosniaks are the only people in the Balkans who do not have their own country." 2012. http://www.vijesti.ba/intervjui/74293-Bosnjaci- jedini-narod-Balkanu-koji-nema-svoju-drzavu.html (accessed 11 Nov 2013). ethno-geo-political entrepreneurs and the creation of internal homelands in Bosnia and Herzegovina culture and media 45

The controller (read: ethno-geo-polit- secession. Translated into the language of ical entrepreneur) shifts the role of the everyday Bosnian and Herzegovinian reality, culprit for the poor state of the economy, this threat to territory transforms space into security, and other conditions in which the a solely geopolitical category that controls controlled (read: the ethnic group that the the respective ethnic group. In this vicious controller exclusively represents) live on cycle, geopolitics becomes and remains an to the Other that endangers his territory enforced destiny of ethnic groups in Bosnia by calling for the abolition of the entity or and Herzegovina.

references

Agnew, J., & Smith, J. (2002). American Kuzmanović, R. (2007). Proces kon- space – American place. Edinburgh: stituisanja RS i BiH. Nova srpska Edinburgh Univ. Press. politička misao. Analize, III (5-6), pp. Brubaker, R. (2004). Ethnicity without 39-50 groups. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Lučić, I. (2010). Što je (bila) Bosna i University Press. Hercegovina i tko smo (bili) mi. Status. Crawford, B. & Lipschutz, R. D. (1998). Nr. 14, pp. 107-136 The myth of "ethnic conflict". Berkeley: O’Loughlin, J., & Ó Tuathail (Gerard University Of California at Berkeley. Toal), G. (2009). Accounting for sepa- Ćurak, N. (2002). Geopolitika kao ratist sentiment in Bosnia-Herzego- sudbina. Sarajevo: Fakultet političkih vina and the North Caucasus of Rus- nauka. sia: a comparative analysis of survey Ćurak, N. (2011). Izvještaj iz periferne responses. Ethnic And Racial Studies, zemlje. Gramatika geopolitike. Saraje- 32(4), 591-615. vo: Fakultet političkih nauka i Atlants- Radović, S. (2013). Grad kao tekst. Be- ka inicijativa. ograd: Biblioteka XX Vek. Čusto, A. (2013). Uloga spomenika Sack, R. D. (1983). Human territorial- u Sarajevu u izgradnji kolektivnog ity: a theory. Annals Of The Association sjećanja na period 1941.-1945. i 1992. Of American Geographers, 73 (1), pp. - 1995. - komparatvina analiza. Sara- 55-74. jevo: Institut za istoriju. Silber, L., & Little, A. (1996). Yugosla- Dahlman, C. T. & Williams, T. (2010). via: death of a nation. New York: TV Ethnic enclavisation and state forma- Books. tion in Kosovo. Geopolitics, 15 (2), pp. Smit, A. D. (2010). Nacionalni identi- 406-430. tet. Beograd: Biblioteka XX Vek. Ekmečić, M. (2007). Istorijske i Trnka K. et al. (2009). Proces odlučivanja strateške osnove Republike Srpske. u Parlamentarnoj skupštini Bosne i Nova srpska politička misao. Analize, Hercegovine. Sarajevo: Konrad Ade- III (5-6), pp. 19-38. nauer Stiftung Gagnon, V. P. (2004). The myth of eth- UNDP (2013). Public opinion pool. nic war. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univer- [online] Retrieved from: http:// sity Press. ba.one.un.org/content/dam/unct/ Kecmanović, N. (2007). Nemoguća bih/PDFs/Prism%20Research%20 država. Banja Luka: Glas Srpske. for%20UN%20RCO_Statistical%20re- Knight, D. B. (1982). Identity and ter- port.pdf [Accessed, 23 May 2017] ritory: geographical perspectives on Vollaard, H. (2009). The logic of politi- nationalism and regionalism. Annals cal territoriality. Geopolitics, 14 (4), pp. Of The Association Of American Geog- 687--706. raphers, 72 (4), pp. 514-531. Kunić, P. (2007). Entitetska struktu- ra i funkcionalnost BiH. Nova srpska politička misao. Analize, III (5-6), pp. 51-60. 46 culture and media impotent media and potent business-political oligarchy

impotent media and potent business-political oligarchy

Helena Puljiz

The recent removal of Domagoj Novokmet, Before dealing the forceful editor and presenter of "Otvoreno" [Open] daily political talk show, marked the com- blow to the commercial media, pletion of an ideological takeover of the those in power mowed down state television broadcaster by the ruling, the non-profit media, having conservative HDZ [Croatian Democratic abolished the already short-term Union]. Domagoj Novokmet was the last and meagre forms of support in a succession of editors and presenters of key left-leaning political programmes who, for the non-profit media sector. under political pressure in the last year- Non-profit media have continued and-a-half, were denied the right to freely their work, but their editors and do their work as journalists and editors. The journalists have more or less Croatian Radiotelevision [HRT] is still mis- produced on a voluntary basis, takenly considered by many a public service television broadcaster although, since so this media sector is no longer Croatia gained independence, it has rarely a safe harbour for those who approached this democratic ideal. fell in the politically-motivated Even though Croatian citizens have sus- clearout of personnel from the tained the existence of the HRT by paying Croatian media. the mandatory subscription fee, the public has never had more than a minimal influence on its editorial policy. As a rule, HRT out a formal cause. It was merely a matter of is governed by the governing parties. The waiting for a good opportunity. formal reason for Domagoj Novokmet’s It would have been alright from the per- dismissal was that he did not invite anyone spective of the Croatian media scene today from USKOK [the State Prosecutor’s Office had Novokmet’s case been isolated, and it for the Suppression of Organized Crime and were just a matter of the ongoing politically- Corruption] to a programme addressing the motivated dismissals of HRT personnel, as affair involving the football oligarch Zdravko dismissals in the HRT mainly do not lead to Mamić, accused of signing footballers such sackings, so at least the colleague in ques- as Luka Modrić or Dejan Lovren to extor- tion does not have to worry whether or not tionate contracts, thus causing Dinamo FC they will continue to receive a salary. But a loss of 116 million HRK. Although Novo- this was not the case. Novokmet merely kmet’s superiors received the guest list in joined a series of journalists and editors advance and approved it without objection, who were prevented from doing journalistic once USKOK accused Novokmet of being and editorial work because of political pres- unprofessional, he was promptly removed. sure, overwhelmingly in the private, com- There has been talk of Novokmet’s dismissal mercial media sector, where the protection Helena Puljiz ever since HDZ came into power – when enjoyed by the majority of those employed independent journalist and creative director at http://novaczasve. Tomislav Karamarko was still in charge of at the HRT is not available. com/ the party – but it could not be done with- impotent media and potent business-political oligarchy culture and media 47

Croatia has finally reached the summit when it comes to the most corrupt countries in the European Union, and it seems unlikely that it will soon topple from that throne. One of the reasons for this lies in the corrupt media, but few people in Croatia even dare to publicly speak about it. Cor- ruption in the media is rarely addressed as a problem in the public, so the uninitiated observer may get the wrong impression that there simply is no media corruption, while it is more likely that the truth is that it is so rife and entrenched that it is no longer even recognised as corruption.

Before dealing the forceful blow to the Editorial policy is shaped outside edi- commercial media, those in power mowed torial boards and is entirely dependent on down the non-profit media – the former the particular political and/or economic culture minister Zlatko Hasanbegović abol- interests of the publisher. It is common ished the already short-term and meagre practice for editorial boards to be dismissed forms of support for the non-profit media and appointed on someone’s political say- sector, and his successor, the supposedly so. Today, Croatian editorial boards are pro-European Nina Obuljen Koržinek, has dominated by editors who belong to the continued the same policy towards the lowest rungs of the administration, not the media. Non-profit media have continued highest ranks of journalists. Once again, their work, but their editors and journalists editors walk around newsrooms wearing have more or less produced on a voluntary camouflage Croatian Army clothes bearing basis, so this media sector is no longer a safe prominent national symbols. Journalistic harbour for those who fell in the politically- freedoms are under attack by anyone who motivated clearout of personnel from the has tangible power – politicians, business- Croatian media. men, war veterans’ organisations and citi- At the turn of the century, the belief pre- zens’ associations close to the governing vailed that privatising the media, as well as party, as well as media owners, for their own foreign investment, will lead to increased particular economic and political interests. pluralism in the Croatian media market, In the race for profit, influential small pub- but unfortunately this did not come to lishers abandon ethical and professional pass. Foreign media investors mostly did journalism, they "depoliticise" their content not make the effort to guarantee the profes- in order to survive. sional and labour rights protection for edi- It is no accident that publishers both tors and journalists, a level of journalistic small and large trivialise content, push freedoms characteristic of their countries sexualised content and reporting on acci- of origin, but used all the "advantages" of a dents and personal tragedies (the current politically controlled (media) market. Cer- editorial boards of leading media happily tainly, there are brighter examples, but they rub their hands when it comes to sexual are more of an exception than a rule. If an offences); this helps to create a quantitative owner or manager running a media busi- mirage of producing media content that the ness is democratically-minded and inclined public allegedly wants, but is in reality noth- towards an open society characterised by ing but an escape form social responsibility. the rule of law, it is likely that the editorial Because to play the role of those who watch board will enjoy freedom to work and pro- over the powerful ultimately means to tection from outside pressure. Totalitarian imperil the financial interests of media pub- minds find such a manner of operating lishers. A majority of them did grow out of unimaginable, and since media managers the business-political oligarchy, or is firmly in the private sector are also mobilised from intertwined with it. Claims that investiga- within party ranks that are totalitarian in tive journalism, or simply professional and nature, it is hardly to be expected that the ethical journalism are expensive and uneco- Croatian media will be run by managers dis- nomic do not mean that the public does not posed towards free journalism and fostering want and demand such journalism; it only freedom of speech or open social dialogue. means that it is not wanted by those who guarantee publishers extra profits – who at this moment in time, in the publishers’ view, are certainly not the readers. 48 culture and media impotent media and potent business-political oligarchy

Croatia has finally reached the summit advertiser, so no issue was made of his and when it comes to the most corrupt coun- his businesses’ affairs. Todorić is osmoti- tries in the European Union, and it seems cally connected to the large media firms, unlikely that it will soon topple from that which is why even after everything that has throne. One of the reasons for this lies in the gone on, journalists do not accost him, and corrupt media, but few people in Croatia no cameras and fired up reporters wait out- even dare to publicly speak about it. Cor- side his villa. It needs to be said that there ruption in the media is rarely addressed as are still enough journalists in Croatian a problem in the public, so the uninitiated newsrooms who would do this, but no chief observer may get the wrong impression editors or editorial boards have the profes- that there simply is no media corruption, sional integrity they would need to dare while it is more likely that the truth is that it send them on such a mission or allow them is so rife and entrenched that it is no longer to do it on their own initiative. even recognised as corruption. Political and business elites, media own- As a matter of fact, both small and large ers and prominent journalists/editors knew commercial publishers stay away from that Agrokor would crack as early as in late critical political journalism and only keep summer of 2016, but everyone kept quiet it alive to the extent necessary for it not to until the company’s dealings had entirely disappear completely. As market laws have poisoned national and regional finances. never come to dominate in Croatia, and All those who were financially depend- since rule of law has never been established, ent on advertising from the Agrokor com- with the entire life of the media taking place pany while it was managed by Todorić are under the watchful eye and the laws of the still financially dependent on its adver- business-political oligarchy, it could logi- tisements now that it is managed by a cally have been expected that in the end, commissioner appointed by the Croatian publishers would choose censorship, and government. And this ultimately means trivialisation of content as a special form of that the publishers’ earnings depend on censorship, as a mode of survival. their being kind to prime minister Andrej The ruins of the Agrokor company pro- Plenković and his administration. For this vide the best view of how the entire main- reason, the coverage of Agrokor and the stream media system functions. While Ivica functioning of Plenković’s government has Todorić ruled Agrokor, he was the biggest been mainly serflike.

"Newspaper" by Silke Remmery, CC-BY-2.0 impotent media and potent business-political oligarchy culture and media 49

Rare exceptions aside, our editorial Croatian journalism is not free. Accord- boards are not democratic systems where ing to international organisations’ evalu- freedom of expression and journalism ations measuring the global level of press based on professionalism and ethics reign, freedom, Croatia has again begun an accel- journalism whose goal it is to inform citi- erated descent, while still remaining within zens on all the questions relevant to a dem- the realm of those states considered as hav- ocratic society in order for them to be able ing a partially free media. to make informed decisions. On average, The fact that the situation is nearly iden- Croatian editorial boards are totalitarian tical in all other European transition states, offices for producing media content, domi- and that in some developed democracies nated by precarious work. media freedoms have waned, does not Journalists’ average pay in Croatia today bring comfort. Unfortunately, we can state is lower than the national average salary, that in Croatia, there has been no signifi- while the number of unemployed journal- cant expansion of freedom of information ists has tripled in just a couple of years. A for the past 27 years. The media have been large number of those registered as unem- subdued, and it is now the turn of the free- ployed have actually worked for years as dom of public speech on social networks. collaborators on a permanent succession of These days we have witnessed detentions short-term contracts with no worker’s rights and arrests for malignant Facebook statuses whatsoever; it is this existential pressure, in – and it is not the application of a law that a country where unemployment has fallen recognises and penalises hate speech on exclusively as a result of accelerating emi- social networks that is the problem, but the gration of work-capable population, that fact that it is exclusively selectively applied has created a lethal atmosphere in news- against ideological opponents. Brutal rooms. threats, slander and terrifying hate speech It has been shown in practice that hon- are not punished when they are used by ourably doing one’s work as a journalist, members of the business and political elites, expressing critical opinions on the ruling that is members and followers of right-wing powers-that-be – despite the fact that the parties neo-fascist groups. public recognises and rewards such work – Croatian citizens today are half- refusing to serve the powerful and insisting informed, often disinformed, and when this on working in the interest of the common ties in with the ruined education system, good, can at any moment lead to you find- it seems to me that this place could easily ing yourself on the street, with no income fall under a dictatorship, as the majority is and no protection of any kind from the entirely uninformed and unaware of why aggression of those who feel aggrieved by dictatorship as a form of government would your work. For this reason, self-censorship be unacceptable for Croatia today, to say the has metastasised throughout the Croatian least. media. We are also witnessing the phenom- translated by Hana Dvornik enon of the author gaining the attention of the broader public, but having no media in which they could work freely. 50 culture and media why must education in Bosnia and Herzegovina be reformed, and why reform is impossible?

uneducation policy: captured education why must education in Bosnia and Herzegovina be reformed, and why reform is impossible?

Nenad Veličković

The answer to the first part of the question – The ethnically divided education why education in BH needs to be reformed – is evident: twenty years since the armed leads directly to weakened com- conflict, crimes committed and mass, the munication, increasing mistrust Bosnian-Herzegovinian society has deterio- and obstructing the flow of ideas, rated in every way: growing unemployment, limiting and controlling competi- accelerating brain drain, inter-national ten- tion and the market – in short, a sions are high and threaten new conflicts; administration at all levels is too large, mass provincialisation benefiting inefficient and corrupt; the budget drained the ethnic parties leeching on and overburdened with debt. Democratic the state resources. procedures have been transformed into instruments of party control over economic resources. and affirming the laws of the market and All this is possible because, among other competition. Teaching methods and text- things, no political option has a clear alter- books are antiquated, educational goals native to the current situation – because and standards low, teaching staff disunited, such an alternative would have to be built scared and unmotivated. on a different social value system. The exist- As a consequence of such education ing system is determined by the interests of policy and practice, generations of future capital, more specifically, by the interests of voters will not master the skills necessary the ethnic-economic elites drawing their for good democratic decision-making, pri- credibility from two sources: the neoliberal marily critical thinking based on verifiably logic of the free market and the narrative of reliable information, in the course of their identity and nation. thirteen-year education. The entire set of Since these elites, who find their politi- educational goals that the community of cal embodiment in the biggest national European states has set as its standard has parties (Bosniak, Croat and Serb), usurp, been pushed into the background in Bos- control and use all existing state appara- nia and Herzegovina, and is only addressed tuses, including the education system, it is occasionally, in a way that is shallow and to be expected that education policy will declarative. also be put in service of their remaining in Therefore, if the direct connection power. between the current catastrophic economic Specifically, the curricula in primary and political situation in the country and and secondary schools (and, to a lesser the poor education system were made, not extent and depth, that is, in a different form, to do which would be practically impossi- in kindergartens and universities as well) ble, as well as foolish and irresponsible, it Nenad Veličković are defined so as to favour national values, would be evident that without an educa- Associate professor at the identity-based differences (of language, tion reform, the society cannot be reformed Sarajevo University; editor of Školegijum, a magazine for a faith, history, culture...), while promoting either. more just education entrepreneurship and private ownership, why must education in Bosnia and Herzegovina be reformed, and why reform is impossible? culture and media 51

It is clear that no reform initiative will come from those managing the educational European Institutions repre- apparatus, as they need it just the way it is. sentatives in Bosnia and Her- This is why no leading party programme zegovina consider education features education as an issue. Leaving policy an internal matter of it in the background, while entering the political arena with the questions of sur- Bosnia and Herzegovina, with vival, endangerment, patriotism, collective which they have no right to guilt, with social issues featured merely as interfere. Which is incorrect, as empty rethoric, they count precisely on the the powers they have and the education-system-guaranteed incapacity pressure mechanisms they have of the majority (not educated to think criti- cally and responsibly and to make decisions at their disposal would allow objectively) to see through their strategy them to do much more. Still, and become aware of its passive role in the they do not do it, as they are process of pillaging the country by means of constrained by their own double, privatisation. The ethnically divided educa- conflicting standards. Namely, tion leads directly to weakened communication, increasing mistrust and obstructing their own basis is not immune the flow of ideas, limiting and controlling to nationalism. Their own competition and the market – in short, a fundamental values, although mass provincialisation benefiting the eth- obscured by pro-European eu- nic parties leeching on the state resources. phoria, are essentially national- In this context, the phenomenon of Two ist and capitalist. schools under one roof should be viewed merely as a logical and politically justi- fied solution to the question of who exer- cises authority over education, that is, the sess the credibility for such an articulation, question of the right of nationalist elites to while the values themselves are not pro- indoctrinate those obliged to go to school moted through the voters’ education. In in their own interests. This question cannot fact, even the so-called parties of the Left be solved without a rejection of an ethni- have flirted with the values of the reigning cally-based education, which means rede- Right. The best example for this can be seen fining the role and importance of subject in the policies pursued by the SDP (Social matter related to identity and culture in the Democrat Party) in the period when this process of education, such as for instance, party held the federal, as well as four out of rejecting the premise of three allegedly dis- six cantonal education ministries. tinct languages – Bosnian, Croatian and The second reason is that opposition Serbian. parties do not have the resources (neither Why, however, do opposition parties material nor in expertise) to envisage, plan, not enter elections with clear and well- develop, prepare and implement the neces- thought-through demands and suggestions sary reform. Such resources are realistically for reforming the education system? And held only by the academic community, but, why do representatives of European values just like the state apparatus, it has been omit to more actively advocate for them, in harnessed for the interests of the ruling the framework of their missions here? There elite and has not done enough to pursue are at least two reasons why opposition par- research addressing education policy and ties do not have active alternative educa- the ideological function of education. tion policies. On the other hand, European Institu- The first reason is that alternative tions representatives in Bosnia and Herze- education policy must start with alterna- govina concede absolute sovereignty over tive social values, which in this case are in education to the cantons, the Brčko district opposition to the values of capitalism and and the Serb entity, considering education ethnic nationalism. Alternative parties have policy an internal matter of Bosnia and not articulated such values, for purely prag- Herzegovina, with which they have no right matic reasons: they do not believe that such to interfere. Which is incorrect, as the pow- a starting point would gain them enough ers they have and the pressure mechanisms votes. Which is correct, as they do not pos- they have at their disposal would allow 52 culture and media why must education in Bosnia and Herzegovina be reformed, and why reform is impossible?

"Education is all – University of Manituba" by Alan Levine, CC-BY-2.0

them to do much more. Still, they do not However, reform is currently impossi- do it, as they are constrained by their own ble, as there is no political force that could double, conflicting standards. Namely, their offer an alternative that could be realisti- own basis is not immune to nationalism. cally implemented. Their own fundamental values, although This paradox will result in an educa- obscured by pro-European euphoria, are tion policy that will sabotage any reform, essentially nationalist and capitalist. strengthening its nationalist and neoliberal For education reform in Bosna and positions using the means of the interna- Herzegovina to be carried out in a way tional community. The intensity and trans- that would make education truly inclusive, parency of this sabotage will depend on the modern and humanist, it is necessary to relations between the forces in the Parlia- have a vision, models, instruments, funds ment, but lacking a more convincing alter- and people. native, there will be no departures from the The vision is blurred (as the wrong lens current course. is being used), the models are dim (apart However, this short, discouraging (!) from Finland), the instruments are obso- analysis dialectically suggests an entire lete, funds are meagre and people discour- spectrum of concrete steps that may and aged. must be taken so that real reform of the Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina education system in Bosnia and Herze- must be reformed, because it is directed govina may nevertheless one day become against the welfare of the majority of chil- possible. dren and it directly contributes to the paral- translated by Hana Dvornik ysis of the state and the degeneration of the society. successfully maintained obstructions experiences with captured states 53 experiences with captured states successfully maintained obstructions

Zlatko Dizdarević

For many older and middle-aged people in The war and peace were stopped the former Yugoslavia, one of greatest and most serious sources of anguish lies in the half-way. The defeat of the fact that today, in this new life, the entire greatest cannot be declared logic of life they grew up with in that "For- for doctrinal reasons of world mer" represents a serious problem. There politics, while the traumas of the is much that used to be a value "then", biggest victim cannot be swept accepted and established, that is today an object of utter denial, of ridicule. What used under the carpet. Here lies the to be on the opposite side of morality, intel- permanent anguish, in response ligence, and knowledge is today frequently to which many inchoate solu- a condition not only for prosperity, but for tions were given, including the bare survival. Nowadays, honesty in the programmatic "capture of the old-fashioned terms is all to often read as stupidity and incompetence, education as society". something only those "who can’t do anything else" need, while openness to every and their measures of worth. Value systems kind of corruption all the way to classical are adapted for dwarves, and they have no thievery, is nothing more or less than proof strength, capacity or interest for a race with of resourcefulness and "business capacity". anything genuinely immense. Should we For many, opportunism, to the level of a race then marvel at the fact that new states are in sycophancy, has become not merely a tailored to a new reality, which must serve common necessity in their line of work, but the new interests and their control? There- a conditio sine qua non! fore they, the states, are not a product of In a situation like this, it is difficult to erstwhile textbook definitions on who they reconcile oneself with the overall reality in are to serve, on the basis of which historic which destruction of society and state must principles and theories of state and law they be read as the reality, as interest, and even should be formed, which laws they should policy, while the projects that are operative obey, what are their forms and standards, in in bringing about these "new standards" whose interest they should be... slowly but successfully migrate into the zone All of this should be kept in mind, even comprising the normal, the unquestionable if just in passing, if we are to try to find an and the somewhat fatefully unavoidable. answer to the question – say, in the Bosnia People get accustomed. The years we have and Herzegovina of today – how, why and left behind us, from the wars of the Nineties for what was this state captured, and how until today, have left their mark. Memories come that its successful maintenance in fade, old truths mutate into lies and decep- this state of "slavery" and obstruction – is a tions, while the new criteria for good and planned and carefully sustained business. evil, smart and stupid, wise and snobbish, have already become established as to be Zlatko Dizdarević unimpeachable. The same goes for people Diplomat and journalist, Sarajevo 54 experiences with captured states successfully maintained obstructions

constitutionally outvotes the minority, thus The declared principle of three constitutional producing the concept of a permanent war peoples that bypasses the constitutiveness of all between the two and the third, or between BH citizens, that is, confining all those who do not one and the two, the so-called integral and independent state neither possesses a sin- declare themselves members of any of the three gle internal sovereignty, nor is it integral or peoples to the category of "other", precludes the independent even to the extent necessary achievement of basic equality between all citizens for it to be free, and not captured. of BiH. It follows logically that as such, they do not The second paradox that "constitution- even have equal active and passive voting rights. ally" determines the situation of capture of the state and society is the critical error Politics cannot solve this, as it is based on the inter- of construction in the generally accepted est of division and national exclusiveness, while the democratic concept of free elections, on international community, whatever that may be, has which contemporary states are supposed to no strength – meaning interest – to sanction this. rest. It is a notorious fact that the declared principle of three constitutional peoples that bypasses the constitutiveness of all BH The state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, citizens, that is, confining all those who do created as would-be sovereign, independent not declare themselves members of any of and self-sustaining, was inaugurated by the the three people to the category of "other", international Dayton peace agreement, as a precludes the achievement of basic equal- by-product of the original intention to put a ity between all citizens of BiH. It is not just stop to the bloody war in 1995. It got out of that they are formally, constitutionally their hands and they got tired, and the mad- unequal throughout the state, but it follows ness refuses to cease. Bad news both for the logically that as such, they do not even have atmosphere at home and for the electoral equal active and passive voting rights. The climate for the many over there, far from "enslavement" of a segment of the citizenry Bosnia. The construction and overall effort in such a state is clear to see. Politics can- were directed at putting an end to the shoot- not solve this, as it is based on the interest of ing. They succeeded. In addition, along the division and ethno-national exclusiveness, way, to deal with the former darkness in the while the international community, what- name of "a new era", of "democracy", and ever that may be, has no strength – meaning head off into the bright future. Here, they interest – to sanction this. The key ruling of did not succeed. And war and peace were the Strasbourg court on this issue has not stopped half-way. The defeat of the great- been implemented for eight years. And not est cannot be declared for doctrinal reasons a word from anyone. Who is the captured of world politics, while the traumas of the party here? biggest victim cannot be swept under the Another, no less significant piece of carpet. Here lies the permanent anguish, in nonsense lies in the fact that the country’s response to which many inchoate solutions leading political parties, generally those were given, including the programmatic that stem from the three-part national con- "capture of the society". stitutionality, are showing no interest in The first condition for the construction eliminating this form of a constitutional and of a free, rather than a captured state, has political concept of division of society, if at not been met because the international, least the minimum to appear to follow the will apparently inclined towards peace and evidently dubious declarations about the concept of constitutional adaptation to the "European path of BH". The logic becomes new society and new interests would neither clear in further discussion of the "divided" desire nor allow it. In short, in BH, a system reality here, in which the lowbrow politics, of "capturedness" has been constitutionally entirely stolen by nation and interests, has built in, a system resting on the elimination successfully outplayed all the fundamen- of the historical substance – a common free tal principles of democracy. The narrative society – to the benefit of a destructive con- is transparent and clear, formally attested cept of division and the strong overriding to by invitations to free elections that, as is the weak. The division sought new hate and well known, are considered the chief mech- the production of permanent intolerance, anism for the expression of the citizens’ will which also required a constitutional basis. in choosing those who suit them most. And so it came to be. In a reality in which Recent statistical data on employment in each micro-environment, the majority in BH show that of all the people in the coun- successfully maintained obstructions experiences with captured states 55

try who are employed, meaning those who said referring to a notorious truth: even the are more or less regularly registered as such, money given for fake diplomas that used to more than half receive their income from figure as a condition in job ads was given the state budget, from various levels of the in vain. No diploma makes any sense if HE, vast public administration. From the lowest, the representative of the people, doesn’t say local, to the highest levels of the entities and that the party and the constitutive people the so-called "state". The size of the admin- find you suitable. If you are not suitable, istration in such a BH is best illustrated the state border is open – getting a passport by the fact that throughout Europe, there is still not conditional on being suitable to will be one civil servant per one thousand the party and to the people. Of course, the inhabitants, more or less. In BH, there is an reverse is also true: If you are especially suit- administrative servant, drawing their salary able and needed, there are no issues to you, from the state budget, for every 52 citizens. as a national representative of this state, Another fact: in Europe, annual financing even its former ambassador, becoming a for salaries for those employed in the public representative of another state’s delegation administration takes up 3-5 percent of the in the European Parliament. Yet, you do not GDP, while in BH this amounts to 14 per- belong to the diaspora, but a "constitutive cent! All of this would be a problem in and people" of an allegedly sovereign state. What of itself, beyond a strict reading of the issue kind of state? Well, probably a captured one. of "captured society", if the local practice of The story of local bigwigs who managed complete control over the electorate by the to use their size, tricks, connections and leading parties had not been taken to the allegiances to join the forces "enslaving" the level of national and party absolutism. Sim- state and its institutions from within, is well ply put, getting any kind of a job in the pub- known and not exactly an exclusive. Various lic administration, from doorman to "boss", Miškovićes, Todorićes, and similar newfan- without enrolling in the party "tribe", is gled national oligarchs born through priva- completely unimaginable. Clearly, it goes tisations of the common wealth are always without saying that those employed thanks around. But the case of the state that was to family ties are suitable to the parties. enslaved by its own laws, its own Constitu- Simply, the fact that more than fifty per- tion, international "historic" political deci- cent of the electorate, in addition to mem- sions in the name of freedom, a state where bers of the families of those employed who many totalitarian aspects of depriving the have the right to vote, have been bought for citizens of those rights that were inscribed the ballot box, in advance and existentially. in many international charters, declarations When the overall electorate is additionally and decisions as fundamental and inviola- divided by three, the level of control over ble have been wholly legalised – is quite a each vote is total. piece of nonsense. It would be even in states Clearly, not everyone who "enrolled" in that are reasonably considered transpar- a party has to be a great fan of the ideas of ently undemocratic. the party that got their vote, but as the old It is as if to confirm the saying, "in Bos- opportunist saying goes: love is love, but nia, anything can always be done". It gets business is business. This is why we are in overlooked that the times are different, what is becoming a slightly grotesque situ- reactions are ever more intolerant, while ation between two electoral cycles, featur- the threshold of tolerance is sinking, even ing deafening all-out invective against the among those who do not even remember administration and officials, parties and how things were when things were better. "leaders". And then, for more than twenty The state will somehow endure its cap- years since the establishment of the "free turedness, but the society here is less and and democratic state", the differences less capable to do so. If the circumstances between votes do not amount to more were objective, things could somehow still than a nuance, for the same concept and be managed. However, it is dawning on the almost the same people. Those who man- majority that they are not objective. In BH, age to wrest the formal right given to the obstruction of change is still fed and sus- leading parties, protectors of the "constitu- tained in a planned fashion. And so is state tive peoples", to determine who will be the capture. chauffeur here, and who a president as the translated by Hana Dvornik "people’s representative" there, who will be a teacher or an ambassador, a cashier or a director over there... As someone jokingly 56 experiences with captured states local captured state – an empirical view

local captured state – an empirical view

Nives Miošić-Lisjak

Unlike corruption, which might be limited According to the results, capture to a single occurrence, capture is systemic produces numerous negative and structural and persists over an extended effects – from creating new or time period, thus causing significant social, widening existing inequalities economic and/or environmental harm and (access to jobs, access to busi- undermining the core democratic values. A team of researchers from academia1 ness opportunities, possibilities and civil society in Croatia recently con- of self-actualization), through ducted research on local state capture generating a sense of inability and publicized the results, under the and pointlessness of public action, title Croatia’s Captured Places2. Using the to political apathy and disinterest case study approach, the research exam- in politics on the part of citizens. ined governance practices in three cities – Zagreb, Dubrovnik and Slavonski Brod, On its own, each of these ele- and one county – Istria, focusing on actors ments has a negative effect on and mechanisms of capture, including the the political and social develop- extent to which citizens of these commu- ment of local communities, while nities are aware of and opposed to such their combined effects are seri- practices. By choosing different localities in very different areas of the country, with very ously detrimental to the further different types and quantities of resources, development of democracy. and with different types of political actors and political blocks in power, the research In contemporary attempts to explain, or at attempted to outline the key characteristics least describe governance practices that are, of local state capture in Croatia. for the most part, falling short of fulfilling The results of the research confirmed the needs of communities, or indeed entire the presence of capture practices in each of societies, social scientists, donors and civil the localities, yet on a different scale, and society organisations are increasingly refer- adapted to local political contexts as well ring to a relatively new concept – capture, as to the nature and quantity of resources and its alterations – state capture, policy available. Additionally, it confirmed the capture, regulatory capture. Like most con- astuteness of actors in combining formal cepts denoting processes, the definition is rules and informal practices in order to somewhat elusive, as processes are deeply achieve particularist interests. contextualized. Yet, there are a few common characteristics that might help in identify- 1 dr. Paul Stubbs, Institute of Economics, Zagreb; prof. ing capture; these include the control of dr. Berto Šalaj, Faculty of Political Science, Zagreb University; prof. dr. Siniša Zrinščak, Faculty of Law, public resources and their allocation to the Zagreb University, and four researchers from GONG Nives Miošić-Lisjak benefit of a particularist interest (or interest – Nives Miošić-Lisjak, Dražen Hoffmann, Duje Prkut Until recently, the head of the and Dragan Zelić. GONG research team; currently groups) based on, often entangled, political, 2 http://www.gong.hr/media/uploads/croatia’s_cap- independent consultant, Zagreb economic and social power and influence. tured_places.pdf local captured state – an empirical view experiences with captured states 57

According to the results, capture produces numerous negative effects – from cre- Common elements identified ating new or widening existing inequalities in all localities fall under the (access to jobs, access to business oppor- denominator of captured control tunities, possibilities of self-actualization), mechanisms – the political oppo- through generating a sense of inability and pointlessness of public action, to political sition, the media and civil society. apathy and disinterest in politics on the Weaknesses of the opposition part of citizens. On its own, each of these are again locally highly context elements has a negative effect on the politi- specific, while the local media cal and social development of local com- and civil society are financially munities, while their combined effects are seriously detrimental to the further devel- dependent on local authorities, opment of democracy. which constrains almost entirely In terms of policy areas, the research any type of criticism, and conse- unearthed several that are "conducive" to quentially impede their working capture: employment/appointment pro- in the public interest. Critical cedures, communal construction works, spatial planning and social policy, each voices are subdued by disciplinary fulfilling several functions enabling or per- measures including public defa- petuating capture, as depicted in the Table mation, (threats of) withdrawal below. of funding and/or working space.

Functions Expanding networks Exerting control over networks Increasing quantity and value of resources in the network distribution Resource within network Increasing chances of re-election Gaining the political support of other political options Employment/appointments X X X X X Communal construction works X X X X Spatial planning X X

Mechanisms Social policy measures X X

Capture practices are enabled and sup- the HDZ’s rank and file in city-owned com- ported by existing legal and institutional panies that he controls. Mirko Duspara in frameworks, and are developed in inter- Slavonski Brod, on the other hand, "trades" action between identified local agents of primarily with the SDP, since his political capture and the leading national parties carrier took off once he established him- (HDZ and SDP), allowing for a hypothesis self as an antipode to the HDZ. He ensures that the practices present in the four locali- employment for members of the local SDP ties are occurring nationwide. Namely, an and provides implicit support to the SDP in invisible hand of the political market in all national elections. Dubrovnik mayor Andro localities has been identified, although the Vlahušić used the deal between the SDP and modalities of "political trading" between the HNS on the national level, where his the local and national levels are highly con- party – when they were the junior partner textualised. Thus, in Istria, the IDS "trades" in the ruling coalition – controlled minis- both with the HDZ and the SDP, justifying tries important for "heavy-duty" projects, such an approach by the need to implement which Vlahušić would implement locally. projects important to the inhabitants of The flip side of this, i.e. the support Vlahušić Istria, regardless of ideological differences. received from the HNS and the SDP, can be In Zagreb, Milan Bandić "trades" primarily interpreted as their wish to politically con- with the HDZ at the national level, by pro- trol Dubrovnik, given the size of its budget, viding political support to the HDZ in the its reputation globally, but also the projects Croatian parliament, but also by employing planned for the future. 58 experiences with captured states local captured state – an empirical view

Common elements identified in all Captured democratic control mecha- localities fall under the denominator of nisms and the failure of voters to punish captured control mechanisms – the politi- the lack of political accountability mean cal opposition, the media and civil society. that the key mechanism of representative The weaknesses of the opposition are again democracy – political "punishment" of the highly specific to the local context, while governing by the governed – has been lost. the local media and civil society are finan- Therein lies the biggest of dangers to further cially dependent on local authorities, which development of democracy. constrains almost entirely any type of criti- The authors offered two sets of recom- cism, and consequentially limits their abil- mendations to strengthen the points of ity to work in the public interest. Critical resistance to local state capture. The first voices are subdued by disciplinary meas- set focuses on necessary legislative changes, ures including public defamation, (threats arguing for the need for these changes to of) withdrawal of funding and/or working take place simultaneously in order to be space. "revolutionary". At a more realistic level, The citizens are aware of the mecha- the authors argue that these changes would nisms leading to capture, but they con- at least increase the transaction costs of sider them to be part of the "normal" and capture. The second set of recommenda- sometimes "expected" behaviour of politi- tions is more long-term, focused on the cians. For citizens, integrity is not the basis necessary increase of the level of political on which they make political choices; they culture among the citizens through coor- thus seek an alternative point of difference dinated impact of the education system, between candidates. In the four cases exam- with the support of organized civil society ined, voters opted for powerful, charismatic and through expanding the few existing, yet leaders with strong political instincts who very important, independent (non-profit) successfully built their images as "benefac- media outlets and support to local citizen tors". Since the dominant position is that initiatives opposing capture practices. political corruption is the starting point of Croatian politics, voting for a "benefactor" creating multiple patron-client relation- ships is not a problem. the story of a party’s attempt to prevent democratic alternation of power experiences with captured states 59 when state capture and myths of victimization meet the story of a party’s attempt to prevent democratic alternation of power

Jovan Bliznakovski

The April incident represents just one of the manifestations of VMRO- DPMNE’s strategy to prevent government alternation which most broadly contained two main elements: 1) reliance on the already established mechanisms of control of the institutions and 2) reliance on ethnocentric myths of victimization which were used to create an image that the fall of the party would bring to a "destruction" of the state. Through these two actions VMRO-DPMNE managed to significantly affect the institutional and political outcomes, as well as to ensure public support through the last several years.

The protracted fall from power of VMRO- dual strategy for prevention DPMNE in Macedonia, a process lasting for of government alternation more than two years, represents an extraordinary series of events which by itself mer- VMRO-DPMNE’s eleven-year rule in the its attention. A political elite caught "red Republic of Macedonia (2006-2017) came handed" in a long list of wrongdoings has to a close during April and May, when a managed to remain a pivotal political com- new parliamentary majority took control of petitor and a factor preventing government the parliament and appointed a new gov- alternation. Many would agree that this is ernment. For many, this was the only pos- an impermissible situation for a country sible outcome following the Wiretapping with a recommendation for opening EU Affair of 2015 which revealed the character accession negotiations. This "success" of a of VMRO-DPMNE’s government. With the party responsible for one of the most noto- publication of the wiretapped recordings, rious political scandals in contemporary Macedonian citizens had the possibility Europe was partly achieved through reli- to explicitly witness the specifics behind ance on ethnocentric myths of victimiza- the state capture operation. The revealed tion. These myths have served a legitimizing conversations indicated an extensive list of function and assured a great level of public wrongdoings, beginning with the unlawful support for an openly corrupt political elite. wiretapping itself (directed at both individ- The article describes how this was done, sin- uals supportive of, or opposing the rule of gles out the implications and discusses how VMRO-DPMNE, as well as the party’s own myths of victimization affect the project of members) and ending with many episodes EU enlargement in the Western Balkans. involving flagrant abuse of power, includ- Jovan Bliznakovski ing but not limited to corrupt acts, electoral PhD fellow at NASP, Graduate School of Social and Political fraud, actions aimed at establishing control Science, University of Milan. In over public and private media and suppres- the period 2014-2016 served sion of the opposition and the civil sector. as programme director in the Institute for Democracy "Societas Yet, the party and its elite proved to be Civilis" (IDSCS), Skopje, Mac- very resilient. It managed to significantly edonia 60 experiences with captured states the story of a party’s attempt to prevent democratic alternation of power

ment of the election of a parliamentary Despite the constitutionally speaker, which represented the first step guaranteed bilingualism, and de- leading to alternation of power. Protesters spite the existence of no explicit claimed that alternation would cause severe damage to the state, its unitary character, connection between bilingualism and the position of the Macedonian ethnic and federalization, and moreover group within it. The protest got out of hand without publicly present tangible when MPs from the new parliamentary demands for federalizing the majority were physically attacked inside the country by key Albanian political parliamentary premises. State institutions leaders, VMRO-DPMNE man- remained cut off and failed to react promptly, a situation which fuelled the public agony of aged to manipulate the distrust uncertainty during the bloody night. While of segments of the public to intervention was assured only several hours block government alternation after the violence erupted, the public quickly for several months. As outlined, learned that the command chain in the this was done by constructing a police force was largely responsible for the failure to react promptly and accordingly. complex narrative of conspiracy Thus, the April incident represents against the country, implicitly just one of the manifestations of VMRO- directed against the Albanian DPMNE’s strategy to prevent government ethnic group and with cues for al- alternation which most broadly contained leged domestic and international two main elements: 1) reliance on the already established mechanisms of con- involvement against Macedonian trol over the institutions and 2) reliance on statehood and self-determination. ethnocentric myths of victimization which were used to create an image that the fall of the party would bring about a "destruc- diminish the achievements of the EU-bro- tion" of the state. Through these two actions kered "Przhino Agreement", which aimed VMRO-DPMNE managed to significantly to create a level political playing field and affect institutional and political outcomes, which designed steps for assuring accounta- as well as to ensure public support through bility. VMRO-DPMNE managed this through the last several years. reliance on the captured institutions, in which the party continued to "push the but- tons" in order to ensure electoral advantage brief history of the equation and impunity. Perhaps more remarkably, between state and party the party stepped down from power while still enjoying significant political popular- VMRO-DPMNE’s history is instructive for ity despite the clear responsibility related to understanding the high ethnocentric appeal the wiretapped revelations: VMRO-DPMNE that the party enjoys in the present day. It was won 51 MPs in the 120-seat Parliament at established as a political party championing the December 2016 general elections, as the cause of ethnic Macedonians, claiming well as the largest portion of votes. Finally, to be a direct descendant of the Internal when it became increasingly clear that Macedonian Revolutionary Organization despite the significant electoral achieve- (VMRO), a rebel group active at the turn of ment, VMRO-DPMNE would not manage to the 20th century, which demanded self-rule negotiate a majority in the parliament, the for Macedonia (then part of the Ottoman party utilized its ethnocentric appeal to fur- Empire). VMRO-DPMNE was one of the ther delay its imminent fall. As a result, the first political actors that openly pressed for country remained in the well-known state of Macedonia’s exit from the socialist Yugosla- protracted political crisis that the elections vian federation. Despite being very popular were supposed to swiftly resolve. during the whole first decade of Macedonian The events of spring 2017 clearly exposed independence due to its patriotic branding, VMRO-DPMNE’s dual strategy for preven- it only managed to attain power in 1998, tion of government alternation. On the night missing a chance to lead the country follow- of 27 April, protesters from the ethnocen- ing the first multiparty elections (1990) due tric movement "For Common Macedonia" to its unwillingness to form a coalition with stormed the parliament, demanding annul- an ethnic Albanian political party. the story of a party’s attempt to prevent democratic alternation of power experiences with captured states 61

Having spent the first decade of Mace- VMRO-DPMNE’s reluctance to reach a donian independence largely in opposition, deal with Greece, as well as the recourse to VMRO-DPMNE stood against the Interim "antiquisation", was seen by many ethnic Accord with Greece (1995), and in particu- Macedonians as a matter of national pride. lar against the provisions that cemented These actions went in parallel with VMRO- the use of the name "the former Yugoslav DPMNE’s success in publicly demoniz- Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)" in mul- ing the opposition as "treacherous", and tilateral international relations and the in further framing the concessions of the change of the state’s flag stipulated within 1990s and the early 2000s as a "sellout" of the agreement. Internally, it stood against the Macedonian national interests. By the the concessions that the SDSM-led govern- Bucharest NATO Summit in 2008, which ment made to the Albanian minority in the "buried" Macedonia’s ambitions to join the country and in particular on the issue of Alliance, VMRO-DPMNE was largely viewed Albanian language higher education. In this internally as the only protector of ethnic way, it broadened its ethnocentric appeal Macedonian interests. Despite the inability and strengthened its ethnic Macedonian of VMRO-DPMNE’s governments to bring electoral base. NATO membership to the country (and The internal conflict of 2001 and later to start accession negotiations with the VMRO-DPMNE’s acceptance of the Ohrid EU), the party’s popularity remained stable Framework Agreement (OFA) that ended it, – high and constant – throughout the years. somewhat diminished the party’s reputation among Macedonian nationalists, but only for a short time. The OFA led to a more a myth intended to save inclusive framework of the state with regard from an imminent fall to the ethnic minorities, and especially the Albanian ethnic group, whose demands VMRO-DPMNE faced the Wiretapping Affair were the main drivers of this redefinition in this mode: largely seen internally as the of the Macedonian polity. This was seen sole protector of Macedonian interests. by many ethnic Macedonians as harmful Contrary to the accusations of significant for Macedonian interests. The outcome of wrongdoing, the party publicly pushed a the conflict, as well as the electoral defeat narrative in which it presented itself as a at the hands of SDSM at the 2002 elections victim in the scandal, claiming that (never brought changes in the party leadership – precisely named) foreign secret services long-term president Ljubcho Georgievski had joined forces with domestic "traitors" was replaced by Nikola Gruevski. During to push an agenda consisting of two points: Gruevski’s leadership, the party went on to federalization of the country and speedy reclaim and expand its ethnocentric appeal "sell-off" of the country’s name. A part of and managed to achieve a significant suc- this narrative lay in the disagreement that cess – winning four rounds of general elec- the wiretapped recordings were authentic tions in a dominating fashion (2006, 2008, at all; instead, VMRO-DPMNE claimed that 2011, and 2014). the recordings were fabricated in an attempt Under Gruevski, VMRO-DPMNE to conspire against Macedonian statehood. strengthened its opposition to any agree- VMRO-DPMNE’s campaign for the ment with Greece over the name dispute, December 2016 elections was also focused reframing the conflict as a question of on the outlined conspiracy theory. While national identity. Furthermore, Gruevski’s the opposition SDSM promoted an agenda government created a new dynamic in the of advancement of official use of the Alba- overall dispute – by pursuing a programme nian language, VMRO-DPMNE used this of so-called "antiquisation" (best visible in as "proof" that the country will be federal- the "Skopje 2014" project), which aimed to ized if government alternation takes place. establish a historical continuity between the This was, of course, very much exaggerated, ancient kingdom of Alexander the Great and given that the Albanian language has been the contemporary Macedonian state, an used in official communication in Macedo- idea towards which Greece is unequivocally nia since 2002 and this was done while reaf- opposed. This further complicated the pos- firming the country’s unitary framework. sibilities for resolution of the long-standing When the leaders of Albanian parlia- name dispute, which represents the most mentary parties agreed a joint platform after important external obstacle for Macedonia’s the elections, which also included demands EU/NATO accession. for advancement of the use of Albanian 62 experiences with captured states the story of a party’s attempt to prevent democratic alternation of power

language, VMRO-DPMNE depicted this as interference of the Republic of Albania in the EU must deal with Macedonia’s internal dealings. Gruevski the myths of victimization used the media to call for "defence" of the operating in Western state, claiming that it is "under attack" by domestic and external conspirators. Upon Balkans societies this, the movement "For a Common Mac- edonia", which served as a cover-up for the The "blockade" that Macedonia expe- April events, emerged. Its main demands rienced in its EU and NATO accession closely reflected VMRO-DPMNE’s positions processes has directly contributed to the and multiplied the reach of the "federaliza- development of the myths of victimization tion myth". that VMRO-DPMNE skillfully used to pre- Despite the constitutionally guaranteed vent alternation of power. Large segments of bilingualism, and despite the existence of the population began to cultivate a genuine no explicit connection between bilingual- mistrust towards the international commu- ism and federalization, and moreover des- nity and especially towards the EU, which pite there being no tangible public demands was increasingly seen as a factor going for federalizing the country by key Albanian against Macedonian positions in the name political leaders, VMRO-DPMNE managed dispute with Greece. Public opinion polls to manipulate the distrust of segments of show that a majority of Macedonian citizens the public to block government alternation (and especially those from ethnic Macedo- for several months. As outlined, this was nian backgrounds) do not support Macedo- done by constructing a complex narrative nian accession to the EU if it is subject to of conspiracy against the country, implicitly concessions regarding the name of the state directed against the Albanian ethnic group (66% of citizens hold this attitude according and with cues for alleged domestic and to a poll conducted by IDSCS in 2016). At the international involvement against Macedo- same time, when EU accession is "discon- nian statehood and self-determination. nected" from the name dispute, joining the EU has extremely high support among the Macedonian population (80% according to the same poll). This signals a need for a different approach by the EU, one that would be more sensitive towards the identity concerns of the Macedonian population. If such an approach is not initiated, Macedonia is at risk of experiencing another authoritarian episode in which the myths of victimization will play a prominent role. The EU should also draw lessons from the Macedonian experience in dealing with other countries of the Western Balkans group, a geography where various divisive historical myths operate to negatively affect contemporary developments. Understand- ing that the myths of victimization are important for contemporary politics in the Western Balkans, and moreover, finding a way to curb their negative effects, should be one of the key tasks of EU policy towards the region. Making the membership perspective more credible for the Western Balkans countries will have a profound effect in minimiz- ing the "voices" against EU accession, even when they are based on complicated identity issues that fuel the ethnocentric myths of victimization.

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Publication information Publisher Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Sarajevo For the publisher Marion Kraske Publication Date September 2017 Editor-in-Chief Srđan Dvornik Language editor Hana Dvornik Cover Page Photo Mirsad Agić Layout / Typesetting TRIPTIH Printed by Amos Graf do.o.o. Sarajevo Opinions expressed in the articles are those of their authors and not Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung. All articles in this publication are subject to Creative Commons License CC BY-NC-ND 3.0