GLOBSEC Trends 2020 CENTRAL EUROPE EASTERN EUROPE & WESTERN BALKANS AT THE TIMES OF PANDEMIC

www.globsec.org Authors

Dominika Hajdu Daniel Milo Research Fellow Senior Adviser

Katarína Klingová Miroslava Sawiris Senior Research Fellow Research Fellow

Democracy & Resilience Programme

Methodology

The outcomes and findings of this The inputs for country-specific context report are based on public opinion and analysis were completed by our poll surveys carried out in September project partners: and October 2020 on a representative sample of the population in nine Martin Vladimirov and Ruslan Stefanov, countries: Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Center for the Study of Democracy, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Bulgaria Poland, Romania, Serbia and Slovakia. The surveys were conducted on a Jonáš Syrovátka, Prague Security sample of 1000 respondents using Studies Institute (PSSI), Czechia stratified multistage random sampling in the form of computer-assisted Péter Krekó, Bulcsú Hunyadi, and telephone interviewing (CATI) due Patrik Szicherle, Political Capital to COVID-19 pandemic restrictions. Institute, Hungary In all countries, the profiles of the respondents were representative of Rufin Zamfir, GlobalFocus Centre, the country according to gender, age, Romania education, place of residence and size of settlement. Ilija Djugumanov, ATA-Macedonia, North Macedonia For the purposes of graphical data visualisation, the results were rounded Center for Democratic Transition, to full numbers. To improve the Montenegro readers’ experience, the responses in closed questions with a scale were Jovana Bogosavljević and Igor generalised. For example, a question Novaković, International and Security with options definitely agree/ rather Affairs Centre, Serbia agree/ rather disagree /definitely disagree was merged to agree / Zofia Lutkiewicz, Political disagree. Accountability Foundation, Poland CONTENTS Contents

PAGE 06 PAGE 30 Executive summary NATO

PAGE 08 PAGE 36 Country highlights United States and Russia

PAGE 12

PAGE 48 COVID-19 China

PAGE 20

PAGE 52 East or West? Democracy & polarisation

PAGE 24

European Union PAGE 62 Connecting the dots GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

3 4 GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Introduction Countries surveyed Czechia Poland Slovakia Hungary Montenegro Serbia Macedonia North Romania Bulgaria INTRODUCTION Introduction

concept. But at the same time, many GLOBSEC finds that “clear pro- people oppose the liberal social Western orientation and messaging,” values that typically characterise the as in Slovakia, is a powerful tool. Western democratic system. The Such messaging can point out that European Union has long assumed ambivalence toward authoritarianism that when democracy exists, liberal and corruption is morally bankrupt. values inevitably follow. But it now Government and non-government finds growing numbers of citizens bent actors must recognize that conspiracy on deploying democratically elected theories and false facts are highly institutions as a weapon against dangerous even when they occur immigrants, domestic minorities and the among populations that generally LGBT+ community. support Western institutions.

Similar tendencies exist in Western Strategic communication literally saves Europe and the United States. But lives in the time of COVID-19. When in Central and Eastern Europe, they a non-trivial part of the population threaten democracy itself. Using believes COVID-19 is a plot to Dear reader, resistance to liberal values as a wedge, manipulate populations worldwide, it authoritarian forces seek to pull is obvious how much effort is needed What is democracy? Is it, above down the entire democratic project. to reinforce not only democracy, but all, institutions – representative Those who would defend democracy rational thought. government, rule of law, freedom of must find a way to show respect and religion and assembly? Or is it just as understanding to those who feel their Many CEE citizens believe the United much a system of values – compassion, lives and countries are changing just States is an important guarantor of respect for people who are different, too fast, while standing up for the their security -- but that it should act and a commitment to responsible kindness, reason and decency that are mainly in the framework of NATO, speech and true facts? In Central hallmarks of true democracy. where Europeans also have a strong and Eastern Europe, these are key voice. This is understandable but also questions today. The autocratic rulers of Sadly, the report finds many citizens reflects substantial scepticism about communist times have been replaced continue to believe in conspiracy overall US intentions and activities. by leaders who are called to reflect theories and other destructive With new leadership in Washington the will of the governed. But the will narratives. This is disturbing in the and the world hopefully emerging from of the governed may not be pretty. best of times. But in the past year its preoccupation with COVID-19, the People may willingly believe conspiracy such theories have amounted to United States has an opportunity to theories. They may treat with hostility biological warfare, killing people by re-introduce itself to CEE citizens. Its anyone they consider an outsider. They encouraging them to be careless goal should be to present the United may feel no commitment to the greater about exposure to COVID-19. If such States as a reliable, compassionate and good of society, opting instead to grab disinformation frightens people into respectful guarantor of the democratic whatever they can for themselves. Even refusing vaccinations, the death toll future that most CEE citizens have respectable politicians, struggling to from the pandemic could be much resolutely chosen. win elections and negotiate knife- worse. GLOBSEC found only 37 percent edge coalitions, may feel they must of CEE citizens are ready to take the accommodate even odious forces for vaccine now. Thomas Kent the sake of political survival. Adjunct Associate Professor of We can take a series of steps to International and Public Affairs, Harriman GLOBSEC Trends 2020 throws these advance democracy in the face of Institute, Columbia University Senior Fellow, Jamestown Foundation issues into sharp relief. It shows strong the forces that threaten it. The first is Associate Fellow, GLOBSEC support in Central and Eastern Europe to build a coherent narrative about

for democracy as an institutional what being part of the West means. 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

5 Executive Summary Executive EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

2020 has been enveloped by the environment, we assessed the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Its prevalence of different polarising profound global impact is likely narratives and their impact on to be the subject of research for attitudes towards liberal democracy many years to come. Against and international cooperation. While this backdrop, in this report, we both democracy and international present current perceptions in the cooperation have suffered setbacks Central and Eastern European and in recent years, public perceptions Western Balkan regions towards from the nine surveyed countries a range of political topics. The suggest they have not been report, in particular, provides vanquished yet. answers to urgent public health concerns including the willingness of societies to get vaccinated against COVID-19 and proneness to believing COVID-19 related conspiracy theories.

We also scrutinise how the European Union, NATO and major powers including the United States, China and Russia are perceived in the region and whether their standing has improved or suffered setbacks in the wake of the pandemic.

And as disinformation campaigns and information chaos continue

GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC to ravage our information

6 THESE ARE OUR

KEY FINDINGS Summary Executive

COVID-19 PRO-RUSSIAN / VACCINATION RUSSIA-ORIGINATING NARRATIVES GOING Trust in public authorities corresponds with people’s willingness to be vaccinated VIRAL against COVID-19. Only 37% of respondents, on average, are inclined to get a COVID-19 At 72%, the proportion of those who support vaccine but this figure rises to 53% among NATO membership in the region is robust. those who trust their public authorities. Nearly 4 in 10 people living in NATO member countries in the region, nonetheless, believe that NATO is an aggressive tool of the US and/or that NATO is provoking Russia by establishing military bases in the country’s vicinity. EU REPRESENTING A MORE PROMISING FUTURE DEMOCRATIC A total of 71% of respondents believe that EU membership will lead to better life prospects PARADOX for future generations and a majority of respondents in seven of nine countries do not The vast majority of people in the region think that the EU is destroying their country’s agree that democracy, as a system based on traditional values and identity. That said, the equality, human rights, fundamental freedoms notion that an “EU dictate” is at play has and rule of law, is good for their country (78%). gained widespread traction. However, a considerable share of respondents perceive democracy to be a threat when it is described as liberal (41%).

CHINA AND RUSSIA NOT SEEN AS THREATS

The perception that China and Russia are threats is currently low, declining over the past year. In numerous surveyed countries, in fact, respondents rather tended to perceive Russia and/or China as key strategic partners for their respective countries. GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

7 East-West Country highlights COUNTRY HIGHLIGHTS

Bulgarians are also more inclined to 2019, in perceptions that Russia is a believe in conspiracy theories. Around threat and a greater preponderance of Bulgarian support 33% of Bulgarians, for example, respondents believing that Russia has for NATO is express credence in COVID-19 related superior military capability is testament conspiracies including the notion that to this effect. That said, it is noteworthy getting fragile the pandemic is fake to manipulate the that 69% of Czechs value NATO population. membership and credit the Alliance for providing them with more security. Bulgarian support for remaining a Large percentages of respondents in member of the EU and NATO has Bulgaria were uncertain or unwilling declined by around 10% since 2018, to respond to survey questions. These with 65% now backing membership in figures ranged from 15% on the matter Czechia is the the EU and 47% in NATO. This decline of whether democracy is a good system only country in comes as the EU dictate narrative and for the country, 30% on attitudes the assertion that NATO is a belligerent towards NATO membership to 50% on the region where organisation both resonate strongly in the issue of threat perceptions. more people the country. perceive China as a threat (51%) Bulgarian society continues to maintain than not (49%). a pro-Russian, rather than pro-US, tilt. While 84% see Russia as their Strong awareness traditional Slavic brother nation, only 23% judge Russia to be a belligerent of Chinese In terms of strategic partnerships, actor seeking to weaken the EU and influence in Germany is the clear preference for the NATO. majority of the population (65%). Czechia The impact of disinformation in Czechia is apparent also in buy-in to COVID-19 Bulgarians also The past year witnessed a notable conspiracy theories, evidenced by the belong to the slump in perceptions of both the EU fact that 43% of Czechs believe that the and NATO in Czechia. Support for EU actual number of cases is lower than more traditional officially reported. attitude cluster membership nosedived by 14% and NATO by 11%. in the region Czechs seem to be confused in their with only 13% The impact of pro-Russian views on democracy. While 76% believe indicating disinformation narratives is at least that democracy is a good system for support for partially responsible for this shift. A their country, more than half (54%) also nearly identical share of the population believe that democracy is non-existent guaranteeing because in reality, world is run by secret LGBT+ rights. is inclined to believe that NATO is involved in provoking Russia (38%) as elites. the reverse (42%). A 9% drop, from GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

8 interested in getting vaccinated, recognising (44%) that the vaccine Majority of Montenegrins’ could save their lives. Hungarians views on NATO disagree with are split Country highlights COUNTRY demonisation of the LGBT+ North Macedonia community wants to belong to Montenegro remains the West HIGHLIGHTS The proportion of those who think committed to its Hungary belongs to the West dropped EU accession, from 45% in 2018 and 2019 to 37% evidenced by the Macedonians express the highest in 2020. Increasing numbers are level of support for EU and NATO now more inclined to support a nearly two thirds membership in the Western Balkan middle ground position, with 56% of of Montenegrins region. And 31% and 28%, respectively, Hungarians being proponents of the (63%) backing EU perceive the EU or the US as their key country finding a place between East membership and strategic partner. and West. 64% associating the EU with a However, pro-Russian sentiment At the same time, Hungarian society can also be found, with narratives expresses overwhelming support for better future. favourable to the Kremlin resonating NATO membership (83% would vote to strongly with Macedonians. A total remain) and 79% of respondents equate of 48% of the population, the second NATO membership with enhanced The EU is also the favoured strategic highest in the region, think that Western security. partner for the population, with 54% countries often unjustly accuse Russia choosing it over other options. of unlawful or fraudulent behaviour.

Montenegrin society is almost equally Despite an increasing interest from An overwhelming divided in its support for NATO. Slightly major global powers in the Western majority of more (50%) would vote to leave NATO Balkan countries, 66% and 62% of Hungarians (80%) than those wishing to remain (45%), Macedonians do not perceive Russia think that having pointing to a notable impact of negative and China, respectively, as threats to a strong leader messaging on NATO. More than half of their country. who does not the population are inclined to agree that NATO is an aggressive organisation and have to bother an even larger majority, 60%, believe with elections that NATO is provoking Russia. 54% of and parliament Macedonians, would be bad for The US is not particularly popular in the least in the their country. Montenegro, with 46% perceiving its NATO ally as a threat. Only 22%, region, believe meanwhile, identify Russia as a threat. that having Russian image projection is also evident a democratic This anti-authoritarian attitude is the in perceptions of its military might; political system highest among all surveyed countries. more people perceive superiority in the with regular Russian military capability (56%) than in The majority of Hungarians (55%) the US (50%). elections and a disagree with the statement that LGBT+ multiparty system rights represent a decadent ideology, On coronavirus, 4 in 10 Montenegrins is good for their despite ongoing efforts by the current (43%) believe that COVID-19 is a country. government to demonise the LGBT+ sham, with a similar share believing minority1. Nearly half of Hungarians, the conspiracy theory that the US moreover, agree with guaranteeing deliberately created the virus (38%). LGBT+ rights. That said, 41% of population are GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

9 East-West China’s mask Romanians want Democracy has diplomacy not very bigger presence a contested Country highlights effective in Poland of the US in the meaning in Serbia region

An overwhelming 90% majority of Poles would vote to remain in NATO, Romanians are ardent proponents the strongest level of support for NATO Serbia is the least of a Euro-Atlantic orientation of their membership measured in the region. country, reflected in growing support pro-EU oriented Affinity for the organisation is further for EU and NATO membership. of all countries evidenced by findings indicating that surveyed. 87% of Poles believe that membership in NATO means they are living in a safer That said, a environment. slight majority On average, 47% of Serbians A strong Euro-Atlantic orientation of Romanians (52%) would be of Poles is, moreover, reflected in do not know interested in perceptions of threats, allies, and foes. whether the joining the EU if A total of 68% of Poles perceive Russia United States, the opportunity as a threat while 69% identify the US as Russia or China the most important strategic partner for arose. their country. present a threat to their country. Meanwhile, 66% of Poles, the most in the region, think that Russia deliberately A total of 84% of Serbs, by contrast, provokes NATO by initiating conflicts would prefer not to join NATO, with in Eastern Europe. These fervent This inability to distinguish between a sizeable share of the Serbian attitudes indeed reflect Poland’s friend and foe, highest in Romania and population holding the view that historical context in witnessing Russian Bulgaria, could become a potential NATO deliberately provokes Russia subversive influence and engagement vulnerability in the future. by encircling it with military bases. in the region. Espousing vehement anti-NATO A total of 57% of Romanians, the most sentiment, Serbia represents an outlier among surveyed countries, think that in the region. the US should play a more important Furthermore, 59% of respondents in 62% of Poles, role in the region. This attitude draws on the society’s preferred Western Serbia consider Russia and China to be the highest orientation and perception that the US the most important strategic partners percentage in is their strategic partner (50%). for the country, by far the highest the region, lay amount among surveyed countries. responsibility Only 29% of Romanians, the least in the region, think that liberal democracy Democracy, as a system based on on China’s human rights, fundamental freedoms shoulders for the threatens their traditional values and national identity. and rule of law, is favoured by 85% global spread of of Serbians, putting the country at COVID-19. the top of the pack alongside Poland on this attitude. However, 74% of Serbians simultaneously believe in the conspiracy theory that democracy does not exist because the world is ruled by secret elites. A further 57%, meanwhile, see liberal democracy as a threat to their values and identity. GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

10 31% of Slovaks bought into COVID- related conspiracy theories, ranging Harmful narratives from the assertion that the US shape Slovaks’ deliberately created the virus to the

notion that the pandemic is fake and a Country highlights understanding of tool to manipulate populations. COVID-19

While Slovak backing for the EU remains relatively robust and steady, NATO is not as popular. Support for NATO membership, nonetheless, has been constantly on the rise, ascending from 43% in 2017 to 61% in 2020. This shift comes despite 56% still believing that NATO deliberately provokes Russia by encircling it with military bases, a common narrative peddled as part of disinformation and conspiracy theory dissemination.

The lower level of support for NATO compared to the rest of the V4 can be linked to some apparent pro-Russian sentiment in the country. While only 20% of Slovaks consider Russia to be a threat to their county, 36% reach the same conclusion about the US.

Slovaks also revealed the strongest level of support for democracy with 90% of respondents agreeing that democracy is a good system for the country.

Narratives demonising liberalism and the West, as a carrier of “decadent” values, however, have infiltrated society. A total of 44% of Slovaks believe that liberalism threatens their values and identity.

Slovaks also show the greatest proneness to believe in conspiracy theories in the V4 region. On average, GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

11 COVID-19 COVID-19 Chapter 1 Reading time 7 min

The COVID-19 pandemic has brought forward a radical paradigm shift, serving as a backdrop against which everything from public health policy to even foreign policy decisions are now contemplated.

While the CEE region managed the first wave of COVID-19 in the spring relatively well, the more recent second wave of the pandemic paired with a growing impact of pandemic counter-measures, economic lockdowns and an infodemic is testing the stability of the region. COVID-19 is indeed often used as an excuse to inflame simmering internal conflicts and tensions.

Perceived (in)competence Who handled the COVID-19 crisis the best so far?2* European Union China

Slovakia 40% 35%

Poland 39% 26%

Hungary 38% 32%

Czechia 36% 23%

North Macedonia 23% 25%

Montenegro 19% 38%

Bulgaria 18% 27%

Romania 17% 29%

Serbia 11% 58% GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

*The respondents were offered a choice between the EU, China, Russia and the United States.

12 By the beginning of December 2020, China China had reported only around

“ COVID-19 100,000 cases of COVID-19 and 4,700 All surveyed countries have a “There is a considerable influence 3 fatalities from the disease , in stark relatively large proportion of people exerted by pro-Russian channels contrast to the staggering 12,400,000 that judge China to be handling the that comes to affect Montenegrin cases and 290,000 deaths recorded pandemic well despite the fact that citizens. The majority of this across the EU4. This comes despite the the origins of COVID-19 have been information originates in Serbia, European population not being even traced back to the country and the where Russian and Chinese a third of the size of China. Intuitively, Chinese Communist Party has come assistance provided during the it appears that China has handled under criticism for initially covering up pandemic received widespread the pandemic far better than the EU, the virus, thereby contributing to the attention from the media, in contrast to direct aid that came managing to obscure its responsibility global spread of the disease12. from the EU. While the media for the spread of the contagion behind has, furthermore, extensively its very efficient personal protective covered the pandemic situation in 5 equipment diplomacy . Western countries, information on “ Russia’s struggles in coping with Aside from the fact that there are the virus has been hard to come “Chinese assistance to Serbia at suspicions voiced by numerous by. The population, therefore, the beginning of the pandemic has remained uninformed about experts about the veracity of the was intensely promoted in the the real situation in Russia.” numbers provided by Chinese Serbian news media, with all 6 [Center for Democratic Transition, authorities and that Harvard major outlets devoting space Montenegro] researchers suggested that the to talk about Chinese aid, outbreak may have started much presented as a substantial and earlier in Wuhan than reported7, brotherly move. In addition, Serbia the EU’s response to the COVID-19 maintains positive historical pandemic has been restricted by relations with China from the the nature of the union as an entity period of communist Yugoslavia. This is further strengthened by comprised of sovereign states with Chinese support for Serbia’s independent health policies8. However, Many position towards Kosovo the unprecedented agreement on as it does not recognize its remain the 750 billion EU Recovery Fund to independence. Statements by foster a turnaround in the pandemic- President Vučić glorifying Chinese undecided impacted union as well as to finance investments further improve 9 green and digital transition has China’s image in the country”. In light of the fact that the [International and Security Affairs confirmed the significant advantages pandemic is far from over Centre, Serbia] of belonging to the EU club. and the situation is still evolving, it is understandable that substantial proportions EU of respondents in Bulgaria Russia (37%), Czechia (27%), Romania Within the V4, there is a consensus (25%) and Poland (24%) now that the EU responded to the Russia is perceived as managing the are undecided about their pandemic better than China. At the pandemic quite well by Montenegrins assessments on how different outset of the pandemic, the EU was (29%), Macedonians (28%) and geopolitical entities have seen as incompetent due to a lack of Serbians (19%). While in Serbia this responded to the crisis. an effective communication strategy. sentiment is attributable to the more The bloc has managed to mostly turn broadly held pro-Russian attitudes in around this perception though, aided the country, with Russia being seen by agreement on the Recovery Fund, as a historical partner and brotherly in the face of intense Russia- and nation, the cases of Montenegro and China-originated10 disinformation North Macedonia reflect the strong campaigns11. Given less sanguine influence that pro-Russian outlets hold sentiment that persists on this question in these two countries. in non-V4 countries, it appears that these campaigns, nonetheless, have been potentially met with some success in shaping public perception of the EU’s competence. GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

13 Vaccination COVID-19 People will get vaccinated against COVID-19 if they trust public authorities.

Those who agree with I would get vaccinated against I would get vaccinated against the following statements: COVID-19 average COVID-19 from those who trust public authorities

67%

59% 57% 56%

50% 53% 53% 52%

48%

45% 45% 43% 41% 40%

36% 36% 35%

29% 25%

23%

0%

North Hungary Romania Poland Serbia Montenegro Slovakia Czechia Macedonia Bulgaria

Trust in public authorities and their the two groups is seen in Montenegro, ability to provide factual information Romania and Slovakia. This finding strongly correlates with people’s reinforces the view that if public willingness to get vaccinated against authorities invest resources in earning COVID-19. Whereas only 37% of the trust of their citizens and engage respondents, on average, are interested in strategic communication, they might in the vaccine, the number grows to prove more effective in overcoming the 53% among those who trust their public pandemic.

GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC authorities. The widest gap between

14 Older people are more willing to get In all countries surveyed, with the exception of Slovakia and Bulgaria, vaccinated against COVID-19 the elderly are generally more willing COVID-19 to get vaccinated against COVID-19. Average willingness to get vaccinated against COVID-19 by age group: The majority of people over the age of 65 are interested in the vaccine in Hungary, Poland, Romania and Serbia. 44% This finding likely reflects the fact that older people face a much higher risk of 40% 39% serious health complications compared to younger generations.

35% 33% 37% Overall average 32%

In 5 of 9 surveyed countries, the youngest age group polled - those aged 18-24 - expressed higher than average interest in getting vaccinated, in stark contrast to people aged 25-54. In some countries (Czechia, Poland, Slovakia and Montenegro), a higher proportion of youth also eschewed COVID-19 related conspiracy theories. This might mean that young people take the threat posed by the virus more seriously and feel less fearful about getting vaccinated.

18 - 24 y.o. 25 - 34 y.o. 35 - 44 y.o. 45 - 54 y.o. 55 - 64 y.o. 65+ y.o.

Multilateralism is not dead

82%

And a further 60% of respondents A total of 82% of all in surveyed EU member states, with the exception of Czechia, think that EU should act as one bloc on the respondents across global stage, even if it comes at the expense of certain national interests. the region think These findings indicate broad support from Central European societies for multilateral cooperation and also that international substantial backing for aspirations to develop a more coherent EU foreign cooperation is policy. important to confront

the COVID-19 crisis. 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

15 COVID-19 infodemic & conspiracy theories COVID-19

The infodemic - information chaos Opinion polls now confirm that unleashed on the world and COVID-19’s conspiracy theories surrounding the close companion13 - has engendered pandemic have found fertile ground in “ “The Slovak population is a demonstrable impact on the quality the significant segments of populations consistently assessed to be of information populations can attain that buy in to the notions that COVID-19 particularly vulnerable to the about the virus including its spread and is a hoax created to manipulate people, impact of conspiracy theories in best practices on mitigation. that public authorities have deliberately the CEE region14. Several factors overestimated the number of positive contribute to this phenomenon The digital information space has cases and/or that the COVID-19 vaccine including a population receptive quickly become an arena where all is a tool to ‘implant nanochips’ to to pro-Russian rhetoric, the kinds of disinformation, misinformation, control people. relatively central position of health hoaxes and COVID-19 related disinformation outlets on Slovak conspiracy theories have burgeoned, Facebook15, the influence of peddled by politically and economically Czech disinformation channels and an obsolete educational motivated disinformation actors. system in need of reform”. [GLOBSEC, Slovakia]

Average prevalence of belief in COVID-19 related conspiracy theories in the region

38% 34%

Official number of COVID-19 cases COVID-19 is fake to manipulate the is lower than my country‘s public population. authorities (institutions) tell us.

26% 24%

USA deliberately created the COVID-19 COVID-19 vaccine is a tool to implant virus. nano-chips and control people. GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

16 In which countries most respondents believe in conspiracy theories? COVID-19

The highest proportion of people believing in the conspiratorial narratives about COVID-19 probed in the survey can be found in Montenegro16. Slovakia, meanwhile, posted the highest figure in the V4.

Montenegro 40%

Serbia 38%

North Macedonia 35%

Bulgaria 33%

Slovakia 31%

Czechia 29%

Romania 26%

Poland 24%

Hungary 21%

Facts first “ “ The survey revealed that large “The explanation for a consistent “Czechia was among the sections of different societies are percentage of the population countries that managed the first undecided on some of the most mistakenly believing that the wave of the pandemic quite well, widespread COVID-19 conspiratorial number of COVID-19 related leading to a sense of security. The infections is lower than reported government was, nonetheless, narratives. A total of 14% of lies in the low level of trust fairly reluctant to apply more respondents overall, for example, endowed by the Romanian stringent measures to avert the do not know whether to believe the population in the government17. spread of the virus and failed to statement that COVID-19 is a hoax This overlaps with a lack of adequately communicate the designed to manipulate people institutional knowledge in need for certain rules18. Some of throughout the world. It is important, communicating measures to the more far-fetched conspiracy in this vein, that factual information contain the pandemic, along theories are, however, not reaches these people before with the flood of disinformation prevalent in the country and even disinformation campaigns do. and misinformation on Romanian the organisers of anti-lockdown social media. This exacerbates protests claimed that they do not the disconnect between political question the existence of the virus elites and a large part of the but rather its severity.” population”. [GlobalFocus Center, [Prague Security Studies Institute, Romania] Czechia] GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

17 Degree of belief in COVID-19 related conspiracy theories COVID-19 Official number of COVID-19 cases is lower than public authorities (institutions) in your country tell us.

43% 42% 40% 39% 39% 38% 36% 36% 29%

Czechia Romania Montenegro Bulgaria N. Macedonia Serbia Poland Slovakia Hungary

COVID-19 is fake to manipulate the population.

43% 43% 39% 36% 36% 35% 32% 24% 21%

Montenegro Serbia Slovakia Bulgaria Czechia N. Macedonia Poland Romania Hungary

USA deliberately created the COVID-19 virus.

38% 38% 37% 33% 27% 19% 18% 18% 9%

Montenegro Serbia N. Macedonia Bulgaria Slovakia Hungary Czechia Romania Poland GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

18 COVID-19 COVID-19 vaccine is a tool to implant nano-chips and control people.

37% 33% 29% 24% 20% 20% 20% 19% 15%

Montenegro Serbia N. Macedonia Bulgaria Poland Romania Slovakia Czechia Hungary

COVID-19 conspiracy theories are most popular among the countries in the Western Balkan region.

Trends to watch out for

Disinformation Willingness to European and conspiracy get vaccinated will Health Union theories will be a mark on states’ The ham-handed response by the significantly hinder ability to build trust EU at the outset of the pandemic recovery from the and communicate provided an invaluable teachable pandemic with citizens moment. The EU will now seek a stronger mandate in the area COVID-19 related conspiracy As approved vaccines become of public health19 to be able to theories and their dissemination widely available, countries will respond to the fallout of similar among vulnerable populations need to invest considerable effort global phenomena in the future in will pose a growing obstacle into strategic communication to a more efficient manner. to combating the pandemic, as both manage the epidemiological frustrated populations are likely situation and persuade people to to be less willing to comply get vaccinated. with state-enforced measures and recovery plans. This will be particularly true for countries where such measures are not well thought out and communicated and in CEE states where parts of society are already susceptible to disinformation. GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

19 East or West? EAST OR WEST? Chapter 2 Reading time 4 min

Classifications based on binary divisions like dark versus light, good versus bad or East versus West are overly simplistic, condensing complex phenomena into categories that are too determinate. The East-West ideological divide, for example, is not merely a historical remnant of Cold War political polarization. In a world home to non-democratic power players including a resurgent Russia and a China on the rise, this is not to say that the division is irrelevant. But public opinion surveys conducted by GLOBSEC20 each year confirm that this dichotomy is no longer accepted in the region. Central Europeans increasingly perceive themselves as occupying different positions “in-between”, an identity distinct from “Western intellectual narcissism”21 or Eastern non-democratic traditions.

V4 prefers to remain in between

Over the past two years, a middle Average responses from the ground stance has cemented itself as the preferred geopolitical and V4 countries since 2018 civilizational posture for the majority of respondents (52%) in the V4, affirming West East In between perceptions of the emergence of a category distinct from either a Western or Eastern orientation. Several factors 50% are at play here, including the notion, promoted by some politicians, that 40% Central Europe represents a ‘bridge’ between East and West. Another

30% purports that pragmatic populations, acting from a deep-seeded mistrust of both East and West learned from 20% historical experiences, want to choose the best of both worlds while not fully 10% aligning with either of them.

0%

2018 2019 2020 GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

20 Would you prefer your country to be in the

West, East or somewhere in-between? East or West?

West In between East

Czechia 29% 59% 5%

Serbia 21% 59% 10%

Hungary 36% 56% 3%

Bulgaria 25% 50% 8%

Romania 37% 49% 6%

Poland 42% 48% 1%

Slovakia 29% 45% 11%

Montenegro 35% 38% 25%

N. Macedonia 46% 37% 7%

Slovakia looks towards the West

Slovakia is the only exception to to pin down, often described as an this trend, with the middle ground ambiguous mixing of pro-European position dropping in support in favour and pro-Russian sentiment lacking a Slovakia is the of a pro-Western orientation, which coherent communication strategy22. only country saw an increase from 21% in 2018 to Current Foreign Minister Ivan Korčok, 29% in 2020. This shift can perhaps meanwhile, has rejected the notion that where support be attributed, in part, to the clearly Slovakia is “some bridge or a country for the ‘in- pro-Western orientation pursued that would belong nowhere” and stated by the new centre-right Slovak that priorities during his term will be between’ government, which assumed office international cooperation with a focus position in March 2020 and has stressed the on the EU introducing endeavours EU and NATO membership as key to combat conspiracy theories that dropped from to Slovakia’s foreign policy interests. demonise the union23. 56% (2018) to This approach represents a departure from the previous government whose 45% (2020).

foreign policy was more challenging 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

21 Narratives about the West North Macedonia influence civilisational affinities is the most pro-

East or West? Western oriented Perceptions of the West are likely A total of 39% of respondents who country in the instrumental in influencing where think that Western countries have region citizens stand on their preferred better functioning democracies relationship: does the population, want their country to belong to the for example, associate the West with West. This compares to only 22% of Among those surveyed, North aspirational ideals like a properly people who buy into the assertion Macedonia ranks as the most pro- functioning democracy or with the that Western countries are ‘morally Western oriented country, with 46% of promotion of ‘decadence’ shrouded corrupted’, a claim actively promoted respondents expressing a preference behind civil liberties? by unscrupulous political actors and for the West. This number is significantly disinformation outlets. higher than the share expressing similar sentiments in Montenegro (35%), a country that, like North Macedonia, is an aspiring candidate for the next round A total of 39% of EU enlargement. of respondents “ “Demographic factors in Montenegro and North who think Macedonia are the main reason behind different attitudes towards the West in these two countries. A considerable proportion of that Western North Macedonia’s population is comprised of ethnic Albanians (25%)24 with a pro-Western orientation while the Serbian countries 25 population in Montenegro (29%) has adopted a more pro-Russian bent. In North Macedonia, have better public opinion polls indicate the significant pro-Western orientation of the population26 and integration into Western structures like NATO functioning and the EU have been presented as a goal by several North Macedonian governments.” [ATA democracies – Macedonia, North Macedonia] want their country to belong to the West. GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

22 Who is perceived as a strategic partner? East or West? To compare threat perceptions towards personal sympathies, economic ties whom trade with Russia corresponds to different countries, respondents were and/or foreign policy priorities. The only 2-5% of all imports and exports27. provided a list of countries and asked latter seemed to prevail in the case The effective marketing carried out by to choose the two that they view as of Germany, which was chosen by a China and Russia is evident in Serbia, the most important strategic partners considerable number of respondents where the EU is not seen as a strategic for their country. The list consisted of: from all countries with the exceptions partner in spite of the substantial China, the EU (for Western Balkans), of Montenegro and Serbia, and the EU, support that the bloc provides to the France, Germany and Russia. a popular selection for Montenegrins country28. and Macedonians. Russia, on the other Respondents’ perceptions of strategic hand, was chosen as a strategic partner partners reflected a combination of by many Slovaks and Hungarians, for

Countries selected by more than 30% of respondents GERMANY Slovakia 71%, Czechia 65%, Hungary 59%, Bulgaria 53%, Poland 50%, Romania 46%, North Macedonia 42%

(ONLY FOR WESTERN EU BALKANS) RUSSIA Montenegro 54%, North Macedonia 31% Serbia 59%, Slovakia 42%, Bulgaria 41%, Montenegro 38%, Hungary 33% UNITED STATES Poland 69%, Romania 50% CHINA Serbia 59%, Hungary 32%

Trends to watch out for

In-between The middle ground position position as an popular in V4 countries will continue to slightly increase over identity of its the next couple of years unless own will remain there are notable changes in prevalent in V4 governments and communication of what the “West” represents. GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

23 European Union EUROPEAN UNION Chapter 3 Reading time 8 min

The European Union still represents an important and unprecedented cooperation of 27 sovereign countries. While economic integration and common policies comprise the backbone of the EU’s power and importance as a global player, its values and principles are increasingly stirring divisions among member states. The selective implementation of democratic principles, the use of ‘othering’ in contradiction to human rights standards and differences in perceptions therein are undermining the EU’s principles and its unity.

Support for EU CEE outliers

membership in all A 15% and 13% percentage point form of widespread public protests nine countries decrease in support for the EU in amid apparent violations of the rule of Czechia and Bulgaria, respectively, was law by the Bulgarian government32. Against the backdrop of the COVID-19 observed over the past year. These pandemic, an ensuing global economic GLOBSEC findings conform with the crisis and strenuous Brexit negotiations, results of the Eurobarometer survey the value of EU membership (or on membership support29, reinstating “ “The indifference of Czechs potential membership) remains the status of Czechia as the most leads to volatile support of EU undisputed in all nine countries, Eurosceptic country. membership which tends to fall notwithstanding nuances between in times of crisis, especially when different countries on this point. According to the Czech research a given crisis could also have institute STEM, support for the EU economic implications.” [Prague In four CEE countries – Hungary, in Czechia is volatile and fluctuating Security Studies Institute, Czechia] Poland, Romania and Slovakia, a from crisis to crisis30. The institute, pattern of either robust or rising support consequently, explains that for the EU was recorded. In some apprehension about the economic countries, this fervent public backing situation in the country and the for EU membership contrasts with pandemic are key factors behind the “ heated populist rhetoric, while in others, recent decrease in trust towards the “Since the start of anti- rising support could reflect increasing EU.31 government protests in July 2020, strategic communication efforts about Bulgarians have increasingly seen the EU voiced by national governments In Bulgaria, meanwhile, the decline the EU as colluding with local tailored to domestic populations. in support measured could be linked elites and not as a guarantor of to perceptions that the EU has not prosperity and democracy for the provided adequate attention to local majority.” [Center for the Study of Democracy, Bulgaria] calls for anti-corruption reforms,

GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC demands that have manifested in the

24 Staying or leaving?

Those who would vote to stay in the EU in European Union a referendum*

2020 2018 2017

Bulgaria 65%

72%

Czechia 54%

69%

Hungary 82%

75%

Poland 85%

80%

Romania 89%

80%

Slovakia 75%

66%

Those who would join the EU in a referendum

Montenegro 63%

N. Macedonia 78%

Serbia 52% GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

*data for 2017 and 2018 were published in GLOBSEC Trends 2017 and GLOBSEC Trends 2018 respectively, Bulgaria and Romania were not included in 2018 polling. 25 The Western EU = Better life for Balkan trio future generations European Union Nudged by a range of political A total of 71% of respondents, on developments, interest in EU average, think that that EU membership membership remains strong among will result in a better life for future the three surveyed Western Balkan generations. There are regional countries. Firstly, for many, the differences though. Czechia is an accession to the EU is perceived outlier, with only 53%, the lowest among as a vehicle for resolving internal Central Europe countries, holding this ethnic disputes, thereby bringing the view. The greatest levels of optimism promise of stability and providing on this question, meanwhile, are found an opportunity to improve internal in Poland (82%), Romania and Slovakia democratic processes. Secondly, (80%). In the Western Balkan countries, Euro-Atlantic integration may still where the question was framed in be viewed as a means for achieving the context of potential membership, economic growth and public wellbeing Macedonians (78%) were particularly in exchange for fulfilling membership sanguine, followed by Serbians and criteria. This perception of the EU as Montenegrins at 64%. a means to solve internal problems could, nonetheless, be detrimental to the EU over the long haul. While the EU’s “carrots” might indeed, for 71% of example, foster domestic reforms or support peace talks, the willingness to implement reforms and settle ethnic conflicts needs to come from within. respondents,

Only 18% on average, of Serbians see the EU think that EU as a strategic partner. membership

This argument is underscored by an will result in EU that has seen its appeal slowly wither away as accession processes have dragged on and countries a better life have encountered an array of conditionalities. Witness the decline of the EU role in, for example, Serbia33, for future where perceptions of strategic partners in the region have shifted. When asked which two countries are the generations. most important strategic partners for their own country, respondents were loath to name the EU. While 54% of Montenegrins ranked their partnership with the EU as top priority, 59% of Serbians, by contrast, identified their most important strategic partners as Russia and China and 21% as Germany,

GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC and only 18% labelled the EU as such.

26 The EU and our values and identity

Contradictions abound in societal European Union perceptions of the EU. In all countries, Do you think that the EU is respondents expressed interest in being part of the EU and majorities destroying your country’s were also confident that the EU could improve their lives and those of future traditional values and identity? generations. Yet these benefits appear No Yes to be perceived primarily in material terms.

While in 7 of 9 countries the majority of respondents do not feel that the EU is destroying their country’s traditional values and identity, this narrative of an EU as a bulwark against traditions has found itself a sympathetic audience with 30-50% of respondents in the region, Romania being the notable exception. This finding is indicative of the fact that, despite a general consensus that the EU is beneficial, the region is particularly sensitive to questions concerning the preservation of values 25% and identity. In this vein, political actors that have propagated “protecting our traditional values” political rhetoric appear to have been met with success. This is the case, for example, in Czechia. Though not necessarily perceived as especially strident about traditions compared to others in the region, against the backdrop of an 38% 42% 58% 59% 52% 61% 62% 65% 68% unpopular EU in the country, the EU as 0% a destroyer of traditions talking point has taken hold. 57% 55% 40% 40% 37% 35% 35% 33% 28% Serbia Poland Czechia Bulgaria Slovakia Hungary Romania

Despite Montenegro Czechs not N. Macedonia being generally considered as 25% a traditional society, stronger Euroscepticism makes them prone to believe the narratives demonising the EU. GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

27 EU Paradox

European Union Differentiation in perceptions towards the EU are also apparent when EU should act as one block comparing views of EU competencies. A majority of CEE respondents, for vs. EU dictate example, want the EU to present a united front on the world stage, even Those who agree with the following statements: if that clashes with their own interests. The EU should act as one block on The EU dictates us what to do Support for the EU in acting as a the world scene, even if it sometimes without my country having a coherent foreign policy bloc meshes clashes with my country’s interests. chance to influence it. with findings indicating that an average 38% of EU-based respondents perceive the EU to be growing in importance over the past five years.

There is, however, a contradiction concerning the application of certain measures to its own member states. The storyline of a so-called “EU dictate” indeed has seeped into the political discourse and public sphere in numerous countries over the past few years. Numerous respondents, in particular, believe that the EU dictates policies to their countries without the possibility for a domestic say on this agenda.

In contrast to the notion of the EU becoming a unified actor in international politics, the EU dictate trope is primarily judged to be an issue of domestic politics, often in connection to value-based sensitive issues like migration and LGBT+ rights. GLOBSEC 50% 46% 58% 64% 66% 73% data, for example, show that the EU

is partially perceived as a threat to 67% 64% 57% 55% 39% 30% traditional values and national identity (especially in Czechia, Slovakia and Bulgaria)34. Poland Czechia Bulgaria Slovakia Hungary Romania Narratives disseminated by various actors seeking to nurture confusion, undermine democracy and weaken Euro-Atlantic partnerships35 are contributing to this dichotomic understanding of the EU. GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

28 A majority of CEE respondents want the European Union EU to act as a united bloc on the world stage, even if that clashes with their own interests. At the same time, however, many believe that the EU dictates policies to their countries.

Trends to watch out for

The EU’s pull worries of an “EU dictate”, the EU Rise of factor will continue still holds a positive image among polarisation its prospective members. Unless to operate as it invests more resources into continues to harm populations communication and relationship- the EU. are drawn in by building, however, it risks losing Polarising issues connected to the prospect of momentum, evidenced by values and identity have become financial benefits developments in Turkey and to pertinent in affecting EU policy and economic a certain extent also in Serbia. and decision-making processes, growth. The unstable political situation in with those capitalising on these several CEE countries and the use issues increasingly finding of anti-NATO rhetoric as a wedge For decades EU membership themselves in positions of power. issue in political debates might has been viewed as an objective Unless the EU redefines its only further destabilise support for whose attainment motivated values and principles or changes the organisation in the region. critical reforms and democratic its modus operandi, these transitions in numerous countries developments will continue to across different regions. Despite impair EU interests and hamper its unity. GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

29 NATO NATO Chapter 4 Reading time 8 min

The NATO accession of post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe was hailed at the time as a success story of transformation and a testament to the new post-Cold War security architecture based on the liberal democratic order. The addition of new members from the Balkans was indeed perceived as a logical next step as stabilisation in the region paired with the pro-western ambitions of countries.

Yet, it seems that NATO armour has lost some of its shine both in the CEE and in the Western Balkans. The same NATO accession that once seemed to be an almost inevitable process with no real alternative is now being increasingly questioned in certain corners. NATO is still perceived as the primary security guarantee across the region but gaps and internal conflicts threaten to further undermine its image at a time of increasing superpower competition.

NATO losing its appeal in CEE?

Central Europeans cherish the security There has been a particular increase umbrella provided by NATO, yet the seen in the number of Bulgarians who positive trend line of increasing support In Bulgaria, are ambivalent on NATO membership. for NATO membership has come to a more The share of those expressing a screeching halt in most countries. no opinion indeed swelled nine While NATO is still overwhelmingly concerning percentage points, rising from 21% to popular in the region with 72% backing shift has 30%. membership, Czechia and Bulgaria are moving in the opposite direction. occurred, According to the Bulgarian Center Especially significant are developments with support for the Study of Democracy, this in Czechia, once one of the most development is driven to a large vehement proponents of NATO in the for NATO in extent by increasing dissemination region, alongside Poland and Romania. 2020 falling and acceptance of pro-Russian Not only has support for NATO dropped disinformation and anti-NATO narratives in Czechia, sentiment for leaving NATO below 50% for in Bulgaria, which have entered into has seen a corresponding rise of 9%. the first time usage even by the mainstream media According to the Czech polling agency and in the public political domain. STEM36, plunging support for NATO since Bulgaria in Czechia is linked to perceptions joined the that Czechia now faces fewer global security threats. The nosedive, organisation moreover, corresponds with previous in 2004. fluctuations in NATO support, which has

GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC hovered historically at around 70%.

30 Meanwhile, growing support for NATO observed in Slovakia, which used “ NATO to be one of the least enthusiastic Steady growth “Among the most propagated backers of the organisation in the of support pro-Russian narratives have region, may be tied to the clear and been the descriptions of NATO consistent messaging of the new for NATO and the EU as devious actors Slovak administration on its foreign membership with a global agenda intended policy approach including on NATO and to undermine the sovereignty of its importance for Slovakia. This pattern in Slovakia nation-states and to manipulate corresponds to a similar increase in continued governments in destroying their Slovakia’s pro-Western orientation relations with Russia. NATO is also largely portrayed as an extension described in the East vs. West chapter. over the last of US power in Europe, which 4 years, the has contributed to widespread mistrust among Bulgarians in the support has alliance’s objectives of boosting risen by 18%. regional security.” [Center for the Study of Democracy, Bulgaria]

Those who would vote to stay in NATO in a referendum*

2020 2019

90%

83% 83% 80% 80%

69%

61% 56% 56%

47%

Poland Hungary Romania Czechia Slovakia Bulgaria 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

*relevant shifts in attitudes since 2019 were only found in Czechia, Slovakia and Bulgaria. Complete results from past years can be found in GLOBSEC Trends 2019. 31 32 GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Stay in NATO (%)* NATO *Those whowould vote tostayinNATO inareferendum establishing militarybasesnearthecountry. member countriesintheregionbelievethatNATO isanaggressivetooloftheUSorthatNATO isprovokingRussiaby The penetrationofpro-RussiannarrativesintotheCEEregionisquitesignificant.Almost4out10peoplelivinginNATO Those whoagreewiththe following statements: Those whoagreewiththefollowingstatements: and theweaklinks NATO chain:hawks,steadysupporters tool fortheUStocontrolothercountries. NATO isan aggressiveorganisationanda we arelivinginasaferenvironment. My country‘s membershipinNATO means N. Macedonia 39% 61% 72 32% 37% Czechia 66% 36% 69 42% 38% initiating conflictsinEasternEurope. Russia deliberatelyprovokes NATO by encircling itwithmilitarybases. NATO deliberately provokes Russiaby Slovakia 49% 61% 61 56% 41% Romania 29% 76% 83 38% 37% to express negative perceptions of to expressnegativeperceptionsof and Hungarybeingtheleastlikely in theregion,withPoland, Romania nonetheless, significantdifferences safer livingenvironment.Thereare, membership hasprovidedthema Central EuropeansagreethatNATO On theotherhand,7outof10 Poland 25% 87% 90 66% 23% Hungary 29% 79% 83 42% 33% from GLOBSEC Trends 2017 creeds. Thisconfirmspreviousfindings the mostreceptivetoanti-NATO spectrum, BulgariaandSlovakiabeing NATO and,ontheothersideof also corresponds with the fact that also correspondswiththefactthat weakest linksintheNATO Chainand identified SlovakiaandBulgariaasthe Bulgaria 37 49% 43% 47 , which , which 22% 46% narratives. highest levelsofsupportforpan-Slavic these twocountriesarehometothe Montenegro 55% 47% 45 60% 44% 33 GLOBSEC Trends 2020 NATO NATO in the Western Balkans NATO

Despite the recent NATO accessions negative perceptions of NATO, with of Montenegro in 2017 and North more than half the population agreeing Macedonia in 2020, on average, with the perspective that NATO is a On average, non-EU Balkan countries are 22% US tool that is used to provoke Russia. more likely to believe that NATO is an While Montenegrin society has always non-EU aggressive organisation compared to been close to equally divided in its Balkan their Central European counterparts. In views on NATO, it appears that anti- a similar vein, non-EU Balkan countries NATO narratives are currently enjoying countries are are 17% more likely to believe that the upper hand. 22% more NATO is provoking Russia with its placement of bases. North Macedonia remains the only likely to country in the Balkan region where believe that It comes as no surprise that the Serbian a majority of the population rejects population is particularly antagonistic pro-Russian and anti-NATO narratives. NATO is an towards NATO, with the trauma of The country’s active and long-standing aggressive the 1999 NATO bombing campaign cooperation with the US, the EU and its victims continuing to shape and NATO have all contributed to a organisation opinions even 21 years later. Russian considerably more positive perception compared to disinformation regarding NATO, of NATO in North Macedonia. which has been widely circulated in their Central the mainstream media and spilled European over into political discourse in the country, effectively builds upon and “ counterparts instrumentalises existing attitudes. “During the war in Kosovo, Serbia and the Serbian population According to an International living in several Balkan countries Republican Institute opinion poll, 83% of (Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia Serbians perceive the role of NATO in and Herzegovina) perceived 38 the world negatively . NATO and US as an aggressor. On the other side, North Macedonia Even in the new NATO members, would never solve any of its major Montenegro and North Macedonia, issues without the mediation and populations are quite divided on their the strong support of the ‘West’. views on NATO. Montenegrins, due to The US, NATO and European the country’s historic and cultural links Allies have always acted swiftly with Serbia, are more likely to hold to mediate all major issues.” [ATA- Macedonia, North Macedonia]

“ “Anti-NATO propaganda was promulgated through several different framings including the argument that joining NATO was specifically directed against Russia, Serbia, Orthodoxy, tradition and Serbian and Slavic culture. The strong connections with Russia and Serbia are also a major factor in this case. Another pertinent issue is the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia during the Kosovo war when military targets in Montenegro, then a part of Yugoslavia, were bombed.” [Center for Democratic Transition, Montenegro] GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

34 Image of NATO: Protector or Aggressor? NATO

Stay in NATO/Join NATO* Leave NATO/Not Join NATO*

Serbia 9% 84%

Montenegro 45% 50%

N. Macedonia 72% 21%

My country‘s membership in NATO means we NATO is an aggressive organisation and a are living in a safer environment. tool for the US to control other countries.

Serbia 26% 81%

Montenegro 47% 55%

N. Macedonia 61% 39%

Russia deliberately provokes NATO by NATO deliberately provokes Russia by initiating conflicts in Eastern Europe. encircling it with military bases.

Serbia 31% 71%

Montenegro 44% 60%

N. Macedonia 32% 37%

*Serbia is not a NATO member

Trends to watch out for

NATO support The Western The renewed will continue to Balkans will US pledge to wane in CEE. experience further the transatlantic shifts in NATO security partnership Support for NATO in Bulgaria might deteriorate further, as perceptions with will act as a bulwark anti-NATO narratives, driven Montenegro and against a resurgent by external and internal actors, North Macedonia Russia and China. take their toll. The unstable moving in opposite political situation in several CEE directions. The new US administration and countries and the use of anti- its policies towards the CEE and NATO rhetoric as a wedge issue The Western Balkans will continue Balkan region will significantly in political debates might only to be a region where global and influence perceptions of the US, further destabilise support for the regional powers clash and this itself closely tied to attitudes organisation in the region. dynamic will likely lead to further towards NATO. destabilisation. GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

35 United States and Russia United States UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA Chapter 5 Reading time 12 min

Russia and the US have historically been the two primary centres of gravity, pulling countries of the CEE and Western Balkan region into their civilisational and cultural orbits through the use of security, economic and political tools. The post-Cold war period, when Russia retreated from both regions and the West, led by the US, was seen as the only viable option, is over. Russia’s investments into its propaganda apparatus appear to be paying off. Particularly at a time when perception is often more important than reality, Russia’s image increasingly looms large over the region.

Attitudes of CEE and Western Balkan countries towards Russia and the US are mixed and again reflect cultural and historical links, geopolitics, current developments and domestic politics. The region is seen by many as a playground for superpowers and the attitudes of different populations seem to correspond with such narratives.

Perception of threat

Perceptions vary from country to region, the latter the most stridently of haziness that prevails in some country. Poland and Serbia, for pro-Russian. Heightened perceptions, countries, furthermore, merit special example, seem to be remaining true among some NATO members, that attention. to their image – the former as the the US poses a threat, declining

GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC most ardently pro-US country in the fears concerning Russia and a state

36 Those who believe Russia or US present a danger (significant threat) to their country:

US in 2020 US in 2019 Russia in 2020 Russia in 2019 United States and Russia United States

Montenegro 46% 22%

Serbia 46% 7%

36% 20% Slovakia 41% 26%

30% 43% Czechia 20% 52%

N. Macedonia 19% 10%

16% 3% Bulgaria 25% 7%

15% 30% Romania 23% 58%

13% 25% Hungary 16% 31%

10% 68% Poland 12% 77% GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

37 38 GLOBSEC Trends 2020 United States and Russia behaviour in the world. behaviour intheworld. US expansionistand/orbelligerent from SlovaksandCzechsalludedto 1999. Aroundtwothirdsofresponses specifically theNATO bombingof “bad historicalexperience” including responses tendedtoemphasise stage. InSerbiaandMontenegro, of theUSasanaggressoronworld meanwhile, generallyrefertotheimage Those whoperceivetheUSasathreat, partner inNATO USisourally/ Why istheUSnotseenasathreatinmostcountries? as athreat? Why istheUSseen protects themandtheirpartners. member inNATO and/oracountry that perception thattheUSisanally, aco- the USasnotathreatexpressed responses, onaverage, thatidentified In thecountriesabove, 32%of Bulgaria andRomania Where: Slovakia,Poland, Montenegro, 1 Undecided decades ago. from foreigninfluenceonlyafew the regiongainedtheirindependence paradoxical giventhatallcountriesin This conclusionis,nevertheless,rather interested inengaginginterference. playing fieldforanylargerpowertobe and insignificantonthegeopolitical their countriesaretoominuscule region. Respondents believethat feature tothreatperceptioninthe This pointoninferiorityisacommon Where: allcountries In NorthMacedoniaandSlovakia, thesamefigurewasaround20%. or didnotknowhowtorespond toquestionsaboutthreatperceptions. In Romania andBulgaria,around50%ofrespondents declinedtorespond threatening totheUS not interestingor Ourcountryis 2 Macedonia Where: Hungary, Poland andNorth business ties relations and/or Fairorgood 3 Why is Russia seen as a threat?

In Poland and Czechia, around 30% of all responses identified negative United States and Russia United States historical experiences. This awareness is reflective of ongoing communication campaigns and/or general knowledge of 20th century history and current events in both countries. Romanians, on the other hand, note their membership in NATO and alliance with the US (22% of responses) and perceptions that Russia is an aggressor (21% of responses).

Why is Russia not seen as a threat?

1 We are not 2 They are our 3 We have fair interesting or brother/sister nation relations/we are threatening to Russia partners

Where: Slovakia, Czechia, Hungary Where: Slovakia, Bulgaria, Serbia and Where: Hungary and Bulgaria and North Macedonia Montenegro (partner), Serbia and Montenegro (ally and friend) Around a third of responses reiterated As elaborated further later in the argument that Russia does not this chapter, a sense that “Slavic While the former two voiced apparent pose a threat to their country because brotherhood” matters is strongly fair relations and partnerships as a Moscow is unlikely to be interested in present in the countries. reason for not labelling Russia as a them. This is a concerning finding in threat, Serbians and Montenegrins light of all the evidence to the contrary take it a step further in identifying on Russian intervention in CEE and the Russia as a friend and an ally who Western Balkans. respects and supports them.

“ “As far as threats are concerned, Macedonians are more focused on internal threats (such as inter-ethnic issues and challenges) and external issues emanating from adjacent countries (Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Albania). These include identity issues that are often times contested by neighbouring countries (name of the country, history, the language, autonomy and recognition of the church, etc…).” [ATA-Macedonia, North Macedonia] GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

39 Mighty Russian Slavic brother

Russia, deploying the legacy of communism and its modern apparatus Those who agree with of information influence, has managed United States and Russia United States to project its preferred image into the Pro-Russian narratives minds of people living in the region: Russia is my country’s traditional Slavic sister/brother nation. Russia is a Slavic brother and a military superpower unjustly blamed Western countries often unjustly accuse Russia of unlawful or fraudulent behaviour. by the West for all wrongdoings. The Russia‘s military power is far greater than that of any other country in the world. combination of these three elements creates a powerful story of an underdog unjustly accused of misconduct, Serbia providing a convenient escape for the 89% “true” culprits (US and NATO) to evade responsibility. The extent to which 71% this narrative is successful in seeping into the mainstream differs across the 61% region, though the existence of a Slavic link plays an important role. Bulgaria 84%

49% Despite no 53%

common Slovakia Slavic heritage, 78% both Hungary 50% (43%) and 52% Romania Montenegro (37%) share 72% some of the 60% narratives 56%

depicting N. Macedonia

Russia as 66%

an innocent 35%

victim of the 58% West. Czechia

47%

43%

47%

Poland

30%

34%

30% GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

40 Those who disagree that Russia is behaving aggressively against its neighbours and tries to weaken the EU and NATO. United States and Russia United States

50%

25%

56% 52% 52% 51% 51% 49% 37% 36% 11% 0%

N. Macedonia Romania Slovakia Bulgaria Serbia Montenegro Hungary Czechia Poland

The perception that Russia acts believes that Russia is unjustly accused in aggressive manner towards its of unlawful behaviour by the West Perception neighbours is not prevalent among the compared to 44%, on average, that of Russia countries surveyed. While significant identify Russia as aggressive. differences among individual CEE seems to be countries exist, as a whole, the changing in population of the region is almost evenly split in their views on Russia Romania. bullying its neighbours. Nearly half

the population (47%) of the region 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

41 Superior Russian guns: image projection trumps reality

Another important element of Russia’s image abroad is its projection that it is a military superpower on par or even “ More people United States and Russia United States “The fact that more Czechs superior to the US. It is, in fact, striking in this region believe that Russia has the most that more people in this region believe powerful military in the world believe that that Russia has the upper hand when than the similar statement about Russia has it comes to military equipment (50%) the US military could be linked in comparison to the US (47%). This to the significant amount of supperior finding underlines the effectiveness coverage the Russian military military of Russian disinformation efforts garners in the Czech news media. including attempts to cultivate views This coverage is not limited only equipment that contradict reality on the ground. to propagandistic outlets like (50%) in With respect to this illustration, for Sputnik but also the mainstream.” comparison to example, the US, in fact, outperforms [Prague Security Studies Institute, Czechia] Russia both in terms of military the US (47%). spending and military capabilities39.

Those who agree that:

Russia‘s military power is far greater than that of any The US military is more powerful and technologically other country in the world. advanced than Russian.

30% Poland 68%

57% Romania 68%

35% Hungary 52%

56% Montenegro 50%

52% Slovakia 47%

47% Czechia 45%

58% N. Macedonia 41%

61% Serbia 30%

53% Bulgaria

GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC 25%

42 The notion of a Slavic brotherhood/ motif in forming overall perceptions sisterhood uniting all Slavic nations of Russia is evident also when it with Mother Russia exerts a powerful comes to the perception of Russia “ “Poland and Russia have had a and Russia United States impact in the region, with 67% of as a threat. The idea of a Slavic troubled past and the relations respondents in Slavic countries40 brotherhood and/or the importance on a bilateral level are strained subscribing to such views and placed on historical links with Russia also due to the 2010 Smolensk only 28% rejecting this ideological was indeed the second most common plane crash. But on a people-to- construct. Serbia and Slovakia reason cited by respondents in not people level, Poles see Russians, particularly stand out from the pack, listing Russia as a threat. Yet Hungary Ukrainians and Belarusians as with more than three quarters of the remains an exception to this rule. their brothers with whom they populations in these two countries Despite not sharing a common Slavic share a complicated history supporting the idea, rendering both heritage, Hungarians, like their Slavic and, to some extent, a more places considerably more susceptible neighbours, are equally loath to label conservative outlook on the to other Russian narratives and to Russia as a threat. world.” [Political Accountability Foundation, Poland] interference more generally. The importance of the Slavic brotherhood

“ “Russia is clearly not perceived as a threat. The Hungarian government’s rhetoric generally depicts relations with Russia in a positive light and as a partnership. The Prime Minister himself, moreover, has often emphasised that Russia is not a security threat to Hungary41”. [Political Capital Institute, Hungary]

Russia is our Slavic brother

Serbia 89%

Bulgaria 84%

Slovakia 78%

Montenegro 72%

North Macedonia 66%

Czechia 47%

Poland 30% GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

43 US appeal persists

The US is seen as an important ally rather than a threat, though scepticism remains regarding its intentions and United States and Russia United States The more involvement. The US is perceived predominantly as an ally and partner by more than half of the population people perceive in all CEE and Western Balkan NATO members. That said, there are profound differences between individual the US to be countries in the intensity of these views. Poland continues to lead the chart as the most pro-US country in the region, attributed to its at times tumultuous an ally, the less history and unfavourable geographic position that places it on borders with Kaliningrad, the heavily militarised receptive they Russian enclave, and Belarus. Even in countries highly sympathetic to pro- Russian narratives and in those that appear to be cherish their Slavic roots, like Bulgaria and Slovakia, there is a prevailing consensus that the US is an ally. to polarising The sentiment that the US is an ally and conversely not a threat could have important ramifications in the struggle messages to counter pro-Russian information operations in the region, which are often based on demonising the US and coming from its policies. The more people perceive the US to be an ally, the less receptive they appear to be to polarising the Kremlin and messages coming from the Kremlin and its proxies in the region. its proxies in Even in the region. countries highly sympathetic to pro-Russian narratives, there is a prevailing consensus over the US being an ally. GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

44 The US – ally or a threat?

Those who agree that the US is our ally and Those who agree that the US is NOT a threat* traditional partner within NATO. United States and Russia United States 88%

81%

77%

74% 75% 73%

70%

63% 63%

59% 58%

55%

51% 49% 50%

42% 42%

36%

25%

Poland Hungary Romania Slovakia Czechia Bulgaria N. Macedonia Montenegro 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

*Those who answered negatively to question whether the US presents a danger (significant threat) to their country

45 No appetite for increased US role in the region

Even among the most ardent Sea region and the annexation of supporters of the US, there is little Crimea. This general lack of support, appetite for seeing the US augment its however, seems to confirm the notion NATO is the United States and Russia United States role in the region. The Western Balkan that NATO is the preferred framework preferred countries, interestingly, are more likely for cooperation with the US in the to support such an increased role majority of countries. It remains to be framework for though. Romania is also an exception seen, however, whether these attitudes cooperation in this regard with a majority of are the result of negative perceptions respondents welcoming a potential towards the current US administration with the US. increase in US involvement, perhaps a or are linked to a deeper yearning for direct consequence of the expanded greater European autonomy. Russian military presence in the Black

Strategic partners: the US, Russia or neither?

The United States Russia

69%

59%

50% 50%

42% 41%

38%

33%

29% 29% 28%

25% 23% 21%

18% 17% 16%

8% 6% 6%

GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC Poland Romania Czechia Montenegro N. Macedonia Bulgaria Slovakia Hungary Serbia

46 When it comes to perceptions that the US and Russia are strategic partners, a rift between surveyed countries is The US should play a more quite evident. Poland and Romania are the only two countries where the US important role in our region draws significant support, while Serbia, Romania 57% and Russia United States Slovakia and Bulgaria are the strongest supporters of Russia. North Macedonia 44% With the exception of Poland and Romania, people living in the region Montenegro 42% do not choose the US as their most important strategic partner and rather Poland 42% place other European countries in this role. The verdict is still out on whether Hungary 32% this dwindling prioritization of the US in the region could, among other possibilities, be a consequence of the Serbia 28% US pivot to Asia or an indication that the longing for greater European strategic Slovakia 21% autonomy championed by some has found a sympathetic audience. The Bulgaria 18% void created by the US pulling out of the region, however, risks being swiftly Czechia 16% filled by China and Russia, apparent already in the Western Balkans.

“ “The Bulgarian public has been firmly divided along a West-Russia dichotomy which has seen the close cultural, religious and historic connections to Russia presented as antithetic to Western society. This is in line with Russian propaganda narratives that point out that in a world dominated by morally decadent values instilled by Western powers, Russia is the one who protects (Bulgaria’s) traditional Christian and moral values.” [Center for the Study of Democracy, Bulgaria]

Trends to watch out for

Russia will US will re-enter continue to project the world stage. its military might The increasing realisation that and portray itself as any void created by the US on the a Slavic brother. world stage will be quickly filled by other superpowers is likely to The country will, furthermore, lead to increased involvement of continue to make full use of its the US in multi-lateral platforms. progress in military modernisation and is likely to further intensify its propaganda that purports an alleged superiority of Russian arms over its western counterparts. GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

47 China CHINA Chapter 6 Reading time 6 min

With no strong cultural ties or lingering feelings associated to any 20th century power-play, China’s position in the region differs from Russia and the US. China is presented, in some countries, as a strategic partner that can be turned to if in need of financing for infrastructure projects. The scale of its influence, meanwhile, is often discussed by both its supporters and detractors at the highest political level, though its power goes unnoticed in some corners. These (in)actions are mirrored in current perceptions of China, though the question of how the political narratives of the present will shape the image of China in the future remains open.

A non-threatening power?

China has been continuously stepping Chinese influence operations focus up its game to exert greater influence mostly on the use of relatively soft in Europe. While its approach in the methods of economic pressure, media “ “China came to the fore in Western Balkans is different to the one influence and narrative formation44 Montenegro by providing 42 the country is pursuing in CEE , China - the use of aggressive means as necessary funds that were lacking is, in general, not perceived as a threat understood in the sense of traditional for infrastructure projects, which in the region, despite the majority of forms of conflict are generally avoided. have often been overshadowed Central and Eastern Europeans viewing These methods, consequently, may be by concerns about corruption China as an international actor with perceived as non-threatening by the and transparency. China is, increasing power and significance majority in the region. consequently, rather seen as in the world (similar to other parts of a more neutral and primarily Europe43). Czechia, in fact, is the only This, however, points to the need for economic player, whose presence has become more country where more respondents more discussion on threats that fall visible through its investments.” identify China as a threat than not. outside the scope of conventional hard [Center for Democratic Transition, tactics like military strikes and warfare. Montenegro] According to a range of experts, China has, in fact, been pursuing a so-called On average, “debt-trap diplomacy”45 strategy in the 66% in the Western Balkans region by financing can be characterised as Chinese loans for large infrastructure projects, cultural and relationship diplomacy, region believe in turn resulting in unsustainable which is pursued by strengthening that China’s debt accumulation. China owns 25% people-to-people relations among of the public debt, for example, in both national and local governments. power and Montenegro46. As intelligence services This may take the form, for example, significance in have reported47, potential infiltration of partnerships in the academic sector into the area of public infrastructure or attempts to influence the media the world has through Chinese providers can, landscape48. The approach ultimately risen. moreover, result in severe security can provide a gateway to engage in breaches and espionage practices. indirect influence and one that can later

GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC Another type of influence, meanwhile, balloon in size and dimension.

48 Do you think China presents a danger China (significant threat) to your country?

Yes Yes in 2019 No Do not know

51% 48%

49% Czechia 0%

34% 36%

50% Poland 16%

24% 28%

65% Hungary 11%

23% 29%

56% Slovakia 21%

23%

61%

16% Montenegro

14%

62%

24% N. Macedonia

13% 25%

36%

Romania 51%

13%

84% Serbia 3%

3% 9%

49% Bulgaria 48% GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

49 China China is Majorities perceived as strategic in different partner by 59% of Serbians societies in the and 32% of Hungarians. region, with the exception of Why is China seen as a threat? Czechia, do not

Those who perceive China as a threat (Czechs and Poles) most commonly identify China cite the country’s strong economic influence in their reasoning. Czechs also mention, though to a lesser extent, as a threat to Chinese expansionist tendencies and China’s status as an authoritarian or undemocratic regime as threatening to their security. their countries.

Why is China not seen as a threat?

1 We are not 2 Geographical 4 China is only interesting or distance pursuing economic threatening to China Where: Poland, Romania interests, they are our Where: All countries but especially trading partner Slovakia and North Macedonia Another argument, emblematic of a Where: Hungary general lack of awareness in some Slovaks and Macedonians particularly countries, holds that China is not a This line of reasoning is most prevalent perceive their countries as too small threat owing to geographical distance. among Hungarians who, according to to garner concern from China. As can our previous research49, indeed have a also be seen in the case of Russia tendency of seeing geopolitics rather explored in the previous chapter, in economic terms. this fact is indicative of clear gaps in 3 They are our friends strategic communication on the part of and supported us public institutions on the role of China in the region. during the COVID-19 crisis

GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC Where: Serbia, North Macedonia

50 How is China perceived in the region? China

“ “ “ “China has been treated as a “Serbia has historically maintained “GLOBSEC Trends had previously very important economic partner constructive relations with China already shown that China is ever since the 2008 economic including during the periods of perceived more negatively crisis in Hungary. The Hungarian communism and Yugoslavia. in Czechia than in other CEE government has indeed Serbians generally perceive countries50. Relations between consistently described China China as a friend given that the two countries are perceived as a country that provides vast Beijing has lent its support to in Czechia as not only a matter economic opportunities that can Serbia’s position on Kosovo and of foreign policy but also only bring benefits to Hungary. withheld recognition of Kosovan domestic politics. In 2014, a independence. The regular new government together with As far as threat perception is release of official statements from President Miloš Zeman sought to concerned, China is seen as too Serbian President Aleksandar change the country’s (until then far away to be of concern for Vučić that advertise Chinese quite negative) stance towards Hungarians. The finer security investments but fail to mention China as part of a broader shift in challenges posed by the country that the financing, in fact, foreign policy away from a focus (e.g. surveillance, 5G), meanwhile, comes in the form of loans are, on human rights51. These moves are rarely discussed in Hungary, furthermore, helping to boost were subsequently countered by only visible in the public discourse China’s image in the country. centre-right opposition parties when brought up by a narrow Chinese aid provided at the that employed the topic of range of political actors like beginning of the pandemic relations with China to challenge Momentum and independent received heightened attention the government, primarily MPs.” [Political Capital Institute, that stressed its importance. In through symbolic gestures Hungary] this vein, pro-Chinese narratives like expressions of support for received unprecedented media Taiwan52. In this regard, negative coverage in comparison to all sentiment towards China became other countries.” [International rather mainstreamed into Czech and Security Affairs Centre, political debates.” [Prague Serbia] Security Studies Institute, Czechia]

Trends to watch out for

Chinese influence The declining account of increasing muddle in may continue to go perception that world affairs, fuelled, for example, unnoticed unless it by a range of actors that use the Russia and China internet to question the validity becomes a topic of pose a threat, of information. On the other a mainstream public combined with hand, non-democratic regimes debate. growing irresolution that are playing a greater role in regarding questions contributing to economic growth Only in Czechia, where the matter and gaining power in the world of Chinese influence has been of partners and may have started to gain appeal featured in debates at the highest foes, will stay here once again. There is, nonetheless, political level, are perceptions of without robust currently a significant void present a threat posed by China strong. public diplomacy that could be filled by a range Chinese methods of soft power and engagement on of actors seeking to sway public influence will continue to garner the part of the EU opinion in different directions. little attention unless the issue is and US. brought to the fore publicly and policies are implemented at both These developments could, on national and EU levels. the one hand, be transpiring on GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

51 Democracy & polarisation DEMOCRACY & POLARISATION

Chapter 7 Reading time 9 min

The path towards democratisation has varied for each of the surveyed countries, especially when comparing Central Europe to the Western Balkans. In the past decade though, while the quality of democracy has continued to rise in some countries, the democratisation process has started to sputter in others53. As a result, the democratic standards upheld by some countries of Central Europe are now on par with those in the Western Balkans. The survey data also reveal that perceptions of democracy are not necessarily different in the two regions. With a rising number of actors at work constantly undermining democratic values and principles, the region is finding itself in the peculiar situation where it has achieved freedoms it had struggled for on the one hand and yet faces headwinds pushing back against securing these same freedoms for others.

The vehement support for democratic country can be explained by the fact Bulgaria and Romania, lower levels of political systems should be deemed a that the question offered a spectrum satisfaction with how democracy works positive sign for the region. Overlaps of choices including fairly good, very in their country (below) also play a between people identifying both good or bad in evaluating the two factor in their higher levels of tolerance systems as potentially good for their types of systems. In North Macedonia, for a strong leader.

Slovakia 46% Hungary 43% Montenegro 41% Czechia 40% Poland 40% Serbia 38% Romania 27% N. Macedonia 26% Bulgaria 20%

Those who are satisfied with how democracy works in their country GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

52 Which form of government is good for your country?

Those who affirmed that the following form of government is “fairly” or “very” good for their country: Democracy & polarisation Democratic political system with regular elections Strong leader who does not need to bother with and a multiparty system parliament and elections

90%

86%

82%

79% 79% 78% 75%

69%

65%

54% 50%

41% 40% 39% 39% 37%

34%

25%

25% 24%

16%

Slovakia Poland Montenegro Czechia Romania Serbia Hungary Bulgaria N. Macedonia 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

53 “Liberal” as a label

The concept of “othering” has been “Democracy as a system based on applied in the CEE political discourse equality, human rights and freedoms for years54. While in the mid-2010s, the and rule of law” is good for their Democracy & polarisation purported threat came from migration, country, constituting the very definition today, it is liberalism and the policies of liberal democracy57. At the same tied to it55. Liberalism has been labelled time, however, a sizeable proportion as “perverted”, “threatening”, “fascist” of respondents believe this very same and “alien to our identity or traditional liberal democracy threatens their values values”. The information space has and identity. been, furthermore, flooded with divisive and detrimental assertions that undermine the very basis of democratic systems and values including Those who agree with the following statement fundamental rights and freedoms56.

The comparison on this page Democracy as a system based demonstrates the extent of impact of on equality, human rights and the “anti-liberal” wave in the region that has made respondents almost freedoms and rule of law is good allergic to the term liberalism, even if “liberal democracy” defines the for our country. very basis of the system they live in. An overwhelming majority in each country agrees with the statement that

85%

85%

85%

84%

84%

77%

76%

67%

60% GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

54 This dichotomy can be understood, human rights and equality generally as on the one hand, as indicative of the universally accepted constructs. When success of actors that have sought it comes to specific cases, however, to polarise society and demonise that potentially impact individuals, Democracy & polarisation liberalism as a concept. On the other, it particularly when concepts like should be noted that the first statement “identity” and “values” are involved, is rather declaratory in nature and it has responses vary greatly. been illustrated in prior research58 that people tend to approve of respect for

Those who agree with the following statement Liberal democracy threatens our traditional values and national identity.

57% Serbia

50% Montenegro

36% Poland

44% Slovakia

39% Hungary

29% Romania

36% Czechia

43% Bulgaria

32% N. Macedonia GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

55 Western model is good but also a threat to us

A similar contradiction can be noted Democracy & polarisation with respect to two descriptive statements about Western Europe. On average, 45% of respondents in the region agreed with the statement that “Western countries promote a morally corrupt and decadent lifestyle 45% which hides behind “civil liberties”. At the same time, 62% also agree that “Democracies in Western countries Western such as Germany and France are better off when it comes to adhering to key model is a threat democratic principles and securing Western countries promote a morally corrupt rights and freedoms and equality and decadent lifestyle which hides behind before the law for their citizens” than “civil liberties”. democracy in their own country.

62% Western model is good

Democracies in Western countries such as Germany and France are better off when it comes to adhering to key democracy principles and securing rights and freedoms and equality before the law for their citizens. than democracy in our country is. GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

56 Cognitive dissonance or insecurity?

These findings indicate that ownership insecurity and uncertainty that has can turn to. This process has been of democratic principles is rather emerged out of the unstable economic capitalised on by political leaders in the declarative and selective, leading and unpredictable security situation. In region over the past few years, with to cognitive dissonance and an a world constantly on the move, a shift some advancing the ideal of restoring Democracy & polarisation asymmetric approach to the application rapidly augmented by an internet age Central European traditional identities of democratic principles and human that contributes to information chaos based on Christian values59. rights, a phenomenon also identified in and overflow, there are few guarantees other chapters above. people can take to the bank. Against this backdrop, for some, “traditions” or Another feasible explanation might “national identity” become a couple of be linked to the genuine feeling of the only dependable comforts people

Liberalism as a threat in Central Europe

“ “ “ “Liberalism in Bulgaria is often “Liberalism has been coupled “The resurgence of populism at perceived as an attack on with the US, which is negatively the international and regional Bulgarian traditional national perceived as belligerent on level has encouraged some identity, which is based on strictly account of the NATO bombing politicians to mimic this behavior. patriarchal norms espousing of Serbia in 1999. Frequently The term “liberal” was widely gender stereotypes and rejecting deployed rhetoric purports that used in a derogatory way unconventional family planning liberalism is destroying traditional for scoring political points or or sexual preferences. Anti-liberal values and liberal capitalism is a slandering political opponents. rhetoric is strongly promoted by Western tool for enslaving small The 2017 broadly popular nationalistic political parties (some countries. protests against the attacks receiving direct or indirect support on the judiciary by the then from Russia) that have become an Serbia is still a strong and Social-Democratic government integral part of Bulgarian politics patriarchal society that cherishes were depicted by the same over the last decade59. traditional family values. There Social- Democratic establishment is, nevertheless, no particular as being orchestrated by Authoritarian states including well-established discourse on ‘liberal, global elites’ (Soros).” Russia and China have taken this, apart from some obscure [GlobalFocus Center, Romania] advantage of this deep-seated media outlets. That said, the prejudice towards liberal values to Serbian prime minister is openly disseminate propaganda material gay, which has garnered little aimed at discrediting Western attention in the media apart from powers and promoting their memes and comments on social “ governance model as a viable networks.” [International and “The stronger derogation of the alternative60.” [Center for the Security Affairs Centre, Serbia] liberal viewpoint started to be Study of Democracy, Bulgaria] present mainly after 2013 when the newly elected president used wealthy liberals from cities (the so-called ‘Prague café’) as a constructed enemy61. This rhetoric has since been “ picked up by other political “The Hungarian government and the far-right Mi Hazánk are the primary actors actors (former President Václav that deride liberalism. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, for example, has recently Klaus, for example, claimed that deployed the term ‘loopy liberals’ (libernyák) to lampoon alleged leftists on contemporary liberalism is, in fact, multiple occasions. Liberals are regularly accused of advancing policies, like the enemy of democracy which openness to migration and pro-LGBT+ views, which supposedly threaten the again puts the identity argument Hungarian nation.” [Political Capital Institute, Hungary] into the mix).”62 [Prague Security Studies Institute, Czechia] GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

57 Connected polarising narratives

Around a third to half of populations the West and/or liberal democracy identify liberal democracy as a threat in the region is impacted by polarising as threats to identity or values make to traditional values and identity also narratives, which target a range of up a rather homogenous group. In agree with anti-LGBT+ and anti-Western Democracy & polarisation possible “others”. The polls show each country, with the exceptions narratives. In North Macedonia and that those who are receptive towards of North Macedonia and Romania, Romania, the overlap falls to around narratives about the LGBT+ community, around two-thirds of respondents that 45%.

LGBT+

A split in society appears to exist respecting rights for the LGBT+ facilitating the penetration and on questions concerning the LGBT+ community outnumber those receptive popularity of storylines that put forward community, which is often targeted to the homophobic narrative, the the “threat to traditional values” framing as a representative group of “liberal opposite is true in other countries. in the respective countries. ideology”. While in Czechia, Hungary This fact underscores the conservative and Poland, the number of respondents orientation of societies in the region,

Those who agree with the following statements:

LGBT+ (equal opportunities and rights for gays, transsexuals The rights of LGBT+ community (such as a and other minorities) is an immoral and decadent ideology. right to marriage) should be guaranteed.

65% 62%

56%

49% 49% 48% 46% 45%

38% 37% 37% 36% 34% 33% 32% 31%

26%

13%

GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC Montenegro Serbia Slovakia Bulgaria Romania Poland N. Macedonia Hungary Czechia

58 Cultural wars coming?

As argued in a chapter focused on democracy in Megatrends 2020, “the pandemic has magnified economic, The pandemic social and political division in our Democracy & polarisation societies”60 and served as a catalyst for has magnified some issues to rise above the surface. economic, Even while societies continue to face the COVID-19 pandemic and a festering social and economic crisis, some countries have political seen abortion, minority rights issues and/or LGBT+ rights pushed into the division in our centre of political discussions. The societies. “protection” of society from LBGT+ ideology, for example, became one of the cornerstones of Polish President Andrzej Duda’s re-election campaign61. And a recent decision of the Polish constitutional tribunal effectively banning nearly all access to abortions62 has resulted in massive protests across the country. A similar attempt to impose stricter limits on abortion, meanwhile, was pursued by Slovak ultra- conservative MPs from the Christian Union, failing by just one vote63. This selectiveness and asymmetric approach in the implementation of liberal principles could lead to cultural shifts and further societal tensions.

Trends to watch out for

The rise of the Cultural and demonisation ideological wars and othering of brewing within liberalism and the societies. selective application of human rights A consequence of the demonisation of numerous groups and fundamental in society by populist leaders freedoms will could be that cultural wars, like continue unabated the one seen in Poland this year in many countries. over abortion restrictions, may ignite broader societal clashes. Unless influential actors revive discussions on what liberal democracy represents and means for societies, the anti- liberal narrative will continue to preoccupy minds. GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

59 Connecting the dots CONNECTING THE DOTS

02 VIRTUAL ARMIES DOMINATE OVER REAL ONES

Regardless of the realities on the ground, 01 with the growing virtualisation of our lives, image projection is becoming an increasingly COVID-19 important component of foreign affairs and geopolitics. Perceptions of power and strength CONSPIRACY indeed often trump reality, with the regular THEORIES UNDERMINE manipulation of public perceptions leading to decisions based on mere illusion. If NATO TRUST IN DEMOCRACY wants to maintain its edge as the world’s leading military alliance, it must step up its Having already left its mark on nearly all strategic communication game. aspects of society, COVID-19 will continue to shape CEE and the Western Balkan region for the foreseeable future. As governments grapple with the health, economic and social ramifications of the pandemic, preposterous conspiracy theories and disinformation running rampant on social media are being wielded as political weapons by domestic and foreign actors. Their aim - to weaken trust in institutions, government and democracy itself. If left unchecked, the impact of these narratives could result in further drift towards “managed democracy” or even outright rejection of the democracy itself. GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

60 Connecting the dots 04 CHINA’S CREEPING INFLUENCE UNDER THE RADAR

China’s rising global influence and ambitions have largely been cast aside in the region. Most countries either welcome Chinese investments, without questioning their geopolitical significance, or turn a blind eye to their potential long-term consequences. With 5G rolling out in Central Europe, questions concerning how the region should engage with the emerging global superpower remain unanswered. 05 EU: A COMMUNITY OF VALUES OR A FREE MARKET ZONE?

The EU accession process served as the impetus for a considerable overhaul of institutions, policies and political culture in the entire Central European region. Yet 15 years later, the values that have been the glue holding the EU together are under attack, with calls for abolishing the value element growing more 03 audacious. Powerful actors in the region are depicting the EU as oppressive and politicians WEST NEEDS A are using the spectre of a “Brussels dictate” as a scapegoat to cover their own misdeeds. If the CHAMPION AND A EU is perceived not as a community of shared NEW NARRATIVE values, but merely a free market area, the EU IN CEE AND THE risks ceding the beneficial transformative power of enlargement. WESTERN BALKANS

While CEE was successfully integrated into the EU and NATO, the notion that the West provides the sole model worth emulating is losing its lustre. If the West wants to hold onto its soft power advantage, it needs to identify an alluring new champion and engage with the increasing great power competition in both CEE and the Western Balkan region. GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

61 References REFERENCES

1 https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/21/ 13 For more information, see the Infodemic 22 https://dennikn.sk/1698131/rusky-rok- hungary-ends-legal-recognition- chapter in GLOBSEC Megatrends andreja-danka-v-moskve-bol-castejsie- transgender-and-intersex-people 2020: https://www.globsec.org/wp- ako-v-prahe-doviezol-si-aj-doktorat/ https://www.euronews.com/2020/06/01/ content/uploads/2020/10/GLOBSEC_ hungary-s-new-anti-transgender-law-is- MEGATRENDS2020_Seesame_online_ 23 https://balkaninsight.com/2020/05/07/ threatening-to-set-hard-won-lgbt-rights- singlepages.pdf after-the-virus-fighting-corruption-tops- back-decades slovak-to-do-list/ 14 https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/ 2 The respondents were offered a choice uploads/2018/05/GLOBSEC-Trends-2018. 24 http://www.stat.gov.mk/Publikacii/ between the EU, China, Russia and the pdf; https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/ knigaI.pdf United States. uploads/2020/06/Voices-of-Central-and- Eastern-Europe-read-version.pdf 25 https://balkaninsight.com/2011/07/12/ 3 https://covid19.who.int/region/wpro/ montenegro-publishes-population-census- country/cn 15 https://www.globsec.org/publications/ data/ visualising-influence-information-bubbles- 4 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/cases- and-ideological-proximities-on-czech- 26 https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/ 2019-ncov-eueea hungarian-slovak-facebook/ iri_macedonia_july_2018_poll_public_ final.pdf 5 https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/ 16 This metric is calculated as an average files/publications/pdf/ASD-ASIA%20-%20 proportion of those who believe that a) 27 https://oec.world/en/profile/country/hun EU%20China%20Coronavirus%20-%20 COVID-19 vaccine is a tool to implant and https://oec.world/en/profile/country/ final.pdf nano-chips and control people, b) Official svk number of COVID-19 cases is lower than 6 https://time.com/5813628/china- public authorities tell us, c) COVID-19 28 https://globalinitiative.net/ coronavirus-statistics-wuhan is a hoax intended to manipulate the wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ population and d) USA deliberately MunichSecurityReport2019-1.pdf 7 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us- created the COVID-19 virus in each canada-52975934 country. 29 https://www.europarl.europa. eu/at-your-service/files/be-heard/ 8 https://ec.europa.eu/health/security/ 17 https://ires.ro/uploads/articole/ires_ eurobarometer/2019/closer-to-the- overview_en romania-in-pandemie_sondaj-national_ citizens-closer-to-the-ballot/report/en- aprilie-2020_partea-i.pdf eurobarometer-2019.pdf 9 https://markets.businessinsider.com/ news/stocks/coronavirus-stimulus-eu- 18 https://www.irozhlas.cz/zivotni- 30 https://www.euroskop.cz/8952/33663/ recovery-fund-agree-historic-860-billion- styl/spolecnost/vlada-komunikace- clanek/stem-duvera-cechu-v-eu-se-mirne- plan-2020-7-1029413313 duvera-stres-opatreni-denisa- zvysuje/ hejlova_2010131443_tzr 10 https://www.theguardian.com/ 31 https://www.stem.cz/obavy-z- world/2020/jun/10/eu-says-china-behind- 19 https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/ ekonomicke-situace-a-pandemie-snizuji- huge-wave-covid-19-disinformation- priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our- duveru-v-eu-i-evropu-se-zachrannym- campaign european-way-life/european-health- balickem-cesi-spise-souhlasi/ union_en 11 https://balkaninsight.com/2020/09/22/ 32 https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_ covid-19-provides-new-material-for- 20 https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/ bulgarias_anti_corruption_protests_ russian-anti-eu-disinformation/ uploads/2018/05/GLOBSEC-Trends-2018. explained_and_why_they_matter/ pdf ; https://www.globsec.org/publications/ 12 https://www.wired.com/story/inside-the- globsec-trends-2019/ early-days-of-chinas-coronavirus-coverup/ 21 https://www.nybooks.com/ articles/2020/11/19/liberalism-grand- illusions/?lp_txn_id=984961 GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

62 References 33 The positive responses of Serbian 42 https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2020/ 54 https://www.theguardian.com/ respondents to the question “In general, china-and-the-eu-in-the-western-balkans/1- inequality/2017/nov/08/us-vs-them-the- does the EU conjure up for you a very chinas-approach-to-the-western-balkans/ sinister-techniques-of-othering-and-how- positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly and https://chinaobservers.eu/chinas- to-avoid-them negative or very negative image?” has sticks-and-carrots-in-central-europe-the- decreased from 42% in 2018 to 33% logic-and-power-of-chinese-influence/ 55 https://www.globsec.org/publications/ in 2020. Eurobarometer Factsheets slovak-parliamentary-election-2020 https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/ 43 https://www.euractiv.com/section/ publicopinion/index.cfm/survey/ global-europe/news/us-influence-wanes- 56 https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/ getsurveydetail/instruments/standard/ as-china-rises-according-to-a-new- uploads/2020/04/Slovak-parliamentary- surveyky/2262 transatlantic-opinion-poll/ election-2020.pdf, https://www.globsec. org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ 34 https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/ 44 https://mapinfluence.eu/wp-content/ EP-Elections_Information-Operations- uploads/2020/06/Voices-of-Central-and- uploads/2020/09/Chinas-Sticks-and- Disinformation-Campaigns-1.pdf Eastern-Europe-read-version.pdf Carrots-in-Central-Europe_policy-paper_ A4_-interaktivni_03-1.pdf 57 Defined as a “democracy based on 35 https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/ the recognition of individual rights and uploads/2020/10/Visualising_influence. 45 https://thediplomat.com/2019/09/how- freedoms, in which decisions from direct pdf china-challenges-the-eu-in-the-western- or representative processes prevail in balkans/ many policy areas” in Collins Dictionary: 36 https://www.stem.cz/obavy-verejnosti- https://www.collinsdictionary.com/ o-bezpecnost-ceske-republiky-klesaji- 46 https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/will- dictionary/english/liberal-democracy or souhlas-se-clenstvim-v-nato-se-mirne- montenegros-new-government-bring-a- “a democratic system of government in snizil/ new-china-strategy/ which individual rights and freedoms are officially recognized and protected, and 37 https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/ 47 For example in Slovakia: https:// the exercise of political power is limited uploads/2017/09/globsec_trends_2017. spectator.sme.sk/c/22497819/intelligence- by the rule of law.” in Lexico: https://www. pdf services-focused-on-russian-and-chinese- lexico.com/definition/liberal_democracy activities-in-slovakia.html or Czechia: 38 Western Balkans Regional Poll, https://kafkadesk.org/2019/09/29/czech- 58 https://www.globsec.org/publications/ International Republican Institute’s Center counter-intelligence-warns-of-growing- slovakia-a-pro-european-island-in-central- for Insights in Survey Research, March threat-of-chinese-espionage/ europe/ 2020, available at https://www.iri.org/sites/ default/files/final_wb_poll_deck_for_ 48 https://mapinfluence.eu/wp-content/ 59 https://www.reuters.com/article/us- publishing_1.pdf uploads/2020/09/Chinas-Sticks-and- hungary-monument-idUSKBN25G0XS Carrots-in-Central-Europe_policy-paper_ 39 The US outperforms Russia both A4_-interaktivni_03-1.pdf 60 https://www.globsec.org/initiatives/ in terms of nominal military budget globsec-megatrends-2020/ expenditure (750 mld USD vs. 48 mld 49 https://www.globsec.org/publications/ USD), but also in purchasing power parity youth-trends-2020/ 61 https://www.bbc.com/news/world- (PPP) terms. On PPP, Russia spends europe-53039864 some 180 to 200 Mld USD annually 50 https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/ on its military. https://www.cna.org/ uploads/2017/05/GLOBSEC-Trends2019. 62 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/22/ CNA_files/PDF/IOP-2019-U-021955-Final. pdf world/europe/poland-tribunal-abortions. pdf According to the Global firepower html report, the US has a decisive lead in 51 https://web.archive.org/ airpower and naval power, while Russia web/20140708092019/http:// 63 https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22499540/ leads only in ground power. https://www. denikreferendum.cz/clanek/17205-lidska- parliament-postpones-vote-on-proposed- globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp prava-v-zahranicni-politice-aneb-od-sneni- abortions-rules.html k-naivite-a-zpet 40 Slovakia, Czechia, Poland, Bulgaria, North Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro 52 Aktuálně.cz, Nejde o protičínskou návštěvu, tvrdí Kubera o cestě na Tchaj- 41 https://index.hu/belfold/2016/10/20/ wan. Zeman nesouhlasí, 2020 orban_oroszorszag_nem_fenyegeti_a_ https://zpravy.aktualne.cz/domaci/ biztonsagunkat/ politika/pokud-kubera-pojede-na- tchaj-wan-pratelstvi-skonci-hrozi-pre/ r~ee2c576436ed11ea9ec9ac1f6b220ee8/

53 https://freedomhouse.org/countries/

nations-transit/scores 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

63 Notes NOTES GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

64 CREDITS Credits

Collection of opinion polls in each country was coordinated by FOCUS, s.r.o.

The inputs for country-specific context and analysis werec ompleted by our project partners:

Center for the Study of Democracy, Bulgaria ATA-Macedonia, North Macedonia (www.csd.bg) (https://www.atamacedonia.org.mk/en)

Prague Security Studies Institute (PSSI), Czechia Center for Democratic Transition, Montenegro (www.pssi.cz) (https://en.cdtmn.org/)

Political Capital Institute, Hungary International and Security Affairs Centre, Serbia (www.politicalcapital.hu) (https://www.isac-fund.org/en/)

GlobalFocus Centre, Romania Political Accountability Foundation, Poland (www.global-focus.eu) (www.odpowiedzialnapolityka.pl)

Terminology used to identify regions in the report:

V4 / Visegrad Four – Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia CEE / Central and Eastern Europe – V4, Bulgaria, Romania Western Balkans – North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia

This publication was supported by the US State Department and the National Endowment for Democracy.

© GLOBSEC 2020

GLOBSEC, the US Department of State and the National Endowment for Democracy assume no responsibility for facts or opinions expressed in this publication or their subsequent use. Sole responsibility lies with the authors of this publication.

Creative concept & design by GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Trends GLOBSEC

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