Russia's Hostile Measures in Europe
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Russia’s Hostile Measures in Europe Understanding the Threat Raphael S. Cohen, Andrew Radin C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR1793 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0077-2 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2019 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report is the collaborative and equal effort of the coauthors, who are listed in alphabetical order. The report documents research and analysis conducted through 2017 as part of a project entitled Russia, European Security, and “Measures Short of War,” sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, U.S. Army. The purpose of the project was to provide recommendations on how the Army can create options for the National Command Authorities to address the threat of Russian aggression in the form of measures short of war (or hostile measures) that leverage, improve upon, and develop new Army and joint capabilities. The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document is RAN167301. This research was conducted within RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Resources, and Doctrine Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) sponsored by the United States Army. RAND operates under a “Federal-Wide Assurance” (FWA00003425) and complies with the Code of Federal Regulations for the Protection of Human Subjects Under United States Law (45 CFR 46), also known as “the Common Rule,” as well as with the implementa- tion guidance set forth in DoD Instruction 3216.02. As applicable, this compliance includes reviews and approvals by RAND’s Institutional Review Board (the Human Subjects Protection Committee) and by the U.S. Army. The views of sources utilized in this study are solely their own and do not represent the official policy or position of the U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. government. iii Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures and Tables ...............................................................vii Summary .......................................................................... ix Acknowledgments ............................................................. xvii Abbreviations .................................................................... xix CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 Organization of This Report ..................................................... 2 Methodology ....................................................................... 3 Russian Objectives ................................................................. 5 Russian Strategies .................................................................13 Dimensions of Russian Influence ...............................................16 Conclusion .........................................................................18 CHAPTER TWO Russian Hostile Measures in the Baltics ....................................19 Motives ............................................................................ 20 Opportunities ..................................................................... 24 Means .............................................................................. 40 The Future of Russian Hostile Measures in the Baltics ......................57 CHAPTER THREE Hostile Measures in Southeastern Europe ..................................63 Motives ............................................................................ 64 Opportunities ..................................................................... 68 v vi Russia’s Hostile Measures in Europe Means ...............................................................................78 The Future of Russian Hostile Measures in Southeastern Europe ........ 101 CHAPTER FOUR Hostile Measures of Influence Elsewhere in Europe .................... 105 Motives ........................................................................... 106 Opportunities .................................................................... 108 Means ............................................................................. 114 The Future of Russian Hostile Measures in Other Parts of Europe ...... 141 CHAPTER FIVE Conclusions ..................................................................... 145 The Nature of the Threat ...................................................... 145 The Contours of the Response ................................................ 148 Implications for the Joint Force and the U.S. Army ........................ 153 References ....................................................................... 157 Figures and Tables Figures 1.1. Examples of Desired Evidence of Russian Hostile Measures .... 4 2.1. Concentrations of Russian Speakers in the Baltics ............. 27 Tables 4.1. Russia’s Ties to Right-Wing Populist Groups .................. 115 5.1. Forecast of Russian Hostile Measures in Europe in the Next Few Years ..................................................... 149 vii Summary This report examines current Russian hostile measures in Europe and forecasts how Russia might threaten Europe over the near to medium term through activities that draw up short of the active use of lethal force. In line with George F. Kennan’s use of the term measures short of war,1 the term hostile measures encompasses a wide range of political, economic, diplomatic, intelligence, and military activities that could be perceived as harmful or hostile. The report assesses the range and limits of Russian tools of influence, European countries’ abilities to resist or respond, and these states’ vulnerabilities to hostile measures. The key finding in this report is that there appears to be an inverse rela- tionship between Russia’s means of influence and its ability to achieve its interests. Where it does have influence over actors, it tends not to be able to change policy significantly. This report examines three key regions of Europe: the Baltics; Southeastern Europe; and, briefly, the rest of Europe at large. For each region, we highlight Russian motives, opportunity, and means of influence. What Are Hostile Measures? Studying Russian hostile measures is inherently challenging because Russia does not want its sources and methods to be publicly known. 1 George F. Kennan, in Giles D. Harlow and George C. Maerz, eds., Measures Short of War: The George F. Kennan Lectures at the National War College, 1946–1947, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1991, pp. 3. ix x Russia’s Hostile Measures in Europe To address this challenge, we begin by specifying the evidence that would ideally be available to demonstrate Russian influence: evidence of intent from the Russian state, evidence of influence from Russia on a local proxy, and evidence that the Russian influence on the proxy led to the achievement of a Russian foreign policy objective. In practice, however, this level of evidence is almost never available. As a result, we cannot definitively prove the absence or existence of Russian influence; instead, we gather the available written and interview-based evidence and draw conclusions where possible. Research by the RAND Corporation’s Arroyo Center into Rus- sian hostile measures determined that Russia pursues both directed and routine hostile measures. Directed hostile measures have a specific purpose or goal and appear to be employed as part of a cohesive plan; routine hostile measures are conducted by all arms of the Russian state as a matter of course. In this report, we identified five categories of very broad objectives that appear to guide Russian hostile measures in Europe: 1. pursuing security and survival of the regime 2. developing and maintaining great-power status 3. exerting influence within the near abroad, meaning Russia’s immediate neighborhood and desired sphere of influence 4. increasing cooperation and trade with Western Europe 5. undermining enlargement of the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). For the most part, Russia pursues broad, long-term objectives in Europe by applying some directed hostile measures but mostly rou- tine ones. This “soft strategy” is applied with a wide range of differ- ent hostile measures. It is pursued with general long-term