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Policy Brief No. 26 September 2011

Organization as Innovation: ’s Human Program’s Efforts to Instill a Quality Management System

Kevin Pollpeter

SUMMARY

pace industries confront unique challenges in successfully Sbringing programs to conclusion, primarily due to the harsh environments in which operate and the technologies needed to send them into . Developers of successful systems place great emphasis on reliable technologies, exacting manufacturing processes, and strict and documentable quality assurance measures. China’s greatest accomplishments in creating its program may not be the development of new technologies. As China increasingly relies on domestically-sourced components and systems to manufacture spacecraft, the internal processes it has developed may be a more reliable indicator of its ability to sustain a successful space program than technological advances. These processes may have a more lasting effect on the space industry’s ability to innovate than the role of technology itself.

The Study of Innovation and Technology in China (SITC) is a project of the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. SITC Policy Briefs provide analysis and recommendations based on the work of project participants. This material is based upon work supported by, or in part by, the U.S. Army Research Laboratory and the U.S. Army Research Office through the Minerva Initiative under grant #W911NF-09-1-0081. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Army Research Laboratory or the U.S. Army Research Office. 1 Space industries confront unique challenges in challenges was political support from the top successfully bringing programs to conclusion. political leadership and the resulting allocation These challenges are primarily due to the medium of funding. Similar to the U.S. program, in which spacecraft operate and the technologies which received support from Presidents Kennedy needed to send spacecraft into orbit. The launch, and Johnson, China’s human spaceflight project space, and reentry environments are the harshest received initial approval from China’s paramount of environments and place great stress on technol- leader Deng Xiaoping in 1991 and, after exten- ogies involved. No other type of technology poses sive feasibility analysis, formal approval from the the same degree of difficulty as that encountered Communist Party’s Politburo Standing Commit- in transporting spacecraft from the ’s surface tee in 1992. This political support, as well as suf- to orbit and back again. This difficulty in develop- ficient funding, has continued to the present day ing successful space systems places great empha- through the administrations of Jiang Zemin and sis on reliable technologies, exacting manufactur- Hu Jintao. ing processes, and strict and documentable quality assurance measures. Moreover, space programs Quality Control and Project Management require long-term support from a country’s top In addition to political support, China’s space leadership along with adequate funding. industry has established an ever-increasing com- mitment to quality. At the beginning of the pro- CHINA’S HUMAN gram it was evident to the leaders of the SPACEFLIGHT PROGRAM program that China’s quality management system was not suitable to the requirements of human China’s human spaceflight program is the coun- spaceflight. China’s space program did not direct- try’s largest and most complex technology pro- ly manage individual projects nor did it use proj- gram. In successfully sending into ect management technology or properly control space since the early , China has surmount- quality and costs. Whereas the U.S. space indus- ed numerous difficult challenges. China’s - suc try benefitted from its well-developed aerospace cess is even more remarkable when considering industry that could draw upon a young workforce the relatively low technological base from which and extensive experience developing aircraft and it started. Indeed, at the outset of the program, missiles, as well as the expertise of German rock- China’s space industry was staffed with an aging et scientists who moved to the after workforce nearing retirement saddled with poor World War II, China had no such luxury. work habits, backward technology, and an insuf- The story of China’s human spaceflight pro- ficiently strict commitment to quality. gram, then, is as much about developing an ef- In overcoming these challenges, China’s fective systems engineering program as it is about space industry followed the same principles in developing new technologies. China did develop developing human spacecraft as the United States new technologies for its Shenzhou space cap- did in its development of the Apollo/ pro- sule and Shenjian , but a successful human grams. However, because China’s space program spaceflight program would not have been possible inherited a legacy industry that was underfunded, if a carefully managed system made up of testing unfamiliar with modern systems engineering, and standards did not inculcate a commitment to technologically backward, and generally lacking quality from the prime contractor down to third- in commitment to quality, China’s human space- tier suppliers. program cannot be said to have become ma- ture until at least 2005, or 13 years after the ap- COMPARING THE U.S. AND proval of its human spaceflight program and two years after China’s first manned flight. CHINESE PROGRAMS Both the U.S. Apollo/Saturn programs and Chi- Top-Level Leadership Support na’s Shenzhou/Shenjian programs had to institute The most important factor in overcoming these a strict top-to-bottom management system to en-

2 sure proper implementation and attention to qual- structure implementing a strict quality assurance ity. In both programs, senior leaders realized that system made of standards, testing, documenta- a loose management style and lax oversight would tion, and inspections. be unable to enforce the strict quality standards The role of organization in technological in- needed for human spaceflight, especially at the novation also places foreign cooperation and component and subcomponent level of manufac- technology transfer in a new light. Discussions of turing. Chinese defense programs most often focus on the In the case of the U.S. space program, a close role of foreign cooperation and technology trans- government-industry team was formed in which fers as the single most important determinant of the government conducted direct oversight of success. The role these two factors have played contractors. In the Chinese case, the China Acad- in the advancement of China’s defense technol- emy of , which was responsible ogy should of course not be underestimated. In for the development of the Shenzhou space cap- fact, China has acknowledged the critical support sule, and the China Academy of it has received from in human spaceflight Technology, which was responsible for the devel- technology. Nevertheless, while foreign assis- opment of the Shenjian rocket, had to take direct tance may have been necessary, it alone has not roles in supervising the work of second- and third- been sufficient to guarantee success of the human tier suppliers. spaceflight program. This system, however, took 13 years before it was fully developed. China did not finalize its CONCLUSIONS component specification list until 2005, after it had already launched its first manned spaceflight Viewing technological innovation as a system in 2003. Nor has China’s level of testing equaled rather than as an individual act demonstrates that that of the U.S. Apollo/Saturn programs. China’s greatest accomplishment may not be the The launch vehicle used to send the development of new technologies, but the organi- Apollo spacecraft into orbit was tested in whole zational skills that were necessary to orchestrate or in part sixteen times before use on a manned a large number of organizations into a united ef- mission. This testing started with the first stage, fort to conduct the exacting business of spacecraft then multiple stages, then the complete rocket manufacturing. This has important implications with mock versions of the Apollo command and for China and the United States. As China increas- service modules and then launches with real com- ingly relies on domestically manufactured com- mand and service modules. By comparison, China ponents and systems to manufacture spacecraft, conducted no test launches of the LM-2F rocket the internal processes it has developed will play before the launch of Shenzhou 1 and conducted a more important role and will be a more reliable just four unmanned launches before sending an indicator of China’s ability to sustain a successful into space. space program. As a result, the invaluable lessons China has acquired in developing a human-rated spacecraft and launch vehicle will have a more THE ROLES OF ORGANIZATIONAL lasting effect on the space industry’s ability to in- STRUCTURE AND PROCESS novate than the role of technology itself. IN ENABLING INNOVATION

While China’s quality assurance rigor may not Kevin POLLPETER is China Program Manager at have equaled that of the U.S. , its Defense Group Inc. (DGI). Before working at DGI, enhanced commitment to quality places the role Pollpeter was an analyst at RAND from 2000–2004. of technology innovation in a broader context. His research focuses on China military and Chinese Technological advancement is not just the simple military-related research and development and product of talented individuals, but is also the re- and technology issues. In particular, Pollpeter focuses sult of a system led by an effective organizational on the .

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