Gunter Bischof, Saki Dockrill, eds.. Cold War Respite: The Geneva Summit of 1955. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000. x + 319 pp. $60.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-8071-2370-6.
Reviewed by H. Matthew Loayza
Published on H-Pol (October, 2001)
Creating an Illusory Peace with four essays that examine the policy aims of Although the Cold War ended only a decade the major participants at the Geneva conference: ago, historians have already produced a formida‐ The United States, Soviet Union, Great Britain, and ble body of scholarship that has enhanced our un‐ France. In the frst of these, "Trust the Lord but derstanding of the origins of the Cold War and Keep Your Powder Dry: American Policy Aims at how it shaped political, economic, and cultural Geneva," Richard H. Immerman argues that U.S. life in various parts of the world. But despite the ofcials resisted European pressure for summit voluminous (and growing) number of works on talks until Moscow's sudden willingness to neu‐ these subjects, Gunter Bischof and Saki Dockrill tralize Austria made further resistance politically charge that scholars have overlooked the impor‐ unwise. Yet neither Eisenhower nor Dulles expect‐ tance of international summit talks during the ed the Soviets to negotiate in good faith. The latter Cold War. As editors of Cold War Respite: The worried that the Kremlin would attempt to seduce Geneva Summit of 1955, Bischof and Dockrill have Western Europeans, giddy in their hopes to end addressed this lack by compiling a series of high the Cold War, into signing agreements detrimen‐ quality essays that examine the origins of the tal to long-term western interests. Since American 1955 Geneva conference, the aims of the partici‐ policymakers did not believe that the summit pants, and their failure to produce an enduring would yield signifcant results, they sought to détente. avoid substantive debates, thereby sidestepping detailed discussions of any Soviet proposals Cold War Respite opens with Ernest R. May's deemed potentially divisive to western unity. The introductory essay on the background of the early administration's low expectations for Geneva, Im‐ Cold War. Although Cold War specialists will fnd merman rightly concludes, became a self-fulflling no surprises here, May provides a concise and in‐ prophecy. formative overview that readers unfamiliar with the period will fnd valuable. The work proceeds H-Net Reviews
The practice of tentative and uninspired consequently tried to forge a constructive dia‐ diplomacy, Vladislav M. Zubok explains, was not logue with the USSR at Geneva, but since neither unique to Washington policymakers. In "Soviet the Soviets nor Americans shared Eden's willing‐ Policy Aims at the Geneva Conference," Zubok ar‐ ness to discuss Germany, Varsori argues that gues that the political infghting that followed Eden's eforts were doomed to fail. Joseph Stalin's death in 1953 hindered eforts to London's doubts regarding its western allies achieve a lasting détente with the west. Although were not completely unjustifed. As Colette Barbi‐ the new Kremlin leaders wanted to reform the er notes in "French Policy Aims at Geneva," the re‐ Stalinist system, Zubok argues that they found it cent French defeat in Indochina, its rejection of difcult to do so without undermining the system the EDC, and growing problems in Algeria had left that confrmed their own legitimacy. French prestige in tatters by 1955. Ofcials in Zubok argues that Soviet leader Nikita Paris therefore viewed participating in the Gene‐ Khrushchev believed that he needed to re-estab‐ va talks as a chance to revive France's stature as a lish the Soviet Union's credentials as leader of the global power. But although the French delegation Communist world -- particularly in the eyes of the to Geneva arrived with far-reaching proposals on People's Republic of China. Hence, the Kremlin disarmament, European security, improving East- viewed Geneva as an opportunity to gauge Ameri‐ West contacts, and large-scale foreign aid to un‐ ca's actual commitment to its stated policy of derdeveloped nations, these ideas were largely ig‐ "massive retaliation" and demonstrate that Mos‐ nored by the other powers. Barbier argues that cow would stand frm in the face of Eisenhower's while the French proposals were well formulated saber rattling. Zubok stresses that Soviet diploma‐ (and in some cases, visionary) they were also ir‐ cy was heavily infuenced by Khrushchev's desire relevant to the concerns of the superpowers. She to consolidate his political power, rather than by concludes that while Paris was able to retain the any intellectual vision of Moscow's role in the appearance of great power status by participating world. This is an intriguing and persuasive argu‐ in the conference, in the fnal analysis, the Soviets ment, but one wishes that Zubok had further de‐ and Americans "did not need the participation of veloped his assertion that Khrushchev "never either Great Britain or France" (p. 18). quite grasped" the sophisticated concepts of The remainder of the essays further explores statesmanship (p. 59). issues raised in the frst half of the book. Gunter According to Antonio Varsori, British ofcials Bischof's "The Making of the Austrian Treaty and approached the Geneva conference with greater the Road to Geneva," explains that Moscow's re‐ expectations than their Soviet and American luctance to discuss Austria resulted from its fear counterparts. His "British Policy Aims at Geneva" of German rearmament. Hence, the conclusion of observes that London policymakers were initially the 1954 Paris agreements prompted Nikita lukewarm about a future summit, as they viewed Khrushchev to agree to neutralize Austria rather their French, German, and American allies as un‐ than see it follow West Germany into the western reliable partners at best. But British ofcials reap‐ camp. praised their position after Moscow suddenly Western European leaders, meanwhile, dis‐ agreed to resolve the Austrian question. Suspi‐ puted the ramifcations of the Austrian treaty. cious that Germany might now reassess its alle‐ Whereas German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer giance with the west, London ofcials decided to feared that Moscow would use Austria as a prece‐ support summit talks before western unity deteri‐ dent for German reunifcation, his British and orated. British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden French counterparts rejected Adenauer's suspi‐
2 H-Net Reviews cions of Soviet duplicity, countering that the Aus‐ as a way to wage psychological warfare rather trian Treaty demonstrated that the Soviets could than as a way to promote actual disarmament (p. be reasonable. Bischof concludes that the argu‐ 225). Aware that the new U-2 spy plane would ments of the latter were highly signifcant in con‐ soon provide detailed intelligence on Soviet mili‐ vincing a reluctant Washington to concede to di‐ tary capabilities, Eisenhower could propose Open rect talks with the Soviet Union. Skies without compromising national security. Saki Dockrill's "The Eden Plan and European Prados concludes that Open Skies indeed contrib‐ Security" provides an expanded analysis of An‐ uted to a feeting "spirit of Geneva," and he ends thony Eden's failed efort to devise a mutually ac‐ with a mild criticism that the Eisenhower admin‐ ceptable German reunifcation plan. If successful, istration failed to seize upon the goodwill created Eden believed that London would beneft from at Geneva as an opportunity for further, more both an easing of tensions and from the prestige substantial disarmament talks. accompanying Britain's new role as mediator to Unlike disarmament, East-West trade rela‐ the superpowers. But Dockrill confrms Varsori's tions, Robert Mark Spaulding notes (in his contri‐ assertion that neither Washington nor Moscow bution entitled "East-West Trade at the Geneva had any real interest in discussing German reuni‐ Summit") never developed into a signifcant issue fcation at Geneva. Dockrill portrays Eden as a at Geneva. Although western countries agreed to somewhat naïve statesman whose eforts only restrict exports to the Soviet bloc during the late raised "false hopes [for détente] in Europe and es‐ 1940s, Europeans had resisted American appeals pecially in Germany" (p. 189). to tighten the controls. The Truman and Eisen‐ Although West Germany did not participate hower administrations, in turn, had difculty re‐ directly in the Geneva summit, Eckart Conze re‐ sponding to these complaints with a single voice. minds us that no country had a greater stake in Moreover, both presidents faced congressional ef‐ the deliberations. In "No Way Back to Potsdam: forts (such as the 1951 Battle Act) to link Ameri‐ The Adenauer Government and the Geneva Sum‐ can economic aid to European deference to mit," Conze explains that Adenauer worried that stricter export controls. Since these eforts pre‐ his allies would agree to a permanent division of dictably sparked great irritation in Western Eu‐ Germany as the price for a wider détente. To stave rope, U.S. ofcials feared that their European al‐ of such a disaster, Adenauer tried to persuade lies might be receptive to Soviet calls to end ex‐ London and Paris that long-term stability would port controls at Geneva. However, Spaulding ex‐ elude Europe if they agreed to partition Germany. plains that East-West trade issues faded in impor‐ But Conze points out that when Moscow later ac‐ tance in 1955, when a Western European econom‐ cepted West Germany's entry into NATO, Ade‐ ic boom made access to Soviet markets less impor‐ nauer's eforts to maintain the idea of eventual re‐ tant. After scrutinizing Soviet behavior during the unifcation ran counter to "the de facto existence Geneva summit, the mid-1955 Soviet/Adenauer of two German states" after Geneva (p. 213). talks, and the 1955 Geneva foreign minister's meeting, Spaulding concludes that the Soviets John Prados provides a detailed analysis of were less interested in trade issues than might Eisenhower's disarmament proposal in "Open have been expected. Like Zubok, Spaulding con‐ Skies and Closed Minds: American Disarmament tends that internal political conficts preoccupied Policy at the Geneva Summit." Although Eisen‐ Soviet leaders during 1955, distracting them from hower depicted Open Skies as "an idea that might other issues. open a tiny gate in the disarmament fence," Pra‐ dos explains that Eisenhower viewed the proposal
3 H-Net Reviews
In "From Good Breakfast to Bad Supper: John ing in hidden-hand fashion) over less enlightened Foster Dulles between the Geneva Summit and internal opposition. Bischof, on the other hand, the Geneva Foreign Minister's Conference," claims that Eisenhower was more sympathetic to Ronald Pruessen argues that Dulles departed Joseph McCarthy's hawkish brand of anti-commu‐ Geneva believing that the USSR's willingness to nism. While Eisenhower scholars may question negotiate demonstrated that it had dangerously this assertion, it is well to note that Bischof still overextended its reach. Dulles subsequently prac‐ distances Eisenhower from Republican "extrem‐ ticed obstinacy over accommodation, declaring ists" who "roped" Eisenhower into denouncing that if Moscow wanted détente, it must agree to Yalta during the 1952 campaign (p. 127). German reunifcation and European security on Political scholars will be equally intrigued by western terms. Pruessen's account is a welcome the analysis of political debates and dissention in addition to recent literature on Dulles that rejects countries beyond the United States. In the USSR, depicting the secretary as a dour, one-dimension‐ Zubok sees "state leaders and bureaucrats" trying al anti-communist. While Pruessen confrms that to assert their views over their "ideologist" oppo‐ Dulles possessed a crusading spirit, he convinc‐ nents (p. 60). In France and Germany, successful ingly argues that the secretary was a more com‐ policymaking depended upon satisfying the con‐ plex thinker than scholars have acknowledged. ficting interests between international allies and Several of the contributors to Cold War domestic interests. Regardless of the particulars Respite point to a signifcant, albeit short-lived dé‐ described in the various essays, all do well to illu‐ tente as the most important achievement of the minate how domestic considerations infuenced conference. But the real measure of the "spirit of the shaping of international policies. Foreign poli‐ Geneva," John W. Young reminds us in the fnal es‐ cy, as Immerman observes, was by no means say, "The Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers, monolithic. October-November 1955: The Acid Test of Dé‐ Another recurring theme in the work con‐ tente," was the later Conference of Foreign Minis‐ cerns the eforts of Western European nations to ters. Young fnds that the Foreign Ministers' meet‐ act independently in a world dominated by the ing failed because the participants could not pa‐ superpowers. As Bischof suggests, Britain and per over their fundamental diferences as they French ofcials successfully used the Austrian had at the summit. Since both East and West held State Treaty as a means to pressure their Ameri‐ irreconcilable views on major issues such as Ger‐ can counterparts into attending a superpower man reunifcation, Young concludes that the con‐ conference. So too did London and Paris seize ference quickly became "an interesting case study upon the opportunity provided by Geneva to re‐ of complete deadlock" (p. 273). gain some measure of national prestige stripped Each of the contributors provide thoroughly away by the Second World War. But although Eu‐ researched, sophisticated accounts that shed light ropean agency was evident in making the Geneva on the internal disputes that accompanied policy‐ conference a reality, it seems that this agency was making in each country. Immerman, for example, quite limited. As the various contributors note, depicts a moderate Eisenhower who, with varying none of the participants at Geneva (save perhaps degrees of success, fended of elements within his for Anthony Eden) believed that any important is‐ administration who preferred to browbeat the So‐ sues could be solved at the conference. And since viets rather than negotiate with them. In like vein, both Moscow and Washington regarded the sum‐ Prados portrays Eisenhower's success in pushing mit as a vehicle for propaganda rather than nego‐ the Open Skies proposal as a victory (albeit com‐ tiations, it appears that all the Western Europeans
4 H-Net Reviews could hope from the summit was that the "spirit of Geneva" would prove to be enduring. Although the resultant détente proved to be feeting, the contributors to the volume argue that the "spirit of Geneva" was by no means irrelevant. Yet given the extensive references to the "spirit of Geneva" and its subsequent importance, the term itself merits closer scrutiny than is provided. If, as the editors claim, the conference had "psychologi‐ cal efects...of immense signifcance," a deeper dis‐ cussion of these efects seems essential (p. 19). How did the spirit of Geneva vary from country to country? Did it persist longer in some areas as op‐ posed to others? The most provoking remarks in this regard come from Barbier, who observes that the French public paid scant attention to the efu‐ sive praise Parisian ofcials bestowed upon their eforts at Geneva. Further analysis of the nature and extent of public interest in the summit, and how it varied from country to country, would have further enriched the volume. This is but a minor complaint in an otherwise impressive achievement. The various perspectives provided in Cold War Respite explain that while the sundry participants at Geneva genuinely hoped to reduce international tensions, the funda‐ mental diferences between East and West on matters such as German reunifcation were wide enough that the "spirit of Geneva" remained more rhetoric than reality. Each of the essays is in itself a thought provoking work that, taken collectively, enrich our understanding of the goals and devel‐ opment of Cold War diplomacy, and suggest why, all too often, it met with only limited success.
If there is additional discussion of this review, you may access it through the network, at https://networks.h-net.org/h-pol
Citation: H. Matthew Loayza. Review of Bischof, Gunter; Dockrill, Saki, eds. Cold War Respite: The Geneva Summit of 1955. H-Pol, H-Net Reviews. October, 2001.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=5559
5 H-Net Reviews
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
6