Gunter Bischof, Saki Dockrill, eds.. Cold War Respite: The Geneva Summit of 1955. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000. x + 319 pp. $60.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-8071-2370-6.
Reviewed by Kathryn Statler
Published on H-Diplo (December, 2000)
A Very Brief Cold War Respite tion of resolving outstanding issues at the cost of While much attention has been devoted to the undermining their own interests. A fourth theme, origins and the numerous conficts of the Cold not explicitly mentioned yet apparent throughout War, possibilities for an easing of East-West ten‐ the essays, is how domestic politics (and especial‐ sions have received far less scrutiny. Conferences ly the internal Soviet power struggle) helped devoted to diplomacy, such as the 1954 Berlin and shape the outcome of the summit. While the pur‐ Geneva conferences and the 1955 Geneva summit, ported goal of the summit was to address the Ger‐ remain underexplored. Gunter Bischof and Saki man problem, European security, and disarma‐ Dockrill thus make an important contribution to ment possibilities, no concrete discussion of these Cold War scholarship with their international his‐ issues occurred. At the same time, all the partici‐ tory of the 1955 Geneva summit-the frst (and last) pants were hopeful that a four-power meeting meeting of the heads of state from the United would provide an opportunity to gradually reduce States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France dur‐ East-West tensions. ing the Cold War. Their edited compilation, Cold Ernest May provides a short but detailed War Respite: The Geneva Summit of 1955, is com‐ background chapter on the early Cold War-prior prised of thirteen well-documented essays that ex‐ to the summit. Experts may want to skim this amine the American, Soviet, British, French, Ger‐ chapter since May gives a straightforward narra‐ man, and Austrian perspectives of the summit. tion of early Cold War history, summarizing cur‐ The book focuses on three major themes--the rent scholarship, but providing little new infor‐ importance of European agency in shaping the mation. May notes three signifcant events that summit, the tension between the diverging goals encouraged Western governments to consider of the Western allies and their determination to whether diplomacy might ofer an alternative to present a united front to the Soviets, and the fact nuclear war: the Soviet peace ofensive following that neither side went to Geneva with the inten‐ Joseph Stalin's death, the induction of West Ger‐ H-Net Reviews many into NATO, and increasing Anglo-American thetic view of Eisenhower's approach to disarma‐ fears of a nuclear war.[1] ment at the summit. Prados explains why Eisen‐ May's overview is followed by an analysis of hower came out with the Open Skies program the American approach to Geneva. In "'Trust in when he did, noting that Eisenhower was well the Lord but Keep Your Powder Dry': American aware that the U-2 plans (Project AUTOMAT) were Policy Aims at Geneva," Richard Immerman nearing completion. Therefore, the American po‐ demonstrates that Dwight D. Eisenhower and Sec‐ sition going into Geneva was that mutual inspec‐ retary of State John Foster Dulles's primary goal tion should precede concrete measures of disar‐ regarding Geneva was to avoid the conference al‐ mament. According to Prados, the United States together, but that this goal proved impossible to gained an advantage in world opinion by ofering achieve given British and French insistence on a to reveal its own military secrets through Open summit. In addition to pointing out divisions Skies. Although the Open Skies proposal was not within the Western alliance, Immerman also com‐ implemented, Prados gives Eisenhower credit for pares the competing views within the administra‐ providing the Russians an opportunity to do tion, outlining how Eisenhower, Dulles, and the something (aerial photography) on a bilateral ba‐ JCS all had diferent approaches toward the Sovi‐ sis that he knew the United States was going to do ets. Once the United States had agreed to a confer‐ unilaterally, through the U-2 (p. 233). In contrast ence, Immerman explains, the goal was "to steer to Vladislav Zubok and Antonio Varsori's assess‐ the talks away from substantive issues" in order ments, Prados notes that although the plan had to counter Soviet attempts to divide the allies (p. begun as a gambit in psychological warfare, the 49). The JCS and Dulles were particularly opposed idea that the United States might be willing to re‐ to serious negotiations with the Soviets on disar‐ veal secrets to reduce global tensions did build mament issues but believed the United States had some world confdence. Both Immerman and Pra‐ to make a pretense for the sake of propaganda dos underscore Eisenhower's agency in determin‐ and allied solidarity. Eisenhower followed his ing American strategy for the summit. own plan, ultimately endorsing the "Open Skies" As the last contributor to focus on the Ameri‐ proposal that entailed a system of reciprocal Sovi‐ can perspective, Ronald Pruessen in "From Good et and American aerial surveillance. Immerman, Breakfast to Bad Supper: John Foster Dulles be‐ contrary to other authors in this volume, sees tween the Geneva Summit and the Geneva For‐ Open Skies as, "not simply another shot in the eign Minister' Conference" emphasizes the impor‐ psychological war but [one which] refected the tance and complexity of Dulles's role in the period president's genuine conviction that both because leading up to and following Geneva. Contrary to of and despite East-West distrust and hostility, the others in the volume, Pruessen argues that Dulles efort must be made to try to control nuclear thought that the conference benefted the West weapons" (p. 54). More evidence and discussion of and that he was "engaged and optimistic" follow‐ this claim would have been useful, especially giv‐ ing Geneva (p. 270). Pruessen suggests that en the difering views presented in the volume.[2] Dulles's optimism after the summit actually un‐ John Prados also examines American strategy dercut opportunities for either dtente or meaning‐ at the summit. His essay "Open Skies and Closed ful improvements in Europe. (p. 261) Dulles's fo‐ Minds: American Disarmament Policy at the cus on an all or nothing approach to the German Geneva Summit" assesses Eisenhower's "Open question made negotiations with the Soviets more Skies" plan. Along with Immerman and contrary difcult since his belief that real breakthroughs to Gunter Bischof's essay, Prados takes a sympa‐ were possible led him to a diplomatic style that emphasized pressure rather than negotiations. I
2 H-Net Reviews was disappointed that Pruessen did not follow strategy for the summit. Antonio Varsori contends through on his point that "insights into the behav‐ that British policy aims for the summit difered ior of others can be gained through an examina‐ markedly from both Soviet and American goals. tion of Dulles's interactions with them" (p. 254). The primary goal of the United Kingdom was to Although Pruessen does discuss Dulles's interac‐ achieve European security and German reunifca‐ tion with West German Chancellor Konrad Ade‐ tion. Britain was increasingly concerned over al‐ nauer, he did not examine Dulles's relations with lied behavior, in particular France's reliability British Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan or and West Germany's political future. The Soviet French Foreign Minister Antoine Pinay. Such a willingness to resolve the Austrian question was a comparison would have proved helpful in estab‐ crucial turning point for London. The British lishing the overall Western attitude after Geneva. feared that the Soviets were stealing the diplomat‐ Illustrating another major theme of the com‐ ic initiative from the West, prompting British pilation, Vladislav Zubok focuses on the impor‐ Prime Minister Anthony Eden to call for a four- tance of domestic divisions in formulating foreign power conference. Varsori points out that al‐ policy. Zubok's main argument in "Soviet Policy though Britain hoped to serve as a bridge be‐ Aims at the Geneva Conference, 1955" is that the tween the US and Soviet Union following the sum‐ internal power struggle between Nikita mit, this "proved to be wishful thinking." (p. 96) Khrushchev, Georgi Malenkov, and V.M. Molotov Varsori emphasizes British agency in formulating infuenced Soviet foreign policy regarding the Western strategy for the conference, highlighting summit. Zubok targets two conficting impulses. the importance of actors outside Washington and On the one hand, Moscow searched for more ef‐ Moscow in shaping Cold War diplomacy. fective ways to alleviate domestic and foreign Similar to Varsori's argument, Saki Dockrill's problems. On the other hand, Soviet leaders were essay draws attention to London's determination constrained by the Stalin cult and ofcial ideology, to play a leading role at Geneva. Dockrill provides which resulted in a somewhat erratic foreign poli‐ a detailed and well-substantiated account of the cy. According to Zubok, the Soviets' main political origins of the "Eden Plan," the American response, goal at the summit was "to overcome the inferiori‐ and why the plan was never implemented. The ty complex and prove to the country, the world, Eden Plan for the Geneva summit was not an and themselves that they could deal with the agreed upon Western proposal but established the Western powers without being intimidated" (p. essential features of the British plan for German 62). The Soviets thus saw the Geneva summit as a reunifcation and European security. According to psychological success in that they had forced the Dockrill, Eden was responsible for trying to create Americans to talk to them as equal partners, with‐ a concrete discussion on German reunifcation at out open intimidation or condescension (p. 72). the forefront of the summit, but was subsequently Drawing on Russian archival sources, Zubok's es‐ thwarted by both the Americans and the Soviets. say illuminates the murky politics within the In the end, Dockrill argues that Eden became al‐ Kremlin and provides a compelling argument that most obsessed with the question of German reuni‐ the Americans and Soviets were determined to fcation and European security, attributing his ob‐ avoid substantive discussion on German reunif‐ session to a desire to create an independent Euro‐ cation. pean detente. According to Dockrill, Eden's deter‐ Antonio Varsori and Saki Dockrill address an‐ mination to impose his plan raised false hopes in other theme in the volume by demonstrating the Europe and especially in Germany. Although pivotal importance of Britain in shaping Western Dockrill is critical of Eden's actions at the summit, more analysis of the motives behind Eden's rea‐
3 H-Net Reviews soning would have strengthened Dockrill's assess‐ to Bischof, and building upon Zubok's analysis of ment of the Eden Plan. Soviet domestic politics, it appears that the power Colette Barbier focuses on the last major par‐ struggle in the Kremlin and Khrushchev's ascen‐ ticipant in the summit. Her chapter explores the dancy were responsible for the breakthrough in French dilemma of trying to persuade the Conseil the Austrian treaty standof. Bischof provides a de la Republique to ratify the Paris accords while fairly sympathetic account of Soviet eforts and a simultaneously ensuring that a four-power con‐ rather harsh portrayal of American, and in partic‐ ference would take place. Barbier contends that ular, Eisenhower's actions. Just as Immerman ap‐ France was conscious of its isolation from the pears to take Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal North Atlantic Alliance, its defeat in Indochina, its at face value, Bischof suggests that the Soviets, by growing difculties in North Africa, and its vul‐ 1955, were sincere in their peaceful coexistence nerability vis-a-vis the newly independent West policy. Bischof indicts Eisenhower as an unbend‐ Germany. According to Barbier, Paris wanted to ing Cold Warrior, arguing that Eisenhower's de‐ use the summit to achieve a psychological and termination to wage Cold War led to his failure to propaganda advantage both at home and abroad respond to the Soviet peace initiative (p. 126). Al‐ and had a number of policy goals. France though Bischof provides a useful corrective to the achieved its frst goal of being one of the three usual views of Eisenhower as the most willing inviting nations at the summit. Second, French person in his administration to pursue peace with leaders wanted to resolve the German question the Soviets, Bischof has perhaps overstated Eisen‐ and with it the problems of European security. Fi‐ hower's Cold Warrior tendencies, at least when nally, France hoped to reestablish European unity. compared to those of Dulles and the JCS, as noted While Barbier does a good job setting out French by Immerman. Bischof does a very good job of goals, more analysis of the French reaction to the pointing to the interplay between Austrian neu‐ lack of concrete discussion at the summit would trality and West German rearmament, especially have been useful. In addition, readers might ap‐ in tracing British and American worries that the preciate further clarifcation of who provided Soviet gambit on Austria was made with Germany more impetus for the conference, the French or in mind as the real target (p. 138). Yet given the British (especially given Varsori and Dockrill's Bischof's numerous works on Austrian-Anglo- focus on British agency). Barbier's ultimate con‐ American relations in the 1950s, I was disappoint‐ clusion parallels Varsori's in that just as Britain ed not to fnd more on the Austrian perspective sought to become a bridge between the Soviets regarding both the treaty and how Austria viewed and Americans, France would have liked to be the preparations for the Geneva Summit. intermediary between the two superpowers. Ulti‐ Although Germany was not invited to the mately, both the French and the British failed in summit, Eckart Conze makes a signifcant contri‐ their objective. bution to the volume by stressing Adenauer's in‐ Contrary to the previous essays that focused fuence in helping determine Western strategy. primarily on the Geneva summit, Gunter Bischof's His chapter "No Way Back to Potsdam: The Ade‐ "The Making of the Austrian Treaty and the Road nauer Government and the Geneva Summit" ex‐ to Geneva" examines Soviet-Austrian negotiations amines Adenauer's policy of assuring West Ger‐ over the Austrian treaty. Bischof argues that the man integration into the Atlantic Alliance before Soviet Union ofered Austrian neutrality as a negotiations with the Soviet Union over the reuni‐ means of preventing Western Austria from being fcation of Germany could take place. Conze notes rearmed and integrated with the West. According that Adenauer was the most pessimistic and cau‐ tious of all the Western leaders in his judgement
4 H-Net Reviews of Soviet motives and aims, even more so than ure at the foreign ministers' level would be far Dulles. According to Adenauer, "West Germany's less dangerous than a build up of expectations frm alliance with the West should not be sacri‐ and subsequent let down at the far more publi‐ fced to achieve short-lived successes regarding cized Geneva summit. According to Young, all the dtente (p. 197). Conze, along with other authors in subjects on the November agenda were set to pro‐ the volume, points out that the Soviets had al‐ duce deadlock. Young notes that no resolution ready given up on the idea of German reunifca‐ was reached on German reunifcation, European tion and instead would be satisfed with two sepa‐ security, or East-West trade as a result of the un‐ rate German states. In the end, Moscow turned reasonable demands on both sides. out to be Adenauer's best ally at the Geneva sum‐ The essays in this compilation clearly demon‐ mit. By refusing to discuss the question of German strate that as long as the Russians refused to coop‐ reunifcation and trying to push through disarma‐ erate with the West on the creation of a unifed ment and security measures based on the status Germany, or as long as the West persisted in the quo, the Soviets allowed Adenauer to blame Mos‐ idea of reunifying Germany within NATO, there cow for the lack of progress on German reunifca‐ could be no reunifcation acceptable to both blocs. tion. Bischof and Dockrill thus place the German ques‐ Robert Mark Spaulding tackles an important, tion as central in the failure to achieve a lasting but underexplored issue pertaining to the sum‐ peace.[3] The editors acknowledge that the prob‐ mit: East-West trade. In his essay Spaulding exam‐ lem with summit conferences is that they always ines why the East-West trade issue, which the arouse unreasonable expectations. And yet, the Americans believed would be discussed, never Geneva summit did result in at least a temporary arose at the summit. Once again, the issue of the reduction of East-West tensions and hence a power struggle in the Kremlin emerges as the pri‐ short-lived respite from the Cold War. The thir‐ mary factor as to why events played out at Gene‐ teen essays, substantiated with thorough primary va the way they did. Spaulding argues that uncer‐ and secondary research, demonstrate why serious tainty over the future course of Soviet economic negotiations did not occur at the Geneva summit policy explains why the Soviets were reluctant to and why the "Spirit of Geneva" lingered so briefy. discuss trade issues at the conference. A discus‐ Notes sion of trade issues would have posed signifcant [1]. In October 1954 the signing of the Paris risks for the United States since Washington con‐ agreements led to the creation of the Western Eu‐ tinued its practice of strategic export controls. ropean Union and to West Germany's admission Dulles thought that the prospect of increased to NATO. The German Bundestag ratifed the Western trade would help moderate Soviet intran‐ treaties in February 1955 and the French Conseil sigence on other issues but his plan fell fat when de la Republique approved the treaties in late the Soviets failed to bring up the issue. Spaulding March 1955. concludes that the Kremlin power struggle pre‐ cluded a clear direction to Soviet economic policy. [2]. Vladislav Zubok sees the Open Skies pro‐ gram as a propaganda tool as does Antonio Var‐ In the last essay, "The Geneva Conference of sori (pp. 73-74, 95). John Prados, while recognizing Foreign Ministers, October-November 1955: The that Open Skies began as a psychological warfare Acid Test of Dtente," John Young argues that the proposal, provides a more nuanced treatment of November foreign ministers' conference failed for the proposal (pp. 215-233). a number of reasons. Young points out that West‐ ern leaders were well aware that an ultimate fail‐ [3]. Marc Trachtenberg's A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement,
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Citation: Kathryn Statler. Review of Bischof, Gunter; Dockrill, Saki, eds. Cold War Respite: The Geneva Summit of 1955. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. December, 2000.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=4754
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