UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN QUEENSLAND
The Reagan Doctrine:
An Analysis of the President’s role in the formulation and execution of American Foreign Policy
vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, 1981-1989.
A dissertation submitted by Ciarán John Ryan
For the Award of a PhD
2010
ABSTRACT
This thesis examines American foreign policy towards the Soviet Union in the 1980s, and seeks to determine President Ronald Reagan’s relationship to the guiding principles of this policy, both in their formulation and execution. It is proposed that America’s strategy towards the USSR during this period could be encompassed by five key ideas, which this study names ‘The Reagan
Doctrine’. These are: 1) Peace through Strength—the need to restore military parity with the
Soviets, both in terms of conventional and nuclear power; 2) That the Cold War was a moral struggle, and needed to be articulated as such by the President; 3) That reliance on the theory of
Mutual Assured Destruction was not a sound basis for national security, and hence the need to build a missile defense system; 4) That the Superpowers should negotiate not just to limit, but rather reduce extant nuclear stockpiles, with the ultimate goal of total nuclear abolition; and 5) that the Superpowers should diminish reciprocal distrust, and ultimately achieve not a détente, but a lasting peace.
This study, more so than any other to date, has incorporated recently released archival material from the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library to help determine Reagan’s beliefs relating to and management of American Soviet policy. Furthermore, interviews were conducted with some of the key surviving figures of the Reagan Administration, including former Secretary of State
George P. Shultz. Finally, a complete review of published work on this topic, both academic and popular, including books and journal articles, was undertaken by this researcher. The result is an original study on the Reagan Doctrine that cuts across the multi-disciplinary fields of international relations, and presidential and diplomatic history, and provides a revised perspective on both the Reagan presidency, and the end of the Cold War conflict.
Certification of Dissertation
I certify that the ideas, research, analyses and conclusions in this dissertation are entirely my own effort, except where otherwise acknowledged. Furthermore, I certify that the work is original and has not been submitted for any other award.
Acknowledgements
This thesis would not have been possible without the wisdom, patience, counsel and support of
Professor Donald McMillen. I will be forever grateful.
Thanks also to the University of Southern Queensland for the granting of a scholarship, without which I would not have had the opportunity to pursue this research full time.
I am also indebted to those who have assisted in researching this dissertation, in particular the archival staff at the Reagan Presidential Library, and Dr. Brendon O’Connor.
Finally, to family and friends, thanks for all your support.
Table of Contents
Introduction ...... 1
Topic Statement ...... 1
Thesis ...... 3
Central Questions and Propositions ...... 7
The Need for a Revisionist Reagan Study ...... 8
Literature Review ...... 11
Interviews...... 22
Research Design: Methodology and Analytical Framework ...... 23
Why Reagan is Misunderstood ...... 25
Outline of Chapters ...... 30
Chapter One: Peace Through Strength ...... 35
Peace through Strength: Official Administration Policy ...... 36
Peace through Strength in the Cold War: Deterring Soviet Aggression ...... 39
Reagan’s Call for an Arms Buildup ...... 45
Weapons Systems ...... 48
The Origin of Reagan’s Ideas ...... 52
1980 Presidential Election Campaign ...... 54
Making his Ideas Policy ...... 56
Chapter Two: Military Modernization ...... 59
The Beginnings: Empowering the Secretary of Defense ...... 60
National Security Decision Directive 12...... 62
The MX ‘Peace-Keeper’ Missile ...... 65
INF ...... 69
The Reagan Maritime Strategy ...... 73
Air Force: New Technology and Strategy ...... 75
Commander-In-Chief: The Grenada Invasion, a Case Study ...... 77
Reagan’s Role and Conclusion ...... 85
Chapter Three: Reagan the Ideologue ...... 89
The Ideological Nature of the Reagan Administration ...... 90
The Origins of Reagan’s Anti-Communism ...... 92
Reagan’s Anti-Communist Crusade: 1940s-1960s ...... 99
Friend of Nixon, Foe of Ford ...... 104
Reagan’s Radio Addresses: Advocating an Idealist Foreign Policy ...... 108
Conclusion ...... 112
Chapter Four: Moral Crusader ...... 114
1981: Reagan Sets the Agenda...... 115
1982: The ‘Ash-Heap of History’ Prediction ...... 119
1983: ‘Murder in the Air’ ...... 125
1984: Reagan Changes his Tone ...... 129
The Role of Nancy Reagan ...... 133
Reagan Challenges Reform: 1986-1988 ...... 136
Challenging Reform from within the ‘Evil Empire’ ...... 141
Conclusions ...... 145
Chapter Five: The Origins of Missile Defense Technology ...... 149
Missile Defense: Reagan Administration Policy ...... 150
ABM under Presidents Johnson and Nixon ...... 153
Reagan’s Visit to NORAD ...... 156
Missile Defense and the 1980 Presidential Campaign ...... 158
SDI: A Hollywood Connection? ...... 163
Conclusions ...... 166
Chapter Six: The Strategic Defense Initiative ...... 168
Rumblings Within the Administration ...... 169
1983: SDI Emerges ...... 173
The SDI Speech: Reagan’s Role ...... 177
Ignoring the Critics ...... 183
The Geneva Summit: Reagan Holds his Ground on SDI ...... 185
The Reykjavik Summit: the Showdown on SDI ...... 191
Conclusion ...... 199
Chapter Seven: Nuclear Reduction ...... 201
Nuclear Arms Reduction: Official Administration Policy ...... 202
History of Anti-Nuclear Beliefs at the White House ...... 205
Reagan’s Anti-Nuclearism ...... 210
Reagan’s Arms Control Positions ...... 213
Influences on Reagan ...... 216
Conclusions ...... 221
Chapter Eight: The Nuclear Bomb, Reduction and Elimination ...... 223
Nuclear Arms Reduction: The Zero -Option ...... 225
Sticking with Zero ...... 228
Negotiating Positions leading up to Geneva ...... 239
The Geneva Summit: 50% Reduction Agreed to ...... 241
Geneva: The Second Plenary Meeting ...... 243
Climbing to Another Summit: 1986 ...... 245
Reykjavik: The Most Sweeping Arms Control Proposals in History ...... 250
Reykjavik: Day Two ...... 253
The Final Showdown ...... 257
Gorbachev Backs Down Over SDI: The INF Treaty ...... 263
The START Treaties ...... 266
Conclusion ...... 268
Chapter Nine: The Cause of World Peace ...... 273
Making Peace: Reagan Foreign Policy ...... 274
Summits for Peace? Superpower Summits from Truman to Carter ...... 278
Reagan’s Destiny ...... 288
The Assassination Attempt: Reagan’s Narrative ...... 292
Conclusions ...... 298
Chapter Ten: Reagan the Peacemaker ...... 300
Following the Assassination Attempt: An Olive Branch to Brezhnev ...... 301
Andropov and Chernenko: Failed Attempts at Peace ...... 307
1985: The Rise of Gorbachev ...... 316
Geneva: Undoing the Mistrust ...... 319
The Rocky Road from Geneva to Reykjavik ...... 328
Reykjavik: A Breakthrough for Peace ...... 332
Washington, Moscow and New York: Cold War Over? ...... 335
Conclusion ...... 342
Thesis Conclusions ...... 346
Key Ideas ...... 346
Review of Chapters and Research Questions ...... 348
Areas for Further Research ...... 357
Concluding Thoughts ...... 359
Bibliography ...... 362
Appendices ...... 386
Appendix A: Reagan Administration Time-Line ...... 386
Appendix B: Transcript of Interview with former Secretary of State George P. Shultz ...... 394
Appendix C: Transcript of Interview with former Under-Secretary of Defense, Richard Perle ...... 408