Berlin & the Origins of Detente

Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 2010 Berlin & the Origins of Detente: multilateral & bilateral negotiations in the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1963 Richard Dean Williamson Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Williamson, Richard Dean, "Berlin & the Origins of Detente: multilateral & bilateral negotiations in the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1963" (2010). LSU Doctoral Dissertations. 3908. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/3908 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please [email protected]. BERLIN & THE ORIGINS OF DETENTE: MULTILATERAL & BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS IN THE BERLIN CRISIS, 1958-1963 A Dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in The Department of History by Richard D. Williamson B.A., University of New Orleans, 1990 M.F.A. University of New Orleans, 1993 M.A, University of New Orleans, 2006 December 2010 Preface I became interested in a longer range interpretation of the Berlin crisis while researching a seminar paper for Dr. Guenter Bischof at the University of New Orleans. I was familiar with the Wall and the Airlift, but hadn‟t understood that the crisis began in 1958 with Nikita Khrushchev‟s demands for a „free city‟ (without Western troops) and a German peace treaty. The fact that Khrushchev suspended his deadline, once Geneva negotiations were in session, seemed an important progression from containment and diplomatic estrangement towards détente. For my thesis, I argued that the US leaders had to balance alliance problems with pragmatic understanding of the limits of forceful response, which included possible use of nuclear arms. They pragmatically chose negotiated resolution. I learned that period only concluded the first visible arc of a much longer diplomatic experience. While collecting source material from the National Archives and reading good authorities like Marc Trachtenberg‟s A Constructed Peace, John Lewis Gaddis‟s Now We Know, William Taubman‟s Khrushchev, and Hope Harrison‟s Driving the Soviets up the Wall, I saw that Khrushchev used his demands as leverage for a peace conference that ostensibly could be used to discuss disarmament. Clear connections were apparent between the Khrushchev‟s 1959 visit, the Paris 1960 summit and the Berlin problem. I found a strong link between the Berlin problem and arms control and test-ban issues. Berlin also catalyzed differences between the US and its European allies, who wanted more control of nuclear deterrence but were unwilling to make conventional force commitments. Berlin became a transitional issue for US-Soviet relations, heavily influencing the first heads of state summits in many years. ii These impressions were even clearer after reading recent published Khrushchev-era narratives like Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali‟s Khrushchev’s Cold War, Sergei Khrushchev‟s Creation of a Superpower and Vladimir Zubok‟s A Failed Empire. These authors had been able to work in the Soviet archives, which provided new insights into Kremlin decision making. They showed how important an issue Berlin was for Khrushchev, both as a potential threat to the Soviet Union and its Eastern European hegemony and a source of leverage for other concerns, including disarmament. Michael Beschloss‟s Crisis Years, also benefiting from post- Soviet sources, gave more indications of an ongoing, though troubled, effort to sustain negotiations. Nikita Khrushchev‟s Statesman provided another important account, with details missing from his previous memoirs. These works also indicated original and secondary sources worth investigating for a dissertation on Berlin-crisis negotiations. I saw that Berlin negotiations were ongoing from 1958-1963. These talks did not resolve the Berlin and German questions, but averted war and gave an opportunity to begin high level discussions between the superpowers. It was an imperfect process that gave rise to incidents like the Wall and Missile Crisis, but it created a template for discussion. Expertise in Soviet thinking was gained by individuals like Ambassadors Llewellyn Thompson, and Charles Bohlen, as well as analysts like Walt Rostow, Gerard Smith, Paul Nitze and Foy Kohler. They helped form a core of well informed Soviet observers. Leaders like Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, and eventually even Kennedy and Secretary Rusk created a tense but closer and more stable US- Soviet relationship. Ironically, Berlin‟s situation - the catalyst, the artificial stimulus - was never resolved with satisfaction for any side. When other concerns replaced Berlin, none of them produced the same level of diplomatic relationship. As Berlin‟s importance diminished, so did US-Soviet contacts, though not to the low pre-Crisis levels. iii The present work is an attempt to synthesize themes of Berlin as a transformative issue in allied and Soviet relations. By telling the story of how negotiations were arranged and conducted, at a number of levels, I seek to show changes in how the US, Allies and Soviets dealt with each other. The role of disarmament in these proceedings is a major subtext, though specific UN disarmament discussions never reached the scope and intensity of Berlin talks. Berlin-era contingency planning for a limited war with nuclear options, as well as force buildups, reveals basic shifts in US and NATO strategic doctrines. Alliance problems, US domestic pressure and Soviet politics are further subtexts that continue through the whole history of the Berlin crisis, with lasting effects. In the Berlin crisis, we see a redefining of the US-British „special relationship,‟ beginnings of de Gaulle‟s isolation from NATO, as well as West Germany‟s growing importance and first taste of Ostpolitik. Much of the basic narrative here is based on the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) collections, which provide a good record of important meetings, correspondence, papers and statements. As useful a guide as FRUS is, there are many influential revealing meetings, cables and proposals not covered. My main sources for the „rest of the story‟ have been Presidential Libraries, particularly the various national security and White House office file series on Germany and the Soviet Union. Particularly useful material has included National Security Council memos, State Department Policy Planning Staff material, CIA reports, ambassadorial working group meetings, briefing books, embassy cable traffic, position papers, and unofficial correspondence. Cross-referencing this material with the FRUS record has, I hope, provided a thorough and well-grounded chronology. This chronology, also heavily based on secondary sources discussed earlier, also draws on specialized sources on specific leaders, issues and situations. For example, Frederic Bozo‟s iv Two Strategies for Europe, Frank Mayers‟ Adenauer and Kennedy, and Nigel Ashton‟s Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War are good accounts of these very influential and distinctive leaders. Wilfrid Loth‟s Europe, Cold War and Co-Existence and Christian Nuenlist‟s Globalizing de Gaulle are very useful anthologies on European relations with each other, as well as with the US and Soviets. David Mayer‟s The Ambassadors is an excellent history of the US diplomatic missions to the USSR and the various emissaries, as well as Soviet views towards them. Frederick Marks Power and Peace, Saki Dockrill‟s Eisenhower’s New Look, and Richard Immerman‟s Waging Peace make insightful cases for Eisenhower-era inclination against force, an impression also gained from Eisenhower‟s own memoirs and Stephen Ambrose‟s biography. Joseph Whelans‟s Soviet Negotiating Techniques provided a long range perspective on Soviet diplomacy I have found consistent, well documented narratives the most useful sources, even in specialized topics. Glen Seaborg‟s Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban and Robert Divine‟s Blowing in the Wind provide well documented histories of the disarmament talks concurrent with the Berlin dialogue. Anatoly Dobrynin‟s In Confidence connects other Soviet narratives with diplomatic field experience. Robert Slusser‟s Berlin Crisis of 1961 may overplay its case against Khrushchev‟s domestic critics, but does show strong domestic pressures that affected his Berlin strategy. Frederick Taylor‟s The Berlin Crisis and Andreas Daum‟s Kennedy and the Wall are helpful, if not critically deep, chronicles of the Berlin situation. Even Berlin histories embedded in topical surveys like Mark White‟s Kennedy: the New Frontier Revisited or Marc Trachtenberg‟s History and Strategy have been very helpful. Many other sources of good supporting evidence are cited throughout, but the books discussed above have been especially influential on my history of Berlin negotiations. v A combination of published and unpublished primary document series and secondary narratives account for most of my documentation. National Archive State Department collections provided a basic orientation, especially the central decimal files and Policy Planning

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