Gunter Bischof, Saki Dockrill, eds.. Cold War Respite: The Geneva Summit of 1955. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000. x + 319 pp. $60.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-8071-2370-6. Reviewed by Kathryn Statler Published on H-Diplo (December, 2000) A Very Brief Cold War Respite tion of resolving outstanding issues at the cost of While much attention has been devoted to the undermining their own interests. A fourth theme, origins and the numerous conflicts of the Cold not explicitly mentioned yet apparent throughout War, possibilities for an easing of East-West ten‐ the essays, is how domestic politics (and especial‐ sions have received far less scrutiny. Conferences ly the internal Soviet power struggle) helped devoted to diplomacy, such as the 1954 Berlin and shape the outcome of the summit. While the pur‐ Geneva conferences and the 1955 Geneva summit, ported goal of the summit was to address the Ger‐ remain underexplored. Gunter Bischof and Saki man problem, European security, and disarma‐ Dockrill thus make an important contribution to ment possibilities, no concrete discussion of these Cold War scholarship with their international his‐ issues occurred. At the same time, all the partici‐ tory of the 1955 Geneva summit-the frst (and last) pants were hopeful that a four-power meeting meeting of the heads of state from the United would provide an opportunity to gradually reduce States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France dur‐ East-West tensions. ing the Cold War. Their edited compilation, Cold Ernest May provides a short but detailed War Respite: The Geneva Summit of 1955, is com‐ background chapter on the early Cold War-prior prised of thirteen well-documented essays that ex‐ to the summit. Experts may want to skim this amine the American, Soviet, British, French, Ger‐ chapter since May gives a straightforward narra‐ man, and Austrian perspectives of the summit. tion of early Cold War history, summarizing cur‐ The book focuses on three major themes--the rent scholarship, but providing little new infor‐ importance of European agency in shaping the mation. May notes three significant events that summit, the tension between the diverging goals encouraged Western governments to consider of the Western allies and their determination to whether diplomacy might offer an alternative to present a united front to the Soviets, and the fact nuclear war: the Soviet peace offensive following that neither side went to Geneva with the inten‐ Joseph Stalin's death, the induction of West Ger‐ H-Net Reviews many into NATO, and increasing Anglo-American thetic view of Eisenhower's approach to disarma‐ fears of a nuclear war.[1] ment at the summit. Prados explains why Eisen‐ May's overview is followed by an analysis of hower came out with the Open Skies program the American approach to Geneva. In "'Trust in when he did, noting that Eisenhower was well the Lord but Keep Your Powder Dry': American aware that the U-2 plans (Project AUTOMAT) were Policy Aims at Geneva," Richard Immerman nearing completion. Therefore, the American po‐ demonstrates that Dwight D. Eisenhower and Sec‐ sition going into Geneva was that mutual inspec‐ retary of State John Foster Dulles's primary goal tion should precede concrete measures of disar‐ regarding Geneva was to avoid the conference al‐ mament. According to Prados, the United States together, but that this goal proved impossible to gained an advantage in world opinion by offering achieve given British and French insistence on a to reveal its own military secrets through Open summit. In addition to pointing out divisions Skies. Although the Open Skies proposal was not within the Western alliance, Immerman also com‐ implemented, Prados gives Eisenhower credit for pares the competing views within the administra‐ providing the Russians an opportunity to do tion, outlining how Eisenhower, Dulles, and the something (aerial photography) on a bilateral ba‐ JCS all had different approaches toward the Sovi‐ sis that he knew the United States was going to do ets. Once the United States had agreed to a confer‐ unilaterally, through the U-2 (p. 233). In contrast ence, Immerman explains, the goal was "to steer to Vladislav Zubok and Antonio Varsori's assess‐ the talks away from substantive issues" in order ments, Prados notes that although the plan had to counter Soviet attempts to divide the allies (p. begun as a gambit in psychological warfare, the 49). The JCS and Dulles were particularly opposed idea that the United States might be willing to re‐ to serious negotiations with the Soviets on disar‐ veal secrets to reduce global tensions did build mament issues but believed the United States had some world confidence. Both Immerman and Pra‐ to make a pretense for the sake of propaganda dos underscore Eisenhower's agency in determin‐ and allied solidarity. Eisenhower followed his ing American strategy for the summit. own plan, ultimately endorsing the "Open Skies" As the last contributor to focus on the Ameri‐ proposal that entailed a system of reciprocal Sovi‐ can perspective, Ronald Pruessen in "From Good et and American aerial surveillance. Immerman, Breakfast to Bad Supper: John Foster Dulles be‐ contrary to other authors in this volume, sees tween the Geneva Summit and the Geneva For‐ Open Skies as, "not simply another shot in the eign Minister' Conference" emphasizes the impor‐ psychological war but [one which] reflected the tance and complexity of Dulles's role in the period president's genuine conviction that both because leading up to and following Geneva. Contrary to of and despite East-West distrust and hostility, the others in the volume, Pruessen argues that Dulles effort must be made to try to control nuclear thought that the conference benefited the West weapons" (p. 54). More evidence and discussion of and that he was "engaged and optimistic" follow‐ this claim would have been useful, especially giv‐ ing Geneva (p. 270). Pruessen suggests that en the differing views presented in the volume.[2] Dulles's optimism after the summit actually un‐ John Prados also examines American strategy dercut opportunities for either dtente or meaning‐ at the summit. His essay "Open Skies and Closed ful improvements in Europe. (p. 261) Dulles's fo‐ Minds: American Disarmament Policy at the cus on an all or nothing approach to the German Geneva Summit" assesses Eisenhower's "Open question made negotiations with the Soviets more Skies" plan. Along with Immerman and contrary difficult since his belief that real breakthroughs to Gunter Bischof's essay, Prados takes a sympa‐ were possible led him to a diplomatic style that emphasized pressure rather than negotiations. I 2 H-Net Reviews was disappointed that Pruessen did not follow strategy for the summit. Antonio Varsori contends through on his point that "insights into the behav‐ that British policy aims for the summit differed ior of others can be gained through an examina‐ markedly from both Soviet and American goals. tion of Dulles's interactions with them" (p. 254). The primary goal of the United Kingdom was to Although Pruessen does discuss Dulles's interac‐ achieve European security and German reunifica‐ tion with West German Chancellor Konrad Ade‐ tion. Britain was increasingly concerned over al‐ nauer, he did not examine Dulles's relations with lied behavior, in particular France's reliability British Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan or and West Germany's political future. The Soviet French Foreign Minister Antoine Pinay. Such a willingness to resolve the Austrian question was a comparison would have proved helpful in estab‐ crucial turning point for London. The British lishing the overall Western attitude after Geneva. feared that the Soviets were stealing the diplomat‐ Illustrating another major theme of the com‐ ic initiative from the West, prompting British pilation, Vladislav Zubok focuses on the impor‐ Prime Minister Anthony Eden to call for a four- tance of domestic divisions in formulating foreign power conference. Varsori points out that al‐ policy. Zubok's main argument in "Soviet Policy though Britain hoped to serve as a bridge be‐ Aims at the Geneva Conference, 1955" is that the tween the US and Soviet Union following the sum‐ internal power struggle between Nikita mit, this "proved to be wishful thinking." (p. 96) Khrushchev, Georgi Malenkov, and V.M. Molotov Varsori emphasizes British agency in formulating influenced Soviet foreign policy regarding the Western strategy for the conference, highlighting summit. Zubok targets two conflicting impulses. the importance of actors outside Washington and On the one hand, Moscow searched for more ef‐ Moscow in shaping Cold War diplomacy. fective ways to alleviate domestic and foreign Similar to Varsori's argument, Saki Dockrill's problems. On the other hand, Soviet leaders were essay draws attention to London's determination constrained by the Stalin cult and official ideology, to play a leading role at Geneva. Dockrill provides which resulted in a somewhat erratic foreign poli‐ a detailed and well-substantiated account of the cy. According to Zubok, the Soviets' main political origins of the "Eden Plan," the American response, goal at the summit was "to overcome the inferiori‐ and why the plan was never implemented. The ty complex and prove to the country, the world, Eden Plan for the Geneva summit was not an and themselves that they could deal with the agreed upon Western proposal but established the Western powers without being intimidated" (p. essential features of the British plan for German 62). The Soviets thus saw the Geneva summit as a reunification and European security. According to psychological success in that they had forced the Dockrill, Eden was responsible for trying to create Americans to talk to them as equal partners, with‐ a concrete discussion on German reunification at out open intimidation or condescension (p.