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The Alliance City: NATO and Berlin, 1958-1963

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The Alliance City: NATO and Berlin, 1958-1963 The Alliance City: NATO and Berlin, 1958-1963 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Mark Jonathan Rice Graduate Program in History The Ohio State University 2010 Dissertation Committee: Professor Peter Hahn, Advisor Professor Robert McMahon, Co-Advisor Professor Carole Fink Copyright by Mark Jonathan Rice 2010 Abstract Very few places evoke the Cold War quite like Berlin. A city literally divided between East and West, it represented the international divisions from its capture in 1945 until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Starting in 1958, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev put Berlin back in the center of the Cold War by threatening to end the Western presence in the western sectors of the city. Over the next five years, the status of Berlin remained at the heart of the relationship between the superpowers, and the possibility of war, especially the possibility of nuclear war, hung over the events of the period, including the building of the Berlin Wall and the Cuban Missile Crisis. This project examines the development of the policies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in response to the perceived Soviet Bloc threat to Berlin from 1958 to 1963 by placing NATO at the center of an examination of the Western response to the Soviet challenge. The tensions between national and collective interests have been an important theme in Cold War history, but the role of NATO within these relationships has not been examined adequately. By placing NATO at the center of my work, this study shows how it became a central pivot around which allied governments approached the Soviet challenge. Doubts about nuclear strategy during the crisis meant that a conventional deterrent was necessary, and NATO provided that conventional deterrent. NATO’s forces complemented and enhanced the main American nuclear deterrent, and helped to protect Western interests in Berlin and Germany during the i crisis. Without NATO to harmonize Western policy behind the American lead, the Allies would likely not have been able to properly confront the Soviets over Berlin, and the presence in West Berlin could not have been maintained. The loss of credibility from losing West Berlin would have severely damaged Western credibility in the face of the Soviet presence, and the stability of West Germany and Western Europe would have been substantially undermined. Thus, NATO and what it represented were vital to the successful protection of West Berlin, mainly through the prevention of a direct Soviet move on the city. ii Dedication This document is dedicated to my parents. iii Acknowledgments My interest in this topic goes back to my final year of undergraduate study at the University of Toronto. The idea first appeared as part of seminar with Professors Robert Bothwell and Francine McKenzie, both of whom have provided valuable advice over the years since then. My MA advisor at Ohio University, Chester Pach, was supportive of my goal to study NATO, and helped give me the skills and knowledge to begin my graduate work in the historiography and the archives. Peter Hahn and Robert McMahon have been extraordinarily helpful in supervising my dissertation. They have provided direction, framework, advice, and critiques both in Columbus and for my research, and have been patient and supportive through all the twists and turns of the second part of my graduate life and my dissertation. Carole Fink has read papers and drafts, given me constructive criticism on everything, and pushed me in my work. I am also grateful for the help and support from David Hoffmann, John Brobst, Marvin Fletcher, Jonathan Winkler, and the staffs in the history offices at Ohio University and Ohio State University. I received institutional support from the Contemporary History Institute at Ohio University and the Department of History at Ohio State University. The research for this dissertation would not have been possible if not for the generosity of the Andreas Dorpalen Award and Philip Poirier Award from Department of History at the Ohio State iv University, an International Travel Grant from the Ohio State College of Arts and Sciences, the Alumni Grant for Graduate Research and Scholarship from the Ohio State Graduate School, and a Research Grant from the Mershon Center for International Security Studies. I also received generous support from the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation. The archivists at the United States National Archives, the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, the Library and Archives Canada, the British National Archives, the archives at Sciences Po in Paris, the Centre des Archives diplomatiques de Nantes, and the NATO Archives in Brussels were all helpful and willing to field my many questions during my times there. I would especially like to thank Cristina Reibel and Dr. Andreas Kunz at the Bundes- Militärarchiv in Freiburg for their extra understanding in resolving a difficult situation. My friends at Ohio University and Ohio State have been invaluable in getting me through graduate school. I need to thank especially Robert Davis, who provided me direction in my research and ideas. I would also like to thank Rickie Garlitz, Amaryah Orenstein, Melissa Kuhn, Tom Bruscino, Jon Peterson, Ryan Irwin, Chapin Rydingsward, David Dennis, and many others. My family has also been tremendously inquisitive about my work, and I should single out my uncle, Gerald Tulchinsky, who provided a beneficial insight into the academic world. My sister, Jodi, read drafts and contributed her English teacher’s eye to my writing. My parents supported me both financially and morally throughout my choice to pursue my graduate degrees, and I could not have done this without them. Finally, my wife Ray Ball has given me the drive and encouragement to make it through the dissertation. She gave me suggestions, feedback, v and love whenever I needed them, and I could not imagine either my professional or personal life without her. vi Vita June 2001 .......................................................B.A.H., History, University of Toronto March 2005 ....................................................M.A., History, Ohio University September 2004 to present ............................Graduate Teaching Associate, Department of History, The Ohio State University Fields of Study Major Field: History vii Table of Contents Abstract ............................................................................................................................................. i Dedication .......................................................................................................................................iii Acknowledgments........................................................................................................................... iv Vita.................................................................................................................................................vii Introduction………………………………………………………………………………..1 Chapter 1: The Soviet Ultimatum .................................................................................................. 24 NATO’s strategic background................................................................................................... 26 Khrushchev’s First Moves......................................................................................................... 32 NATO’s December Meeting...................................................................................................... 45 Macmillan’s Trip ....................................................................................................................... 57 Meeting again in Geneva ........................................................................................................... 64 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 72 Chapter 2: The Rise and Fall of Summits ...................................................................................... 75 Eisenhower’s Summits .............................................................................................................. 80 Early problems of contingency planning................................................................................... 88 The Origins of LIVE OAK ........................................................................................................ 92 NATO and LIVE OAK............................................................................................................ 102 The Paris Crash........................................................................................................................ 110 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 121 viii Chapter 3: Reevaluating Strategy................................................................................................. 124 In the Wake of Paris................................................................................................................. 127 The Strategic Question............................................................................................................. 136 Conclusion ..............................................................................................................................
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