The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (Part 1)

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The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (Part 1)

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What options did John F. Kennedy consider after his aides informed him on 16 October 1962 that the Soviet Union was secretly deploy- ing medium-range nuclear-capable missiles in Cuba? In most accounts, his options fell into three categories:

1. military: an attack against Cuba involving a large-scale air strike against the missile sites, a full-scale invasion, or the ªrst followed by the second; 2. political-military: a naval blockade of Cuba (euphemistically called a “quarantine”) to prevent the shipment of further “offensive” military equipment and allow time to pressure Soviet leader Nikita Khrush- chev into withdrawing the missiles; or 3. diplomatic: a private overture to Moscow to persuade Khrushchev to back down without a public confrontation.

Kennedy ultimately chose the second option and announced it on 22 Octo- ber in his nationally televised address. That option and the ªrst (direct military action against Cuba) have been exhaustively analyzed over the years by Western scholars. Much less attention has been devoted to the third alternative, the diplomatic route. This article shows, however, that a variant of that option—a variant that has never previously received any serious scholarly treatment—was actually adopted by Kennedy at the peak of the crisis. The United States pursued a separate diplomatic track leading not to Moscow but to Havana (via Rio de Janeiro), and not to Khrushchev but to Fidel Castro, in a secret effort to convince the Cuban leader to make a deal: If Castro agreed to end his alliance with Moscow, demand the removal of the Soviet missiles, and disavow any further support for revolutionary subversion in the Western hemisphere, he could expect “many changes” in Washington’s policy toward Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 6, No. 2, Spring 2004, pp. 3–20 © 2004 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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Cuba, including an explicit non-invasion pledge and, implicitly, American aid or at least an end to the U.S.-led diplomatic and economic embargo. Castro also would be assured of U.S. support if the Soviet Union and its hardline allies within the Cuban leadership tried to resist such a dramatic swerve in policy. The Kennedy administration chose, despite considerable misgivings, to employ the Brazilian government of President João Goulart as an intermedi- ary in this highly sensitive and tightly concealed effort to reach Castro at the height of the missile crisis. Kennedy at one point had regarded Goulart as a potential “New Frontiersman” and a valuable partner in the Alliance for Prog- ress (AFP), but U.S. ofªcials increasingly viewed the Brazilian president with irritation, exasperation, and even suspicion for what they saw as his ªnancial mismanagement, political demagoguery, ºirtations with neutralism (and the Sino-Soviet bloc) in foreign policy, and, most alarming, cooperation with and toleration of leftist elements. Some within the Kennedy administration even began to consider supporting a military coup in Brazil rather than risk seeing the country end up in Communist hands. The story of this secret U.S.-Brazilian-Cuban triangular diplomacy thus sheds light not only on a previously little-known aspect of the Cuban missile crisis and the hidden efforts at dialogue between Washington and Havana, but also on the troubled U.S.-Brazilian relationship—and by implication the broader issues of alliance management and the limits of maneuver within a superpower’s sphere of inºuence during the Cold War.1 Part 1 of this two-part article will set the context for an analysis of U.S.-Brazilian-Cuban contacts during the crisis, which will be explored in depth in Part 2, to be published in the next issue of the journal.

Background

The secret Brazilian mediation effort during the missile crisis, described in this article with the aid of newly available U.S., Brazilian, Russian, British, Cuban, and other sources, actually climaxed three years of ªtful Brazilian diplomatic efforts, spanning three Brazilian and two American presidencies, to play a direct role in efforts to limit the U.S.-Cuban confrontation. Although

1. On U.S.-Brazilian relations, see especially W. Michael Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups d’état: Brazil- ian-American Relations, 1945–1964 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993); and Ruth Leacock, Requiem for Revolution: The United States and Brazil, 1961–1969 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1990). On internal Brazilian politics, see Thomas E. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964: An Experiment in Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); and John W. F. Dulles, Unrest in Brazil: Political-Military Crises, 1955–1964 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970).

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space constraints preclude a full-blown recounting, a brief review in Part 1 of the article will provide useful background for the discussion in Part 2 of the October 1962 initiative. The priorities and tactics of the individual Brazilian leaders varied, but they all had multiple reasons to attempt mediation between Washington and Havana. First, they saw Brazil as an important hemispheric power that was well positioned to assume a prominent role in settling major disputes between the “colossus of the north” and Latin American countries (a role not necessar- ily welcomed by some of Brazil’s neighbors). Second, because Brazilian ofªcials were less alarmed than U.S. leaders by the supposed menace of Fidelismo, they watched with increasing dismay as Washington, in their view, became obsessed with Cuba to the detriment of U.S. relations with the rest of Latin America. Third, at the height of the prestige of the newly formed non-aligned movement, Brazilian leaders ºirted with a more “independent,” quasi-neutralist foreign policy through which they could escape subservience and irrelevance within the U.S. sphere of inºuence and play a more balanced position between East and West, even while clearly leaning to one side. Fourth, in domestic political terms, Brazilian leaders had to deal with sub- stantial leftist and nationalist constituencies that were sympathetic to the Cu- ban revolution and resentful of the United States. Achieving a settlement that preserved Cuba’s sovereignty and internal political orientation from (North) American pressure, yet that also satisªed Washington, would thereby consti- tute a major achievement in both domestic and international political terms. Fifth, mediation suited Brazil’s consistent emphasis on respect for the principles of self-determination and non-intervention with regard to Cuba and Cas- tro’s socioeconomic system. Brazilian leaders hoped to foster Cuba’s ultimate reintegration into the inter-American system, even while decrying Castro’s increasing “extra-continental” links to the Soviet bloc. The ªrst important Brazilian mediation efforts vis-à-vis Cuba occurred in 1960 during the last full year of the presidential administrations of both Juscelino Kubitschek in Brazil and Dwight D. Eisenhower in the United States. As U.S.-Cuban relations plummeted, Brazil’s ambassador in Havana, Vasco Tristão Leitão da Cunha, an early enthusiast for the Cuban revolution who was fast growing disillusioned, joined with his Argentine colleague, Julio Amoedo, to try to convince Castro to adopt a more moderate position toward the United States. They also were in contact with the U.S. ambassador, Philip Bonsal, in a bid to foster a civilized dialogue.2 Kubitschek, a strong leader who

2. Records on these mediation efforts can be found in the State Department Decimal Central Files (DCF) in Record Group (RG) 59, National Archives II (NA), College Park, MD; in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vol. V: American Republics (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Ofªce, 1991), hereinafter cited as FRUS, with appropriate year and

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had spearheaded a drive for domestic political and economic modernization and greater international prominence for Brazil (including his “Operation Pan-America,” a proposal for Latin development foreshadowing Kennedy’s “Alliance for Progress”), also sent emissaries to Washington and other hemispheric capitals to try to blunt the sharpening U.S.-Cuban enmity. When Ei- senhower visited Brazil in February, he gave Kubitschek his general, if unen- thusiastic, approval of the idea of using Brazilian and Latin “mediation or good ofªces” (“anything the Latin American nations could do to bring Castro to a more amenable frame of mind would be helpful”3). Soon thereafter, U.S.-Cuban relations reached a new low when Castro accused Washington of responsibility for blowing up a French ship (the La Coubre) that was carrying arms to the Cuban government in early March, an explosion that killed sev- enty-ªve Cuban dock workers as well as French shipmen. Despite this set- back, the two Latin American envoys persisted in arranging all-night asados with Castro and his associates, as well as dinner parties and conversations with U.S. diplomats, to try to alleviate the conºict. In the summer, after a new crisis sparked by a U.S. cutoff of sugar purchases and by U.S. efforts to pressure American and British oil companies to refuse processing of Soviet fuel, Brazil joined Mexico and Canada in a high-level approach to Eisenhower to offer their “good ofªces.” This overture received a cordial brush-off in Washington, but the Brazilian, Mexican, and Canadian foreign ministers continued to promote mediation during an Organization of American States (OAS) foreign ministers’ meeting in Costa Rica. All these efforts went nowhere, primarily because the positions of the two sides were incompatible. Moreover, the Eisenhower administration had al- ready decided to pursue a different route. Despite politely expressing mild interest in patching up relations with Havana, the administration in fact had embarked on a covert effort in mid-March 1960 to overthrow the Castro leadership rather than seek an accommodation with it. The covert operation was nearing a decision point at the beginning of 1961 when Kennedy took ofªce in Washington and Jânio Quadros—the gov- ernor of Sao Paulo who had raised eyebrows in Washington with a friendly campaign trip to Cuba and rhetoric hinting at a more “neutralist” foreign policy—succeeded Kubitschek. The full rupture in diplomatic relations between

volume numbers; and in the Brazilian Foreign Ministry Archives (Arquivo do Ministério das Relaçðes Exteriores, or AMRE-B), Brasília. See also Philip W. Bonsal, Cuba, Castro, and the United States (Pitts- burgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971). The most extensive work dealing with Cuba using Bra- zilian archives is Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, De Martí a Fidel: A Revolução Cubana e a América Latina (Rio de Janeiro: Civilizaçío Brasileira, 1998). All quotations from Brazilian sources in this article are my unofªcial translations from the original Portuguese. 3. FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. V, p. 764.

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Washington and Havana during the Eisenhower administration’s ªnal weeks and the growing rumors in the Western press that anti-Castro Cuban exiles backed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were training for an invasion of the island ensured that the Cuban problem immediately rose to the forefront of the agenda for both Kennedy and Quadros. Sensing an imminent violent clash and encouraged by the Cuban chargé d’affaires in Rio de Janeiro,4 Quadros launched an intensive bid to broker some sort of deal between Castro and the incoming U.S. administration. He enlisted the help of former ambassador da Cunha (who had become secretary-general of Ita- maraty, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry) when the latter was visiting Havana in February and April 1961 to promote a “Finlandization” arrangement whereby Castro would relinquish Soviet-bloc military support and accept neutrality in the Cold War in exchange for ªrm commitments from the United States to abjure intervention and accept the island’s internal political orientation.5 Al- though Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticós thanked Brazil for its efforts, he denied that his chargé had been authorized to request mediation and told da Cunha that in any event the United States, being “solely responsible for the existing state of tension,” must “take the ªrst step” to improve relations.6 Even if the Cubans had been more receptive, Washington evinced little interest in compromise, for reasons that became obvious in mid-April 1961 with the failed invasion at the Bay of Pigs, which only deepened the mutual hostility.7 Seeking to consolidate Latin American support after this U.S. set- back, Cuba the following month requested aid from Brazil, along with Ecua- dor and Mexico, in opening a dialogue with Washington. But that gambit, which sank amid diplomatic confusion,8 proved less signiªcant than an episode that took place in August 1961 when hemispheric leaders gathered at the Uruguayan resort of Punta del Este to discuss the Kennedy administration’s new Alliance for Progress. At the close of the summit, Brazilian and Argentine diplomats arranged a late-night cocktail-party rendezvous between Cuban Fi-

4. See Brazilian Foreign Ministry (BFM) memorandum, “Policy of Brazil in Relation to Cuba” (Se- cret), 1 September 1961, in AMRE-B, folder “ANEXO Secreto—600 (24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICOS—1958–1961.” 5. See Sir Herbert Marchant (British Embassy, Havana) to Foreign Ofªce (FO) (Secret/Immediate), 6 April 1961, No. 267, FO 371/156140, The National Archives (hereinafter TNA/UK, formerly known as the Public Record Ofªce), Kew Gardens, England. 6. Brazilian Embassy in Havana (hereinafter BE/H), Telegram No. 29 (Secret/Extremely Urgent), 15 February 1961, in AMRE-B; BE/H, Telegram No. 30 (Secret), 15 February 1961, in AMRE-B; and BE/H, Telegram No. 67 (Secret/Urgent), 3 April 1961, in AMRE-B. 7. A National Security Council staff aide (out of the loop on Bay of Pigs planning) suggested just prior to the invasion that Washington might avail itself of Brazil’s services to “settle accounts” with Cuba, only to be told by McGeorge Bundy that a more favorable solution to the Castro problem might be obtained. Interview with Marcus Raskin, Washington DC, June 2001. 8. See documents in AMRE-B, including “Policy of Brazil in Relation to Cuba,” 1 September 1961.

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nance Minister (and revolutionary ªrebrand) Ernesto “Che” Guevara and a senior White House aide, Richard N. Goodwin, who had been a driving force behind the AFP. In a conversation at the Montevideo house of the chief of a Brazilian trade delegation, Guevara expressed thanks to the United States for the Bay of Pigs (which he said had helped enormously in consolidating the revolution) and presented cigars to Goodwin to deliver to Kennedy. On a more serious note, Guevara raised the prospect of achieving “at least an in- terim modus vivendi” between Havana and Washington, even if a genuine “understanding” remained impossible. In a subsequent memorandum to Ken- nedy, Goodwin said he suspected (as did the Brazilian diplomats who arranged the session) that Cuba is undergoing severe economic stress, that the Soviet Union is not pre- pared to undertake the large effort necessary to get them on their feet (A Brazil- ian told me “you don’t feed the lamb in the mouth of the lion”), and that Cuba desires an understanding with the U.S. Goodwin advocated “some way of continuing this below ground dialogue which Che has begun,” if only as a means to “probe for a split in the top leadership” while simultaneously pursuing anti-Castro policies and covert operations. In the end, however, the brief encounter between the Argentine-born revolutionary, “wearing green fatigues, and his usual overgrown and scraggly beard,” and the young adviser to the U.S. president failed to open any channel of ongoing U.S.-Cuban communication.9 Only a few days after Guevera continued on to Rio de Janeiro where Quadros cordially greeted him (and decorated him with the country’s most distinguished award for foreigners, the cruzeiro do sul, triggering an outcry from conservatives), the Brazilian leader suddenly resigned, sparking a brief but tumultuous political crisis. His replacement (with circumscribed powers) was the vice president, “Jango” Goulart, who had been a labor minister under and protégé of the strongman Getulio Vargas in the early 1950s. Goulart then served as Kubitschek’s vice president and as the leader of the fast growing Bra- zilian Workers Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, PTB). He was judged by U.S. analysts to be “a demagogue and opportunist, without ideology or ide- als” (and whose coincidental presence in “Red” China on a trade mission at the time of Quadros’s resignation hardly reassured them).10

9. See Richard N. Goodwin’s cover memorandum to JFK and memorandum of conversation in FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. X: Cuba, 1961–1962, pp. 640–645; his more vivid account in Remembering Amer- ica: A Voice from the Sixties (Boston: Little, Brown, 1988), pp. 196–210; and Secretary of State for Ex- ternal Relations to Cabinet in Brasília, Telegram No. 707, 19 August 1961, in AMRE-B, Moniz Bandeira collection, National Security Archive, folder “600(24h)—SIT. POL.—CUBA 1961.” 10. See assessments in Weis, Cold Warriors, pp. 85, 98; and in John F. Kennedy Library (JFKL),

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Even if U.S. ofªcials had been more favorably disposed toward the new Brazilian leader, they would have remained frustrated, even exasperated, by Brazil’s ªrm opposition to strong measures against Castro and its belief, as Foreign Minister Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco told Secretary of State Dean Rusk in September 1961, that every effort should be made “to bring Cuba back into the family” of the American system “rather than to put it outside.”11 When Goulart’s new ambassador to Washington, Roberto de Oliveira Cam- pos, a moderate economist, presented credentials in the Oval Ofªce in Octo- ber, Kennedy “expressed disappointment” at the “incomprehensions” of some Latin American countries regarding the nature of the conºict with Castro. The problem, the president stressed, was not bilateral but hemispheric and did not stem from Cuba’s internal changes but from Castro’s devotion to international Communism. Kennedy warned of the threat Cuba that represented to the rest of Latin America, and he emphasized that Castro was so devoted to Moscow and to Marxist-Leninist ideology that he displayed even “less independence than some of the Soviet satellites and much less than” prominent neutralist leaders such as Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah and Guinea’s Sékou Touré.12 “I fear that Brazil underestimates the dangers of Cuban ideological expansionism,” Kennedy bluntly told Campos after the Brazilian acknowledged that some sectors of his country still felt “sympathy for the un- derdog” and had urged the president to eschew a violent course, focus on the positive agenda of the AFP,and hew to a strategy of “hopeful vigilance.” Cam- pos added that it would be useful to differentiate more visibly between accep- tance of Cuba’s social reforms and rejection of its “satellitization” by Moscow, and to disseminate more widely evidence of Havana’s subversive inªltration. “All these solutions,” Kennedy countered, “are good but are slow.”13 Campos had sensed that Kennedy’s presentation of American grievances against Cuba was somewhat “mechanical,” but by the time their conversation ended the ambassador had come to appreciate the growing U.S. impatience over the issue. Even so, Brazil refrained from going along with Washington’s maximum agenda for isolating and sanctioning Cuba (to complement the “Operation Mongoose” covert operations program, which the president se-

Boston, CIA Ofªce of Central Reference, Biographical Register, “GOULART, Joao Belchior Mar- ques,” n.d., National Security Files (NSF), Country Files (CF): Brazil, box 12. 11. See Rusk-Arinos memorandum of conversation, 5:30 p.m., 25 September 1961, New York, in NA, RG 59, Secretary’s and Under Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, 1953–1964, folder “Septem- ber 1961–December 1961,” Box 25. Lot 65D330, Entry 1566. 12. Brazilian Embassy in Washington (hereinafter BE/W) (Campos), Telegram No. 725 (Secret), 19 October 1961, in AMRE-B. (Copy courtesy of Roberto Baptista Jr.) On his term as ambassador, see Roberto Campos, A lanterna na popa: Memórias (Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks, 1994), pp. 437–551. 13. Campos, A lanterna na popa, pp. 446–452.

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cretly approved in November 1961), and the Brazilians riled U.S. ofªcials by rigidly insisting on the principles of non-intervention and self-determination. In the face of Washington’s promotion of a special OAS foreign ministers’ meeting to condemn Cuba, Brazil steadfastly resisted and rallied opposition to the idea for months. Then, after the OAS Council barely approved the res- olution of condemnation by the required two-thirds majority, Goulart’s foreign minister, San Tiago Dantas, led a minority coalition at the January 1962 Punta del Este “meeting of consultation” in a successful effort to water down U.S.-backed anti-Castro resolutions—a gesture that earned him the sarcastic sobriquet “San Tiago de Cuba.”14 Although Kennedy and his aides continued to fear that unreliable leadership, simmering nationalism and anti-Americanism, and political and economic turbulence could yet turn Brazil into a “second Cuba”15—a development that they feared would be devastating to U.S. interests and prestige— they could take some comfort from a discernible cooling of Brazilian-Cuban relations. Examples of Cuba’s “insolent attitude,” in the words of a secret analysis by the Brazilian Foreign Ministry in September 1961, included Castro’s open promotion of an “armed revolutionary struggle” in Brazil to prevent a military takeover during the political crisis that followed Quadros’s sudden resignation16 and Havana’s opposition to Brazil’s observer status in the Sep- tember non-aligned movement conference in Belgrade.17 Castro’s statement in December 1961 unabashedly describing himself and his revolution as Marxist-Leninist further irritated Brazilian ofªcials, whose resistance to harsh anti-Cuban measures steadily declined.18 Later that month, at a secret Itamaraty strategy session, Dantas acknowledged a “slight difference” between Goulart’s policy toward Cuba and that of his predecessor. Whereas Quadros had at times exhibited “a slight trace of ideological sympathy and a systematic denial and sometimes even evasive position” toward Cuba, the new Brazilian

14. For U.S. and Brazilian documentation on their sharp differences (especially between Rusk and Dantas) over Cuba at Punta del Este in January 1962, see Executive Secretariat Conference Files, in NA, RG 59, Boxes 274–276; and various ªles in AMRE-B. “San Tiago de Cuba” is from DeLesseps S. Morrison, Latin American Mission: An Adventure in Hemisphere Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965), p. 169. 15. On Kennedy’s continuing fear of a “second Cuba” in the hemisphere, see Stephen G. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999). 16. Castro made these comments during a televised address on 29 August 1961. See BE/H Telegram No. 237 (Carlos Jacyntho de Barros, Conªdential), 31 August 1961, 1:15 p.m., in AMRE-B, “MDB—Telegramas Recebidos—HAVANA—1960/61, (Cx 228)”; and “Policy of Brazil in Relation to Cuba,” 1 September 1961. 17. “Policy of Brazil in Relation to Cuba,” 1 September 1961. 18. See Brazilian delegation to the United Nations (hereinafter BD/UN) (Arinos), Telegram No. 245, 8 p.m., 3 December 1961, in AMRE-B, “ANEXO Secreto—600 (24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICOS—1958–1961.”

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attitude, though still based on the principles of self- determination and non-intervention, frankly recognized the Havana regime as non-democratic.19 Moreover, by early 1962, Washington was mildly encouraged by Goulart’s appointment of a relatively moderate cabinet and his expressed willingness to smooth over irritants in bilateral relations, such as a provincial government’s expropriation of a U.S.-owned power company. What would turn out to be a short-lived honeymoon between Goulart and Kennedy coincided with murky reports of a power struggle inside the Cuban leadership, with intimations of possible strains between Havana and Moscow. During the ªrst three months of 1962, amid reports that an experiment in collective leadership was under way in Cuba, observers in Havana no- ticed that for the ªrst time since the revolution, Fidel Castro seemed to be taking a less prominent role. Castro’s prolonged absences from public view prompted speculation that a behind-the-scenes battle for the leadership had begun. Such rumors found conªrmation when Castro resurfaced on 26 March to deliver a spirited television address announcing a purge of senior members of the Cuban Communist party. Targeted in the purge were ofªcials who were considered closest to Moscow, including one of the party’s leading ªgures, minister Aníbal Escalante. The Soviet ambassador, also in disfavor, soon left the country.20

Prequel: Spring 1962

Although the “Escalante Affair” did not receive wide attention in the United States, it prompted a fresh secret Brazilian mediation effort during Goulart’s visit to the United States in early April. This episode merits close attention here because it foreshadowed the initiative that would emerge during the missile crisis. Goulart’s trip, featuring an address to a joint session of Congress, multiple encounters with Kennedy and other key ªgures, and a visit to the Strategic Air Command in Omaha, in addition to speeches and meetings in New York, Washington, and Chicago, was a public relations success and

19. “Meeting of the Planning Commission on Subjects Related to the VII [OAS] Consultation Meet- ing—Dec. 26, 1961,” in National Archives of Brazil [Arquivo Particular de Francisco Clementino de San Tiago Dantas—Arquivo Nacional], Rio de Janeiro, San Tiago Dantas Papers. 20. This paragraph is based on reports from the British Embassy in Havana in TNA/UK, FO 371; State Department analyses; and Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, “One Hell of a Gam- ble”—Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964: The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), pp. 162–170. In June, Moscow named Aleksandr Alekseev, far more popular than Sergei Kudryavtsev in Castro’s circle, as the new Soviet envoy. On the so-called Escalante Affair, see Maurice Halperin, The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 149–159.

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brought at least a momentary warming of bilateral relations. The visit even seemed to kindle a degree of personal rapport between the Brazilian and U.S. presidents. For a “ºeeting moment,” Campos later recalled, Kennedy dis- cerned in Goulart “a reforming leader of the center, able to communicate with the masses and capable of assuming the missing leadership of the Alliance for Progress in Latin America, which rightfully belonged to Brazil, not only as the largest country, but also because it had initiated Operation Panamerica.”21 Cuba received relatively short shrift in the talks between Kennedy and Goulart. The discussions focused mainly on bilateral relations, U.S. economic aid, the recent military coup in Argentina, and the ªnancial and political crisis in Brazil. But on the evening of 4 April, after the two leaders concluded their talks, Foreign Minister Dantas raised the issue of Cuba with Secretary of State Rusk.22 In the Brazilian’s view, the political and economic situation in Cuba was “rapidly” deteriorating, and Castro was “in a ªght” with (and “in danger of being discarded by”) the Communists, whose apparatus appeared to be gaining strength. Clearly alluding both to Rio’s diplomatic representation in Havana and the distance it had studiously maintained from Washington’s harsher tone and actions toward Castro, Dantas stressed that Brazil was “in a good position to follow and inºuence [the] situation”—Rusk interjected that this status might soon be “unique”—and probed the Secretary of State’s interest in concretely exploring the possibilities “of getting Fidel away from the Communists.” Dantas emphasized that there could be no return to the situation before the revolution, “the status quo ante,” and that perhaps a more realistic goal would be to “create the conditions for a new form of democratic revolution.” Noting that Khrushchev “despises” Castro, Dantas foresaw a nationalistic, nonaligned brand of Cuban socialism or Communism along the lines of Tito’s Yugoslavia as a plausible scenario. An intrigued yet cautious Rusk responded that above all Dantas (and by implication Castro) should understand that two points were non-negotiable for Washington: “(1) the direct Cuban ties with Moscow, such as arms and the Communist apparatus; and (2) Cuban subversive actions elsewhere in the hemisphere.” Rusk allowed that if Castro made “a clear break with Moscow,” then a “change” in U.S. policy might ensue. He seemed to agree that recent intelligence signaled a potentially signiªcant split in the leadership, alluding

21. Alberto Dines, et al., O mundo depois de Kennedy (Rio de Janeiro, n.p., 1965), p. 110, quoted in Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964, p. 394 n. 21. See also Campos, A lanterna na popa, pp. 474–485. 22. Memorandum of Rusk-Dantas conversation, “Subject: Cuban Situation” (Eyes Only), 4 April 1962, Secretary’s Ofªce, 6 p.m., in FRUS, 1961–1963,Vol. XII: American Republics, pp. 309–311.

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to recent “top-level defections (among those still in Cuba) over the embracing of the Communist apparatus.” Because Rusk was sensitive to charges from Brazilians and many others in Latin America to the contrary, he stressed that the Kennedy administration’s principal grudge against Havana was neither its internal political changes nor its economic expropriations, but its links to Moscow and subversive activities elsewhere in the hemisphere. Rusk emphasized once again that “if Castro had support free from the Communist apparatus and cut the ties to Moscow, this would create a new situation.” As examples of actions the Cuban government could take to provide evidence of a break with Moscow, Rusk suggested “rec- onciliation with Castro’s early supporters who have left him on the Commu- nist issue and the dropping of the language of Communism.” He added that a formal severance of diplomatic ties with the USSR would not be necessary even if it might be a logical and desirable result. Dantas wanted to be sure that he understood correctly. He directly asked whether Rusk “thought the idea of trying to wean Castro away from the Communists had some merit,” and he received a cryptic green light in response: It had been no accident, the Ameri- can responded, that Washington had never asked Brazil to break diplomatic relations with Castro’s Cuba. To follow up on the idea, Dantas proposed to consult with his ambassador to Havana, Luís Bastian Pinto, in Mexico City a few days later, during the upcoming visit there by Goulart. He said he would report back to Rusk the following week. Importuning the Brazilian to keep the discussion secret, Rusk invited Dantas to join him for a cruise on the Potomac in the president’s boat, weather permitting, on the afternoon of 12 April to take up the matter upon his return from Mexico. After Dantas left town, Rusk checked cautiously within the administration to see whether he could ofªcially authorize the Brazilian enterprise. Given the proposition’s explosive nature, he presumably checked at some point with the president himself, although no record of such a conversation has emerged. In any event, Rusk ran into hardline opposition on 10 April when he mentioned Dantas’s proposal to Director of Central Intelligence John A. McCone, the Republican who had replaced Allen W. Dulles after the Bay of Pigs debacle a year earlier. McCone obviously abhorred the idea of making any sort of deal with Castro. According to McCone’s secret account of the conversation,23 Rusk assured him that he had, in his conªdential discussions with Dantas, reafªrmed Washington’s non-negotiable points—that

23. John A. McCone, Memorandum of Conversation with Rusk, “Subject: Brazilian Foreign Minister Dantas,” 10 April 1962, in FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. XII, p. 470; and a differently sanitized version in the State Department’s microªche supplement to FRUS, 1961–1963, Vols. X–XII, Doc. No. 283.

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Castro break with Moscow (“International Communism”) and cease subversive efforts in the hemisphere—and indicated that “other matters such as compensation for American properties, etc. were in his opinion negotiable.” Yet Rusk wanted McCone to consider taking up the Brazilian’s offer and proposed his own variant, a “two-stage operation” ªrst to extract Cuba from the Communist bloc, as Dantas had urged, and then to get rid of Castro himself:

2. Dantas has told Rusk that the Castro regime was split at the top and that his Ambassador had reported a serious conºict existed between Castro and his fol- lowers on the one hand and the hard-line Communists on the other. Dantas felt that this split might be capitalized on and the Communist regime disposed of. Rusk encouraged this thinking and urged me to explore carefully with Dantas [less than one line of source text not declassiªed]. 3. Rusk envisaged a two-stage operation; ªrst the rupture between Castro and the Communist and, second[,] the disposal of Castro.24

Precisely what Rusk meant by Castro’s “disposal” is not clear. The CIA was ac- tively pursuing various schemes to assassinate the Cuban leader at the time, although the Secretary of State’s speciªc knowledge of them has not previously been documented. The phrasing would not exclude Castro’s physical elimination, even if the context suggested merely his ejection from any role in ruling the island. On this issue, Rusk seemed to have had a more open mind than McCone. “At one point,” the CIA head recorded, “Rusk intimated that Castro might be acceptable if free of Communist inºuence. McCone dis- agreed.” This apparent divergence between the two senior U.S. ofªcials on how to deªne an acceptable outcome in Cuba—and on a Brazilian initiative to split Castro from old-line Communists more closely tied to Mos- cow—would resurface during the missile crisis (as discussed in Part 2 of this article). Prophetically, Rusk also urged McCone to endorse Dantas’s proposal, arguing that it would be a good idea to “attempt to develop a direct unattributable contact with Castro as the ability to reach him might be important at some future time.” In any case, it appears that Rusk hoped to ex- ploit the Brazilian initiative without informing Dantas or his associates of Washington’s ultimate aim—in other words, to set Rio (as well as Castro) up for a double-cross. The bottom line for Rusk (and perhaps for the more skep-

24. The version of this document in FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. XII, p. 470, omits the words “and, second the disposal of Castro,” which are included in the microªche supplement’s version—which, conversely, deletes the second paragraph in its entirety, despite the near-total inclusion of it in the published FRUS volume.

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tical McCone) was that Washington “should recruit Dantas’ assistance to split Castro and the Communists but should not under any circumstances reveal our decision reference Castro.”25 McCone’s opposition to any arrangement that left Castro in power did not deter Rusk from giving the Brazilian effort his blessing when Dantas re- turned to Washington. On Thursday afternoon, 12 April, the Brazilian foreign minister reported on his conversation in Mexico City with Brazil’s envoy to Havana. He quoted Bastian Pinto as being convinced that a “serious struggle for power was going on between the Castroites and the old line Commu- nists.”26 Rusk, in turn, carefully reafªrmed Washington’s two prerequisites for a new relationship with Castro (“his political-military ties to the Soviet Union and his subversive activities in this Hemisphere”), implied that other matters such as expropriation were open for discussion, and authorized Dantas to as- certain whether the Cuban leader would be interested in a deal.27 After speaking to Dantas, Rusk telephoned McCone and asked for his “fellows’ best appreciation” of the Brazilian foreign minister. “If [Dantas] is re- liable,” the Secretary of State remarked, “some extremely interesting possibilities may open up. If not, [we] will have to watch ourselves.” The next afternoon, as requested, McCone sent over a one-page CIA proªle of Dantas. It was a harshly critical portrait of a “brilliant, although unscrupulous” lawyer and politician, highlighting his alleged sympathy for “the authoritarian type of leadership”—from the Nazis during World War II to the Soviet bloc (including Cuba) during the Cold War—his distaste for the United States, and his ambition to become prime minister. Nevertheless, McCone told Rusk in a follow-up phone call from California, “[t]here was an opportunity to use [Dantas] more so than the memo indicated.” Rusk responded favorably.

25. McCone, Memorandum of Conversation with Rusk, 10 April 1962. The reference to Rusk’s belief that the U.S. “should recruit Dantas’ assistance” is sanitized from the microªche supplement’s version, but left in the published FRUS volume. 26. For Bastian Pinto’s analysis of the leadership struggle, see his 5 May 1962 ofício (memorandum) to Foreign Minister Dantas, “Political Situation of Cuba,” No. 143/600 (24h) (Conªdential), in AMRE-B, “MDB—DESPACHOS—HAVANA—OFICIOS REC.—1962/1964,” CX 49; as well as his Telegram No. 97 (25 February 1962), in AMRE-B, “MDB—DESPACHOS—HAVANA— OFICIOS REC.—1962/1964,” CX 49; his Telegram No. 111 (9 March 1962), in AMRE-B, “MDB—DESPACHOS—HAVANA—OFICIOS REC.—1962/1964,” CX 49; his Telegram No. 128 (27 March 1962), in AMRE-B, “MDB—DESPACHOS—HAVANA—OFICIOS REC.— 1962/1964,” CX 49; and his Telegram No. 135 (1 April 1962), in AMRE-B, “MDB— DESPACHOS—HAVANA—OFICIOS REC.—1962/1964,” CX 49. 27. The 12 April Rusk-Dantas conversation is described in Deptel 2979 to Rio (Top Secret/No Distri- bution/Eyes Only), 14 April 1962, in JFKL, NSF, CF: Cuba, Cables, Box 40. See also FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. X, pp. 792–793. Conºating this talk with the Rusk-Dantas exchange on Cuba eight days earlier, the FRUS editors incorrectly date the conversation as having taken place on 10 April. See FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. X, p. 792 n. 1.

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“Since we could try it without commitment, he might as well play his hand and see what happens.”28 After speaking with McCone, Rusk decided to move ahead, albeit in a gingerly manner. Using a message he cleared personally after it was drafted by Edwin M. Martin, the assistant secretary of state for economic affairs (soon to become assistant secretary for inter-American affairs), Rusk sent a cable to the newly installed U.S. ambassador in Rio, Lincoln Gordon (a Harvard economist and former Marshall Plan administrator, who had been sent by Kennedy largely to promote the AFP29), informing him on an “eyes only” basis of his conversation with Dantas. “It was agreed,” Rusk related, “that [Dantas] would ask his Ambassador to seek an appointment to see Castro alone and inquire whether Brazil could be of any assistance in freeing Castro from the pressure of the old line Communists.”30 Because the Kennedy administration was intensifying its political, diplomatic, and economic campaign to isolate Castro and was secretly escalating its Mongoose operations against Havana, and because the Cuban issue was such a lightning rod in domestic politics, Rusk obviously grasped the delicacy of making any overture to Castro, even if it were indirect, hedged, camouºaged, and unlikely to succeed. “I cannot emphasize too much the importance of limiting this whole matter to your personal knowledge only,” he stressed in his telegram to Lincoln Gordon on 14 April. Perhaps feeling second thoughts, Rusk and Martin backtracked the next day, clarifying to Gordon that Dantas had merely “informed” Rusk that the Brazilian ambassador in Havana would “seek an appointment with Castro,” but “there was no agreement between Dantas and Secretary on this point.”31 Despite this effort to gloss over U.S. approval of the initiative, the secretary and other senior State Department ofªcials were intensely curious to ªnd out what, if anything, it might produce. On 27 April, Martin sent Gordon a follow-up cable asking him to check with Dantas.32 A week later, Gordon re-

28. “Telephone Call to Mr. McCone, Thursday, April 12, 1962, 6:55 p.m.,” in NA, RG 59, Dean Rusk Records, Transcripts of Telephone Calls, Box 46, Lot 72D192, Entry 5379; “RE: SAN TIAGO DANTAS, Foreign Minister of Brazil” (enc. with Walter Elder to Secretary of State, 13 April 1962), in NA, RG 59, Dean Rusk Records, Transcripts of Telephone Calls, Box 46, Lot 72D192, Entry 5379; and “Telephone Call from Mr. McCone (Pasadena)—Sat. Apr 14, 1962, 2:20 p.m.,” in NA, RG 59, Dean Rusk Records, Transcripts of Telephone Calls, Box 46, Lot 72D192, Entry 5379. 29. For Lincoln Gordon’s accounts of his term as ambassador, see his JFKL oral history interviews; Lincoln Gordon, Brazil’s Second Chance: En Route toward the First World (Washington: Brookings In- stitution, 2001); and his more detailed Portuguese-language Brazilian edition (translation courtesy of author). 30. Deptel 2979 to Rio, 14 April 1962, in FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. X, pp. 792–793. 31. See Deptel Priority 2987 to Rio (Top Secret/Eyes Only), 15 April 1962, in JFKL, NSF, CF: Cuba, Cables, Box 40. 32. Deptel 3113 to Rio, 27 April 1962, in FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. X, p. 805 n. 3.

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ported back to Rusk and Martin the rather ambiguous outcome of the Brazil- ian probing in Havana.33 According to Dantas, Bastian Pinto had seen Castro privately “immediately after Easter” (22 April) and explained that the Brazil- ian government hoped that the Cuban Revolution (with Castro as its leader) might yet evolve away from Moscow toward a “nationalist socialism.” In fact, the envoy added, the Brazilian government had tried to keep the door open to Cuba at the Punta del Este conference in January precisely “to leave such an alternative open to Cuba instead of the Soviet Bloc as its only option.” Noting that Brazilian leaders had closely observed the “apparent internal crisis” with the “old line communist party group,” Bastian Pinto had asked Castro “whether and how Brazil might be useful, since [it represented the] only signiªcant channel left for Cuba to [the] West.” Castro responded warmly but warily. While expressing “cordial appreciation” for the conversation and acknowledging “increasing difªculties” between him and the old line Communists, Castro put off any immediate an- swer to the Brazilian offer to mediate a dialogue with Washington, though he promised Bastian Pinto to “present concrete suggestions soon.” However, Dantas surmised that Castro “would have difªculty in formulating precise suggestions, and he could not tell from [the] report whether and when some- thing would be forthcoming.” Echoing what he had told Rusk in Washing- ton, the Brazilian ofªcial stressed the “impossibility” of a return in Cuba to the “pre-revolutionary status quo” for which Miami-based anti-Castro émigrés were clamoring. What Dantas had in mind, instead, was the “barely possible evolution toward nationalist type of socialism cut off from Soviet bloc in which some ex-Fidelist refugees might be willing [to] participate.” The spring 1962 Brazilian initiative stalled there—perhaps because, as Dantas predicted, Castro never came back with concrete proposals. Neverthe- less, the hints of a potential split in Havana had not gone unnoticed in Wash- ington. In some quarters, the murmurings in Havana continued to generate support for an overture to Castro that would offer a plausible alternative to the Mongoose operations designed to overthrow him, an effort that was yield- ing few if any prospects for success. In late May 1962, Deputy Assistant Secre- tary for Inter-American Affairs Richard Goodwin, who had shifted from his White House duties to the State Department but remained an important ªgure in policy toward Latin America, secretly raised the idea of such an approach.34 From recent intelligence reports on the Cuban power struggle, Goodwin sensed “an opportunity for a tentative probe designed to test the

33. Embtel 2577 (Rio) to State (Top Secret/Eyes Only/No Distribution), 3 May 1962, in FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. X, p. 805. 34. Memorandum, Goodwin to Martin, “SUBJECT: Cuba” (Top Secret), 24 May 1962, in FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. X, pp. 821–822.

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possibility of splitting the Castro revolutionaries from the old line communists (those who did not participate in the early stages of the revolution).” In a memorandum to Martin, he attributed the “growing evidence of strains” within the Cuban power structure mainly to a “rivalry for power” rather than “ideological differences.” Goodwin speculated that Raul Castro, and perhaps Che Guevara (albeit “very much behind the scene”), had alerted Fidel Castro to the danger that old-line Communists tacitly backed by Moscow were trying to “moderate the power of Fidel and consequently of their group.” Goodwin noted that although it would be “foolish” to speculate that So- viet-Cuban ties had reached “the breaking point,” he had always believed that a rupture between the two countries would more likely emerge from a “split in the top leadership” than from a popular anti-Communist revolt. Havana’s “greatest obstacle” to leaving Moscow’s fold, he noted, remained its “complete dependence” on Soviet aid as well as the “undoubted feeling that were the So- viet Union to be antagonized Cuba would have no place to go for support.” Therefore, [Goodwin continued,] I would suggest an approach to Castro along the following lines: that whatever our past policies we are sympathetic to the original stated aims of the Cuban revolution—social reform and an end to dicta- torship—and we are conªdent that the questions of property which emerged from the revolution can be amicably negotiated; that the reason for our concern is and has been the Soviet control over Cuba which we have always believed is inimical to Castro’s own desires and to the aims of the revolution; that were Castro to disengage himself from the communists we would be willing to re- establish normal commercial relations with his revolutionary government and welcome [Cuba’s] participation in Inter-American efforts including the Alliance for Progress. Goodwin stressed that such an approach to Castro should be “moderate and face-saving.” In order to appeal to the Cuban leader, they would have to as- suage his fears that Washington would try to overthrow him or insist on the return of U.S. properties expropriated during the revolution. They would also have to offer a route to “disengage [from the Soviet bloc] with dignity and with minimum fear of the consequences”—perhaps including “some multi- nation guarantee offered to Castro.” “Once he has broken [with Moscow] we would, of course, reconsider this policy,” Goodwin added—although it is un- clear whether he (like Rusk to McCone a month before) was seriously suggest- ing that Washington double-cross Castro or just wanted to sound a hardline note while proposing a rather radical-sounding initiative. As for the “method of approach,” Goodwin favored preserving deniability (“the Cubans should not be able to prove a U.S. initiative”) and communicating with Castro indirectly either through “a European embassy”

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or the Cuban ambassador to the United Nations, Mario García Incháustegui, who was reportedly “loyal to Fidel and not to communism.” (The latter idea also appealed to Goodwin because of the U.S. “capacity to monitor commu- nications between New York and Havana.”) However, reºecting the skepti- cism with which Washington viewed “neutralist” initiatives, Goodwin re- jected the idea of a Latin American, particularly a Brazilian, mediator between Washington and Havana, given the danger of exposure. He warned of the “temptation to play internal politics with such a ‘mediation’ role” and the “no- toriously poor” Latin American “sincerity and concepts of security.” Despite Goodwin’s proposal, the idea of a private message from Washing- ton to Castro lay dormant during the summer and early autumn of 1962, as the Kennedy administration instead focused its attention on continuing its political and diplomatic efforts to isolate Havana (particularly within hemispheric organizations) and to tighten economic sanctions against the island. The administration also was continuing and expanding its covert operations (“Operation Mongoose”) and assassination plots in the hope of eventually toppling Castro. Beginning in the late summer, U.S. ofªcials were increasingly preoccupied and alarmed by the growing indications of a Soviet military buildup in Cuba, and they sought to counter Republican charges that Ken- nedy was being “soft” on Cuba in what was emerging as a central issue in the midterm congressional election campaign.35 All of this militated against any overture, no matter how discreet, to Cuba. Meanwhile, the Rusk-McCone disagreement over the feasibility of encouraging or exploiting Soviet-Cuban friction persisted. At a meeting on 10 August of the Special Group (Aug- mented), the secret high-level panel overseeing Mongoose, Rusk (while not mentioning the abortive Brazilian initiative a few months earlier) “emphasized the desirability of attempting to create a split between Castro and old-line Communists,” a development that, he said, would be “beneªcial to U.S. interests no matter which way the balance of power swung.” Once again, however, McCone poured cold water on the notion. The “previously-cited frictions between Castro and the old-line Communists have been resolved in Castro’s favor, and no issue currently exists,” McCone stated, observing the advent of “at least temporary rapprochement between Fidel and Moscow.” The meeting turned back to ideas for intensifying Mongoose, but in the end, the minutes record, in addition to stepping up “economic sabotage” McCone also was requested “to emphasize measures to foment a Castro–oldline Com-

35. On U.S. policy toward Cuba in the months leading up to the crisis, see James G. Hershberg, “Be- fore ‘The Missiles of October’: Did Kennedy Plan a Military Strike Against Cuba?” in James A. Na- than, ed., The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), pp. 237–280.

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munist split.”36 That was the way things stood on the eve of the Cuban missile crisis, an episode that will be examined in depth in Part 2 of this article.

36. Thomas A. Parrott, memorandum for the record, Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Aug- mented) on Operation MONGOOSE, 10 August 1962, Exhibit No. 1, attached to Robert S. McNamara deposition to Church Committee, 11 July 1975, in NA, RG 46, Records of U.S. Senate, Church Committee Records of JFK Assassination Collection, Box 45, folder “Robert McNamara 7/11/75.” It is not known what measures, if any, McCone and the CIA took to promote this aim prior to the missile crisis.

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