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The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (Part 1)

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The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (Part 1) TheHershberg United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (Part 1) ✣ What options did John F. Kennedy consider after his aides in- formed him on 16 October 1962 that the Soviet Union was secretly deploy- ing medium-range nuclear-capable missiles in Cuba? In most accounts, his options fell into three categories: 1. military: an attack against Cuba involving a large-scale air strike against the missile sites, a full-scale invasion, or the ªrst followed by the second; 2. political-military: a naval blockade of Cuba (euphemistically called a “quarantine”) to prevent the shipment of further “offensive” military equipment and allow time to pressure Soviet leader Nikita Khrush- chev into withdrawing the missiles; or 3. diplomatic: a private overture to Moscow to persuade Khrushchev to back down without a public confrontation. Kennedy ultimately chose the second option and announced it on 22 Octo- ber in his nationally televised address. That option and the ªrst (direct mili- tary action against Cuba) have been exhaustively analyzed over the years by Western scholars. Much less attention has been devoted to the third alterna- tive, the diplomatic route. This article shows, however, that a variant of that option—a variant that has never previously received any serious scholarly treatment—was actually adopted by Kennedy at the peak of the crisis. The United States pursued a separate diplomatic track leading not to Moscow but to Havana (via Rio de Janeiro), and not to Khrushchev but to Fidel Castro, in a secret effort to convince the Cuban leader to make a deal: If Castro agreed to end his alliance with Moscow, demand the removal of the Soviet missiles, and disavow any further support for revolutionary subversion in the Western hemisphere, he could expect “many changes” in Washington’s policy toward Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 6, No. 2, Spring 2004, pp. 3–20 © 2004 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 3 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/152039704773254740 by guest on 30 September 2021 Hershberg Cuba, including an explicit non-invasion pledge and, implicitly, American aid or at least an end to the U.S.-led diplomatic and economic embargo. Castro also would be assured of U.S. support if the Soviet Union and its hardline allies within the Cuban leadership tried to resist such a dramatic swerve in policy. The Kennedy administration chose, despite considerable misgivings, to employ the Brazilian government of President João Goulart as an intermedi- ary in this highly sensitive and tightly concealed effort to reach Castro at the height of the missile crisis. Kennedy at one point had regarded Goulart as a potential “New Frontiersman” and a valuable partner in the Alliance for Prog- ress (AFP), but U.S. ofªcials increasingly viewed the Brazilian president with irritation, exasperation, and even suspicion for what they saw as his ªnancial mismanagement, political demagoguery, ºirtations with neutralism (and the Sino-Soviet bloc) in foreign policy, and, most alarming, cooperation with and toleration of leftist elements. Some within the Kennedy administration even began to consider supporting a military coup in Brazil rather than risk seeing the country end up in Communist hands. The story of this secret U.S.-Brazilian-Cuban triangular diplomacy thus sheds light not only on a previously little-known aspect of the Cuban missile crisis and the hidden efforts at dialogue between Washington and Havana, but also on the troubled U.S.-Brazilian relationship—and by implication the broader issues of alliance management and the limits of maneuver within a superpower’s sphere of inºuence during the Cold War.1 Part 1 of this two-part article will set the context for an analysis of U.S.-Brazilian-Cuban contacts during the crisis, which will be explored in depth in Part 2, to be published in the next issue of the journal. Background The secret Brazilian mediation effort during the missile crisis, described in this article with the aid of newly available U.S., Brazilian, Russian, British, Cuban, and other sources, actually climaxed three years of ªtful Brazilian dip- lomatic efforts, spanning three Brazilian and two American presidencies, to play a direct role in efforts to limit the U.S.-Cuban confrontation. Although 1. On U.S.-Brazilian relations, see especially W. Michael Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups d’état: Brazil- ian-American Relations, 1945–1964 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993); and Ruth Leacock, Requiem for Revolution: The United States and Brazil, 1961–1969 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1990). On internal Brazilian politics, see Thomas E. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964: An Experiment in Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); and John W. F. Dulles, Unrest in Brazil: Political-Military Crises, 1955–1964 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970). 4 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/152039704773254740 by guest on 30 September 2021 The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 space constraints preclude a full-blown recounting, a brief review in Part 1 of the article will provide useful background for the discussion in Part 2 of the October 1962 initiative. The priorities and tactics of the individual Brazilian leaders varied, but they all had multiple reasons to attempt mediation between Washington and Havana. First, they saw Brazil as an important hemispheric power that was well positioned to assume a prominent role in settling major disputes between the “colossus of the north” and Latin American countries (a role not necessar- ily welcomed by some of Brazil’s neighbors). Second, because Brazilian ofªcials were less alarmed than U.S. leaders by the supposed menace of Fidelismo, they watched with increasing dismay as Washington, in their view, became obsessed with Cuba to the detriment of U.S. relations with the rest of Latin America. Third, at the height of the prestige of the newly formed non-aligned movement, Brazilian leaders ºirted with a more “independent,” quasi-neutralist foreign policy through which they could escape subservience and irrelevance within the U.S. sphere of inºuence and play a more balanced position between East and West, even while clearly leaning to one side. Fourth, in domestic political terms, Brazilian leaders had to deal with sub- stantial leftist and nationalist constituencies that were sympathetic to the Cu- ban revolution and resentful of the United States. Achieving a settlement that preserved Cuba’s sovereignty and internal political orientation from (North) American pressure, yet that also satisªed Washington, would thereby consti- tute a major achievement in both domestic and international political terms. Fifth, mediation suited Brazil’s consistent emphasis on respect for the princi- ples of self-determination and non-intervention with regard to Cuba and Cas- tro’s socioeconomic system. Brazilian leaders hoped to foster Cuba’s ultimate reintegration into the inter-American system, even while decrying Castro’s in- creasing “extra-continental” links to the Soviet bloc. The ªrst important Brazilian mediation efforts vis-à-vis Cuba occurred in 1960 during the last full year of the presidential administrations of both Juscelino Kubitschek in Brazil and Dwight D. Eisenhower in the United States. As U.S.-Cuban relations plummeted, Brazil’s ambassador in Havana, Vasco Tristão Leitão da Cunha, an early enthusiast for the Cuban revolution who was fast growing disillusioned, joined with his Argentine colleague, Julio Amoedo, to try to convince Castro to adopt a more moderate position toward the United States. They also were in contact with the U.S. ambassador, Philip Bonsal, in a bid to foster a civilized dialogue.2 Kubitschek, a strong leader who 2. Records on these mediation efforts can be found in the State Department Decimal Central Files (DCF) in Record Group (RG) 59, National Archives II (NA), College Park, MD; in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vol. V: American Republics (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Ofªce, 1991), hereinafter cited as FRUS, with appropriate year and 5 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/152039704773254740 by guest on 30 September 2021 Hershberg had spearheaded a drive for domestic political and economic modernization and greater international prominence for Brazil (including his “Operation Pan-America,” a proposal for Latin development foreshadowing Kennedy’s “Alliance for Progress”), also sent emissaries to Washington and other hemi- spheric capitals to try to blunt the sharpening U.S.-Cuban enmity. When Ei- senhower visited Brazil in February, he gave Kubitschek his general, if unen- thusiastic, approval of the idea of using Brazilian and Latin “mediation or good ofªces” (“anything the Latin American nations could do to bring Castro to a more amenable frame of mind would be helpful”3). Soon thereafter, U.S.-Cuban relations reached a new low when Castro accused Washington of responsibility for blowing up a French ship (the La Coubre) that was carrying arms to the Cuban government in early March, an explosion that killed sev- enty-ªve Cuban dock workers as well as French shipmen. Despite this set- back, the two Latin American envoys persisted in arranging all-night asados with Castro and his associates, as well as dinner parties and conversations with U.S. diplomats, to try to alleviate the conºict. In the summer, after a new cri- sis sparked by a U.S. cutoff of sugar purchases and by U.S. efforts to pressure American and British oil companies to refuse processing of Soviet fuel, Brazil joined Mexico and Canada in a high-level approach to Eisenhower to offer their “good ofªces.” This overture received a cordial brush-off in Washington, but the Brazilian, Mexican, and Canadian foreign ministers continued to pro- mote mediation during an Organization of American States (OAS) foreign ministers’ meeting in Costa Rica.
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