SECTION 2: Latin America The Final Frontier: Cuban Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis or most researchers probing the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Nikita Khrushchev) emissary Anastas Mikoyan near the end Cuban archives have been the final frontier—known to of his three-week November 1962 stay in Cuba; a summary exist, undoubtedly critical, yet largely and tantalizingly of Mikoyan’s subsequent conversation in Washington with US Fout of reach. For a little more than two decades, even as impor- President John F. Kennedy, conveyed to the Cubans at the UN tant archives remained shut (except to a few favored scholars), in New York by Moscow’s ambassador to the United States, Havana has occasionally and selectively released closed materials Anatoly F. Dobrynin; an internal report by communist party on the crisis, often in the context of international conferences. leader Blas Roca Calderio on his travels in Europe at the time This process began with Cuban participation in a series of “criti- of the crisis; and—perhaps most valuably for those seeking to cal oral history” conferences in 1989-92 with U.S. and Soviet understand Soviet-Cuban interactions after the crisis—a record (and then Russian) veterans of the events, which climaxed in a of the conversation in Moscow in December 1962 between January 1992 gathering in Havana at which Fidel Castro not Nikita Khrushchev and a visiting Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, only participated actively during all four days of discussions but evidently the first face-to-face meeting between the Soviet leader several times, with a figurative snap of the fingers, “declassified” and a senior Cuban communist figure since the Soviet leader’s important Cuban records.1 decision to withdraw the missiles, a step taken without advance Ten years later, in October 2002, to mark the 40th anniver- notice to or consultation with Havana that aroused consterna- sary of the crisis, Fidel Castro and the Cuban government again tion among the Cuban leadership and populace. (The last- hosted an international assembly of scholars and former officials, mentioned document is particularly valuable since the Soviet co-organized with the National Security Archive (a non-govern- version has yet to emerge from the Russian archives.) mental research institute and declassified documents repository While these documents are fascinating and important to based at George Washington University) and Brown University’s understanding Cuban conduct, they unfortunately remain excep- Watson Institute for International Studies.2 For the conference tional: Only a small percentage of the Cuban materials opened (“La Crisis de Octubre: Una vision politica 40 años despues”), in for the 2002 conference (or a predecessor in March 2001 to mark cooperation with the US co-sponsors, Cuba released hundreds of the 40th anniversary of the Bay of Pigs/Playa Giron events) dealt pages of additional documents pertaining to the events of the fall with top-level Cuban decision-making or exchanges with the of 1962, from a variety of sources—party, military, intelligence, Soviet Union. Moreover, Havana is not known to have made diplomatic, and more.3 any further significant releases of historical documents on the While many of these materials have been made available 1962 crisis in the past decade, and as a result, far more materials to specialists in the original Spanish through the National have been available on the Soviet (and Soviet bloc) perspective Security Archive’s website and Digital Archive, only a handful on the events—especially the Mikoyan mission, detailed in the have either been translated into English or published in any just-published book The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis, which form. What follows below is a selection of some of the most sig- includes essentially the complete record of those November 1962 nificant, high-level materials made available by Cuba for the Soviet-Cuban exchanges from the Soviet side.5 This new book, in 2002 conference, which are appearing in English and in print turn, builds on an already substantial record of Soviet materials for the first time. They include: a record of a meeting of Fidel previously (and now) made available, including scores of diplo- Castro and his military commanders on 24 October 1962—the matic cables from Moscow’s embassy in Havana published by the day the U.S. blockade (“quarantine”) of the island went into Cold War International History Project.6 effect—as they discuss preparations for a potential American Consequently, the Cuban side of the 1962 events—both the invasion; a chronology of Cuban contacts at the United Nations “October crisis” confrontation with the United States, and the apparently prepared by Havana’s ambassador, Carlos Lechuga ensuing Soviet-Cuban crisis over Khrushchev’s handling of the Hevia4, and a bit of cable traffic between Lechuga and Cuba’s missiles’ removal—remains largely inaccessible due to continued foreign minister, Raúl Roa, regarding a Brazilian “denuclear- restrictions on Cuban sources. Worse, from a Cuban perspective, ization” proposal to declare Latin America an atomic-free zone this means that the most important accounts continue to interpret (offering a wider cover for the removal of the Soviet missiles and reconstruct Havana’s actions (and Soviet-Cuban interac- from Cuba); a report to Fidel Castro from Cuban President tions) through the lens of other countries’ sources7—from CIA Osvaldo Dorticos regarding a conversation with Soviet (i.e., reports to Soviet cables (and Russian memoirs) to the documents 135 of many other nations, whether communist, neutral, or Western, less time than what was figured; and anti-landing divisions that are represented in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin. 2[unreadable] 2 hours.9 Judging from the documents printed below, further releases of I suggest that the operation plan be made taking the fol- Cuban material and openings of Cuban archives could add a lowing into account: first, the possibilities of the enemy in valuable fresh perspective on this event beyond the documents of each army zone; later, the movements of forces, and last, the the opposing nuclear superpowers, and help inform a more bal- mutual aid between forces. anced narrative of one of the twentieth century’s most significant episodes. -JH Capt. Raúl Curbelo (Aviation): According to the estimations made, we have fuel and fleet for making four daily missions for 20 days. Of the 200 trucks promised for the transport of anti- aircraft (missiles) only 85 have been delivered to us. We Record of Meeting of Fidel Castro and are missing personnel for the 11 batteries for which we are Military Chiefs, 24 October 1962 coordinating with our comrade Rebellón to begin a training course tomorrow, if it is authorized. Important aspects contained in the information offered by the Commander Fidel Castro: military chiefs, meeting on 24 October 1962, in the General Staff with Commander Fidel Castro. The reserve anti-aircraft batteries in Havana must be in such conditions that they can be moved when it is necessary. Captain Pedro Luis (Information): To lend mobility to the reserve batteries we need more trucks, and a further increase of 200 to the requested amount We believe that in case of aggression against us, the is needed. possibility of mobilization of United States forces would be between 5 and 6 divisions, and no more. They have 10 Commander Fidel Castro: divisions, but it is not possible to deploy them all against us. These facts are interesting for making our operation plan, Withdraw the trucks from batteries that are in San Antonio, because we think that they might in the first step use 2 or 3 Baracoa and Ciudad Libertad, because they are not needed divisions that would be moved in 120 or 130 ships, a consid- there; do not remove them from Loma del Burro or from erable amount of force that must be detected by us in time. Príncipe, because those can be moved; and do not take them The American base at Key West [Florida] has been rein- from the refineries either. forced, and has acquired a quite interesting importance. I would have the reserve batteries in three groups, for Our opinion, based on the concrete facts that we have, is example, to facilitate their removal in case it is necessary, since that there is no evidence of any immediate aggression against it is more difficult if they are widely dispersed. us – based on the information we have – but rather that they The 30mm anti-aircraft guns are very effective weapons will enact the blockade, and if a grave situation should arise against landings, and have an enormous value, as they serve to because of this, they have the possibility of moving between 4 fight on the coast, against infantry, airplanes, and everything; and 5 divisions and launching them against us, but could not they are the weapons that can demolish the highest number of do this in fewer than six days. However, using the airborne tactical aircraft. They should be concentrated in three points, division, they could move their first troops here in five or six at least 24 batteries in three points; not disorderly, but care- hours. But if they move the 82nd division, we would certainly fully placed, not in assigned places but so that they can be know, [excised] moved toward any other place. I would put at least 24 batteries outside Havana, but so Captain Flavio Bravo (Operations): that we could move them, transfer them to whatever place. I mean that the reserve guns should not be placed in a dispersed A particularly interesting fact: according to the average mobi- manner. lization, the permanent units were moved in 3 hours to their The Artillery requires many trucks; the situation with the zones of concentration; the reduced divisions, from 8 to 9 rocket launchers is fine but we must figure out those trucks.