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Venezuela and Cuba: the Ties That Bind

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Venezuela and Cuba: the Ties That Bind Latin American Program | January 2020 A portrait of the late Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez in between the Cuban and Venezuelan flags.Credit: Chávez Fusterlandia (On the left) A silhouetted profile of Fidel Castro in his military cap says “the best friend.” Dan Lundberg, March 18, 2016 / Shutterstock Venezuela and Cuba: The Ties that Bind I. Two Nations, One Revolution: The Evolution of Contemporary Cuba-Venezuela Relations By Brian Fonseca and John Polga-Hecimovich CONTENTS “Cuba es el mar de la felicidad. Hacia allá va Venezuela.” I. Two Nations, One (“Cuba is a sea of happiness. That’s where Venezuela is going.”) Revolution: The Evolution —Hugo Chávez Frías, March 8, 2000 of Contemporary Cuba- Venezuela Relations Contemporary Cuban-Venezuelan relations blossomed in the late 1990s, due in large part By Brian Fonseca and John Polga-Hecimovich to the close mentor-pupil relationship between then-presidents Fidel Castro Ruz and Hugo Chávez Frías. Their affinity grew into an ideological and then strategic partnership. Today, these ties that bind are more relevant than ever, as Cuban security officials exercise influ- II. The Geopolitics of Cuba–Venezuela-U.S. ence in Venezuela and help maintain the Nicolás Maduro government in power. Details of the Relations: relationship, however, remain shrouded in secrecy, complicating any assessment of Cuba’s An Informal Note role in Venezuela. The Venezuelan and Cuban governments have not been transparent about By Richard E. Feinberg the size and scope of any contingent of Cuban military and security professionals operating in Venezuela. In fact, Havana claims that there are no Cuban security personnel in Venezuela, but merely medical staff supporting humanitarian missions.1 At the same time, the United 1 Sergio Alejandro Gómez and Ismael Francisco, “Cuba no puede retirar sus tropas de Venezuela, porque no existen, asegura el Minrex,” Cuba Debate, May 1, 2019, http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2019/05/01/cuba-no-puede-retirar-sus-tropas-de-venezuela-porque-no- existen-asegura-el-minrex/#.XUF5C3dFyUl; Yuniel Labacena Romero, “Emociones con los «militares» cubanos que están en Venezuela,” Juventud Rebelde, May 23, 2019, http://www.juventudrebelde.cu/internacionales/2019-05-23/emociones-con-los-militares-cubanos- que-estan-venezuela. CUBA-VENEZUELA RELATIONS 1 States and others have at times exaggerated the number of Cuban security forces in Vene- zuela for political purposes.2 Despite the lack of transparency and exaggerations regarding Cuban security professionals operating in Venezuela, it is evident that Cuban security training and technical assistance has aided the Venezuelan government to establish a firewall against internal and external threats. At the outset of this partnership, Castro provided mentorship to Chávez in the areas of health, politics, and security and intelligence. In return, Chávez helped underwrite Cuba at a time of economic hardship and diminishing relevance in the international system follow- ing the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although the texture of Cuban-Venezuelan relations remains consistent with the areas of cooperation borne of the Chávez-Castro relationship, the intensity and depth of engagement slowly faded under presidents Raúl Castro and Miguel Díaz-Canel in Cuba and Maduro in Venezuela—with the notable exception of Cu- ban security and intelligence support to the Venezuelan leadership. Although it is difficult to assess the number of Cubans assisting the Venezuelan government and their precise roles, it is clear that Havana has a compelling economic and political interest in the Maduro government’s survival. This essay will explore three periods of Cuban-Venezuelan relations during the past 20 years. The first period comprised a series of bilateral agreements, including the Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement (Convenio Integral de Cooperación), and spanned Chávez’s arrival to power in 1999 and lasted until 2004. The second period involved an increase in the exchange of goods and the institutionalization and regionalization of relations. It began with rising oil prices and the creation of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (Alianza Bo- livariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América, ALBA) in 2004 and lasted until Chávez’s death in 2013. The third stage spans the Maduro presidency from 2013 to the present. This period coincides with a fall in oil prices, Venezuela’s economic and political crisis, and a stronger role for Cuban political, military and intelligence advisers in Venezuela. Two Nations, One Revolution (1999-2004) Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez first met in 1994 following Chávez’s release from prison after his failed 1992 coup attempt against President Carlos Andrés Pérez. In his visit to Cuba, Chávez gave an impassioned speech at the University of Havana in which he praised the country as a “stronghold of Latin American dignity” that must be emulated.3 However, the relationship did not begin to take form until Chávez’s election to the Venezuelan presidency 2 This includes the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States and anti-Castro civil society organizations, which have exaggerated claims about the size of Cuban military and security forces in Venezuela. 3 Marco Aponte-Moreno and Lance Lattig, “Chávez: Rhetoric Made in Havana,” World Policy, 2012, https://worldpolicy. org/2012/03/26/chavez-rhetoric-made-in-havana/. 2 CUBA-VENEZUELA RELATIONS in 1998. Castro attended Chávez’s inauguration in 1999 and later that year, the two govern- ments began to establish vital economic, political, and security ties. The two leaders also visited each other frequently between 1999 and Chávez’s death in 2013; Chávez was especially fond of making un- scheduled stopovers in Havana, and Castro celebrated his For Castro, Chávez appeared as 75th birthday in Venezuela. one of the last champions of the Cuban-inspired revolutionary Castro long sought revolution in Venezuela as well as pref- erential access to Venezuelan oil.4 Castro’s first trip after social and political movements coming to power in 1959 was to Venezuela, where he so- that had swept Latin America licited $300 million in oil from then newly elected President and the Caribbean during the Rómulo Betancourt.5 Betancourt declined and tensions be- Cold War. Chávez identified as tween Havana and Caracas grew.6 In late 1961, Betancourt a socialist and often employed a broke relations with Cuba altogether following a new doc- trine of severing ties with governments that had come to highly charged “anti-imperialist” power via non-electoral means; in 1962 Venezuela voted rhetoric. He viewed himself as a to expel Cuba from the Organization of American States revolutionary in keeping with the (OAS). For its part, Cuba provided more than $1 million in fi- precedents set by Simón Bolívar nancial support, including arms and military equipment, to and Fidel Castro… Venezuelan insurgent movements such as the Armed Forc- es of National Liberation (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional) between 1961 and 1964.7 Tensions came to a head in 1967, when the Venezuelan Army and National Guard were forced to repel an attack by a small contingent of Cuban and Venezuelan guerillas on the beach of Machurucuto.8 Carlos Andrés Pérez reestablished diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1974 at the beginning of his first term in office.9 4 “‘Venecuba,’ a single nation,” The Economist, February 11, 2010, https://www.economist.com/the-Wamericas/2010/02/11/venecuba- a-single-nation. 5 Stephen G. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (Uni- versity of North Carolina Press, 1999), 100-108; Patrick Oppmann, “The History That Chains Cuba to Venezuela’s Crisis,” CNN World, February 2, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/02/americas/venezuela-cuba-history-oil/index.html; 6 “Betancourt Say He Denied Castro a $300 Million Loan,” New York Times, July 20, 1964, https://www.nytimes.com/1964/07/20/ archives/betancourt-says-he-denied-castro-a-300-million-loan.html. 7 Central Intelligence Agency, “Foreign Intervention by Cuba,” https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP- 77M00144R000400100003-7.pdf; Kevin Ginter, “Truth and Mirage: The Cuba-Venezuela Security and Intelligence Alliance,” Interna- tional Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 2013, https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2013.758003. 8 Kevin Ginter, “Truth and Mirage: The Cuba-Venezuela Security and Intelligence Alliance,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 2013, https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2013.758003; Jim Wyss, “From Failed Invasion to Red Carpet, Castro’s Ideals Still Pushed by Venezuelan Government,” Miami Herald, December 1, 2016, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation- world/world/americas/venezuela/article117749768.html. 9 lsa Cardozo da Silva and Richard S. Hillman, “Venezuela: Petroleum, Democratization and International Affairs,” in Latin American and Caribbean Foreign Policy, eds., Frank O. Mora and Jeanne K. Hey (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), Pgs. 158-60. Harold Trinkunas, “What is Really New about Venezuela’s Bolivarian Foreign Policy?,” Strategic Insights, Volume V, Issue 2 (February 2006). CUBA-VENEZUELA RELATIONS 3 Chávez and Fidel Castro in Sandino, Cuba, inaugurating the new Simón Bolívar community. Photo: ©Cubadebate Chávez’s rise came nearly 30 years after the Machurucuto event. For Castro, Chávez ap- peared as one of the last champions of the Cuban-inspired revolutionary social and political movements
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