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Thirteen Days Is the Story of Mankind's Closest Brush with Nuclear Armageddon

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Thirteen Days Is the Story of Mankind's Closest Brush with Nuclear Armageddon Helpful Background: Thirteen Days is the story of mankind's closest brush with nuclear Armageddon. Many events are portrayed exactly as they occurred. The movie captures the tension that the crisis provoked and provides an example of how foreign policy was made in the last half of the 20th century. Supplemented with the information provided in this Learning Guide, the film shows how wise leadership during the crisis saved the world from nuclear war, while mistakes and errors in judgment led to the crisis. The film is an excellent platform for debates about the Cuban Missile Crisis, nuclear weapons policy during the Cold War, and current foreign policy issues. With the corrections outlined in this Learning Guide, the movie can serve as a motivator and supplement for a unit on the Cold War. WERE WE REALLY THAT CLOSE TO NUCLEAR WAR? Yes. We were very, very, close. As terrified as the world was in October 1962, not even the policy-makers had realized how close to disaster the situation really was. Kennedy thought that the likelihood of nuclear war was 1 in 3, but the administration did not know many things. For example, it believed that the missiles were not operational and that only 2-3,000 Soviet personnel were in place. Accordingly, the air strike was planned for the 30th, before any nuclear warheads could be installed. In 1991-92, Soviet officials revealed that 42 [missiles] had been in place and fully operational. These could obliterate US cities up to the Canadian border. These sites were guarded by 40,000 Soviet combat troops. Further, 9 SRBMs [Short Range Ballistic Missiles] were ready to be used against the Americans in case of an invasion. The Soviets had tactical nuclear weapons that the local commanders were authorized to use to repel an attack. After he learned of this in 1992, a shaken [Robert] McNamara [Kennedy's Secretary of Defense] told reporters, "This is horrifying. It meant that had a US invasion been carried out... there was a 99 percent probability that nuclear war would have been initiated." National Security Strategy: The Cuban/Caribbean Missile Crisis, October 1962 by Professor Branislav L. Slantchev, Department of Political Science, University of California -- San Diego February 23, 2004, pages 7 & 8. See also McNamara's interview in "The Fog of War" HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS Although the crisis began and ended in October of 1962, the story began much earlier. Almost immediately after World War II, relations between the Soviet Union and the U.S. deteriorated, ending the cooperation which enabled the Allies to defeat Nazi Germany. The Russians did not withdraw their forces from Eastern Europe. Russian occupying forces overstayed their tour of duty in the Middle East. The Russians supported Communist revolutionaries in Greece. Britain and America thwarted the expansion of the Azerbaijani Soviet Republic into Iran and began the policy of containment attempting to restrict Soviet expansion. As the Cold War took hold, Americans became alarmed at the spread of Communist regimes in East Europe and East Asia. The Soviets were worried about postwar unity among the U.S. and powerful West European nations. Both the Communist bloc and the capitalist democracies lurched from crisis to crisis. These ranged from the Soviet blockade of Berlin, the Korean War, American spy planes crossing Russian airspace, Chinese shelling of Taiwanese islands Quemoy and Matsu, and the confrontation between Soviet ally Egypt and Western allies Israel, France and Britain over the Suez Canal. Both sides developed highly destructive nuclear weapons. At the time of the crisis, Russia had almost 40 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and numerous Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs). The IRBMs could not reach the U.S. (other than Alaska) but they could reach Western Europe. With these missiles and its bomber fleet, the Soviet Union could hit the U.S. and its allies in Europe with approximately 250 nuclear weapons, enough to take out all of the major cities. Well over a hundred million people would have been killed in the U.S. and the NATO countries. The U.S., for its part, had approximately 170 ICBMs and taking all delivery devices into consideration, including long range bombers, IRBMs and submarine based missiles, the U.S. could deliver some 3,000 nuclear bombs into Russia. While there were defenses to the long range bombers, there were no defenses to ICBMs or IRBMs. (There are still no defenses to these weapons.) In 1962 while the U.S. government knew that its nuclear forces were much stronger than those of the Soviet Union, it realized that losing its major cities with casualties approaching 100,000,000 people was not acceptable. In addition, through treaty obligations and as a practical matter, no U.S. government could permit Europe to be destroyed. However, the Soviets acutely felt the inferiority of their nuclear deterrent. The effort to place missiles in Cuba was an effort by the Russians to improve their nuclear capability quickly and inexpensively. Missile transporters and missile-ready tents where fueling and maintenance took place. The U.S., under the Kennedy Administration, increased military expenditures and increased its lead in nuclear weapons over the Russians, while, at the same time, refusing to disavow a nuclear first strike. In addition, despite the Bay of Pigs debacle, the U.S. continued its efforts to destabilize Cuba and to assassinate its dictator, Fidel Castro. The Soviet leadership didn't realize how much the U.S. feared Russia's nuclear deterrent. In an attempt to redress the imbalance in nuclear missiles and ensure that the U.S. would not mount another Cuban invasion, Nikita Khrushchev, dictator of the Soviet Union, began a program to secretly place intermediate range nuclear missiles in Cuba. These missiles would be able to reach almost all of the continental U.S. The CIA learned of suspicious activity from intelligence sources on the island and the U.S. sent U-2 spy planes to investigate. When a U-2 came back with photographs of missile sites under construction, President Kennedy convened his advisors before announcing the discovery to the world. While some recommended diplomacy, others pressed for military options, such as air strikes or invasion of Cuba. President Kennedy adopted a middle approach in which the U.S. Navy quarantined the island of Cuba, preventing any additional missiles or offensive weapons from reaching the island. In the meantime, the U.S. mounted a diplomatic offensive attempting to use world opinion to pressure the Soviets to remove the missiles. Soviet ships tested the blockade, but ultimately chose not to challenge the quarantine. The U.S. for its part allowed ships with food and fuel through the quarantine. Acting without Moscow's approval, a Soviet surface-to-air missile (SAM) battery shot down a U-2 spy plane over Cuba, killing the pilot. In secret negotiations, Khrushchev agreed to dismantle the missiles in Cuba. President Kennedy pledged not invade Cuba. In a confidential side agreement, the U.S. promised future removal of 15 obsolete Jupiter missiles from Turkey. President Kennedy had ordered these missiles removed months before but, because of objections from the Turks and bureaucratic inertia, the missiles remained in place. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, the superpowers moved to reduce the risk of a nuclear confrontation. Difficulties in Communications encountered during the crisis led to the installation of direct telephone Communications between the leaders to avoid any future misunderstandings. In subsequent years, the countries negotiated a nuclear test ban treaty. Future presidents and Soviet leaders conducted Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in the 1960s and 1970s to limit the number of nuclear warheads poised to strike the other side. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1969 attempted to limit the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary of the Communist Party Mikhail Gorbachev negotiated the INF Treaty in the late 1980s, which began the elimination of intermediate range nuclear missiles. Other American presidents and Russian leaders have worked to reduce nuclear weapons through a pair of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I & II). Never again would America and Russia come to the same level of threat that characterized those thirteen days in October of 1962. The following additional background will be helpful in understanding the concerns of the participants and their statements, as set out in the film. Munich and Appeasement: In the 1930s a resurgent Nazi Germany violated the restrictions on its military set out in the Versailles treaty that ended WW I. Looking to expand, Germany demanded that Czechoslovakia cede to it a part of Czech territory called the Sudentenland in which approximately 3 million ethnic Germans (23% of the population) lived. Hitler claimed that they were oppressed by the Czech majority. At a conference in Munich held to consider Hitler's demands, the leaders of the Western powers (France and Great Britain) agreed to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia to appease Hitler. Hitler promised that if Germany absorbed the Sudentenland, it would seek no additional territory. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain returned home saying that he brought "peace in our time." He was wrong. The Munich conference convinced Hitler that France and Britain were weak, leading directly to the German invasion of Poland. Hitler thought France and England would do nothing. Realizing their mistake with Czechoslovakia, Britain and France declared war on Germany. World War II had begun. "Munich" was thereafter cited as the classic historical example of encouraging an aggressor by giving in to its demands. "Munich" also had a personal meaning for the Kennedy brothers. Their father, Joseph P. Kennedy, had been one of the few millionaires to back Franklin Roosevelt in the 1932 election.
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