DOCSLIB.ORG

One World, Two Classrooms, Thirteen Days: Film As an Active Teaching and Learning Tool in Cross-National Perspective

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
One World, Two Classrooms, Thirteen Days: Film As an Active Teaching and Learning Tool in Cross-National Perspective 1 ONE WORLD, TWO CLASSROOMS, THIRTEEN DAYS: FILM AS AN ACTIVE TEACHING AND LEARNING TOOL IN CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE Cristina Yumie Aoki Inoue Instituto de Relações Internacionais Campus Universitário Darcy Ribeiro Universidade de Brasilia – Asa Norte Caixa Postal 04306 – CEP 70919 – Brasilia, DF (Brazil) Email: [email protected] Phone: 55 61 3107 3644 or 31073637 and Matthew Krain Department of Political Science The College of Wooster Wooster, OH 44691, USA Email: [email protected] Phone: 1 330 263 2469 ABSTRACT This study assesses the pedagogical value of film as case material, and whether that value is affected by the different national and institutional contexts of the students engaging that text. We test whether students in two different Theories of International Relations classrooms – one in Brazil and one in the United States – demonstrated a statistically significant, different level of increased knowledge, understanding, or ability to apply theoretical frameworks to real world cases. Students in each class cover the same theoretical approaches using the same focused readings on theories of foreign policy decision-making, and then view the same film – Thirteen Days – to which they apply these theoretical frameworks. Using a quasi-experimental design, we use pre- and post-test surveys or “quizzes” to directly measure students’ knowledge about the case, and ability to apply IR theories to it. We also measure film’s utility indirectly by asking questions about students’ perceptions of their own understanding of the cases, and their perceptions of the utility of film as a tool in the IR classroom on those surveys. The film selected is a U.S. film about a U.S. case, making the comparative effect of the film on Brazilian and U.S.-based students particularly interesting. AUTHORS’ NOTES: The authors would like to thank the ISA for its Catalytic Workshop Grant to fund the 2012 ISA Workshop “Think Globally, Teach Locally? Active Teaching and Learning in Cross-National Perspective,” at which this project was first devised. We would also like to thank Stephanie T. Sugars for her research assistance on this project. This research was performed under College of Wooster Human Subjects Research Committee Approval HSRC 03-1213. Replication data for this article can be found at http://discover.wooster.edu/mkrain/research Forthcoming: Journal of Political Science Education 2 Active teaching and learning (ATL) approaches have been applied regularly in international studies classrooms in the United States since the 1990s. In Lantis, Kille, and Krain’s (2010) survey of the literature on ATL in international relations (IR) that draws on work primarily done in the United States, the authors identify a wide range of benefits, including: enriching student understanding of key concepts in international affairs; creating powerful and effective learning environments by encouraging students to take risks and to express their views on complex and controversial issues; and increasing the retention of knowledge. In other countries, such approaches have evolved more recently as IR has emerged as a distinct field of inquiry and study. For instance, in Brazil a more comprehensive reflection on active teaching and learning was initiated with a workshop for Brazilian instructors and advanced students, hosted at the University of Brasilia’s Instituto de Relações Internacionais in October 2006. The workshop gave a broad overview about many active teaching and learning techniques, and provided a forum for critical reflection on instructional approaches in international studies and work as teachers and educators (Kille, Krain and Lantis 2008). It has also led to a wider and more systematic usage of these techniques in Brazilian classrooms (Inoue 2012). However, there are no published studies yet about either the extent of the evolution of active learning in Brazil, or whether the students have benefited from a more student-centered approach. Attempts to compare the effects of active teaching and learning cross-nationally are also scarce. A recent one was the Think Globally, Teach Locally? Active Teaching and Learning in Cross-National Perspective ISA Catalytic Workshop 2012. During the workshop there was a very lively and rich discussion on active teaching and learning within several national and institutional contexts, the benefits of active teaching and learning, and challenges faced by each instructor. Also, the need for in-depth comparative analysis was identified in order to assess whether the same active teaching and learning approaches have similar effects cross-nationally. This paper is a response to these identified 3 needs. It aims at comparing active teaching and learning in two different national contexts: the United States and Brazil. We chose to compare the use of film in IR theory classes in both countries. The film that we chose addresses an oft-used case in the study of IR more generally, and IR theories more specifically – the Cuban Missile Crisis. It has been fifty years since the Cuban Missile Crisis, and yet for scholars of IR the case remains indispensible (Cyr 2013). Key theoretical arguments about conflict, disputes, deterrence, great power rivalry, and of course foreign policy decision-making have been developed or tested using the events of those dramatic thirteen days in October 1962. And the case remains a staple pedagogical tool in the IR classroom. The drama of the case, its high profile actors, and the level of detail available about the case make it particularly useful for demonstrating how to apply different theoretical lenses to real world cases, and how to use those cases to test different theories’ hypothetical expectations. Indeed, if anything the popularity of the case as a pedagogical tool has only risen over time, most notably after the release of a popular film about the case – Thirteen Days – that lays out the events of the crisis (from the United States’ perspective) in tense, dramatic fashion. Recent research has demonstrated the utility of case studies in general, and film in particular, in the IR classroom. What we want to know is whether an American film focused on U.S. decisionmaking during a U.S.- Soviet crisis has different pedagogical effects in both U.S. and non-U.S. classrooms. In short, we ask whether the pedagogical value of the film as text is affected by the different national and institutional contexts of the students engaging that text. To address this question, we test whether students in two different Theories of IR classrooms – in Brazil and the United States – demonstrated a statistically significant, different level of increased knowledge, understanding, or ability to apply theoretical frameworks to real world cases. Students in each class covered the same theoretical approaches using the same focused readings on theories of foreign policy decision-making, and then viewed the same film, to which 4 they applied these theoretical frameworks. Using a quasi-experimental design, we used pre- and post-test surveys or “quizzes” to directly measure students’ knowledge about the case, and ability to apply IR theories to it. We also assess film’s utility indirectly by asking questions about students’ perceptions of their own understanding of the cases, and their perceptions of the utility of film as a tool in the IR classroom on those surveys. After seeing the film and answering the post-test, we facilitated discussions in each class in order to obtain a more in depth assessment of students’ views and understandings. The discussions also served for clarifications on theoretical concepts, and reflections on the applications of theories to real world case and on the use of film as a pedagogical tool FILMS AS ACTIVE TEACHING AND LEARNING TOOLS Active Teaching and Learning The approach employed in this study, active teaching and learning, is a student-centered approach designed to produce learning, develop critical thinking skills, and elicit discovery and the construction of knowledge. This process of discovery situates students as critical thinkers in a collaborative and experiential learning environment. It also tasks them with being both consumers and generators of knowledge (Dewey 1938; Barr and Tagg 1995). While the evidence is mixed as to whether active teaching and learning leads to greater short- term knowledge acquisition than more traditional approaches (Albanese and Mitchell 1993; Lieux 1996; Powner and Allendorfer 2008), this kind of collaborative learning involving real-world applications has been shown to promote a deeper understanding of key concepts, arguments, or cases (Dewey 1938; Kolb 1984; Krain and Lantis 2006; Lantis 2012). When students actively engage with the material they are more likely to learn, understand, and retain that knowledge (Schachter, 1996; 5 Jensen 1998; Brown and King 2000; Kuzma and Haney 2001; Krain and Nurse 2004). Research in cognitive psychology and education has found that material learned experientially and through a combination of approaches (visual and verbal; heard, expressed and acted upon) tap into multiple senses and emotions and create “memorable events.” These have been found to yield greater knowledge retention across a range of students with different learning styles (Paivio 1975; Schacter 1996; Jensen, 1998; Prince 2004). Studies also consistently show that active learning approaches enhance student critical thinking and problem-solving skills, and the ability to transfer their knowledge to new, complex and uncertain, situations (Bonwell and Eison 1991; Lieux 1996). And active learning has been shown to help students develop a sense of personal efficacy and the willingness to take risks in expressing and acting on their ideas (Krain and Nurse 2004). For a more extensive discussion of the wide-ranging pedagogical effects of active teaching and learning in the IR classroom, see Lantis, Kille and Krain (2010). Case Learning and the Use of Film One of the most frequently employed approaches in IR classrooms is what is sometimes referred to as the case learning approach (Angelo and Boehrer 2002; Krain 2010). This approach allows students to engage abstract concepts while exploring specific real-life cases.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Oral History Interview – 2/10/2003 Administrative Information
    Sid Davis Oral History Interview – 2/10/2003 Administrative Information Creator: Sid Davis Interviewer: Vicki Daitch Date of Interview: February 10, 2003 Place of Interview: Washington D.C. Length: 76 pages Biographical Note Davis was a journalist, a White House correspondent (1959-1968) and Washington News Bureau chief (1968-1977) for the Westinghouse Broadcasting; director (1977-1979), bureau chief (1979-1980), and vice president and bureau chief (1980-1982) for NBC News; and a senior Washington correspondent (1982-1987) and director of office programs for the Voice of America (1987-1994). In this interview, he discusses the 1960 presidential campaign, John F. Kennedy’s assassination and Lyndon B. Johnson’s swearing in, and the press coverage of the White House, among other issues. Access Open. Usage Restrictions According to the deed of gift signed on April 5, 2004, copyright of these materials has been assigned to the United States Government. Users of these materials are advised to determine the copyright status of any document from which they wish to publish. Copyright The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be “used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research.” If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excesses of “fair use,” that user may be liable for copyright infringement.
    [Show full text]
  • Hofstra University Model United Nations Conference
    Hofstra University Model United Nations Conference EXCOMM October, 1962 Crisis Committee Timothy Lachapelle Chairperson 1 Letter from the Chair Dear Delegates, Welcome to Hofstra Model United Nations, and the West Wing Crisis Committee. My name is Tim Lachapelle. I worked on the staff of the first HMUNC Crisis Committee, which re-created the West Wing in the post 9/11 Era. After two days of fast paced debate, and constant threat of nuclear Armageddon, the Hofstra Model UN club quickly discovered that the HMUNC delegates were up to any challenge that we throw at them. This year we are presenting another historical crisis scenario. In this committee you will all be acting as members of the Oval Office during the JFK era. The leaders of the nation are faced with many challenges during his presidency and this committee will be responsible for managing two potential crises: the first is the threat of Soviet missiles off the coast of Florida; the second is the constant threat of an attempt on the President’s life. Although this committee will rely on historical fact to solve these crises, the events will not play out exactly as they did in the history books. Some events or people involved may change depending on how the committee resolves each issue. I am currently a sophomore at Hofstra University, studying Political Science. I have been doing Model United Nations for one year. My first Model UN conference was at the University of Pennsylvania and I represented Iran in the World Health Organization. I discovered a passion for crisis committees when I worked on the staff of the crisis committee during the first Model UN conference ever hosted by Hofstra University.
    [Show full text]
  • The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (Part 1)
    TheHershberg United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (Part 1) ✣ What options did John F. Kennedy consider after his aides in- formed him on 16 October 1962 that the Soviet Union was secretly deploy- ing medium-range nuclear-capable missiles in Cuba? In most accounts, his options fell into three categories: 1. military: an attack against Cuba involving a large-scale air strike against the missile sites, a full-scale invasion, or the ªrst followed by the second; 2. political-military: a naval blockade of Cuba (euphemistically called a “quarantine”) to prevent the shipment of further “offensive” military equipment and allow time to pressure Soviet leader Nikita Khrush- chev into withdrawing the missiles; or 3. diplomatic: a private overture to Moscow to persuade Khrushchev to back down without a public confrontation. Kennedy ultimately chose the second option and announced it on 22 Octo- ber in his nationally televised address. That option and the ªrst (direct mili- tary action against Cuba) have been exhaustively analyzed over the years by Western scholars. Much less attention has been devoted to the third alterna- tive, the diplomatic route. This article shows, however, that a variant of that option—a variant that has never previously received any serious scholarly treatment—was actually adopted by Kennedy at the peak of the crisis. The United States pursued a separate diplomatic track leading not to Moscow but to Havana (via Rio de Janeiro), and not to Khrushchev but to Fidel Castro, in a secret effort to convince the Cuban leader to make a deal: If Castro agreed to end his alliance with Moscow, demand the removal of the Soviet missiles, and disavow any further support for revolutionary subversion in the Western hemisphere, he could expect “many changes” in Washington’s policy toward Journal of Cold War Studies Vol.
    [Show full text]
  • Cuban Missile Crisis: Applying Strategic Culture to Gametheory
    Utah State University DigitalCommons@USU All Graduate Plan B and other Reports Graduate Studies 5-2013 Cuban Missile Crisis: Applying Strategic Culture to Gametheory Chelsea E. Carattini Utah State University Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/gradreports Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Carattini, Chelsea E., "Cuban Missile Crisis: Applying Strategic Culture to Gametheory" (2013). All Graduate Plan B and other Reports. 236. https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/gradreports/236 This Report is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies at DigitalCommons@USU. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Graduate Plan B and other Reports by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@USU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Introduction Game theory applied to political situations offers a unique approach to analyzing and understanding international relations. Yet the rigid structure that lends itself so well to mathematics is not practical in the real world . It lacks a built in mechanism for determining a player's preferences, which is a key part of an international "game" or situation. Strategic culture, another international relations theory, is quite the opposite. Critics claim it suffers from a lack of structure, but it captures the spirit of international actors and what makes them tick. This paper explores the idea of pairing the two otherwise unrelated theories to bolster both in the areas where they are lacking in order to provide a more complete understanding of international states' behavior and motivations. Brief Summary of Major Theories The theories presented in the following pages are drawn from distinct schools of thought; consequently it is necessary to provide some background information.
    [Show full text]
  • Timeline of the Cold War
    Timeline of the Cold War 1945 Defeat of Germany and Japan February 4-11: Yalta Conference meeting of FDR, Churchill, Stalin - the 'Big Three' Soviet Union has control of Eastern Europe. The Cold War Begins May 8: VE Day - Victory in Europe. Germany surrenders to the Red Army in Berlin July: Potsdam Conference - Germany was officially partitioned into four zones of occupation. August 6: The United States drops atomic bomb on Hiroshima (20 kiloton bomb 'Little Boy' kills 80,000) August 8: Russia declares war on Japan August 9: The United States drops atomic bomb on Nagasaki (22 kiloton 'Fat Man' kills 70,000) August 14 : Japanese surrender End of World War II August 15: Emperor surrender broadcast - VJ Day 1946 February 9: Stalin hostile speech - communism & capitalism were incompatible March 5 : "Sinews of Peace" Iron Curtain Speech by Winston Churchill - "an "iron curtain" has descended on Europe" March 10: Truman demands Russia leave Iran July 1: Operation Crossroads with Test Able was the first public demonstration of America's atomic arsenal July 25: America's Test Baker - underwater explosion 1947 Containment March 12 : Truman Doctrine - Truman declares active role in Greek Civil War June : Marshall Plan is announced setting a precedent for helping countries combat poverty, disease and malnutrition September 2: Rio Pact - U.S. meet 19 Latin American countries and created a security zone around the hemisphere 1948 Containment February 25 : Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia March 2: Truman's Loyalty Program created to catch Cold War
    [Show full text]
  • The Ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense : Robert S. Mcnamara
    The Ascendancy of the Secretary ofJULY Defense 2013 The Ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara 1961-1963 Special Study 4 Historical Office Office of the Secretary of Defense Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 4 The Ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense The Ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara 1961-1963 Cover Photo: Secretary Robert S. McNamara, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, and President John F. Kennedy at the White House, January 1963 Source: Robert Knudson/John F. Kennedy Library, used with permission. Cover Design: OSD Graphics, Pentagon. Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 4 The Ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense The Ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara 1961-1963 Special Study 4 Series Editors Erin R. Mahan, Ph.D. Chief Historian, Office of the Secretary of Defense Jeffrey A. Larsen, Ph.D. President, Larsen Consulting Group Historical Office Office of the Secretary of Defense July 2013 ii iii Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 4 The Ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense Contents This study was reviewed for declassification by the appropriate U.S. Government departments and agencies and cleared for release. The study is an official publication of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Foreword..........................................vii but inasmuch as the text has not been considered by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, it must be construed as descriptive only and does Executive Summary...................................ix not constitute the official position of OSD on any subject. Restructuring the National Security Council ................2 Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a standard source credit line in included.
    [Show full text]
  • The Cuban Missile Crisis: How to Respond?
    The Cuban Missile Crisis: How to Respond? Topic: Cuban Missile Crisis Grade Level: Grades 9 – 12 Subject Area: US and World History after World War II; US Government Time Required: 1-2 hours Goals/Rationale: During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy's advisors discussed many options regarding how they might respond to the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba. In this lesson, students examine primary source documents and recordings to consider some of the options discussed by Kennedy's advisors during this crisis and the rationale for why the president might have selected the path he chose. Essential Question: Does an individual's role in government influence his or her view on how to respond to important issues? Objectives Students will: discuss some of the options considered by Kennedy’s advisors during the Cuban Missile Crisis; identify the governmental role of participants involved in decision making and consider whether or not their role influenced their choice of option(s); consider the ramifications of each option; discuss the additional information that might have been helpful as of October 18, 1962 for Kennedy and his staff to know in order to make the most effective decision. analyze why President Kennedy made the decision to place a naval blockade around Cuba. Connections to Curriculum (Standards) National History Standards US History, Era 9 Standard 2: How the Cold War and conflicts in Korea and Vietnam influenced domestic and international politics. Standard 2A: The student understands the international origins and domestic consequences of the Cold War. Massachusetts History and Social Studies Curriculum Frameworks USII.T5 (1) Using primary sources such as campaign literature and debates, news articles/analyses, editorials, and television coverage, analyze the important policies and events that took place during the presidencies of John F.
    [Show full text]
  • Konrad Adenauer and the Cuban Missile Crisis: West German Documents
    SECTION 5: Non-Communist Europe and Israel Konrad Adenauer and the Cuban Missile Crisis: West German Documents access agency, the exchange of mutual non-aggression declara- d. Note: Much like the other NATO allies of the United tions and the establishment of FRG-GDR technical commissions. States, West Germany was not involved in either the ori- Somehow the proposals leaked to the German press, leading gins or the resolution of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.1 Secretary of State Dean Rusk to protest the serious breach of confi- EBut, of course, nowhere in Europe was the immediate impact of dence. Hurt by the accusation, Adenauer withdrew his longstand- Khrushchev’s nuclear missile gamble felt more acutely than in ing confidante and ambassador to Washington, Wilhelm Grewe. Berlin. Ever since the Soviet premier’s November 1958 ultima- Relations went from cool to icy when the chancellor publicly dis- tum, designed to dislodge Western allied forces from the western tanced himself from Washington’s negotiation package at a press sectors of the former German Reich’s capital, Berlin had been the conference in May. By time the missile crisis erupted in October, focus of heightened East-West tensions. Following the building Adenauer’s trust in the United States had been severely shaken.4 of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 and the October stand-off The missile crisis spurred a momentary warming in the between Soviet and American tanks at the Checkpoint Charlie uneasy Adenauer-Kennedy relationship. Unlike other European crossing, a deceptive lull had settled over the city.2 allies, Adenauer backed Kennedy’s staunch attitude during the cri- Yet the Berlin question (centering around Western rights sis wholeheartedly, a fact that did not go unnoticed in Washington.
    [Show full text]
  • Thirteen Days Is the Story of Mankind's Closest Brush with Nuclear Armageddon
    Helpful Background: Thirteen Days is the story of mankind's closest brush with nuclear Armageddon. Many events are portrayed exactly as they occurred. The movie captures the tension that the crisis provoked and provides an example of how foreign policy was made in the last half of the 20th century. Supplemented with the information provided in this Learning Guide, the film shows how wise leadership during the crisis saved the world from nuclear war, while mistakes and errors in judgment led to the crisis. The film is an excellent platform for debates about the Cuban Missile Crisis, nuclear weapons policy during the Cold War, and current foreign policy issues. With the corrections outlined in this Learning Guide, the movie can serve as a motivator and supplement for a unit on the Cold War. WERE WE REALLY THAT CLOSE TO NUCLEAR WAR? Yes. We were very, very, close. As terrified as the world was in October 1962, not even the policy-makers had realized how close to disaster the situation really was. Kennedy thought that the likelihood of nuclear war was 1 in 3, but the administration did not know many things. For example, it believed that the missiles were not operational and that only 2-3,000 Soviet personnel were in place. Accordingly, the air strike was planned for the 30th, before any nuclear warheads could be installed. In 1991-92, Soviet officials revealed that 42 [missiles] had been in place and fully operational. These could obliterate US cities up to the Canadian border. These sites were guarded by 40,000 Soviet combat troops.
    [Show full text]
  • The Final Frontier: Cuban Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis
    SECTION 2: Latin America The Final Frontier: Cuban Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis or most researchers probing the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Nikita Khrushchev) emissary Anastas Mikoyan near the end Cuban archives have been the final frontier—known to of his three-week November 1962 stay in Cuba; a summary exist, undoubtedly critical, yet largely and tantalizingly of Mikoyan’s subsequent conversation in Washington with US Fout of reach. For a little more than two decades, even as impor- President John F. Kennedy, conveyed to the Cubans at the UN tant archives remained shut (except to a few favored scholars), in New York by Moscow’s ambassador to the United States, Havana has occasionally and selectively released closed materials Anatoly F. Dobrynin; an internal report by communist party on the crisis, often in the context of international conferences. leader Blas Roca Calderio on his travels in Europe at the time This process began with Cuban participation in a series of “criti- of the crisis; and—perhaps most valuably for those seeking to cal oral history” conferences in 1989-92 with U.S. and Soviet understand Soviet-Cuban interactions after the crisis—a record (and then Russian) veterans of the events, which climaxed in a of the conversation in Moscow in December 1962 between January 1992 gathering in Havana at which Fidel Castro not Nikita Khrushchev and a visiting Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, only participated actively during all four days of discussions but evidently the first face-to-face meeting between the Soviet leader several times, with a figurative snap of the fingers, “declassified” and a senior Cuban communist figure since the Soviet leader’s important Cuban records.1 decision to withdraw the missiles, a step taken without advance Ten years later, in October 2002, to mark the 40th anniver- notice to or consultation with Havana that aroused consterna- sary of the crisis, Fidel Castro and the Cuban government again tion among the Cuban leadership and populace.
    [Show full text]
  • The Missiles of November, December, January, February . . . the Problem of Acceptable Risk in the Cuban Missile Crisis Settlement
    CoTheleman Problem of Acceptable Risk in the Cuban Missile Crisis Settlement The Missiles of November, December, January, February . The Problem of Acceptable Risk in the Cuban Missile Crisis Settlement ✣ David G. Coleman On 17 November 1962 the director of the U.S. Central Intelli- gence Agency (CIA), John McCone, met in a secure room at Dulles Airport with President John F. Kennedy and former president Dwight D. Eisenhower and warned them that the United States still had a “missiles in Cuba” prob- lem. McCone’s statement came less than three weeks after the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had backed down in the Cu- ban missile crisis and agreed to remove newly installed Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) from Cuba and ship them back to the USSR—a settlement laid out in an exchange of letters between Kennedy and the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. But McCone told Kennedy and Eisenhower that at least four kinds of Soviet short-range missiles remained in Cuba, including hundreds of surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, and air-to-surface missiles.1 A number of these were so-called dual-use missiles, capable of delivering both conventional and nuclear warheads. Although they posed no direct threat to the continental United States and could not reach any American cities, they were able to strike the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo and U.S. ships close to the coast of Cuba. Moreover, if Kennedy at some point ordered an invasion of the island—an option that was still on the table—U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • The Press Office: a Presidential News Conference Simulation
    The Press Office: A Presidential News Conference Simulation Topic: President Kennedy’s Press Conferences Grade Level: 9-12 Subject Area: US History after World War II Time Required: 1-2 hours Goals/Rationale President Kennedy was the first US president to hold live televised press conferences. During his years in office he held, on average, one every sixteen days. In this lesson, students act as members of President Kennedy’s Press Office with an assignment to prepare a briefing for the president on topics that may come up in a specific press conference. To fulfill this assignment, students explore the Kennedy Library website, using both primary and secondary sources. As a culminating activity, students participate in a simulated press conference either virtually or in class. Essential Question: How might a president address the public about important issues? Objectives Students will: • discuss major events that occurred during President Kennedy’s administration. • discuss the role of the presidential press secretary and press conferences. • conduct web-based research. • analyze primary source documents and web-based materials. • create press briefing materials for selected press conference dates. • write appropriate and accurate press conference questions and answers. • present orally their questions and answers for the press conference. Connections to Curriculum (Standards): National History Standards US History: Postwar United States (1945 to early 1970s), Era 9: 2A, 2B, 2C, 3B, 4A. World History: The 20th Century Since 1945: Promises and Paradoxes, Era 9: 1B. Massachusetts History and Social Science Framework USII.T3 (12); USII.T4 (4)(5)(6); USII.T5 (1); WHII.T5 (3); SCLA (1)(4) Prior Knowledge and Skills Students should have a working knowledge of US history prior to 1961.
    [Show full text]