DOCSLIB.ORG

Konrad Adenauer and the Cuban Missile Crisis: West German Documents

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Konrad Adenauer and the Cuban Missile Crisis: West German Documents SECTION 5: Non-Communist Europe and Israel Konrad Adenauer and the Cuban Missile Crisis: West German Documents access agency, the exchange of mutual non-aggression declara- d. Note: Much like the other NATO allies of the United tions and the establishment of FRG-GDR technical commissions. States, West Germany was not involved in either the ori- Somehow the proposals leaked to the German press, leading gins or the resolution of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.1 Secretary of State Dean Rusk to protest the serious breach of confi- EBut, of course, nowhere in Europe was the immediate impact of dence. Hurt by the accusation, Adenauer withdrew his longstand- Khrushchev’s nuclear missile gamble felt more acutely than in ing confidante and ambassador to Washington, Wilhelm Grewe. Berlin. Ever since the Soviet premier’s November 1958 ultima- Relations went from cool to icy when the chancellor publicly dis- tum, designed to dislodge Western allied forces from the western tanced himself from Washington’s negotiation package at a press sectors of the former German Reich’s capital, Berlin had been the conference in May. By time the missile crisis erupted in October, focus of heightened East-West tensions. Following the building Adenauer’s trust in the United States had been severely shaken.4 of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 and the October stand-off The missile crisis spurred a momentary warming in the between Soviet and American tanks at the Checkpoint Charlie uneasy Adenauer-Kennedy relationship. Unlike other European crossing, a deceptive lull had settled over the city.2 allies, Adenauer backed Kennedy’s staunch attitude during the cri- Yet the Berlin question (centering around Western rights sis wholeheartedly, a fact that did not go unnoticed in Washington. and presence in the divided city as well as Western recognition of If anything he advocated an even harder line vis-à-vis Castro— the GDR regime and the Soviet threat of a separate peace treaty repeatedly advocating aerial attacks, invasion, and the fostering of with East Germany) remained unresolved and the survival of the unrest inside Cuba. Having looked the other way for years as amity city’s western sectors hung in the balance. It was here where future blossomed between the East German communists and Castro, aggressive moves on the part of the Soviet Union were expected, Bonn demonstrated its hardline attitude towards Castro when possibly later in the year. Not surprisingly, upon discovering the Cuba formally recognized the GDR in January 1963. Applying Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, the Kennedy administration the so-called Hallstein non-recognition doctrine, Bonn broke off all immediately suspected that the deployment aimed at providing relations with the Castro regime, even rejecting Havana’s appeals Moscow with new levers of pressure on Berlin, even that the to retain some limited trade or consular mission in Hamburg.5 Cuban action might be a precursor to another move to evict But worries about the United States soon resurfaced in Western forces from the divided city. Adenauer’s thinking. Press reports had suggested that Adenauer The Cuban Missile Crisis occurred in the aftermath of doubted the American assertions that all the missiles had in fact the deepest crisis in relations between the United States and the been removed, and in January 1963 the chancellor confided in Federal Republic in the Adenauer years: The aging chancellor (the French President Charles de Gaulle his incredulity at the fact FRG’s only leader since its inception in 1949) was having difficul- that the Russians had managed to move the missiles to Cuba ties connecting with the young American president. He abhorred without being discovered. “The Americans had neither realized the idea of starting a nuclear war over Berlin and had been the danger in time nor managed to implement on-the-ground skeptical about hardline American contingency plans to respond inspections.” The once reliable protective power could no longer to a Soviet blockade of access routes between West Berlin and West be fully trusted.—C.O. Germany or an outright take-over of the city. At the same time, he grew critical of the Kennedy administration’s search for a Berlin solution as part of a larger effort at détente. Negotiations led by the US ambassador to Moscow, Llewellyn E. Thompson, for an inter- national access agency for Berlin that could settle the thorny Allied access problem conjured up old fears of a US-Soviet deal over Cable from Federal Republic of Germany German heads. An international agency that included German Embassy, Washington (Knappstein), 22 Democratic Republic representatives would only further legitimize October 1962 the regime of East Berlin’s Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) Ambassador [Karl-Heinrich] Knappstein, Washington, to the and threaten West Berlin’s longer-term viability as a free city.3 Foreign Office In April 1962, Washington had informed Bonn on short notice that it planned to propose to Moscow the creation of an 114-8546/62 secret 622 Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 17/18 Telex Nr. 3152 Nitze almost categorically rejected another question from Citissime the German side whether the new situation might limit free- dom of action with regard to implementing Western plans for Sent: 22 October 1962, 24:00 hours countermeasures in case of a conflict over Berlin. He stated Received: 23 October 1962, 08:20 hours that the finalization of these plans, decisiveness, and unity are more important than ever. The current situation is characterized by the Cuba block- ade imposed by the American government. For now, I want to III. According to first impressions, the American decision provide the following assessment of the situation: must be viewed in this context: I. According to American opinion, a first exchange of analyses 1) In the National Security Council, the news about conducted in the military sub-committee (chaired by [Paul Soviet shipments of offensive weapons (reaching the H.] Nitze) about Soviet intentions in deploying offensive North American continent) led a week ago to the military’s strategic arms on Cuba brought about these results: demand to act. Especially the facilities in Cape Canaveral are considered potentially vulnerable. 1) Expanding Cuba to a base with offensive potential is a “quantum leap” in crisis development of East-West rela- 2) In light of its nuclear superiority to last for some tions. This way the United States is supposed to be forced more years (reliably confirmed by U 2 [reconnaissance into either accepting the deployment of these weapons planes] and satellites, of which the Soviets are said to be next to the coast of the American continent, or into giving aware), the [American] government believes to [be able in to Soviet demands concerning disarmament and Berlin. or willing to] run an increased risk. Yet the window for The dangerousness of this “big gamble” and “extreme freedom of action is said to be not unlimited. move” is taken extremely seriously. 3) An aggravation of the Berlin crisis in late November 2) Far-reaching Soviet intentions aim at: this year would also have provided Kennedy with the - implementing Soviet disarmament demands desired opportunity to act against the build-up of Cuba as concerning American bases overseas; a base for Soviet offensive weapons. - the withdrawal of American forces from Europe; the retreat of Western troops from Berlin. Khrushchev’s talk with [US Ambassador Foy D.] Kohler [in Moscow on 16 October 1962] and Gromyko’s 3) Short-term intentions according to Nitze: talks in Washington [with President John F. Kennedy and - pressure on “Western” alliances, especially on NATO; Secretary of State Dean Rusk on 18 October], however, - dividing the Western world (“fissures”). have raised doubts whether the Soviets are actually eager to stage a Berlin crisis at the end of the year (new indications Lord [Viscount Samuel] Hood [Minister, British Embassy for expanding the time factor, emphasis on ongoing readi- in Washington] thought the Soviets want to test American ness to talk). This renders moot the prospect that Soviet resolve. In case the first offensive expansion of the Cuban base action on a separate [peace] treaty [with the GDR], or on is accepted, Moscow will step up further. If America reacts Berlin, might soon provide a “pretext” to act against Cuba. [firmly], Moscow will retreat. In any case, the Soviets want to figure out how far they can go. They will possibly try to trade 4) Since on one hand the government no longer wants in the giving up of the Cuban base for “something different.” to passively watch the offensive threat, and on the other hand Soviet policy on Berlin does not seem to provoke an II. In the same meeting [of the Nitze group] there existed immediate aggravation of the Berlin crisis, the question agreement that a Soviet reaction could also affect Berlin. about the timing of the Cuba action poses itself in a dif- None of the participants present indulged into speculations ferent way. which Soviet measures might be considered likely with regard a) In addition, the current timing is certainly influ- to Berlin. enced by the upcoming elections where signifi- Nitze negated the question whether the Soviets might have cant losses for the Democrats are predicted. The intentions to push the Berlin problem to the backburner. Republican party leadership recently decided to turn the Cuba question into the main election issue. I 623 have no doubts, however, that domestic consider- Mr. Acheson admitted it was a big mistake not to conduct ation merely influenced decisions on timing. The the Bay of Pigs landing operation with all the consequences it actual political reasons are the Cuban threat and would have needed. Back then a revolution could have been Soviet policy on Berlin.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • 30Years 1953-1983
    30Years 1953-1983 Group of the European People's Party (Christian -Demoeratie Group) 30Years 1953-1983 Group of the European People's Party (Christian -Demoeratie Group) Foreword . 3 Constitution declaration of the Christian-Democratic Group (1953 and 1958) . 4 The beginnings ............ ·~:.................................................. 9 From the Common Assembly to the European Parliament ........................... 12 The Community takes shape; consolidation within, recognition without . 15 A new impetus: consolidation, expansion, political cooperation ........................................................... 19 On the road to European Union .................................................. 23 On the threshold of direct elections and of a second enlargement .................................................... 26 The elected Parliament - Symbol of the sovereignty of the European people .......... 31 List of members of the Christian-Democratic Group ................................ 49 2 Foreword On 23 June 1953 the Christian-Democratic Political Group officially came into being within the then Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community. The Christian Democrats in the original six Community countries thus expressed their conscious and firm resolve to rise above a blinkered vision of egoistically determined national interests and forge a common, supranational consciousness in the service of all our peoples. From that moment our Group, whose tMrtieth anniversary we are now celebrating together with thirty years of political
    [Show full text]
  • Bibliography
    Bibliography I. Primary Sources A. Manuscript Collections and Government Archives Foreign Affairs Oral History Program (FAOHP), Georgetown University Washington, D.C. (copies also deposited at George C. Marshall Library) Everett Bellows (February 1989) David S. Brown (March 1989) Vincent V. Checchi (July 1990) Lincoln Gordon (January 1988) John J. Grady (August 1989) William Parks (November 1988) Melbourne Spector (December 1988) Joseph Toner (October 1989) Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. W. Averell Harriman Papers George C. Marshall Library, Lexington, Virginia Dowsley Clark Collection European Recovery Plan Commemoratives Collection William C. Foster Papers George C. Marshall Papers Marshall Plan Photograph Collection Forrest Pogue Interviews (Paul Hoffman and John McCloy) Harry B. Price Interviews (conducted 1952–54) ECA and OEEC Leland Barrows Richard M. Bissell Samuel Board Harlan Cleveland H. Van B. Cleveland John O. Coppock Glenn Craig D. A. Fitzgerald William C. Foster Theodore Geiger Lincoln Gordon W. Averell Harriman Carroll Hinman Paul Hoffman E. N. Holmgren John Lindeman Shaw Livermore Robert Marjolin Orbun V. Powell MacDonald Salter Melbourne Spector Harold Stein Donald C. Stone Allan Swim Samuel Van Hyning Greece (Americans) Michael H. B. Adler Leland Barrows Dowsley Clark John O. Coppock Helene Granby Joseph F. Heath Robert Hirschberg Paul A. Jenkins Brice M. Mace Lawrence B. Myers Walter E. Packard Paul R. Porter 163 Bibliography Greece (Americans—continued) Alan D. Strachan Edward A. Tenenbaum John O. Walker Greece (Greeks) Costa Hadjiagyras Constantin D. Tsatsos Italy (Americans) Vincent M. Barnett William E. Corfitzen Henry J. Costanzo Bartlett Harvey Thomas A. Lane Dominic J. Marcello Walter C. McAdoo Guido Nadzo Chauncey Parker Donald Simmons James Toughill Italy (Italians) Giovanni Malagodi Donato Menichella Ernesto Rossi Turkey (Americans) Clifton H.
    [Show full text]
  • John F. Kennedy and Berlin Nicholas Labinski Marquette University
    Marquette University e-Publications@Marquette Master's Theses (2009 -) Dissertations, Theses, and Professional Projects Evolution of a President: John F. Kennedy and Berlin Nicholas Labinski Marquette University Recommended Citation Labinski, Nicholas, "Evolution of a President: John F. Kennedy and Berlin" (2011). Master's Theses (2009 -). Paper 104. http://epublications.marquette.edu/theses_open/104 EVOLUTION OF A PRESIDENT: JOHN F. KENNEDYAND BERLIN by Nicholas Labinski A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School, Marquette University, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts Milwaukee, Wisconsin August 2011 ABSTRACT EVOLUTION OF A PRESIDENT: JOHN F. KENNEDYAND BERLIN Nicholas Labinski Marquette University, 2011 This paper examines John F. Kennedy’s rhetoric concerning the Berlin Crisis (1961-1963). Three major speeches are analyzed: Kennedy’s Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis , the Address at Rudolph Wilde Platz and the Address at the Free University. The study interrogates the rhetorical strategies implemented by Kennedy in confronting Khrushchev over the explosive situation in Berlin. The paper attempts to answer the following research questions: What is the historical context that helped frame the rhetorical situation Kennedy faced? What rhetorical strategies and tactics did Kennedy employ in these speeches? How might Kennedy's speeches extend our understanding of presidential public address? What is the impact of Kennedy's speeches on U.S. German relations and the development of U.S. and German Policy? What implications might these speeches have for the study and execution of presidential power and international diplomacy? Using a historical-rhetorical methodology that incorporates the historical circumstances surrounding the crisis into the analysis, this examination of Kennedy’s rhetoric reveals his evolution concerning Berlin and his Cold War strategy.
    [Show full text]
  • De BVD Op Een Bascule Het Openbaarheidsdebat Omtrent De BVD 1950-1990
    De BVD op een bascule Het openbaarheidsdebat omtrent de BVD 1950-1990 Tom Augustin S4126742 Geschiedenis Masterscriptie Politiek en Parlement Radboud Universiteit te Nijmegen Begeleider: Wim de Jong Inhoudsopgave Inleiding 3 Een start in rustig vaarwater 12 Is de Commissie voor de Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdiensten het antwoord? 13 BVD blijft veelal onder de radar 16 Conclusie 18 De storm zet aan: omsingelt door critici 20 Wie luistert mee? 21 Reden van afwijzing onbekend: het antecedentenonderzoek 24 Conclusie 29 Een nieuwe taak voor de BVD: terroristische rukt op 31 Ruis op de lijn tussen BVD en CRI 32 Rudie van Meurs niet beeld 37 Conclusie 39 Openbaringsdebat breek werkelijk los 41 Het vuurt laait op rondom de vredesbeweging 41 Op dezelfde voet verder na nieuwe wetgeving 47 Conclusie hoofdstuk 4 51 Conclusie 52 Bibliografie 56 Primaire bronnen 56 Secundaire bronnen 59 2 Inleiding “Ik ben in de meest duistere krochten van de overheid geweest, en voor licht zijn ze het bangst.”1 Edward Snowden stelt middels dit citaat dat een overheid niet volledig transparant is en dat overheden dit ook niet willen. Volgens Snowden zal dit wel het geval moeten zijn omdat controle uitoefenen op diezelfde overheid anders niet mogelijk is. Ook vanuit academische kant zijn geluiden als deze te horen. Politicoloog Ian Shapiro beschrijft in zijn boek The moral foundations of politics dat transparantie nodig is voor een democratie, omdat het ervoor zorgt dat politici goed werk verrichten. Voornamelijk omdat politici dan beter in de gaten worden gehouden.2 Democratie en transparantie worden aan elkaar gekoppeld alsof het een niet zonder het ander kan.
    [Show full text]
  • Hitler's American Model
    Hitler’s American Model The United States and the Making of Nazi Race Law James Q. Whitman Princeton University Press Princeton and Oxford 1 Introduction This jurisprudence would suit us perfectly, with a single exception. Over there they have in mind, practically speaking, only coloreds and half-coloreds, which includes mestizos and mulattoes; but the Jews, who are also of interest to us, are not reckoned among the coloreds. —Roland Freisler, June 5, 1934 On June 5, 1934, about a year and a half after Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of the Reich, the leading lawyers of Nazi Germany gathered at a meeting to plan what would become the Nuremberg Laws, the notorious anti-Jewish legislation of the Nazi race regime. The meeting was chaired by Franz Gürtner, the Reich Minister of Justice, and attended by officials who in the coming years would play central roles in the persecution of Germany’s Jews. Among those present was Bernhard Lösener, one of the principal draftsmen of the Nuremberg Laws; and the terrifying Roland Freisler, later President of the Nazi People’s Court and a man whose name has endured as a byword for twentieth-century judicial savagery. The meeting was an important one, and a stenographer was present to record a verbatim transcript, to be preserved by the ever-diligent Nazi bureaucracy as a record of a crucial moment in the creation of the new race regime. That transcript reveals the startling fact that is my point of departure in this study: the meeting involved detailed and lengthy discussions of the law of the United States.
    [Show full text]
  • YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS, 1953- 1957: Normalization, Comradeship, Confrontation
    YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS, 1953- 1957: Normalization, Comradeship, Confrontation Svetozar Rajak Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy London School of Economics and Political Science University of London February 2004 UMI Number: U615474 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U615474 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 ” OF POUTICAL «, AN0 pi Th ^ s^ s £ £2^>3 ^7&2io 2 ABSTRACT The thesis chronologically presents the slow improvement of relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, starting with Stalin’s death on 5 March 1953, through their full normalization in 1955 and 1956, to the renewed ideological confrontation at the end of 1956. The normalization of Yugoslav-Soviet relations brought to an end a conflict between Yugoslavia and the Eastern Bloc, in existence since 1948, which threatened the status quo in Europe. The thesis represents the first effort at comprehensively presenting the reconciliation between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, between 1953 and 1957. It will also explain the motives that guided the leaderships of the two countries, in particular the two main protagonists, Josip Broz Tito and Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, throughout this process.
    [Show full text]
  • Compromesso Storico 1 Compromesso Storico
    Compromesso storico 1 Compromesso storico Compromesso storico è il nome con cui si indica in Italia la tendenza al riavvicinamento tra Democrazia Cristiana e Partito Comunista Italiano osservata negli anni Settanta. Questo possibile sviluppo politico fu chiamato anche con il nome di terza fase in ambito moroteo, mentre i comunisti preferivano la definizione alternativa democratica. Questa politica in ogni caso non portò mai il Partito Comunista a partecipare al governo in una grande coalizione ai sensi del cosiddetto consociativismo. Motivazioni La proposta dal neo-segretario del Partito Comunista Italiano Enrico Berlinguer alla Democrazia Cristiana per una proficua collaborazione di governo (aperta anche alle altre forze democratiche) doveva interrompere così la cosiddetta conventio ad excludendum del secondo partito italiano dal governo. In tal modo, si voleva anche mettere al riparo la democrazia italiana da pericoli di involuzione autoritaria e dalla strategia della tensione che insanguinava il paese dal 1969. Berlinguer si vedeva peraltro sempre più deciso a sottolineare l'indipendenza dei comunisti italiani dall'Unione Sovietica e di rendere quindi il suo partito una forza della società occidentale. Il compromesso venne lanciato da Berlinguer con quattro articoli su Rinascita a commento del golpe cileno che aveva portato le forze reazionarie in collaborazione con gli USA a rovesciare il governo del socialista Salvador Allende (11 settembre 1973). Sviluppi del compromesso storico La scelta di Berlinguer, fondamentalmente legata alla politica di eurocomunismo, era un esempio di politica reale che non riscontrò i favori dell'area di sinistra del suo partito.[1] Il compromesso trovò una sponda nell'area di sinistra della DC che aveva come riferimento il presidente del partito Aldo Moro e il segretario Benigno Zaccagnini, ma non ebbe mai l'avallo degli USA, né dell'ala destra della DC, rappresentata da Giulio Andreotti.
    [Show full text]
  • Crisisbeheersing in Regionale Context
    Clingendael Magazine voor Internationale Betrekkingen Crisisbeheersing in regionale context December EU, NAVO, GOS, Afrikaanse Unie, ASEAN, ad hoc-operaties Te koop: het Olympisch ideaal! 2013 Al-Qaida en gijzelingen in de Sahel Internationale erkenning LHBT-rechten moeizaam proces www.internationalespectator.nl Inhoud Redactioneel De rol van regionale actoren in brandhaarden 1 Artikelen Europese Raad en daad? | Margriet Drent & Dick Zandee 2 Al-Qaida en gijzelingen in de Sahel: een effectieve strategie? | Sergei Boeke 5 Tot de dood(straf) ons scheidt: LHBT-rechten en Internationale Betrekkingen | Cees van Beek 10 Column Sotsji: Olympisch ideaal te koop | Bob van den Bos 15 Artikelen De rol van regionale organisaties in crisisbeheersingsoperaties en stabilisatiemissies De evolutie van VN-vredesoperaties en de rol van regionale organisaties | Gustaaf Geeraerts 18 Europese vredesoperaties: waar is de strategie? | Sven Biscop & Luk Van Langenhove 23 EU-geleide crisismanagement-operaties: minder, kleinschaliger en pragmatischer | Tim Haesebrouck & Melanie Van Meirvenne 28 De grenslegioenen van de fantoom-USSR: vredesoperaties onder het GOS | Bruno De Cordier & Joris Wagemakers 33 Is de Afrikaanse Unie klaar voor crisisbeheersing op eigen continent | Joost van Puijenbroek 39 De track record van ad hoc-coalities: Koeweit, Oost-Timor en Irak | Kees Homan 45 ASEAN, de onderschatte soft power en het belang van post-moderne diplomatie | Jan Willem Blankert 50 Opinie Oorzaak ineffectiviteit VN in weeffouten systeem | Bibi van Ginkel 55 Artikelen Slachtoffer van een VN-vredesoperatie | Sanne Maas 57 Between a rock and a hard place; geopolitieke dilemma’s rond de tweede democratische verkiezingen in Bhutan | Jeannette Mak 62 Respons EU-zelfreflectie kan tot vrede leiden | Jan Wijenberg 66 Boekbesprekingen Herman van Roijen, 1905-1991.
    [Show full text]
  • The Dynamics of Soviet–East German Relations in the Early Cold War
    © Copyright, Princeton University Press. No part of this book may be distributed, posted, or reproduced in any form by digital or mechanical means without prior written permission of the publisher. INTRODUCTION The Dynamics of Soviet–East German Relations in the Early Cold War The two states that emerged from the defeated Germany were central to the development of the cold war. Rapidly evolving from defeated objects of Four Power policy, the two Germanys became important actors in their own right on the front line of the cold war. Both super- powers initially treated their part of Germany as war booty to be plun- dered and kept weak, but as the cold war developed, they would each come to see their part of Germany as an essential ally whose needs were intertwined with their own. For political, military, economic, and ideo- logical reasons, the superpowers engaged in a competition for allies to show that their side of the cold war was the stronger, more popular, more vibrant one. They also wanted to ensure that their German ally would not unite with the other against them. Beginning in the 1950s, the superpowers invested themselves, and their reputations, increasingly in their German allies, who were adept at taking advantage of this situation. While there have been a variety of in-depth studies of the U.S.–West German alliance,1 there has been much less investigation of the Soviet– East German alliance.2 This book will take advantage of the opening of former communist archives to examine the Soviet–East German side of the cold war from Josef Stalin’s death in 1953 through the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961.
    [Show full text]
  • The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (Part 1)
    TheHershberg United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (Part 1) ✣ What options did John F. Kennedy consider after his aides in- formed him on 16 October 1962 that the Soviet Union was secretly deploy- ing medium-range nuclear-capable missiles in Cuba? In most accounts, his options fell into three categories: 1. military: an attack against Cuba involving a large-scale air strike against the missile sites, a full-scale invasion, or the ªrst followed by the second; 2. political-military: a naval blockade of Cuba (euphemistically called a “quarantine”) to prevent the shipment of further “offensive” military equipment and allow time to pressure Soviet leader Nikita Khrush- chev into withdrawing the missiles; or 3. diplomatic: a private overture to Moscow to persuade Khrushchev to back down without a public confrontation. Kennedy ultimately chose the second option and announced it on 22 Octo- ber in his nationally televised address. That option and the ªrst (direct mili- tary action against Cuba) have been exhaustively analyzed over the years by Western scholars. Much less attention has been devoted to the third alterna- tive, the diplomatic route. This article shows, however, that a variant of that option—a variant that has never previously received any serious scholarly treatment—was actually adopted by Kennedy at the peak of the crisis. The United States pursued a separate diplomatic track leading not to Moscow but to Havana (via Rio de Janeiro), and not to Khrushchev but to Fidel Castro, in a secret effort to convince the Cuban leader to make a deal: If Castro agreed to end his alliance with Moscow, demand the removal of the Soviet missiles, and disavow any further support for revolutionary subversion in the Western hemisphere, he could expect “many changes” in Washington’s policy toward Journal of Cold War Studies Vol.
    [Show full text]
  • Cuban Missile Crisis: Applying Strategic Culture to Gametheory
    Utah State University DigitalCommons@USU All Graduate Plan B and other Reports Graduate Studies 5-2013 Cuban Missile Crisis: Applying Strategic Culture to Gametheory Chelsea E. Carattini Utah State University Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/gradreports Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Carattini, Chelsea E., "Cuban Missile Crisis: Applying Strategic Culture to Gametheory" (2013). All Graduate Plan B and other Reports. 236. https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/gradreports/236 This Report is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies at DigitalCommons@USU. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Graduate Plan B and other Reports by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@USU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Introduction Game theory applied to political situations offers a unique approach to analyzing and understanding international relations. Yet the rigid structure that lends itself so well to mathematics is not practical in the real world . It lacks a built in mechanism for determining a player's preferences, which is a key part of an international "game" or situation. Strategic culture, another international relations theory, is quite the opposite. Critics claim it suffers from a lack of structure, but it captures the spirit of international actors and what makes them tick. This paper explores the idea of pairing the two otherwise unrelated theories to bolster both in the areas where they are lacking in order to provide a more complete understanding of international states' behavior and motivations. Brief Summary of Major Theories The theories presented in the following pages are drawn from distinct schools of thought; consequently it is necessary to provide some background information.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Justiz Und Nationalsozialismus Richter Am Oberlandesgericht Dirk
    Justiz und Nationalsozialismus Richter am Oberlandesgericht Dirk Frenking Auf dem rechten Auge blind? Fragt man nach den Gründen dafür, dass sich die deutsche Justiz ohne nennenswerten Widerstand dem NS-Regime unterworfen und an der Pervertierung der Rechtsordnung durch den Nationalsozialismus mitgewirkt hat, darf man nicht erst bei der „Machtergreif- ung“ ansetzen. Die Wurzeln der Willfährigkeit weiter Teile der deutschen Justiz liegen we- sentlich tiefer und sind schon im Kaiserreich mit seinem ausgeprägten Nationalismus und einem in allen gesellschaftlichen Schichten weit verbreiteten Antisemitismus zu finden. Nach dem durch die Abdankung des Kaisers gekennzeichneten Ende der Monarchie wurde Deutschland mit der Weimarer Republik zwar zur Demokratie, den Wechsel der Staatsform machten indessen große Teile der Beamtenschaft und insbesondere auch der Richterschaft nicht mit. Viele von ihnen waren noch in der Kaiserzeit in den richterlichen Dienst eingetreten und dachten national-konservativ. Den neuen Staat, an dessen Spitze als Reichspräsident ein Sozialdemokrat stand, lehnten viele von ihnen ab. Aber auch die jüngeren Juristen, die den Ersten Weltkrieg und die Not der Nachkriegszeit erlebt hatten, sahen die bestehende Gesellschaftsordnung durch die Republik als gefährdet an. Für sie ging die Gefahr in erster Linie von den Kommunisten aus und sie glaubten wie viele in den national-konservativen Kreisen nur zu gern an die „Dolchstoßlegende“, nach der der „jüdische Bolschewismus“ für den Untergang der Monarchie verantwortlich war. Die Justiz verfolgte vor allem linke Intellektuelle und Publizisten, wie zum Beispiel den späteren Friedensnobelpreisträger Carl von Ossietzky. Von Ossietzky hatte in der von ihm herausgegebenen Zeitschrift „Die Weltbühne“ unter dem Titel „Windiges aus der deut- schen Luftfahrt“ über eine geheime Aufrüstung der Reichswehr berichtet, die nach dem Versailler Vertrag verboten war.
    [Show full text]