SECTION 5: Non-Communist Europe and Israel Konrad Adenauer and the Cuban Missile Crisis: West German Documents access agency, the exchange of mutual non-aggression declara- d. Note: Much like the other NATO allies of the United tions and the establishment of FRG-GDR technical commissions. States, West Germany was not involved in either the ori- Somehow the proposals leaked to the German press, leading gins or the resolution of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.1 Secretary of State Dean Rusk to protest the serious breach of confi- EBut, of course, nowhere in Europe was the immediate impact of dence. Hurt by the accusation, Adenauer withdrew his longstand- Khrushchev’s nuclear missile gamble felt more acutely than in ing confidante and ambassador to Washington, Wilhelm Grewe. Berlin. Ever since the Soviet premier’s November 1958 ultima- Relations went from cool to icy when the chancellor publicly dis- tum, designed to dislodge Western allied forces from the western tanced himself from Washington’s negotiation package at a press sectors of the former German Reich’s capital, Berlin had been the conference in May. By time the missile crisis erupted in October, focus of heightened East-West tensions. Following the building Adenauer’s trust in the United States had been severely shaken.4 of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 and the October stand-off The missile crisis spurred a momentary warming in the between Soviet and American tanks at the Checkpoint Charlie uneasy Adenauer-Kennedy relationship. Unlike other European crossing, a deceptive lull had settled over the city.2 allies, Adenauer backed Kennedy’s staunch attitude during the cri- Yet the Berlin question (centering around Western rights sis wholeheartedly, a fact that did not go unnoticed in Washington. and presence in the divided city as well as Western recognition of If anything he advocated an even harder line vis-à-vis Castro— the GDR regime and the Soviet threat of a separate peace treaty repeatedly advocating aerial attacks, invasion, and the fostering of with East Germany) remained unresolved and the survival of the unrest inside Cuba. Having looked the other way for years as amity city’s western sectors hung in the balance. It was here where future blossomed between the East German communists and Castro, aggressive moves on the part of the Soviet Union were expected, Bonn demonstrated its hardline attitude towards Castro when possibly later in the year. Not surprisingly, upon discovering the Cuba formally recognized the GDR in January 1963. Applying Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, the Kennedy administration the so-called Hallstein non-recognition doctrine, Bonn broke off all immediately suspected that the deployment aimed at providing relations with the Castro regime, even rejecting Havana’s appeals Moscow with new levers of pressure on Berlin, even that the to retain some limited trade or consular mission in Hamburg.5 Cuban action might be a precursor to another move to evict But worries about the United States soon resurfaced in Western forces from the divided city. Adenauer’s thinking. Press reports had suggested that Adenauer The Cuban Missile Crisis occurred in the aftermath of doubted the American assertions that all the missiles had in fact the deepest crisis in relations between the United States and the been removed, and in January 1963 the chancellor confided in Federal Republic in the Adenauer years: The aging chancellor (the French President Charles de Gaulle his incredulity at the fact FRG’s only leader since its inception in 1949) was having difficul- that the Russians had managed to move the missiles to Cuba ties connecting with the young American president. He abhorred without being discovered. “The Americans had neither realized the idea of starting a nuclear war over Berlin and had been the danger in time nor managed to implement on-the-ground skeptical about hardline American contingency plans to respond inspections.” The once reliable protective power could no longer to a Soviet blockade of access routes between West Berlin and West be fully trusted.—C.O. Germany or an outright take-over of the city. At the same time, he grew critical of the Kennedy administration’s search for a Berlin solution as part of a larger effort at détente. Negotiations led by the US ambassador to Moscow, Llewellyn E. Thompson, for an inter- national access agency for Berlin that could settle the thorny Allied access problem conjured up old fears of a US-Soviet deal over Cable from Federal Republic of Germany German heads. An international agency that included German Embassy, Washington (Knappstein), 22 Democratic Republic representatives would only further legitimize October 1962 the regime of East Berlin’s Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) Ambassador [Karl-Heinrich] Knappstein, Washington, to the and threaten West Berlin’s longer-term viability as a free city.3 Foreign Office In April 1962, Washington had informed Bonn on short notice that it planned to propose to Moscow the creation of an 114-8546/62 secret 622 Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 17/18 Telex Nr. 3152 Nitze almost categorically rejected another question from Citissime the German side whether the new situation might limit free- dom of action with regard to implementing Western plans for Sent: 22 October 1962, 24:00 hours countermeasures in case of a conflict over Berlin. He stated Received: 23 October 1962, 08:20 hours that the finalization of these plans, decisiveness, and unity are more important than ever. The current situation is characterized by the Cuba block- ade imposed by the American government. For now, I want to III. According to first impressions, the American decision provide the following assessment of the situation: must be viewed in this context: I. According to American opinion, a first exchange of analyses 1) In the National Security Council, the news about conducted in the military sub-committee (chaired by [Paul Soviet shipments of offensive weapons (reaching the H.] Nitze) about Soviet intentions in deploying offensive North American continent) led a week ago to the military’s strategic arms on Cuba brought about these results: demand to act. Especially the facilities in Cape Canaveral are considered potentially vulnerable. 1) Expanding Cuba to a base with offensive potential is a “quantum leap” in crisis development of East-West rela- 2) In light of its nuclear superiority to last for some tions. This way the United States is supposed to be forced more years (reliably confirmed by U 2 [reconnaissance into either accepting the deployment of these weapons planes] and satellites, of which the Soviets are said to be next to the coast of the American continent, or into giving aware), the [American] government believes to [be able in to Soviet demands concerning disarmament and Berlin. or willing to] run an increased risk. Yet the window for The dangerousness of this “big gamble” and “extreme freedom of action is said to be not unlimited. move” is taken extremely seriously. 3) An aggravation of the Berlin crisis in late November 2) Far-reaching Soviet intentions aim at: this year would also have provided Kennedy with the - implementing Soviet disarmament demands desired opportunity to act against the build-up of Cuba as concerning American bases overseas; a base for Soviet offensive weapons. - the withdrawal of American forces from Europe; the retreat of Western troops from Berlin. Khrushchev’s talk with [US Ambassador Foy D.] Kohler [in Moscow on 16 October 1962] and Gromyko’s 3) Short-term intentions according to Nitze: talks in Washington [with President John F. Kennedy and - pressure on “Western” alliances, especially on NATO; Secretary of State Dean Rusk on 18 October], however, - dividing the Western world (“fissures”). have raised doubts whether the Soviets are actually eager to stage a Berlin crisis at the end of the year (new indications Lord [Viscount Samuel] Hood [Minister, British Embassy for expanding the time factor, emphasis on ongoing readi- in Washington] thought the Soviets want to test American ness to talk). This renders moot the prospect that Soviet resolve. In case the first offensive expansion of the Cuban base action on a separate [peace] treaty [with the GDR], or on is accepted, Moscow will step up further. If America reacts Berlin, might soon provide a “pretext” to act against Cuba. [firmly], Moscow will retreat. In any case, the Soviets want to figure out how far they can go. They will possibly try to trade 4) Since on one hand the government no longer wants in the giving up of the Cuban base for “something different.” to passively watch the offensive threat, and on the other hand Soviet policy on Berlin does not seem to provoke an II. In the same meeting [of the Nitze group] there existed immediate aggravation of the Berlin crisis, the question agreement that a Soviet reaction could also affect Berlin. about the timing of the Cuba action poses itself in a dif- None of the participants present indulged into speculations ferent way. which Soviet measures might be considered likely with regard a) In addition, the current timing is certainly influ- to Berlin. enced by the upcoming elections where signifi- Nitze negated the question whether the Soviets might have cant losses for the Democrats are predicted. The intentions to push the Berlin problem to the backburner. Republican party leadership recently decided to turn the Cuba question into the main election issue. I 623 have no doubts, however, that domestic consider- Mr. Acheson admitted it was a big mistake not to conduct ation merely influenced decisions on timing. The the Bay of Pigs landing operation with all the consequences it actual political reasons are the Cuban threat and would have needed. Back then a revolution could have been Soviet policy on Berlin.