YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS, 1953- 1957: Normalization, Comradeship, Confrontation Svetozar Rajak Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy London School of Economics and Political Science University of London February 2004 UMI Number: U615474 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U615474 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 ” OF POUTICAL «, AN0 pi Th ^ s^ s £ £2^>3 ^7&2io 2 ABSTRACT The thesis chronologically presents the slow improvement of relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, starting with Stalin’s death on 5 March 1953, through their full normalization in 1955 and 1956, to the renewed ideological confrontation at the end of 1956. The normalization of Yugoslav-Soviet relations brought to an end a conflict between Yugoslavia and the Eastern Bloc, in existence since 1948, which threatened the status quo in Europe. The thesis represents the first effort at comprehensively presenting the reconciliation between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, between 1953 and 1957. It will also explain the motives that guided the leaderships of the two countries, in particular the two main protagonists, Josip Broz Tito and Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, throughout this process. It will also provide insight into the reasons behind the collapse of this process in the beginning of 1957. The thesis will establish that the significance of the Yugoslav-Soviet reconciliation went far beyond the bilateral relations between the two countries. It had significant ramifications on relations in the Eastern Bloc and in the global Communist movement, and on the dynamics of the Cold W ar world at its crucial juncture. The reconciliation had brought forward the process of de-Stalinization in the USSR and in Peoples’ Democracies; it had also encouraged the process of liberalization throughout Eastern Europe and had helped Khrushchev win the post-Stalin leadership contest. Finally, the reconciliation had enabled Yugoslavia to acquire equidistance from both Blocs and to successfully embark upon creating, together with India and Egypt the new entity in the bi-polar Cold War world - the Non-aligned movement. The unique contribution of this thesis is that it is based on the research of the Yugoslav and Russian archives; it brings into the Cold W ar scholarship a great number of previously unresearched documents. 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS A b s tra c t page 2 Table of Contents 3 Introduction 4 CHAPTER I: Overtures 19 1.1 Yugoslavia’s National Security Crisis 21 1.2 Stalin’s Death 32 1.3 Soviet Overtures 45 1.4 Implications of the October 1953 Trieste Crisis 59 CHAPTER II: Normalization 84 11.1 Establishment of Direct Communication 85 11.2 Continuation of Tito-Khrushchev Correspondence 108 11.3 The Impasse 139 CHAPTER III: Comradeship 153 111.1 Khrushchev’s Visit to Yugoslavia 155 111.2 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee 183 111.3 Rapprochement 210 111.4 Comradeship 224 CHAPTER IV: Confrontation 236 IV.1 Tito’s Visit to the USSR 238 IV.2 'Containment’ of Yugoslavia 256 IV.3 Deterioration of Yugoslav-Soviet Relations 281 IV.4 Confrontation 296 Conclusions 334 Bibliography 347 4 INTRODUCTION The Yugoslav-Soviet reconciliation between 1953 and 1957, which is the subject of this thesis, was the second and concluding half of the historic drama that had started in 1948. In June 1948 the World was shocked to learn of the Yugoslav-Soviet confrontation. As a bolt from the blue, a rupture appeared in what was perceived to be the impermeable, monolithic Communist Bloc. The news was received with equal disbelief on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Hitherto, Yugoslavia had been considered the most doctrinaire of the Socialist regimes and the most reliable pillar in the Stalinist edifice. On 28 June, at its extraordinary session in Bucharest, the COMINFORM issued a Resolution accusing Tito and the Yugoslav leadership of conducting policies aimed against the Soviet Union and the All Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), and of abandoning Marxism-Leninism. The Resolution openly encouraged ' healthy elements in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY)’ to replace Tito and his closest associates with a 'new, internationalist leadership '.1 The Resolution was never officially sent to Belgrade. Yugoslav leaders learned of it when it was published in the East European press on 29 June. Following ideological disqualification, Yugoslavia was immediately subjected to concrete pressure from the Peoples’ Democracies. They began unilaterally 1 The Resolution of the Information Bureau on the situation in the CPY, Bucharest, 28 June 1948, in Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Socijalisticke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije: 1945- 1950 [Documents on the Foreign Policy of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia: 1945-1950] (Beograd: Savezni sekretarijat za inostrane poslova / Institut za medjunarodnu politiku i privredu / Jugoslavenski pregled, 1984), 621-7. 5 cancelling existing agreements on trade and economic cooperation with Belgrade.2 Simultaneously, a vicious anti-Yugoslav propaganda campaign was initiated throughout Eastern Europe and in the USSR.3 In response, Tito and his associates successfully rallied the CPY membership and Yugoslav public opinion in support of their resistance to Stalin’s hegemony. The Fifth Congress of the CPY (the first since 1940) was convened in Belgrade between 21 and 28 July. I tapproved ‘ the position of the Central Committee (CC) of the CPY’. It also declared the Soviet and COMINFORM accusations to be ' untrue, incorrect, and unjust’.* The fault lines of the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict were thus defined. By the end of 1948, the Soviet Union and Peoples’ Democracies had imposed on Yugoslavia a full economic blockade. Its economy came on the verge of collapse. The threat of famine became real and would remain so for several years after 1948. The gravity of the situation can only be appreciated given the fact that Yugoslavia had emerged from the Second World War devastated; its proportional losses in human life in this conflict had been second only to that of Poland. In addition, between 1945 and 1948, following doctrinarian Stalinist concepts, the Yugoslav leadership had subordinated their country’s economy to the idivision of labour’ within the Socialist camp5, making it fully dependant on Soviet assistance.6 2 Note of the Government of FNRJ [Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia] to the Government of Peoples Republic of Albania regarding unilateral cancellation of economic contracts, agreements, and conventions, 2 July 1948, in Dokumenti of spoljnoj...(1948), 189-93. 3 Statement by the Federal Assembly of the FNRJ on the propaganda campaign by the Information Bureau, Belgrade, 30 September 1948, in Dokumenti o spoljnoj...(1948), 373-6. 4 Resolution of the Fifth Congress of the CPY on relations with the Information Bureau, in Dokumenti of spoljnoj...(1948), 266-7. 5 The Socialist ‘camp’or ‘lager1 were commonly used by the Soviet and Satellite officials to depict the Soviet Bloc and would henceforth be used in the text. 6 Speech by President J.B. Tito at the Fourth (extraordinary) session of the Federal Assembly of FNRJ on the economic development of Yugoslavia in 1948, Belgrade, 27 December 1948, in Dokumenti of spoljnoj...(1948), 488-90. For more detailed analysis of the consequences of the blockade and Yugoslavia’s consequent dire economic situation post-1948, see Chapters I and II. 6 However, the likelihood of the Soviet and Satellite military aggression posed the biggest threat to the survival of Tito’s regime. Within months of the COMINFORM Resolution, armed incidents, clashes and infiltration of armed groups became daily occurrences on Yugoslavia’s borders with the Satellite countries. Between 1948 and 1953, 7,877 border incidents took place, of which 142 were characterized as ‘substantive’ clashes. Between 1948 and 1952, threatened by the prospect of a military aggression from Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia was forced to increase its military budget ten-fold to US $655 million. At the same time, in the first two years of the economic blockade, the economy of war-torn Yugoslavia sustained losses amounting to US$429 million.7 Within a year after the COMINFORM Resolution, diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and its allies effectively lapsed. Diplomatic missions were reduced to skeleton staffs, which were subjected to absurd restrictions on their movements and to intimidating surveillance and harassment. Between 1948 and 1953, 145 Yugoslav diplomats were expelled from the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries.8 In August 1949, the Yugoslav leadership became convinced that Stalin was contemplating an attack on Yugoslavia. During the previous months, the Yugoslav authorities had arrested a group of White Russian emigres, who had settled in Yugoslavia after the October Revolution. A number of them had 7 Vladimir Dedijer, Novi Prilozi za Biografiju Josipa Broza Tita,[ The New Supplements to the Biography of Josip Broz Tito] Volume 3, (Beograd: